CASE DIGEST

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed
the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors
holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The
respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office.
Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.


ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work
involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if
the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge
and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 30783. August 27, 1929.]
JUAN B. ALEGRE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Respondent-
Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellant.
Camus & Delgado and Jose M. Casal for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PURPOSE AND INTENT OF ACT NO. 2380. The purpose and intent of Act No. 2380 is to provide for the
inspection, grading and baling of "abaca," "maguey," "sisal," and other fibers, and for an uniform scale and
grading, and the issuance of official certificates as to the kind and quality of hemp, from an examination of which
an intending purchaser would know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale.

2. SECTION 1788 OF ADMINISTRATIVE CODE IS NOT A DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Section 1788 of the Administrative Code, as amended, which provides for the general requirement as to grading
and certification of fibers, is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board to carry
out the purpose and intent of the law, and is not a delegation of legislative power.

3. DEFECTS, IF ANY, IN ADMINISTRATION NO ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY.
The contention that there may be partiality or even fraud in the administration of the Fiber Law is not an
argument against its constitutionality.

4. SECTION 8, ARTICLE 1, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY. The fact that similar
laws enacted by different states of the United States have been declared unconstitutional as in violation of section
8, of article 1, of the United States Constitution, which vests Congress with the authority "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes," does not apply to the Philippine
Islands, for the simple reason that this country is not a state of the United States, a foreign nation or a tribe of
Indians.



STATEMENT
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the production of abaca and its exportation
to foreign markets. November 8, 1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales of
abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be permitted to export the abaca in question
without a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Administrative Code for the grading,
inspection and certification of fibers and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional
and void.

For answer the defendant admits the allegations of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the amended petition and denies all
other allegations, and as a special defense, alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That on November 8, 1927, the petitioner addressed to the respondent a letter of the following
tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

"Manila

"SIR: I desire to export to England one hundred (100) bales of abaca which are not supported by any certificate
of the Fiber Standardization Board recently created by law.

"I do not desire to submit to the decision of the inspectors of said Board, and want to ship the abaca referred to
without any certificate of inspection.

"I would request you to inform me if I can obtain the permission of that office for the exportation of the
aforementioned one hundred (100) bales of abaca.

"Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)" JUAN B. ALEGRE

"2. That on the same day the respondent, through the Insular Deputy Collector of Customs, answered the above
letter of the petitioner informing him that he would not be permitted to export the said one hundred bales of abaca
unless the export entry covering the exportation is accompanied by a certificate of the Fiber Standardization
Board, or a notation is written on the face of the triplicate of the export entry signed by the fiber inspector who
made the inspection indicating that the abaca covered thereby has complied with the provisions of the law relative
to the shipment of such product. Copies of the said letter and its enclosures are attached to, and made a part of,
this answer marked as Exhibits A, B, and C.

"3. That the provisions of the law relating to the classification, grading, and inspection of fibers were designed to
remedy, and did remedy the dangerously unsatisfactory conditions of the Philippine fiber industry obtaining at the
time of their enactment.

"4. That the petitioner has secured fiber grading permits from the Fiber Standardization Board and has otherwise
enjoyed the benefits of the law providing for the grading and inspection of fibers as amended.

"Wherefore, the respondent prays that the amended petition for the writ of mandamus be denied with costs against
the petitioner."cralaw virtua1aw library

As the result of a trial on such issues judgment was rendered as prayed for in the petition, from which the
defendant appeals and assigns the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The lower court erred in not holding that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the constitutionality of
Act No. 3263 amending section 1772 et seq. of the Administrative Code.

"2. The lower court erred in holding that sections 1772 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are
unconstitutional and void.

"3. The lower court erred in ordering the respondent to permit the exportation of petitioners hemp without the
certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board."




D E C I S I O N


JOHNS, J.:


Act No. 2380 is entitled "An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca (Manila hemp),
maguey (cantala), sisal, and other fibers," and was enacted by the Philippine Legislature, February 28, 1914.

