Emma F. Phillips In 1993, the Cuban government significantly expanded the scope of legal self- employment on the island. The change has not been uncontroversial, and cuentapropistas have frequently been held up, both in Cuba and in the United States, as the symbol of Cubas transition to a free-market economy. In fram- ing cuentapropistas as the vanguards of capitalism, observers have adopted a concept of transition which is both rigidly ideological and teleological. This article argues that by employing a sociolegal approach toward cuentapropismo Fexamining close-up not only the Cuban governments regulation of self- employment, but also how the operation of law is mediated through cuentapropistas own self-perceptionsFwe can develop a richer and more complex understanding of transitional periods. Rather than conceptualizing transition as a straight line from communism to capitalism, a sociolegal analysis draws attention to the complex relationship between law, identity, and work in the renegotiation of citizenship, and the constitutive role that evolving conceptions of citizenship may have for the shape and character of a tran- sitional period.
Maybe tomorrow Ill turn capitalist, Alejandro
1 jokingly tells me. Today Im staying home! Alejandro is one of a small number of licensed self-employed workers in Cuba, or trabajadores por cuenta propia (workers for own account). Although legal in Cuba for more than 10 years, trabajo por cuenta propia remains a contro- versial sector in the Cuban economy. As the rst Cubans to shift from the centralized state sector to self-employment in the private sector, cuentapropistas challenge the state socialist monopoly on la- bor and production. For a country whose constitution states that it is a nation composed of workers, peasants, and other manual and Law & Society Review, Volume 41, Number 2 (2007) r 2007 by The Law and Society Association. All rights reserved. 305 I am grateful for the support of the David Rockefeller Centre for Latin American Studies, the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University, and the Centre for Criminology at the University of Toronto, which enabled me to conduct eldwork in Cuba. I would like to thank William Fisher, Brian Palmer, and Ron Levi for their encouragement and guidance in the development of this project, and Mariana Valverde, Mark Salber Phillips, Herbert M. Kritzer, and the anonymous reviewers of the LSR for their very helpful comments. Please direct correspondence to Emma Phillips, Sack Goldblatt Mitchell, 20 Dundas Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 2G8; e-mail: efphillips@gmail. com. 1 All names have been changed to protect interview subjects anonymity. intellectual laborers (Constituticion de la Republica de Cuba 1992), the legalization of independent workers motivated by pri- vate gain is particularly contentious. Of course, trabajo por cuenta propia is not a unique change in the Cuban labor market, and the creation of joint venture and market-oriented state enterprises, as well as an active black market, pose equally strong challenges to the socialist labor regime. Yet cuentapropistas remain one of the most potent symbols of Cubas changing economic, political, and ideological characterFin part because of the significance outside observers have attached to their existence. Indeed, the group has frequently been portrayed as a kind of capitalist vanguard by North American commentators, the shepherds of Cubas transition from socialism to a free-market democracy. In examining the tension surrounding cuentapropismo, this ar- ticle argues that a sociolegal approach can help expose the overly rigid assumptions that have frequently informed analyses of Cubas limited opening of self-employment. Cuba-observers have tended to view Cubas transition to a free-market economy as all but inevitable, with cuentapropistas as its personal agents. Viewed from the inside, however, the picture looks significantly different. As Alejandros comment illustrates, cuentapropistas themselves are ambivalent about claiming a larger group identity, on the one hand taking pride in their unique position outside of the state-controlled centralized economy, and on the other hand disclaiming any kind of capitalist mentality or work culture. Rather than asking whether cuentapropistas are capitalist or socialistFrubrics that are closely bound up in Cold War ideology and hard-line rhetoric in Cuba and the United StatesFa sociolegal approach provides a richer, more complex understanding of the contemporary moment in Cuban society by focusing our attention on how the law con- structs identity by opening up spaces for particular kinds of eco- nomic and social activity, which then become the basis for the renegotiation of citizen-state relationships. Drawing on the work of Sarat (1990), Espeland (1994, 1998, 2001), and Ewick and Silbey (1998, 2003), I argue that cuentapropismo is not simply a profes- sional classication, but a legally constructed social framework with a range of consequences beyond the simple facilitation of economic activity. More specifically, changes in the regulation of labor have implications for cuentapropistas changing self-conceptions, which in turn put pressure on traditional socialist models of state and citizen. Rather than understanding the role of law in periods of significant social change as purely instrumentalist, a sociolegal ap- proach illustrates the ways in which the regulation of economic activity may result in new self-perceptions, which may themselves become constitutive of fundamental social change that is not easily captured by the binary of communism/capitalism. 306 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State In broad terms, this article seeks to make two contributions. First, it argues that a more complex understanding of the significance of cuentapropismo can be achieved if we bracket ideological consid- erations and examine not only the regulation of self-employment, but also the ways in which cuentapropistas negotiate those regu- lations. This approach entails exploring how the operation of law is mediated through cuentapropistas self-perceptions. Such an in- vestigation highlights the complex interaction between law and identity in the context of a socialist state, one which may differ in marked ways from sociolegal accounts based in Europe and North America. Equally, it illuminates how, in periods of significant change, individuals reconstruct their identities by extrapolating from existing structures, rather than entering into a kind of stark ideological ip. Second, the article asserts that studies of transition can benet from a sociolegal analysis of the interrelationship between law, identity, and work during periods of significant social change. Adopting a sociolegal lens can help complicate ideological inter- pretations of transition by focusing our attention instead on chang- ing individual-state relations and conceptions of citizenship. Not only does such an approach help expose the limitations of a mod- ernization view of Cubas current transformations, but it also illustrates how the factors that shape periods of change are frequently unpredictable, contradictory, and bottom-up as well as top-down. One of the complexities of employing the term transition is the difculty of distinguishing a period of transition from the less sharply marked uctuations of social evolution. While Cubas direction remains unknown, it is almost certainly a country un- dergoing a period of profound transformation. The pace and scale of economic change since 1990, including the dollarization of the economy, the growth of foreign investment, and the explo- sion of foreign tourism, have created a fundamental shift in Cubas socialist framework that will be difcult to reverse, despite the governments recent announcement that Cuba is in a phase of deepening socialism. 2 Thus while this article specifically rejects a teleological, evolutionist conception of transition (as do Bridger & Pine 1998; Verdery 1997; Kubicek 2004), it does suggest that the contemporary moment in Cuba is one of pro- found and radical change. As a close examination of cuen- tapropismo illustrates, the legalization of self-employment has important consequences for the renegotiation of individual-state relations and the construction of citizenship. This renegotiation 2 Announcement of National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon, EFE News Service, December 1, 2005. Phillips 307 may itself help contribute to the creation, shape, and character of a transitional period. The article is divided into four sections. The rst section briefly describes the research methodology and the context of cuen- tapropismo. The second section, building on extensive eld re- search, focuses on the legalization of self-employment and the governments ambivalent reaction to the creation of an indepen- dent work culture. The third section critiques conventional conceptions of transition by drawing on discussions of govern- mentality, work, and the legal constitution of identity. The fourth section concludes by asking whether self-employed workers them- selves identify with a larger cuentapropista identity and with the capitalist label they have often been given. Methods and the Context of Research This article builds on eldwork conducted in Havana, Cuba, intermittently over a period of seven years, from 1998 to 2005. 3 From August 1998 to January 1999, I conducted eldwork in Havana, immersing myself as much as a foreigner can in the ev- eryday life of my neighborhood. My interest in the expansion of self-employment on the island took focus when I was introduced to Alejandro, a cuentapropista craftsman who sells papier-ma che to tourists, and who quickly became my primary informant on the ways and means of cuentapropismo. Several days a week for a period of three months, I accompanied Alejandro to the Malecon Market, where he has a stall. The second largest of Havanas three tourist markets, the Malecon Market turned out to be an ideal eldwork site, with the close quarters of market stalls and the long hours of a slow day providing ample opportunity for conversation and gossip. The nature of the market as a tourist center was also particularly important since it allowed a focused look at the rapid growth of the tourist industry, stimulated by one of the most dra- matic changes in recent government policy. 4 My daily observations came into sharper focus through 12 formal interviews with eight informants, which I conducted in the Malecon Market with Alejandro and four of his neighboring 3 The germ of this article originated in an undergraduate thesis in anthropology entitled Transforming Identities: An Ethnography of Change in a Cuban Market (2000; on le with author) at Harvard University, in which the ethnographic material is more fully presented. Further work was conducted in 20042005 for a research project in the Masters of Criminology program at the Centre for Criminology, University of Toronto. 4 The Malecon Market was moved from its previous site to an indoor location in Central Havana in early 2006, for reasons I have not yet been able to explore. Ofcials indicated that the market would ultimately be moved to a building that once housed a department store. 308 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State vendors, as well as with Alejandro and members of his family in his home. Informal visits to Alejandros home also gave me added insight into the domestic economy of families dependent on cuen- tapropismoFthe balance between paid work and domestic work, family time and work timeFas well as relationships within the neighborhood. Informants were chosen in part as a function of Alejandros friendships and thus cannot be said to be objectively representative. Particularly in the early stages of research, Alejandros introductions were essential in allaying suspicion about my presence in the market. 5 Over time, however, my face became known in the marketplace and I was able to approach vendors of my own accord. Indeed, one afternoon in February 2005, after I conducted several tape-recorded interviews, a vendor informed me that some Cuban students had been at the market that morning seeking to interview cuentapropistas about the contribution of self- employment to the Cuban economy. Almost all the vendors, in- cluding the ones I had just interviewed, refused because they were concerned about how the material might be used. By contrast, my status as a foreigner seemed to reassure themFperhaps because it indicated that I might be more neutral, and because I would be taking my research back to North America with me, where it would be unlikely to appear in a Cuban publication. 