5 Intercultural Communication

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES
Sponsored by the
International Association for
Intercultural Communication Studies
Department of Communication, 310 Strickler Hall
University of Louisville, Louisville, KY USA

Intercultural Communication Studies (ICS) began in 1991 with the goal of
publishing research related to the study of intercultural communication in the
many areas involved in the field. The interdisciplinary nature of the journal
can be seen in some of the fields scheduled for publication:

Art, communication, history, J apanese language and culture,
Korean studies, Chinese culture, language and culture
education, language and linguistics in Europe, law, linguistics,
literature, nonverbal communication, philosophy, religion,
sociology, speech communication, South African studies.

In ICS, theoretical academic articles and articles dealing with educational
and other applications constitute the majority of content. Progress reports on
current research, discussion papers on specific problems in the field, and book
reviews are also included. Those articles that look across disciplinary
boundaries are encouraged.
Authors should follow the APA style book carefully. Each article should
have an abstract and should be followed by a short paragraph explaining how
the content relates to intercultural communication studies as a whole. Authors
or their institutions must be subscribers during the year of publication.

2008 International Association for
Department of Communication
310 Strickler Hall
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292

Intercultural Communication Studies is regularly listed in
the International Current Awareness Services. Selected
material is indexed in the International Bibliography of the
Social Sciences.

INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION
STUDIES
Special Issue Editor
Robert W. Vaagan, Oslo University College

General Editor
Margaret DSilva, University of Louisville

Consulting Editors
Robert W. Vaagan Nabil Echchaibi
Oslo University College University of Colorado, Boulder

Song Li Yoshitaka Miike
Harbin Institute of Technology University of Hawaii, Hilo

Editorial Assistants
Lindsey Bird J acquelyn Lile
University of Louisville University of Louisville

Volume XVII: 3 2008

Intercultural Association for

ISSN 1057 7769

INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION STUDIES is sponsored by the International
Association for Intercultural Communication Studies
General Editor:
Margaret DSilva, University of Louisville, USA
Consulting Editors:
Robert W. Vaagan, Oslo University College, Norway
Song Li, Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Yoshitaka Miike, University of Hawaii at Hilo, USA
Nabil Echchaibi, University of Colorado, Boulder, USA
Editorial Board:
Erich Berendt, Seisen Womens University, J apan
Hu Wenzhong, Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, China
J ia Yuxin, Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Robert N. St. Clair, University of Louisville, USA
Song Li, Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Liu Chang-Yuan, Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Ana C. T. Williams, Northwestern University, USA
Marli Leite, Universidad de Sao Paolo, Brazil
Bates L. Hoffer, Trinity University, USA
Guo-Ming Chen, University of Rhode Island, USA
L. Brooks Hill, Trinity University, USA
Editorial Assistants
Lindsey Bird, Editorial Assistant, University of Louisville, USA
J acquelyn Lile, Editorial Assistant, University of Louisville, USA
IAICS Board of Directors:
Sarah Corona Berkin Universidad de Guadalajara, Mexico
Guo-Ming Chen University of Rhode Island, USA
Ling Chen Hong Kong Baptist University, China
Margaret DSilva University of Louisville, USA
L. Brooks Hill Trinity University, USA
Nobuyuki Honna Aoyama Gakuin University, J apan
Robert N. St. Clair University of Louisville, USA
J ia Yuxin Harbin Institute of Technology, China
Officers of IAICS:
President: Nobuyuki Honna, Aoyama Gakuin University 2007-2009
Vice President: Robert N. St. Clair, University of Louisville 2007-2009
Past Presidents: Bates L. Hoffer, Trinity University 2005-2007
J ia Yuxin, Harbin Institute of Technology 2003-2005
D. Ray Heisey, Kent University 2001-2003
Masanori Higa, Ryukoku University 1999-2001
L. Brooks Hill, Trinity University 1995-1999
Exec. Director: Robert N. St. Clair, University of Louisville
Treasurer: J acquelyn Lile, University of Louisville
Advisory Board
Yuko Takeshita Toyo Eiwa University, J apan
Robert W. Vaagan Oslo University, Norway
Maria Lebdko Far Eastern National University, Russia
Svetlana Ter-Minasova Moscow State University, Russia
Sun Youzhong Beijing Foreign Studies University, China

Volume XVII: 3 Table of Contents 2008

New Media and Globalization: Norway and China
Robert W. Vaagan, Issue Editor 1

The Legitimation of Cultural Icons Across Cultures: The Role
of Mass Media in the Marketing Process
Robert N. St. Clair 13

The Development of the Internet and the Digital Divide in China
A Spatial Analysis
Wei Song 20

Blogs as a New Form of Public Participation in Mainland China
Yonghua Zhang 44

Self-Censorship and the Rise of Cyber Collectives: An Anthropological
Study of a Chinese Online Community
Cuiming Pang 57

It is we you and me, who possess real power: Blogging Protests against
Official Norwegian Policy on Climate Change
Andreas Ytterstad 77

Bubble or the Future? The Challenge of Web 2.0 in China
Na Yang 93

Online News in China and Norway
Arne H. Krumsvik & Xiaowen Wang 104

Can Internet Reconstruct Traditional Media Frames? A Study of Hyperlink
Influence on Responsibility Attribution
Juntao He, Xiaohui Pan, & Yi Liu 118

Complexity Design: A Case Study on Sino-Norwegian Educational
Cooperation using Digital Media
Helge Hivik, Jorun Retvik, & Shenquan Yu 137

Alternative Online Chinese Nationalism: Response to the Anti-J apanese
Campaign in China on Hong Kongs Internet
Simon Shen 155

The Development of Digital Television in China and Norway
Robert W. Vaagan & Yu Wang 169

Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Vaagan
New Media and Globalization: Norway and China

Robert W. Vaagan, Oslo University College

Last year I visited China three times to attend conferences and, as it turned out,
to meet with many of the contributors to this special issue of Intercultural
Communication Studies. I was quite pleased with the networking and discussions
with my colleagues. Then one of my Norwegian students criticized my frequent
airplane travels between Norway and China, claiming that it was having a negative
impact on global CO
2
emissions. Why did I not instead use video conferencing or
other civilized means of new media and mediated communication forms that are
gaining currency with increased globalization? Baffled at first, and almost regretting
that I had recommended my students read, T. Freidmans (2006) The World is Flat.
The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century, I was forced to systematize my
thoughts on communication in an increasingly globalized world. Luckily, many types
of communication at the interpersonal level are still direct and physically face-to-face.
These need not be transmitted through or depend on media. Yet a significant and
apparently increasing proportion of our communication even at the interpersonal
level is mediated in the sense that it is delivered through or with the assistance of
media technologies (Thussu, 2006). These range from increasingly sophisticated
mobile phones to blogs and cyber communities like Facebook or MySpace. The
ubiquitous Internet facilitates many of these new communication forms and is
making them ever more mainstream. In a sense, yesterdays citizens are becoming
tomorrows netizens.

Mediated Communication, New Media and Globalization

The most obvious example of the increased importance of mediated communication
probably involves television, traditionally the most popular medium worldwide. Television --
whether distributed through terrestrial, satellite or cable transmission systems, is now
undergoing digitization. With the proliferation of multiplex digital channels, much more
content is available to viewers than before, and two-way, interactive digital TV programs such
as Idol are becoming increasingly popular in many countries. Another example is the
electronic book or e-book. It is now on the market and cheaper than its printed parent. The e-
book allows access to hundreds of books in one hand-held device. The electronic ink of the e-
book offers better visual reading quality than a traditional PC screen. Also, children and the
visually impaired can activate sound so the text can be read aloud. In reality, the e-book
allows you to carry around a library in your pocket (Dupois & Grallet, 2008). Both interactive
digital TV and e-books are emblematic of new media. A basic distinction between old and
new media is to see the former as print-based and/or one-way, like traditional newspapers
or TV and radio broadcasting, while the latter are overwhelmingly electronic, two-way and
interactive (Everett & Caldwell, 2003; Manovich, 2001; Wardrip-Fruin, 2003). More
specifically, new media can be seen as information and communication technologies plus
their social usage. This last context-related dimension involves a) The devices used to
communicate or convey information; b) The activities and practices in which people engage
1

to communicate or share information; and c) The social or organizational forms that surround
these devices and practices (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2007, p. 2 ).This means that the
analysis of new media can involve at least three analytical levels, ranging from devices
through social practices of individuals or groups to organizations and organizational
communication. Another important point with new media regards the financing where
advertising is playing an ever more important role (Spurgeon, 2008).
Of course, opinions vary on where increasingly mediated communication forms and new
media will lead us and what the effects are. After all, IFS (the information fatigue syndrome)
suggests there are limits to how much media content we can absorb. The skepticism to
television articulated, for example, by Postman (1986) and Bourdieu (1998) and the
dumbing down debate of mass media can be extended to the entertainment-focus of new
media, such as computer games. If we add to this that media conglomerates and ownership
concentration spawned by advertising-funded media often involve a fusion of news and
entertainment, as we see with The Walt Disney Company, there are reasons for concern. Yet it
has proven very difficult to stop technological advances, and technological laggards are an
endangered species.
Ever since Marshall McLuhans concept of the global village was coined in the mid-
1960s, communication at all levels, from interpersonal phone calls to mass communication
and transnational broadcasting, has become increasingly media-dependent, or mediated. Our
messages, or rather the content we put into our messages, are increasingly being channeled
through and processed by a variety of new media technologies and formats before reaching
the receiver. New interactive media muddle the traditional distinction between sender and
receiver. When tourists check out distant destinations and plan itineraries through Google
Earth where sights can speak back to us through animations or guided virtual tours, who is
then the sender and who is the receiver? Further examples of such interactive new media are
online newspapers, blogs, web pages, electronic net journals, e-mails and SMS, CD/DVD,
electronic kiosks, virtual reality and cyber societies, data games, interactive TV, IP-
telephoning, e-commerce, 3G mobile telephoning, and podcasting (Lievrouw & Livingstone,
2007). Some would also include electronic books where publishers can now choose between
several technologies such as Sonys Reader PRS-505, Bookens Cybook, Ganaxas GeR2, or
iRex Technologies iLiad (Dupois & Grallet, 2008). In Norway the latest fashion is
litcasting, or the broadcasting of sound books. Some see these developments as an
irreversible consequence of a technology-driven process and technological determinism.
McLuhan argued that In the electric age, when our central nervous system is technologically
extended to involve us in the whole of mankind the globe is no more than a village (1964,
p. 5). Others take a more sinister view and see a development from Orwells 1984 to an
emerging surveillance society where all our electronic traces as individual citizens are
assembled in databases beyond our reach and control (Hirst & Harrison, 2007).
Since the 1960s, the process of globalization and the attendant forms of mediated
communication have undergone tremendous changes. This is not the time or place to
elaborate on what Curran (2002) has called the absent debate in the development of
globalization theory and practice, but some key points should be outlined. Writing in the
early 1990s, Sreberny (1991, reprinted 2006, p. 605) asserted that the field of international
communications since the 1960s had been dominated by three successive intellectual
paradigms: a) communications and development; b) cultural imperialism and c) revisionist
2

cultural pluralism. To this she added her own fourth paradigm with globalization of media
forms, structures, flows and effects. The most critical contemporary voices regarding
globalization see it as a US-led (and to some extent also European) exploitation of a single,
worldwide market where new media forms are simply tools of an emerging surveillance
economy and society (Ahmad, 2004; Hirst & Harrison, 2007, p. 49). Less critical voices argue
that while globalization may lead to unprecedented standardization and cultural homogeneity,
the global media industries have responded by producing global media in local languages
and integrating local content in various ways (Machin & van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 2-3).
Agreeing with this last view Volkmer (2005, p. 367) describes a global public space and a
new transnational dimension for political communication that influences national/statist
political spheres. Today, globalization is bringing change to the established system of nation
states with national languages and cultures. Increasingly, an emerging global language and
culture transmitted by global corporations and international organizations rather than nation-
states is making itself felt. In this process mediated communication is playing a key role,
although there is disagreement on the extent and pace of the process and the exact role of the
media (Machin & van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 2-3; Curran, 2005, p. 182; Hafez, 2007; McDowell
et al., 2008). Consistent with this breadth of perspectives, some emphasize that globalization
is inextricably linked with related concepts such as deterritorialization, disembedding,
acceleration, standardization, interconnectedness, movement, mixing, vulnerability, and re-
embedding (Hylland Eriksen, 2007, p. 7-8). Others again encapsulate many of the same
problems in terms such as globalists vs. anti-globalists, the infosphere, etc. (Held &
McGrew, 2007; McDowell et al., 2008). Despite these differences, we can conclude that the
following is a fairly standard view of the relationship between new media and globalization
today:

Globalization is ... the overall process whereby the location of production,
transmission and reception of media content ceases to be geographically fixed, partly
as a result of technology, but also through international media structure and
organization. Many cultural consequences are predicted to follow, especially the
delocalizing of content and undermining of local cultures. These may be regarded as
positive when local cultures are enriched by new impulses and creative hybridization
occurs. More often they are viewed as negative because of threats to cultural identity,
autonomy and integrity. The new media are widely thought to be accelerating the
process of globalization. (McQuail, 2005, p. 556-557)

Needless to say, these changes have also affected journalism and the role of the journalist,
including in China where Lee (2005) distinguishes historically between three broad types of
journalists: Confucian-liberal (1900s-1940s), Maoist (1949-present) and Communist-capitalist
journalists (from 1980s, esp. after 1992). In China, the role of the Communist Party still
precludes an independent role for journalism, (e.g. the media are not mentioned in text books
on the Chinese government) (Yang, 2004). The different understandings of journalism in
China and in the West have become apparent in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics (Markin,
2007; Foss & Walkosz, 2007). Ultimately, the changes affect all of us and how we as citizens
and individuals perceive the world through national, transnational and global news flows.
Prior to the arrival of the Internet and online journalism from the mid-1990s onward, global
3

news followed four main routes: news organizations own foreign correspondents, news
agencies, shortwave radio, and satellite television. The advent of the Internet, information age
journalism, online journalism, blogs, and citizen journalism has changed the profession. The
web now offers a proliferation of news sources, institutional and individual, that represent
alternatives to journalistic gate-keeping. Truthful and accurate reporting may still be a
professional ideal for many, and investigative reporting is no doubt still taking place, but the
overall impact of new media on the quality and direction of journalism is unclear. If we add to
these issues the concentration of media ownership, media conglomerates, the forces of
advertising-funded media, the fusion of the entertainment and news industries, and media
convergence, we are looking at the major challenges and critical issues facing contemporary
journalism which are to a large extent accentuated by globalization and new media. (Allan,
2005, 2006; Campbell, 2005; Croteau & Hoynes, 2005; Curran, 2002; McPhail, 2006;
Spurgeon, 2008).

Norway, China and Virtual Cosmopolitanism

Norway and China are obviously very different countries in many respects, most
obviously in terms of geography and demography. While tiny Norway is home to a small
population of 4.6 million and covers only 323,875 square kilometers in the northern corner of
Europe, immense China with a population of 1.3 billion straddles no less than 9,560,900
square kilometres and many time zones at the other side of the globe. If we look at some
selected ICT parameters, these also show clear differences, e.g. telephone lines per 100
inhabitants: Norway: 45.7 and China: 26.6; or mobile phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants:
Norway: 102.9 and China: 29.9; or computers per 1,000 inhabitants: Norway: 57.2 and China:
4.1; and lastly Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants: Norway: 515.2 and China: 1.5 (The
Economist 2007, p. 131,189). The differences extend also to how governments relate to
globalization and mediated communication. Global information and communication
technologies pose a number of challenging issues to nation states, especially transnational
issues of intellectual property rights, privacy and freedom of expression (Stein & Sinha, 2007).
It may be sufficient here to note that China and Norway differ in how their governments are
handling these issues. Thus Rao (2005, p.282-283) has classified information societies on a
scale ranging from restrictive to embryonic, emerging, negotiating, intermediate,
mature, advanced, and agenda-setting. He places China in the negotiating group.
Here widespread Internet/wireless infrastructure exists, there are local capacities for ICTs and
e-commerce, and governments are negotiating benefits and challenges of new media while
authorities exercise strong control over online content and search engines, coupled with
political and cultural censorship of the Internet. Though not specifically mentioned, Norway
would most probably be put in the mature group where there is large-scale penetration of
Internet/wireless; a mature business model for online content, and furthermore the political
climate is generally free of censorship for traditional and online media. Whether one agrees
with Raos terminology or not, the issues he identifies are in ample evidence in China and in
Norway, as the articles in the present volume reflect. In comparing two such very different
countries as Norway and China in terms of the information society criteria and terminology of
Rao, we need to keep in mind the much larger growth potential of China. In December 2007,
Asia accounted for 38.7% of world internet users, and the corresponding figures for other
4

regions were: Europe (26.4%), North America (18%), Latin America/Caribbean (9.6%),
Africa (3.4 %), Middle East( 2.5%) and Oceania/Australia (1.5%). In China the most recent
figures estimate there were 210 million internet users in December 2007, compared with only
22 million in 2000. With higher penetration rates there is no doubt China will dominate global
Internet user statistics (Internet World Statistics, 2008).
In terms of globalization and new media, both Norway and China are affected in many
ways. The blog of the two Chinese Dormitory Boys and their tremendous success on YouTube
with their dubbed versions of pop hits reflect that new media is tremendously popular among
Chinese youth with access to the Internet. Scholarly works on traditional Chinese culture may
need to be rewritten in the years ahead (Zhang Qishi, 2004). Their blog (Dormitory Boys,
2008) is also very popular with Norwegian youths, suggesting that although Norway and
China are far apart geographically, this is no impediment to global netizens or virtual
cosmopolitans from both countries. But also in real life outside cyberspace and the
blogosphere there are now close bilateral relations between Norway and China, both
economically and politically.
As a newly appointed executive officer at The Norwegian Ministry of Trade and
Shipping in the early 1980s, I was second to the China desk and monitored the economic
and commercial ties between Norway and China. I frequently met with Chinese guests and
came to realize how misleading the stereotype of Chinese collectivism versus Norwegian
individualism could be. When I some years later worked as Regional manager for the Far East
in a private commercial bank, I travelled extensively in Asia and gained a deeper
understanding of China.
Ever since Norwegian sailors from the 1600s started bringing back exotica from China
that duly entered into private collections and folk culture, there has been a fascination among
many Norwegians with distant China (Huitfeldt, 2002). Chinas unprecedented economic
growth over the last 2 decades has turned it into a key stakeholder in global politics and trade,
a change that Norway (as only a small global stakeholder) has attempted to adjust toward. The
Norwegian government in August 2007 launched a new strategy regarding China,
encouraging increased and intensified bilateral contacts at all levels. Almost a year before that,
in December 2006, my faculty at Oslo University College decided to host a visiting scholar
from China Dr. Yu Wang from the Communication University of China in Beijing for a
10-month period, under the bilateral cultural exchange program between the two countries.
Shortly after her arrival in Oslo in September 2006, she and I decided to co-author a research
paper on digital TV. We also received generous support from the KLOK program at Oslo
University College, a cross-disciplinary research program involving several faculties and
centers. In October, we also applied to The Norwegian Research Council for a small grant for
a project entitled Norwegian-Chinese Media and Communication Research. The financing
we received in December 2006 has so far resulted in two work shops, several conference
papers and meetings during the course of 2007, including the 12 papers in this special volume
of Intercultural Communication Studies.

Special Issue of Intercultural Communication Studies

While Intercultural Communication Studies over the years has published numerous
contributions on various media and on different aspects of the media, the field of intercultural
5

communications as such has still not addressed the role of new media. For instance, the
otherwise excellent textbook by Neuliep (2006) does not index or fully discuss media or
new media. There is considerable potential for intercultural communication studies in terms
of new media. This special issue of Intercultural Communication Studies brings together 12
articles, including this introductory article, on various forms of new media, mediated
communication and globalization in Norway and China. The number of articles is more a
reflection of the size of the research group than a parallel to the Chinese zodiac.They all
address most of the issues identified by Rao and other scholars referred to above. Most of the
articles are linked with the research project I had the pleasure of heading in 2007, and it has
been my great privilege to work with distinguished scholars, PhD candidates and Master
students from Norway, China and the US in a multidisciplinary group with both established
and new scholars where our common goal has been to write research papers related to new
media, mediated communication and globalization. A broad concept of the media has been
encouraged, extending the definition to embrace mediated communication taking place, for
example, through or in art exhibitions and the classroom. This is consistent with the
organizational forms dimension of new media mentioned earlier and defined by Lievrouw
& Livingstone (2007). While this broad definition may irk some media purists, it is consistent
with the rapid changes that are taking place in new media studies: if we today can conduct e-
tours of museums and art exhibitions from our laptops wherever we happen to be, or access
global literature through e-books from any geographic vantage point, it seems reasonable not
to exclude institutions or organizations using new media to broaden communication with their
audiences. In a media-saturated global environment, media literacy similarly must adopt a
broad understanding of the media (Potter, 2004). Consequently, organizational
communication can be part of new media studies (Eisenberg & Goodall, 2004).
In media and communication studies as it is taught in Western liberal democracies, one
traditionally distinguishes between three different research traditions depending on the frame
of analysis: institutions, texts or audiences (Bertrand & Hughes, 2005). Some authors like
McQuail (2005) throw in effect studies with audience research. Had this research project only
involved myself or close colleagues in media & communication studies or journalism studies,
these paradigms may well have prevailed in selecting and arranging articles for this type of
anthology. However, the KLOK program at Oslo University College which initially supported
this project, encourages multidisciplinary and multi-method research (Brewer & Hunter,
2006), and from the outset several of my colleagues from the Center for Educational Research
and Development took active part. In addition, the project soon attracted scholars with
diverse disciplinary backgrounds from both mainland China, Hong Kong and the U.S. This
diversity is felt in the articles to follow. Likewise, this has been a further reason to adopt a
broad definition and understanding of media and of mediated communication.
On behalf of the authors, I would like to thank The Research Council of Norway for
generous support, and also the KLOK research program at Oslo University College. I also
want to thank The International Association for Intercultural Communication Studies for
agreeing to publish this special issue of Intercultural Communication Studies. I am very
indebted to J untao He, Shenzhen University, who has kindly assisted me in the editing and
technical layout of all the articles in this volume. Together with two of his colleagues, he has
also contributed an article to this volume. Last but not least I am greatly indebted to each of
the authors who have contributed time and effort to this joint undertaking.
6

Below, I have listed and briefly outlined each of the articles and also added a few lines of
biographical information on the authors. The sequence has been determined mostly by theme
and scope, each article thereby adding to the understanding of the next article. Together, they
hopefully form a story that justifies the title of this volume.

The Legitimation of Cultural Icons Across Cultures:
The Role of Mass Media in the Marketing Process
Robert N. St. Clair

Globalization involves an emerging world culture and consciousness, often generated by
capitalist economic actors, often originating in the U.S., seeking profit in a global market
(Lechner & Boli, 2008, p. 1-5). When Starbucks Coffee was temporarily allowed to operate
from within The Forbidden City in Beijing, many observers believed the term clash of
civilizations had acquired a new meaning. In his analysis of cultural icons across cultures,
Robert St. Clair, professor at University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky and President of
the International Association for Intercultural Studies, addresses an important aspect (some
would say a consequence) of the tremendous economic growth that has taken place in China
over the last two decades, coinciding with forces of globalization. Nobody can hide from the
effects of globalization, which its staunchest critics equate with Americanization and
McWorld.

The Development of the Internet and the Digital Divide in China - a Spatial Analysis
Wei Song

Dr. Wei Song, Department of Geography & Geosciences, University of Louisville,
Louisville, Kentucky, discusses digital divides in China, at the national and local levels. Using
Internet user counts and the number of domain names, he assesses the spatial divide in the
distribution of Internet content creation and demand for Internet services. These are measured
by a User Quotient (IUQ) which indicates the extent to which Internet users are concentrated
in a province as compared to the nation as a whole, and a Domain Name Specialization Ratio
(DSR), which is a standardized measure of the specialization of a region in domain names as
compared to the nation as a whole. In conclusion, he finds discrepancies in digital access that
suggest the digital divide is not likely to disappear in the near future.

Yonghua Zhang

Many scholars in the fields of political studies and communication studies have discussed
the implications of the blogosphere and citizen journalism/grassroots journalism to democracy.
Professor Yonghua Zhang, Chair, Department of Journalism and Communication, School of
Film, TV Art and Technology, Shanghai University, extends this perspective to the Chinese
context. Based on the blog content of a few selected websites in mainland China, she
discusses the role of blogging in public discussion of issues of general concern. Finding that
blogging in China so far is mostly private in nature, and drawing a parallel with European
coffee houses of the 17th and 18th centuries, she explores the interplay between new online
7

media and traditional mass media, with an emphasis on present and future merits and demerits
of blogging and democratic processes.

Self-Censorship and the Rise of Cyber Collectives.
An Anthropological Study of a Chinese Online Community
Cuiming Pang

Chinese youths are increasingly turning to the Internet to communicate with other
youths, inside and outside China, and there are countless Chinese online communities. Many
of these young virtual cosmopolitans know they will run into problems of censorship,
filtering and government control. The issue of self-censorship, i.e. the extent to which one
refrains from or avoids certain types of cyber conduct in anticipation of possible sanctions or
lack of approval from the environment, is an interesting research topic, as PhD candidate
Cuiming Pang, Oslo University discusses.

Blogging Protests against Official Norwegian Policy on Climate Change
Andreas Ytterstad

Blogging has become a major feature of new media and anyone with access to the
Internet can use the blog to speak their minds to the world. There are considerable differences
globally in terms of Internet penetration and access, as there are significant differences
regarding the extent of government censorship. In Norway where most people enjoy
broadband access and a large extent of freedom of expression, ordinary concerned citizens
and established politicians are increasingly resorting to blogs to comment in Norwegian on a
wide range of issues, for example, the climate debate. PhD candidate Andreas Ytterstad, Oslo
University College, has chosen blogs and the climate debate in Norway as the theme of his
PhD project. While his material is Norwegian, it may be suggestive of the possibilities and
direction of political blogging also in other countries.

Arne H. Krumsvik & Xiaowen Wang

In many countries, traditional print newspapers face plummeting sales and circulation
while electronic online newspapers are on the rise. Like much of the media industry,
newspapers are squeezed between on the one hand what Croteau & Hoynes (2006) term the
public sphere model with its macro-perspective of informed readership and the public
interest and on the other hand the business model dictated by the more micro-oriented
bottom-line considerations of enterprises. The decreasing popularity of traditional, print-based
one-way media and the increasing popularity of two-way, interactive, electronic media
mean that the work of journalists and editors is rapidly changing. Research fellow and PhD
candidate Arne H. Krumsvik, Oslo University College, and MA candidate Xiaowen Wang,
Communication University of China, discuss these developments in their co-authored
comparative article on the status and development of online news in China and Norway.

8

Bubble or Future? The Challenge of Web 2.0 in China
Na Yang

As PhD candidate Na Yang, Communication University of China, explains, the term
Web 2.0 was coined in 2004, and refers broadly to a second generation of web-based
communities and hosted services, particularly social-networking sites and blogs. Of special
concern are the ways in which these facilitate creativity and collaboration among end users
and software developers, from ordinary netizens to business enterprises. By contributing
content, the end user gives meaning to the term interactivity. Outlining the history of the
Internet in China and with an emphasis on regulations such as censorship and social effects,
especially decentralization of power, Na Yang finds that although Web 2.0 is popular with
many Chinese netizens, the business community and investors have so far not identified a
clear business model. The future of advertising-funded media in China is therefore still not
clear, although the potential is obvious (Spurgeon, 2008). It may therefore be too early to
conclude how Web 2.0 will affect Chinese society.

Complexity Design: A Case Study on
Sino-Norwegian Educational Cooperation using Digital Media
Helge Hivik, Jorun Retvik & Shengquan Yu

In Norway, digital competence is one of 5 basic skills in primary school; also in
secondary and tertiary education, ICT is quickly making inroads. Internationally, ICTs have
already made headway in the classrooms in many countries, sometimes as shared tools of
globalized infrastructures. This is demonstrated in this article where Helge Hivik, J orun
Retvik and Shenquan Yu discuss educational innovation, design, design templates and
patterns in e-learning, versatility, software solutions, and present findings from their dragon
project, involving pupils and students in primary, secondary and tertiary level education
institutions in Norway, China and Poland. Helge Hivik is associate professor at the Center
for Educational Research and Development, and J orun Retvik is assistant professor at The
Faculty of Art, Design and Drama, both Oslo University College. Shenquan Yu is professor at
The School of Modern Education Technology, Beijing Normal University.

Can Internet Reconstruct Traditional Media Frames?
A Study of Hyperlink Influence on Responsibility Attribution
Juntao He, Xiaohui Pan & Yi Liu

The hyperlink structure of the Internet resembles the way the brain processes information
through neural nodes, and can be seen as a prerequisite for all Internet-based communication
drawing on hyperlink structures. This idea is elaborated by J untao He, Xiaohui Pan and Yi
Liu, who are all Masters in Mass Communication at Shenzhen University. They discuss the
extent to which hyperlinks can connect fragmented information into an integrated and more
meaningful picture, thus affecting audience perception of society. In this perspective, the
Internet can be viewed as a framing mechanism to reconstruct traditional media frames. In
conclusion, the authors argue that while cyberspace may not give China more democracy, it
does provide an opportunity to think more rationally about the formation of democracy.
9


Alternative Online Chinese Nationalism:
Response to the Anti-Japanese Campaign in China on Hong Kongs Internet
Simon Shen

Cybermen are playing an increasing role in Hong Kong public discursive debate in
Hong Kong, and many mainland cybermen are also joining in. In April 2005, a series of anti-
J apanese demonstrations broke out in China. Some scholars described these events in terms of
Chinas online nationalism. Is this form of Chinese nationalism found throughout China?
Do the mainland Chinese Internet users have a different nationalist attitude from their
compatriots living on Chinas periphery in places like Hong Kong? What are the implications
for Chinas future? Dr. Simon Shen, Associate professor, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The
Chinese University of Hong Kong, discusses the concurrent and subsequent response of Hong
Kongs cybermen to the anti-J apanese discourse prevalent within the mainland Internet
community from April 2005 to March 2007. Drawing on messages from 10 electronic forums
in Hong Kong, his analysis probes into the reasons behind the differences, and he previews a
likely pattern of online Chinese nationalism, should political circumstances in Beijing one day
approximate those of present-day Hong Kong.

Robert Vaagan & Yu Wang

Television remains the most popular global medium and the switch from analogue to
digital TV technology taking place worldwide offers TV viewers much more program content
and channel choice, but of course all this comes with a price. Associate professor, Dr. Yu
Wang, Communication University of China, Beijing and Associate professor, Dr. Robert
Vaagan, Faculty of Journalism, Library and Information Science, Oslo University College,
discuss these developments and identify key stakeholders and structures in China and Norway
regarding government policy formulation of digital TV. While China and Norway are very
different, their governments face many of the same problems regarding digital TV
development: a need to weigh public interest and state broadcasting services against market-
driven pressures, viewership preferences and affordability, all ushered in by globalization,
economic progress and technological advancement.

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Allan, S. (Ed.). (2005). Journalism: Critical issues. London: Open University Press.
Bertrand, I., & Hughes, P. (2005). Media research methods. Audiences, institutions, texts.
London: Palgrave MacMillan.
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Sur la tlvision [On television]. Paris: Liber.
Brewer, J ., & Hunter, A. (2006). Foundations of multimethod research. Synthesizing styles.
London: Sage.
Campbell, V. (2004). Information age journalism. Journalism in an international context.
London: Arnold.
10

Croteau, D., & Hoynes, W. (2006). The business of media. Corporate media and the public
interest. Pine Forge Press: Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi.
Curran, J . (2002). Globalization theory: the absent debate. In J . Curran (Eds.), Media and
power (pp. 166-184). London: Routledge.
Curran, J . (2002). Media and power. London: Routledge.
De Burgh, H. (Ed.). (2005). Making journalists. London: Routledge .
Dupois, J ., & Grallet, G. (2008). Le Livre numrique pour les nulls [The e-book for dummies].
Express International, February 28, 76-78.
Dormitory Boys (2008). Retrieved February. 25, 2008, from
http://twochineseboys.blogspot.com/
Durham, M. G., & Kellner, D. M. (Eds.). (2006). Media and culture studies. KeyWorks.
London: Blackwell.
Eisenberg, E. M. & Goodall, H. L. J r. (2004). Organizational communication. Balancing
creativity and constraint. Boston: Bedford/St.Martins.
Everett, A. & Caldwell, J . T. (Eds.). (2003). New media. Theories and practices of
digitextuality. London: Routledge.
Foss, S. K. & Walkosz, B. J . (2007). Spatial structuring of cultural display around Chinas
Olympic games: Definition, equivocation, accumulation and anticipation. In
Collections. 2007: China Communication Forum (pp. 650-670). Beijing: National
Center for Radio and Television Studies at The Communication University of China
Freidman, T. L. (2006). The world is flat. The globalized world in the twenty-first century.
London: Penguin.
Hafez, K. (2007). The myth of media globalization. London: Polity Press.
Held, D., & McGrew, A. (2007). Globalization/Anti-globalization. Beyond the great divide.
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Hemer, O. & Tufte, T. (Eds.). (2005). Media and global change. Rethinking communication
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Hirst, M., & Harrison, J . (2007). Communication and new media: From broadcast to
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Huitfeldt, J . (2002). Drmmen om Kina. Kineserier fra europeiske slott til norsk folkekunst
[Dreaming about China. Chinese objects from European castles and Norwegian folk
art]. Oslo: Andresen & Butenschn.
Hylland E., T. (2007). The key concepts: Globalization. Oxford: Berg.
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Lechner, F., & Boli, J . (Eds.). (2008). The globalization reader. London: Blackwell.
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Markin, K. M. (2007). Traditional Chinese values and their implications for the
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11

Television Studies at The Communication University of China.
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Governance, technology and cultural practice in motion. Philadelphia: Temple
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12

Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: 3 2008 St. Clair
The Legitimation of Cultural Icons across Cultures:
The Role of Mass Media in the Marketing Process

Robert N. St. Clair, University of Louisville

In the world of international trade, products also carry cultural values and many of
these products remain as commodities but others emerge as cultural icons. How do
certain products take on a special symbolic status and are idealized in a culture? The
answer to this question is a rather complex one. It has to do with how cultural
artifacts are embedded into the cultural space of the past. For example, the cultural
space of a nation-state changes over time. Before discussing how cultural icons are
legitimated in a foreign nation-state, one should first consider some examples of
certain cultural icons that are already established in China.
International products by themselves are merely commodities. They are artifacts
produced in another country. However, some artifacts transcend the image of mere
commodities and take on a significant ambience. Whetmore (1987) has referred to
these products as cultural icons. What is interesting about these icons is that they
are given special status in the cultural space of other cultures. This process and the
role that mass marketing plays in the social construction of these icons are discussed
in this essay. It is now time to look closer at some of these cultural icons.

The Supremacy of Coca-Cola as a Cultural Icon

Coca-Cola is a carbonated soft drink introduced in the United States in 1866. It is now
sold in stores, restaurants, and vending machines in more than 200 countries world wide.
China was one of its first overseas markets. The actual production and distribution of Coca-
Cola follows a franchising model. The company only produces a syrup concentrate which it
sells to various bottlers around the world who hold the Coca-Cola franchise for a certain
geographical area. The bottlers produce the final drink by mixing the syrup with filtered water
and sugars before they carbonate it as a Coca-Cola brand product.
Coca-Cola promoted its product as a cultural icon by sponsoring international events. For
example, Coca-Cola was the first-ever sponsor of the Olympic Games. In 1928, it promoted
its product at the games in Amsterdam and it has been an Olympic sponsor ever since. Hence,
it is not surprising to see that Coca-Cola is also a sponsor of the Olympic Games in Beijing in
2008. The marketing of Coca-Cola as a cultural icon is not limited to the Olympics. Since
1978, Coca-Cola sponsored the FIFA World Cup and in one of the events it was even called
the FIFA Coca Cola Cup. The brand has been marketed in association with Major League
Baseball, the National Football League, the National Basketball Association and other
sporting events as the official soft drink at those events. The result is that Coca-Cola has
taken on a high degree of identification with the United States. It has become a cultural icon
(Rosen & Sevastiades, 1993).
Coca-Cola entered China in 1928 when it became a sponsor of the Olympic Games in
China. The company built its first bottling plant in China after the First World War and was
the first company from the Untied States to distribute products in China after Deng Xiaoping

13
opened the country to foreign investors in 1979. Today, Coca-Cola has 24 bottling companies
in that country (19 of these 24 use the foreign majority partners: Swire and Kerry). These
bottling companies account for 70% of Chinas carbonated beverage market and generate
annual sales up to $1.2 billion USD (Du, 2001). In addition to the 14,000 employees of Coca-
Cola as suppliers, distributors, wholesalers, and retailers, there are an additional 400,000 who
are employed in related company ventures. Currently, Coca-Cola spends $600 million
annually on raw materials and packaging supplies in China. Initially, Coca-Cola imported its
products and was only allowed to sell them retail outlets designed for foreigners such as
hotels and Friendship Stores. Coca-Cola appeared in the Shanghai Club and the Country Club
in Hong Kong, both under British control (Allman, 2007). However, with the construction of
bottling plants in Beijing, Guangzhou and Xiamen, ownership was given over to the central
government and this improved the sales and secured the distribution rights of this product. In
addition to the internationally known drinks of Coca-Cola, Fanta, and Sprite, local brands
have been developed in China through the Tianjin J in Mei Beverage Co., Ltd. One such
product is Tianyudi (Heaven and Earth), a noncarbonated drink that includes mango and
lychee flavors mixed with golong and jasmine teas. Coca-Cola is now involved in the
production of Tianyudi.
This introduction of Tianyudi provides an example of how Coca-Cola has been able to
secure a foot hold in China. It has a policy of think local, act local. The company
encourages local managers to develop new drinks and as a result, there are some 19 brand
names across the Asia-Pacific Region. Local managers also have control over advertising
operations and this has led to the investment of $26.1 million in advertising. Consequently,
Coca-Cola was the first foreign company to advertise on CCTV, Chinas central-government
television station (Weisert, 2001).

Starbucks in China

Starbucks began in Seattle in 1971 in the famous Pike Place Market. Howard Schultz
joined the company in 1982 as its director. He convinced the founders of that company to test
the coffee house concept in downtown Seattle. It soon developed into 6,566 company
operated stores nation-wide and 3,729 licensed stores (Starbucks, 2007). The first Starbucks
opened in Beijing in 1999 and has grown to the point where it accounts for less than 10% of
the $6.4 billion in global sales. In Beijing, however, Starbucks has maintained an annual sales
growth of more than 30% in recent years.
In China, Starbucks uses a different kind of ownership structure. It authorizes local
developers to use the Starbucks brand or set up a joint venture with partners. In Beijing, the
Meida Coffee Co. Ltd. is authorized to develop northern China. It is 90% owned by a Hong
Kong-based firm, one of the largest venture-capital companies in the Asia-Pacific region. In
Shanghai, the developing partner is the Uni-President Starbucks Coffee Ltd. It operates in
Shanghai and in the J iangsu and Zhejiant provinces. In this joint venture 95% of the
ownership is held by the Uni-President Group, a Taiwan-based company. In Hong Kong, the
Maxims Caterers Ltd. is the joint venture partner. It operates in Hong Kong, Macau, and
southern China. There are now 400 stores in China. It is no longer just a commodity, but a
cultural icon. However, as a cultural icon, it has encountered massive resentment when it built
one of its outlets in the Forbidden City.