Section 1 specifically defines the meaning of the words "fiber," "abaca," "maguey," "sisal," "strand," "string,"
"tow," "waste," "grading station," and "grading establishment."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 2 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) The Director of Agriculture is hereby enjoined and directed to establish, define, and designate standards
for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey, and sisal, which shall become the official standards of classification
throughout the Philippine Islands, calling to his assistance the agencies of his Bureau, those of any other Bureau
or branch of this Government, or such other agencies as he may deem necessary.

"(b) The Director of Agriculture shall prepare in suitable form the official standard of each grade of the fibers
covered by this Act and furnish the same upon request to all authorized grading establishments, provincial
governments, chambers of commerce, planters associations, and other institutions directly interested in the trade,
the actual cost of such specimens to be paid in advance by the party requesting the same.

"(c) The designation and mark of each grade of the official standard, together with the basis upon which each
grade is determined, shall be defined and published by the Director of Agriculture in a Bureau of Agriculture
General Order not less than six months prior to the date when this Act goes into effect; the Director of Agriculture
shall furnish a sufficient number of copies of this order and of any other or others hereafter issued on this subject
to the foreign markets, municipal presidents, provincial governors, and to such other persons and corporations as
he may deem advisable, for general information and guidance.

"(d) To preserve the official standards as originally prepared, the Director of Agriculture shall stipulate the
manner in which they shall be kept and shall define the period at the expiration of which they shall be renewed.

"(e) Any grading establishment shall have the right to prepare or renew the set of official standards of grades
for its use, providing that such a set shall be an exact copy of the official set of standards and that it shall have
been approved and certified to by the Director of Agriculture or his authorized agent.

"(f) The Director of Agriculture shall establish one or several standards for abaca which may have been
partially cleaned or prepared in the form of tow, waste, or strings, at the request of a party concerned, if such
standards are required by the market. He shall also likewise establish a standard or standards for the fiber of any
species of Musa other than abaca for which there shall be a demand in the market. Such standards, if established,
shall be designated and defined in the general order referred to in section two (c) of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Subsection (b), of section 3, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No person, association, or corporation shall engage in grading abaca, maguey, or sisal, unless a permit shall have
previously been obtained, which shall be signed by the Director of Agriculture, such permits to be known as
grading permits."cralaw virtua1aw library

Subsection (e) says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In grading fiber for export, each grade prepared shall correspond to one of the official standards, and it shall also
bear the same designation and mark as the latter. The set of official standards shall be placed in a prominent
position in the grading shed for reference."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 5 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) All fibers included in this Act which are intended for export shall be pressed in bales approximately of the
following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters; and
weight, one hundred and twenty- five kilos, net. In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be
injured by excessive pressure, the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be
determined in a general order by the Director of Agriculture.

"(b) The limit of size of diameter of each hank contained in the bale of abaca, the manner in which these hanks
shall be arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and tying of each entire bale shall be designated by the
Director of Agriculture not later than six months prior to the date on which this Act goes into effect.

"(c) Each and all hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank shall also be
securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes
the bale.

"(d) Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical with that
which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Subsection (g), of section 6, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All fiber of which the official standard shall have been established as provided in section two hereof shall be
graded, baled, inspected and approved as provided in this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

And the last paragraph of subsection (i) says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The object of such inspection shall be to determine whether or not the grade inspected conforms with the official
standard for the same, whether or not the private mark (if any) used is correct, and whether the baling and
labeling is in conformity with the provisions of this Act and the authorized instructions of the Director of
Agriculture."cralaw virtua1aw library

Subsection (k) provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Every shipment of graded and baled abaca, maguey, or sisal, which has been inspected and approved, shall be
accompanied by a certificate or certificates of inspection attached to the bill of lading and duly signed by the fiber
inspector who made the inspection. All certificates of grading shall be prepared in quadruplicate, the original and
one copy to be given the owner, one copy to be forwarded to the Director of Agriculture, and one copy to be filed
in the inspectors office."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 7 says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) No person shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly or in part, or cause to be changed, obliterated, or
counterfeited, the official or private mark or brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and
stamped as provided in this Act, nor shall any person use any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the
provisions of this Act or the authorized orders of the Director of Agriculture; nor shall any person tamper with or
alter the quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this
Act.

"(b) Any person, association, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction
thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, be fined not more than two hundred and fifty pesos.