6 In August 1999, I conducted six follow-up interviews with Malecon Market vendors, including three of the original infor- mants, as well as an informal survey of 14 vendors in the market- place. Interview questions focused on the individuals education and work prior to becoming a cuentapropista, reasons for entering into self-employment, perceived advantages and disadvantages of the shift in work practices and income, attempts to balance family and work time, plans for the future, and aspirations for the chil- dren. In February 2005, I again interviewed three of my original informants, as well as four new research subjects. Interview ques- tions remained largely the same as in 1999; however, I also asked informants to comment on some of their previous observations, as well as whether they continued to view cuentapropismo as a pro- visional measure, and how they perceived their recent incorpora- tion into a local union. Two of the new informants were chosen 5 The fact that I am Canadian, a country Cubans generally consider to be friendly and nonthreatening, and was also a student at a well-known American university and thus able to satisfy my interviewees curiosity about a variety of aspects of American life, also helped diminish any apprehension. 6 I also had the opposite experience. One cuentapropista agreed to be interviewed but requested that I not audiotape the interview. She recounted that Spanish CNN had televised an interview with some cuentapropistas who had formed a kind of informal cooperative. Shortly after the interview was broadcast in Spain, the collective was closed down by the government. Phillips 309 because they work in areas of licensed self-employment other than craftsmanship: running a hair salon for local Cubans, and renting a room to tourists. These activities provided an interesting contrast to the work of the vendors in the marketplace because they are run out of the home and because they represent the commercialization of womens work. Interviewing cuentapropistas outside of the Malecon Market allowed me to explore whether other groups of self-employed workers were also joining national unions. The ability to return to Havana over a period of seven years added an important dimension to the research. Such revisits al- lowed me to compare points of variance or constancy over time, to recognize that a phenomenon rst seen in a moment of apparent stability was in fact in a state of ux, or that something that seemed short-lived was able to endure. As such, my return visits did not so much constitute ethnographic updates as opportunities for a re- theorization of self-employment and the relationship between work, identity, and the state (Burawoy 2003). The focus on artisans gave me a specific perspective on trabajo por cuenta propia. In some ways craftsmanship is one of the least controversial activities authorized for self-employment. Where pri- vate taxis, restaurants, or casas particulares (room rentals in private homes) are perceived as competing with their state counterparts for tourist revenue, the government is less likely to attempt to nationalize craftsmanship since the very fact that an object is hand- made by an individual artisan is what gives it value. Moreover, tourists ock to craft markets precisely for the sensation of buying authentic local goods. Craftspeople are also able to draw on the image of the artist, whose work is an extension of him or herself, rather than something produced purely for its commercial value. This is particularly advantageous for craftspeople because the gov- ernments attitude toward artistic activity has undergone significant change in the past decade, involving, for example, the recognition of copyright and artistic authorship (Herna ndez-Reguant 2004). The focus on artisans, however, does not limit the relevancy of the analysis to other types of cuentapropismo. While the less pre- carious position of artisans may allow them to speak more freely with a foreign researcher, the fundamental changes they have ex- perienced in the regulation of their daily workFthe freedom to set their own schedule and negotiate their own prices, the difculty of dealing with government licenses and inspectors, the exclusion from state welfare programsFis shared by all cuentapropistas. Furthermore, like most residents of Havana, I had daily contact with cuentapropistas at work in a variety of settings, and this article is therefore equally grounded in my informal conversations with taxi drivers, booksellers, and food vendors, as well with people in private homes. Finally, I was able to put my observations and 310 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State interviews into context through discussions with several Cuban scholars at the Centro Ps cologico y Sociologico who have conduct- ed extensive sociological studies of the Cuban labor market. Of course, this study cannot claim to represent all cuen- tapropistas and remains limited by its geographical focus and small empirical base. The challenges and advantages of cuen- tapropismo may vary significantly in smaller communities or in regions less affected by tourism. Moreover, I only conducted one interview with a cuentapropista whose work focuses on providing services to Cubans rather than to tourists; a more comprehensive study would benet from a comparison of self-employment in the tourist industry with self-employment in the domestic sector. Nor can Alejandro be said to speak for a single cuentapropista work culture. Indeed, a key nding of the study is that cuentapropistas themselves reject adopting a cohesive group identity, and therefore any attempt at generalization must be treated with caution. While these limitations are significant, they do not, however, undermine the broader conclusion of this studyFthat cuentapropistas are neither capitalist nor socialist, but are helping to redene what it means to be a productive worker, and therefore a citizen, in Cuba. Sometimes, of course, vendors refused to be interviewed. The position of cuentapropistas is clearly precarious, and it was under- standable that some cuentapropistas were unwilling to enter into conversation. Furthermore, while most vendors adopted a largely avuncular attitude toward me, this was sometimes tempered by their recognition of my greater purchasing power or exposure to technology and world travel. It is also impossible to know to what extent my own questions inuenced the direction of my infor- mants answers. Despite my attempts to avoid using ideologically charged terminology, it is entirely possible that when interviewees used terms such as socialist and capitalist, they were merely using the categories they thought would be most recognizable to me, or that would be most intriguing to an outside observer of the dying days of socialism. In daily contact with tourists, the market ven- dors are by no means unaware of the fascination they hold for foreigners arriving on their island with preset, and often highly romanticized, notions of the Revolution. Finally, an analysis of cuentapropismo cannot be understood in isolation from Cuban-American politics. As Arnaldo Perez Garcia, a Cuban psychologist who has written about recent changes in the Cuban labor market, explained to me, You have to remember that the disagreement between Cuba and the United States penetrates every single decision made in Cuba. You cannot understand cuen- tapropismo outside of this context (Personal communication, Havana, February 2005). Drawing a circle on a piece of paper, he explained that the circle represents the system, and that, from Phillips 311 the Cuban governments point of view, anything that falls outside of the system is vulnerable to manipulation by American interests and is therefore a threat. A 1997 statement by Raul Valdes Vivo, the Communist Partys Academy Director, supports Perez Garcias comments. Writing in the state newspaper, Granma Internacional, Valdes Vivo effectively announced the governments intention to limit cuentapropismo, stating, The creation of the seeds of a local bourgeoisie would bring in a social force which sooner or later would serve the counterrevolution (Valde s Vivo 1997:4; trans- lated by author). American media and academics have added to this perception. For example, one analysis of self-employed work- ers in Cuba, presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in Miami in 1998, suggests that the highly visible success achieved by cuentapropistas. is what makes the self-employed phenomenon so interesting and important for the near term future of the country; when a tran- sition toward a true free market economy occurs in Cuba, the self- employed will be an important minority of Cubans who have small enterprise experience, who are familiar with risk taking, investment and profits, taxes and regulation. They will be uniquely equipped to thrive in a capitalist setting. They will con- tinue to sell goods and services to the domestic population and cater to tourists, but they will be able to expand their businesses, hire other people, and generate real wealth (B. Smith 1998:58). Secure in the assumption that Cuba will transform itself into a free market economy, the author concludes, To the extent that the self- employed can create employment and demonstrate the tangible benets of hard work for average Cubans, they will do much to smooth the transition to a market economy in Cuba (B. Smith 1998:59). Cuentapropistas, in this account, serve a symbolic func- tion in promoting popular support for reform by demonstrating that widely held fears about capitalism are unfounded, and that hard work will result in material gain. The specific position that cuentapropistas occupy within Cubas economic and political infrastructure is therefore as significant as the kind of economic, capitalist activity they engage in. While representing only a very small percentage of the Cuban labor force Fminuscule in comparison with the number of Cubans who par- ticipate in the black marketFcuentapropistas pose a powerful symbolic challenge to the socialist regime. In particular, cuen- tapropistas embody an increasing tension between Cubas socialist past and uncertain future. In this period of late socialism, many Cubans express both a deep attachment to and pride in the suc- cesses of the Revolution, and an increasing certainty that socialism is no longer economically or politically viable. Yet many Cubans are 312 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State equally reluctant to embrace a capitalist future, which they worry will breed avarice, income inequality, and a lack of compassion. This ambivalence is further heightened by deep strains of nation- alism, which lead some Cubans to rejoice at being one of the only countries to withstand the political interference of the United States, even as they decry the socialist Revolution that helped to protect Cuban sovereignty. The gure of the cuentapropista, in its ambiguous position between socialism and capitalism, captures this tension in a particularly explicit way, making the cuentapropista both a powerful and a vulnerable actor in the Cuban landscape. The Legal Creation of an Anomaly From its inception in 1993, cuentapropismo has been an un- comfortable development for the Cuban government. In the midst of the special periodFa series of austerity measures and radical economic reforms adopted in the face of Cubas dramatic economic decline 7 FNational Assembly members vigorously debated the wisdom of expanding the private sector. 8 Those who argued in favor of cuenta propia maintained that it would create jobs for the unemployed, provide goods and services that the state could not satisfy, increase control of illegal activities, boost tax revenues, and satisfy a popular demand. Among the opposing arguments were concerns that self-employment encouraged profiteering, that it would compete with state enterprises for labor, or that it was too small-scale to be efcientFpossibly creating deformities in the sys- tem (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:934). Even those in favor of the ec- onomic reforms were constrained to maintain that the economic pragmatism motivating the limited opening of self-employment was not indicative of changed ideological orientation. While self-employment was ultimately authorized, political and ideological ambivalence informs its very existence, and the attempt to harmonize economic pragmatism with ideological purity has been imperfect and contradictory. At the time of the legalization of self-employment, for example, the following description of the ideal self-employed individual was given in the Cuban media: 7 Between 1989 and 1993, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cubas GDP fell by approximately 40 percent, and its imports dropped by around 80 percent. Salaries declined more than 45 percent, and the average monthly salary is now around 232 pesos, or $10 USD. In response to the crisis, in 1990, the Cuban government declared the implementation of a Special Period in Times of Peace, modeled after wartime contin- gency plans. Most notably, the government introduced a series of dramatic economic reforms, including the de-penalization of the U.S. dollar and the reintroduction of foreign tourism, foreign investment, and market mechanisms on the island. 