14
Biz China is the prime-time daily business show on China Central Television
International. The Director of Biz China is Ghenggang Rui. In 2007, he started an online
campaign to remove Starbucks Coffee from Beijings Forbidden City (Rui, 2007). He did not
see Starbucks as just another cultural icon, but one that was trampling over the Chinese
culture. There are many Starbucks in China, but they were not the center of attention. For
example, he did not attack the Starbucks at the New World Plaza in downtown Beijing which
is surrounded by other cultural icons such as Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), and Pizza Hut.
As a result of this tirade by Rui and his supporters, Starbucks closed its coffee house in the
Imperial Palace. In the social psychology of globalization, the two cultural icons clashed with
one another. Starbucks is a cultural icon of the United States; The Forbidden City is a cultural
icon of China (Chiu & Cheng, 2007). When these two cultural icons are seen, they invoke the
cultural values of their own nation-states. If they are juxtaposed in a public space, the result is
a cognitive clash of values and traditions. This juxtaposition of cultural icons leads to an
interesting question. Would the opening of a Chinese restaurant chain in the White House
create a similar problem of cognitive dissonance? The answer is affirmative. Starbucks lacked
cultural sensitivity by building one of their franchises in the Forbidden City and the Chinese
lacked a similar insensitivity by allowing it to be built there.
What is interesting about the Starbucks case is not that globalization took place or that
cultural icons are being imported into China. What is interesting about this situation is where
they are allowed to operate. The New World Plaza in Beijing is a thriving place of
modernization. It is a symbol of modernity. The Forbidden Palace, on the other hand, is a
cultural icon of the past. This is one case in which the business adage of location, location,
and location does not work. Globalization can be an enriching process because it brings in
new experiences, strengthens the process of cultural diffusion, and it removes barriers that
stand in the way of cultural change (Appiah, 2006). Critics of globalization argue that the
process is a hegemonic force that undermines the cultural identity of a nation-state. This may
be true of societal types that are distant from the complexities of modern industrial societies
(Brahm, 2002). However, China is a modern industrial nation. They are not threatened by the
cultural icons of transnational companies (Huntington, 1996). The problem is that modern
nation-states are hybrids. They maintain cultural icons of the past in the form of holidays, and
national monuments. A national monument must be treated as a sacred place and they must be
respected and treated separately from other parts of a nation-state and its involvement in
modernity.

McDonalds in China

The McDonald brothers operated a hamburger stand in San Bernadino, California. What
made their fast food operation unique is that it operated an assembly-line procedure for
cooking and serving hamburgers. The menu was limited to nine items: hamburgers,
cheeseburgers, three types of soft drinks, milk, coffee, potato chips, and pies. French fries and
milkshakes were soon added. In 1954, Ray Kroc visited the hamburger stand and in the
following year he formed a partnership with the McDonald brothers (Ritzer, 1993). In 1955,
McDonalds opened up its first restaurant. By focusing on the efficiency of the operation, the
owners were able to keep the costs down substantially and soon became a leader in the fast

15
food industry. By 1998, it had about 23,000 restaurants in more than 110 countries.
McDonalds and its golden arches has now become a cultural icon.
When the first restaurant opened in Singapore in 1982, it quickly became the largest
selling McDonalds in the world. In 1992, it opened its largest restaurant in Beijing with 700
seats, 29 cash registers, and nearly 1,000 employees. On the first day of business, it served
more than 40,000 customers (Rizter, 1993; Yan, 2002). The headquarters of McDonalds in
Asia is located in Hong Kong where the business began in 1974. Recently, however, the
headquarters has been moved to Shanghai. Some say that it is because the company has some
600 restaurants on the Chinese mainland. Others claim that the move was because KFC, its
rival, has been a runaway success in Hong Kong. Still others attribute the move to the fact
that the manager in Hong Kong is accused of taking bribes and kick backs from Thai-based
food suppliers.
The problem with a good idea is that it is copied and improved upon. Other competitors
also began to sell hamburgers in an assembly-line fashion and have done well. This has led
the firm to add new items to its menu. It now offers fried chicken and Starbucks coffee and
various kinds of soft-cone ice cream. This is done in order to ward off its competitors. One of
its biggest competitors is KFC.

The Colonel Visits China

Colonel Harlan Sanders owned and operated a restaurant that specialized in fried chicken
as its main menu item. It was not a new business for him. He served his fried chicken in 1930
in the midst of the Great Depression at a gas station that he owned. By 1936, his restaurant
expanded to 142 seats. By 1940, he devised what has come to be known as his original
recipe. By the 1950s, he sold his restaurant and traveled the U.S. to attempt to franchise his
restaurant, Kentucky Fried Chicken. By 1960, there were 600 outlets in the U.S. and Canada.
When he finally sold his ownership of the franchising group, he received $2 million. Most
recently, it was sold to Pepsi Cola who made it a part of their Tricon Global Restaurants
division. They changed Kentucky Fried Chicken to KFC (Keegan, 1991) and by 1997 the
conglomerate was renamed Yum! Brands.
KFC is located in Louisville, Kentucky. Today, it has 10,000 restaurants in 78 countries.
It has many global franchises. In 1978, KFC opened its first Western fast-food restaurant in
Tianamen Square, Beijing. Since then, it has over 1200 restaurants in over 121 cities in China.
It is one of the most recognized cultural icons in China. It dominates over its rival, McDonald.

Making Chinese Brands go Global

Cultural icons are lucrative. They bring in brand loyalty and brand recognition. For these
reasons among others, all multinational trading companies want to establish their
commodities as cultural icons in other nation-states. China is rapidly moving in that direction.
Two brand names have recently emerged that merit further discussion, Lenovo Computers
and Tsingtao Beer.

16
Lenovo Computers

Two years ago, Dell Inc. rejected a plan to sell computers online in China. The problem,
according to Dell, is that Chinese consumers didnt use credit cards online. This situation is
similar to the experience of online shopping in the U.S. Most consumers were wary of using
their cards online due to security issues. In addition to this rationale, Dell Inc. assumed that
these Chinese consumers were too poor to become big web shoppers. This evaluation of the
computer consumer market was not consistent with the facts. More than 90 million people
along the countrys coastal cities have access to the Internet at home or at work. The Chinese
computer company, Lenovo, provides them with a home market. As a matter of fact, Lenovo,
commands one-third of the Chinese marketplace. However, Lenovo is not content in just
supplying the regional markets. They want to become an international icon. They have
already began this journey but completing a $1.25 million acquisition of IBMs Think
brand. This includes its laptops (ThinkPad), desktops (ThinkCentre), software tools
(ThinkVantage) and monitors (ThinkVision). As a consequence of this move, Lenovo now
ranks third in the worldwide PC business behind Dell and HP.
The company has a worldwide workforce of more than 19,000 people and 4,400 retail
outlets in China. Its principal home of operations of Lenovo is in Beijing with assembly
factories in Shenzhen, Huiyang, Beijing, and Shanghai. The new Lenovo will have annual
revenues of $14 billion and a volume of approximately 14 million units. Obviously, Lenovo is
now a cultural icon.

Tsingtao Beer

The Tsingtao Brewery was founded in 1903 by German settlers in Qingdao, China.
Tsingtao Lager is brewed and bottled by the Tsingtao Brewery-the 10th largest brewery in the
world. Also, it is the 12th largest beer brand worldwide. It is sold in more than 50 countries.
In 1972, the beer was introduced in the U.S. and soon became one of the best sellers.
Today, 27% of the Tsingtao Brewery Company Ltd. is owned by Anheuser-Busch. It
should be noted that Harbin Beer is also partially owned by Anheuser-Busch. Because the
distribution of this beer was limited, the company was forced to deal with overseas markets.
The main export company was the Good Harvest of Five Grains Corporation based in Hong
Kong, a wholesale network consisting of 300 companies. Tsingtao is now an international
icon.

Concluding Remarks

Globalization has brought cultural icons of diverse cultures together. The metaphor that
best captures this situation is a metaphorical flood of information (St. Clair, 2007; St. Clair &
Thome-Williams, in press). In a flood of mass-media events, some parts of the terrain are
covered while other parts are not. That which adheres can be redefined as the new-present.
That which is washed away leaves the original terrain or the old-past. The social construction
of the present (co-present) is based on this juxtaposition of the old and the new. What this
means is that cultural knowledge does not just accrue, it is reconstructed and redefined in
order to make sense of the present (Foucault, 1966, 1968, 1971).

17
How do cultural artifacts become cultural icons? How are they modified in the co-present?
When commodities are introduced into a nation-state, they may enter as cultural icons or
merely as cultural artifacts (commercial products from overseas). Mass media are used to
assist the consumer to reconstruct his understanding of the present by redefining the co-
present (the place where the past and the present co-exist before they are redefined or
restructured through re-conceptualization). If cultural icons are accepted as such, they become
part of the new-present. If they are just seen as commodities, they are predicated to be a part
of the past. Since the past has been reassessed, it is now called the new-past. Consider the
case of the Starbucks franchise in the Forbidden City. Starbucks is a cultural icon. It was
supposed to supplant the past as a new level, a new layer on the terrain. The problem,
however, was that the past in this case was no ordinary part of the past. It represented a salient
cultural space of the past. In the co-present, they were in conflict. To redefine the situation of
the co-present as the new-past would mean that Starbucks has no place in the Forbidden City.
Similarly, to redefine the situation of the co-present would mean that the Forbidden City
would have no place in the new-present. The dilemma could not be resolved. In order to make
sense of the new-present or the old-past, this problem had to be resolved. When Starbucks
removed its franchise from the location, the problem was resolved. The Forbidden City
remained as the old-past and Starbucks could not supplant the Forbidden City as the new-
present. It could do so in another cultural space, but not in that one.

Notes

Robert N. St. Clair is a professor of communication at the University of Louisville,
Louisville, KY. USA. He is also the Executive Director of the International Association for
Intercultural Communication Studies and the Director of the Institute for Intercultural
Communication.

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Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Song
Development of the Internet and Digital Divide in China: A Spatial
Analysis

Wei Song, University of Louisville

We are in an era in which the nature of work, as measured by the industrial or
occupational structure of economies, is changing dramatically, and in which the
sources of income and wealth to those who create demand are shifting. The
information age we currently inhabit refers to the preeminence of information as the
defining component in many of the economic, social, and political actions that shape
our lives (Wilson and Corey, 2000). Changes in economic systems are being fueled
by the development of networks of communication. By the products and industries
they directly generate, through the structural transformation they permit and provoke,
information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become a powerful agent
of economic development.

Digital Divide

As claimed by Beyers (2000), information-oriented businesses are, to a growing extent,
forming the prime basis for future economic development in world regions. At national and
international scales, information and telecommunication technologies form a fundamental
part of the social and economic changes around the world, and have reconfigured the
structure of social relations and the rhythms of everyday life. Studies have showed that the
Internet has contributed to the expansion of civil society by pluralizing public discourse,
extending the public sphere and mobilizing collective actions (Chu & Tang, 2005). Malecki
(2002) suggested that urban competitiveness is sustained by networks, gathering knowledge
via social interactions (soft networks) and, to a growing degree, the technological capability
plugging into the Internet (hard networks). To be effective, these networks need to operate at
the global, national, regional and local scales. Many international bodies and agencies such as
the World Bank are also embracing information technology. Telecommunication and the
Internet in particular are considered promising vehicles for development of the least
developed countries (Morrison, 2000). At the local scale, digital networks have contributed to
a substantial reconstruction of urban space within cities (Graham & Marvin, 1996; Mitchell,
1995), including telecommuting, the on-line provision of private and public services,
entertainment, and public and private information of multiple forms. In such an environment,
being digital is increasingly critical to knowledge, wealth, status, and power (Warf, 2001).
Despite the mythology of equal access for everyone and the stereotype that the Internet
eliminates space, overcoming the friction of distance (Cairncross, 1997), the reality of the
worlds established and emerging information societies, however, clearly points to the
opposite. The current transformation, based on the diffusion of electronics-based systems, has
not, and will not, rejuvenate all economies automatically, nor will it benefit all countries
equally. Significant and troubling digital divides and vast discrepancies in access to the
Internet exist at various geographical scales. The digital divide was early defined as the divide
separating information haves and information have-nots (NTAI, 2000). The concept has

20
since been expanded to involve "the gap between those who have access to and can
effectively use information technologies and those who cannot" (Wilhelm, 2001). The
American Library Association now uses the concept to characterize differences in access to
information through the Internet and other information technologies and services in the
knowledge, skills, and abilities to use information, due to geography, race, economic status,
gender, and physical ability (American Library Association, 2002). Selwyn (2002) and
DiMaggio and Hargittai (2002) suggested that the digital divide should be constructed in more
sophisticated terms. Selwyn defined the digital divide in the context of three basic forms of
technological capital (economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital). Norris (2001)
reframed the digital divide along three distinct aspects. The global divide refers to the
divergence of Internet access between industrialized and developing societies. The social
divide concerns the gap between information rich and poor in each nation. And lastly, the
democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do, and do not, use digital
resources to engage, mobilize and participate in public life.
The emergence of information-based economy has led to a new round of uneven
development and spatial inequality. The global divide is manifested by the greatest Internet
access in the most economically developed parts of the world, primarily North America,
Europe, and Japan, with the hegemony of the U.S. particularly notable (Warf, 1995, 2001;
Brunn & Dodge, 2001; Hargittai & Centeno, 2001; Townsend, 2001; Zook, 2001). The social
divide is apparent concerning access on multiple dimensions gender, age, household
income, education, and race (Katz, Rice & Aspden, 2001). Socio-demographic factors are
widely regarded as the leading causes of the digital divide. In the U.S., groups with higher
incomes and better education, particularly whites, are in an advantaged position in adopting
newer information and communication technologies (Warf, 2001). It has been pointed out that
the Internet currently provides reinforcement rather than dispersion of power and patterns of
gendered, racial, and occupational segregation within society (Tyner, 1998; Crowther, 2000;
Lindsay, 2005). These social inequalities are clearly matched by geographical disparities
(Warf, 2001; Bosman & Chakraborty, 2002; Chakraborty & Bosman, 2005). In many cases,
information technologies have reinforced centralizing tendencies of large metropolitan areas
where dominant shares of telecom infrastructure are maintained (Kitchin, 1998; Wheeler &
OKelly, 1999; Graham, 2001; Grubesic & OKelly, 2002; Hwang, 2004), while peripheral,
rural areas become increasingly disconnected from the opportunities presented by the new
digital economy (Grimes, 2003).
Brunn (2000) proposed the concept of the electronic state which refers to those states that
are already wired to the Internet or those proposing to implement and diffuse these
technologies through a series of information highways. A tightly integrated electronic state
would be one in which the above technologies are available. Further, a critical and equally
important issue surrounding the concept of the electronic state is the spectrum of inclusion.
An electronic state at one end of the spectrum could be one in which peripheral and core
areas, rich and poor sections, and creative and laggard regions are equally connected or
networked, so that all benefit from the introduction and diffusion of new goods and services
in a nation. Another electronic state, at the other extreme of the spectrum, could only include
those centers of wealth, corporate offices, military, and state power, while smaller and less
important places on the economic and political map are excluded or perhaps only partially
planned for inclusion by those with the power, prestige, and money.

21
Under the broad theoretical framework of digital divide, this paper will examine the
development of information and communication technologies and the digital divide in China.
Over the past decades, there has been an explosion in the development and use of information
and communication technologies in China. Before the 1980s, todays Internet activity was far
beyond peoples imagination. It was not until 1987, when China successfully sent out its first
email to Germany that the worlds most populous country stepped into the Internet era (J ing,
2007). Two decades have passed since that historical day, and Internet use has grown at an
astonishing speed in China. A span of two decades is a short time for a country with a history
of 5,000 years, but those 20 years appear destined to make a major difference in the nation,
and have drastically transformed Chinese society. The Internet has contributed to China's
economic development, and the new economy is transforming China's traditional production
and consumption modes. Chinas economy has been boosted by and become increasingly
restructured around information technologies. In the social and political realm, the Internet
has changed the way information is disseminated and received, and it has helped promote
Chinese peoples enthusiasm for public participation. The right to know the truth, something
that used to be unfamiliar to the Chinese people, has become increasingly popular, helping to
foster a more democratic society. However, as the most populous and the largest developing
country in the world, China faces a severe digital divide, which exists not only in the
international context between China and developed nations, but also internally among its own
regions and social groups. Like many other indicators of development, wide gaps exist
between Chinese ICT haves and have-nots.
Based on data from China Statistical Yearbooks and Semiannual Survey Reports on
Internet Development in China, this study investigates Chinas digital divide related to the
national system of supply and demand for Internet content, with a special focus on the
geographical dimension. Specifically, using Internet user counts and the number of domain
names, as well as the combination of the two indicators, an assessment of the spatial divide in
the distribution of Internet content creation and demand for Internet services will be surveyed
at the provincial and regional levels. Longitudinal analyses will also be conducted to examine
the dynamics in the provincial and regional disparities to determine if the digital divide in
China is shrinking or widening.
The rest of the paper is organized into four sections. The first section provides a brief
overview of Chinas development in information and telecommunication technologies and in
particular the Internet. Results of the empirical analyses of Chinas spatial divide in the
Internet usage and the web of production will be detailed in the second section, followed by a
typology of provinces and municipalities based on the functioning of Internet activities.
Concluding remarks, implications, and future studies will be presented in the final section.

Telecommunication and the Internet in China: Development and the Intensification of
Interactions

Over the past two decades, there has been an explosion in the use of information and
communications technologies in China. As early as the 1990s, the Chinese government
identified expansion of Chinas information and communications infrastructure and its usage
as a key component of the national economic growth strategy (Harrington, 2007). To
encourage competition, the government broke up the state-owned telecom monopoly, China

22
Telecom. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and the Ministry of Electronics were
restructured, and merged into the Ministry of Information Industry. The government also
passed a series of market opening regulations that allowed freer competition among existing
firms and encouraged new entrants into emerging mobile phone and Internet service provider
markets. Internet consultancy and IT related hardware markets including personal computers
and mobile handsets have flourished. The market-opening moves were accompanied by
massive public and private investment in beefing up the telecommunication infrastructure.
The government also supported partial privatization of its largest IT firms through listings on
foreign stock exchanges. In addition, the high-tech sectors of the economy, including
telecommunications, are among the most active in terms of foreign investment (Guthrie,
2006). Every major foreign IT firm has a presence in China (Anderson, 2000). For instance,
market leaders Cisco and Motorola have identified China as their most important growth
market and are in the process of making multibillion-dollar investments there.
Table 1 shows the growth in IT since the economic reforms began nearly three decades
ago. Business volume of telecommunication services, long distance phone calls, land-line
telephones and mobile telephones all important indicators of a growing IT economy in
China have expanded dramatically. The use of mobile telephones, which was basically
nonexistent in China in the mid-1980s, has undergone extreme growth since the late 1990s,
growing to over 393 million registered users in 2005. The penetration of these technologies
indicates that the spread of information more generally in China has occurred in dramatic
ways over the course of the economic reforms.
Figure 1 depicts indices related to the growth of telecommunications. The data in the
figure are indexed against levels in the year of 1995, with background magnitudes for GDP in
comparable prices, employment, and per capita disposal income of urban residents as
references for comparison. The figures reveal an explosive growth in the number of mobile
phone subscribers, business volume in telecommunication services, and the number of local
telephone subscribers. Every index measure of telecommunication outstrips the background
measures, which indicates a strong relative increase in the intensity of interaction via
telecommunication in China as compared to the growth of GDP, employment, and per capita
income. This growth could be attributed to the development of telecommunication network
capacities, but it may also be evidence of the emerging structural change in Chinas economy
toward information services. Beyers (2000) claims that the growth of information-related
sectors will lead to increased human-to-human interaction. Figure 2 presents interaction
measures for air and mail, and the trend is similar. Strong growth in domestic air passenger
traffic and express mail flows may again be related, to a certain extent, to structural shifts in
the economy toward information-oriented services that require face-to-face meetings and
increasing intensity in the exchange of information. Telecommunication technology itself is
spreading in significant ways in China. Access of information and the high-tech vehicles that
facilitate communication and the sharing of information have become significant forces,
which, along with the increasing intensity of human-to-human interaction in other forms,
have paved a way for long-lasting changes in Chinese society.

23

Table 1. Growth of Telecommunications in China
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2006.
Year Business
Volume of
Tele-
communication
Services
(billion yuan)
Number
of long
distance
phone
calls
(billion
times)
Mobile
phone
subscribers
(10,000)
Land-line
phone
Subscribers
(million)
Ownership
rate of
telephones
(sets/100
persons)
Ownership
rate of
mobile
phones
(sets/100
persons)
1978 0.19 1.93
1980 0.21 2.14
1985 0.38 3.12
1986 0.42 3.50
1987 0.52 3.91
1988 0.65 0.32 4.73
1989 0.78 0.98 5.68
1990 1.16 1.83 6.85
1991 15.16 1.73 4.75 8.45
1992 22.66 2.87 17.69 11.47
1993 38.25 5.07 63.93 17.33
1994 59.23 7.58 156.78 27.30
1995 87.55 10.14 362.94 40.71
1996 120.88 12.74 685.28 54.95
1997 162.90 15.54 1323.29 70.31 8.11 1.07
1998 226.49 18.26 2386.29 87.42 10.53 1.89
1999 313.24 17.83 4329.60 108.72 13.00 3.50
2000 455.99 21.08 8453.30 144.83 20.10 6.77
2001 409.88 22.00 14522.20 180.37 25.90 11.40
2002 520.11 19.28 20600.50 214.22 33.60 16.10
2003 647.88 19.60 26995.30 262.75 42.16 21.02
2004 914.80 22.62 33482.40 311.76 50.03 25.91
2005 1140.30 25.92 39340.60 350.45 57.22 30.26

24
Figure 1 Interaction Measures - Telecommunications
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
I
n
d
e
x

-

O
t
h
e
r

I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
1
21
41
61
81
101
I
n
d
e
x

-

M
o
b
i
l
e

P
h
o
n
e

S
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
r
s
GDP (Comp Price)
Employed
Disposal Income
Business Vol. Telecommunications
Local Phone Subscribers
Mobile Phone Subscribers
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2006.

Figure 2 Interaction Measures - Air and Mail
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
I
n
d
e
x
GDP (Comp Price)
Employed
Disposal Income
Express Mail
Domestic Air PAX
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, 1996-2006.

Against the general background of Chinas development of telecommunication
sectors, Table 2 summarizes key indicators in the Internet development. Since 1997 when the

25
first survey report on Chinas Internet development was released by the China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC), the use of the Internet has taken off at a breathtaking
pace. By the end of 2006, the number of Internet users reached 137 million, over 200 times as
many as in 1997. The number of total computer hosts rose to 59.5 million, with nearly 60% or
35.3 million being connected via broadband. In 2006, China had approximately 4,109,020
domain names, and .CN domain names surged to beyond 1.8 million. The number of websites
was estimated at 843,000 in 2006, approximately 560 times as many as in 1997. Total
capacity of bandwidth of Chinese Internet for international connection was increased from
less than 30M, with only four backbone network operators in 1997, to 256,696M in 2006
when the number of backbone network operators reached ten. China is now directly linked,
via these operators backbone networks, to such countries as the U.S., Russia, France, the
United Kingdom, Germany, J apan, South Korea, and Singapore, while only the U.S.,
Germany, France, and J apan were connected in 1997.
Yet, despite its rapid diffusion, in the international context, a profound gap in access to
the Internet exists between China and the rest of the world, given U.S. and European
dominance (see Figure 3). This inequality, or digital divide, in access to the Internet between
China and leading developed countries, to a large extent, is a reflection of the long-standing
bifurcation between the First and Third Worlds (Warf, 2001). Although China ranked as
second in the world next to the U.S. in terms of Internet population, its penetration rate (i.e.
the percent of population online) was only around 12%. This rate of penetration was not only
far below the rates of developed countries, but also below the world average which was
17.8%.

Table 2. Growth of Internet in China
Year Computer
Hosts
(million)
Internet
users
(million)
Domain
Names (.cn)
Websites Total
bandwidth
of
International
Connection(
M)
1997 0.29 0.62 4,066 1,500 25.4
1998 0.75 2.10 18,396 5,300 143.0
1999 3.50 8.90 48,695 15,153 351.0
2000 8.92 22.50 122,099 265,405 2,799.0
2001 12.54 33.70 127,319 277,100 7,597.5
2002 20.83 59.10 179,544 371,600 9,380.0
2003 30.89 79.50 340,040 595,550 27,216.0
2004 41.60 94.00 432,077 668,900 74,429.0
2005 49.50 111.00 1,096,924 694,200 136,106.0
2006 59.40 137.00 1,803,393 843,000 256,696.0
Source: CNNIC 1998-2007

26
Figure 3. Top Ten Countries with the Highest Number of Internet Users
0
40,000,000
80,000,000
120,000,000
160,000,000
200,000,000
240,000,000
United
States
China Japan India Germany United
Kingdom
France Italy Canada Spain
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t

U
s
e
r
s
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
e
n
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

(
%

o
f

P
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
Internet Users
Penetration
Source: Internet World Stats

Digital Divide in the Distribution and Dynamics of Internet Content Consumption and
Production

Our empirical survey of Chinas digital divide in Internet services starts with measuring
inequalities in Internet usage and Internet content production and analyzing geographical
variations at the regional and provincial scales.

Spatial Inequality in Internet Usage

China is traditionally divided into three regions East, Middle and West based on
geographic location, distinct natural environment, population distribution, and economic
development patterns (see Figure 4). Large discrepancies exist in the inter-provincial use of
the information and telecommunication technologies in China. Over the past decades, the
Chinese government has adopted policies that call for Chinas coastal provinces to get rich
first, which has led to growing inter-provincial disparities. The growth of the income and
wealth gaps is well reflected in the use of the Internet. Figure 4 shows the increasing number
of Internet users between 2000 and 2006 at the level of province and centrally administered
municipality, while the average annual growth rates are summarized in Table 3.

27
The number of people online is probably the most basic indicator of a regions progress
toward information era and a digital economy. While in 2000 less than 2% of Chinese people
were online, by 2006 this number had grown to 11%. However, provinces differ greatly in the
degree to which their residents are online. On the basis of absolute number of users, Beijing,
Guangdong, and Shanghai dominated the use of Internet in 2000, with most of the other
provinces only carrying significantly small number of users. Together, the top three
accounted for roughly one-third of the total number of Internet users in China. At the other
end of the spectrum were small interior provinces, such as Tibet, Qinghai and Hainan, each
with less than 100,000 people accessing the Internet in 2000. Between 2000 and 2006, the
Internet technologies quickly diffused across the nation from the three nodes. By the end of
2006, Guangdong was leading the nation in the number of Internet users, followed by the
coastal provinces of Shandong, J iangsu, Zhejiang and Fujian. Several most populous
provinces in China, such as Hebei, Henan, Hubei in the Middle region, and Sichuan in the
West joined the top ten. While Beijing and Shanghai still retained large number of users, they
had been out-numbered by the above provinces by the end of 2006. Beijing, in particular,
dropped out of the list of the top ten. Comparatively, the increase in the number of Internet
users in the provinces near the very bottom of the hierarchy was not as impressive, indicating
that these remote, interior provinces are still lagging largely behind the current round of
technological diffusion.

Figure 4. Growth in Internet Users in China, 2000-2006
Internet Users
(10,000)
920
2000
2003
2006
MIDDLE
EAST
WEST
Beijing
Tianjin
Shanghai
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
Hebei
J iangsu
Zhejiang
Fujian
Shandong
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Yunan
Guizhou
Henan
Shanxi
Hubei
Hunan
Jiangxi
Anhui
Sichuan
Chongqing
Tibet
Qinghai
Gansu
Ningxia
Shaanxi
Xinjiang


28
Table 3: Internet Users 2000-2006
Province &
Municipalities
Users
2000
(10,000)
% of
people
online
2000
Users
2003
(10,000)
% of
people
online
2003
Users
2006
(10,000)
% of
people
online
2006
Average
annual
growth
rate
(%)
Beijing 279 20.17 398 27.33 468 30.40 9.02
Tianjin 57 5.69 145 14.30 260 24.90 28.81
Hebei 56 0.82 289 4.27 631 9.20 49.92
Shanxi 30 0.91 149 4.49 380 11.30 52.55
Inner
Mongolia

27 1.15

75 3.15

160 6.70

34.34
Liaoning 105 2.47 292 6.92 483 11.40 28.99
J ilin 54 1.99 147 5.42 271 10.00 30.76
Heilongjiang 55 1.50 226 5.92 366 9.60 37.00
Shanghai 202 12.06 432 25.23 510 28.70 16.71
J iangsu 122 1.64 611 8.25 1027 13.70 42.59
Zhejiang 149 3.18 451 9.64 977 19.90 36.82
Anhui 55 0.91 184 2.86 337 5.50 35.41
Fujian 81 2.33 318 9.12 516 14.60 36.22
J iangxi 47 1.13 169 3.98 285 6.60 35.24
Shandong 120 1.32 627 6.87 1126 12.20 45.25
Henan 52 0.57 226 2.33 517 5.50 46.44
Hubei 79 1.31 381 6.35 532 9.30 37.36
Hunan 89 1.39 265 3.98 408 6.40 28.81
Guangdong 218 2.52 950 11.95 1831 19.90 42.57
Guangxi 45 1.01 229 4.71 374 8.00 42.09
Hainan 7 0.89 40 4.90 117 14.10 60.00
Sichuan 113 1.36 424 4.88 690 8.40 35.16
Chongqing 46 1.48 177 5.64 220 7.90 29.95
Guizhou 18 0.51 83 2.15 142 3.80 41.09
Yunnan 33 0.77 166 3.80 275 6.20 42.49
Tibet 1 0.26 9 3.18 16 5.80 69.49
Shaanxi 33 0.92 197 5.33 395 10.60 51.19
Gansu 25 0.99 122 4.70 152 5.90 34.72
Qinghai 7 1.35 20 3.65 37 6.80 32.06
Ningxia 11 1.92 33 5.74 42 7.00 25.40
Xinjiang 34 1.76 118 6.09 155 7.70 28.78
NATION 2250 1.78 7950 6.15 13700 10.48 35.13

29
However, the spatial pattern of Internet use cannot simply be described in terms of the
absolute number of users, since, in many ways, it is closely correlated to the size of a
provinces population. A big number of Internet users against a sizeable population implies
that only a small proportion of a regions entire residents indeed has access to the Internet.
For instance, 2.18 million people in Guangdong were online in 2000, the second largest group
of user. However, due to its large population base, this number accounted for only 2.52% of
the population, not too far above the national average of 1.78%.
A useful technique for comparing provinces is the Internet User Quotient (IUQ) which
indicates the extent to which Internet users are concentrated in a province as compared to the
nation as a whole (Zook, 2000, 2001). A value greater than 1.00 indicates a higher degree of
concentration than the national average and a value less than 1.00 indicates a lack of
concentration.

China of Population / China in users of Number
province a of Population / province a in users of Number
IUQ=

According to the IUQs summarized in Table 4 (Ranked based on IUQ in 2006), the three
centrally administered municipalities have demonstrated the highest degree of Internet user
concentration comparatively for the entire period from 2000 to 2006. In other words, Internet
users are disproportionally large or over-represented in the three municipalities. For instance,
the percentage of the population using the Internet in the capital city of Beijing was about 20,
nearly 11 times as much as the national average in 2000. A similar situation has existed for
Shanghai and Tianjin. Also of interest is the noticeable discontinuity between the top three
and the rest of the provinces, particularly in the year 2000, making the three municipalities
the most concentrated areas in the distribution of Chinas Internet users.
While the share of Internet users in all provinces had risen considerably by the end of
2006, the relative degree of concentration of the top three had been greatly lowered, although
they still led the nation on the basis of Internet users concentration. It can also be noticed that
in 2006, all the provinces with an IUQ greater than 1.00 (i.e. out-performing the national
average), except Shanxi and Shaanxi, were located in the coastal, East region, while those
with the least IUQs were southwestern and western provinces of Tibet, Yunnan, Guizhou,
Gansu, as well as Henan and Anhui in the Middle region. One positive side is that these
provinces with the lowest level of Internet use, in both absolute and relative terms, have
demonstrated the fastest average annual growth between 2000 and 2006. Many provinces in
the Middle and West regions, such as Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Hubei and Shanxi, already
progressed to a level close to the national average in the concentration of Internet users. This
indicates that the inter-provincial distribution of Chinas Internet users has started shifting
toward a more even or spatially balanced pattern. On a comparative basis, the spatial divide
among provinces in terms of the participation of residents in the Internet-based activities has
started narrowing.

30
Table 4: Internet User Quotients 2000-2006
Province &
Municipalities
2000 2003 2006
Beijing 11.35 4.44 3.28
Shanghai 6.78 4.10 3.07
Tianjin 3.20 2.32 2.59
Guangdong 1.42 1.94 1.90
Zhejiang 1.79 1.57 1.70
Fujian 1.31 1.48 1.32
Shandong 0.74 1.12 1.26
J iangsu 0.92 1.34 1.24
Liaoning 1.39 1.13 1.04
Shaanxi 0.52 0.87 0.99
Hainan 0.50 0.80 0.98
Heilongjiang 0.84 0.96 0.97
Hubei 0.74 1.03 0.96
Shanxi 0.51 0.73 0.94
Sichuan 0.76 0.79 0.87
J ilin 1.12 0.88 0.87
Hebei 0.46 0.69 0.84
Guangxi 0.57 0.77 0.83
Chongqing 0.83 0.92 0.80
Xinjiang 0.99 0.99 0.74
Hunan 0.78 0.65 0.65
Yunnan 0.43 0.62 0.64
Ningxia 1.08 0.93 0.63
Qinghai 0.76 0.59 0.63
Mongolia 0.64 0.51 0.57
Gansu 0.56 0.76 0.57
Anhui 0.51 0.47 0.53
J iangxi 0.63 0.65 0.51
Henan 0.32 0.38 0.50
Tibet 0.14 0.52 0.38
Guizhou 0.29 0.35 0.34
Source: Calculated by the author from CNNIC 2001-2007.

In many ways, these observations reflect the difference in the level of social and
economic development among the provinces, and across the three broad regions in general.
For instance, ownership of personal computers, a prerequisite to ready access to the Internet,
varies considerably among the regions. While roughly every two urban households owned a
personal computer in the East Region in 2005, the rates of personal computer ownership per
100 urban households were only approximately 31 and 28, respectively, in the Middle and the
West regions (Figure 5). The digital divide in computer ownership, indeed, puts those without

31
computers and computer skills in a disadvantaged position. Currently, only around 12% of
Internet users accessed the Internet via mobile phones, while the number of Internet users is
slightly more than one-third of all mobile phone subscribers in China. However, mobile
phone subscribers are expected to be the major source of Internet newcomers (Liu, 2006).
Thus, the low ownership rates of mobile telephones in the Middle and West regions (Figure
6) will no doubt hinder the rapid catch-up in the Internet use for residents in the Middle and,
in particular, the West regions.

Figure 5. Onwership of Personal Computers Per 100 Urban Households
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

P
e
r
s
o
n
a
l

C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
s
East
Middle
West
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2000-2006

32
Figure 6. Onwership of Mobile Phones Per 100 Urban Households
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

M
o
b
i
l
e

P
h
o
n
e
s
East
Middle
West
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2000-2006

Spatial Inequality in the Web of Production

Use of the Internet by organizations continues to grow at an extremely rapid pace in
China. As the country code (CC) top level domains, the number of .CN domain names
registered in China grew from 4,066 in 1997 to 122,099 in 2000, and to over 1.8 million by
the end of 2006. During the same period of time, the number of websites expanded from
1,500 to 843,000. For even some small local businesses, a website has become the storefront
of the 21st century. More importantly, an increasing number of firms, regardless of industry,
have made a highly functional website integral to their business model, as doing so has
become a competitive necessity. In many ways domain names are one of the most basic
building blocks of the commercial Internet. A relatively small number of domains within a
geographical region may be an indicator that its users rely more on outside sources of content,
and correspondingly the consumption of content produced within the region by outsiders will
be lower. Likewise, a large number of domains within a region would indicate a good supply
of Internet content available to the national network (Zook, 2001). The growth and
distribution of domain names very much mirror those of the websites in China. Since the
country code domains are likely to be more domestically oriented (i.e. using Chinese
language rather than English), geared towards a national instead of global audience (Zook,
2001), the analysis here is focused on only .CN domain names.
Table 5 summarizes the number of .CN domain names at the provincial/municipal
level between 2000 and 2006. Spatial concentration of domain names is evaluated using

33
Domain Name Specialization Ratio (DSR), which is in a similar format as the Internet User
Quotient in providing a standardized measure of the specialization of a region in domain
names as compared to the nation as a whole.

China of persons Employed / China in names domain of Number
province a of persons Employed / province a in names domain of Number
DSR =

The reason to use the number of employed persons is because the phenomenon under
study is the process and the level of economic activities creating Internet content, a measure
of the development of digital economy. Again, a DSR value of greater than 1.00 signifies a
higher specialization than the national average, which indicates that a province or
municipality is highly engaged in the development of domain names, and potentially the
commercial Internet-based activities. Provinces/municipalities are ranked based on 2006 DSR
values in Table 5.
Geographical inequalities are evident among Internet providers. As one would expect,
domain names are not evenly distributed, but are highly clustered in particular locations. The
spatial disparity in the concentration of .CN domain names largely echoes that of Internet
users. The variance in domain name per 10,000 employee figures is quite marked from a low
of 2.1 per 10,000 employed persons in Guizhou to a high in Beijing of 212.0. Although most
provinces showed clear improvement and increase over 2000 in terms of their relative shares
of domain names by the end of 2006, the level of geographical concentration of domain
names seems still much stronger than that of Internet users. Beijing remained the most
concentrated location of domain names, with a DSR value over 15.0 in 2006, although its
DSR has been lowered significantly from 42.67 in 2000. Shanghai came a close second with a
DSR value near 9.0, which is roughly unchanged from 2000. Ranking the third, Fujian greatly
enhanced its status as one of the key Internet service providers in China, from both absolute
and relative perspectives. When combined, the number of the domain names of the top five
provinces and municipalities with a value of DSR greater than 2 accounted for 60% of
Chinas total domain names in 2006, while only 12% of the nations total employment was
from within these top performers. Its clear again that all the eight provinces or municipalities
with higher than the national level in the concentration of domain names are located along the
coastal areas in the East region. Some similar provinces, such as Inner Mongolia, Anhui,
Henan, Gansu, and Guizhou are near the bottom in the operation and dynamics of Internet
activities and content production as measured by the specialization in the domain names.

34
Table 5: Domain Names (.CN) in China, 2000-2006
Province &
Municipalities
Domain
names
2000
DSR
2000
Domain
names
2003
DSR
2003
Domain
names
2006
DSR
2006
Average
annual
growth
rate (%)
Beijing 44,605 42.67 84,144 23.73 569,668 15.55 52.89
Shanghai 11,141 9.85 28,940 9.08 152,184 8.92 54.61
Fujian 2,983 1.07 11,395 1.57 75,964 4.15 71.52
Guangdong 17,043 2.63 47,322 2.78 218,089 2.67 52.94
Tianjin 2,004 2.93 5,366 3.10 18,548 2.61 44.90
Zhejiang 4,862 1.07 19,780 1.62 125,871 1.73 72.00
J iangsu 5,471 0.91 20,587 1.38 87,803 1.28 58.82
Liaoning 3,718 1.22 9,793 1.27 38,022 1.03 47.33
Tibet 143 0.69 624 1.16 1,885 0.68 53.70
Shandong 4,740 0.61 13,429 0.67 71,697 0.68 57.26
Ningxia 299 0.65 1,022 0.85 22,727 0.68 105.82
J ilin 762 0.42 3,659 0.85 13,564 0.66 61.59
Hainan 1,270 2.26 1,150 0.79 4,045 0.63 21.30
Hubei 2,093 0.50 6,131 0.59 31,467 0.57 57.10
Heilongjiang 1,156 0.42 3,332 0.50 13,381 0.52 50.40
Hebei 2,099 0.36 6,135 0.44 30,733 0.49 56.41
Chongqing 1,140 0.41 3,651 0.53 17,733 0.46 58.00
Shaanxi 1,563 0.51 4,030 0.51 17,036 0.46 48.90
Xinjiang 1,044 0.92 2,579 0.87 6,433 0.44 35.40
Shanxi 768 0.32 1,684 0.28 11,603 0.38 57.23
Sichuan 2,165 0.29 7,380 0.40 34,923 0.38 58.96
J iangxi 447 0.14 2,311 0.28 16,866 0.35 83.14
Inner Mongolia 556 0.33 1,942 0.47 7,308 0.34 53.62
Anhui 1,051 0.19 3,649 0.26 21,786 0.30 65.74
Qinghai 86 0.21 348 0.33 1,381 0.29 58.84
Henan 1,919 0.20 4,898 0.21 33,944 0.28 61.42
Hunan 1,138 0.20 3,216 0.22 27,442 0.28 69.97
Yunnan 1,689 0.44 3,539 0.36 13,382 0.28 41.19
Guangxi 835 0.20 2,751 0.26 16,188 0.25 63.90
Gansu 401 0.20 1,274 0.24 5,373 0.18 54.12
Guizhou 371 0.11 1,269 0.15 6,384 0.15 60.68
NATION 119,562 307,330 1,713,430 55.85
Sources: CNNIC 2001-2007 and authors calculation.