"(c) Upon conviction of any person, association, or corporation of a violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, the Director of Agriculture may withdraw and cancel the grading permit theretofore issued to such person,
association, or corporation."cralaw virtua1aw library

It will thus be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in detail for the inspection
grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue
official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an intending purchaser from an examination of
the certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale.

The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of, the Administrative Code,
section 1244 of which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard
grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port,
unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Section 1783 of the Administrative Code, which corresponds to section 5 of the original act, now reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in bales approximately of
the following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters;
and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net.

"Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical with that which
constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry.

"All hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank shall also be securely tied by a
strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes the bale.

"In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure, the approximate
dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be determined in a general order by the Director of
Agriculture. He shall in like manner determine the limit of the diameter of hanks contained in bales, the manner in
which these hanks shall be arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and tying of each entire bale."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Section 2 of Act No. 3263, which was approved December 7, 1925, among other things,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections seventeen hundred and seventy-one and
seventeen hundred and seventy- two of the same Act:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 1771-A. Philippines fiber inspection service. There is hereby created an office which shall have charge
of the classification, baling, and inspection of Philippine fibers and shall be designated and known as "Philippines
Fiber Inspection Service" and be governed by a standardization board.

"SEC. 1771-B. Standardization Board. There is hereby created a board which shall be designated and known
as "Fiber Standardization Board" and shall be vested with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. Said Board
shall consist of seven members, with the Director of Agriculture as its permanent chairman and executive officer,
and the other members shall be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Senate:
Provided, That one member shall represent the local rope manufacturers; two members shall represent the fiber
exporters; one member shall represent the dealers or middlemen; and two members shall represent the fiber
producers."

Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of
Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade
shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are
determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same
shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.

"If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign
markets for a period of at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the
amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library


Section 2748 of the Administrative Code now reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Any person who shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly or in part, or cause to be changed, obliterated, or
counterfeited, the official or private mark or brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and
stamped as provided in this law, or who shall use any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the provisions
of this Act or the authorized orders of the Fiber Standardization Board, or who shall tamper with or alter the
quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been so inspected, graded, and stamped, or who shall otherwise
violate any of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos; and
upon conviction hereunder of any person holding a grading permit, the Fiber Standardization Board may, with the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, withdraw and cancel such permit."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of fibers and the
creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is squarely presented as to whether or not the
authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative power.

Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, a standard authority all over the world, vol. I, 8th ed., pp. 228-232,
says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The maxim that power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority
does not preclude the Legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.
It may confer an authority in relation to the execution of a law which may involve discretion, but such authority
must be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix
the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested with
the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done
there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
sufficiently both in provision and execution.

"Boards and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and
industrial evolution of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing
complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation
to them of certain powers. Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the
Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and various
governmental powers for the more efficient administration of the laws."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, the question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or
administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient administration. It must
be conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law could only be carried into effect through a board or
commission. The case of Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470, is square in point. The law there construed is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That from and after May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, it shall be unlawful for any person
or persons or corporation to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior in
purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to the standards provided in section three of this Act, and the
importation of all such merchandise is hereby prohibited.

"SEC. 2. That immediately after the passage of this Act, and on or before February fifteenth of each year
thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a board, to consist of seven members, each of whom shall
be an expert in teas, and who shall prepare and submit to him standard samples of tea; . . .

"SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of the said board, shall fix and establish
uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United
States, and shall procure and deposit in the customhouses of the ports of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and
such other ports as he may determine, duplicate samples of such standards; that said Secretary shall procure a
sufficient number of other duplicate samples of such standards to supply the importers and dealers in tea at all
ports, desiring the same, at cost. All teas, or merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness
for consumption to such standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the first section hereof. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Construing which that court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the legislation considered in Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, that it does not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power of legislation. Congress
legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled
to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power
of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring that the plenary power vested in
Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted."cralaw virtua1aw library

And

"The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury the determination
of what teas may be imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative power, is without merit.
We are of opinion that the statute, when properly construed, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but expresses
the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption,
or presumably so because of their inferior quality. This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and
devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared
in the statute."cralaw virtua1aw library