8 While self-employment was never completely banned after the triumph of the Revolution in 1959, it all but disappeared and was mostly limited to peasant-farmers who did not join agricultural cooperatives. Phillips 313 The idea of the self-employed worker is based on incorporating people with honorable social behavior into these activities. Crim- inals, speculators and embezzlers will not have access to these activities. In accordance with this principle, requesters must rst present a certication with information from their work center, in which their discipline is recorded. Before being approved by the labor directive of the municipality, the registrations will be sub- mitted for consideration by the [local] Peoples Council since it is there where the person and the needs of the locality are known (Perez-Lopez 1998:245). On this somewhat paradoxical view, self-employment ought only to be undertaken by those who prove themselves to be model socialist citizensFthese being the very people who ought not to be swayed by the economic incentives characteristic of self-employment. The deep ambivalence surrounding self-employment must be understood in relation to the powerful symbolic role of the worker in the Cuban Revolution. The very rst article of the Cuban Constitu- tion states that Cuba is a country composed of workers, peasants, and other manual and intellectual laborers (Constitucion de la Republica de Cuba 1992; translated by author). This symbolism is equally apparent in Che Guevaras conceptualization of the New Socialist Man (el hombre nuevo): a gure that denoted more than a productive worker or an individual dedicated to revolutionary ideals, but the forging of a new morality and consciousness (Perez 1998:340). Man dominated by commodity relationships will cease to exist, writes Che Guevara (1965) in his inuential Man and Socialism. . . . Man will begin to see himself mirrored in his work and to realize his full stature as a human being through the object cre- ated, through the work accomplished. Work will no longer entail surrendering a part of his being in the form of labor-power sold . . . but will represent an emanation of himself reecting his con- tribution to the common life, the fulllment of his social duty (Che Guevara 1965: n.p. translated by author). While el hombre nuevo was not a long-lasting economic or even ideological success, the concept continued to function as a kind of moral yardstick up until the early 1990s, and even today it carries a certain nostalgic and emotive powerFhelped, no doubt, by the continuing symbolic power of Che Guevara himself. It is hardly surprising, then, that a gure as antithetical to the social ideal of worker and personhood as the trabajador por cuenta propia has re- ceived a mixed welcome from the Cuban government. As Nunez Moreno, a Cuban sociologist, observes, Of all the changes intro- duced by the current reforms, the extension of private activity is perceived by many as the change that has the greatest capacity to dissolve Cuban socialism (1998:41; translated by author). 314 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State An Occupational Constituency: Cuentapropistas and the Legal Constitution of Identity It is difcult to draw a comprehensive prole of the community of people working in trabajo por cuenta propia. Government data on self-employed workers are not available and indeed may not exist. Two informal, small-scale surveys conducted in 1996 (Jatar- Hausmann 1999) and 1997 (B. Smith 1998), however, provide a picture. 9 In the mid-1990s, the average cuentapropista earned $135 USD a month, as compared to an average state salary of $10 a month (B. Smith 1998:51). Thirty-two percent of cuentapropistas were women, corresponding with an estimated 33 percent of women in the total Cuban labor force (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:99). Around 45 percent of cuentapropistas graduated from technical schools, while 29 percent had university degrees (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:100; B. Smith 1998:55), making them more educated than the average Cuban worker. Forty percent of cuentapropistas fell between the ages of 25 and 34 (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:100), and the average age was 37.5 years (B. Smith 1998:56). Because the sector has been closed off for a number of years, however, the average age is likely rising. The rules governing self-employment are tightly drawn. Under Law Decree No. 141, 162 occupations 10 are eligible for self-employment, including food vendor, taxi driver, carpenter, bicycle and car repairperson, artisan, hairdresser, shoe repair- person, and manicurist (Decree-Law #141 (DL-141), Sobre el trabajo por cuenta propia, Granma, 9 Sept. 1993). Renting out a room or apartmentFusually to touristsFis also an activity governed by trabajo por cuenta propia. Initially, only individuals at the margins of the workforce were permitted to enter into self-employment, such as retirees or workers with a reduced ability to work, redundant workers, or homemakers. These re- strictions ensured that a very limited number of workers within the labor force were eligible to enter the private sector and that those who did become self-employed workers were not core employees in the state sector or at the height of their productivity. Eventually, university graduates were also permitted to register for 9 It is important to note, however, that the government stopped issuing new licenses in 19981999, and a significant number of cuentapropistas have since dropped out of the work sector. No data are available to indicate whether those who dropped out of the private sector share any particular characteristic, such as age, gender, or education level, and therefore whether the prole of cuentapropistas today differs significantly from the time of the surveys. 10 This number has uctuated somewhat since the inception of self-employment. In 1993, 110 activities were authorized for self-employment. Five activities were struck off the list in 1994, apparently in reaction to the growing popularity of cuentapropismo. In 1995, 19 new occupations were added to the list, and in 1996, the government authorized another 40 activities. Phillips 315 self-employment, 11 although they are not allowed to carry out self-employed activity in their own profession (for example, doctors cannot establish private clinics). Nor can state or foreign enterprises contract the services of self-employed workers (Evenson 2003:265). Other regulations govern more specific details of dif- ferent cuentapropista activities, such as hygiene, hours of opera- tion, allowable materials, and so forth. More signicantly, government regulations are carefully de- signed to prevent the exploitation of labor and the development of significant income inequalities within the population (Nunez Mo- reno 1998:44). Self-employed workers cannot employ others, pric- es may be standardized by the government if there is any evidence of abuse, and the government can adopt measures to forestall the excessive proliferation of vendors and to prohibit the emergence of middlemen (Resolucion Conjunta no. 10/95 1995). Heavy licens- ing fees 12 and an annual progressive income tax 13 make it difcult for many cuentapropistas to continue their trade, or at least to accumulate a net profit. Artisans, for example, pay around $150 USD a month, while those who rent rooms to tourists commonly pay $200 or $250 USD per room, regardless of whether they are occupied. Cuentapropistas lives are therefore deeply shaped and in- formed by law. As Sarat writes about the welfare poor in the United States, law is all over for welfare recipients, in the sense that a significant part of their lives is organized by a regime of legal rules invoked by ofcials to claim jurisdiction over choices (1990:344). As discussed in greater detail below, however, cuentapropistas make an interesting counterexample to Sarats welfare poor. On the one hand, they too encounter law in the most ordinary trans- actions and events of their lives (Sarat 1990:344). But this is an experience common to all Cubans, not just cuentapropistas. In- stead, what makes cuentapropistas distinct is their position outside of the normal legal regulation of labor. In choosing to leave state employment, cuentapropistas give up their afliation to the work centers that would otherwise be a requirement of their employment. As such, they not only relinquish the social benets 11 Resolucion Conjunta no. 10/95, 1995. 12 Benjamin Smith observes that while the National Tax Administration Ofce (Of- icina Nacional de Administracion Tributaria) establishes minimum monthly fees, municipal authorities may adjust these rates higher, giving them considerable discretionary authority to encourage or dissuade self-employment in their jurisdiction (B. Smith 1998:512). 13 Benjamin Smith estimates that in 1996, the average cuentapropista paid an annual income tax of 57 percent. Cuentapropistas must report their annual income in the form of a sworn statement and may deduct the value of the monthly fees from their pretax annual income, as well as 10 percent of gross income to pay for business expenses. Anecdotal evidence indicates that underreporting of income is rampant, perhaps indicating why tax rates are so high (B. Smith 1998:52). 316 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State distributed by work centersFeverything from pensions to state subsidized child care to the use of a beach house in the summer 14 Fbut they also remove themselves from a system of state incor- poration and control. Under socialist ideology, according to Cuban sociologists Jose Luis, Martin Romero and Armando Capote Gonzalez, The individual existed more as a member of a groupF of the neighborhood, of the work center . . . the we was privileged over the I, the interests of the collective over the interests of indi- viduals (1998:80; translated by author). Cuentapropismo, by con- trast, depends on the decentralization of the organization of work, allowing for increased autonomy not simply in the distribution of labor and resources, but also in the realm of decisionmaking. The partial abstraction of cuentapropistas from the centralized state labor system thus represents a fundamental challenge to the collectivist social pact underlying Cuban socialism. Arguably, it is this relational shift that, more than economic status or capitalist mental- ity, distinguishes trabajadores por cuenta propia from the rest of the populace and provides some sense of group identity. This restruc- turing of worker-state relations may also be at the heart of the Cuban governments anxiety about trabajo por cuenta propia. As Maribel, a 37-year-old cuentapropista who was an audiovisual technician before selling leather goods in the Malecon Market, comments, Before, the state provided you with the necessities of life. Now, the trabajador por cuenta propia can acquire things, and we control ourselves. The state doesnt interest us, because it doesnt do anything for us. We even have to pay to do our work. What it does do is sell us things at a high price, and at the same time imposes more taxes and sends more inspectors. [The govern- ment] realizes that they are losing control of trabajo por cuenta propia, although we dont have any kind of capitalist mentality. Here they practically dont even let you think. And so it seems to me that thats what the government fears, not that we have a capitalist mentality, but that we dont depend on the state for anything, nothing more than to pay our $163 each month (Personal communication, Malecon Market, August 1999). Similarly, economist Jatar-Hausmann writes in describing a cuen- tapropista shoemaker she interviewed, Jorge likes to work at odd hours, he likes to raise the prices of his shoes, to lower them, to give them away . . . to speak out about and defend the need to develop the minuscule private sector open to Cubans. He is part of a new social breed who does not rely on the government to earn a decent living; and he is enjoying it with a vengeance (1999:107). 