35

A Typology of Provinces and Municipalities Based on the Functioning of Internet Activities

Thus far, the discussion has addressed both the demand or consumption side and the
supply side of Internet activities. Now the two sides are combined to examine the dynamics of
the creation and consumption of Internet information in order to make a more comprehensive
comparison regarding how provinces and municipalities differ in their production and use of
Internet content. Figure 7 shows a scatter plot of each province or municipalitys 2006
domain name specialization ratio and average annual growth rate in domain names between
2000 and 2006, while Figure 8 depicts each province or municipalitys 2006 Internet user
quotient and average annual growth rate in Internet users during the same period of time.

Figure 7. Domain Name Specialization Ratios and Domain Name Annual Growth Rates
0.10
1.00
10.00
100.00
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Average Annual Growth Rate 2000-2006 (%)
D
S
R

(
2
0
0
6
)
Fujian
Zhejiang
Beijing
Shanghai
Tianjin
Guangdong
Jiangsu
Liaoning
Hainan
Xinjiang
Yunnan
Shaanxi
Gansu
In. Mongolia
Heilongjiang
Tibet Ningxia
Jiangxi
Hunan
Guizhou
Anhui
Guangxi
Jilin
Henan
Qinghai
Hubei
Chongqing
Sichuan
Shanxi
Hebei
Shandong
National average growth rate

36
Figure 8. Internet User Quotients and Internet User Annual Growth Rates
0.1
1
10
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Average Annual Growth Rate 2000-2006 (%)
I
U
Q

(
2
0
0
6
)
Beijing
Shanghai
Tianjin
Liaoning
Guangdong
Zhejiang
Fujian
Jiangsu
Shandong
Tibet
Hainan
Shanxi
Shaanxi
Hebei
Guizhou
Henan
Yunnan
Guangxi Hubei
Heilongjiang
Ningxia
Hunan
Xinjiang
Chongqing
Jilin
Qinghai
In. Mongolia
Gansu
Jiangxi
Anhui
Sichuan
National average growth rate

Its evident that the two figures share common characteristics. Although they may be too
rough for making definitive conclusions, they do provide an initial division of provinces or
municipalities into some useful types. While many provinces are close to straddling the divide
between classifications, there are enough commonalities among them that some
generalizations can be made.
In the context of Chinas Internet development, the first category dubbed Front Runners
contains provinces and municipalities that have values of both DSRs and IUQs greater than
1.0, and slower-than-average growth rates. This could suggest that these provinces and
municipalities have already achieved much higher level and relatively mature status in both
Internet content production and consumptions. They have already left behind the stage of
rapid growth, as a result of which their annual growth rates are somehow leveled-off and
slower than the national average. Three centrally-administered municipalities Beijing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin as well as Liaoning Province belong to this category. They have
entered into the realm of Internet content production with a well balanced demand for
information across the national network in China.

37
The next category called Achievers, is basically composed of provinces which have DSRs
and/or IUQs that are greater than 1.0, and annual growth rates are faster than the national
average. In other words, they are largely the provinces that appear to have achieved
significant and relatively balanced Internet content production for the increasing demands of
their users, but they are still in the process of driving to maturity. This category is composed
of the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, J iangsu, and Shandong.
Chinas Internet activities are undoubtedly dominated by the provinces and municipalities
of the first two categories. They are at the top of the national hierarchy in the development
and implementation of Internet technology. Geographically, they are associated with three of
Chinas economically most dynamic, most developed and most urbanized regions: Bohai
Rim, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta. Two centrally administered municipalities,
Beijing and Tianjin, as well as Shandong and Liaoning are within the Bohai Rim, which also
contains other major cities such as Qingdao, Yantai, Weihai, Dalian, Yingkou, and J inzhou.
The Yangtze River Delta consists mainly of Shanghai, the largest metropolis in China, and
southern J iangsu and northern Zhejiang provinces. Major cities also include Nanjing,
Nantong, Suzhou, Hangzhou and Ningbo which have kept up high levels of economic
development at a rapid pace. In close proximity to Hong Kong and Macau, the cities of
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai are the economic powerhouses in the Pearl River Delta
located in Guangdong Province. Across the strait from Taiwan, with the backing of overseas
Chinese and foreign investments, the export-oriented economy of Fujian, centered on Xiamen
and Fuzhou, has sustained rapid growth in the past decades. Cities in the above regions are
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), open coastal cities, leading metropolitan areas, as well as
the major economic, financial, political, and tourist centers from both domestic and
international perspectives. As a result, each city demonstrates a great deal of spatial
interactions with other areas, forming the core of provincial and regional economic
development. These provinces and municipalities hold the highest per capita GDPs in China,
and when combined account for around 43% of the nations total GDP in 2005. The trio of
Bohai Rim, Yangtze River Delta, and Pearl River Delta clearly constitutes the backbone of
Chinas domestic telecommunication and information network. They also serve as key nodes
of the Chinese Internet for international connections.
The third classification of provinces is labeled Catch-up, and consists of provinces that
have both DSRs and IUQs lower than 1.0, but annual growth rates are faster than the national
average in both domain names and Internet users. These provinces havent achieved well
developed Internet content production and consumption systems, but they are experiencing
the take-off at a rapid pace along both fronts. They are geared towards providing more
Internet content and promoting higher online participation rates for their local residents. Eight
provinces in this category include Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, J iangxi, Guangxi, and
Guizhou, with a majority situated in the Middle region.
The final category dubbed Novice contains the remaining provinces. They have lower
levels of concentration in both domain names and Internet users, and their growth rates for
Internet content production and consumption are either slower than the national average, or
highly disproportionate from each other. These provinces lack a well developed and relatively
balanced system for producing Internet content and for promoting local residents Internet
demand and consumption. These provinces are lagging far behind in the process of moving
towards the implementation of new information and telecommunication technology. They

38
have literally just crossed the threshold of the information age, and could be considered as
preconditioned for take-off. They are still building up necessary resources and motivations
both from internal and external sources for their moments of take-off in a large scale. Except
for Hainan, a newly designated island province in the East, and Heilongjiang and J ilin, two
Manchurian provinces, as well as Inner Mongolia and Hunan in the Middle, all others in this
category are distributed throughout the vast West region (see Figure 9).
While categories presented here are idealized types and the exact placement of provinces
placed within the classification is debatable, this typology is an important theoretical and
empirical exercise about the dynamics of Internet content production and consumption, as
well as the digital divide in the spatial perspective in China.

Figure 9. Typology of Provinces & Municipalities
Categories
Front Runner
Achiever
Catch-up
Novice
MIDDLE
EAST
WEST
Beijing
Tianjin
Shanghai
Heilongjiang
Jilin
Inner Mongolia
Liaoning
Hebei
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Fujian
Shandong
Guangdong
Guangxi
Hainan
Yunan
Guizhou
Henan
Shanxi
Hubei
Hunan
Jiangxi
Anhui
Sichuan
Chongqing
Tibet
Qinghai
Gansu
Ningxia
Shaanxi
Xinjiang

Conclusion

As indicated by Warf (2001), the claims that access to the Internet is readily available to
all and its affects cannot help but be beneficial and democratic must be viewed with great
caution and skepticism. Technologies, including the Internet, are never socially or spatially

39
neutral and universal in their impacts. The Internet is likely to reinforce or even deepen
existing divisions between the haves and the have-nots.
This digital divide can be revealed by the clear and sharp spatial disparities in the level of
development of the Internet in China. Given the space-transcending nature of Internet
technology, significant differences in Internet content production and consumption still exist
across Chinas various regions. Although every Chinese province has developed its own
Internet infrastructure and particular brand of Internet content, distinct inter-provincial
inequalities are occurring at a considerable intensity. Regional boundaries indeed are making
a difference, and access to the Internet in China is deeply conditioned by where one is. Long-
standing polarized relationships, such as the divisions between developed and less developed
regions, or between the coastal area and the interior, are still apparent in the realm of Internet
in China.
This paper has outlined the distribution and dynamics of Internet content production and
consumption in China. It is clear that the dominance of the East region, particularly those
front runners such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangdong, remains strong, although the
Internet has diffused to other regions and provinces and some signs of the narrowing of the
digital divide have emerged. As Zook (2001) pointed out, the Internet acts as complement
rather than a substitute for the advantages of cities and regions. Thus domain names and
Internet users remain highly concentrated in the provinces, particularly major urban areas,
which already possess exceptional economic and developmental advantages. The Internet
seems to further reinforce and increase the gains of the economically leading regions.
The digital divide is a multifaceted phenomenon, which is deeply rooted in the economic,
social, cultural and political dimensions of society. Overall, Chinas Internet users are
relatively well educated, wealthy, and in professional occupations with or demanding for
college degrees. The economic and educational biases are compounded by gender and age.
Internet use in China is heavily gendered roughly 60% of all Chinese Internet users were
male in 2006 (CNNIC, 2007). Those between the ages of 18 to 24 make up the largest
proportion of Internet users, at 35.2%, while teenagers under age 18 make up another 17.2%.
Although these patterns are not truly unique in China, some unprecedented problems in
Chinese society are deemed to be closely linked with the Internet. With a high prevalence of
high school and college students online, some research has shown that 13.2% of young
Chinese Internet users suffer from Internet addiction disorder, and another 13% have the
tendency to become addicted (J ing, 2006). Furthermore, when a local low-income youth
ignores his/her school work and instead spends his/her evenings playing violent videogames
at a local cyber caf, s/he is not really benefiting from digital technology.
Given that the majority of Chinese live in the countryside, the digital divide between
urban and rural areas is astounding as well as worrying. Personal computers, which are a
daily necessity to many urban residents at present, are still considered an extravagant
purchase by rural people. The broadening income gap between urban and rural residents also
greatly constrains rural peoples consumption of high-tech products. Low education levels
and the lack of a sufficient infrastructure and channel to get information, further compound
the digital divide between Chinas urban and rural areas.
All these essential dimensions of the digital divide in China warrant thorough and
ongoing research which will be able to provide further elaborations of the causes and social
and economic implications of the Internets growth and diffusion. In addition, this analysis is

40
constrained by the available data which are aggregate at the level of provinces or centrally
administered municipalities. If urban-level and firm-level data, particularly data of intercity
interactions via the Internet, are available, future research will be able to explore the ways in
which cities and localities are woven into the national even global lattices of mobility and
information flows, as well as the way specific metropolis or region networks and individual
firms adapt to and exploit the opportunities offered by the Internet.

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43
Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Zhang

Yonghua Zhang, Shanghai University

The relationship between democracy and mass communication has long been one of
the central themes in social studies. The tradition can be traced back to works in
social theories long before communication studies became a separate academic field,
works by French sociologist Gabriel de Tarde and American philosopher J ohn
Dewey in particular. More recently, the works by Jurgen Habermas emphasize the
importance of political participation and the role of the public sphere in democracy.
At present, development of Internet technology has brought about the rise of new
forms of communication and public participation, such as BBS, virtual chatting
rooms, blogs and so on. This has extended the study of the mass communication-
democracy relationship into public participation in cyberspace.

The Rise of the Blogosphere

Many scholars in the fields of political studies and communication studies have been
addressing the issue of implications of the innovative blogosphere and citizen journalism/
grassroots journalism for democracy. This paper attempts to study this issue in the Chinese
context. It will discuss, on the basis of examining the content of blogs on a few websites of
different types in the mainland of China, the role of blogging in public discussion of issues of
general concern and the features of public participation through blogging, and it will explore
the interplay between these new, online media and the traditional mass media and analyze the
merits and demerits of blogging in the democratic processes.
In social studies, researchers have long addressed the theme of connection between
democracy and mass communication. With the development of Internet technologies, new
forms of public discussion in cyberspace have attracted academic attention to the issue of
connection between such new forms of public discussion and democracy. Building on theories
of the public sphere, political democracy, social functions of mass media, and so on, many
scholars have studied online forms of information and opinion dissemination and exchanges
such as BBS, online chatting rooms, and blogs, in an attempt to examine this connection. This
paper sets out to contribute to academic understanding of the issue in the Chinese context. At
a time when the number of Internet users in Mainland China has reached 210 million,
according to statistics given in the latest report issued by the China Internet Network
Information Center, the high rates of Internet penetration demonstrate the significance of new
online forms of communication. This calls for studies of such new forms.
Blogs on four different websites in China are chosen for study. These are: the website of
the Peoples Daily (www.people.com.cn), a well-known commercial portal site
www.sina.com.cn a website with a blog channel (http://blog.china.com) claiming to be the
biggest portal for professionals, and a blog website www.blogcn.com. The writer decides
on a two-time-span design for this study: from J anuary 1 to December 31, 2007 as the first
time span, and two weeks in late J anuary 2008 (during the meetings of the local Peoples
Congress and Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference). Owing to time constraints
the writer faces in carrying out this research, she chooses to study a sample of the blogs rather
44
than the whole population of the blogs on these websites during the first time span. Sampling
is done through the following steps: For each website, four bloggers are selected, two
famous/prominent bloggers and two ordinary ones; for each week, two days are selected (i.e.,
weekends for 9 months and two week days a week for 3 months, because bloggers may have
more time for writing and posting their messages during the weekends). Added to that is a
study for the period of two weeks in late J anuary 2008 when provincial/municipal Peoples
Congress and Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) held meetings, as
such a period naturally prompts more public discussion on issues of general concern. It is
assumed that the blog content during such a period is likely to be somewhat different from
routine blogging in terms of attention paid to public issues.

Theoretical Background

Mass Communication and Democracy

The tradition of studying the relationship between mass communication and democracy
can be traced back to classical social theories. As early as the end of the 19th century, Gabriel
de Tarde, in his study of modern Western society emphasized the importance of the public and
public opinion. To Tarde, the forming of publics depends on shared experiences of their
members, who may not be in the same or nearby physical places. According to Tarde, among
various factors that exerted an impact on the emergence of modern publics, newspapers had a
particularly essential role as newspapers helped to set the topics for public discussion and
facilitated the formation of nation-wide public opinion. Meanwhile, he also touched upon the
issue of interpersonal contacts playing a conjunctional role with the mass media in this aspect.
In a series of articles, including La Conversation, he explored the connections between the
state, the government, the parliament, the venues of public conversations (such as pubs and
coffee houses), public opinion, and social actions, particularly highlighting public opinion and
its connection with the emerging medium of newspapers (Clark, 1969). The American
philosopher J ohn Dewey analyzed the link between mass communication and democracy
about three decades before communication studies turned into a separate field. Dewey
stressed the importance of discussion, consultation and debate on social needs and troubles
to democracy (Dewey, 1927; Festenstein, 1997). Concerned about the decline of the factors
that bound traditional communities, such as family ties, neighborhood connections and so on,
Dewey explored the potential role of the rising medium of newspapers in filling the void left
by the decline of such factors, for he observed that this medium brought about new forms of
public discussion. Tarde and Deweys works could be said to anticipate later studies into the
role of the media in democratic processes.
More recently, J urgen Habermas in his works emphasizes the importance of political
participation and the role of the public sphere in democracy. He was critical of the negative
effects of the media when addressing the issue of the transformation of public sphere in
Western societies from the liberal public sphere to a media-dominated one in the 20th century
(Habermas, 1962,1989), but his later works exploration of the critical conditions under which
mediated political communication can play a positive role in deliberative democracies
(Habermas, 2006) indicates his concern for the implications of the media for democracy.
Among Chinese scholars, the issue of the relationship between democracy and mass
45
communication has also been discussed in various works on journalism, social functions of
mass communication, etc. Like their international counterparts, Chinese scholars have in
recent years accorded much attention to the interplay between media development and
development in ways of democratic participation by the public.

New Forms of Online Public Discussion and Democracy

As innovative things keep emerging along with the rapid development of new
information technologies, the rise of new forms of public discussion based upon Internet
technologies has brought a new phase in the study of the mass communication-democracy
relationship. As various forms of open online dissemination and exchanges of information and
opinions such as BBS, virtual forums, online chatting rooms and blogs have begun to be
increasingly used in peoples social-political lives, many scholars have started to study the
implications of such new forms on democracy in the new setting. A search with Google
(Scholar) by typing Internet and democracy leads to 155,000 results, and typing blogs and
democracy, leads to 4,300 results (J anuary 2008). Dan Gillmor (2004) expounds the role of
grassroots journalism/ citizen journalism in democracy. David Beers talks about new forms
of online journalism and their democratic potential and limitation (Beers, 2006). Debra A.
Adams holds that the Internet technologies have enabled the creation of new publishing
spaces where diverse voices engage in conversation about matters affecting daily lives
(Adams, 2006). Steve Outing, in his discussion of citizen journalism, summarizes it into 11
layers (Outing, 2005). J oichi Ito and others view the flourishing of blogs, open publishing
online and so on as symbolizing an emergent democracy, (i.e., a new form of democracy
that indicates changes in flow of power not only in media industries, but also in society) (Ito,
2003). Stephen Coleman regards blogs as democratic listening posts enabling people to
pick up signals of subjective expression which might inform debate in these more reflexively
democratic times (Coleman, 2005, p. 276). Axel Bruns uses the term produsage to describe
an emergent user-led content creation environments, and holds that Web 2.0 environments
have a profound impact on social practices, the media, economic and legal frameworks and
democratic society itself (Bruns, 2007). M. Roberts et al. and Byoungkwan Lee et al. both
examine the relationship between online discussion and the agenda of the traditional media,
but their findings are markedly different. Based upon research carried out in the U.S., M.
Roberts et al. hold that the traditional media agenda exerts an impact on the discussion
through BBS (Roberts, Wanta, & Dzwo, 2002). But Byoungkwan Lee et al. in a study in
South Korea, observe that the online Bulletin Board Systems had an inter-media agenda-
setting influence on newspapers with regards to newspaper coverage of the 2000 general
election (Lee, Lancendorfer, & Lee, 2005).
Chinese academics have in recent years also conducted research in this area. Similar
searches with Google (Scholar) using the Chinese language, led to 16,900 and 5,220 results,
respectively. Dahong Min, in summarizing Internet development in China examines, among
other innovative phenomena, online public opinion and its channels such as BBS and blogs
(Min, 2003, 2006). Guoming Yu observes the role of the Internet in providing a new public
space for discussion (Yu, 2004). J ianjun Ding discusses the impact of online opinion on
democratic politics in China (Ding, 2004). Bin Zhang explores the positive influence of the
Internet in accelerating the process of open governance, in promoting citizens participation in
46
politics, and in strengthening the effectiveness of social supervision over the use of power
(Zhang, 2002). Shenyong Chen and J ie Du address the issue of online forum boards role in
enhancing public participation (Chen & Du, 2005). Yanfang J iang writes about blogging
during the period of meetings of the local Peoples Congress and CPPCC in Zhejiang
Province and the construction of the public sphere (J iang, 2006).
All these scholars works enlighten the writer on a connection between the new, online
forms of public discussion and democracy. Nevertheless, there have not been many studies of
the issue in the Chinese context based upon systematic, empirical studies of the content of
such new forms, except for research on some special cases that involved unusually heavy
traffic on websites. This paper, therefore, attempts to study this issue through analyzing the
content of blogs on four different types of websites in mainland China, examining the features
of public participation in these new forms in the political life of the country, the interplay
between these new comers of communication and the traditional mass media, and the merits
and limitations of blogging when put to use in democratic processes.

Blogging in P. R. China: Development, Content, and Characteristics

Rise of BBS/online Forum Boards and Blogging in P.R. China

In Chinas mainland, BBS as a new form of public discussion emerged towards the
middle of the 1990s after the Internet found its way into the country. Among the early players
of the websites adopting Bulletin Board Systems, Ying Hai Wei (www.oihw.com) was once
very popular among the early net users in P.R. China. After Chinas media organizations
began to establish websites in 1995, the practice developed to a new stage. Peoples Dailys
website took the lead among Chinese media websites to open an online forum board in May
1999. Through about nine years of development in the practice of running BBS, this media
website has now formed an online community embracing about 30 online forum boards,
including Strengthening the Nation Forum, International Affairs Forum, Theoretical
Discussion Forum, Community Service Forum, Environmental Protection Forum, Fighting
Against Corruption Forum, and so on. During the past few years, online forums have become
common among media websites as well as portal sites in the country. Some studies have
found an interactive relationship between communication activities through virtual forums
and those of the traditional media in some cases. For example, Yonghua Zhang pointed out in
2007 that in such cases as the event of a big fire in Luo Yang in 2003, the new, online media
provided a public space or platform for public discussion, and that the online media, with the
capacity for quickly aggregating related information on the topic, had started to play the role
of accelerating the process of social issues moving from the media agenda to the public
agenda, thus aligning itself with the traditional media in exercising an impact on public
agenda (Zhang, 2007). It was further argued that in some cases, public opinion on virtual
forum boards and dissemination of news and opinions by the traditional news media
resonated and reinforced each other (Zhang, 2007).
Blogging, which represents Web 2.0 technologies, was introduced in Chinas mainland in
2002. Xingdong Fand and J unxiu Wang opened up the blog website www.blogchina.com in
August of 2002. The next year (2003), blogging was adopted by 200,000 Internet fans in
Chinas mainland. Nanjing University opened a blog system on its website in 2003, and
47
Chinese University of Technologies experimented on the practice in the same year.
Meanwhile, some scholars began to study weblog technology and its impact on ways of social
interactions. The year 2004 witnessed the development of a commercial model of operating
blog services in P. R. China. In that year, blogchina.com became the first choice of university
bloggers as it opened Teachers Blogs and Students Blogs. In addition, at an academic
conference focused on Internet communication held in Nanjing University that year, blogging
became one of the hottest themes discussed. The year 2005 saw the spread of blogging
beyond elites, as more and more ordinary net users became bloggers in P. R. China. It was
then estimated that bloggers took up 10% of the Internet population in Chinas mainland
(www.xinhuanet.com, March 6, 2006). The countrys commercial portal sites
www.sina.com.cn and www.sohu.com both opened blogging that year. Among media websites
in the country, the Peoples Dailys website again took the lead in adopting this innovative
practice. It started to provide blogging service in early 2006. During its experimental stage in
late J anuary 2006, within one week after its inauguration, it already attracted 2,000 registered
bloggers, publishing over 6,000 articles, over 2,000 pictures and over 2,000 comments.
(Zhang & Li, 2007). At present, other famous major websites of P.R. China such as
www.qianglong.com and www.xinhuanet.com in Beijing, www.eastday.com in Shanghai,
www.dayoo.com in Guangzhou, and www.enorth.com.cn in Tianjin have all adopted the
practice.
Research Questions

BBS and blogging share the characteristic of enabling netizens to post and read messages
on websites, thus representing new forms of public sharing of information and public
discussion online. As blogging relies on more recent Internet technologies, the writer chooses
to focus on blogging in this study. Although blog services have been going on for 6 years in
mainland China, during its early stage of development, prominent utilization of blogging
seemed to lie in private chatting. In a few early cases of blogs attracting high rates of clicks
such as Mu Zimeis blogs (on the blog website www.blogcn.com) revealing her private life in
2003, which caused a stir in Internet circles due to her expressions of personal feelings and
affairs. In the past two or three years, however, blog services have begun to increasingly
exhibit their social functions, their roles in public discussion, public debates and public
participation. In these years, on special occasions of meetings of the Peoples Congress and
CPPCC (at both local and national levels), many deputies and reporters opened special blogs
and interacted with ordinary citizens. Ordinary net users also used blogging to discuss issues
of public concern or raise questions. All this indicates that in P. R. China the blogosphere
has in recent years become a new public space where social-political discussion can take
place. It may share certain features with that of the old public space, but the blogosphere is set
in cyberspace which is fundamentally different from physical space. This paper attempts to
contribute to the academic understanding of the issue of blogging and democracy by asking
the following research questions:

(1) Does public discussion of general concern form a substantial part of the content of
blogs in P.R. China?
(2) What is the relationship between such public discussion in blogs and the agenda of
the traditional media in the country?
48
(3) Blogosphere can also be used and, as in the case of Mu Zimeis blogs in 2003, have
been used sometimes, by some net users for talking about privacy. This makes it different
from the traditional media sphere where the communication activities of the institutionalized
media tend to have a collective nature. The bloggers are private individuals entering the
blogosphere to post and exchange messages. Is it then similar to old public places (of the 17th
- and 18
th
-century West) of pubs and coffee houses where private individuals who came into
conversations on matters of social concern could also chat about matters of personal concern?
(4) What are the distinctive features of blogs as a new form of public discussion, debates
and participation? What are the merits and limitations of blogging in terms of its role in
democracy?
As blog services are provided by different types of websites in P.R. China, a systematic
study of the content of blogs should cover the different websites. The selection of blogging
service on the website of Peoples Daily, on the famous commercial portal www.sina.com.cn,
on http//blog.china.com and on the blog website www.blogcn.com serves this purpose.

Content of Blogs on the Selected Websites in 2007

Altogether, 442 blogs from the four selected websites are collected and studied. The
following paragraphs summarize their content.

Blog Content of the Selected Bloggers on the Website of Peoples Daily

Two Famous Bloggers

One famous blogger on www.people.com, named Yongxin Zhu, is a famous university
professor and a very active figure in the local CPPCC. During the days selected for this study,
Zhu posted 20 blogs. While almost all were about cultural, educational, and social activities in
which he participated, these blogs describing his experience ponder in particular on such
issues as reform in the field of education, equity of education, and experiment on a new
model of education with emphasis on cultivating childrens interest in reading and on their
contact with nature. The other famous blogger on this website is Fei Shi, an editor for the
opinion page of a provincial newspaper, who posted 33 blogs during the days selected for this
study. These blogs mostly use the form of fables/parables to comment on current affairs,
involving such topics as the significance of unity, mutual help and harmony, condemnation
against graft and corruption, criticism over some officials lack of the spirit of making
themselves accountable to the citizens, denouncement of cheating, discussion of major issues
of peoples well-being (housing, pension and so on), and criticism over the excessive use of
vocational qualification testing and certifying mechanisms.

Two Ordinary Bloggers

Of the two ordinary bloggers whose blogs we studied in 2007 (choosing two days each
week), the first one posted 37 blogs during the selected days. Among these blogs, 8 are
expressions of personal emotions; all other blogs belong to social-political discussion in a
broad sense, covering the themes of anti-corruption, improving peoples lives, ethos of public
49
service, cultural taste and quality of cultural products, social harmony, the stock exchange and
other economic issues, and discipline inspection. The other blogger posted 28 blogs in the
selected days for research. They are mostly about the bloggers campus life and comments on
events experienced by the blogger during the campus life.

Blog Content of the Selected Bloggers on the Commercial Portal Website www.sina.com.cn

Two Famous Bloggers

One of the famous bloggers, called Acosta on the Internet, can be described as a
grassroots celebrity. The 20 blogs posted by Acosta during the selected days for study are
mainly expressions of personal emotion and reflections on life, yet some blogs comment on
TV entertainment and on public service activities. The other famous blogger, Han Han, a
young writer very popular among high school and university students, posted 34 blogs during
the selected days for study. Most of his blogs narrate his activities, such as his participation in
motorcycle races. But some blogs give his remarks on such hot issues as transportation
facilities, prices of petroleum, and problems of exam-oriented education, in a sharp (satirical
at certain points) style characteristic of the celebrity.


Of the two ordinary bloggers, one posted 18 blogs during the selected days of study.
These blogs are mostly records/logs of the bloggers daily-life activities and experiences, and
expressions of her emotions. The other ordinary blogger on this website posted 27 blogs,
which fall mainly into the following types: travels, comments on songs and singers, and
thoughts on daily experiences.

Blog Content of the Selected Bloggers on http://blog.china.com

Two Famous/Prominent Bloggers

Guoping Lu, a newspaper reporter, and Ifeng, who is a registered blogger on several
websites and a columnist on the website of Rongzi Corporation (Rongzi in Chinese means
financing in English), are the two famous/prominent bloggers selected from the blog channel
on the website www.china.com. The 38 blogs posted by Guoping Lu during the selected days
of study can be said to be social comments on various issues, especially on moral values, on
problems in media communication and in entertainment, and on housing. Ifengs blogs during
the selected days of study, amounting to 25, are also mainly social comments. They touch
upon such issues as problems related to state monopoly in telecommunications, rights of
villagers, anti-corruption, undesirable behavior in the arts circles, and so on.


The two ordinary bloggers selected from this website both posted 37 blogs during the
days selected for study. The first ordinary blogger mostly gives his/her views on some hot
50
issues of general public concern, such as peoples well-being, anti-corruption, problems
caused by commercialism, social values, equity of education, overflow of exams, and
communication for the coming Beijing Olympic Games. The other ordinary blogger also
makes social comments in his/her blogs. A comparison of the content of their blogs shows
that the second blogger pays more attention to the economic situation and financing, and also
to foreign affairs and international events. The other issues covered in the blogs of the second
one include: anti-corruption, education, governance abilities, and government accountability.

Blog Content of the Selected Bloggers on the Blog Website www.blogcn.com

Two Famous/Prominent Bloggers

One of the prominent bloggers selected, Songluo Han, writes regularly for a column in
Jinghua Daily, Beijing Youth Weekly and some other periodicals. During the days selected for
study, he posted 24 blogs at www.blogcn.com. They fall into the following types: discussion
and comments on the life of stars (7 blogs), thoughts triggered by TV dramas and films (5
blogs), articles with a literary coloring, personal expression of emotions, reflections on life,
and comments on a Western novelist. The other one is a grassroots celebrity. With the
blogging name Suoyi Shuo (meaning therefore we say), this one posted 24 blogs on the
website during the days selected for study. Blogs giving accounts of daily experiences
constitute a major part (11 blogs). Thoughts on life along with expression of personal
emotions are the content of 5 blogs. The remaining blogs cover: warm wishes for friends,
thoughts caused by a trip to Beijing, comments on popular culture and on a historical figure,
and an account of a dialogue between the blogger and a friend.


The two ordinary bloggers selected from this website posted 18 and 22 blogs,
respectively, during the selected days for study. The first one, with 18 blogs posted, gives
accounts of his daily experiences (9 blogs) and of his work, and expresses personal emotions
and reflections on life. Of the 22 blogs posted by the other ordinary blogger, 5 deal with the
hot social issues of the prices of gas, online cheating, Chinese medicine (along with criticism
directed toward a famous member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences regarding his view on
Chinese medicine), and popular culture. About half of the other blogs are just accounts of
daily experiences; 5 blogs express personal emotions; a couple of the blogs discuss sports.
The remaining blogs discuss a film, an online video, and predictions about development in
science and technology.

Content of Blogs on these Websites in Late J anuary 2008 (During Meetings of the Local
Peoples Congress and the CPPCC)

In late J anuary 2008, meetings of the local Peoples Congress and the CPPCC were held.
As the period for these meetings is an important period for social-political discussion and
decision-making and thus naturally inspires greater enthusiasm by the public for political
participation, a study of the content of blogs during this period will lead to findings that can
51
be compared with the routine content of the blogs. Such a comparison will help us in our
efforts to obtain a deep understanding of the content and role of blogging practice in the
country.
Forty blogs during that period were collected from the above-mentioned websites. A
careful reading of these blogs leads to the following findings:
(1) Most of the 10 blogs from the website of the Peoples Daily (www.people.com.cn)
mainly express expectations regarding the meetings, especially expectations for the meetings
to have ample and in-depth discussion of various issues of peoples well-being, for the
deputies of the local Peoples Congress and CPPCC to offer straightforward remarks and
sharp criticism, for the leaders to listen to criticism with an open mind and discuss various
issues of public concern with ordinary participants of these meetings on an equal footing. One
blog expresses the opinion that the performance/behavior of the deputies participating in these
meetings should be made known to the public. One blog lists a number of current social
problems. One blog posts the news about Shanghais preparations for holding the meetings of
the municipal Peoples Congress and the CPPCC. One blog airs the view that fighting against
blitz significantly out-weighed the meetings.
(2) The 10 blogs from the website www.sina.com.cn express expectations for the
meetings of local Peoples Congress and the CPPCC to bring more well-being to the public,
for different voices to be heard at the meetings, and discuss such social-political issues as the
reform in the structure of the government bodies, the problem of abuse of power (for example,
by some urban management officials), and so on.
(3) The 10 blogs from the blog channel of www.china.com are mostly comments of
different sorts more or less related to the meetings, such as comments on certain
motions/proposals (in one case on a hearsay motion) by the deputies of the local Peoples
Congress and members of the local CPPCC, comments on some members of the local CPPCC
(in one case about an ex-member), comments on power supply and electricity fees. The
remaining small numbers of blogs are miscellaneous, ranging from discussion of the possible
effects of the meetings on solving housing and price problems, to anecdotes about some
participants of the meetings.
(4) Of the 10 blogs on the blog website www.blogcn.com, half were clearly posted by
journalists, giving accounts about their news gathering and reporting work during the period
of these meetings, with some complaints about their fatigue caused by long hours of work.
The remaining blogs range from comments on the phenomenon of officials, the rich, and
celebrities forming a large proportion of the local Peoples Congress and members of the local
CPPCC (offering views on having a more balanced composition of these organizations),
comments on the procedures of the meetings, to thoughts on family planning, to best wishes
for friends and colleagues.

Discussion

From the above paragraphs, it can be seen that all four websites selected for the study
contain a certain amount of blogs of a public discussion nature. However, the websites differ
in the proportion of blog content devoted to public discussion of issues of general concern.
While social-political discussion constitutes a considerable proportion of the blog content in
2007 on the media website www.people.com.cn and the blog channel of the website
52
www.china.com, such discussion only forms a tiny proportion of the blog content in that year
on the other two websites, the commercial portal site www.sina.com.cn and the blog website
www.blogcn.com.
As the two websites in each of these two groups are different in type, we do not have
grounds for drawing a simple conclusion regarding the connection between the type of a
website and the degree to which its blogs serve as a new form for public discussion and public
participation. Given the nature of the Peoples Daily that runs the website
www.people.com.cn, however, we may speculate on the possibility that those who have
registered blogs on this website of the most prominent party paper in the country pay
relatively more attention to issues of current affairs. With regards to findings about the
content of the blog channel of www.china.com, a possible explanation might lie in the
demographic features of the users: since this channel aggregates a lot of professionals with
high levels of education, a relatively high sense of public participation is perhaps somewhat
natural for the bloggers.
The hot issues touched upon in the blogs, such as anti-corruption, housing prices, equity
of education and so on are also hot issues covered in the traditional Chinese media. This
indicates a connection between the agenda of public discussion in blogging as a new form of
media communication and the agenda of the traditional media. Such a connection suggests an
interplay or interactive relationship between the two, but the present study does not produce
findings for drawing a causal link between the two. To generalize on the nature of the
connection, further studies are needed.
Comparing the blog content from the four websites in the year 2007 with the content of
the same websites in late J anuary 2008 when meetings of the local Peoples Congress and the
CPPCC were being held, the writer observes that discussions of social, political, economic
and cultural issues are the focal concern of blogs on these websites during the period of the
meetings of the local Peoples Congress and the CPPCC, yet they just form either a
considerable part (in the case of www.people.com.cn and the blog channel of www.china.com)
or a tiny part (in the case of www.sina.com.cn and www.blogcn.com) of the routine blog
content. This conforms with the assumption that on special occasions such as the periods for
the meetings of the Peoples Congress and the CPPCC, the capacity of blogs for serving as a
new channel of public discussion and participation is brought to greater use than usual.
The fact that the greater part of the blogs posted by the selected bloggers in the research
period of 2007 on www.sina.com.cn and www.blogcn.com cover matters of individual
concern indicates that so far, blogging activities are still often private in nature. In this aspect,
the blogosphere bears a similarity to the public sphere of the 17th- and 18th-century West
represented by pubs and coffee houses where conversations between individuals did not
always have to be of a social nature. As for those blogs that discuss matters of public concern,
however, they differ markedly from conversations of similar nature in old-time coffee houses
and salons as blogging is characterized by global and instantaneous spread of messages and is
of a mediated nature, and these lead to difficulties of maintaining rationality in public
discussion through blogs. When compared with the public discussion in the traditional media,
public discussion through blogging also distinguishes itself in a few ways. In public
discussion through blogs, the tones, stances/positions and foci are basically a matter of
individual choice of the private netizens, whereas in public discussions in the traditional
media, media organizations and their professional journalists act as gatekeepers. Moreover, in
53
blogging, the duration of issue prominence is basically in the hands of the participating
bloggers, while in traditional media communication, this mirrors the media agenda-setting
function. This being the case, blogging seems to have the merits of airing and hearing diverse
voices, especially grassroots voices in their natural style. Admittedly, blogging practice so far
has also shown its limitations in its role in democratic processes. The blogosphere more often
than not contains messages with idiosyncratic views of a strong emotional coloring which is
not conducive to rational deliberation. And the above-mentioned global and instantaneous
spread of messages and the mediated nature in blogging may further aggravate this problem,
affecting the role of blogging in the democratic processes.
The present study has some limitations. Lack of a parallel content analysis of the
traditional media makes it impossible to address, on the basis of basic empirical data, the
nature of the connection between the issues of public discussion through blogs and the agenda
of the traditional media in the mainland of China. The depth of the papers brief discussion of
the interplay between these issues and the traditional media agenda is also affected by the
absence of such a parallel content analysis. In addition, since this is not a longitudinal study, it
fails to provide data for historical comparison and for examining trends in the development of
blogging in the country.

Conclusion

The present study shows that blogging has more or less found its way into public
discussion of social, political, economic and cultural issues in mainland China. Blogging has
started to exhibit a public discourse function. This means that to a greater or lesser degree
blogs are put to use as a new way of participation in democratic processes. Meanwhile, the
present study also reveals that communication activities of a private nature are perhaps still
the main use of blogging in the country. The prosperity of the blogging practice serving a
democratic function depends on the active involvement in social-political processes on the
part of the bloggers.
Being a new means of public discourse, blogging has the potential to push democracy
forward. It opens up new opportunities of hearing diverse voices, especially grassroots voices.
Keeping communication channels open to diverse voices is generally thought to bear greatly
on democratic processes. Although blogging has its limitations in serving the democratic
function, especially in terms of the difficulties in maintaining rationality in public debate
through blogs, the innovative blogosphere holds out possibilities of improvement in this
aspect when bloggers gradually mature in the blogging practice, just as all innovations hold
out possibilities of changes and improvements.

Comments

(Ms. Haiang Zeng has contributed to this article by collecting the blogs from the four
websites selected for study. The writer wishes to extend her sincere thanks to Ms. Zeng.)

54
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language media] (p. 117-124). Shanghai: .
Zhang, Y., & Li, L. (2007).
[Citizen journalism and its latent impact on international communication]. In
Editorial Office (Eds.), [J ournalism collection] (p. 166-183). Beijing:
.