The St. Louis v. Taylor (210 U. S., 281), construed the validity of an Act of Congress, which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Within ninety days from the passage of this Act the American Railway Association is authorized hereby to
designate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured
perpendicular from the level of the tops of the rails to the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several gauges
of railroads in use in the United States, and shall fix a maximum variation from such standard height to be
allowed between the drawbars of empty and loaded cars. Upon their determination being certified to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, said Commission shall not at once give notice of the standard fixed upon to all common
carriers, owners. . . And after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall
be used in interstate traffic which do comply with the standard above provided for."cralaw virtua1aw library

And in its opinion said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the railway association
and to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is clearly a Federal question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted
that after a date named only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be used in interstate commerce, and that
the standard should be fixed by the association and declared by the Commission. Nothing need be said upon this
question except that it was settled adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in error in Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U. S., 470; 48 Law. ed., 525; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349, a case which, in principle, is completely in point. And
see Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S., 364; 51 Law. ed., 523; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 367, where the cases
were reviewed." (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 617.)

It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of
Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade
shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are
determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same
shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor.

"If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign
markets for a period of at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect."cralaw virtua1aw library

That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of "official standards for commercial
grades of fibers," and that "the Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various
commercial grades of Philippine fibers," and that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in uniform bales. The
approximate volume and net weight of each bale, together with the manner of binding, marking, wrapping, and
stamping of the same, shall be defined in a general order by the Fiber Standardization Board."cralaw virtua1aw
library

And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quantity greater than the amount
sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. That is
to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by whom and how it should
be done, and creates the Fiber Board with power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In
legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be
inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board for that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to
do the actual work. That is not a delegation of legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of
administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of
things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would
have to be vested in a board or commission.

The petitioners contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp,
without any means of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by
whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is
not an argument against its constitutionality.

The appellee has cited authorities of similar laws, which have been enacted by different States of the United
States, that have been declared unconstitutional in violation of section 8 of article 1 of the United States
Constitution which confers upon Congress the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."cralaw virtua1aw library

It must be conceded that within the meaning of the Constitution, the Philippine Islands is not a State of the United
States, that it is not a Tribe of Indians, and that it is not a foreign nation.

We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and are clearly of the opinion
that the act in question is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by
the Legislature to the board are for administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed, without costs to either party. So
ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.



submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "finalorder" which is exclusively and
directly appealable to this court on certiorari.What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and
decisions, of theCOMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law arethose rendered
in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and takencognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicialpowers
. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission grantingthe award to a bidder is not an
order rendered in a legal controversy before itwherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented
evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission wasissued pursuant to
its authority to enter into contracts in relation to electionpurposes.
In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions but merely as anincident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections,
andhence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable bycertiorari by the Supreme Court.
Being non-judicial in character, no contemptorder may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no
direct andexclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any questionarising from said order
may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before thetrial courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
17

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is
Salud vs. Central Bankof the Philippines.

18
Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case,argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg.
129, orders of theMonetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that theMonetary Board is among the
"quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments arewithin the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is
only said Court,"to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the MonetaryBoard's resolutions.
19

Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdictionover resolution or orders of the
Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode ofappeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC.
20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction toentertain Civil Case No. 86-
37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcingits resolution.Although We have finally settled the issue of
jurisdiction, We find it imperative todecide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide
themuch awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.

Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for acommendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of thelicensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to
conceal itsconstitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonablein that an examinee
cannot even
attend any review class, briefing, conferenceor the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from
any school,collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions
. ...
21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing theprohibited acts even without any
ill motives will be barred from taking futureexaminations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it
isinconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye oneach and every examinee during the
three days before the examinationperiod.It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities
should not actarbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,such rules and
regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end inview. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they areauthorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on theexaminees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC hasno authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should preparethemselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained fromtaking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition tobecome public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoytheir freedom
to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personalgrowth. As defined in a decision of the United States
Supreme Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or thebounds of a prison. It means
freedom to go where one may choose and to act insuch a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others,
as his judgmentmay dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings andvocations as may be
most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to themtheir highest enjoyment.
23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academicfreedom of the schools concerned.
Respondent PRC cannot interfere with theconduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
enabletheir enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledgedpublic accountant. Unless the
means or methods of instruction are clearly found

to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools andcenters may not be stopped from
helping out their students. At this juncture, Wecall attention to Our pronouncement in
G
arcia
vs.
T
he Faculty AdmissionCommittee, Loyola School of
T
heology,