14 Cuentapropistas continue to receive state benets distributed to the population at large, such as free health care, subsidized public transportation, free public education, and food ration cards. Phillips 317 Law No. 141 therefore allows cuentapropistas to step outside of the state-controlled economy and to challenge existing social and legal norms. It is for this reason that Nunez Moreno refers to the creation of cuentapropistas as the change with the greatest ca- pacity to dissolve Cuban socialism. (1998:41; translated by author). Under the mantle of legal legitimacy, cuentapropistas are not only breaking down traditional institutions and avenues of power, but they are also helping to create new social norms characterized by increased individualism and autonomy (Ewick & Silbey 2003:13323). The result is the development of a culturally demarcated group whose authorized experimentation with new forms of property and market relations is leading to the formation of a new work culture and a new kind of worker (Martin Romero & Capote Gonza lez 1998:79). Law No. 141 has not, there- fore, simply facilitated individual workers undertaking legal self- employment, but has created a kind of occupational constituency that has become the basis for cuentapropista identity. As Espeland observes in another context, law can act as a mediating structure that can potentially transform the identity and interests of the group it brings together (2001:431). It is this relational shift that, more than economic status or capitalist mentality, distinguishes trabajadores por cuenta propia from the rest of the populace and provides the basis for a new sense of group identity outside the socialist mainstream. As Jatar-Hausmann illustrates, this new breed of workers is characterized by an unprecedented autonomy within the Cuban labor market. The Malecon Market vendors frequently cite their newfound independence as one of the greatest advantages of the shift to self-employment from the state sector. The ability to set their own schedule and to see the fruits of their labor is a frequently recurring theme. Were our own masters, Maribel comments: Despite the regulations we have, were our own masters because you can get up at the hour that you want . . . I come if I want, take vacation when I want . . . I dont have to wait for my colleagues to take vacationFwhen I want to take them, I take them, I go where I want. You understand? And we really obtain the fruits of our own effort. If we push ourselves more, we gain more. If we push ourselves less, we gain less. The difference is that the rest of the workers [in the state sector] dont have this [incentive]. Push yourself more or less, you almost always get the same. You have to establish goals in life, depending on what you obtain (Personal communication, Malecon Market, February 2005). Like Jorge, Maribel nds great satisfaction in the increased self- reliance and decisionmaking that trabajo por cuenta propia al- lows her. As opposed to the government mentality she says is 318 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State ubiquitous in the state sector, self-employment allows her to de- termine her own goals and the strategies she will use to achieve them. Significantly, however, Maribels change in viewpoint goes beyond the personal; participating in private work has also led her to redene what makes a good worker more generally: I think that state work should also depend on the effort that you put inFnot having a rigid salary structure for all workers. De- pending on the effort that you put in, the amount of work that you want to do. I think this would raise peoples enthusiasm to work in order to obtain better results and at the same time better remunerationFpeople would be able to have the work that they want. Just like we do here. We push ourselves and so can the rest of the population . . .. It would also be good for the government because they can gain with this (Personal communication, Malecon Market, February 2005). Although the government has, in fact, incorporated material in- centives into a new business model for some state enterprisesF known as el perfeccionamiento empresarialFthis shift toward inde- pendence and personal accountability goes to the heart of the state monopoly on employment and one of the most important sources of state power. It is important to note, however, that not all cuentapropistas express the same sense of freedom as the Malecon craftsmen. Bar- bara, for example, was an economist in the sugar industry before obtaining a cuentapropista license to rst sell pizzas and then to rent out an apartment in her home to tourists. Commenting that she feels tied down because she must constantly take care of clients, watch out for inspectors, and obtain foodFfrequently from black market ven- dors selling door to doorFBarbara sometimes longs for her old profession. If you could live from [state] work, she comments, it would be better. Because you have your work for eight hours a day, or your studies or whatever. But all this with the house is difcult. You have to be paying attention 24 hours a day (Personal com- munication, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005). Rachel, Alejandros wife, similarly expresses a sense of being trapped inside her home as a result of trabajo por cuenta propia. Rachel is not a licensed cuentapropista, but she helps Alejandro produce, in contravention of the regulations, the papier-ma che objects that Alejandro sells. In recent years Rachel has begun to long for her old job as a teacher. As she puts it, Its not easy. Here youre like a slave. If you work for the state you have a xed schedule. You have your weekends free, or you spend them doing something else like reading. But Im always here working, working, working. I know that I have to do it, but really, Im exhausted with this (Personal communication, Rachels home, Havana, February Phillips 319 2005). Rachel misses being in the middle of things as a teacherF running to meetings, dealing with students, meeting with parents Fand appears to feel isolated by her work in the home. At the same time, it is likely that if Rachel were working in the state sector in the current economy, she would spend all her available free time engaging in some kind of illegal or informal work in order to gain extra income and would have even less leisure time than she cur- rently has. Rachels and Barbaras comments indicate not only that the degree of independence enjoyed by self-employed workers may vary by activity, but also that there is an important gender dimen- sion to the benets of cuentapropismo. While certain self-em- ployed activities may enjoy greater autonomy and mobility, such as vending to tourists or driving a taxi, these activities tend to be dominated by men. By contrast, anecdotal evidence suggests that cuentapropista businesses that occur within the home, such as renting a room to tourists, selling snacks from a cafeteria on the front doorstep, or running a hairdressing salon, are overwhelm- ingly run by women. Female cuentapropistas may therefore be much less likely to enjoy the freedom and exibility that their male counterparts do. 15 Similarly, some female vendors complain that they suffer a disadvantage as cuentapropistas because they do not receive the same state benets as do other working women. Specifically, female cuentapropistas may not enroll their children in the free day care services, or crculo infantl, provided to working women in Cuba. Rachel speculates that this is because the state does not consider cuentapropismo to be real work, but rather an activity under- taken by retired persons, the unemployed, housewives, and others on the margins of the labor market. As such, people working in the self-employed sector should not need to avail themselves of services that are designed for workers, such as subsidized day care. At the same time, it is illegal for Cubans to pay privately for child care by employing a babysitter or nanny. Thus while some cuentapropistas may rely on a family member for child care, many are caught in a dilemma. This catch-22 has been brought to the attention of the union representing the Malecon vendors, and union representa- tives have negotiated on behalf of individual vendors in the market to secure public child care. No sectorwide policy has thus far been developed, however. Women entering cuentapropismo are thus caught in the contradiction that the work they have undertaken to provide for their families disentitles them to the key welfare 15 One exception to this might be family-run private restaurants, or paladares, which usually involve the whole family working from the home. 320 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State services of a socialist state. 16 It is a contradiction that arises, at least in the mind of some, from the fact that the state does not dene self-employment as real work, even though it functions this way. The gendered dimensions of cuentapropsimo, however, does not obviate the fact that cuentapropistas, both women and men, enjoy an independence of decisionmaking that is rarely seen in the state sector. If power is the ability to mobilize individuals concerted activities (D. Smith 1990:80), the development of cuentapropismo represents a marked challenge to the Cuban states control over labor, economic activity, and, to a certain extent, popular ideas about what makes a productive citizen. Once removed from the centralized state system, furthermore, cuentapropistas are rapidly developing their own networks of social and economic relations outside of state-controlled venues. Alejandro and his family, for example, sometimes rent a beach house in the summer since they no longer have access to state-subsidized holidays. The woman they rent the house from is also a licensed cuentapropista, and the transportation they use is licensed taxi drivers. 17 What has there- fore become increasingly evident, as Martin Romero and Capote Gonza lez argue, is that cuentapropistas are developing a whole range of exible options permitting each individual to structure his or her own [life-]strategies and, as a result, to continually readjust what the [social contract] has to offer (Martin Romero & Capote Gonza lez 1998:80; translation by author). As a result, cuen- tapropistas are consciously experimenting with new models not only of private economic activity, but of private social activity as well. Of course, cuentapropistas are not the only Cubans to engage in private work, and a far greater number of Cubans are involved in informal or black market activities. 18 Yet ironically, the states authorization of self-employment may create a situation of even greater ambivalence for cuentapropistas than for those who engage in illegal work. While black marketeers can claim that their illegal wheeling and dealing is more a matter of survival than of ideology, 16 The question of gender and cuentapropismo thus far has received very little attention and is an important topic for further study. 17 Of course, cuentapropistas also develop these networks through informal or illegal economic exchange, such as by employing other Cubans for private services (e.g., child care, private tutoring, tailoring, etc.) or by relying on others for the exchange of illegally obtained goods such as gasoline. For a detailed discussion of the underground economy, see Ritter 2006. 18 It is important to understand cuentapropistas in relation to other actors involved in the dollar and underground economy, as well as in relation to the exchange of informal services prior to 1993. See, e.g., Ritter 2006 for a description of the range of legal, in- formal, and illegal economic activities characterizing day-to-day life in Cuba and their effect on the functioning of the Cuban economy. In an essay being prepared for publication, I examine the reorganization of the Cuban labor market, including the development of self-employed workers, workers for international or joint venture companies, informal workers, and black marketeers. Phillips 321 cuentapropistas have greater difculty reconciling their ofcial, legitimate activity with membership in a socialist state. Recog- nizing the liminality of cuentapropistas structural positionFone that is ideologically threatening in part because it is legally autho- rizedFhelps illuminate why they are regarded with suspicion by the Cuban government. As legally authorized private, for-profit workers, cuentapropistas throw into confusion the ideologically clear-cut categories of socialism and capitalism. Adopting the language of Mary Douglas, cuentapropistas transgress the inter- nal lines of the socialist system, thereby becoming a social pol- lutant (Douglas 1966:122). The legalization of self-employment thus creates the paradox- ical question of whether cuentapropistas can claim to be socialist citizens. Alejandro suggests that the answer lies in cuen- tapropistas contributions to the everyday functioning of their country: Were bringing in a lot of money to the country, to the govern- ment. Plus services that the government cant provide. If the private farmers market [agropecuario] closes, where will people nd things to eat? And if they stop the taxi drivers, how will people move around Havana? Or if they stop the shoe repair- men, who will repair the shoes? The trabajador por cuenta propia resolves many problems for the population that the government just cant provide for the moment (Personal communication, Ale- jandros home, Havana, August 1999). Alejandro thus emphasizes not only the nancial benet that cuen- tapropistas bringFwhich may, after all, continue to be viewed as suspect in a socialist stateFbut also their key role in facilitating the day-to-day functioning of the country. This is an imperfect answer, however, since it is through private, profit-making activity anti- thetical to the socialist paradigm that cuentapropistas are able to make this contribution. Yet it illustrates both the strength and the vulnerability of cuentapropistas as they straddle the socialist past and an uncertain future. The Legal Regulation of Cuentapropismo While cuentapropistas are broadening the scope of per- sonal autonomy, they are not by any means lawless; by strictly reg- ulating income, materials, hours of operation, and other work conditions, the government seeks to reassert some control over cuentapropistas. In March 2001, for example, the government released orientaciones (legally binding guidelines or regulations), which, among other requirements, oblige cuentapropistas to conduct business out of their own homes or designated markets (they cannot, in other words, rent a space that may have better 322 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State commercial prospects), register their earnings and expenses with the Oficina de Trabajo por Cuenta Propia, buy their primary materials from assigned government stores, and so on. While some of the regulations aim at ensuring clean and hygienic workplaces, others prohibit cuentapropistas from forming cooperatives, con- tracting out work, or creating any kind of collective organization of production. 