56
Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Pang
Self-censorship and the Rise of Cyber Collectives:
An Anthropological Study of a Chinese Online Community

Cuiming Pang, University of Oslo

The relationship between the Internet and democracy has been a continuing matter of
debate for decades. Optimists foresaw new opportunities for accelerating the
democratization process, for consolidating and promoting democratic societies, and
for facilitating the collapse of authoritarian regimes, maintaining that the Internet is
inherently a powerful force for democracy (e.g. Barber, 1998, p. 573-589; Hirschkop,
1996, p. 86-98). Pessimists lamented the arbitrary manipulation of the Internet by
political authorities, who used it to enhance their surveillance capability and
controlled its use and appropriation in response to a fear of political resistance (e.g.
Gandy, 1993; Lyon, 2003, p. 67-82). Research concerning the Internet and
democracy in China mostly concentrated on the governments censorship system
from a top-down perspective, while few studies focus on the meso-level of
collectives and organizations, and on the micro-level of individual Internet users.
Many scholars mentioned that in China, censorship is often not initiated by the
government alone, but is in fact self-censorship by organizations, such as Internet
service providers and Internet content providers (e.g. Sinclair, 2002, p. 24; Sohmen,
2001, p. 21-22). Therefore, a detailed study of collectives and organizations in terms
of their attitudes and implementation of self-censorship is essential to understand the
political impact of the Internet in the Chinese context.

Focus

Based on participation observation of an online community - Houxi Street
1
- and in-depth
interviews with community managers and members, this paper will investigate Internet users
and Internet content providers perceptions of and reactions to censorship, especially
regarding how they learn, perceive, and practice self-censorship. Special focus here will be on
the organizations interpretation and practice of the governments media policies, their
conflicts and negotiations with both the government and Internet users, and how they provide
space for Internet users to express themselves within the boundaries of the limitations on free
speech set by the government.
This paper argues that many Chinese cyber collectives organized in the format of online
communities tend to withdraw collectively rather than fight for free speech when they
encounter the governments censorship. Even though there is a wide range of criticism
towards the governments political suppression among ordinary community members and
even community mangers, the managers tend to learn and practice self-censorship on their
own, rather than taking risks to challenge the government authority, for fear of penalties. They
generally tend to establish a friendly relationship with ordinary users, and adopt the strategies
of negotiation and dialogue rather than restrictions and sanctions, to remind users to be
cautious of their own behavior. In addition, ordinary users who establish a collective identity
with the community in which they participate tend to understand and accept the community
57
managers self-censorship, even treating it as a collective task, maintaining and protecting
their collective spontaneously. Therefore, cyber collectives that emerge in the Chinese
Internet environment actually act as a social safety valve, and to some extent help to relieve
the tensions and struggles between the state and individuals. This makes it easier for the
government to practice Internet censorship, and the road to democracy in China is much more
unpredictable.

Internet with Chinese Characteristics

The Internet, when in its beginning stage, was widely predicted to convey information
freely and globally, redefining concepts of space, place and time, thereby challenging nation-
state boundaries (e.g. Frissen, 1997, p.115). However, a number of case studies, especially
those focusing on authoritarian states, such as Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and some Asian countries,
have proven that states, as information receivers, actually play an active role in selecting and
reinterpreting information, exerting a great resistance to information globalization (e.g. De
Kloet, 2002; Fandy, 1999, p. 124-147; Hachigian, 2002, p. 41-58; Kalathil & Boas, 2001).
China, for example, has largely supported the development of new technology, realizing its
important role in the process of modernization, industrialization, and marketization, but at the
same time has adopted sophisticated strategies to restrict information access and use, in fear
of a potential danger to political stability (Zhou, 2006, p. 131-154).
These complicated censorship systems, including technologies, laws, and hierarchical
structures of administration, have been established gradually by the Chinese government, ever
since China was connected to the Internet
2
. National firewall and filtering systems have been
the main technologies used to block harmful (youhai de) websites and information
outside China, and sensitive (mingan de) words in domestic Internet content.
Various rules and regulations have been constituted, aimed at telecommunications, Internet
services in general, news services, publications, bulletin board services, and Internet cafs
specifically
3
. Several government agencies, including the Ministry of Information, the
Ministry of Public Security, the Central Propaganda Department, and their subordinate
bureaus in provinces and cities, have taken the main responsibility for conducting censorship
at different levels and in different domains
4
.
Most of the rules and regulations are targeted directly at organizations, such as Internet
service providers and Internet content providers. In order to obtain an operating license,
Internet content providers, such as Houxi Street (HXS), are required to register with the
provincial information bureau, submitting materials describing personnel and the purpose and
content of the website, and must then register with the local police bureau within the first
thirty days. If a website runs without a license, or provides services other than those registered,
it will be fined, compelled to rectify the situation, or forced to shut down. In addition, Internet
content providers are required to set up a secure registration and login system used to identify
and track subscribers, to keep logs of subscribers usage for sixty days, and hand this
information over to the government upon demand. The general picture of website operation in
the Chinese context was depicted vividly by one of theHXS members when we were chatting
in Starbucks, taking the coffee store as an analogy that land, roads, and even electricity are
owned by the Communist Party and the government, and if these services are suddenly taken
58
away, the store will definitely close down. In fact, not only do these external facilities
depend on the government, but the products the store sells are also under the governments
supervision. Instead of conducting direct censorship on Internet content, the government
requires the Internet content providers to employ self-censorship (ziwo jiandu ).
By taking responsibility for controlling content posted on their websites and implementing
filtering mechanisms, the Internet content providers should, as an Internet police officer
whom I interviewed put it, take charge of their own expression and behavior.
This self-censorship policy seems to make room for website managers to make their own
decisions. However, many website managers, such as those on HXS, are frustrated about how
exactly to take charge of themselves, what kind of content is deemed to be inappropriate
(buheshi de ), and what kind of expression and behavior will bring trouble upon
themselves. The difficulties of grasping the yardstick (bawo chidu ) set by the
government are largely due to the current regulatory framework.
Many scholars mentioned in their studies on Chinese Internet rules that the current
regulatory framework for controlling Internet content carries some Chinese characteristics
(Hartford, 2002, p. 255), such as multiple regulators, vagueness of types of prohibited
content, lack of required monitoring procedures, and impracticality of content
maintenance requirement (Ellis, 2005). The administrator of HXS, who holds the main
responsibility for setting up a filtering system, complained about these rules and regulations
for being too general and vaguely written and difficult to implement, thus making it
difficult to determine which words and phrases to filter. Some expressions found in Internet
rules, such as endanger the security of the state, divulge the secrets of the state, harm the
dignity and interests of the state, disturb social order, and damage social stability
5
,
which are used to judge inappropriate content make the rules too ambiguous to be used as
criteria for carrying out self-censorship.
The obscurity of the Chinese Internet rules annoyed many website managers because of
the difficulties it caused when censoring Internet content. On the other hand, its ambiguity
was something HSX took advantage of. According to the rule for the administration of
Internet bulletin board system services (2000), those websites that have bulletin board
services (HSX for example), should apply for a special license and are required to arrange
full-time website administrators to monitor their screen round the clock
6
. However, HSX
actually does not have this license, and from my interview with the founder, it seemed that he
did not intend to apply for it, mainly owing to the difficulties of applying for the special
license and the expense of hiring full-time administrators. He also did not show any concern
about violating the Internet law and the possibility of being punished. We have a
relationship (guanxi ) with the provincial information bureau,
7
he explained, and
those bigger websites dont have any trouble, let alone such a small HXS.
The HXSs administrators main impression of how Internet police implement regulatory
rules can be described as take action after the event (shihou guan ). After having
dealt with Internet police on several occasions, he figured out that the implementation of the
governments regulations, especially actions taken by Internet police, tend to be loose in
peace time, but could suddenly become strict, mostly in the form of intensive campaigns,
59
when something happened. His argument is supported by the national emergent
reorganization of Internet cafs in 2002, which resulted from a big fire in an Internet caf in
Beijing. Tuis, in his study of the Chinese Internet, took sine wave as a metaphor, and
pointed out that regulations are usually strictly enforced to begin with, followed by a lax
period, and then tightly enforced again, when the government feels it needs to issue a warning
(Tuis, 2001, p. 28). The general situation and potential dangers of Chinese websites, which
are facing the government regulation, were concluded by one of my interviewees who has
much working experience in the IT domain, as In general, pretty free; if problems arise, then
regulations come into play.
Lawrence Lessig constructed a model of cyberspace regulation, in which law, market,
architecture, and norms are regarded as four main regulators that constrain individuals
expression and behavior (Lessig, 1999 p. 85-99). This innovative model provided a general
framework of what and who regulates the Internet, while how the Internet is being regulated,
especially the conflicts and negotiations between the regulators and regulatees, should be
complemented by specific case studies. In Chinese cyberspace, technology, such as filtering
systems, must be set up in every website. The words and phrases to be filtered are added by
the website administrators themselves, who normally have differing ideas, opinions, and
judgement, a situation that results in different interpretations of the key words and phrases
8
.
Laws have been put into effect as well, to maintain the legitimacy of government censorship,
although the practice of these laws is sometimes unstable and unpredictable. Both law and
technology in the Chinese context have left grey space (huise didai ) for arbitrary
interpretation by the government, for organizations tricky strategies of taking a chance
(zuan kongzi ), and also for the struggles, conflicts and negotiations between
individuals, organizations, and the government with regard to the enforcement of self-
censorship.

Web 2.0 and the Construction of Houxi Street

The year 2006 was widely acclaimed as the year of online communities (shequ zhi nian
) in the Chinese IT domain
9
. The number of online communities in China reached
630,000 in September 2006; about 30.3% were established during this year
10
. Online
communities, which are normally characterized as a social space with social aggregation and
personal relationships (Rheingold, 1993, p.5), have initiated a new enclosure movement
(xin quandi yundong )
11
in Chinese cyberspace. Communitization (shequhua
) is predicted by many IT experts to be the inevitable tendency of Chinese websites
12
.
The explosion of online communities and groups in recent years has escalated with the
innovative and broad use of web 2.0 applications, such as weblog, RSS, tag, podcast, and so
on. These new applications have greatly encouraged users to play the role of both consumers
and producers of information, provided a platform for individual exhibition and open
communication, and also created a new type of social participation. The popularity of
MySpace and Facebook, in which members can produce files, share information, and create
groups, has shown that social network sites perhaps the most socially significant of the
60
Web 2.0 applications (Beer & Burrows, 2007), mainly online communities have been
widely accepted by Internet users all around the world.
The boom of online communities in China has also impressed HXSs administrator, who
had established his own forum in 2001. Any forum at that time was treated by Internet users
as an invaluable treasure, he remembered, while now, what bothers users most is which
community to choose, rather than where to find one. This opinion was reinforced by all other
interviewees, who showed a strong interest in online communities and exhibited a great
autonomy in selecting the right one. According to their description, the main criterion for
choosing a community or group is whether it is useful for me. Useful (youyong de
) here is a concrete reference to getting information, getting rid of a feeling of
loneliness, enlarging a social network, improving social ability, and even clarifying
career and life direction, and making sure what we really want in our life. Common
interest (gongtong xingqu ) was another important criteria. A twenty-three year old
girl told me that she joined some groups because of their abundant offline activities; however,
when she found that most of the activities took place at pubs, something she was not happy
about, she left these groups immediately. Not only do users choose communities,
communities choose members as well. Once certain themes are formed in a community, the
members tend to protect their common interest and maintain community order, barely
tolerating different voices and behaviors. Therefore, those intruders who do not fit into the
invisible standards of the community would be kicked out (tichuqu ) by community
managers, while those who are accustomed to the community culture (wenhua ),
environment (fenwei ), and rules (guize ), will easily achieve a sense of
belonging and a feeling of being at home.
To establish a virtual home was the initial idea of HXSs founder, who created this
website in November 2005. His former experience of surfing a national schoolmates online
community inspired him to build a similar community for communication specifically for
people from his hometown Tanyang
13
living in other places. By J uly 2007, HXS has
attracted more than six thousand registered community members from among former Tanyang
people all around China and even overseas, and is widely praised by many Tanyang people as
the best website in Tanyang
14
. The common interest of HXS is diverse topics in reference to
Tanyang County, including its economic development, travel industry, religion, education,
dialect, food, leisure activities, etc. Many talented, well-educated, and high social
status people of Tanyang post in order to express their ideas and opinions, which were
seldom heard by others before, as well as to receive a lot of feedback, support, and praise.
Therefore, for those who are interested in and concerned about the development of Tanyang,
HSX is not only a platform for communication and interaction, but also an influential means
for expressing personal voices.
In addition, various community activities organized both online and offline have also
contributed to the outstanding reputation of HXS. The most famous online activity is the
HXS evening talk (HXS yehua) held every month, providing an opportunity for members
to gather online at the same time and discuss certain topics, such as how to invest in the stock
market, how to relieve childrens stress, etc. Offline activities mainly include dinner
61
gatherings, badminton sessions, outdoor activities, movie appreciation, and some volunteer
work. HXS has registered with the Tanyang government to become a non-governmental
organization in 2006, and has launched many activities, including soliciting donations for a
seriously ill student, recruiting a volunteer team to look for old soldiers who survived the
Sino-J apanese War (1937-1945). These volunteer activities are considered by many members
as meaningful(youyiyi de ), having positive effects (jiji yingxiang )on
society, having expressed their sense of social responsibility (shehui zerengan )
and fulfilled their social values (shehui jiazhi ). After two years of operation, HXS
has developed a participatory culture (Decrem, 2006), where users are deeply involved in
community construction, generating content, expressing opinions, expanding networks, and
organizing collective activities.
As with most HXSs members, I also knew of this website from friends, and entered
easily into the community, getting the chance to interview community managers and ordinary
users. My offline fieldwork started during the period of May to J uly, 2007. During this two
month period, I conducted in-depth interviews with almost thirty members, including the
community founder, investors, administrator, board masters, and some other ordinary
members. I also participated in various online and offline activities, such as dinner gatherings,
playing badminton, and some volunteer work. After registering to be a member of this
community and its chat groups, I have also employed participant observation on the virtual
field site, reading posts, recording chat material, and analyzing virtual characters created by
members through their nicknames, avatars, personal profiles, weblogs, and so on. These
anthropological methods have helped me to develop a more comprehensive picture about how
an online community really runs, what happened inside this community, and especially the
perceptions, ideas and opinions of community members towards diverse topics, such as the
governments Internet censorship, which are sometimes not clearly shown on the web.

Censorship and Self-censorship: From the Perspective of Community Managers

Within various communication forms email, chat room, weblog, etc in Chinese online
communities, Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) is the basic and most popular form (Cui, 2001
p.6). It attracts broad attention mainly because of its simple user-friendly design and great
topical openness (Giese, 2005, p. 26). According to the latest CNNIC report released in J uly
2007, about 43.2% of Internet users frequently use BBS or forums
15
. Topics on BBS cover
diverse domains, ranging from general themes on education, literature, fashion, sports, music,
partnership, marriage, and parenthood, etc. to specific interests, such as customs in certain
minority groups and real estate in certain cities. Compared with other forms, BBS was widely
assumed by many Chinese Internet researchers to be the most public-oriented space for open
discussion, spreading information swiftly, thereby easily triggering and stimulating wide-
spread social movements from the grassroots level (e.g. Chen and Deng, 2002, p.13; Giese,
2005, p. 20-43). Nevertheless, other scholars emphasized the existence of regulatory rules and
hierarchical administrations on BBS, pointing out that this seemly open space is actually
strictly controlled by its managers, who play an active role in setting up rules, monitoring
content, and quickly removing unhealthy (bujiankang de ) and inappropriate
62
(buheshi de) posts (e.g. Huang, 1999, p. 145-162; Qiu, 1999, p.1-25).
BBS in China generally has two types of regulatory systems: a front stage (qiantai
) and back stage (houtai ) system. The former refers to those strategies shown on the
web - the arrangement of board masters (banzhu ) and the establishment of board
rules (Bangui ) which are adopted to warn users not to cross certain borders, while the
latter, operating in the background as the name implies, pertains to the main tasks of
community administrators, including all sorts of technical issues, such as setting up secure
login and filtering systems, applying BBS or weblog format, etc., in order to ensure the
website runs smoothly.
Taking HXS as an example, the basic service of the HXS community, BBS on HXS
comprises fifteen boards with a wide range of themes, including sports, photography, local
customs, games, investments, partnerships, and so on. Each board has its own set of rules,
which is usually publicized on the front page by board masters, defining board boundaries and
warning users to take responsibility for their own posts. Four kinds of behaviors are normally
deemed to be a violation of board rules, quoting, as follows: (a) expression against the
government and Communist Party; expression against Chinese laws, rules and regulations;
or touching upon sensitive political topics; (b) spreading sexually suggestive material,
gambling, violence, and immoral information; (c) insulting or slandering others or
exposing others privacy and (d) commercial advertising. Penalties imposed upon those
who break the rules vary from the most common penalty of removing the offending posts and
issuing a warning to the authors, to the higher level of reporting to the community
administrator to ban their ID temporarily, and to the most extreme penalty of permanently
banning their ID and prohibiting their access to the community. However, as HXSs
administrator admitted, the real control system filtering system in particular is dealt with
behind the scenes; it is operated automatically and is perhaps not known by ordinary users. A
set of keywords, such as Falun gong, J une 4
th
, and J iangzemin, which are classified by
HXSs administrator as obviously violating the rules and regulations, are included in HXSs
filtering system. Posts including these words are blocked, or the offending words are replaced
with XX.
Although it is difficult to figure out exactly what kind of topics are deemed
inappropriate, by the government, there seems to be a common knowledge (gongshi )
among community managers the founder, administrator, board masters regarding political
issues. In terms of community managers criteria for deleting posts and setting keywords,
topics like J une 4
th
, Falun gong, Tibet, or Taiwan independence, are high-tension lines
(gaoyaxian ), which means very sensitive; those who touch them will definitely
bring troubles on themselves and will be sent to prison as a consequence. To criticize the
central leaders of the government and the Party is normally prohibited, and to denounce
leaders of certain regions where the website is registered is deemed to be a risk; however, it is
normally no problem to show indignation toward leaders of other regions. Whats more, the
format of posts, the style of description and the tone displayed in these descriptions are
sometimes more arresting than the content itself. Posts written with a harsh tone are more
63
likely to be deleted than those with a gentler tone, even if their content and purpose are no
different.
Normally, there are no directives from the government listing supervision criteria
explicitly; nevertheless, website members are usually able to sense the governments ideology
and thoughts toward the Internet, largely owing to the governments propaganda. As a key
weapon employed to maintain the legitimacy of the government and the Communist Party, the
Chinese propaganda system continues to play a crucial role, and is in fact strengthened by the
introduction of new tools, such as the Internet (Brady, 2002, p. 574). Meanwhile, this tool
itself is also recognized as an unstable and dangerous space, demanding strong propaganda. In
the physical world, the Chinese government has traditionally used a combination of slogans
and campaigns in enforcing censorship of the media. This technology is now being applied to
the virtual space, creating slogans, such as build up a harmonious Internet (jianshe hexie
wangluo ), run a civilized Internet (wenming banwang ) and use
the Internet civilly (wenming shangwang ), and launching campaigns targeting
Internet cafs, University BBS, and so on. These slogans and campaigns actually reveal the
governments thoughts and attitudes towards the Internet, a board master concluded, from
his abundant experience as board master on a national website. We should learn to grasp
their ideology from their propaganda! Sometimes, the local propaganda department or public
security bureau will organize conferences, gathering local websites managers to study
documents (xuexi wenjian ), which normally convey the spirit (jingshen ) of
higher-level government. HXS, for instance, is required to send representatives every year to
participate in conferences organized by the Tanyang government, to learn the governments
Internet policies.
This common knowledge is also shaped by lessons learned from Internet polices direct
warnings and punishment. HXSs administrator operated his own forum previously, and was
once fined, or invited to drink tea (qingqu hecha )in his own words, by Internet
police, for not removing a post which mentioned the 1989 student movement. During my
fieldwork in Qingjian, similar things also happened to HXS, when the founder suddenly
received a call from Qingjians Internet police, urging him to delete a post expressing harsh
criticism towards the national leaders immediately. The Internet police also tried to test
HXSs filtering system on one occasion, by sending some meaningless words to the
administrator, requiring him to put these words into the system, to check whether the website
had set up a filtering system, and how quickly it worked. In order to avoid making mistakes
(fancuo ), HXSs founder sometimes logged on to bigger websites intentionally to
observe how these websites treat certain particular issues, and which topics they did or did not
cover.
It is obvious from my interviews of HXSs managers that they do not intend to challenge
the governments authority. We have to face reality for survivals sake, as HXSs founder
emphasized, survival is the most important thing for a website. Users might applaud you for
a while, for your braveness in publishing bold posts. However, the day you die, who will
mourn you?! Website managers tend to take charge of political posts primarily because of
their fear of the governments penalties, which are usually practiced in three ways: fines,
64
temporary suspension of network connection, and licence revocation. Even though many
managers considered it (with the openness of society and the rise of legal consciousness),
the Chinese government would not be as arbitrary as before; they still believe the following
famous saying: Dont trouble troubles until trouble troubles you (duo yishi buru shao yishi
).
It is true that different websites may have different sets of words to be filtered and
different website managers may have their own criteria for removing posts; however, this
does not mean there will be a rise of conscious resistance from organizations to the
government. From my observation of HXS, I prefer to consider this fact as a consequence of
the difficulties for organizations in conducting self-censorship, and their confusion in judging
inappropriate messages, as a tricky strategy they used to take advantage of the ambiguous
Internet rules, or as an accidental leakage occurring in their balance between maintaining the
websites openness and ensuring its survival. These websites have shown their potential
attitudes toward Internet censorship when they registered with the government in the first
place. They might exhibit a dissimilar interpretation and practice of self-censorship, and some
even diverge from the rules and regulations; however, they are, for some websites at least,
more liable to back up at any time at the governments request.
However, on the other hand, the organizations practice of self-censorship does not
necessarily mean that they totally support the governments censorship policy. Many
international Internet companies, such as Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft, have been widely
criticized by international human rights organizations for their work in assisting the Chinese
government in suppressing ordinary users rights to free information and free speech
16
.
Similarly, Chinese websites, their managers in particular, have been blamed by many
researchers for their cooperation with the government and their active instigation of
censorship (e.g. Huang, 1999, p. 145-162; Qiu, 1999, p. 1-25). Website managers, such as
administrators and board masters, who are responsible for monitoring Internet content,
establishing rules, and deleting posts, are generally categorized as the lowest level of the
technocrat system, or the whole hierarchical administration structure (Qiu, 1999, p. 14). It is
true that website managers play an active role in weeding messages which are not in line with
government rules, and also call for an orderly and rational discussion; nevertheless, those
managers, at least HXSs board masters and administrator, may not be satisfied with the
appellations of technocrat (Qiu, 1999, p. 14), or big mama (Tsui, 2001, p. 39).
Board masters on HXS, as those on many other Chinese websites, are ordinary users,
elected by other users, and also could be dismissed from their positions at any time, if not
qualified. Only those who are active, enthusiastic, professional,and prestigious are
liable to be elected as board masters. As HXSs rule of board masters management
mentioned, being a board master means responsibility and persistence rather than glory. Most
of HXSs board masters take this unpaid job seriously, spending a lot of time and energy on
their own boards. Their most important tasks, described in the board masters own words, are
to attract attention, activate atmosphere, help the board flourish, and hold focus at the
same time. They encourage members to publish posts of high quality have convincing
points, literary talent or sufficient arguments and tend to delete those posts involving
violence, pornography, personal insult, and violation of privacy. They also keep an eye on
political posts; however, from my interviews and observations of these board masters, it
65
seems that they are not so rigorous and scrupulous as much of the research seems to imply,
and also do not treat the political mission as their only or even main responsibility.
In her report about how the Chinese government controls the media, He Qinglian
suspected the authenticity of a large-scale survey released by the Chinese Academy of
Science in 2003, which claimed that 50% of respondents think it is necessary to manage and
control the Internet, and another 36.2% think that it is somewhat necessary (He, 2004)
17
.
However, when I asked a similar question of my informants, every informant, manager or
ordinary user answered without any hesitation that the Internet should be regulated, and
recognized law, government, and individuals themselves as the main regulators. As with
almost every online community all around the world, HXSs members exercised a strategy of
self-regulation in community construction as well, arranging an administration system,
creating their own code of conduct, and resolving community conflicts. It is very clear that
the arrangement of board masters is not only required by the government but also demanded
by Internet users, who are frustrated over Internet rumors, misleading information, and
slander, and who appeal for the establishment of a regulated Internet environment.
Calling for an orderly Internet environment, however, does not mean that those managers
or ordinary users support the governments regulation of political issues. Scholarly analysis of
the report mentioned above has tended to ignore the fact that most people think pornography
(86.7%), violence (71.2%), and junk messages (68.5%) should be controlled, while a smaller
number think content related to politics (12.9%) should be controlled
18
. This large
differentiated attitude towards ethical and political issues has also been testified by my
interviews with HXSs managers and members. They believed that the government should
take responsibility for regulating the production and spread of immoral behavior, and even
felt that the governments policy and its implementation are too loose to control pornography,
violence, rumors, etc., effectively. On the other hand, those managers, even the founder and
the administrator, are critical of the governments Internet surveillance on political issues,
considering it to be too strict and saying there is no need to be so strict.
Based on my observation of HXS, I prefer to put aside all the stereotypes toward
community administration systems and their managers, rather than presume them to be on the
governments side. The management system is arranged not only due to the governments
requirements, but also by the demand of ordinary users who want an internal control of
immoral expression and behavior. Managers do take measures to control posts on political
topics in accordance with the governments requirements, and tend to learn self-censorship on
their own rather than taking risks to challenge authority. However, these managers are first of
all ordinary Internet users and have their personal ideas, opinions, and attitudes toward
government Internet censorship, be it supportive, understanding, discontent, or criticism,
which are likely at odds with the behavior they exhibit on the web. It is not difficult to
understand why there might be a large discrepancy between managers inner thoughts and
external behavior; however, the most intriguing questions here would be how ordinary
members perceive and react to community managers self-censorship; how the managers face
ordinary users possible questions, indignation, challenges, and resistance, while they
themselves may also have similar doubts and discontent with the governments political
control; and how they encourage users self-expression while attempting not to stray beyond
the governments tolerance limitation.

66
Identity and the Collectivization of Political Discussion

The number of Internet users in China has increased dramatically in recent years, and
reached 162 million in J uly 2007, retaining its status as the world's second-largest population
with Internet access only after the United States
19
. The Internet is consistently used by
Chinese users for obtaining information, for communication and entertainment, and for
practical assistance, such as online dating, online shopping, and online education
20
. Even on
HXS, a small and highly hegemonic community, there are a variety of services, including
news, music, movies, games, weblogs, a chat service, match-making, and plenty of
suggestions and tips on fashion, investment, finding jobs, raising children, maintaining health,
and so forth. A 2005 survey on urban Chinese Internet usage and impact discovered that most
Chinese Internet users seek out entertainment online instead of serious political discussion,
and concluded that the Chinese Internet is an entertainment highway rather than an
information highway
21
. Nevertheless, some other researchers also pinpointed that, in the
Chinese Internet arena, attention towards political and social problems and discontent with
current society are undoubtedly on the increase (Lagerkvist, 2006 p. 43). Posts concerning
political and social issues on HXS, for instance, are not rare, and those topics relating to
corruption, officials irresponsible behavior, and foreign policies always invoke heated
discussion.
It was not a surprise to me when I was told by HXSs founder that he had just been
warned by Internet police for not deleting a post with harsh criticism towards the national
leaders. I was more attracted to a conversation, transmitting this news from the founder to
other members, especially the post author, when all of us showed up in the same chat group
(liaotian qun ) at the same time. This conversation started when the post author made
another critical post in this chat group:

2007-06-13 14:49:11 land@HXS
22
: Dragon,
23
Dont transfer this post to our BBS, otherwise
the Internet police will call me again.
2007-06-13 14:50:04 dragon: Internet police?
2007-06-13 14:50:08 HXSthumb
24
: If the post was only published here, will they block this
chat group?
2007-06-13 14:51:28 dragon: How did Internet police find it?
2007-06-13 14:51:39 pigs head: ...So serious
2007-06-13 14:51:55 pigs head: But funny.
2007-06-13 14:52:03 land@HXS: They searched it automatically.
2007-06-13 14:52:16 land@HXS: They found that joke you transferred from our stock chat
group
25
to the BBS.
2007-06-13 14:52:21 dragon: Now I see. In fact, it will make our website more famous.
2007-06-13 14:52:36 dragon: Whats wrong with that joke?
2007-06-13 14:52:54 land @HXS: Dragon doesnt have any political sensitivity.
2007-06-13 14:53:02 dragon: I agree.
2007-06-13 14:53:29 dragon: But it was not for political opinions sake. I just thought that
the joke was funny.
2007-06-13 14:55:01 land@HXS: Yes, I know.
67
2007-06-13 14:55:08 land@HSX: Thats why I didnt blame you.
2007-06-13 14:55:43 dragon: And then, you deleted that post?
2007-06-13 14:56:56 dragon: Poor me. I searched so hard on the stock group and finally got
something. But now I've become a spy!
2007-06-13 14:57:16 land@HXS: Faint! Of course I deleted it. Otherwise, should we wait to
die?
2007-06-13 14:57:23 land@HXS: They called me!
2007-06-13 14:57:37 dragon: I should save it to my hard disc first.

Some research on the Chinese BBS or forum pointed out that many managers maintain a
kind tone when communicating with ordinary users (e.g. Zhou, 2006, p. 152). The above
conversation between HXSs founder and its members also proved that the managers in some
online communities, HXS for instance, are willing to develop an open communication and a
friendly relationship with ordinary members. Even faced with the post author who brought
trouble to the community, the founder showed a great understanding and tolerance instead of
assigning blame and invoking punishment. He patiently explained the cause and effect of this
event to the author, and even joked with him for not having any political sensitivity
(zhengzhi mingandu ). On the other hand, the author, dragon, also seemed to
understand the founders treatment of his post, and accepted the fact immediately without any
dispute. In some other cases, which are exhibited on HXSs BBS, some authors whose posts
were deleted by the managers are not so polite and accepting as dragon; they usually tend to
publish another post with a striking title, angrily demanding an explanation. However, their
irritation is often appeased by the board masters modest attitudes, patient explanations and
sincere apologies. According to HXSs rule of board masters management, community
managers are not allowed to use coercive methods to resolve conflicts and disputes. They
have an obligation to give reasons for removing posts and are expected to keep an open mind
toward users questions and challenges.
It is also clearly shown in this conversation that HXSs founder was confronting a
dilemma of preserving the communitys openness and obeying the governments rules at the
same time. He obviously still tried to balance this conflict and did not want to constrain
members self-expression completely, even though he showed a strong fear of the
governments political censorship. By reminding dragon not to transfer his post to HXSs BBS,
the founder distinguished two types of communicative forms, BBS and the chat group, and
treated the former as a more fragile space, where members should be more cautious of their
behavior, while performance on the latter seemed to have a lesser risk in relation to
governmental supervision. The members also showed their awareness of the difference
between BBS and the chat group, when dragon called himself a spy, and HXS thumb
questioned the safety of the chat group, even though they clearly did not know how to behave
appropriately in each place.
In Chinese cyberspace, a variety of methods of counter-control are adopted and widely
spread by Internet users, despite the fact that many of them may not intend to challenge the
government. By observing and comparing different communicative forms BBS, email,
weblogs and chat groups I found counter-control strategies to be most vividly displayed in
chat groups, where a number of people are able to chat and discuss at the same time
28
. I was
68
sometimes surprised by bold expression in chat groups, such as a picture of a naked female
body with J iang Zemins
29
head, some funny words added to serious images of Hu J intao, and
some extremely harsh doggerel satirizing corruption officials. In chat groups, it is quite
normal for users to create various metaphors, satire, jokes, pictures, and avatars to make their
expression more humorous and poignant.
In fact, although chat groups are also under the supervision of the chat service provider
and the government
30
, it is more difficult to exert censorship in this participatory form than in
others, mainly because it is too complicated on a practical level to control the huge amount of
daily chat material, and censoring technologies are still not able to recognize pictures, which
are widely used in chat groups
31
. This weakness in Internet censorship is exploited by many
websites, such as HXS, as a strategy to strengthen their relationships with users. By creating a
virtual space to meet most users demands for communication and interaction, and thereby
unlocking a more open space for freer expression, HXSs managers have built up a mutual
understanding and trust between themselves and members, and have greatly encouraged
members to develop a sense of identity toward this community.
Many members told me that, compared to other communities in which they have
participated, this HXS community is the easiest to become deeply involved in. As Giese
pointed out, the awareness of ones local place of birth is a very important part of ones online
identity (Giese, 2006, p. 30); a common birth place and dialect, similar interests, and familiar
background, have attracted a large number of people to gather together on HXS and to get to
know each other quickly. This group of people not only uses this website to express
themselves and develop interpersonal relationships, but also exerts great effort to facilitate
website construction and development, producing a diverse Internet content, offering
managers suggestions and advice, and spontaneously maintaining a collective orientation and
set of values. Some community symbols, such as the community name, logo, slogan, and
clothes, which were created by members cooperatively, have distinctly indicated a strong
collective identity established on the HXS community.
A Chinese Internet observer pointed out that forum participants tend to be more
cooperative with web masters in keeping the forum in order when they realize the political
risk the forum faces
32
. Many of HXSs members also exhibit a great comprehension of the
difficulties of running a website in Chinas political environment, and the struggles the
managers must confront. Managers often took a community member living in Taiwan as a
typical example to show members support and understanding, and appreciated the fact that he
reminded managers to delete his posts if they were inappropriate. As one member expressed,
HXS is, after all, a spontaneous, private, and self-financing website, we should cherish and
protect it. Many members also seem to develop a common sense similar to the managers,
regarding the kinds of topics they can or cannot touch, and tend to avoid publishing harsh
posts in relation to political and social issues. Those who are not aware of the yardstick (du
), like dragon, generally become more cautious after being reminded by the community
managers.
In fact, many members are not only cautious about their own behavior, but also watch
others, even the managers performance, and try to remind them to grasp the yardstick if
necessary. Once when a board master who took charge of HXS evening talk proposed a
discussion about the fact that large numbers of Chinese government officials use the services
69
of prostitutes, many members reminded him that this topic was too sensitive and was likely
to result in serious consequences, especially during the current tense situation (fengsheng
jin ). The phrase dont discuss politics (motan guoshi ) is quite often
quoted, not only by managers, but also by ordinary users on BBS and in chat groups, as a
serious warning, or sometimes as a joke which actually implies a criticism and discontent
towards the governments censorship.
It is also very interesting to note that in the above conversation, all the participant
members HXS thumb, pigs head, glass snake, dragon, etc. did not really seem to take
this event seriously, and commented that it was funny and would make HXS famous
instead. They also did not show great indignation toward the governments censorship, which
to some extent exhibited their underlying political opinions and attitudes. As dragon clarified
his behavior as not being for political opinions sake, some HXSs members who create and
spread political pictures, jokes and doggerel also explained that their initial intent was for
entertainment rather than to express political views. Some others who actually want to
express their dissatisfaction with political and social problems tend to criticize the policies,
rules, and regulations the government and Communist Party enforce, instead of directly
targeting Chinas political system, one-party rule, and non-democratic regime. Most of my
informants seemed to hold an ambivalent attitude toward the Chinese government and
Communist Party, criticizing their opaque political practice, and at the same time believing
they are improving all the time, having achieved more openness and transparency. There are
also some informants who were not optimistic about the Chinese future and pointed out
potential risks China might encounter with the authoritarian system. Nevertheless, they tended
to accept current reality, adopting a pragmatic view that to change things that can be changed,
and to accept things that cannot be changed, rather than seeking resistant strategies as those
political dissidents reported by the media.
From my observation of this Chinese online community, it seems that a collective
behavior regarding political discussion has developed among community managers and
ordinary members. In order to maintain a friendly relationship with members, managers do
not generally want to exert complete supervision toward political posts, an attitude which also
facilitates the development of a collective identity in the community. And once members
establish a strong identity with the community, they tend to protect it when faced with the
governments censorship, by taking care of their own behavior and reminding others. Those
managers who are not aware of the current political climate and might make mistakes are
also liable to be warned by ordinary members. Therefore, conducting self-censorship and
grasping the yardstick has been treated as a collective task by ordinary members, and not as
the responsibility of the managers alone.
Moreover, in his study of Chinese media and the Internet, J ohan Lagerkvist noted that a
kind of social contract (Lagerkvist, 2006, p. 184) in relation to Internet use is agreed upon,
not only by the Communist Party and the government, but also by media organizations and
individual Internet users, who tend to be satisfied with the emergence of new media and
alternative information channels. Actually, similar social contracts have also been established
in China with regard to Chinas political system and the Chinese future, in which many
ordinary Chinese people still have confidence. This underlying belief and the exhibited fear of
punishment, together with some possible vents for expressing discontent and criticism, have
70
also helped to explain why the collective political discussion on many online communities,
such as HXS, tends to withdraw rather than exhibiting active resistance and protest, when it
encounters the governments censorship.

Conclusion

Since the early 1980s, China has experienced an intense individualization process
concomitant with the gradual retreat of the state from the lives of ordinary citizens, within the
context of rapid industrialization, marketization, and urbanization. On the other hand, there
has been a tendency to establish new collectives, either by the government, which realizes that
tense social conflicts result from a rapid dismantling of old collectives without alternative
social security systems, or by individuals, who are forced to recompose their lives and are
liable to fall back on collectives to fight a rather unstable and insecure society
33
. The trend of
forming new groups, collectives, and organizations is clearly exhibited in the Chinese Internet
arena, and has escalated with the introduction of Web 2.0 applications, which greatly facilitate
a deeper and wider social interaction and participation. These web-based collectives, such as
the HXS community, have created a new type of communicative mode and a particular
organizational form: transcending class and regional boundaries and inviting broad
participation and collaboration; eroding the social order and social stratification that exists in
the physical world, and at the same time constructing alternative rules and alternative
hierarchical structures; and developing a largely anonymous environment and establishing a
mechanism of mutual trust.
The emergence and proliferation of cyber collectives in recent years was regarded by
Yang Guobin as the main indicator and force, together with public debate and popular protest,
for unlocking the public sphere in China and empowering Chinese civil society (Yang, 2003a,
p. 453-475; Yang, 2003b, p. 405-422; Yang, 2006, p. 303-318). He argued that these web-
based collectives and organizations, such as environmental groups, usually start as online
communities and adopt various media applications email, instant messaging, BBS, and
weblogs, etc. for trans-regional mobilization (Yang, 2006, p. 209), practicing bottom-up
politics (Yang, 2003c, p. 92), and linking up (Yang, 2003a, p. 475) with the global
community. It is evident that collective action is more influential in spreading public opinion
and organizing public activities than separated and unorganized individual action. However,
when faced with the threat of a more powerful authority, a grassroots collective would
possibly become more fragile than the individual, and is liable to compromise in order to
avoid complete annihilation. The evaluation of the impact of the Internet on politics in terms
of the collective level should not only be based on what kind of activities these collectives
launch, but also on how they organize these activities, especially how they conflict and
negotiate with the factors that influence their practices.
The case of Houxi Street, a small and local online community, however a good
illustration of the problems and issues common to all such Chinese online communities,
proved that at least some Internet content providers who create online communities are
confronted with a dilemma between offering users a space that is as open as possible, while
ensuring their own survival. By taking advantage of the obscurity of the self-censorship
policy, they attempt to create some vents for users to express their indignation toward the
government while attempting to maintain a friendly relationship with users for the sake of
71
website development. And as many other ordinary users, website managers also have their
own opinions toward the governments political censorship, mostly negative in the case of
HXS. To a certain extent, these opinions influence the way in which they censor Internet
content, setting up filtering words and removing posts. However, on the other hand, fear of
severe penalties keeps them from taking risks to challenge government authority, and they are
liable to withdraw when their behavior is deemed by the government to have transcended
political lines. In order to persuade users to take responsibility for their own statements and
avoid sensitive political topics, the managers generally adopt gentle strategies instead of
coercive methods when dealing with users questions and challenges, and are ultimately
usually successful in appeasing users irritation. Moreover, ordinary Internet users tend to
participate actively in website construction when they choose to be members of a community
such as the HXS community, which functioned as a platform for cementing alliances and
providing mutual assistance, for individual expression and the exchange of information, and
as an arena for exhibiting a strong sense of social responsibility and social solicitude. They
are also eager to protect these communities, into which they exert much effort, show a great
understanding of the managers self-censorship, and try not to bring problems to the
community. Therefore, a collective action of retreat rather than direct and further collision
with the government has occurred in some Chinese online communities, the HXS community
being one example, with regard to political discussion and activities.
It is evident that the Chinese government has never abandoned or even loosened its
control of collective activities in fear of the potential dangers and challenges these collectives
could bring. The occasional unrest or potential political resistance in the Chinese Internet
arena is normally suppressed by the government, for example by the management of the
reorganization of Internet cafs and university BBSs. Fierce repression is enforced by the
government in dealing with some cyber collectives constructed by political dissidents, such as
the Falun gong group, while a gentler strategy of self-censorship with some room for
negotiation is implemented toward most other cyber collectives, which actually have no
intention of organizing political protest and resistance. This self-censorship strategy has
largely consolidated the Chinese governments Internet censorship, and is likely to continue
its influence in the short run.