24
regarding academic freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right.It decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is freefrom outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding publicwelfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainlyextending to the
choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to beconstrued in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee thatthe alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at leastminimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them
of legitimate meansof review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should berefreshing
themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes andpreparing their mental and psychological
make-up for the examination dayitself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What
isneeded to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakagesand stop it right there. If corrupt
officials or personnel should be terminated fromtheir loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.
Strict guidelinesto be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed,then licenses should
be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers ofthe respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. Butby all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all
legitimatemeans to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.In the light of the above, We hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another
judgment is herebyrendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effectfor being
unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.SO ORDERED.
Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
G
rio-Aquino, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:

This is an original Petition for prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

The record of the case discloses that the herein petitioner Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. is a non-stock,
non-profit corporate entity duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The herein respondent
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports is a ranking cabinet member who heads the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports of the Office of the President of the Philippines.

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and
Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the
DECS the following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees for the
schoolyear 1987 to 1988

(1) Private schools may be allowed to increase its total school fees by not more than 15 per cent to 20 per cent
without the need for the prior approval of the DECS. Schools that wish to increase school fees beyond the ceiling
would be subject to the discretion of the DECS;

(2) Any private school may increase its total school fees in excess of the ceiling, provided that the total
schools fees will not exceed P1,000.00 for the schoolyear in the elementary and secondary levels, and P50.00 per
academic unit on a semestral basis for the collegiate level. 1

The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the
respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued
an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. 2
Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and
reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the petitioner still
opposed the increases. On April 23, 1987, the petitioner, through counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the
Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of Department Order No. 37. 4 No response appears to
have been obtained from the Office of the President.

Thus, on May 20, 1987, the petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the
instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order
unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis.
The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process
clause of the Constitution in asmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said
Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school
fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. 5

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that
should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses
that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

Complying with the instructions of this Court, 6 the respondent Secretary submitted a Comment on the Petition. 7
The respondent Secretary maintains, inter alia, that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and
necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character. In due time, the petitioner
submitted a Reply to the Comment. 8 Thereafter, We considered the case submitted for resolution.

After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the instant Petition devoid of merit.

We are not convinced by the argument that the power to regulate school fees "does not always include the power
to increase" such fees. Section 57 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as The Education Act of
1982, vests the DECS with the power to regulate the educational system in the country, to wit:

SEC. 57. Educations and powers of the Ministry. The Ministry shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administration, supervision and regulation of the
educational system in accordance with declared policy.

xxx xxx xxx 9

Section 70 of the same Act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its
functions and duties under the law, to wit:

SEC. 70. Rule-making Authority. The Minister of Education and Culture, charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other
government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be
considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the
law.

We find the remaining argument of the petitioner untenable. The petitioner invokes the due process clause of the
Constitution against the alleged arbitrariness of the assailed Department Order. The petitioner maintains that the
due process clause requires that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the Department Order to be validly
issued.

We disagree.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates
laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. 9a

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The
assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the
country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its
issuance.

This observation notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and convincing
evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without any justification for
the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to assume that the report of the Task
Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to allow an increase in school fees, was made
judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually
reduced the original rates of 15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to
this case, We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.

Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 10 In the absence of
proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the party assailing the
regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.

We commend the petitioner for taking the cudgels for the public, especially the parents and the students of the
country. Its zeal in advocating the protection of the consumers in its activities should be lauded rather than
discouraged. But a more convincing case should be made out by it if it is to seek relief from the courts some time
in the future. Petitioner must establish that respondent acted without or in excess of her jurisdiction; or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law before the extraordinary writ of prohibition may issue. 11

This Court, however, does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its judicial imprimatur to future increases in
school fees. The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to an outrageous exercise of
government authority and power. In such an eventuality, this Court will not hesitate to exercise the power of
judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.