19 Such strict regulations have taken their toll, and there are now just over 100,000 registered cuentapropistas on the islandFabout half as many as there were in 1997 (The Economist, 16 October 2004, p. 33). The Ministry of Labor, which is in charge of allocating licenses, appears to have stopped issuing new licenses in 1998 or 1999, and thus cuentapropistas who drop out of the market are not replaced. Where cuentapropistas express greatest frustration, however, is where legal regulation appears to be deliberately irrational, often pushing them into violating the law. Because cuentapropistas are viewed as a mal necesario (necessary evil), Perez Garc a explains, the state has taken an increasing number of steps to restrict their activities, to the point where the relationship between the state and the cuentapropistas hasnt been one of facilitating cuen- tapropismo, but rather of impeding it. As a result, for [cuen- tapropistas] to carry out their activities, at certain moments in their workFsometimes at many momentsFthey have to act illegally (Personal communication, February 2005). For example, strict rules limit where self-employed workers can acquire the materials used in their servicesFwhether it be paint, clay, textiles, gasoline, or shampoo. Cuentapropistas are required to prove that all ma- terials were acquired legally, usually from state-run stores, and in- spectors frequently request receipts. However, materials in state stores are usually very expensive and of poor quality, if they exist at all. Cuentapropistas are thus faced with buying materials on the black market, thereby breaking the law, or going out of business. As Maribel explains, Acquiring materials is getting more and more difcult. Because not only do they restrict where we can acquire materials, but they also dont help us [to buy them legally]. We have to buy materials through them, but if they dont have them, you can imagine, we are obliged to break the rules (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). The more irrational the regulations appear to cuentapropistas, the more justied they feel in breaking themFalthough they must still be careful of being caughtFand the less they respect the state that 19 Some argue that these regulations are an attempt to prevent the development of nongovernmental organizations and a nascent civil society; see for example Fornaris 2001. Phillips 323 seems to want to impede, rather than facilitate, legal behavior. As Ewick and Silbey suggest, the seeming arbitrariness of law under- mines legal authority by reversing the direction of legitimation between power and law. Rather than viewing laws authority as derived from some higher source of morality, for cuentapropistas law sometimes simply becomes the power of the powerful, an arbitrary and unpredictable exercise of the coercive force of the state (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1347). Yet despite such experiences, cuentapropistas are not anti- law, and many of the orientaciones that structure legal self-em- ployment appear to them to be reasonable and valuable. Majela, who taught technical drawing in a faculty of engineering before obtaining a license to sell leather goods in the Malecon Market in 1996, suggests that some regulations are for the good of the vendors themselves: Sometimes its really to do with us. Theyve told us now that we have to be here before 9:30 in the morning to put up our stalls. But we were the ones at fault. Not me, because Im always here early, but there were people arriving at 11 a.m. or 12 p.m. Then theyd have all their things in the passage, all their bags in the middle of the passage in the way of other sales. So this rule was for our own benet . . .. They passed the law because everyone was arriving late, there were vendors who were ghting because of the blocked passageways. . . . When they tell us we have to be here before 9:30 a.m. and people complain, its because they dont realize that we ourselves are a part of this (Personal com- munication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). Majelas description of law as a benign means of conict resolution supports Ewick and Silbeys observation that in narratives about the law, legal authority is often valued for its objectivity as well as for its ability to prevent or resolve the inevitability of conict (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1347). But cuentapropistas may also view the basis for laws authority in another source: the benevolence of the so- cialist state. As Barbara comments, the government creates new regulations as they gain experience. They change something every year, she observes, as a result of the problems that have occurredFwhat occurred last year with the tourists, and so forth (Personal communication, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005). Barbara seems to express an almost fraternal relationship to the state, forgiving government policy makers for their mistakes and recognizing that it is, in a sense, only human to learn from past experience. This reication and personalization of the state may be a result of the strong identication of the Cuban government with its powerful, charismatic, and seemingly omnipresent leader. 324 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State Rules protecting the health and welfare of the Cuban public may garner even more support among cuentapropistas. For ex- ample, Barbara notes with approval a recent regulation prohibiting the owners of casas particulares from renting a room for less than 24 hours, an obvious attempt to prevent the growth of prostitution and sex tourism. Similarly, a recent law against drug trafcking provides that the owner of a casa particular can be criminally pros- ecutedFand have the house conscatedFif it is found that he or she knowingly rented a room to someone possessing or trafcking in drugs (Law Decree No. 232, issued January 2003). Barbara seems comfortable with this provision, even though there is a risk that an innocent homeowner may be wrongfully arrested: They have to investigate, because here, you know, the movement against drugs is very strong and organized. So from this point of view I dont see it as a bad thing [that they investigate]; we have to because young people are starting to take drugs and I dont want anyone to end up in this, you understand? (Personal communi- cation, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005). Laws designed to protect the public goodFparticularly against moral corruption by touristsFmay therefore meet with wide- spread support, even where it means a potential loss in profit. The fact that cuentapropistas are experimenting with private, individ- ualized forms of economic activity does not, therefore, mean that they no longer view themselves as members of a wider social or national collective for which they maintain some responsibility. Barbara and Majelas comments indicate an ambivalent rela- tionship to the state. While on the one hand they decry the use of legal regulation to restrict and impede their activities, cuen- tapropistas continue to respect and, more important, presume the states right to regulate in certain circumstances. Such a pre- sumption contributes to the hegemonic power of the state and the relationship between state power and law. Yet at the same time, what constitutes the public good and who gets to determine its parameters may be a matter of decreasing consensus. While many cuentapropistas may support a rule preventing a tourist from dat- ing a Cuban under age 15, for example, there may be much less agreement about the social benet of rules designed to prevent increases in income inequality within the population. Similarly, rules established by the government to prevent Cubans from buy- ing electronic equipment such as microwaves and VCRs in order to control energy consumption may be viewed as the prerogative of government by some, and oppressive by othersFparticularly those who have the nancial means, but not the opportunity, to purchase such goods. The states authority to foster particular visions of the social good through legal regulation may therefore be increasingly Phillips 325 ineffectual. This is particularly true as alternative lifestyles and models of governance are transmitted through European and North American media, conversations with tourists, and the in- creasing number of Cuban emigrants. Cuentapropistas have also, in some cases, been able to negotiate with state ofcials to modify legal obligations. For exam- ple, cuentapropista artisans are not allowed to employ assistants (ayudantes). The vendors in the Malecon Market nd this partic- ularly difcult because they are tied to their market stalls all day long, unable to take a break to go for lunch, to the washroom, or to step out of the hot sun. Many artisans in the Malecon Market have therefore unofcially hired assistantsFsometimes a family mem- ber or another artisan who would have liked to be a cuentapropista but was unable to obtain a license. With the help of the union, the cuentapropistas have come to an implicit understanding with the market administratorFa state employee charged with looking af- ter the day-to-day operations of the marketFallowing them to hire assistants. When state inspectors catch assistants in the marketplace, the administrator or one of his or her assistants will often step in to smooth things over and prevent the inspector from imposing a ne. While it is unclear whether other cuentapropistas have been able to come to similar compromisesFand it is unlikely that the govern- ment will legalize the practiceFthis arrangement demonstrates the ways in which cuentapropistas have been able to actively shape the law, rather than simply live within its connes. 20 Through such negotiations, the relationship of power between the cuentapropistas and the state remains in ux. As Ewick and Silbey point out, Power . . . is exercised by drawing upon the symbols, practices, statuses, and privileges that have become habitual in social struc- tures. Although structures . . . often confront us as external and coercive, they are more accurately understood as emergent fea- tures of social transactions, (re)produced with each repetitive act 20 This arrangement has not met with uniform approval among cuentapropistas. Raquel, a 45-year-old cuentapropista who sells a variety of ceramic and wooden souvenirs for tourists, explains that unless she can delegate work to an assistant, the arrangement seems pointless: I dont have an assistant . . .. If I could leave him here, taking care of my business, and go do what I need to at home [it would make sense]. But to be here with him or her, under the same hot sun, why do I need an assistant? . . . He cant sell, I cant leave him to sell . . . If I leave the market I have to close up my business. Why would I want this kind of assistant? (Personal Communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005) This is, of course, exactly the situation the state seeks to prevent by making it illegal for cuentapropistas to employ others. At the same time, the ofcial prohibition on ayudantes has left many assistants vulnerable to exploitation by their employers. As Juan, an ayudante for a cuentapropista craftsman selling wooden sculptures, says, There are more people who would like to do this than there are people who need ayudantes, so I cant afford to take it too lightly. (Personal Communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005) Juan earns a percentage of his employers earnings and only takes time off when his employer does. Because his employer sells in the market six days a week, Juan has only one day off. 326 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State and transformed with each innovation or unfaithful repetition (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1334). Unionization and the Value of Legal Legitimacy Given the value that cuentapropistas attach to their indepen- dence, it is perhaps surprising that the Malecon Market vendors voted to join a national union in 2004. 