Notes

1
In the following sections, the name of this online community has been altered to protect its
anonymity, as are the website address and members nicknames.
2
There are numerous articles and media reports, which have given a general introduction to
Chinas Internet censorship system; see for example: OpenNet Initiative. 2005. Internet
Filtering in China in 2005-2005: A Country Study. Retrieved September 14, 2006 from
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf
3
Rules and regulations; see for example: Measures for managing internet information
services (2000); Provisional rules for the administration of the operation of news publication
services by web sites (2000); Rules for the administration of Internet bulletin board system
services (2000). Retrieved October 10, 2007 from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/index/OF/
index.htm
4
These three government organs have different tasks. The Ministry of Information has the
72
main responsibility for managing telecommunication industries and Internet service and
content providers licenses; the Ministry of Public Security, in conjunction with Internet
police, mainly supervises the use of the Internet; The Central Propaganda Department is in
charge of propagandizing the Communist Partys ideology and policies relating to the Internet.
5
See the rule: Measures on Internet information service (2000), Article 15. Retrieved October
10, 2007 from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2000/09/25/062.htm
6
See the rule: Rule for the administration of Internet bulletin board system services (2000).
Retrieved October 10, 2007 from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/html/Dir/2000/10 /08/0653.htm
7
This relationship refers to a friend of one of HXSs members, who works in the provincial
information bureau.
8
The variation of setting up words to be filtered can be proved by a test carried out by the
OpenNet Initiative in November 2004, which examined the filtering mechanism of three
Chinese blog providers, showing that some of the keywords contained in blog entries were
completely prevented from being posted by two of the providers, while the other carried out
the censorship of entries by replacing the words with characters. The report Filtering by
Domestic Blog Providers in China is available online: Retrieved September 14, 2006 from
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/008/
9
See relevant reports about the first Chinese online community conference which was
organized in 2006. Retrieved J une 16, 2007 from
http://www.qihoo.com/site/portal/zhuanti/newpower/index.html
10
Current statistics were published by a national survey of Chinese online community in 2006.
Retrieved November 10, 2007 from http://app.discuz.net/2006vote/report.pdf
11
For relevant reports, see for example Dai Lu, 2007.
12
See relevant reports about the second Chinese online community conference which was
organized in 2007. Retrieved J une 16, 2007 from http://www.techweb.com.cn
/special/zt/07webbbs/
13
The name has been altered.
14
This website registered in Qingjian (the name has been altered), the capital city of one
province in China; however, it was also under the Tanyang governments management,
because it also registered with the Tanyang government as a non-governmental organization.
15
Current statistics were released by China Internet Network Information (CNNIC), in the
report The 20th Statistical Report on China's Internet Development. Retrieved August 11,
2007 from http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2007/7/18/113918.pdf
16
Relevant reports see for example: Amnesty International report Undermining freedom of
expression in China: the role of Yahoo!, Microsoft and Google (July 2006).
Retrieved November 14, 2007 from http://irrepressible.info/static/pdf/FOE-in-china-2006-
lores.pdf Human rights watch report Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in
Chinese Internet Censorship (August 2006). Retrieved December 10, 2006 from
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/china0806webwcover.pdf
17
The title of the report is Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Twelve Chinese Cities,
released in 2003 by the Chinese Academy of Science. Retrieved September 14, 2006 from
http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/chinainternet_usage.pdf
18
Ibid.
19
This statistic was released by Chinese Internet Network Information (CNNIC) in the 20
th

73
survey report on Chinas Internet development. Retrieved August 11, 2007 from
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2007/7/18/113918.pdf
20
Ibid.
21
The title of this survey is Surveying Internet Usage and Impact in Five Chinese Cities. It
was released in 2005 by the Chinese Academy of Science. Retrieved September 14, 2006
from http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/china_final_11_2005.pdf
22
This is the founders nickname. All the nicknames here have been altered.
23
This is the poster authors nickname.
24
This is the nickname of one of HXSs members, as are pigs head and glass snake in the
following conversation.
25
This is another chat group on HXS, the main topic of which is the stock market and stock
investment.
26
This is my translation of the original citation: Minzhi mingao Hu J intao (
). The name of the president was actually replaced by some other characters with the same
pronunciation.
27
This is the trace left by Internet police, showing that a certain post on a certain website was
checked out. The URL address, website physical IP, website physical address, and website
name have been altered.
28
This chat service is called QQ group, a sort of Instant Messaging (IM), provided by Tencent
QQ Company, Chinas most popular instant messaging company.
29
Chinas former president.
30
One of HXSs QQ groups was once blocked by Tencent QQ Company, which suspected that
this group used QQ service for gambling. According to some of HXSs managers analysis, all
the chat history will be stored in Tencent QQ Companys server for six months, and must be
handed over to the government upon request.
31
Even though this QQ chat may be more open and less censored than BBS and weblogs now,
this situation may change in the future.
32
This reference was quoted from a secondary source. See Zhou, 2006. The original online
source was retrieved by Zhou in July, 2000 from
www.peopledaily.com.cn/wsrmlt/istannual/mtpl/i.html. The site was not retrieved when I
later tried to access it.
33
These conclusions are mainly inspired by the research project The Chinese Individual:
Negotiations of Rights and Responsibilities. Detailed project description retrieved October 24,
2007 from
http://www.hf.uio.no/ikos/forskning/forskningsprosjekter/chineseindividual/index.html

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Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Ytterstad
It is we you and me, who possess real power:
Blogging Protests against Official Norwegian Policy on Climate Change

Andreas Ytterstad, Oslo University College

Norway is to be world champions on climate, VG tells us today Right now I am
just happy about politicians quarrelling over who is best and who isnt good enough.
I have just seen Al Gores An Inconvenient Truth, and my soul is thrilled by the focus
on the environment and that the goal should be to be best.
From the blog The everyday trivialities of Sissel, J une 22, 2007
1

Global warming

Public attention to the issue of global warming has increased rapidly over the last few
years in Norway. As this article is being finalized for publication
2
, Al Gore is coming to
Norway to receive the Nobel Prize, together with the climate panel of the UN IPCC, for their
work in alerting the public of the looming danger. Until recently, however, the political
translation from knowledge to action, has been scant in Norwegian media (Ryghaug, 2006, p.
213). The speech of the Norwegian Prime Minister J ens Stoltenberg on April 19, 2007 was
probably a turning point. With Kofi Annan and the mother of sustainable development Gro
Harlem Brundtland at his side, Stoltenberg launched what he dubbed the most ambitious cuts
by any government in the world. During the following three months the debate on solutions to
the problem of global warming reached prime time quite predictably as the Stoltenberg
government launched official Norwegian climate policy (Klimameldingen)
3
on June 22, 2007.
But despite the high ambitions of the government, and despite extensive media coverage,
popular impatience has begun to emerge. Nina Dessau, the writer of a popular book on
climate change, is among those who have highlighted how politicians trail behind their
electorate (Dessau, 2006; Godrej, 2006, p. 10, 106). J rgen Randers (2007) even sees popular
mobilization and protest ahead in Norway. Co-author of the 1972 environmental classic The
Limits to Growth, Randers was also the leader of The Committee for Low emissions
(Lavslippsutvalget) set up by the Norwegian government. Forecasting developments, he now
expects popular rebellion for climate cuts against globalization in Norway in the next decade.
This article will focus on the popular protests already evident in the Norwegian
blogosphere. The introductory quote is taken from the blog Everyday trivialities of Sissel.
As with a number of other bloggers in Norway, she is inspired by Al Gores film and praises
his communicative skills. But she also has a critical comment, which points towards the
popular protest Randers expects:

Id wish he also focus on our power and in larger degree on force, for I have always
felt and thought that human force has been underestimated. Our main problem is that
we do not understand what we are in possession of. We do not realize what we can
become accomplish. But he made me think that my little posting here might
actually make a difference not path-breaking, but perhaps for you?
4

Sissels faith in the force of ordinary people provides the cue for my research question:
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What is the scope and character of blog resistance to official Norwegian policy on climate
change? The concern over the democratic potential of new digital media is a longstanding
one among media scholars (Jenkins & Thornburn, 2003). I would place this article alongside
theorists who consider new media an effective tool for democracy in combination with
progressive social movements and their adherents (Hassan, 2004; Rogers, 2004; Donk et al.,
2004). Although many environmental organizations do exist in Norway, there is no mass
movement with a huge web presence. Still, through blogs we can nevertheless observe how
meaning and perspectives are given to the public without journalistic intermediaries
(Rasmussen, 2006). The blogging protests for an even more ambitious climate policy can thus
perhaps anticipate the shape of things to come.

In the U.S. a number of climate scientists
communicate through blogs. In Dr. Glen Barrys mobilizing post for the National Day of
Climate Action (April 14, 2007) he complained about the fact that we dont have a
movement - the largest rally yet held in the U.S. about global warming drew a thousand
people. If we're going to make the kind of change we need in the short time left us, we need
something that looks like the civil rights movement, and we need it now. Changing light bulbs
just isn't enough (Barry & McGibben, 2007).
So do blogs function, as Christian Hgsbjerg suggests (2007), as some sort of modern
variant to the democratic impulse George Orwell saw in the proliferation of popular
pamphlets in England during the 17
th
century? At the dawn of industrialization,
pamphleteering bred the chartist movement. With the global consequences for the
environment occasioned by late capitalism in mind, this article will ponder whether Sissel and
her like can be thought of as the harbinger of peoples power once again.

Data and Methods

I have selected blog postings for analysis in the period from April 19
th
, 2007 to J uly 11
th
,
2007. I thus begin with the date Stoltenberg launched his ambitions for a climate policy, and
follow the debate up until the governments climate policy document was launched on J une
22
nd
and the first ensuing three weeks of debate after its launch. In choosing this time period
for study, I believe to have caught an important beginning which I hope can provide a useful
reference point for further studies.
It is difficult to delineate data in the blogosphere. New blogs appear at an astonishing
speed and different search engines will come up with different numbers (Larson, 2007). One
has to rely on the keywords selected by individual authors, and it requires some guesswork to
find the relevant postings. My data are selected from the two main sites I suspect most
bloggers themselves would search if they wanted to take the pulse on the global warming
debate in Norway. Technorati.com is a main international metablog. Based on the search
words (exact word, in Norwegian) global oppvarming and klima, I ended up with 190
blog entries within this period. VGB.no is the blog service of VG Norways biggest paper.
In the search for vgb.no I also included the search word (by tags, not free text in Norwegian)
milj. This gave a total of 165 entries. Through an induction partly informed by frame
analysis, where the notion of a certain themes salience is key (Entman, 1993), I created 14
content categories. Although I tried to be open to any kind of pattern or significant, general
points on global warming, I could not fit 110 entries in any of the 14 created categories
5
. I
have also chosen to consider two of the categories irrelevant, taking away another further 3
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entries. The total number of blog postings I have categorized are thus (355-113=) 242, with
135 stemming from technorati.com and 107 from vgb.no. Some, but not very many of the
entries are placed within more than one category. Summing up the total from my 12
categories I get 331.
To say something about the scope of blog resistance to Norwegian Climate Policy, I will
shortly present the results of the analysis in quantitative form. My main approach though, is
qualitative. In order to evaluate and place in context the specifics of blog protest I have first
done a literature review, paying heed especially to new popular publications on climate
change in Norwegian bookstores. Secondly, I have included some auxiliary data in my
analysis. I have not been able to do a systematic, comparative analysis of other media, but
have tried to read and watch as extensively as feasible during the period. Two dates were
considered crucial. The day after Stoltenbergs speech (April 20
th
), and the day after the
Climate Policy Document was launched (J une 22
nd
). I bought and read VG, Dagbladet,
Dagens Nringsliv, Dagsavisen and Klassekampen, all big and/or important agenda setting
newspapers in Norway. I taped the first televised debate on NRKs Redaksjon En, the biggest
debating program on national television, who had put up a provisional studio in the
conference hall of the Labour Party the day Stoltenberg spoke. Finally I taped the live
broadcast of the press conference on June 22
nd
.
My main method for the analysis of the character of blog protest is critical discourse
analysis. In particular I have found Norman Faircloughs (1992, 1995) concept of
intertextuality suggestive. As the example of Sissel once again illustrates, bloggers use other
media as raw material for their own postings. Analyzing the representations of other media
which bloggers in turn rerepresent, as well as the ones they do not, may provide a key answer
to the ways in which blog protests differ from other kinds of mediated protests.

The Scope of Resistance

Table 1: Taxonomy of blog content
Category VGB T Total
Politicians blogs or defense of policy of a certain political party 47 38 85
Reactions against decisions or proposals by leading politicians 25/30 21/22 52
What you or anybody can do to curb global warming 11 23/25 36
Concrete calls for more radical measures than those on offer 20/21 13/14 35
Humor/ridicule/outbursts against the theme and/or the debate 15 12/13 28
Skepticism or rejection of man-made global warming 10/13 13/15 28
Pinpointing political double speak. Politicians dont REALLY care 8 8/9 17
Rebuttals of the arguments of the skeptics 5 10/11 16
We (society) are all to blame for the destruction of nature 3/5 9/11 16
Blaming capitalism and/or the market 1 6/7 8
Ridicule of the Progress Party 1 7 8
Popular expositions of global warming by scientists 2 0 2
Total 331

In table 1 above, one sees the 12 categories arranged from the biggest to the smallest that
I have been able to make analytical sense out of. I have distinguished between entries found at
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vgb.no (VG) and technorati.com (T). There are some entries whose content salience is in
some doubt. Where this is the case I have put the smallest figure before and the largest figure
behind a slash (e.g., 25/30).
This table gives some broad contours of the global warming debate in the Norwegian
blogosphere. My ambition in this first part of the analysis is not to explain fully or exemplify
the intricacies of all categories. I will restrict myself to interpreting the results in lieu of my
research question. What was the scope of resistance like in the beginning of a more ambitious
Norwegian Climate Policy?

Politicians and Popular Protest

I had not planned to survey the demography of the blogosphere on global warming. As in
other forums on the net, there are quite a lot of nick names, an apparent over-representation of
men of which a few of these dominate the debates with several postings and comments. My
focus was on content and the overall representation of protest in the material. Nevertheless, I
could not but notice that the content of many blog entries is often little more than digital
replica of the official positions on global warming by the political parties of Norway. Most of
the 7 entries from AP (Labour Party) politicians came during their party conference; the same
went for most of the 13 entries by Hyre (the Conservative Party) who had their conference a
few weeks later. Steinar Anderson writes 8 of 11 entries by Frp (The Progress party),
defending their credence on climate policy. This tendency to simply advertise party policy
is also present in several of the 15 entries by SV (The Socialist Left Party), but less so. They
did not have a party conference in this period and entries are a bit more varied. They do
engage in the debates on global warming as such in a deeper way.
Nevertheless, this finding weakens the analogy of blogging with popular pamphleteering.
It is indeed tempting to interpret this result as a vivid demonstration of cooptation by the elite.
What began as an innovatory democratic impulse from below is now being dominated and co-
opted by the usual powerful actors. But this line of argument may be rectified if we take a
closer look at who amongst politicians blog. Firstly, with a few exceptions, such as SV deputy
leader Audun Lysbakken, there are very few full time politicians in my data. Secondly, as
mentioned, most of the entries from the established parties limit themselves to advertise party
policy. Thirdly, and this is what really separates the blog debate from the normal public
debates on global warming, the Green Party has the biggest number of entries by far: 34
entries in total with 25 of them stemming from their top candidate in Bergen. Much of the
criticisms directed at political leaders, and many suggestions for more radical measures, come
from this single individual.
On balance, this would make the overall dominance of traditional political power much
less than what 85 entries originally suggested. In particular I would interpret the
overrepresentation of contributions from the miniscule Green Party as something that
increases the overall presence of protest in the material. Although they too advertised their
party in front of the municipal elections that took place in September 2007, they strengthen,
rather than weaken the frame of us versus them, I turn to now.

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All in the Same Boat? Or Us Versus Them?

A useful key to identify and assess the scope of resistance is, I believe, to look at the age-
old question of them and us. How does a sense of a global us where everybody needs to
contribute, compare with a sense of them high up above, not listening, not doing enough, to
save the planet? According to the worst case scenarios of climate change, it would seem
indisputable from a long term global point of view, to consider humanity and all life on earth
in the same boat. But how much of a division is present now in the Norwegian blogosphere,
between those who govern and those who do not? By adding up some of the biggest as well
as some of the smallest categories above we arrive at some figures that can help unlock this
key to latent popular protest.
The 52 entries in the second biggest category are critical responses to the ideas and
solutions of political leaders. Adding entries from the categories pinpointing doublespeak
16
,
We (society) is all to blame
16
and blaming capitalism/the market
8
we get 92 entries with a
salience of opposition to Status Quo or to use a common phrase in the global warming
debate business as usual. The fact that so many either are unsatisfied with and/or have
their own ideas of how to reduce more CO
2
than their political leaders -- bespeaks some
impatience from ordinary people on climate action. Added to the 92, should be most of the 35
entries who suggest more radical measures to combat climate change than the ones offered so
far. This amounts to well over a third of the total 331 entries in my material.
On the other hand, despite the oppositional edge to the suggestions for a more radical
climate policy, they are mostly precisely suggestions, concrete measures relevant for a sector
of society cheap and free transport, windmills, saving tips on electronic devices and so on.
There are few demands, and as I will elaborate later on - no radical demands that could be
an affront to structural power in Norway. Furthermore, there is the next big category of
bloggers who are very concerned about global warming, but do not differentiate between top
and bottom at all; 36 entries say that everybody needs to do her bit. Eight of these 36 are
explicitly inspired by Al Gore or want to recommend his film. Often there is a sense of
urgency in them. To me, there is also something admirable about individuals who take the
time to send out anonymous recipes into the blogosphere, telling people what you can do
6
.
But because they are not clearly oppositional, they do not hint very strongly towards future
protest. On the contrary, it seems to me that the main political parties of Norway would find it
perfectly possible to further and to partly realize most of the concrete demands put
forward in the blogosphere. The distinction of us versus them is there, perhaps even
pronounced some of the time, but the rift by no means appears beyond healing.

Protests and Ridicule (of the Science of) Man-made Global Warming

So far the story has been one of who wants most and most rapid cuts in emissions. But
there is another sort of protest going on. If we add up the 28 skeptics to (the science of) man-
made global above with the 28 entries who seem to poke fun with the entire debate, we have a
sixth of the total who do not seem to care much about the issue at all. Some of the skepticism
is cautious though. Likewise, some of the humour seems like cathartic outbursts. Marina is
funny (Marina er morsom), writes under the heading How to stop global warming that
the simple answer is spend less, before she goes on: There. Now I have answered and it
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took me less than two minutes. So easy is it to save the world from meltdown and certain
doom. We superheroes are really effective! Marina is probably more overwhelmed by than
uncaring about global warming
7
.
Nevertheless, most postings under this category endorse a do-nothing-policy on global
warming. And there are certainly enough sceptics around to make the following outburst from
Starmite unwarranted: Am I THE ONLY ONE who seriously considers divergent
views?
8
. Although Starmite writes more than one of the 28 skeptical postings, he is not alone.
A sizable minority of the Blogosphere makes up the rearguard, not the vanguard of future
popular activism.
But a minority nonetheless. Indeed, one of my smaller categories, with 8 entries, is called
ridicule of Frp (The Progress Party, a right wing populist party that has grown dramatically
in recent years). Some of these bloggers obviously relish the thought that in this debate as
opposed to the debate on immigration for instance Frp is on the wrong side of common
sense
9
. In addition come the 16 rebuttals of the skeptics, several of them very thorough. In
fact the two bloggers with perhaps most knowledge in the natural sciences on climate change
make up about half of the rebuttals. Anders As Environmental blog, writes at length, to
counter several misunderstandings of the IPCC
10
. The only blogger who describes himself as
a climate scientist (with the fitting name glacier_activity) combines polemic and popular
exposition of science in a similar way
11
. In sum, a majority in both the blogosphere and in the
Norwegian parliament, do recognize man-made global warming as a fact, and take it as a
serious problem.

A Preliminary Balance Sheet

A few hundred postings on global warming do not exactly dominate the blogosphere. The
figures popping up with keywords like Iraq and muslims, not to mention football or
sex, easily swamp global warming. The numbers thus tell of no popular rebellion to
Stoltenbergs speech. Nevertheless, the analyses above do lend support to a degree of popular
dissent among ordinary people. Tentatively, the proportion of critical responses to official
Norwegian Climate Policy do vindicate those commentators who have claimed that
politicians are trailing behind the population on this issue.
But the sort of commitment we saw in Sissels blog, talking about the necessary human
force to bring about change, seems rare. And as the opening quote from her blog suggests, all
faith in politicians is by no means broken down. She is not completely cynical about the
official aim of Norway becoming world champions; rather she is just happy about politicians
quarrelling over who is best and who isnt good enough. The mood seems to be the
politicians are not doing enough, but at least they have taken up the challenge. My
impression is that this mood captures the level of impatience in much of my material quite
well. We can perhaps also interpret the meagre participation of climate scientists in the
blogosphere, as echoing this as of yet immature sense of protest. The scientist glacial_activity
uses his or her authority not to mobilize for action from below, as we saw with Dr. Glen Barry
in the U.S., but to counter the arguments of skeptics to the science of man-made global
warming.
Overall, there is scope for blog resistance but there is also scope for accommodating that
resistance - within the traditional channels of parliamentary politics in Norway. To be able to
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assess further which way the balance may tilt, it is necessary to go deeper into the blog
postings which, although less representative in numbers, may logically be more likely to clash
with the red-green government. And more anticipatory perhaps, of a Norwegian branch of a
mass movement to stop the burning of the planet before it is too late.

Reasons to Move

To move towards building a mass movement against a red-green government in Norway
that seems a daunting task and an unlikely scenario. But as we saw, Jrgen Randers
prognosis of a popular rebellion in Norway is only a decade ahead in time, so I feel obliged to
suggest some of the logical reasons why bloggers in Norway might anticipate some of the
protests Randers sees on the cards. The following reasons to move certainly depend on my
own sense of logic. But the guiding idea of the analysis of context I now embark upon has
been that these are reasons readily observable by any follower of the public debate on climate
policy by spring 2007.

The Fossil Industry, the Market and the Politically Realistic

The fact that Norway is an oil economy has dire consequences for the amount of CO
2

Norway releases into the atmosphere. Ten days after Stoltenbergs speech, the (partially) state
enterprise Statoil bought the North American Oil Sands Corporation, expecting a profit after
ten years of full production. By then it will produce oil with the CO
2
equivalent of one and a
half times all cars in Norway (Dagsavisen, April 29). Looked at logically from a global
perspective considering that this is just one takeover by Statoil oil would be the place for
Norway to cut back on emissions of CO
2
. Nevertheless, according to the well known
Norwegian sociologist, leftist and environmentalist Ottar Brox, it seems like common sense
for most that Norway should keep on pumping up oil from the North Sea. The alternative, to
ask whether we need the economic growth fossil energy creates, is not even raised. Thus he
wrote in Dagbladet two days after Stoltenbergs speech
12
.
The limits set to climate policy by the system and its (fossil fuel) main actors are very
much spelled out by economic theory and interests. The Kyoto-agreement, the Stern Report
and so called Integrated Assesment Models all try to integrate targets for cuts with a form of
economic realism where the market and cost-benefit analysis take centre stage (Helm, 2005;
Hope, 2005; Mabey et al., 1997; Noreng, Andersen & Anker-Nilssen, 1998). This is so even
though the perception of this enormous gap between objectives and policy (Helm, 2005, p.
2) is shared by some economic realists. George Monbiot (2006, p. 41) recounts a debate in
Britain on where to set the exact target of how many parts per million (ppm) can be
acceptable. Anything less than 550 ppm, would be politically unrealistic argued Sir David
King, scientific advisor to Tony Blairs government. This equals the upper range of the Stern-
report, and is identical to the target of the British Government. But this only gives a 10-20
percent chance of averting a worst case scenario. In an opposite editorial translated in
Klassekampen (J uly 12, 2007), Monbiot learns from a good source within the British
government, that they know perfectly well the target of 60% cuts in emissions by 2050 is too
little, too late. But that was the only target acceptable to the Confederation of British
Industry.
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Targets: Better Safe than Sorry

What would the targets be if the precautionary principle was given more weight than
economic structural constraints? To answer this question, an impatient blogger in Norway
could as I have done try to read up on some of the available (and decipherable for a non-
expert) literature. There seems to be little disagreement on the ground rules of the successive
IPCC reports. Global median temperatures may in this century rise between 1.5 and 5.7
degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels. But most of the dangers loom at 2 degrees, because
of a series of feedback effects like the melting of the Arctic ice - that can push temperatures
upwards rapidly. The IPCCs target for reduction in emissions before 2050 is reported to be
between 50% and 85%
13
. However, the IPCC does not apply probabilistic reasoning to its
different projections of climate change scenarios. It does not address whether 2C or 5C
warming is the most likely scenario.
But that doesnt mean no such probabilistic reasoning exists among climate scientists.
This truth, however, was only brought home to me through my reading of George Monbiots
Heat, and Mark Lynas Six Degrees. Norway is a betting nation, well familiar with the
question what are the odds. I believe most Norwegians reading English would be able to
draw out the simple logic of better safe than sorry, omnipresent in both of these books.
Monbiots book is one long recipe of How to stop the planet burning, the project being how
to achieve a 90% reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 without bringing civilization to an
end.
14
. Mark Lynas shows in table form (2006, p. 274-276), that in order to have a 75%
chance of staying below 2 degrees the target must be 400 ppm. This means that global
emissions must peak by 2015, reduced by 60% by 2030 and 90% by 2050.
Strangely though, in the year or so these books have been available to a Norwegian
audience, it took a long time before such targets were put forward as an alternative to the
IPCCs vague stipulations in prominent Norwegian media. Dagbladet, finally on J une 18
th

made (front page) news of the former UN-director Svein Tveitedals statement that emissions
must be down 90% by 2050
15
. I am genuinely puzzled by this time lag. Perhaps the bloggers
on climate change fared better? Did they place an earlier bet in the blogosphere, on targets
that would place us in the camp of the politically unrealistic camp perhaps, but also on the
safer side of sorry?

The Best Climate Change Policy in the World Through Quotas

The target of the Stoltenberg government is 100% cuts, not 90% by 2050. On this rests
his claim for fame as number one in the world. But a sizeable chunk of emissions will be cut
through the buying of climate quotas. This was the main point of Stoltenbergs speech to the
Labour party conference. Since then, the skepticism towards this policy has surfaced more
and more in Norwegian media
16
. But this skepticism was not nearly as pronounced, at least
not in mainstream media, immediately after Stoltenbergs speech.
I here believe the first televised debate following up the speech of the prime minister is
both illustrative and significant. Redaksjon En the Norwegian Broadcasting Companys
(NRK) flagship of the debate on April 19
th
mounted a provisional studio inside the conference
halls. The only politicians in the panel are the prime minister and the deputy leader of the
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Labour party. Along with these two representatives of the same party, are three profiled media
commentators, but these only join the debate after ten minutes or so. The background is
draped with the party banners of Arbeiderpartiet. Viggo J ohansen, the host of Redaksjon En,
kicks off the debate by referring to how many have called Stoltenbergs speech historic
before his opening question to the prime minister; J ens Stoltenberg, was this your most
important speech ever? It is in this televisual context Stoltenberg is allowed to explain the
meaning of buying climate quotas abroad, to hinder emissions and to foster development of
the third world in a go. I think it is fair to add that this idea of quotas is explained without
much opposition
17
. This edition of Redaksjon En was indeed quite panegyric in its praise of
the prime minister. In hindsight I find the lack of a critical questioning of climate quotas
astonishing. Whats more, editorials in Dagsavisen and commentators in Dagbladet and VG
alike, all seemed to leap to Stoltenbergs defense of this policy
18
.
Some two months later, when Klimameldingen was disclosed, coverage was much less
congratulatory. The editorials of Dagsavisen Aftenposten, and Dagbladet all describe the
policy document as a step in the right direction, but the latter two have critical things to say
about the lack of demands towards the oil industry. Dagens Nringsliv interviews J rgen
Randers. The heading is a quote from him saying Stoltenberg has bent over for the economists
(Et knefall for konomene)
19
. This increase in mainstream media skepticism
notwithstanding, the idea of buying quotas still held credibility. The day after
Klimameldingen, the editor of VG (J une 23, 2007), Olav Versto, was still almost shocked
by the argument that it really mattered whether cuts were made on national soil or not. For
Versto, the credibility and leadership of J ens Stoltenberg on climate change policy through
the buying of quotas remained intact.

The Character of Resistance

With the above reasons to move in mind, it is time to return to the analysis of blogs.
Sixteen-19 blog entries, or around a third of the 52 critical responses I explained earlier,
concern climate quotas.

Calling the Bluff on Climate Quotas

It is in bad faith against climate quotas that we can find the most focused expression of
resilience to Norwegian climate policy amongst bloggers. There are several variants of this
bad faith: A cheap way we buy ourselves out of trouble, an act of moral deliverance
20
. A dose
of humour, puns and metaphors is used to illustrate the scam of quotas: Cheatneutral offsets
your cheating by funding someone else to be faithful and NOT cheat. This neutralises the pain
and unhappy emotion and leaves you with a clear conscience
21
. Its a bit like paying your
neighbour to jog and then claim you have begun working out
22
. But this perception of a
logical flaw is also argued through in a down-to-earth manner: Company A changes from
coal to gas. Emissions from A then go down. Well and fine. The leftover coal is sold cheaply
to company B. Then emissions from B go up. Not good
23
.
An interesting thing about all this skepticism, is that it comes very early. The first
response to Stoltenbergs speech by the big media was, as we saw in Redaksjon En, very
positive. But at the same date as the paper editions of the biggest paper defended the buying
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of quotas, the front page of vgb.no was Yet another environmental scam. At 12:37 on
April 20
th
, Sondre B, head of the Green party in Bergen, made the entry. Sixty-nine comments,
with contributions from many other bloggers follows Sondres short, but very immediate
denunciation of climate quotas as empty words
24
. Many of the comments that follow defend
the idea of quotas with just as much zeal as Gro Harlem Brundtland and VG editor Olav
Versto. And probably because the debate on this thread exploded with comments, new topics
are introduced into what ends up in a cacophony of debates. Nevertheless, on this occasion, I
think Sondre B contributed to a debate on Stoltenbergs speech that was nowhere near as
closed and self congratulatory as elsewhere. And because his contribution was given
prominence through vgb.no, there was a democratic impulse widening the horizons of public
debate, with an audience (J enkins & Thorburn, 2003, p. 12-13). More comparative research
would be needed in order to ascertain quite how much Sondre Bs calling of the bluff stood
out from the rest of Norwegian media at the time. But to some significant extent, he was
anticipating a rising critique through the medium of weblogs.

But No New Targets

Less buying of quotas abroad means more cuts at home. Given the fact that many of the
bloggers want more radical measures and/or view ambitions of their government inadequate,
one would expect proposals for more radical, domestic targets. Even though we also saw that
such targeting came late in mainstream Norwegian media throughout the period under study, I
had at least expected some of the bloggers to be up to speed on this matter. But no. I have
searched in vain for any blog entry that echoes the targets Mark Lynas, George Monbiot or
Svein Tveitdal, and repeats that we need at least a 90% cut in the rich countries.
To launch an entirely new target and argue for it requires much more knowledge than
simply pointing out that there is something fishy about quotas. Terje Rasmussen (2006, p. 68)
observes that bloggers more often come forward with facts and skepticism than with new
perspectives, and this finding confirms his point. Nevertheless, I remain a bit surprised.
Authors like Mark Lynas and George Monbiot not only sell in Norwegian bookstores. Both
have websites, where one with a few clicks can locate their rationale for cutting 90 %
25
.
Ultimately though, this lack of new targets probably has political reasons. Eighty-five of
my entries are from politicians. None argue for 90%. Many of those who want more radical
measures at home than J ens Stoltenberg are from SV. But as their candidate for mayor in
Stjrdal points out, SVs own official target is according to many climate scientists not
enough to stop the development of a significant global warming, but it is a very ambitious
target in national terms
26
. There is a contrast here, between goals that flow from the
precautionary principle on the one hand, and Norwegian parliamentary realpolitik under the
leadership of the red-green alliance on the other. So far protest has no target in the
blogosphere, something that probably weakens the impulse to take to the streets. There is no
focus point demand for the generation of a mass movement.

Radicalism at an Impasse

In J rgen Randers prognosis, the ordinary people who rebel for climate cuts will also
rebel against globalization a buzzword not dissimilar to the structural constraints of the
86
fossil industry and the market, or an economic system that underpins the politically realistic.
To be radical would then, here as elsewhere, mean to tackle the root of the problem. The
existence and organizing capacity of radicals is a potential trigger for popular protest. So it
makes sense to scrutinize the character of resistance in the radical blogs.
In my material we find them within the categories who either blame society
16
or
capitalism
8
. The difference between the two is not clear cut. Bloggers in both categories share
an inclination to put sustainability before the economy. But in the first category the emphasis
is on growth and consumerism vices we are all trapped within whereas the second exposes
an anticapitalism reminiscent of the sort of global protests we have seen since the protests
outside the World Trade Organisation since 1999
27
.
Not surprisingly, it is the organized radical left of Norway who dominate the latter
category. SV and Rdt together account for half of the entries pinpointing capitalism as the
system that pushes us towards the abyss. This would suggest that the most radical exposition
of protests in my material, coincide with the positions of our most radical political parties on
the left. The general anti-capitalism of SV bloggers, however, needs to be weighed against
their tendency to defend SVs participation in the red-green government. Steps are being taken
in the right direction. This mediation of radicalism is detectable in both deputy party leader
Audun Lysbakkens entry (consisting of quotes from his speech on May 1
st
) and in Ivar
J ohanssens entry. Probably to legitimize SVs own theoretical critique of the market,
J ohanssen provides a link to a speech by the popular but New Labour type foreign secretary
J onas Gahr Stre, who said: The market doesnt know of needs, only demand. And demand
presupposes purchasing power, in other words money
28
.
In the other category, anti-growthism, there is no adaptation to the parliamentary rules of
coalition government. Instead, there is a much stronger feeling of resignation and despair.
Echoing the deep ecology of Arne Nss, chriben writes about the devastating human
arrogance in its urge to control nature
29
. It is also in this category that one can find the entries
which reek with anger. This is most pronounced in the blog Uten Grenser (Without
Borders), signed by the pseudonym Amos Keppler, who has four of the anti-growthism entries.
Under the entry called a passionate critique of An Inconvenient Truth, he begins by very
strongly recommending that everybody sees Gores film, but immediately adds: and
especially the smug idiots who participate in the labour party conference
30
.
One of Amos Kepplers entries, his last one in my material from J uly 11
th
, blames both
society and capitalism. Largely because of the comment section that follows Kepplers entry, I
would characterize this as the most concentrated and radical expression of protest in my
material. The overall message of the entry itself is typical of the category that blames society
and growth, with this ominous ending: So man made society continues on its through and
through destructive road, like a growing snowball rolling ever faster towards its inevitable
destiny; the full stop at the end of the hill. Things look ugly. But then the first reply is from
Helge Samuelsen, who clearly belongs to the anti-capitalist camp:

Yes, things look ugly. Even in a country like Norway, where environmentalism is
supposed to be on the political agenda, nothing at all is being done with the basic
problems. J ust that they plan to extract and use all available oil and gas in the North
Sea, and that Statoil is even expanding beyond the countrys borders to extract
everything they can get their claws into, proves that all the political milieux is
87
concerned about, is words.
As usual, one can probably say
All the folding of milk cartons in the world cannot change thatIn the workplace
one doesnt give a shit about people taking the dive. As before, capital is King. The
ability of the State to sacrifice human beings is not limited to warfare.
And politicians wonder why they are losing credibility?
31

One could imagine that this line of reasoning could have led to more radical targets,
focused the elements of protest that surfaces with the edge against the oil economy and with
the clear sense of them and us. But at the end of the blog discussion that follows, there is no
progression in the direction of a movement. Samuelsens very last comment is pure antithesis
and despair: Be afraid be very afraid. For the politic of today is not exactly preparing for a
happy ending.
This, to me, is radicalism at an impasse. Even where protest is most concentrated, radical
and pronounced in the blogosphere, we have no climate policy from below to contrast the
polices of J ens Stoltenberg and the Norwegian government. Confronting the six degrees
doomsday scenario, radicals in the blogosphere in Spring 2007 left us with two options only:
Go with Socialist Left Party and take baby steps away from capitalism or jump into the
abyss.

Concluding Remarks

These are some indicators of both the scope and the character of blog resistance in the
first spring of an official climate policy that is supposed to be leading the world. What will
come in the blogosphere, and what will come of global warming and the official plans and the
social movements mounted to stop it, is beyond this study. There is obviously no causal
relationship from the results of this study to such large unknowns. However, if J rgen
Randers is right in his prognosis, and the beginnings of a movement get off the ground, blogs
will be part of the process.
Politicians take the medium quite seriously. Politicians from SV both criticize the
government (of which they are part) and make moral appeals to everybody to cancel their
copy of the phone directory. But the presence of politicians also reinforces a commonsensical
view on politics. The author of The Weather Makers (Flannery, 2005, p. 301) concludes in
precisely this vein, quoting what he clearly perceives to be the old truth of Alfred Russel
Wallace: Vote for nobody who says it cant be done. Vote only for those who declare it
shall be done. Politicians in the blogosphere on climate change in Norway are not only the
main actors. They also appear to be the only solution makers.
But their solutions will be contested in the blogosphere. Other ideas, perhaps better
suggestions and demands, are easily voiced. Some of the solutions that are perceived as a
hoax like the climate quotas may well meet very rapid resistance. And although the most
radical critique in this material took the form of despair, the single blog entry of Sissel still
leaves a beacon of hope, for the democratic potential of new media sure, but more importantly
for the future in general:
88
Politicians make the ground rules, nails
sic
the laws and provides
sic
the money, but this
can never work unless we have good communicators who can reach the masses. For
it is through the masses pressure comes. The demands. The great movement. It is we
who regulate the market through our consumption. It is we who give birth to the
children who will become our next state leaders. It is we state and industry must
follow. [] It is we you and me, who possess real power
Notes

1
Retrieved J uly 17, 2007 from
http://sisselv.wordpress.com/2007/06/22/enubehageligsannhet/
2
This article is a preliminary to a planned PhD project on climate change and Norwegian
media. It is based on a paper delivered at the NordMedia Conference, Helsinki August 16-19,
2007. I am very grateful to SciencePub for financing my participation in that conference as
well as time for writing it out. My thanks go also to my colleagues Robert W.Vaagan and
Harald Hornmoen, for invaluable support and helpful comments.
3
St.meld. nr.34. Retrieved J uly 17, 2007 from
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2006-2007/ Stmeld-nr-34-2006-
2007-.html?id
4
Retrieved J uly 17, 2007 from http://sisselv.wordpress.com/2007/06/22/en-ubehagelig-
sannhet/
5
Keywords such as the environment or climate are so general that many blogs mention
global warming only in passing, with no relevance at all for climate policy. Moreover, due to
its inherent personalized format (Long, 2006, p. 21), blogs are prone to idiosyncrasies.

6
Good examples retrieved J uly 17, 2007 which I have translated into English, include:
http://ustaoset.blogspot.com/2007/06/miljtips-for-ungdom-konkret-enkelt-og.html
http://kneggblogg.wordpress.com/2007/04/29/na-eller-aldri/
http://www.vgb.no/ 13025/perma/199478/

7
Retrieved July, 17, 2007 from
http://supermarina.wordpress.com/2007/06/17/hvordanforhindre-global-oppvarming/

8
Retrieved J uly, 17, 2007 from http://www.vgb.no/12648/perma/214593/

9
In vgb.no 8 entries by one Frp politician (Steinar Andersen) are all written in a defensive
mode, against the public impression of Frp as a climate laggard.

10
Retrieved J uly, 17, 2007 from: http://www.vgb.no/24004/perma/215441/

11
Retrieved J uly, 17, 2007 from http://www.vgb.no/24583/perma/207957/ and
http://www.vgb.no/24583/perma/207955/

12
It is my impression that by fall 2007, the pinpointing of oil as the main problem was more
common in the public debate. ivind Ihlens book Petroleumsparadiset (2007) (The petrol
paradise) came out in October, in which he unravels the communication strategies of
Norwegian oil companies posing as part of the solution to a sustainable development. Also,
by November, the leader of the Red party (Rdt) wrote an open letter to Prime Minister J ens
Stoltenberg demanding an end to new concessions to drill oil in the North Sea. This prompted
several environmental organizations and profiled individuals, like Steinar Lem, to admit that
environmentalists had been soft on the matter for too long (Klassekampen, November 22, 24,
2007).
89

13
See Dagbladet J une 18, 2007. It would be interesting to conduct an analysis of this
reporting. My impression is that politicians and Norwegian media are even vaguer with
numbers, saying that scientists recommend at least 50 percent and the like.

14
Quoted from the cover page. How to stop the planet burning is Heats subtitle.

15
Almost a month before, Tveitedal had himself written a letter in Klassekampen (May 23,
2007) arguing his position.

16
Klassekampen, in particular, ran a series of articles in mid-J uly casting doubt on the
purchase of quotas.

17
I have showed this debate to two of my classes at Oslo University College, and asked them
how this edition of Redaksjon En can be said to express, directly or indirectly, Norwegian
power. Students in both classes were quick to dub the debate as propaganda for the Labour
party.

18
Dagsavisens editorial on April 20, 2007 declared Prime Minister Stoltenbergs plan
acceptable, whereas Dagbladets Stein Aab the same date under the heading Gr Gore
en hy gang called opposition to quotas meaningless.

19
All paper references from J une 23, 2007.

20
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://www.vgb.no/12372/perma/201634/ In a similar vein,
Zuul writes that he and his wife are no longer going to the South this year. (The south:
Norwegian byword for a holiday at some warm beach resort). So if anybody out there are
longing for two trips to the South, here is a way to ease your bad conscience. You pay me an
appropriate sum for my two quotas Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from
http://www.vgb.no/15110/perma/195594/

21
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://www.vgb.no/23701/perma/196755/

22

23
See the discussions in http://andersablogg.blogspot.com/2007/05/om-kutte-hjemme-eller-
ute_07.html and http://www.vgb.no/24004/perma/208700/ Last retrieved J uly 20, 2007.

24

25
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://www.marklynas.org/2007/2/9/the-way-out and from
http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2006/10/31/heres-the-plan/

26
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://runehegge.blogspot.com/2007/05/nr-skal-vi-vkne.html

27
The theme of my MA thesis (Ytterstad, 2004).

28
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://ivarsblog.blogspot.com/2007/05/markedet-kjenner-
ikke-til-behov-bare.html. The last of the SV against capitalism entries, by a member of their
youth organization, employs less civil language. The title of his entry is Corporate freedom
SUCKS!!! Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://sosialistn.blogspot.com/2007/04/corporate-
freedom-sucks.html

29
Retrieved July 20, 2007 from http://www.vgb.no/2786/perma/214360/

30
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://utengrenser.blogspot.com/2007/04/en-ubehaglig-
sannhet-en-lidenskapelig.html

31
Retrieved J uly 20, 2007 from http://utengrenser.blogspot.com/2007/07/den-sanne-
svindelen-avslrt.html

90
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Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: 3 2008 Yang
Bubble or Future? The Challenge of Web 2.0 in China

Na Yang, Communication University of China

The Internet industry in China has been developing for over a decade. With a scale
of 162 million Internet users and 1.31 million Websites in 2007 (CNNIC, 2007), the
industry has grown at an astonishing speed and it is deemed a sunrise industry in
China. Nevertheless, the development of the Chinese Internet industry has not all
been smooth sailing; it has gone through ups and downs. 1994 was the starting point
for the Chinese Internet industry with the milestone that China achieved full-
functional access to the Internet. Since then, China has become a member of the
Internet family and the Internet industry has begun to flourish.

The First and Second Internet Booms in China

From 1994 onwards, the rapid expansion of the Internet industry led to its climax when
Chinas top Internet companies Sina, Sohu and Netease were listed on NASDAQ in 2000.
However, this first Internet boom in China turned out to be the reflection of a global dot-com
bubble. When the dot-com bubble burst around 2001, the Chinese Internet industry
experienced a recession. Tens of thousands of Internet-based companies were closed down in
China, and stocks of the three Internet companies on NASDAQ lingered as junk. A half-
decade later, in 2005, the Chinese Internet industry began to recover when a great deal of
investment flowed into the Chinese Internet market. In 2005 and 2006, 44 Chinese Network
companies disclosed venture capital financing totaling 414 million dollars (Seekfortune,
2007). Notwithstanding the significant and profound restructuring of the Chinese Internet
market during 2005-2006, this second Internet boom cooled down very soon. Since the 3
rd

quarter of 2006, many Chinese network companies have cut back on staff (e.g. Bokee, Baidu,
Blogcn, Zhongsou and Oak Pacific Interactive) and the price of Chinese Internet stocks on
NASDAQ has declined rapidly.
The second Internet boom in China was stimulated by the concept of Web 2.0. The
success of Myspace, Youtube and Facebook in America provided the Chinese network market
a promising model, and the speedy growth of netizens in China revealed a huge online
potential for Web 2.0. Not only did the startups regard the concept as a great commercial
opportunity of challenging the dominant position occupied by portal websites and set up a lot
of Web 2.0 sites, but the investors also agreed with the startups, and most of the venture
capital they provided to Internet companies was related to the Web 2.0 concept (Seekfortune,
2007). As well as the sudden surge, the quick subsequent relapse was also caused by the Web
2.0 concept. Since the second half of 2006, most Web 2.0 startups have found it difficult to
cover the cost of websites. Moreover, investors have lost patience with continuing the
investment yielding little profit and they have become more and more prudent. According to
the statistics released by Dow J ones VentureOne and Ernst & Young, the equity investment in
Chinese Web 2.0 companies fell 25% from 2005 to 2006 (Fang, 2007a). With reduced capital
and many Web 2.0 companies having reduced staff, Chinese Internet stocks were affected and
declined.

93
Following this fluctuation, two opposite opinions were presented. The pessimists
compared the recent development with the dot-com bubble in the beginning of the 21
st

century, and concluded that there was a second dot-com bubble, namely Bubble 2.0 (Xin,
2006; Zhang, 2006). The optimists indicated the fruitful example of the American Web 2.0,
which not only attracted increasing investment (Fang, 2007a), but also made considerable
profit from commercial advertisements (Fang, 2007b). Besides, the optimists considered the
decline as accommodation of the market and predicted that the Web 2.0 market would expand
to a scale of 300 million U.S. dollars by year-end 2008 (Analysys International, 2006).
The debate between these two opposite opinions was not merely limited to the market
sphere; they also argued over the social affects that the Web 2.0 concept would produce. The
optimists defined Web 2.0 as a revolution of the Internet and projected that Web 2.0 would
overturn the existing system of information communication (CJ R, 2006). They believed that
Web 2.0 would enable a broad flow of information, and the mass netizen and convenience
access companied with the Web 2.0 concept would promote the achievement of true
democracy in China (Wei, 2006). However, the pessimists insisted Web 2.0 was simply a
continuation of Web 1.0 and that many of the technology components of Web 2.0 had existed
since the early days of the Internet. They declared that the innovations made by Web 2.0
companies would only strengthen the existing structure (Wang, 2006).
In the Chinese Internet market, while startups, entrepreneurs and researchers crowd into
forums and conferences to discuss the development of Web 2.0, the awareness of this concept
is very low. Only 26.7 percent of respondents know what Web 2.0 is, according to an ISC
survey (ISC, 2006). At the same time, there are 17.49 million bloggers and 33.75 million
blogs in China (CNNIC, 2006). None of the entrepreneurs have announced that they can
make a profit from the service. While U.S. Web 2.0 websites overtake Web 1.0 websites, the
Chinese Internet market is still dominated by portal websites and even the Chinese version of
U.S. Web 2.0 sites can hardly challenge them. So what is wrong with the Chinese Web 2.0?
Will the Web 2.0 concept stimulate another dot-com bubble or represent the future trend of
Internet development in China? By studying the ecosystem and characteristics of the network
in China, this paper will contribute insights into the challenges that Web 2.0 faces in the
Chinese network market. A clear understanding of such challenges will be vital in order to
generate innovation and strategies that realize the creative and economic powers of new Web
technologies in China.

What is Web 2.0?

The term Web 2.0 was originally brought forward by the first O'Reilly Media Web 2.0
conference in 2004. In a brainstorming session before the conference, O'Reilly VP Dale
Dougherty noted that with new applications and Websites exploding with regularity, the Web
had become more important than ever. Then people attending the session brought about the
notion of Web 2.0 to make sense of the development trend after the collapse of the first dot-
com bubble (O'Reilly, 2005). The term Web 2.0 gained currency following the conference,
although there is no precise agreement over what Web 2.0 means.
Tim O'Reillys definition of the Web 2.0 concept is based on an assumed premise that Web
2.0, as the second generation of the World Wide Web, is radically different from Web 1.0. He
explains the concept by citing examples of what belongs to Web 1.0 and Web 2.0. For

94
instance, under the Web 1.0 catalogue there are DoubleClike, stickiness, Publishing and
content management systems; correspondingly, within the Web 2.0 catalogue there are
Google AdSense, syndication, participation and wikis (O'Reilly, 2005). The table framed by
J im Cuene (2005) illustrates the contrast more transparently:

Table 1: The differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0
Web 1.0 (1993-2003) Web 2.0 (2003-beyond)
Major
characteristics
HTML pages viewed through
web browsers
Web pages, plus a lot of other
content shared over the Web,
with more interactivity; more like
an application than a page
Mode Read Write, Contribute
Primary Unit of
content
Page Post/record
State static dynamic
Viewed through Web browser Web browser, RSS readers
Architecture Client Server Web Services
Content Creator Web Coders Everyone
Domain of geeks mass amatuerization
Source: Suene (2005)

OReilly concludes that Web 2.0 is the business revolution in the computer industry
caused by the move to the Internet as platform, and an attempt to understand the rules for
success on that new platform. Chief among those rules is this: Build applications that harness
network effects to get better the more people use them (O'Reilly, 2006) .
The technologies and applications which carry out the Web 2.0 concept include blogs,
RSS feeds, Web service, APIs (Web application programming interfaces), wikis, tags, social
bookmarking, SNS (social network software), AJ AX (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML),
XML, and interface protocol. All these applications are conducted by, or generated from, such
thoughts and theories as six degrees of separation, long tail, social capital, decentralization,
and so on (ISC, 2006).
Although technologies and applications are the main symbol of Web 2.0, it is not purely
technologies or applications. Supporters of the concept emphasize that Web 2.0 is a set of
executive principles that practice the ideal of Web socialization and personalization (ISC,
2006). As Stephen Fry (2007) described in an interview:

Web 2.0 is an idea in people's heads rather than a reality It's actually an idea that
the reciprocity between the user and the provider is what's emphasized. In other
words, genuine interactivity if you like, simply because people can upload as well as
download. (Fry, video interview, 2007)

However, critics question whether the term Web 2.0 is more than a buzzword. As Tim
Berners-Lee (2006) said in an interview,

95
Web 1.0 was all about connecting people. It was an interactive space, and I think
Web 2.0 is, of course, a piece of jargon, nobody even knows what it means. If Web
2.0 for you is blogs and wikis, then that is people to people. But that was what the
Web was supposed to be all along So Web 2.0, for some people, it means moving
some of the thinking client side so making it more immediate, but the idea of the
Web as interaction between people is really what the Web is. That was what it was
designed to be as a collaborative space where people can interact. (Laningham,2006)

While we examine technologies and applications which are entitled Web 2.0, the
representative models and relevant technologies indicated by them do not present any update
to technical specifications. For instance, AJ AX, instead of supplanting the underlying
protocol HTTP, is just an amendment of adding an additional layer of abstraction on top of it.
Indeed, they are merely renewed technologies and applications of the existing ones.
Furthermore, when we look around the Web market, the features of both Web 1.0 and Web
2.0 always merge with each other instead of one replacing the other. For instance, many
portal websites begin to provide blog service nowadays, while many professional blog and
social network websites put the popular content on the front pages just like the portal websites
always did before. Also, the BBS (Bulletin Board System) forum, which is the typical mode
of Web 1.0, started to use tag applications and declared that they are heading into BBS 2.0.
Thus, some critics have stated that Web 2.0 is an evolution but not a revolution. As Huang
Shaolin (2006) indicates,

The phrase of 2.0 usually causes such opinion that Web 2.0 is definitely different
from Web 1.0. People always neglect that between two Web editions, there still exist
Web 1.7354, Web 1.212, and so on. The phrase makes people believe that Web 2.0 is
evolution but not revolution. In fact, even the Web 2.0 is a transition, but not the
finish of a revolution. (Shaolin, 2006)

Compared with other kinds of mass media, the Internet is the most interactive one.
However, its advantages are not apparent at first sight. In Web 1.0, as shown in J im Cuenes
comparison above, content is created by only a few people, while most people just read and
give some feedback. With the barrier of technologies and limited thoughts, the Internet is
more like an imitation of other media. The communication process of the Internet is still a
broadcast, and its huge potential of interactivity has not been fully displayed. Step by step,
new technologies and applications facilitate the end users communication in that they can
contribute content and not only read. In this sense, the communication process of the Internet
turns into a kind of interpersonal communication with a wide scope and convenient means.
Therefore, the core component of Web 2.0 is people but not content. In Web 1.0, the main
production of the Internet is information. In Web 1.0, people use the web as a medium to
acquire information, and how to deal with the information explosion is the dominant issue. By
contrast, the aim of Web 2.0 is to build up relationships. People utilize content and the Web
as tools to generate relationships. Learning how to create and maintain effective social
networks become the key issue (Huang, 2007).
In conclusion, Web 2.0 is an evolutionary form of computer-based communication,
which enables and encourages more people to get together on the Web platform and

96
communicate with others in an effective way. In short, as concluded by Dion Hinchcliffe
(2006), the read-write Web, plus lots of people using it, equals Web 2.0.

The Challenges of Web 2.0 in China

Users

According to the survey report of CNNIC (2007), China already has the second largest
netizen population in the world, only behind that of the U.S. Moreover, the report predicts
that the number of Chinese netizens will sharply increase in the next three to five years. The
huge number and the optimistic predictions spur both domestic and foreign Web
entrepreneurs. It seems that China has already had a lot of netizens participate in the Web 2.0
movement. Unfortunately, this assumption is not correct in practice.
The 1.63 million netizens only amount to 12.3 percent of the population in China, and all
these people have a relatively low income (CNNIC, 2007). To advertising clients, those
statistics are disappointing compared with the universality rate of television, newspaper and
radio. Therefore, it is hard for websites to generate revenue from advertisements.

Figure 1. Daily reach statistics of Blogcn, Tudou, Youtube and Myspace.

Source: Alexa (2007)

For Web 2.0 websites, this situation is more serious. The Web 2.0 ideal requires that
netizens should be active in the communication process; they should not only read but also
write. In other words, people should regard the Internet as a tool to facilitate their active
communication, but not merely in terms of mass media from which they receive information
rather than make a creative contribution. In this sense, the number of netizens that can
actively participate in communication is not that large. Compared with the statistics two years

97
ago (CNNIC, 2006), the amount of Chinese netizens has increased by 59 million, which
means that over 36% of Chinese netizens are fresh to this medium. New netizens often have a
preconception that the Internet is a medium similar to television or radio, because they have
little experience with surfing on the Internet and only a cloudy idea of what a transactional
medium could be. The graph in figure 1 above measures the daily reach statistics of Blogcn
(famous blog website in China), Tudou (famous video share website), Youtube and Myspace.
While Youtube and Myspace rapidly gained an increasing number of users, they have begun
to attract advertising clients and have started making profits. However, their parallels in China
just maintain a fairly stable amount of users despite the increase of Chinese netizens.
Unlike U.S. Web 2.0 websites, which use English as the communication language,
Chin
ebsites
Chinese startups regard the Web 2.0 age as a rare opportunity of entering the market and
chan
py the Silicon Valley model.
Som
ese websites have a language barrier in terms of attracting users from around the world.
Therefore, the target users of Web 2.0 websites in China are limited. To the domestic Web 2.0
market, though the future is promising with optimistic predictions of expansion, the number
of active users will not increase so quickly. Before it matures as a market, a transition period
of cultivation and patience will be required.

W

ging the existing market structure which is dominated by major portal websites. However,
after several years of development, most startups find that they can hardly survive in the
market and many of them disappear. The biggest problem facing startups is the lack of
innovation, both in website models and in sources of revenue.
A common stereotype is that Chinese startups always co
etimes, startups present a copycat without any change except the language. As the core
component of Web 2.0 is people, their own social and cultural backgrounds cannot be
neglected, because these features have an effect on motivation and on the dynamics of
establishing relationships and being active in virtual communities. Although the mechanism
of a website corresponds with peoples traditional value of relationships, it will appeal to
more people and spur their creation and vice versa. Although successful U.S. models offer a
helpful parallel, they do not always suit Chinese needs. A clone of a U.S. website may attract
attention at first because of its fresh model, but its neglect of Chinese characteristics will
cause failure of generating relationships between users as well as locking in users. For
example, the definition of keywords is very important for SNS websites, because it helps
people to find others who have similar interests. However, the keywords definition system of
the U.S. is inefficient in China. Chinese are living in a complex cultural and social context;
thus, their characteristics are complex and ambiguous which makes them difficult to include
in a limited keyword system. While the keywords tool in a copycat of a U.S. social network
website fails to work efficiently, people who join it will soon lose interest in the website, for it
can do little to help them establish real relationships,but will instead burden them with a
crowd of undesirable strangers. The clone of U.S. models also results in tough competition in
Chinas market. The market is swarmed with varieties of Chinese Facebooks and hundreds
of Chinese Youtubes. With little innovation, those websites resemble each other and have
few differences that can attract more users.

98
The development of revenue sources is another problem that startups face. The main
revenue sources of Web 2.0 sites in China are user charges, wireless value-added services and
advertisement, though none of these are promising from a business perspective. As regards
user charges, people in China are unwilling to pay for Web 2.0 services. For instance,
according to CCW Research (2007), only 28% of users consent to pay services for online
videos, while others declare that they only watch free ones. Regarding wireless value-added
services, these are based on mobile penetration which is well developed in China. However,
not only is this sector of the market keenly competitive, it also has a high entry barrier
because of government regulations. Finally, in terms of advertisements, the network
advertising market in China is comparatively small. As the report of iResearch Consulting
Group (2007) predicted, the advertising revenue of the Chinese network market was set to
grow to 10 billion RMB in 2007, which is merely equal to 6.44%of the American network
market. Moreover, the advertising clients prefer Web 1.0 sites which have a mature system
with diverse ways of pasting advertisements, while Web 2.0 sites have still not found a
satisfactory model. For instance, some video sharing websites try to stick advertisements
before the videos start. As the videos are contributed by users, the quality and content of
videos are so diverse that this affects the control of advertising efficiency.
Furthermore, the Web 2.0 concept encourages a lot of people to use the web platform and
to contribute content. With the expansion of end users and a growing amount of content, the
costs of broadband and storage facilities become more and more expensive. As their own
revenue can barely cover the increasing costs, startup entrepreneurs begin to seek venture
capital funding. However, investors are disinclined to provide financial support for those
websites because of the lack of good revenue sources and high risk in the market. Even the
investors who have already entered this market will soon withdraw while their expensive
investments bring them little profit. This eventually shortens the development cycle of Web
2.0 sites. With high costs and a lack of viable business models, many of them disappear.
Big companies, which have gone through the first dot-com bubble, still dominate the
market. They have lots of loyal users and stable revenue sources, which mainly rely on
wireless value-added services, online games and advertisements. Therefore, with their own
financial support and accumulated experience of the Chinese market, they can easily copy the
ideas which are generated by Web 2.0 startups and then bypass the startups, as Zhang
Chaoyang, the CEO of Sohu, said: No matter what Web 2.0 companies are doing now, we
can copy all their innovations as soon as possible(Qtd. in Wei, 2006). Whenever they enter
the scene of Web 2.0 services they win market share quickly. For instance, in the blog hosting
market, during the third quarter of year 2007, Sinablog occupied 19.84%of the market share,
while the most successful first mover of this sector, Bookee, just achieved 9.07%, which is
very close to another big company, Sohus, share of 8.9% (CIIS, 2007).

Regulations

The government policy and regulations of the Network industry are a potential risk for
entrepreneurs, especially for startups without stable revenue sources. Although China has
already issued in succession a set of administrative regulations, state council decrees and
normative documents on network management, a complete regulation system of the network
management has not yet been devised. As the Chinese building of a legal framework is still

99
underway, Internet regulation always changes and alters. Besides, the lack of long-term
objectives means that short-term practices of network regulations always exist. Above all, the
adjustment of regulations is obviously behind the development of the market. This problem is
grave for Web 2.0 sites because since they entered Chinese territory there have been few
regulations that define their development. A frequently revised regulation may cause loss to
initial investment. Moreover, with increasing regulatory risks, venture capital will be much
more cautious in investing in Web 2.0 sites. As an example, the Ministry of Information
Industry (MII) and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) recently
released a regulation on online video sites. According to the new rule, Internet sites have to
get licenses to offer online video service, and only state-owned and state-controlled
businesses can apply for these licenses. This means that most video sharing websites cannot
get the permission of running this business, because they are mostly private companies
without any state share. Before this regulation took effect on J anuary 31, 2008, they were told
they had to shut down. However, none of the websites were suspended, and on February 3,
2008, the government announced that all video sharing websites could still run their
businesses.
The Web 2.0 concept indicates that content could be communicated among people freely
and directly through the Internet. In Web 1.0, there still existed gatekeepers to select the
content and filter information. With Web 2.0, everyone can be a broadcaster and bring content
to the masses. However, the fact is that Internet censorship in China still plays the role of a
gatekeeper. The censorship is conducted under a wide variety of policies and regulations and
is mainly enforced in two ways technological and artificial means. The technological means
involve software which automatically checks the content and stops the sensitive ones. This
device is enabled by verifying keywords (e.g. relating to matters such as illegal groups,
banned BBS and some historical events). Whenever these keywords show up in a message,
whether the opinion of the content is pro-government or not, the whole message will be
blocked. However, this censorship block is easy to evade. Most users avoid it by adding
dashes between Chinese characters or replacing the words with the first letters of
pronunciation. People can understand it, but the software can not. The artificial means is
executed by a group of people, including editors and webmasters of websites, Internet
policemen, governors, and so on. This way monitors a wider scope of topics than the
technological means. Besides the message relates to sensitive keywords, the artificial means
also deletes content, including word, video and audio texts, which are regarded as offensive
and considered to have negative social effects by the government. Website companies are
assigned to implement this means; if they fail to do so, they face the risk of being shut down.
However, the government has never released a list of so-called sensitive content. The
definition and borders of what are problematic content are ambiguous. The usual way that the
government announces banned topics is through interpersonal ways, such as meetings and
through the telephone. The technological means are efficient but not strict, while the artificial
means are inefficient but very strict. In these two ways, the Internet censorship system has
proven to be efficient and profound.

100
Social Effects

One of the most important social effects of Web 2.0 is the decentralization of power,
especially in China, where power is highly centralized. Web 2.0 reduces the intermediate
links of communication, and provides a platform for people to talk to the masses directly. The
power to speak in public, which was centralized to a small group of people before, now has
the possibility to be extended to the masses. Although the existing censorship system still
impedes such decentralization in some ways, the voices of the grassroots become more and
more strong and begin to challenge the old authority. For example, on October 12
th
, 2007, the
Shanxi Forestry Department published a photo of a wild Huanan (South China) tiger taken by
a local peasant. The photo suggested that the believed-to-be-extinct wild Huanan tiger still
existed. J ust a few days later, some netizens suspected that the photo was a fake and posted
their analyses on the Internet to question it. With the participation of more netizens and
experts of different fields, these doubts turned into a national controversy centered on the
truthfulness of the photo. Though the governors of the Forestry Department insisted the photo
was real, netizens searched for proof everywhere to oppose their judgment. As more and more
proof had been found, netizen action broke down the myth of authority of the governors and
the department they represented. One of the governors exclaimed in grief: How can the
netizens show no confidence to the news that is released by the government? (Xinhua News,
2007).
However, decentralization does not inevitably induce equal power. In Chinas case, it
empowers new authority. In the Huanan tiger event, the news presented by netizens set the
media agenda of television, newspaper and radio. But the messages which were delivered by
netizens were merely regarded as opinions, not as evidence or facts. While other media,
especially the television, repeated these messages and drew conclusions, people believed that
their judgment was fair. Media were empowered as a new authority, and their judgment
decided whether news from the netizens was factual or only rumors.
The Web 2.0 concept believes that the mass debate will generate diversified opinions and
eventually result in consensus. However, the spiral of silence theory is still effective in Web
2.0. The raising of a topic always causes two opposite opinions and others turn to silence.
Moreover, rather than result in consensus, people with divergent views deviate from the main
theme and ultimately induce personal abuse. As an example, a young writer, Hanhan, and a
musician, Gao Xiaosong, started a debate over what is a literary circle on their blogs in
2006. With thousands of fans joining the debate, there only remained two kinds of voices:
pro-Han or pro-Gao. Their respective fans attacked every different idea, and finally the debate
turned into personal abuse between two celebrities with the support of their fans.
The diffusion of Web 2.0 also raises the issue of media literacy. With means of blogs and
free upload video sites, some people broadcast rumors, distorted news, false blogs of
celebrities and offensive videos on the Web. The credibility of the Internet is increasingly
becoming a concern. In addition, Internet mobs arouse considerable attention in China. When
ones behavior provokes the netizens, they get together and take revenge. They hunt the
Internet to find every conceivable private detail of the person, such as real name, address,
telephone number, and so on, and then release all this information on the Internet and
encourage everybody to disturb and harass the person. With more and more people joining in
this group of Internet mobs, violence is extended from the virtual world to reality. Always,

101
the cause of the event is moral issues which can hardly be sanctioned by law. Mobs make
their own judgments and implement revenge. In this sense, the Internet becomes a panopticon
over society, in which rules are made by the judgment of mobs. Some researchers propose
that a real name system (i.e. abandoning anonymity) could settle the questions of media
literacy. However, others argue that such a system might restrict the variety and freedom of
expression (Sina, 2005).

Conclusion

Regarding Web 2.0 as an evolution but not a revolution, the development of Web 2.0 is
still in its infancy. With regulation risks and the advantages of big companies, startups face a
tough situation of surviving in the market. Only those who make innovations based on the
features of the Chinese market can achieve success. The diffusion of Web 2.0 applications
enables the masses to obtain freedom of expression. However, it also brings a lot of side
effects to Chinese society. The ideal Web 2.0 scene has not yet been fully achieved in China,
but it is the future of network development.

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Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: 3 2008 Krumsvik & Wang


Arne H. Krumsvik Xiaowen Wang
Oslo University College Communication University of China

News has been available online since the 1970s, and the first newspaper on the
proprietary online service America Online was launched by the Chicago Tribune in
May 1992. But not until 1995 was the online newspaper concept of today developed,
featuring among others CNN as a global news engine. 1995 was also the year in
which public Internet usage had its breakthrough globally, largely due to a simpler
point-and-click interface for the World Wide Web. After the turn of the century,
there were over 12,000
1
news media online world wide, among these at least 150
2
in
China and approximately 200
3
in Norway (Deuze, 2001; Rasmussen, 2002). The
media landscapes of the worlds most populous nation, as well as its small far
northern counterpart were both affected. This analysis of online news in China and
Norway will discuss not only traditional online newspapers, but in a broader
perspective analyze providers of news content, including the online phenomena of
aggregating portals without their own news gathering operations.

Theoretical Approach

Based on the knowledge of various models of social environment in which technological
development takes place and diffuses, a study by Zhou He and J ian-hua Zhu (2002) proposes
the social environment model shown in Figure 1 to examine the development of online
newspapers:

In this model, the communication of online media is seen as a dynamic process,
made up by the communicators, the message, the online channels and the audience.
All these factors interact with and influence each other in a nonlinear fashion, as
shown by the overlapping circles. This whole process is based immediately on the
telecommunications infrastructure in a society, which influences the online
communication process and is, in turn, influenced by the process as it develops. Both
the online communication process and the telecommunications infrastructure are
embedded in a larger social, political, economic and cultural environment, which
influences and is influenced by them at the same time. (He & Zhu, 2002, pg. 122)

This comparative case study will focus on (a) online news media, (b) their market
position (audiences) and the structural environment of (c) laws and regulations, and (d) the
economic system.

104


Figure 1. A Social-environmental Model of Technology (He & Zhu, 2002)

Rasmussen (2006) has developed a typology of online news media based on traditional
media affiliation, audience and functions:

1. Online Newspapers Published by Traditional Newspapers is the most typical online
news venture, with a strong resource base. Most traditional newspapers in the world do have
some kind of online presence.
2. Stand Alone Online Newspapers are very rare, and the Norwegian Nettavisen
launched already in 1996 represents a deviant case.
3. Online Niche Media are more typical for stand alone online media, dominated by
publications covering information technology.
4. Online Magazines have been more experimental in developing new genres. HotWired
was among the first in this category, followed in the United States by Saloon, Crikey in
Australia, and Tebleka in India.
5. Portals and Search Engines became important as a consequence of the tremendous
growth in the number of web pages. This category tend not to do original news reporting, but
are aggregators of news content from other media outlets and distributors of news content
from wire services. Yahoo! and Google are the dominating world players in this field.
6. Online Media affiliated with Broadcasters tend to focus on interaction with and
promotion for broadcast shows, and distribution of broadcast content online. To a larger
degree than for newspapers, these websites enrich the mother media channels.
7. Other Online Media represent the digital frontier of online news gathering and
distribution, characterized by user created content in various configurations. Phenomena such

105


as Slashdot and Digg.com are representative for this type, alongside alternative media and
blogs with political agendas.
The online news media landscape in China and Norway will be described and analyzed
based on this online news media typology and the social environment model, with a special
emphasis on how regulations and the economic system affects the relative presence and
dominance by various types of news media.

The Case of China

There are two main categories of online news media in China -- one belongs to traditional
media and the other comprises commercial websites. The latter identified news content as
important for attracting audiences from the very beginning.
Sina, Sohu, and Netease became well-known to Chinese online users. In 1995, an
infamous magazine named ShenZhouXueRen launched its electronic version online, which
was the first time traditional Chinese media appeared on the internet. China Trade J ournal
became the first online newspaper the same year. In 1996, the opening of Guangdong People
Radio Internet and CCTV Internet marked the beginning of the online journey of traditional
media. Before 1998, most Chinese online news media was available in an electronic version
and most news media websites repurposed content from traditional media. Later some major
news media developed large-scale comprehensive stand-alone online media sites, named
People Internet or XinHua Internet.
The new commercial online media operations had more resources for technical
development than most media organizations and aggregated news content from traditional
media. This pattern of priorities is common among portals globally, but in China the main
rationale for not building news organizations was government regulations rather than
economic efficiency.

Regulations

China online regulations included access, news gathering, and content distribution.
According to national regulations, a license is needed for news gathering operations, and this
is only given to traditional media organizations.
In J anuary 2000, the first online news propaganda conference was held by the News
Office of State Council in Beijing. By the end of May, the international online news
propaganda industry development sketch was formally put forward by the Publicity
Department and the central propaganda office. In the document, the guiding principle and
target of online news propaganda industry was proposed, and the Chinese Internet News
Center, Peoples Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International and China Daily
was identified as the first key online news propaganda websites.

Economic System

The main income source for online news media in China is advertising. The development
of online media affiliated with traditional media was funded by their mother organizations

106


and to some extent direct government subsidies, while news commercial media are funded by
investors.
An example of multi-dimensional investment was QianLong Net and Eastern Net.
QianLong Net obtained fund support from the Beijing nine traditional media in the first three
years. Shanghais Eastern net got 600,000,000 Yuan funds from the Eastern Pearl Group,
the Wenxin News Group, Liberation Daily and so on.
An example of investment from other places is China Youth online, which, operating
under the status of The Beijing Online Network Information Technology Company,
obtained the Hong Kong Enterprises investment. As a result of the national policy limit, the
media websites ability to attract funding is relatively limited.

Online Media

Currently the main force of Chinas online media are those websites that are authorized
by the State Council Information Office, which has four levels, (a) the central press units
websites, (b) the central state organs and departments media websites, (c) provincial
autonomous regional and municipalities media websites, (d) integrated commercial units
websites. Furthermore, online media held by newspapers, periodicals, radio stations, and TV
stations.

Online Newspapers Published by Traditional Newspapers

Compared to large-scale media online companies, it was rather simple for many
newspapers to start their online businesses by reissuing their content on the web, without
revision. Print had priority and staff was limited. The national policy was the third restricted
factor. For considering resource integration, the government issued Regulations on the Ways
of Online Media News Publicity to limit online news publicity. On the other hand, the birth
of key online news media also pressed the growth of online newspapers.

Online Niche Services

China Youth Net and Chinese Economy Internet represent major niche services targeting
the young audience and the business community.

Portals and Search Engines

Yahoo! and Google have adapted to Chinese regulations and provide local language
versions of their services. The strongest local player is Sina, an IT company founded in 1993.
SiTongLiFang information technology limited cooperation was founded in Beijing and
became one of the fifty companies strongly supported by the Beijing government.
SiTongLiFang opened its website SRSNET at the Internet tide.
In J uly 1998, SiTongLiFang gained exclusive rights and broadcasted live the World
Cup in France, a major event by a non-media identity. It was planned and executed by two
online pioneers, ChenTong, later Sinas vice executive officer and editor-in-chief, and
WangYan, the later CEO of Sina Group. The website created the highest visit record at that

107


time among Chinese sites; almost two million clicks came through everyday. This became a
new starting point of SiTongLiFang, and they changed the name into LiFang Online and
developed the concept of a Chinese portal in China.
On November 1st, 1998, Lifang Online announced plans to buy the largest Chinese
Internet company, Huayuan Information, and establish the largest Chinese website, Sina,
both domestic and abroad.
At that time, SiTongLiFang had a business model of providing Chinese platform
software, which was considered the Hottest Welcomed Software in China. Even when Sina
prepared to be listed on NASDAQ, it was clearly written in the prospectus that the software
income represented more than 70 % of the total revenue.
On March 26th, 1999, Sina put forward a special topic about the Kosovo Crisis, which
used traditional reporting methods combined with the rapidity and interactive character of the
Internet to attract many users. On August 8, Sina was the first to report the NATO missile hit
of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia. News centers became the most up-to-date place for
promptly and comprehensively reporting news, and at that moment the visits were five times
greater. After chatting and email services, online news attracted most users.
On March 25th, the famous anchor WuXiaoli of Phoenix TV station in HongKong visited
Sina which raised the curtain on celebrity online chatting.
The main business of Sina was narrow in the field of Sina Internet (sina.com), Sina
wireless (sina.mobile) and Sina Hotline (sina.net). Among them, the short message income of
Sina Wireless and ads were about 40% and 50% respectively. The fast growth of Sina Hotline
was expected to be a revenue source for the future.
Sina and other portal services were labeled News Supermarket for their practice of
copying content from traditional media without clearing copyright. In the beginning of 1999,
Xinhua News Agency and Peoples Daily stopped the supply to Sina. The crisis was solved
after signing an agreement over news supply. At the beginning of 2006, the Liberation Daily
Newspaper Group proposed to establish a newspaper association in order to raise the charge
for online media news transfer.

Online Media Affiliated with Broadcasters

CCTV Internet was founded in December 1996, and enlisted as a national key news
website in December 2000. On May 25
th
, 2001, CCTV founded an online propaganda
department with the object to propagandize Chinese culture to the world and entertain the
globe by video and audio programs. CCTV Internet has launched 50 web-channels,
including English, Spanish and French foreign language channels.
Each day, the total length of time for live broadcast programs and VOD programs on
CCTV Internet is 118 hours. CCTV-NEWS, CCTV-4 and CCTV-9 channels broadcast live
around the world all day long. The key programs of channel CCTV-1, CCTV-2, and CCTV-5
have fulfilled online synchronized live broadcast, and 280 television programs including
news, arts, sports and science are available as video on demand (VOD).
CCTV Internet is also in charge of interactivity with television viewers, receiving more
than 2000 letters daily and hosting 50 forums in which famous television stars, TV anchors,
arts stars, political commentators and experts and scholars hold discussions with online users.

108


Original online programming also includes a news channel and an entertainment channel
targeting young people.

Other Online Media

News gathering regulations limit the development of Stand Alone Online Newspapers
and Online Magazines in China. But new online formats depending on user generated content
are not regulated, and these represent an important part of original content for commercial
websites.

Audiences

According to the CCNIC Chinese online development statistics survey up to J uly 2007,
there were nearly 162 million online users in China and 77.3 % were users of news websites.
Above 90% stated that, when in need of news information, they would seek it online first, and
76.3% said they usually got major news from the Internet.
In market reach, the commercial portals without news gathering operations are the
dominant providers of news, a phenomenon also observed internationally. In the U.S., Yahoo!
is the largest news provider.
According to Alexa.com
4
, Sina is the third largest website in China after Baidu.com and
qq.com. The Chinese version of Google is the fourth largest site. All top four distribute online
news. Baidu pioneered the new generation news portal concept, providing valued-added
services such as news search and individual news subscriptions.

The Case of Norway

Norway was among the first countries outside the U.S, to connect to the network we today
know as the Internet
5
.

Regulations

The Broadcasting Act of 1992 and The Media Ownership Act of 1997 regulate
broadcasting (distributed over the air, by cable or by satellite) and concentration in ownership
of traditional media in Norway. The purpose of The Media Ownership Act is to promote
freedom of expression, genuine opportunities to express ones opinions and a comprehensive
range of media. But there are no regulations for online media.

Economic System

Online news is supported by advertising. Newspapers receive various subsidies, but there
is no direct governmental funding of online media development. A strong newspaper industry
and active participation in online development by Telenor (the national Telco), might
represent indirectly governmental support of the development of online news media.
After turbulence in the aftermath of the America Online financial collapse in 2001, the year
2005 represented the commercial break-through for the online newspaper business, receiving

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more demand for advertising space than they could offer, and making high profit margins.
The largest media group, Shibsteds online activities produced strong figures in 2006. The
revenue grew by more than 60%, and these activities share of the Groups operating profit
(EBITDA) was 24%.

Online Media

Dagbladet (single copy sales, nationally distributed tabloid) launched the first major
online news operation in Norway March 10
th
, 1995. VG (single copy sales, nationally
distributed tabloid) brought forth its online edition on October 10
th
of the same year. And
even though Dagbladet re-launched a more news-focused issue the day before, it did not keep
the countrys largest daily from taking the lead online as well. A solid brand and interactive
services were its main weapons.

Online Newspapers Published by Traditional Newspapers

Sigurd Hst has kept a register on the development in the number of online newspapers
since 1996, and following a certain amount of hesitation in 1995 (only 17 newspapers
registered online by February 1996), a quick expansion came in 1996. Then came three years
of relatively slow growth until activities boomed once more in 2000 (Hst, 2001, p. 18-19,
our translation). This boom was also echoed in media coverage of this new area in the media
landscape.