21 State workers in Cuba are organized into sectorwide national unions. Although Cuban unions have, historically, played a role in protecting individual workers at disciplinary hearings or in conicts with management, critics have argued that they are, fundamentally, adjuncts of the state and function to subjugate workers rights to the interests of the state (Leiva 2000:481). Yet it is, arguably, precisely the unions close relationship to the state that makes them attractive to cuen- tapropistas. While self-employed workers are proud of their po- sition outside of the state, they are also keenly aware of the threat this independence poses to the government, and thus of the vul- nerability of their work sector. As Maribel explains, Its completely uncertain . . . We imagine . . . that were a stable sector, because we dont cost anything [to the state] and we bring a lotFin dollars and in national pesos. But at the same time, were a privileged sector because weve obtained independence with our work . . . and that brings advantages and disadvantages. Be- cause when weve become too privileged relative to the rest of the population, we could disappear any minute. Because really, it seems to me that the government doesnt really look at what we contribute. If we compare ourselves to the rest of the population Fthe contribution, the revenue, what we provide to touristsF its a lot (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). Maribel recognizes the threat posed by an independent workforce to the state. At the same time, however, her observations highlight the consternation that many cuentapropistas express that they do not receive more recognition for the economic benets they bring. Perez Garc a similarly argues that despite the controversy sur- rounding cuentapropismo, in many cases the work sector has only reafrmed a strong work ethic. While some state workers simply go to work in a factory to rob, Perez Garc a points out, there are many cuentapropistas who are educating their children about 21 Specifically, they joined the Sindicato de Industr a Ligera, or Union of Light In- dustry. The unionization of cuentapropistas has received no academic attention as yet. Indeed, Cuban labor researchers with whom I spoke were unaware that unionization was even being considered. My future research will include the investigation of the extent of unionization of cuentapropistas, the representation of cuentapropistas within unions, and the relationship of cuentapropistas to the Partido Comunista Cubana. Phillips 327 sacrice and the value of hard work . . .. [Cuentapropistas] are earning money with the sweat of their brow (Personal communi- cation, Havana, February 2005). The vilication of cuentapropistas, Perez Garc a concludes, may thus create a deformation in popular understandings of a good work ethic. Like Maribel, Majela also expresses concern about the uncer- tainty of trabajo por cuenta prop a. Despite the contribution made by self-employed workers to the national economy, Majela remains keenly aware that in the eyes of the government, self-employment is a necessary evil. Moreover, because cuentapropismo originated in the economic crisis, she worries that the government may decide to close the work sector as soon as the economy recuperates: This is like anything elseFtoday were here and tomorrow self- employment is over, and we have to nd a place for ourselves [in the state sector.] This work isnt secure, were not secure. [Self- employment] arose because of the special period, the lack of employment . . .. Weve brought benetsFwe contribute a lot to the state. But just as quickly as this appeared, it could disappear. It appeared at a specific moment and because of a specific set of conditions in the country. If this situation ends, well, I assume we could also disappear (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). Alejandro similarly ties the fate of self-employment to the vagaries of the economy. The country will recuperate, he observes, or rather, it is recuperating . . .. So it could be that tomorrow they tell us that we cant do this anymore. Majela and Alejandros com- ments illustrate not only the deep uncertainty that underlies self- employment, but also their profound awareness that they are living through a particular historical phase that has demanded radicalF and quite possibly temporaryFmeasures. While cuentapropistas may value the independence they enjoy in determining their work conditions, therefore, they are also aware that this independence is self-defeating if it means that the government will continue to view them with hostility. Unionization can mitigate the threat of cuentapropismo by reincorporating self- employed workers back into the state through labor regulation. As Maribel explains, At a minimum [unionization] incorporates us into the rest of so- ciety. Now were no longer an isolated society . . .. Were incor- porated, regardless of whether we work in the private sector and we have private earnings . . .. We want to be independent work- ers, but not independent in spirit (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). Unionization may therefore provide cuentapropistas with an im- portant mantle of legitimacy, and thus with an added degree of 328 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State security. It also provides cuentapropistas with valuable symbolic capital. As members of the union, cuentapropistas are no longer outliers in the system but can instead claim full membership in the Cuban stateFwithout giving up their autonomy and material benets. In this sense, the distinction that Maribel makes between being independent workers and being indepen- dent in spirit is a significant one, because it indicates a desire to be viewed as part of the same spirit, or social fabric, as the rest of Cuban society, even if their work habits differ from those of state workers. As members of a union, cuentapropistas have been able to further demonstrate their social citizenship through the frequent collections that the union takes up for charitable and Revolutionary causes. Rachel, Alejandros wife, points to these contributions proudly, if with some bitterness about the states failure to recog- nize the contributions made by cuentapropistas: They dont give trabajo por cuenta propia the value it really de- serves . . .. The artisanFor the cuentapropistaFis really contrib- uting to the state! Alejandro, for examples, pays the MTT [local militia]. 22 He helps to buy them uniforms, arms, whatever else they need. Alejandro gives money to cancer hospitals where there are sick children. He helps to collect money for the union. And he has to pay 45 pesos every time he wants to sell [to rent his spot in the market] and $159 a month. There are people in society who do nothing at allFso why dont they give them a hard time? (Personal communication, Alejandro and Rachels home, Havana, February 2005). Barbara similarly argues that in comparison to the many Cubans who participate in illegal or black market activities, cuen- tapropismo is at least a legal form of earning money. While she would prefer to return to the quieter lifestyle of state employment, she explains, You do this because you have to; because life is so expensive and you have to get the money from somewhere. I started in cuentapropismo because its at least an honorable way of making money, no? (Personal communication, Barbaras home, Havana, February 2005). While the Cuban government may view cuentapropistas as potential agents of American interests, most cuentapropistas would likely be shocked by such a suggestion. Through union participation, cuentapropistas can counter the image of the parasitic, exploitative capitalist by making nancial contributions to state-approved, socially valuable causes. The Cuban government appears to have come to a similar conclusion that through unionization the government can retain 22 Movimiento de Tropas Teritoriales, a local peoples militia that played an important role in the 1959 Revolution. Phillips 329 the economic benets of self-employment 23 while reasserting some control over self-employed workers. At its national conference in 2005, the Congreso de Trabajadores Cubano (National Congress of Workers, or CTC), which coordinates the national unions and represents workers interests to the national government, recog- nized that cuentapropistas are now a substantial entity 24 and announced a campaign to invite self-employed workers to join the national unions. Magalys, an older cuentapropista in the Malecon Market and the main representative of the Malecon vendors to the Union de Industr a L gera, 25 suggests that the government may be waiting until the private sector is organizedFi.e., unionizedFbe- fore it permits new licenses: What happened was that to allow us to organize ourselves they stopped allowing new licenses. Right now they arent giving out new licenses in order to say to people: Stop. Lets get orga- nized. And after everythings organized, it will open up again . . .. So that when new people enter [the sector], they enter into something organized (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). While it is unclear whether cuentapropismo will be allowed to grow again after unionization is complete, Magalyss comments afrm the idea that the government is seeking to integrate cuen- tapropistas into the state sector. Cuentapropistas are being invit- ed to join either the union most related to their work activity or physically closest to their home. Noticeably, no suggestion has been made of creating a cuentapropista union, which would allow self- employed workers to pool economic power and to developFor solidifyFa sense of common identity and purpose. Indeed, cuen- tapropistas are strictly prohibited from forming cooperatives or associations. It is unclear how many cuentapropistas have decided to take up the invitation to join a union, although Barbara reports that the idea was discussed and rejected at a recent meeting of cuentapropistas who are licensed to rent rooms. Besides these important symbolic gains, unionization has also brought small but concrete improvements to the marketplace, particularly to the physical work conditions. For example, vendors 23 Benjamin Smith (1998:58) estimates that in 1997, cuentapropistas brought in an estimated $130 million USD in tax revenue. The government does not release data on tax revenues from self-employed workers. 24 Interview with the secretara general (general secretary) of the Malecon Market to the Union of Light Industry (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, 24 February 2005). This is an interesting comment, given the steep decrease in the number of self- employed workers over the last ve years. 25 There are 12 cuentapropistas in the market who serve as union representatives, and Magalys is the secretar a general. She is also a member of the National Committee of the Union of Light Industry to the Cuban Labor Congress. 330 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State used to rent space in local private homes to store their merchandise overnight. When the government recently banned this practice, 26 the vendors were left without any choice but to haul their mer- chandise home with them, often over a considerable distance. At the cuentapropistas instigation, the union negotiated with the market administration to allocate a small warehouse next to the marketplace to the vendors so that they may store their products close by. As Magalys explains, At times, the laws of the administration [of the market] are a little rigid. So the union is the organization that can persuade the ad- ministration in some areas . . .. Through the mediation of the union we were able to increase the space of the marketplace and now within the market itself we have our own warehouse (Per- sonal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, February 2005). Similarly, as previously discussed, the union was able to negotiate a tacit agreement with market administrators to allow the vendors to hire assistants. Both of these changes made a significant difference to the market vendors daily work and indicate that at least some ofcials within the state are sympathetic to the difculties that constrain cuentapropistas. Rather than functioning purely to en- force state regulation and to restrict cuentapropistas activities, union ofcials have in fact attempted to modify some of the par- adoxes of government regulationFcreating, where possible, un- ofcial compromises or alternate avenues to facilitate day-to-day operations. The fact that such assistance is limitedFthat union ofcials will not, for example, challenge the government on some of the more significant restrictions on cuentapropista activity or advocate for large-scale reformFillustrates that union ofcials ex- perience their own ambivalence about the place of private activity in the economy and the role of market mechanisms in Cubas future. Law and Identity in Transitional Societies As the comments of Alejandro, Maribel, Barbara, and others make clear, cuentapropistas cannot easily be cast in an ideological mold. While cuentapropistas themselves argue that their existence provides crucial support to the continuation of the socialist state, it is clear