Table 1. Growth of Online Newspapers in Norway
Year Number of online newspapers* Nettavis in Atekst**
1995 17 1
1996 72 87
1997 74 331
1998 102 481
1999 120 511
2000 157 1456
2001 201 1775
2002 - 1519
2003 212 1684
2004 - 1803

Notes: *Registration at the end of the year, except 1995, which has registration data from
February 1996 (Hst, 2004).
** Search for nettavis (online newspaper) in the Norwegian search database Atekst.

By the end of 2000, there were 157 newspapers online, and out of these 126 offered a
news service as part of its output. Dagbladet started the new millennium by establishing DB
Medialab, responsible for its activities in digital media.

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Separating online activities into separate companies served to make visible its values to
the market, increasing the value of the owners shares. And while print papers were marked
by processes of efficiency improvement, the spirit of entrepreneurship was cultivated in new
media.
The trend of separation spread to other major Norwegian newspaper companies, such as
VG, Aftenposten and Stavanger Aftenblad (a regional subscription-based newspaper).
The maturing of the online newspaper market measured by the number of print
newspapers with their own respective online editions does not follow a classic diffusion
curve, and Sigurd Hst (2000) emphasizes two explanatory variables:

If we compare the pattern of diffusion (...) with the ideal-typical S-curve for
diffusion (...), it is most notably the fast growth in 1996 which does not fit. Instead of
waiting to see what would happen, as many papers did in 1997-1999 (...), many were
now anxious to get on early. The explanation is both that they were afraid of being
surpassed by the technological development (being left on the platform as the train
leaves), and that it was possible to create a fairly decent Internet service at a low
cost (Hst, 2004, p. 14, our translation).

In addition, the launch of Nettavisen.no in 1996 made a significant impact, contributing to
changing the market structure.

Stand Alone Online Newspapers

The entrepreneurs of Nettavisen.no lacked proper funding to launch a new printed paper,
and a central part of the business idea was to function as a meta medium in relation to
newspapers. By systematically surveying and citing the most interesting stories published in
the print media every day, Nettavisen, despite its limited resources and within a short period
of time, was able to offer complete news coverage, previously only available through the
largest newspapers. And then a few self-produced stories were often quite elegantly
developed to make the evening television news, hence promoting Nettavisen.
After some time, Nettavisens breadth constituted a substitute for the omnibus print
paper, instead of promoting the original messenger of the particular piece of news. The
newspapers responded by increasing efforts in their own online editions and thus reinforced
the effect.
The news battle was no longer about 24 hours, but about minutes. This was strengthened
by the fact that editors publicized the exact time a story was made public. The news
competition was given preference over experimenting with new forms of expression and
developing the characteristics of the new medium. The new channel was also well suited to
news transmission, given its ability to continuously combine the advantages of newspapers,
radio and television through the use of multimedia.
In 1995, most newspapers had to ask themselves whether this was in fact a case of
cannibalism, but the concerns had to be put aside in favor of looking at the realities of the
competition on the market.
Now, all online papers cite each other, and the problem for print papers that wish to
withhold stories from their online editions is that the readers may now find the story in its

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online rival, and not where it would be logical to start the search. It is precisely the good,
exclusive stories that one wishes to withhold. The problem is that these are also the ones that
will be cited (Krumsvik, 2006).

Online Niche Media

In the first phase, publications covering information technology were the typical stand
alone online media. A new phenomenon in Scandinavia is the joint development of new
online niche media by online newspapers. E24.se started the trend by using the business and
economics content from Svenska Dagbladet combined with the distribution power of
Swedens largest online newspaper Afronbladet. The owner of these newspapers, the
Norwegian media group Schibsted, copied the success in Norway with a joint venture
between Aftenposten and VG. In both markets the new business web sites became the online
market leaders in their niche and were profitable after the first year of operations.

Online Magazines

Most advertisers prefer large news services, and thus far there has not been a market
potential for online magazines in Norwegian. Magasinet published as part of Dagbladet.no
represents the deviant case, experimenting with online feature journalism.

Portals and Search Engines

Scandinavia Online was launched as a joint venture between Telenor (the national Telco)
and Schibsted (the largest media group) in 1997, and became the default home page of 80%
of the private online users. Hence it also became the most important portal of online news, but
all traffic was sent to the media of origin. The Swedish Telco Telia joined the venture, and
through mergers and acquisitions SOL became a major player in Norway, Sweden and
Denmark. The initial rationale was partly defensive in response to expansion plans by
America Online. This never became a reality, but the positions in the portal and search
markets were strong enough to make Yahoo! leave Scandinavia.
After the online financial crisis in 2001, Scandinavia Online was sold to the Yellow
Pages operator Eniro, and Schibsted developed VG.no as their main portal initiative in
Norway and Aftonbladet.se in Sweden. Default start pages became less important for market
reach, and the online newspapers in Norway had developed a very strong position due to
major investments as a consequence of the competition from Nettavisen.
In 2006, Schibsted re-entered the national search market to compete with the dominating
position of Google, using the domestic developed Fast technology, with a comprehensive
news search as a differentiating factor. One year later the Sesam search venture joined forces
with Yahoo! in this struggle.
Online Media Affiliated with Broadcasters

The public broadcaster NRK (the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) is Norways
major broadcasting institution with nine radio channels and two TV channels with an
approximate 100% coverage. NRK began experimenting with the World Wide Web in 1995,

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starting with offering a selection of program related material. Due to advice from the
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) not to invest too much on Internet activities, they
started rather low scale. Today this is used as an explanation of why NRK is not in a leading
position, as is the case in every other market they operate.
The first online organization had three employees. They got financial resources to
finance their own salaries, and a license to beg for production funding from the other
departments at NRK. This led to an online offering dependent on the willingness to pay in
various parts of the organization. The most prestigious part of the programming felt no need
to invest in new media development, hence there was no online news offering for the first five
years. For a broadcaster financed by license, the income was fixed, and new ventures had to
compete alongside existing activities for resources.
The general online optimism leading up to the millennium, and advertising financing of
parts of selected BBC products online, led to a new strategy at the NRK. There was a need to
allocate more resources to the online service, and advertising was identified as the solution. In
order to open for such revenue, the online offering had to be defined outside the public
service mission of NRK. A new division named NRK Futurum was established with a
mission of creating new streams of revenue for the public broadcaster, and an ambitious goal
of taking a dominant place in the online space was proclaimed in 2000. Online news then
became a part of the offering.
The dot.com downfall of 2001 limited the potential of online revenue, and the online
organization was reorganized. Online production became an integrated part of the various
production departments. In 2004 the decision was made to make all regional transmissions,
both radio and television, available on the Internet across all national borders. In the case of
major news events, the NRK web site transmits live from the sites where events are taking
place.
The broadcaster had high hopes for better market positions as video consumption was
expected to grow substantially due to increased online penetration. 2005 became the break
thru for online video. But NRK did not manage to realize the potential. Mandatory
registration of video users was removed to enhance usability, but the automated production
was detached from the online news staff, and the integration of video in online news
developed slowly.
The national newspapers started web-tv offerings in 2006, and the largest newspaper,
VG, also became the leading online broadcaster, to the frustration of the nations dominating
broadcaster, NRK.
The leading commercial broadcaster, TV 2, had become a major player in online news
through the purchase of the online only Nettavisen. TV 2s strategy was to offer online video
as premium service requiring a paid subscription. As the dominant player in this niche, this
became a profitable venture based on on-demand news and entertainment previously aired on
television.
Hence the traditional major newspapers took the lead in development of original
multimedia news content for the web.
As digital terrestrial television (DTT) is about to be introduced and analogue shut off is
decided, a new situation emerges for the traditional television channels. NRK and TV 2 will
not be the only channels with full distribution. In preparing for increased competition the

113


traditional market leaders introduce niche channels. TV 2 went from being a family channel
to offering a family of channels, with sports, news and movies as part of the new portfolio.
NRK decided to re-launch NRK2 as a news channel in competition with TV 2 and to
establish a childrens channel in addition. As TV 2 launched the news channel in February
2007, NRK did a soft launch of their news channel online and reorganized the news
department in order to realize the new strategy on continual publication of online news in all
three channels.
Internal conflicts led to a compromise of two news organizations, one responsible for all
traditional prime time news shows on radio and television, and the other responsible for the
new continuously updated news offerings in all channels. The latter was supposed to control
the news gathering resources, but the traditional shows are struggling for control over
dedicated reporters.
One of the objects of reorganizing was to produce more without increasing the total
resources. As more people are dedicated to specific program offerings, fewer resources are
available for a centralized multi-channel production.

Other Online Media

The major online newspapers have developed into mega sites in Norway, also providing
games, entertainment and venues for user created content. Hence their major competition on
this field is the international (e.g. American based) players.

Audiences

Norway is one of the most digitally sophisticated markets in Europe, according to Jupiter
Research. 80% of the population over 12 years of age uses the Internet regularly
7
. Among the
top 10 national sites five are traditional news organizations affiliated with newspapers and
broadcasters, with the online newspaper VG.no as the market leader. The other five are
portals and search sites
8
. This makes Norway the deviant case in the dominance of national
newspapers in the online industry.

Discussion

The development of online news is influenced by a larger social, political, economic and
cultural environment. At first sight the difference in laws and regulations due to different
political systems tends to be the main variable of the environment in which technological
development takes place and diffuses in China and Norway (He and Zhu, 2002). The Internet
technology is truly global, as are the basic economic models for online news. Regulations,
however, might become less significant as a limiting commercial factor.
Nevertheless, competition from new Stand Alone Online Newspapers, such as the
Norwegian Nettavisen, has not been and is still not possible in China today, due to limitations
in news gathering for online media. In the early phase of Norwegian online news
development, Nettavisen was a significant event triggering the traditional newspapers to
invest earlier and heavier in online news development. Hence the Norwegian national
newspapers have an unprecedented strong position in the overall online market.

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Both China and Norway had commercial portals dominating the market of online news,
without any major investment from the portals in original reporting, in the first phase of
online development until the financial crisis in 2000. After this point, the market structure in
China is more typical for the global Internet, dominated by relatively young online brands.
The main portal in Norway, Scandinavia Online, was sold to a Yellow Pages operator,
and lost its position as the home page for most online users. The dominating media group,
Schibsted, made a strategic choice to let their online newspapers be the main vehicle of online
expansion, and this reinforced the strong newspapers position from the first phase,
introducing entertainment features and online community functionality normally associated
with portals to their online news services.
In China traditional media are the driving force in developing Online Niche Media, due
to news gathering regulations. In Norway traditional media have the same position due to
their distribution power and content creation capability.
In China Online Magazines developing new genres are less likely to appear due to
regulations. In Norway this is also less likely due to the limited size of the market.
Regulations might change, but there will only be incremental growth in the Norwegian
online market. Large Chinese ventures, such as Sina, are accessing global capital markets to
finance their expansion, economies of scale makes this less probable for Norwegian
ventures
9
. The level of sophistication might be maturing in Norway while China represents a
new frontier for online content development, depending on changes in the social, political,
economic and cultural environment. Hence the market size seems to be more significant for
the diversity of online news content over time.
Online media affiliated with broadcasters tend to focus on interaction with and promotion
for broadcast shows, and distribution of broadcast content online in both China and Norway,
and other online media might to a larger degree represent the digital frontier of online news
gathering and distribution in China, as this represents a possibility to bend the rules of content
creation.
Conclusion

This comparative case study has been focusing on various types of online news media,
their market position (audiences), and the structural environment of laws and regulations, and
the economic system in China and Norway. The two markets are on the opposite side on the
main variables of social environment. Norway is low on regulations and low in market size
while China is high in both areas (See figure 2).

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Figure 2: Market Size, Regulations and Social Environment of Online News Development

Chinese online regulations include access, news gathering, and content distribution. The
main consequence of regulations is the limitation of news gathering for online media in
China. Hence the dominating commercial portals are limited to repackaging and redistribution
of news from other sources. This is however the same model used by the American (and
global) portals Yahoo! and Google. They have the possibility of news gathering in most
markets of operation; but they do not find the investment interesting. The diversity of news
will be limited in the Chinese model, but this tends to be the same effect in Western societies
due to mainstreaming (Piene, 2008).
The Norwegian market is not regulated, but the market size limits development of online
magazines and other stand alone web sites targeted for more narrow groups. Hence the
number of large players is very limited, and they use their distribution power to dominate new
niches of economic interest as the market develops. This might lead to discussion of
regulations to ensure diversity, potentially moving Norway to the quadrant of low market and
high regulations not a desirable position for players in the market.
China might over time move to a position of lower regulations, making this the most
interesting online market on the globe. The major players like Yahoo! and Google have met
some controversy for their willingness to compromise over regulations in order to be
positioned, and as we have seen, their main concepts and business models are adaptable to the
Chinese social environment of online news.

Notes

1
In April 2001, the American trade journal Editor & Publisher Interactive had registered in
its database 12,878 news media online.
2
Estimate by Zhou He and J ian-hua Zhu (2002).
3
Sigud Hst (2004) registered 157 in 2000, 201 in 2001, and 212 in 2003.
4
http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?cc=CN&ts_mode=country&lang=none retrieved
December 13, 2007.

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5
NORSAR (Norwegian Seismic Array) at Kjeller was one of about 50 nodes of ARPANET
in 1975.
6
Schibsted (SCH) annual report 2006. Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization (EBITDA) is a metric that can be used to evaluate a company's profitability.
7
TNS InterTrack, March 2007.
8
TNS Metrix, December 2007.
9
Sina is listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange in New York.

References

Chen, Z. & Huang, Z. (2006, April). The dilemma and outlet of commercial portals.
Communication Research, 90-91.
Deuze, M. (2001, October). Online journalism: Modeling the first generation of news media
on the World Wide Web. First Monday, 6(10). Retrieved from
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/deuze/index.html
He, Z. & Zhu, J . (2002). The ecology of online newspapers: The case of China. Media
Culture Society 24, 121.
Hu, S. & Wang, J . (2005). The ponder of network time. Advanced Television Engineering, 8,
51-53.
Hst, S. (2000). Avisret 1999: Nye gratisaviser, flere aviser p Internett. Rapport 2/2000.
Fredrikstad: Institutt for J ournalistikk.
Hst, S. (2004).Avisret 2003 Farvel til fullformatet? Revidert utgave. Rapport 2/2004.
Fredrikstad: Institutt for J ournalistikk.
Krumsvik, A. H. (2006). What is the Strategic Role of Online Newspapers? Nordicom
Review, 27(2), 283-295.
Liu, L. (2007). Theory about the New Media: The first decade of CCTV Internet. Beijing:
China International Broadcasting Press.
Peng, L. (2005). The first decade of Chinese Online Media. Beijing: Tsinghua University
Press.
Piene, B. (2008) P nett med verden. In Ottosen R. and Krumsvik, A. H. (Eds).
Journalistikk i en digital hverdag [J ournalism in a Digital Environment] (pp. 174-
184). Kristiansand: Hyskoleforlaget/IJ -forlaget.
Rasmussen, T. (2006). Nettmedier: Journalistikk og medier p Internett [Internet Media:
J ournalism and the Internet] (2nd ed.). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

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Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: 3 2008 He, Pan & Liu

Can the Internet Reconstruct Traditional Media Frames?
A Study of Hyperlink Influence on Responsibility Attribution

Juntao He, Xiaohui Pan & Yi Liu
Shenzhen University

This study attempts to establish a descriptive model in order to explore the
relationship between hyperlink types and responsibility attribution. The paper
hypothesizes that hyperlinks might connect fragmented information into an
integrated picture so audiences might have thematic perceptions of society. Thus,
their responsibility judgments may shift to social background. The Internet might be
seen as a framing mechanism to reconstruct traditional media frames. The
hypotheses are derived from a combination of previous research such as framing
attribution effects and Internet information processing. The research also tested the
mediating variables between hyperlinks and attributions. The research method
involves between-group computer-based experiments. Data were statistically
analyzed with ANOVA and the General Linear Model. The results show that
responsibility attribution varies based on experiment treatment. Yet, both the
comparative relationship and significance between manipulations were not as
expected. The role of mediating variables could not be confirmed. The reasons are
discussed in a psychological perspective.

Media frames are always considered determinants influencing audience cognition, which
consequently leads to a change in social behavior (Scheufele, 1999). Nevertheless, media
nowadays are undergoing criticism because of their improper content (Fleming et al., 2006).
There is a popular saying that the media are crammed with pillows and fists which are the
metaphors of sex and violence. American journalists even evoke more sinister media effects:
if it bleeds, it leads (Fallows, 1996). Episodic or fragmented media frames those focusing
on specific events or people rather than social backgrounds fill in everyday news coverage
(Iyengar, 1993). Further, Bennett (2003) argued that this kind of political communication was
an unavoidable information tendency bringing in destruction of audiences rational
reasoning of the public life. Overwhelming attention to details of events or even personal
traits torture audience perception so people improperly attribute responsibility to individuals
in news stories, while missing the decisive factors originating from social structure (Iyengar,
1990, 1991, 1993). Not only audience cognition but also social actions are reshaped by media
(Baron & Byrne, 2003; Iyengar, 1991; Weiner, 1995). Our understanding may be superficial
and fragmental because episodic and amusing media coverage deprives human beings of their
causal reasoning ability (Postman, 1986).
The cyber age seems to make everyone believe that infinite information produces rational
reasoning materials for social and democratic issues (Lax, 2000). It provides the possibility
and expectancy for improvement of individual life (Jin, 2001). However, in terms of cost
considerations, news websites port information from traditional media, especially from
print media (Barnhurst, 2002; Fredin, 1997) so content of traditional and new media is partly
overlapped to a large extent (Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000). Some countries (e.g., China,

118


North Korea) even regulate traditional media and the official news agency as the only legal
sources for the Internet. Managers are not permitted to recruit their own news gathering staff
(Zhang, 2006). The traditional media are still a major news source so that episodic media
frames in it still make boundaries and interpret the world (Gamson et al., 1992). Based on
this logic, the news coverage we harvest from the Internet is as episodic as ever.
Notwithstanding, even though the Internet cannot rewrite content, its unique
information-organizing pattern can reconstruct bits of information. As several scholars have
explored (e.g., Eveland & Dunwoody, 2001; Eveland et al., 2004a; Eveland et al., 2004b;
Sundar, 1998; Sundar et al., 2003; Tewsbury & Althaus, 2000), the Internets special
character hyperlinks might convey structural and associative information, weaving a
broad, open-ended and all-inclusive network of facts. Therefore, a pressing question is
whether hyperlinks can reconstruct traditional media frames by melting the fragmented and
episodic information into an integrated form? Can audience responsibility attribution be
altered due to the changing of media frames? Are there any differences in terms of
responsibility attribution at different levels of Internet interactivity characterized by hyperlink
types? If so, what are the dynamics of hyperlinks reconstructing effects?
This research attempts to answer these questions by observing and analyzing peoples
responsibility judgment and online browsing behavior.

Literature Review

Responsibility Attribution and Traditional Media Framing

Responsibility attribution is one of the four major effects of framing (Pan, 2006).
Iyengars research (1990, 1991, 1993) showed how responsibility attributes varied with the
way in which the media depict social facts. The independent variable social fact
representation has two values. If news coverage is about the background of the story, it is
called a thematic frame, which as Iyengar & Simon (1993) held, is abstract and impersonal
(p. 369). On the other hand, if news coverage focuses on the individual level rather than
societal phenomena (Iyengar, 1993), the media frame is defined as episodic. The dependent
variable is thus personal or social responsibility attribution depending on whether the media
frame is episodic or thematic. Iyengar (1993) took the issue of poverty as an example.
Stimulus of the episodic frame was description of poor persons, their families and the places
where they lived. The episodic frame drew a good picture (Iyengar, 1991, p. 14) which was
filled with strong visual attraction and made the audience be attendant in that situation
(Iyengar, 1990, p. 22). However, the thematic frame was the description of a difficult and
severe social environment. In Iyengars survey, the respondents exposed to the episodic frame
believed that individual victims are accountable for their poverty due to lack of hard work
and education/skills, while those assigned to the thematic frame group pointed out problems
of the state of economic conditions and inadequate governmental/societal efforts (Iyengar,
1990, p. 13). Iyengars perspective on framing and attribution can be illustrated as follows:

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Figure1. Iyengars Framing Effect Model on Responsibility Attribution

Media
frames
Episodic
frame
Thematic
frame
Audiences responsibility
cognition
Ind

ividual responsibility
attribution

Social responsibility
attribution

Why Does Iyengars Perspective Matter?

Why has the issue of episodic or fragmented news coverage attracted so much scholastic
attention (e.g., Bennett, 2003; Iyengar, 1990, 1991, 1993; Postman, 1986)? Explanatory
approaches in both psychology and media studies are relevant. Though the criteria for social
judgment varies with different situations, social psychologists believe people are inclined to
simplify such complicated processes into responsibility attribution because the process of
attribution is the base of social conduct (Weiner, 1995). Attribution may not only conceive
personal images that result in evaluations and attitudes of the communicators, but it also plays
a role as a circumstantial and contextual cue for our daily choices, forming judgments,
expressing opinions and making decisions (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Weiner, 1995). Further,
Weiner (1995) pointed out that we extend our views from responsibility cognition to
attitudinal and behavioral aspects. In this way, attribution surpasses the boundary of personal
information processing to exert considerable influence on social interactivity.
From the perspective of media studies, episodic news coverage is crammed in everyday
news reports in TV networks and on every page of newspapers (Iyengar, 1990). This
inclination, which is an unavoidable trend of news style, as Bennett (2003) argued, conceals
the real background of social facts so news cannot provide guidance for public action and
hinders participation in political life. The accountability of social issues are left to politicians
or victims while social factors and other necessary solutions such as social welfare reforms or
mutual assistance, are ignored. Citizens, therefore, live in an isolated or suburban
community (Turow, 1997) where growing cynicism unfolds (Cappella & Hall, 1997)
because people think that those in power or in difficulty can decide problem solving and
initiate social change without civic society debate and the participation of average people
(Bennett, 2003). This also, to some extent, explains why todays politics become candidate-
centered politics (Wattenberg, 1991). In this sense, audiences are passive receivers
because of the lack of causal reasoning capacity (Postman, 1986). Postmans monograph
(1986) carries a title that with great insight crystallizes the episodic and fragmented negative
effects of messages: This kind of media text may just Amuse ourselves to death. Based on
this reasoning, media frames with attribution effects may be decisive factors for our social

120


action. They can also be references when people try to make sense of political issues and
public affairs (Iyengar, 1991, 1993).

Comments on Iyengars Perspective

There is no doubt that Iyengars contribution (1990, 1991, 1993) explores a brand new
stage for framing analysis which can enlighten scholars knowledge mining on public opinion
and media effects (Pan, 2006). Yet, some aspects of his findings need to be supplemented.
The attributing effects of media frames tested in previous research take place in the era of
mass communication. It is based on the premise of mass medias great effect (McQuail,
2005) by which an audience may not actively reorganize information on their own. However,
the Internet can change audiences media usage and result in better control of personal
browsing behavior such as speed, order and content, allowing people to enhance their
learning (Kinzie et al., 1988; Tsai, 1989; Young, 1996). On the base of information
reorganization by hyperlinks, Eveland et al. (2004a) proposed that hyperlinks are a specific
kind of framing mechanism providing a context for an episodic event. Hyperlinks
associate related information from other messages and integrate the nature of public affairs
topics (Eveland et al., 2004b). Social perception may be more thematic than it is when
triggered by disconnected messages in traditional media. In this way, can hyperlinks
reconstruct episodic frames drawn from traditional media and reorganize audiences
responsibility judgment?
As a theory of media effect, Iyengars finding does not surpass the tradition of
framing analysis in which individual frames are directly affected by media frames (Scheufele,
1999). The attributing process by mass media looks like a black box which simplifies
complicated information processing into a stimulus-response model without any mediating
variables (See Figure 1). The communicating process itself is beyond Iyengars interest (Pan,
2006). In reality, this process is full of mediating variables (Eveland et al., 2004a). They
composite a continuous process (Broadbent, 1958, cited in Eysenck & Keane, 2000) during
which people handle information both in top-down or bottom-up manners (Neisser, 1976,
cited in Eysenck & Keane, 2000). As mentioned above, audiences may take advantage of the
interactivity of the Internet such as hyperlinks to reconstruct messages. Audience browsing
behavior and information processing may modify learning effects. Therefore, the mediating
variables should be taken into account.
So what are the reconstructing dynamics of the Internet? How do hyperlinks, one of the
distinguishing characteristics of the cyber age, reorganize the frames that audiences receive?
To answer this we need to consider the Internets information processing pattern.

Information Structure on the Internet

How does the Internet reframe news coverage? What is the information difference
between the Internet and traditional media? Both the content and structure of knowledge are
major issues of media studies (Eveland et al., 2004a, 2004b). Nevertheless, as stated earlier,
various kinds of media share most news content (Barnhurst, 2002; Fredin, 1997; Tewksbury
& Althaus, 2000). What makes knowledge from the Internet unique may be its structure and

121


organization, since website designs have a direct impact on knowledge (Eveland et al.,
2004b).
The word Internet is composed of the roots inter and net and both roots suggest
interrelationship or interconnection. The literal and practical meaning of Internet is linkage
between bits of information. This associative pattern of the Internet has its origin in the
human memory structure. Eveland et al. (2001, 2004a, 2004b) called this the structural
isomorphism of the human brain. In cognitive psychology, memory is modeled as a network
composed of linked information nodes (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Sternberg, 2003). The nodes are
factual knowledge describing concepts and attributes while the form of linkages between
nodes is structural knowledge depicting the organizing pattern of information (Eveland et al.,
2004a, 2004b; Jonassen et al., 1993). Memory and learning work by making meaningful
links between nodes (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Jonassen, 1988; Nelson & Palumbo, 1992). In
this sense, the Internet mimics the interrelating system of the brain (Churcher, 1989;
Eveland et al., 2001, 2004a, 2004b; Nelson & Palumbo, 1992). Websites, texts, graphics,
images, and videos look like nodes while hyperlinks are bridges among objects (Carison &
Kacmar, 1999). The Internet may extend learning and assist the acquisition of information
by the mechanism of structural isomorphism compared with traditional media (Churcher,
1989; Eveland et al., 2004b; Nelson & Palumbo, 1992). The additional dimension that
audiences get from the Internet may be knowledge structure rather than factual knowledge.

How can Hyperlinks Reconstruct Episodic Frames?

How can hyperlinks reconstruct episodic frames? Hyperlinks as linkages organize
knowledge structures, and may lead to a large picture of daily news. Such linked clusters of
news may not be episodic any more because related messages on similar topics by hyperlinks
are brought in to enlighten readers about interconnected nature of news events (Eveland,
Marton & Seo, 2004, p. 84). The interactivity of hyperlinks may be like the interconnection of
links in the human brain. Eveland & Dunwoody (2001), Eveland et al. (2004a, 2004b) and
Sundar et al. (2003) all addressed research in hyperlinks and structural learning of knowledge.
From the reciprocal influence view of human-computer interactivity (Pavlik, 1996), higher
interactivity and more learning take place. Thus, different types of hyperlinks referring to
different interactivity levels may influence information acquisition. With in-text hyperlinks,
audiences can move to related knowledge any time during reading, and this may be the
highest form of interactivity. Following-text hyperlinks represent an intermediary form of
interactivity because click-in decisions are usually made freely after reading the whole text.
Linear hyperlinks, in this reasoning, are the lowest form of interactivity due to limited
browsing by the web-pages structure. Hyperlinks in this web are just like doorknobs of
sequential doors. People are not free to go into the room they may wish because where they
go is defined by room configuration.

Mediating Variables for Hyperlinks Reconstructing Effect

Though hyperlinks build information bridges, this does not mean that the Internet has
already reconstructed traditional media frames, because the real effect of media frames are
their influence on individual frames related to audience cognition and action (Scheufele,

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1999). The information network may be a real network only if browsers actively melt the
fragments together. Thus, only when users structure, access, and manipulate information
within a spatial network of nodes and links (Conklin, 1987; Nelson, 1965 cited in Carlson &
Kacmar, 1999, p. 386), the comprehension of society may take place on a mental model that
represents the objects and semantic relations (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983, cited in Thuring,
Hannenmann & Haake, 1995, p. 58). From this logic, the actions initiated by the website
(Sundar et al., 2003, p. 48) or so-called browsing behavior, intermediate between media and
individual frames. With hyperlinks, the users can freely choose their browsing pathsThis
intrinsic structure should have some effects on users browsing and commenting activities
(Tsai, 1989, p. 126) and navigating clicking-in from one node to another specific destination
(Carlson & Kacmar, 1999).
In a word, hyperlinks cannot directly reorganize episodic media frames. Browser
behavior is critical in mediating variables and catalyzing frame reconstruction. Eveland et al.
(2001, 2004a, 2004b) used hyperlinks and knowledge structure density (KSD) as independent
and dependent variables to test the relationship between interactivity and knowledge
structure. They used mediating variables such as selective scan and elaboration (see Figure 2).
In their work, selective scans measured browsing pattern while elaboration depicted mental
mechanisms for information connecting. KSD was used to assess the degree of knowledge
interrelation. Yet, the results of their research were mixed.

Figure 2. Model of Linearity Manipulation and KSD

Selective
scan
Elaboration
KSD
Linear
Manipulation

Comments on Previous Research

Based on previous literature, it is clear that the structural isomorphism of hyperlink
system integrates fragmented messages so users can acquire knowledge with fuller
backgrounds, which is close to Iyengars thematic frames. Eveland et al. (2004b) even hold
that knowledge structure provided important evidence about episodic versus thematic
framing effects, with interactivity as framing mechanism (p. 102). However, few empirical
studies have focused on hyperlinks and responsibility attribution. Can the dynamics of
hyperlinks and browsing behavior be accommodated with Iyengars view on episodic versus
thematic frames? Thus, the present research attempts to deal with the issue of hyperlinks and

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episodic frame reconstruction while using browsing behavior and linking action as mediating
variables.

Research Framework and Hypotheses

The research tries to place Iyengars model (1990, 1991, 1993) into an Internet
communication context while adding mediating variables to the framing process. The
integration of Iyengar and Eveland et al.s models is done as follows (see Figure 3.).

Figure 3. Model of Hyperlink Types and Responsibility Attribution

The present model extends the dependent variable of Eveland et al.s model to
responsibility attribution while episodic news coverage is fixed by imputing stimulus.
Meanwhile, for Iyengars model of frame and attribution, mediating variables such as
selective scan, elaboration, KSD and even hyperlinks, are inserted so the black box may
shift to a gray box if the model is confirmed. The causal relationship of variables is
arranged as follows: (a) Hyperlink type (degree of Internet interactivity) is an independent
variable; (b) Responsibility attribution is the dependent variable; (c) Selective scan,
elaboration and KSD are mediating variables; and (d) With the purpose to test the
reconstructing effect of hyperlinks, all inputs are identical, episodic news coverage. The
hyperlink types are manipulated according to those actually used in cyberspace. Three
interactivity degrees from low to high are used: linear treatment, following-text hyperlinks
and in-text hyperlinks.
As noted earlier, higher interactivity of a hyperlink design means that more information
and connections are available. The research questions are generalized as the following
hypotheses:

Episodic
News
coverage
Interactivity
hyperlink types
Responsibility
attribution
KSD
Selective scan
Elaboration
H1 H1
H4
H2
H3
H4
H2
H3

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Hypothesis 1: Social background attribution score will be greater in higher interactivity
level hyperlink manipulation.

This means the relationship between social background attribution score and hyperlink
types will be as follows: In-text link > following-text link > linear link. Because linear
websites can be viewed as similar to print newspapers (Eveland et al., 2004b, p. 89), a
comparison between Internet and traditional media on attribution is made.
As Iyengar (1990, 1991, 1993) argues, attribution was composed of causal and treatment
attribution, and the influence on dependent variables will be tested separately. So hypothesis
1 should be divided into two sub-hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a: Social background score of causal attribution will be greater in higher
interactivity level hyperlink manipulation.
Hypothesis 1b: Social background score of treatment attribution will be greater in higher
interactivity level hyperlink manipulation.

Selective scan, elaboration and KSD, the indices of mediating variables of Internet
interactivity in previous research (Eveland et al., 2004a, 2004b), are involved in the present
study to test how hyperlinks reframe audience attribution. Therefore,

Hypothesis 2: Selective scan will positively affect social factor attribution score.
Hypothesis 3: Elaboration will positively affect social factor attribution score.
Hypothesis 4: KSD will positively affect social factor attribution score.

For the same reason that attribution includes causal and treatment dimension, this study
will attempt to verify hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 from the above two perspectives.

Method

Research Design

With the purpose of testing the relationship between hyperlink types and responsibility
attribution, this study utilizes controlled laboratory experiments because researchers could
directly manipulate causal relationships between independent and dependent variables with
the effective exemption of disturbance (Christensen, 1997). A set of between-group
computer-based experiments was implemented. The participants were randomly assigned to a
three-level interactivity group featured by hyperlink types. The in-text hyperlink group, in
which users can directly navigate to related information when looking through the stimulus,
represented the highest level of interactivity. The following-text hyperlink, which is the most
widely used pattern in actual websites, was the middle level. The linear treatment group
presenting information in sequential order played the role of traditional media for
comparison. A comparative study between Internet and traditional media on episodic frame
reconstruction was designed. For valid evaluation of hyperlinks reconstructing effect, a
control group which only presented an episodic homepage without hyperlinks was also
included.

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Participants

One hundred forty undergraduate students of a Graphic Design Course were enrolled as a
convenient sampling for this study. They were primarily first and second year undergraduates,
young and relatively well educated, who are also experienced Internet users. The participants
were randomly distributed to one of four groups of 35 people when they had class in the
computer graphic design laboratory. After questionnaire filling, researchers filtered out
invalid participants by blank-check and mistake-check
1
. Valid subjects (n=117, male=42,
female=75) for each treatment were: control group (n=32), in-text hyperlink group (n=29),
following-text hyperlink group (n=30), and a linear treatment group (n=26). They had an
average age of 19.34 years and they spent 25.92 days online out of the past 30 days, and none
of them claimed to have not used the Internet in the past month.

Stimulus

A homepage with episodic frames and 22 relevant articles was prepared as a stimulus.
The homepage articles were about a Chinese youths unfortunate experiences such as failing
to go to school, committing a crime, losing jobs and being discriminated against when job-
hunting. The story gave us a vivid depiction of his life. Indeed, the reason for his suffering
was that he did not have an Official Household Registry
2
. The news was a typical episodic
framed story while the actual driving force was the flaw of the Official Household Registry
System. Because our goal was to verify hyperlink influence on attribution, other potentially
affecting factors were avoided. The selection of linked articles was based on following
systematic criteria: (a) Truth and objectivity; (b) No personal feelings; (c) Story and
information not typical for recalling.
The story was the identical stimulus in all manipulations. For the in-text hyperlink group,
participants were allowed to read more freely, instead of waiting to finish a page of reading,
users could jump from one page to another by clicking in highlighted hyperlinks in the text.
In the following-text group, the 22 hyperlinks with article titles were listed at the bottom of
the homepage, and participants could select the stories they were interested in, and this was
the middle level of interactivity. For the linear treatment group, the only way to move
between pages was to use navigation buttons next and back at the bottom of the screen.
Thus, this site represented the lowest level of interactivity. In the control group, participants
only read the homepage with episodic frames.

Procedure

Before each experiment, the researchers gave instructions to the effect that participants
would read an article written by a candidate hunting for a position in a news agency. They
were informed that the applicants ability for news writing and information gathering would
be evaluated, and everyone could be relaxed and fill out the questionnaires as they liked.
Then participants were asked to browse the website as usual. The reading time was fixed to
15 minutes which was not enough to read all 23 articles. They were instructed that all articles
were being evaluated. Yet, they were told several times to read as usual. This arrangement

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=
n(n-1)/2
was aimed to make participants use hyperlinks while not interrupting their browsing habits.
During the experiment, participants could only visit stimulus materials we published on a
private blog, other unrelated websites were blocked. Afterwards, a paper-and-pencil post
questionnaire was administered. The subjects in the control group merely completed a
shortened version of the questionnaire (excluding questions related to the use of stimulus
materials in sub pages and mediating variables).

Measures

Causal and treatment attribution were measured separately by a 7-point Likert-scale with
point 1 as individual responsibility and point 7 as social responsibility (M=4.4916, SD=.3387,
Cronbachs Alpha=.4989). Similar versions of scales for selective scan and elaboration were
utilized by previous research (Eveland et al., 2004a, 2004b), so the authors used them for
mediating variable testing. (Selective scan: M=5.0824, SD=.3160, Cronbachs Alpha=.6506;
Elaboration: M=4.9133, SD=.2133, Cronbachs Alpha=.6800. See Appendix for details.)
For Knowledge Structure Density, two sub-indices were implemented: Dichotomous
KSD and Value KSD (Scott, 1990; Eveland et al., 2004a, 2004b). A 10 X 10 matrix was
provided in the questionnaire. It was used to evaluate correlations between concepts cited
from 23 articles. The concepts were chosen by the researchers. Value KSD was to assess the
connected density by the correlation value judged by participants. If a subject thought they
were correlated, a score from 1 to 7 was marked to represent the correlation strength. If they
were not thought to be correlated, the subject wrote 0 in the respective cell. The letter n is the
number of paired concepts, v represents the value of each cell of the matrix and k is a given
link (M=.5484, SD=.7706).

D
kv
KS

(Scott, 1990; Eveland et al., 2001, 2004ab)

Dichotomous KSD was to calculate the degree of connectedness by the number of linked
pairs where n was the number of paired concepts and l represented the number of linked pairs
(M=.7676, SD=.1513). Dichotomous KSD and Value KSD were correlated (r=.553, p=.01).

KSD=
l
n(n-1)/2

(Scott, 1990; Eveland et al., 2001, 2004ab)

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Findings

This research aims to test the reconstructing effect of hyperlink types. A comparison of
attribution scores was launched by ANOVA as the first step. More specifically, hypothesis 1
predicted that the social attribution score would be greater in high interactivity hyperlink
manipulation. In other words, the relationship between social factors attribution score and
hyperlink type would be as follows: In-text link > following-text link > linear link. Because
responsibility attribution contains causal and treatment dimension (Iyengar, 1990), both
ANOVA and Post Hoc Test were conducted separately.
Expectation of hypothesis 1a was partially supported because the result did not fully
verify this hypothesis by post hoc mutual comparisons. As it was about causal attribution and
hyperlink types, the main effect was significant with F (3, 115) = 18.257, p < .001. However
with the Post Hoc Test, the result did not strongly support the authors assumption (see Table
1). As pointed out earlier, all intergroup score comparisons might be significantly different
with social background attribution scores and with ascending order from control group to in-
text manipulation. Yet, just four of the six pairs of between-group score differences were
significant (e.g., linear treatment versus following-text; following-text versus in-text; in-text
versus control group; following-text versus control group). The score difference of linear
treatment with both in-text and control group were not as expected. Furthermore, the
comparative relationship between scores was not as in hypothesis 1a. In-text treatment, the
assumed highest level, showed a lower score than following-text manipulation (Following-
text: 5.43, In-text: 4.41).
The data conveyed a mixed result of hypothesis 1a. Those participants exposed to
following-text hyperlinks might believe more that the victim in the news story would
shoulder the responsibility for an unfortunate life. Yet the score of the in-text group could not
support the expectation of statistic significance with the linear group and the following-text
treatment. Meanwhile, the score of the linear treatment with the sequential information
structure was not significantly different from the one of the control group without related
information in sub-pages.