that their activities also amount to an expansion of spheres of individual autonomy and alternate social and economic 26 It is unclear why this decision was made. It may have been part of a broader move to prohibit renting space, other than rooms or apartments for tourists. In other words, renting living space seems to be allowed, while renting space to conduct a commercial venture is strictly prohibited. Phillips 331 networks that circumvent ofcial state avenues. In so doing, cuen- tapropistas are developing new conceptions of what it means to be a productive worker in Cuban society and what kind of relationship workers will have with the state. For a country that places labor at the very center of its national and ideological identity, the impact of such changes on fundamental questions of citizenship and com- munity are profound. By citizenship, I refer not so much to the narrower definition of citizenship as legal status, but to the broader concept of citizenship as an expression of ones membership in a political community. (Kymlicka & Norman 1994:369) As subjec- tivities change and citizenship is reconceptualized, increased pres- sure is brought to bear on the structures of governmental power, leading to the further evolution of new governance regimes. In other words, changes in popular understandings of citizenship bring about further changes in models of governance and exert an important inuence on the evolving shape and nature of new governmental authorities. The renegotiation of work thus has implications far beyond the day-to-day lives of cuentapropistas themselves, and it poses a sig- nificant challenge to socialist orthodoxy. In the renegotiation of social, political, and economic power during periods of dramatic change, underlying ideas about who is a productive member of society become a key battleground. This insight into the relation- ship between law, work, and identity during transitional periods helps complicate the conventional transition paradigm, in which law is represented as an autonomous force acting upon society, rather than as a product of contestation and negotiation among individuals, ofcials, and state institutions. As a close examination of trabajo por cuenta propia makes clear, such a unidimensional, externalized account fails to account for the powerful ways in which law opens up spaces for new kinds of economic, political, and social activity, as well as the consequences that this may have for the renegotiation of political and social relations. This process of renegotiation has important bearing on the character and scope of a transition. A number of law and society theorists have addressed this constitutive role of law in the process of identity formation, high- lighting the way in which law exists in society as a negotiation between citizen and state (Ellickson 1991; Engel 2003; Espeland 1994, 1998, 2001; Ewick & Silbey 1998). Through its functions of categorization and legitimization, law delineates how individuals and communities are valued and what kinds of activities and beliefs are rewarded. Law channels interactions with, or challenges to, the state, and delimits at what point, or under what conditions, those interactions will no longer be supported. Yet law is also regularly appropriated, manipulated, and resisted by individuals and 332 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State communities (Espeland 1994, 1998, 2001) who mobilize to formally change legal codes or develop alternative practices that bypass formal law altogether (Ellickson 1991). In struggles to dene the boundaries of community or individual identity, law becomes not only a powerful tool of legitimization, but also an integral part of the frame around which identity is constructed. The role of law in the construction of avenues for social par- ticipation and conceptions of citizenship is particularly important in the context of the socialist state, given that a central goal of the socialist project is not only to remake the economic and political character of the state, but also to reconstruct the socialist citizen at the core of the new regime. Yet the insights of law and society theorists do not map onto socialist states with perfect precision. One of the most important moves by legal sociologists has been the realization that the production of legality is not limited to formal legal institutions, or to the ofcial legal actors who populate them. In recognizing the pervasiveness of law, legal sociologists remind us that law is manifested in the most mundane interactions of every- day life, affecting in often invisible or unconscious ways how we structure our lives and dene our relationships. Sarat (1990:344), for example, illustrates how the welfare poor in the United States experience law almost viscerally because of the way in which their lives are organized around a heavily regimented legal bureaucracy. By comparison with other groups in society who would never ex- pect ofcials to claim jurisdiction over private areas of their lives, welfare recipients are caught in a web of law. For citizens of socialist societies, however, the power of law to shape the minutiae of daily existence, or the ability of state ofcials to exercise this power, may come as little surprise. The pervasiveness of the law may simply be viewed as an extension of the revolutionary char- acter of the state, which requires a unied, total commitment. (For those who view the socialist project as inherently repressive, the authoritarian operation of law is perhaps even more apparent). In line with Sarat, Ewick and Silbey observe that in modern American society, people generally confront legal authority within impersonal, rule-governed, functionally organized hierarchies (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1347). In narratives of resistance, Ewick and Silbey comment, Americans emplot law as a powerful force, describe themselves as a protagonist up against this force, and present some action that avoided or overcame, if only temporarily, this situation of relative powerlessness (Ewick & Silbey 2003:1345). By contrast, cuentapropistas do not paint themselves in such heroic colors; rather, their comments reect a conception of the law as fully embedded in the fabric of everyday life. Law is not something that is encountered, conquered, and vanquished, but maneuvred and negotiated through ordinary acts. In this narrative Phillips 333 structure, cuentapropistas are neither heroes nor victims (nor socialists, nor capitalists), but individuals seeking to wend their way through the law in order to obtain the basic necessities of life. Despite this need to tailor the insights of law and society to the socialist context, a sociolegal approach can enrich our under- standing of the constitutive role of law in transitional periods sig- nificantlyFhelping the eld to move beyond, for example, asking simply what role legal institutions can play in establishing demo- cratic governance. Transition theory, as some critics have pointed out (Bridger & Pine 1998; Verdery 1997; Kubicek 2004:136), has been tainted with a kind of Cold War triumphalism that posits transition as a progressive set of stages along a unidirectional path from communism to capitalism. Such teleological and ahistorical thinking ignores the impact that changing conceptions of citizen- ship and state may have on the evolution of the transition itself, and on the development of new models of governance. 27 The transition literature has largely, of course, come out of the particular social, political, and geographic context of the end of communism in Eastern Europe. Cuba is clearly not postcommunist, and the transition literature can thus only be applied in a general way to the Cuban case. Yet the tendency to frame transition analyses in highly politicized terms is particularly strong in Cuban studies; in the ongoing political battle between the United States and Cuba, U.S. foreign policy interests, as well as the interests of many in the Cuban American community, have been particularly inuential in polarizing the terms of debate. Analyses of societies in transition may therefore be greatly enriched by the recognition that in the negotiation between citizen and state, law has a profound inuence on individual and group identity. Law, as Espeland observes, not only represents the in- terests of some group, or even constructs their interests but also, simultaneously and often implicitly, constructs the subject who is holding those interests (Espeland 1994:1171). In understanding the relationship between law and identity in the socialist context, the insight of governmentality theorists that modes of conduct, knowledge, and agency are not suppressed by government but are cultivated in ways that are aligned to specific governmental aims (Valverde et al. 1999:4) is particularly useful. Different ideological systems will produce different subjectivities and, by extension, dif- ferent conceptions of citizenship, as individuals are conditioned by particular structures of power. Where most transition studies take a 27 Moreover, in service of such politicized thinking, as Guilhot points out, transition theorists have ignored the origins of the concept of transition in Marxs own highly evolved discussion of transitions to socialism. For a discussion of the historical and the- oretical development of the concept of transition, see Guilhot 2002. 334 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State top-down approach, focusing on the role of law in the macro- structure of governance, the concept of governmentality draws at- tention to the ways in which the very conception of citizenship is reconstructed during periods of profound economic and political transformation. Indeed, the success of a transitionFthe extent to which it establishes a new, stable model of governanceFdepends not only on its authorization of new modes of conduct, knowledge, and morality (as well as its stigmatization of old modes), but also on its ability to remake subjectivities. 28 As the focus on cuentapropismo illustrates, workplaces are a particularly significant site of governance and identity formation. The bond between individual and workplace, Martin Romero and Capote Gonzalez, observe, generates a set of relations which are incorporated, as part of the individuals experiences, into the existence of the person and, as such, into his or her subjective internal world . . .. Through this bond, people construct a form of existence which converts em- ployment into a social condition necessary for self-realization (1998:81; translated by author). By structuring workers time, activities, aspirations, economic re- muneration, and social interactions, laws governing work sites play a formative role in conditioning the interests and desires of work- ers to align with those of the employer and the state (Rose 1999:157). In socialist societies, the link between work, govern- mental power, and the construction of citizenship is particularly clear because of the states monopoly over employment and its ideological position as the voice of the workers. The legitimacy of the state depends, at least rhetorically, on its identication with workers interests, and in a workers state workers are presumed to share in state policies encouraging productivity and efciency. The state, moreover, has direct control over work sites to ensure the implementation of these policies. The authoritarianism of so- cialist states, as well as their ideological formation, thus reinforce the importance of work sites as a governable space (Rose 1999:31) for the dissemination of state power and the construction of citizenship. As Martin Romero and Capote Gonzalez argue, In the Cuban case, more then any other, inclusion in the program of employment . . . is a form of incorporating [individuals] into the sociopolitical project and of fostering proactive participation in the 28 There is, of course, something of a chicken-and-egg question here, highlighting the limitations of the governmentality literature. Is it the creation of new economic and political activities that produces new subjectivities, or do changing beliefs and forms of knowledge spur political and economic change? What is the role of law in creating and impeding these processes? While analyses of governmental power tell us something im- portant about how power is produced and reproduced, it provides less of a lens onto why regimes of power change and in what directions. Phillips 335 creation of the base and the socio-political system (1998:82; translated by author). The central role of work in the construction of citizenship makes work a particularly important factor in periods of transition. In postsocialist transitions in particular, new forms of property and modes of economic activity frequently come into existence that are completely antithetical to the outgoing regime. With the diversi- cation of employment and forms of property typical of postso- cialist economies, the individual no longer exists purely as a member of the collectivity and must begin to explore new spheres of individual decisionmaking and self-reliance. As Martin Romero and Capote Gonzalez explain in the context of Cuba, Society has been changing and we can only expect the individual to do the same. Indeed a new [social] pact is being formed in which none of the involved parties can maintain their previous positions. In the case of the individual, we must consider the implications of the changes that have occurred in his objective social position for his subjective reection. Such changes may, in turn, lead to a new evaluation of his or her individuality in the new situation and to enhanced self-recognition under these new conditions (1998:80; translated by author). The rise of market relations, in particular, requires workers in the new labor paradigm to assess a variety of state, informal, illegal, and private work options to develop strategies for economic sur- vivalFperhaps involving more than one work optionFdeal with new forms of property, and make independent decisions unnec- essary under the socialist system. Such new levels of individual autonomy, risk-taking, and decisionmaking have implications far beyond the workplace, extending to other realms of social and family life, such as opening up opportunities for education, recre- ation, and material comfort that other Cubans may not enjoy. In transitional societies, workFin both ofcial discourse and day-to-day practiceFthus becomes a battleground for the devel- opment of new governmental powers. Significantly, the contest to dene what will constitute work and who will be a legitimate worker within the new socioeconomic model is itself constitutive of the transitional period. As Perez Garc a observes, Work, as the backbone of society, is not only impacted [by external factors], it also produces them, converting itself, together with the crisis and the reforms, into a cause of the transformations occurring in the social structure (2004:148; translated by author). As worker sub- jectivities are reconstructed to encompass a growing range of in- dividual choices and opportunities, new ideas evolve about who is a productive member of society and how citizen-state relationships should be mediated. This, in turn, has an impact on how new 336 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State models of governance are envisioned and within what parameters. Changing conceptions of work and worker are thus themselves inextricably tied to shifting notions of citizenship and to the evo- lution of new models of governance. Conclusion: The View From the InsideFIs There Such a Thing as a Cuentapropista Identity? Sarat relates how a welfare client reminded him that the wel- fare poor are not a natural social group. They neither share a distinctive background nor common ties of sentiment; they vary greatly in their life situations, their ability to survive without public assistance, and their disposition to do so (1990:348). In much the same way, cuentapropistas were not a preexisting community of people that the Cuban government acted upon through legal regulation, and the strong social cohesion that has formed around the legalization of self-employment does not necessarily reect a coherent or consistent internal identication among self-employed workers. By focusing too closely on how government rationalities shape cuentapropistas conduct, we may therefore miss some of the more complex intersubjective dimensions of the construction of a cuentapropista identity. For example, how do cuentapropistas re- late to terms such as socialist and capitalist, and how conscious are they of the ways in which their presence is viewed by the Cuban government and the outside world? More broadly, how are images of the good citizen constructed, and how do they get performed on the ground? How do zones such as work become sites for the construction of the citizen, and how are certain kinds of economic behavior rewarded and legitimated? What is the inu- ence of internal and external politics on the propagation of certain conceptions of citizenship? How do conceptualizations of state and citizen change in periods of profound economic and political transformation, and what inuence do such changes have on the possibility for, and character of, transition itself? These questions bring us back, in effect, to the statement with which we began. When Alejandro jokes that maybe tomorrow hell turn capitalist but today hes staying home, how is he positioning himself in relation to capitalist and socialist work paradigms, and what mix of resistance and acceptance does he signal toward a larger cuentapropista group identity? At rst glance, Alejandro appears to reject the capitalist label, expressing, through a com- bination of humor and irony, his awareness of the potency of the categorization and its importance in the ongoing dispute between Cuba and the United States. Indeed, implicit in Alejandros comment is his understanding that regardless of his Phillips 337 own self-conception, he will inevitably be viewed in relation to the gure of the capitalist and is better off explicitly positioning himself against it. By contrast to the common image in Cuba of capitalists as competitive, self-absorbed workaholics with little time for family or friends, Alejandro feels that his own relaxed attitude toward work and turning a profit is clear proof of his noncapitalist tendencies. Rather than being concerned about drawing ahead of his neigh- bors, Alejandro in fact uses his increased income to buy more leisure time for socializing with friends and family. Indeed, for Alejandro capitalism is incompatible with such Cuban cultural idiosyncrasies as sociability and spontaneity. Whether he views these characteristics as distinctly socialist, or not, Alejandro appeals to a broader set of values that are more public-minded than those he associates with the hyperindividualism of a market economy. Yet despite Alejandros attempts to distance himself rhetorically from the more negative capitalist stereotypes, the realities of his daily practice tell a different story, suggesting a second interpretation of his comment. While Alejandro may have chosen to stay at home today, he knows he has the potential to turn capitalist in the future, should such an adaptation be necessary materially, politically, or both. The ability to respond quickly and with ingenuity to changing economic circumstances is, Cubans boast, something of a national characteristic. Resolver is the oper- ative verb, describing the combination of ingenuity, creativity, and energy required to resolve or obtain daily necessities. What Ale- jandro and the other cuentapropistas have further been able to accomplish, however, is to make a substantial living by resolving other peoples needs, whether it be by supplying shoes or tourist knick-knacks. 29 Despite the obvious skill and business acumen that go into being a successful cuentapropista, however, Alejandro rejects any attempt to construct a general prole of self-employed workers, arguing, Theres no dened type. There are university graduates, professionals, workers, housewives, those who have never worked. Theres no one definition of cuentapropista. There are all kinds, all kinds (Personal communication, Alejandro and Rachels home, Havana, August 1999). Businessman seems not to be a legit- imate category, despite the fact that Alejandro has himself changed product types several times since quitting his job and is constantly planning new schemes (such as opening up a private health club), whose common feature is not craftsmanship 29 Indeed, Perez Garc a comments that the Cuban government has on several occa- sions adopted ideas developed by cuentapropistas and then sought to create a government monopoly for the service (Personal communication, 25 February 2005). 338 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State so much as self-employment in the private sector. There is, then, an unresolved tension for Alejandro between a desire to distance himself from the image of the malevolent capitalist exploiting the labor of others, and pride in the contributions that cuentapropistas make and the modest material success that cuentapropismo has brought his family. In expressing both sentiments, Alejandro is not contradicting himself. Rather, he is asserting his ability to reject both the economic tyranny of capitalism and the bureaucratic tyranny of socialism to determine for himself the distribution of his labor and leisure time. Alejandro is clearly not unaffected by the underlying logic of either socialism or capitalism, but he is actively negotiating the host of economic and ideological contradictions that currently inform the cuentapropista work sector with his own particular blend of economic pragmatism, entrepreneurial spirit, and sense of humor. Another way of understanding Alejandros suggestion that he might turn capitalist is to examine what kinds of aspirations cuentapropistas articulate for their children. On the one hand, cuentapropistas express an almost universal desire to see their children obtain a university education. This may be a result of a continued sense that professional work is more prestigious or valuable than commerce, or a concern that cuentapropismo is only a provisional response to a historically specific problem. As Maribel comments, Tomorrow the system will change. Being a professional will be valued again . . .. Cuentapropismo is necessary because of the economic crisis, I dont know how long into the future it will continueFit depends on history, on the changes that history brings (Personal communication, Malecon Market, Havana, August 1999). Cuentapropistas do not, therefore, express any kind of explicit desire to see the growth of a capitalist class in Cuba, to which their children would be the natural inheritors. 30 At the same time, however, many recognize that the Cuban economy has gone through irrevocable changes from which their children are well-positioned to benet. Thus while Alejandro himself may not turn capitalist tomorrow, his childrenFin part 30 Interestingly, while most cuentapropistas expressed a similar hope that their chil- dren will pursue higher education, some cuentapropistas views about the value of a uni- versity degree have changed as they have become more established in the private sector. In an interview in 1999, for example, Maribel emphasized her desire that her son, Jorge, obtain a university education. However, in 2004, Jorge began working for his mother as an assistant in the Malecon Market, and Maribel hopes that he will be able to secure a cuen- tapropista license if the government starts to distribute them again. Jorges decision not to attend university may be the result of a number of factors, both personal and economic. However, it is interesting to note how the valuation of professional education may change as self-employed workers become increasingly accustomed to private sector work. Such changes may also indicate that the longer cuentapropismo continues in existence, the more assured self-employed workers will feel that the private work sector has a long-term future in Cuba. Phillips 339 as a result of his effortsFwill have a much greater ability to take advantage of new opportunities to work in profit-making enterprises. While cuentapropistas frequently resist dening themselves in terms of a larger occupational identityFparticularly one dened in relation to capitalismFthey are equally clear that they are devel- oping new skills and abilities that give them a particular indepen- denceFboth economic and ideologicalFfrom traditional institutions of state power. In experimenting with new forms of property and profit-making, cuentapropistas are expanding spheres of individual autonomy and creating alternate social and economic networks that circumvent ofcial state avenues. This renegotiation of work has implications far beyond the day-to- day lives of cuentapropistas themselves and poses a significant challenge to socialist orthodoxy and the Cuban government. No longer following in the footsteps of el hombre nuevo, the new Cuban worker is entrepreneurial, independent, guided by material as well as moral incentives, and self-motivated. Yet cuentapropistas are equally adamant that they are full members of Cuban society and in fact are making important contributions to the prosperity of the socialist state. Nor do they accept that they must be guided by stereotypical capitalist values, but hold up al- ternate culturally informed ideas about family and community. It is this dualityFthe challenge that cuentapropistas pose to the social- ist paradigm, and their insistence that this challenge is in fact a contributionFthat resonates with many ordinary Cubans and makes cuentapropistas a powerful actor in the Cuban landscape. 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In 20052006, she clerked for the Honourable Marie Deschamps at the Supreme Court of Canada. 342 Cuentapropismo in a Workers State
The City As The Object of Architecture Author(s) : Mario Gandelsonas Source: Assemblage, Dec., 1998, No. 37 (Dec., 1998), Pp. 128-144 Published By: The MIT Press