Table 1. ANOVA and Multiple Comparisons of Hyperlink Types and Causal Attribution
ANOVA Multiple Comparison by Dunnett Test
Attribution Score Between-group Score Difference p F (3, 115)
= 18.257,
p < .001
Following-text 5.43
In-text 4.41
Linear group 3.81
Control group 3.41
Linear group -- Following-text
Linear group -- In-text
Linear group -- Control group
Following-text -- In-text
Following-text -- Control group
In-text -- Control group
-1.63
-.61
.40
1.02
2.02
1.00
.00
.353
.678
.010
.00
.015

Shedding light on hypothesis 1b, the relationship between treatment attribution and
hyperlink types, expectations were also partially supported because the result did not fully
verify this hypothesis by post hoc mutual comparisons. As it is about treatment attribution

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and hyperlink types, the main effect was significant with F (3, 115) = 23.318, p < .001.
However, with the Post Hoc Test, the result did not strongly reflect the authors assumption
(see Table 2). As pointed out earlier, all intergroup score comparisons might be significantly
different with social factor attribution score rising from control group to in-text manipulation.
Yet, also five of the six pairs of intergroup score differences were significant (e.g., linear
treatment versus following-text; linear treatment versus in-text; following-text versus in-text;
in-text versus control group; following-text versus control group). The score difference of
linear treatment with control group was not as expected and the score comparison between
following-text and in-text manipulation just showed a slight significance at the .05 level.
Furthermore, the comparative relationship between scores was not as in hypothesis 1b. In-text
treatment, the assumed highest level, showed a lower score than following-text manipulation
(Following-text: 5.47, In-text: 4.66).
The data conveyed a mixed result of hypothesis 1b. Those participants exposed to
following-text hyperlinks might believe more that the victim in the news story would solve
the problem. Yet the score from the in-text group could not support the expectation by
comparison with the following-text treatment. Meanwhile, the score for linear treatment with
sequential information structure was not significantly different from the one of control group
without related information in sub-pages.

Table 2. ANOVA and Multiple Comparisons of Hyperlink Types and Treatment Attribution
ANOVA Multiple Comparison by Dunnett Test
Attribution Score Between-group Score Difference P F (3,
115) =
27.764, p
< .001
Following-text 5.47
In-text 4.66
Linear group 3.62
Control group 3.29
Linear group -- Following-text
Linear group -- In-text
Linear group -- Control group
Following-text -- In-text
Following-text -- Control group
In-text -- Control group
-1.85
-.1.04
.32
.81
2.17
1.36
.00
.014
.777
.041
.00
.00

The remaining hypotheses were tested using the General Linear Model to verify the role
of mediating variables such as selective scan, elaboration and KSD on frame reconstructing
effect. Because the questionnaires of the control group did not have items concerning
mediating variables, the GLM was only conducted in in-text, following-text and linear
treatment. Hypothesis 2a and 2b assumed that selective scan might be positively related with
social attribution. Nevertheless, the selective scan scale did not present any positive effect on
attribution (see Tables 3-4). Hypothesis 3a and 3b yielded the same result as hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 4a predicted that KSD would be positively related with causal attribution. This
hypothesis was supported for value density (=.435, p<.05) while that of dichotomous density
was without any significant difference (=.382, p=.703). Unlike Hypothesis 4a, neither
dichotomous nor value density could support the treatment attribution of hypothesis 4b
(Dichotomous KSD: =-.441, p=.692; Value KSD: =-.196, p=.373).
As Eveland et al. (2004a, 2004b) have argued, these mediating variables did not show
any significantly positive relationship. Further checks for validity of selective scan,
elaboration and KSD were conducted. Beyond the authors assumption, there was not any

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Table 3. General Linear Model for Mediating Variables and Causal Attribution
Type III
SS
df

MS F Beta p Partial
Eta
Squared
Corrected model 48.057
a
6 8.010 6.722 -- .000 .344
Intercept 17.454 1 17.454 14.648 4.205 .000 .160
Selective Scan .485 1 .485 .407 -5.70E-02 .525 .005
Elaboration 2.620 1 2.620 2.199 -.267 .142 .028
Dichotomous KSD .175 1 .175 .147 .382 .703 .002
Value KSD 5.831 1 5.831 4.894 .435* .030 .060
Treatment 27.581
b
2 13.790 11.573 -- .000 .231
Error 91.752 77 1.192
Total 1932.000 84
Corrected Total 139.810 83
Note
a. Treatment attribution R2=.286 (adjusted R
2
=.213).
b. This includes linear treatment, following-text hyperlink and in-text hyperlink, but not the
control group. c. * p < .05

Table 4. General Linear Model for Mediating Variables and Treatment Attribution
Type III
SS
df

MS F Beta p Partial
Eta
Squared
Corrected model 45.713
a
6 7.619 5.153 -- .000 .286
Intercept 20.836 1 20.836 14.092 4.822 .000 .155
Selective Scan .788 1 .788 .533 -7.26E-
02
.467 .007
Elaboration 3.693E-02 1 3.693E-
02
.025 -3.17E-
02
.875 .000
Dichotomous KSD .233 1 .233 .158 -.441 .692 .002
Value KSD 1.189 1 1.189 .804 .196 .373 .010
Treatment 35.930
b
2 17.965 12.151 -- .000 .240
Error 113.846 77 1.479
Total 1961.000 84
Corrected Total 159.560 83
Note
a. Treatment attribution R2=.344 (adjusted R
2
=.293).
b. This includes linear treatment, following-text hyperlink and in-text hyperlink, but not the
control group.

intergroup significance by hyperlink treatment (Selective scan: F (2, 82) = .333, p = .718;
Elaboration: F (2, 82) = 1.876, p < .160; Dichotomous KSD: F (2, 82) = 1.260, p < .289;

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Value KSD: F (2, 82) = 2.241, p < .113). The mediating role of browsing behavior should be
discussed.

Discussion

Looking at the outcome of this study, perceptions of the Internets influence on our world
may be to some extent reshaped by our findings. Social responsibility attribution, the basis of
social understanding and mutual action, as Weiner (1995) suggests, and which was developed
in mass media by Iyengar (1990, 1991, 1993), shows new results in the context of Internet
communication. The episodic frames dominating traditional media could have been
reconstructed by hyperlinks when this news coverage went online. The framing mechanism
of hyperlinks, in the phrasing of Eveland (2001, 2004a, 2004b), has been partially verified in
this study. Although the results are mixed depending on the particular hypothesis, the
experiments show the Internets critical role of cushioning print medias framing effects.
Linked information online may refurbish the opinion basis for rational action because
browsers can make sense of the world in a more complete and integrated way. Yet, the results
obtained by analyzing the attribution score in different hyperlink manipulations are complex,
so the following section will address the output and its implications.
What seems most critical for the discussion is following-text manipulation. The score of
this experimental treatment, with layout that hyperlinks also at the bottom of the homepage
such as that of the linear group, shows significant differences with both the linear and the
control group. Further, its attributing score is higher than that of the in-text website which
was assumed to be the most interactive at the 0.05 level. How can we interpret this result? A
theoretical and practical explanation could run as follows:
From a theoretical viewpoint, research in psychology and educational science has
focused on this issue for years. The first explanation may be schema and cognitive
completeness. Schema, the guideline of peoples daily perception and information process
(Sternberg, 2003), is widely accepted in cognitive psychology as a slot structure of
attributes of social facts in our mindset that give us predictive information (Anderson,
1995). Once participants get involved in some parts of a news story, a similar or even the
same schema may appear as the story scripts take effect, and this allows people to predict
later events. This process can keep people from continuing their reasoning, reading and
predicting. Thus, those exposed to in-text hyperlinks may not interrupt reading for related
information with the purpose of a more complete understanding of a news story. On the other
hand, the motivation to click in-text hyperlinks should be taken into account. But to what
extent did participants have an information demand or were interested enough in the linked
pages to click hyperlinks? The motivation of this behavior should be considered in further
research of hyperlink use.
From a practical viewpoint, in trying to explain why following-text manipulation
obtained the highest score in attribution, we must not neglect audience browsing habits.
Following-text hyperlinks are the most widely used form on websites while in-text hyperlinks
are not so prevalent (Dominick, 2002). People form habits: after reading the main story, they
look through the following hyperlinks for more related information. The participants in this
group only did what they normally do. From this viewpoint, they might get related
information leading to social attribution. Looking back to in-text and linear manipulation, the

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participants might face Internet browsing interplay they were not familiar with, so their active
behavior to click hyperlinks for new information may have been restricted by uncertainty in
an unfamiliar context (Baron & Byrne, 2003). This may well have hindered the automatic
information process and action through script in audiences minds (Myers, 2005). Meanwhile,
Sundar et al.s research (2003) showed a similar explanation, that high level interactivity such
as in-text hyperlinks, can annoy subjects by its higher level of information fragmentation.
Another result worth discussing is that linear treatment showed no significant difference
from the control group. Although linear websites were less interactive than following-text and
in-text hyperlink pages, in reality they connected related information. In this vein of
reasoning, it may be self-evident that more knowledge was available in linear treatment in
comparison with the control group which only had the content of homepages. But why did the
score comparison not show any significant effect between these two groups? The layout of
linear treatment may provide an explanation. The hyperlinks to next article in linear
websites were at the bottom of each page, so the patterns were like online serial fictions and
participants could conduct a general browsing or even a complete reading of the main story
before clicking to the next page. Such special reading patterns might lead to theoretical and
research method explanations. Media frames are the information organizing structure guiding
audiences social cognition and reasoning (Gitlin, 1980; Gamson, 1984). Their roles as
schemas make boundaries and interpret the world (Gamson et al., 1992). Reading the whole
stimulus story first may trigger cognition referring to media frames. After this, an audience
may reduce its information processing because people subconsciously incline to save the
limited reasoning resources in the brain once they have already absorbed the impression of
social facts (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). As a result, the influence of existing frames in news
coverage can be reinforced in relative terms, so the effects brought in by hyperlinks and the
information they link with can be weakened. From the research method direction, after
several minutes of energy concentration on the story in the homepage, the participants may be
tired, so even though they had been instructed to read the articles on sub-pages, they may
abandon reading these sub pages. From these two views, we may conclude that participants in
linear treatment may read just the main story like those in the control group. This may
provide an answer to why no significant differences were found.
As suggested several times, social responsibility attribution is brought in by the
information a person acquires. Interconnected knowledge may give us a thematic picture
while only fragmented and independent information just show people the episodic pictures. In
the context of Internet communication, information acquisition is through click-in action and
mental association with knowledge furnished by hyperlinks. Previous research utilized such
mediating variables such as selective scan, elaboration and KSDbehavioral and mental
constructs to measure the influence of Internet interactivity (Eveland et al., 2001, 2004a,
2004b). In our research, even intergroup ANOVA of these three variables did not show any
significant difference. In the General Linear Model estimation, only the Beta of Value-KSD
conveyed significance for a positive relationship with causal attribution. These three
mediating variables did not verify the hypotheses, while the most evident intergroup
difference was still hyperlink manipulation. Based on this logic, we find that self-report scales
of Internet browsing and mental information processes may lack validity for Internet
browsing behavior measurement. Accordingly, the authors suggest that the objective record
of browsing behavior such as computer-based monitor of exposure time and click-in behavior

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may be a better measurement to construct mediating variables in framing mechanisms of
hyperlinks.
In conclusion, though the hypotheses were not strongly supported by the experiment
data, it is still theoretically instructive to find evidence that hyperlinks on news websites may
give audiences a complete and integrated depiction of society by linking relevant knowledge
together. Fragmented and amusing frames may be moderated by the Internet (Bennett, 2003).
The negative effect on causal reasoning capacity is cushioned by new media which give
people abundant materials for rational and analytical thinking. Yet, such reconstructing
effects are complicated since cognition is a combination of both environmental stimulus and
brain information processing. Improved understanding of psychological dimensions will
allow better appraisal of the internal dynamics of frame reconstruction by hyperlinks.
Nevertheless, as Lax suggests (2000), cyberspace might not give us a better chance to conduct
democracy, but it can leave us the opportunity to think more rationally about the formation of
democracy.

Appendix

Measurement
(a) Causal attribution (7-point Likert-scale)
Who should shoulder the responsibility for the victims unfortunate experience in the story,
the victim himself or the society? (Use 1~7 to represent the extent of your opinion with 1 for
victim himself while 7 for society.)
(b) Treatment attribution (7-point Likert-scale)
Who should solve the problem of the victim in the story, the victim himself or the society?
(c) Selective scans (7-point Likert-scale)
1. I only read sections that looked important.
2. I skimmed through the story.
(d) Elaboration (7-point Likert-scale)
1. I found myself tying what I read to ideas Ive had before.
2. I tried to visualize the events described in the stories.
3. I tried to relate what I read to my own background experiences.
4. I tried to see the connections between the various stories I read.
5. I thought about how the stories related to other things I know.
6. I tried to mentally piece the stories together like a puzzle to gain a thorough understanding.
7. I found myself making connections between the news stories and information Ive read or
heard about elsewhere.

Notes

1
Blank-check aims to filter the questionnaires with at least one unfilled item. Mistake-check
aims to filter questionnaires with at least one mistaken item (e.g., mark 10 at age item).
2
Official Household Registry is a special demography managing and controlling system in
Mainland China. It is divided into the urban and the village Household Registry. It is not only
the data record of basic demographics, but also includes a persons right to complete social
welfare such as education, housing allowance and medical insurance. If an urban citizen or

133


villager leaves the place where he or she has recorded Household Registry, social welfare
cannot be issued elsewhere, even though the tax has been paid. This system is the obstacle to
social fairness especially for villagers in China.

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136

Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Hivik, Retvik &Yu
Complex Designs: A Case Study on Sino-Norwegian Educational
Cooperation using Digital Media

Helge Hivik, J orun Retvik, Oslo University College,
Shengquan Yu, Beijing Normal University

This chapter contains introductory remarks on core characteristics of the knowledge
economy and the framework this creates for new teaching and learning processes.
The focus is directed at designs, design templates and design patterns. On the general
level, e-learning is described as distributed discourse, and an important aspect of
didactics is considered as the effort to design and engage participants in
communications. Practical examples are provided from a multinational project
spanning Norway, China, Italy and Poland with pupils and students on several
educational levels.

Backdrop: Digital Media in the Knowledge Economy

The historical rationale for large-scale manufacture was tangible but diminishing
marginal costs. Over two centuries this effect gave rise to an industrial economy of mass.
Opposed to this, the current knowledge economy has entire sectors where marginal costs are
infinitesimal. Value that is put into the production process does not translate to or rub off on
the singular end products but resides in the non-tangible aspect as oeuvre and content. This
extends to singular design ideas and the composite of the activities to create new content and
form. It also extends to the production processes as such and the required and renewed (and
mostly digital) tools for their realization. In the words of Harvard economists Baldwin and
Clark, 2005, design is the very means by which knowledge translates to economic and social
goods in the knowledge economy. The development of new designs is itself an object of
investigation and betterment, leading to more generalized design patterns and semi-finished
(or under-designed) templates. They are deployed over a range of design challenges. On the
macro-economic level one may consider this to be an example of economy of scope or the
reusability principle. Briefly stated, societal value in the knowledge economy is a composite
of repositories and representations of symbolic or textual content together with the tools and
structures used for its production, maintenance, retrieval and dissemination. Value is
primarily created as content, concept and design that may or may not embody the realization
of more fluid design or concept patterns. A subset of this is commonly referred to as media,
i.e. both as the container and delivery mechanism for textual content and content itself.
Digitization acts as the new and powerful lever that unifies, increases and remediates the
volume of this intellectual capital, and by this token provides its defining impact in our times
(Bush, 1945; Engelbart, 1962). Together with standardization of interfaces like the high- and
low-voltage electrical grids for power transfer or the international container system for
transfer of physical goods, digitization is a strong driver for globalization and
internationalization. The hub-and-spoke (or center-periphery) type of social organization of
the industrial age transforms into what Simon Phipps calls a meshed world (Moody, 2007),
future shock (Toffler, 1970) or supercomplexity (Barnett, 2000). The latter terms are
indicative of a certain mismatch in which human capital seems to trail the developments of
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intellectual capital. This impacts media oriented institutions like publishing industries,
schools and universities, as well as museums and libraries that deal with cultural duration and
impartment (Altbach, 2002).
E-Learning

On this general backdrop, educational environments actively explore the affordances
provided by new media and the new economic and technological conditions. We consider
formal learning as so many discourses where written and otherwise mediated expressions
circulate between social agents (Blackmore, 1999). Related performances are seen as
engagements within these mediated circles of discourse (see Figure 1) that contain expressive
and impressive (or adaptive) elements. Participants take turns to appropriate symbolic content
produced by others, but they also provide their own input. The latter may consist of mere
reproductions or imitations. The reproduced texts may also be rephrased, augmented and
extended, leading to either simple or extended textual reproduction.

Figure 1: Circle of Discourse
E-learning designs may then be taken as so many efforts to rework, reinvent and expand
upon an established set of media conventions when the mediated circle of discourse has
education and learning as its purpose. We create new reading and writing spaces (Bolter,
1991). With these limitations, we will consider each learning design as one effort at digital
remediation (Bolter & Grusin, 2000). Development of new designs draws upon previous
modes of learning and must to some extent fit within the practices and requirements that
circumscribe and relate to those modes but invents and expands upon them with the
provisions of new media.
The parallelism and similarities of such efforts are yet another recent expression of
globalization and, to some extent, a movement toward monoculturation. A comparative study
of ICT dissemination in Norway and China found, for instance, marked similarities in their
implementation of digital learning environments between two different cultures of higher
learning (Hivik and Cui, 2006). Norway is a small, wealthy, modernized society that
generally shares with Western Europe an insistence on individualism and a pedagogical
tradition with a strong bent towards social constructivism and collectivism. China is a rapidly
modernizing, collectively oriented society that exhibits a new-found insistence on individual
development combined with deep-rooted Confucian learning traditions. Despite these and
several other differences, the study found strong parallel developments between the newly
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established and agile Oslo University College and one heavy-weight of the Chinese academic
sector, Peking University. They are orchestrated by the convergence of how digital texts are
produced, distributed and consumed. Even though each approach was developed locally
and without any direct link between them, the conceptual solutions and their tools for
development and implementation were derived from the same global design space.
The similarity between them did not end with development and implementation
strategies. Even more so, there are similarities in the general outcomes or rather: the lack of
broad results. In both China and Norway, as in most other countries, investments in digital
educational technology have met with less success than anticipated. A certain mismatch
between new technological opportunities and the required social capability is obvious.
An Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report from
2006 based on a set of recent global surveys may serve as an index. The authors point to the
proliferation of networked computational infrastructures, but also to the concurrent lack of
pedagogical uptake when they write that:

Although the multiplication of platforms typically shows the novelty and relative
immaturity of LMS [Learning Management Systems], it might also represent a
wasteful duplication of effort ... and correspond to an over-emphasis on the
technological infrastructure when the real challenge could lie in the innovative and
effective use of the functionalities offered to faculty and students. The pedagogic
impact and institutional take-up of new and prominent open source platforms ...
remain unclear. (OECD, 2006, p. 15)

To rectify this, the report presents broad recommendations like the dissemination of good
practices to stimulate innovation and scale up successful experiments. Staff development on
the individual and collective levels should be supported as well as R&D efforts related to
learning objects and other promising pedagogic innovations. Having worked with educational
innovations in new media for the last three decades, we share this view. The weight should
still lie on the development of good practices from grounded experiments that provide proof
of concept rather than evidence of wide-spread effect. We furthermore subscribe to the
notions of the London-based Kaleidoscope research network when they write that:

Traditionally, formal education has focused more on the transmission of stable
knowledge established by scholars and scientists. But education is now recognizing
the importance of equipping individuals with the capability to produce their own
knowledge to continue to learn from their own experience and interactions with
others. The skills of enquiry, analysis, synthesis, collaboration, knowledge
negotiation, evaluation, communication, are the high level cognitive skills that we all
need as citizens and as a workforce. Technology supports both expert and
practitioner knowledge. It can support the teaching of stable knowledge, as in
tutoring systems, or in computer-supported inquiry-based learning. And
complementing this, a key theme in Kaleidoscope is research that focuses on
supporting the development of practitioner knowledge through interactive and
collaborative online environments in which users can create and negotiate new ideas
or representations of their practice. (Laurillard, 2006, p. 4)
139

In this chapter, we present experiences from one exploratory project toward such
knowledge construction and negotiation. We give a brief overview of the project design on a
more general level before we present two subprojects in more detail.

Versatility

A project is commonly understood as a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique
product or service. But our approach here is more akin to the principles inherent in agile
development (Cockburn, 2001). In relation to the founding manifesto of this approach we
emphasize continuous and incremental product improvement, quick turn-around and
continuous design and design improvement of product, tool and production process. More
importantly, agile development is not a method per se, but more an attitude or general
approach. Agile development is phenomenological rather than structural. Paul Dourish deals
with interface design in this perspective when he writes that:

phenomenology turns our attention to how we encounter the world as
meaningful through our active and engaged participation in it [where] the approach
to interface design allows us to engage with technology in ways that allow us to
uncover, explore and develop the meaning of [its] use as it is incorporated into
practice. (Dourish, 2001, p. 11)

Figure 2 below may illustrate our approach. Within a more general and long-term stream
of events, the three arrows represent the innovative project in the common interpretation of
this term, but on a small scale. Each arrow has some merit, but it is the accumulation of
experiences across these activities that generate new insights and design ideas.

Figure 2: Umbrella Project Model
Each arrow is defined in relation to a particular field of practice and its agents and
agencies. Here we identify the social roles of end user, representative (of the field),
developer, project leader and supervisor. The developer creates e-learning solutions to cater
to end user needs. The project leader, who might wear the hat of developer as well,
coordinates and drives the process of requirement specification, development, implementation
and testing/evaluation. He or she can only do so in close cooperation with the representative
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and the end users of the field. In this way, each subproject represents one singular effort to
develop a context-dependent solution to an e-learning challenge. The time frame for any one
of the subprojects may be a few moths and up to 1-2 years.
Teachers in higher education will recognize this approach as a didactic design for
learning-by-doing. This is precisely how the work has been framed, financed and developed.
The elements infrastructure, toolbox and communication in Figure 2 were established by
us to create and conduct one particular university course. This Masters Degree offering 15
European Credit Points (equal to of an academic year) was conducted in the blended mode
and as the core around which other activities would flow and be initiated. For the subprojects
we had initially identified the areas of arts and crafts as well as health care, but we also left
space for the participants to further refine or redefine this. Individual and groups of
participants were thus invited to expand upon or redefine the topics for the smaller
developmental projects.
Funding came primarily from Norway Opening Universities (NOU) which is a
governmental body with the particular responsibility of promoting e-learning through
experimental work.

Figure 3: Template and Two Implementations - The Dragon Projects

Figure 3 illustrates one core element of the approach where a design pattern is used to build
templates that spawn instantiations. Based on the Fragments general design pattern (Hivik,
2005) we built a template for the Dragon projects. Two copies drawn from this setup were
enhanced and modified by the developer/project leader and the authors for two different, but
related purposes. Both should act as intermediaries or boundary objects for cooperation
between Chinese, Norwegian and Italian school children to display and negotiate their
concept of the dragon as a mythological figure.

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Globalized Infrastructures - Shared Tools

Social computing is a socially and technically complex and multi-modal practice. Of
prime importance is the shared infrastructure which is composed of information and
communication technologies with related protocols, interface conventions and design
patterns. This enables mash-ups where users combine or reuse computational components
into an integrated experience.
Figure 4 shows the common client-server architecture that was used. It consists of a standard
LAMP/WAMP stack with Linux or Windows as the operating system, Apache web server,
PHP (or Python or Perl) programming language and a MySQL database server. The client
side is run through an Internet browser. There is also a dedicated database (in this case the
defunct MySQL-Front) client for maintenance access to the repository.

Figure 4: LAMP / WAMP Stack
WEB 2.0 would not exist without such shared tools and the related shared competencies.
The last point is not the least important. The extensive knowledge distribution through
Internet postings of advice and code has established one new collective persona,- a Friendly
Other. He and she are found by the thousands in China, India, Europe, the U.S. and
elsewhere. Each individual behind this emerging social archetype provides countless others
with advice, code snippets and opinions. They represent one aspect of the deeper sociality in
social computing.
This process of collective learning within on-line communities of practice is evident on
the infrastructure level and as regards particular protocols, programming languages, tools and
the commercial or open-source products. Such resources have served both as direct inputs to
the present work and as the referential or defining ecology for its design. The following
provides a few examples.

Contextually Derived Software Solutions

To serve the particular needs that arose in our work we developed a handful of small-
scale and experimental software solutions. Some are general and classify as infrastructure.
Others were tailor-made for each project. Most of the latter types were dedicated to the two
Dragons projects. As one example of the former we will take a brief look at a collaborative
presentation tool. It supports creation and the use of on-line presentations in multiple
142

languages across the Internet and was developed and used for lecturing purposes in our MA
course.
Figure 5 presents the main interface elements of the player.

Figure 5: Presentation Tool
In the background is shown an instance of the player as it is integrated with other content
in a single browser screen. Another instance is overlaid showing the player only with an
enlarged navigation bar up front. The bar contains simple buttons for moving backward and
forward in a linked list of slides. The radio buttons are marked with the two-letter codes en,
zh, pl, it and no for English, zhng (Chinese), polski, italiano and norsk (Norwegian),
respectively. By selecting the relevant language and pushing the sound icon, a sound file in
MP3 format is played. It is commonly used for oral lectures and comments.
The figure shows two slides. A single lecture consists of arbitrarily many. They are
stored as still images and Flash movies on a WEB server together with several corresponding
MP3 sound tracks. The MySQL database contains one table with name, addressing
information and a description of each slide. An additional table describes the ordered sets that
constitute each slide sequence for a lecture.

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Figure 6: Logical Diagram for the Data Flow for the Presentation Tool

Figure 6 shows the data stream feeding the player (written as a Macromedia Flash
movie). It is embedded in an HTML page and requires one single parameter that identifies
each ordered set that corresponds to a particular lecture. This value is fetched by the player
from the HTML <OBJ ECT>or <EMBED>set of parameters. The player then issues a
database call in PHP syntax to the database with this value as the selection criterion (1 +2).
The selected data are formatted as an XML stream that is read by the player (3 +4) so that
the address for each slide is extracted from an XML child node and the corresponding slide
fetched from the database.

Figure 7: Ordering Lists Stills, Video and Animations for Display Purposes
As an example of the latter we use a function for ordering online animations within the
two Dragons projects. There was here a need to reorder still images, video footage and
short animations for small online exhibitions. Using a mixture of online available scripts and
fresh programming, we made two solutions. The first allows the user to define image
sequences, describe them and select or deselect their contained items as shown in Figure 7.
An additional WYSIWYG (What You See Is What You Get) solution was also built
based on freely available scripts. Using point-and-drag techniques, the user may move images
between positions in a 4 by 4 framework as shown in Figure 8.

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Figure 8: Two-dimensional Drag-and-drop Reordering
Umbrella and Subprojects

In the umbrella model in Figure 2, the provision for entry and exit management
coincided with recruitment and formal exams in the MD course for participating students.
Each individual project was a term assignment where students were required to put into
practice what they had learnt in class and with one essential requirement: Projects should
relate to and be disseminated to real fields of practice and preferably in a manner that would
link these across national and cultural borders as well as between educational levels. The
overall aim of this work was thus not to establish and run MD courses as such, but to explore
design ideas and practices as described in the opening pages of this chapter. A main aim was

..the development of practitioner knowledge through interactive and collaborative
online environments in which users can create and negotiate new ideas or
representations of their practice. (Laurillard, 2006, p. 4)

The undertaking was given funding for this purpose under the formal title Academic
Network Building Through User Development of E-Learning Solutions. Table 1 illustrates
the results of this approach where 6 individual subprojects were developed by a total of 10
developers. As is sometimes the case, not all projects came to fruition. This happened with a
well-conceived effort to create an interactive repository for so-called step sheets which is a
mechanism to provide individualized learning at various steps in Norwegian primary
schools. One way or the other, the remaining five projects were developed and tested. One of
them called Visual Semantics was a solution for collaborative work and comparative analysis
of visual creativity among Norwegian and Polish pupils. Parts of the basic work were
integrated into what turned out to be a successful doctoral dissertation in Poland. One other
(Learning Path) was directed at Norwegian participants in a Bachelor level course in
physiology in nursing as the defining field of practice.
It may seem too nitty-gritty, but a little more of the organizational detail deserves
attention for illustrative purposes: One participant who worked on the three projects Dragons
& Lions, 2006 Best Architecture and Visual semantics did this as part of her doctoral-level
qualification. A Chinese and a Polish participant both MA students joined her on the first
of these, while one Polish student took part in the last. A Norwegian student was formally
assigned one project alone, but received substantial support to shoulder this task.
145

Table 1. Umbrella with Individual Projects
Sub Projects Dragons
of China
&
Norway
Dragons
& Lions
2006 Best
Architecture
Visual
Semantics
Learning
Path
Step
Sheets
Total
#executives 1 3 2 2 2 3 10
Level MD MDPhD MD PhD MDx2 MDx3
Nationality N Ch N P N N N N N
N

Gender F F F F F M M F M
M

#participants 51 152 192 100 40 N/A 535
BA stud N 60 40 100
N 28 21 54 50 153
Ch 23 20 12 55
P 35 50 85
I 51 91 142
N=Norway Ch=China P=Poland I=Italy M=Male F=Female Note:Participant numbers are
estimates based on the earlier and middle stages of each project. They might be different at
the end of the project.

These are practical examples of complexity handling and border crossing, or subsumed
by one single term as versatility. A common framework and design pattern is employed
across several practical and differing implementations. This represents a practical and
small-scale example of economy of scope.
We propose that such versatility should be taken as a candidate characteristic of
successful e-learning. We furthermore relate this to the concept of boundary objects (Star &
Griesemer, 1989). They are physical or cultural artifacts that are shared by different contexts.
By that token they can also act as interfaces between them. A boundary object is handled and
talked about in different ways by different communities. But since they are also shared, they
may serve to expand and integrate two or more cultural contexts. This was precisely how we
defined the initial purpose of our collaborations.
The Sino-Norwegian educational cooperation that we report on here as part of the overall
work was thus primarily aimed at strengthened cooperation using digital media as the
integrating boundary object. In the following we will look closer at the two Dragons
projects that realized this ambition.

In More Detail: The Dragons Projects

The particular subproject we report on here was anchored in the institutional practices of
the partners in our case Beijing Normal University and Oslo University College with
extension to partner schools in Bergamo and Roma in Italy as well as the National Museum of
Art, Design and Architecture in Oslo and the Cultural Center of the Li (Lai) minority in
Whuzhishan in the Hainan Province, China. The choice of dragons as a leitmotif grew out of
146

the previous and unrelated engagements through which we entertained a relationship with this
cultural center in Whuzhishan. Since the dragon image is an engraved concept also in
Norwegian culture, it made a good fit that this center had in its possession an ancient and very
valuable dragon carpet. One impression and one idea begot the next and we ended up with
this as a cultural boundary object.
The work relates to the time-frame 2004-2007 when initiatives were taken and funds
provided in the fall of 2004. Preparatory work and consortium or network building was
conducted through the first half of 2005. The dragon theme was initially identified as
common to all participating countries and taken to be a mutually recognized but also as
diverse lever for interaction and enhanced understanding between participants. We then
became aware that this was not true for Italian partners where folklore is not strong in this
respect. The project was thus extended to cover the image of lions which reestablished
common ground between all four countries.
In each country small groups of pupils were invited and in some cases trained to
describe their concept of dragons (and lions as the case was), exchange these materials
through a software application and in various degrees comment and otherwise
communicate between each other on these contributions. In the project Dragons of Norway
and China this was done along institutional lines so that each group comprised pupils at one
school only. In the parallel Dragons and Lions project the opposite approach was taken with
multinational teams. Each (virtual) group drew members from each of the three countries.
Each team produced and uploaded singular images or videos/animations about their
topic. In the first project the teams generally sent one still image and one animation, while the
pupils in the second sent an average of 15 stills from each group (of which some were
duplicates or false uploads). They also wrote a few words about themselves and their topic
and gave brief feedback to each others presentations. Up to 19 written messages were
recorded for the uploaded material with a preference for the animations that fetched an
average of 7.5 short messages each.

Participation Data

Close to 100 pupils participated in the Dragon projects. They were mostly in their teens
and mostly girls (3 out of 4). One school in China (Beijing) and one in Norway (Oslo)
differed to some extent from this profile in that the pupils there were younger (10-11 years)
and with a greater proportion of boys (2 out of 5).
Between the schools there are also other systematic differences in these populations in
terms of school size, infrastructure, local tradition and history, selection criteria, etc. The
Beijing school was chosen as one with longstanding engagement with computerized learning
as was the case with the Valdres and Oslo schools in Norway. In Sanya the participants were
among the elite students with a good grasp of English. They study at a mixed school based
on tuition and non-tuition contracts for both boarding and non-boarding pupils. Project work
at the three Norwegian schools was handled by two Norwegian MD students assisted by their
advisors. The Chinese part of the project was initiated by us and handled by one Norwegian
and one Chinese MD student respectively. The pupils in two of the Norwegian schools
conducted excursions to study the dragon theme. The first made a modest trip within the
vicinity of their school while the other was invited for a special program at the Norwegian
147

National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design in Oslo, including lectures and exhibitions
of Chinese folk art from Hainan that was paid for by project funds.

Table 2. Participation Norway, Italy and China

Counties & Cities F M T
NORWAY 74 33 107
Valdres 11 2 13
Mysen 13 0 13
Oslo 50 31 81

Italy 20 15 35
Bergamo 20 15 35

CHINA 30 13 43
Beijing 12 9 21
Sanya 18 4 22

Total 124 61 150

More important than these differences on background variables, the methodological
approach to describe and analyze the work was generally ad-hoc and experiential with an
eclectic mix of participatory observation, analysis of online contributions, conversations and
semi-structured interviews. To counteract this lack of formality we conducted a follow-up
survey of the Chinese participants. A similar after-the-fact investigation in Norway proved
unsuccessful. For these and other reasons, the project must be considered exploratory rather
than comparative. But as such it provides some insights and experiences.
The following brief discussion is based on the available empirical material. It consists of
the thesis for the Master Degree by the leader of one of the subprojects that deals with Mysen,
Valdres and Sanya (Bergum, 2007). Added to this is quantitative data available as recorded
on the project website as well as our survey of the Chinese students that we conducted in
Sanya ourselves and with the help of the Chinese MD student in Beijing. This is a brief walk-
through, though, where we look at computerization levels and competencies, the students
objective contributions and their subjective appreciation of this kind of learning process.

148

Computerization

Data on the computerization levels is not available for all participating schools in Norway
and China. We circumvent this by using general statistics in Norway, which to a large extent
is mirrored at the school level, with the factual data extracted from our interviews in China.
The yearly national survey in the Norwegian ITU Monitor shows marked differences in
computer use in primary and secondary schools in that country, but also that the gap is
diminishing (ITU 2007). Teenagers generally use computers on a daily or almost daily basis
while the frequency is less at lower grade levels. ICT is mostly used by Norwegian pupils for
searching the Internet to find information and to integrate this with previous knowledge and
as a tool to produce text and numbers in office productivity applications. Based on the survey
data we find that the pupils in the Beijing school use computers in a similar manner. Their
older counterparts in the south are not as frequent users and less so than the Norwegian pupils
as shown above.

Note: Pupils at the Beijing school are mostly 10 years of age while
those in Sanya are in their teens.
Figure 9: Frequency of Computer Usage
Overall the usage patterns are quite similar between the two countries. The teenagers in
our survey use the Internet to search and browse the Internet as do the Norwegian students.
As could be expected, the younger Beijing pupils use Internet-related functions to a lesser
degree, but are relatively more occupied with locally hosted software like word processing,
drawing programs and games. The latter fact may reflect their character as a computerized
school. In Beijing 4 out of 5 of the youngsters have a home computer while only 1 out of 3
did so in Sanya. Most of these computers (2/3) were without Internet connection. Where
relevant the Sanya pupils did compensate with visits to Internet Cafs, but not so in Beijing.
This may be explained by age differentials or the government-imposed age restrictions on
caf usage.
149

The overall pattern that emerges from Norwegian national statistics and these numbers is
one of similarity. It seems that both countries are now engaged within the same educational
design space. Even though each country and each school or region in the economically
developed parts may show differences, they are generally quite similar with respect to the
general trait of computerization. We may conclude with reasonable safety that it is viable to
conduct online cooperation at most school levels at least in the more affluent institutions
in terms of computer access and general competencies.

Figure 10: Usage patterns by 10-year-olds in Beijing and the teenagers

Pupils Experiences

Between them the pupils produced close to 20 animations with the dragon theme and
uploaded them to the common website. They also wrote close to 90 messages to each other
about their work. Based on conversations and interviews Bergum (p. 96-99) found that the
Norwegian students did enjoy the work and found it stimulating to create and discuss these
animations. But they did not feel that they learnt so much about the topic itself (i.e. the dragon
as a common, but very different mythical creature in the two cultures). This changed
somewhat when the students took part in the event at the Norwegian National Museum.
The Chinese students were likewise asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with
this question: Do you think that this practical project was helpful in your studies?
Compared to the Norwegian pupils, the Chinese pupils felt more strongly that they had
learnt something new about the two cultures through this project.
The Chinese pupils also felt that the mode of working in project groups as they did in
this project was of value and more so in the South.

150


Figure 11: Level of agreement with the statement: Do you
think that this practical project was helpful in your studies?

Figure 12: Level of agreement with the statement: Have
you learnt something about the dragon as cultural object
in other countries?

151


Figure 13: Level of agreement with the statement: This
project taught me something valuable about cooperation
between pupils.
Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter we set out with an emphasis on design, design patterns and new concept
formation as main activities within the knowledge economy. In this framework education is
increasingly about the construction and application of collaborative online environments
where students and pupils access, create and negotiate both old and new concepts and
representations of relevant practices.
We have looked at one example that we describe as a versatile effort in this direction.
This is demonstrated by the complexity of the social and organizational constructs and
relationships that were necessary for its realization. It was by design - not by chance - that this
work thus exemplifies a meshed approach combining students and pupils at several levels
of the educational system (primary school, secondary school, MA and PhD levels) from
different countries (Norway, China, Italy) and institution types (institutions of higher and
lower learning, museums and cultural centers). Most e-learning efforts will not show similar
levels of complexity, but may well approach and in rare cases transcend this limit.
From a scientific point of view, such experiments lend themselves to formal research. But
this may come at the cost of the educational effect. If, on the other hand, we allow a degree of
eclecticism and welcome smaller projects as idea generators and pilot studies, one stands to
gain at all levels. As such, we also consider this work a successful experiment to give new
meaning to the concept of research-based education or rather a reformulation of this ideal:
the integration of education with research and development efforts in a digitized economy.
152


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154

Intercultural Communication Studies VXII: 3 2008 Shen
Alternative Online Chinese Nationalism: Response to the Anti-Japanese
Campaign in China on Hong Kongs Internet

Simon Shen
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

In April 2005, a series of anti-J apanese demonstrations broke out in China. Scholars
such as Liu Shih-diing proposed that these events were a milestone in the
development of Chinas online nationalism. Based on Lius analytical framework,
this paper studies the concurrent and subsequent response of Hong Kongs
cybermen to the anti-J apanese discourse prevalent within the mainland Internet
community from April 2005 to March 2007, analyzes the reasons behind the
differences, and previews a likely pattern of online Chinese nationalism should
political circumstances in Beijing one day more approximate those of present-day
Hong Kong.

In April 2005, a series of anti-J apanese demonstrations broke out in China and South
Korea to protest against J apanese militarism and Tokyos bid for permanent membership of
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Liu Shih-diing published a perceptive article in
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies in November 2006, describing these events as a milestone in the
development of Chinas online nationalism (Liu, 2006). However, is this form of Chinese
nationalism to be found throughout China and/or the Greater China Region? Do the mainland
Chinese Internet users described in Lius article Who we will call cybermen? have a
different nationalist attitude than their compatriots living on Chinas periphery in places such
as Hong Kong? If Lius observation were correct and representative of contemporary Chinese
politics, would it be applicable for an eventually democratized China of the future?
Based on Lius analytical framework, this paper attempts to do the following in three
parts: (a) study the concurrent and subsequent response of Hong Kongs cybermen to the anti-
J apanese discourse prevalent within the mainland Internet community from April 2005 to
March 2007; (b) analyze the reasons behind the differences; and (c) preview a likely pattern
of online Chinese nationalism should political circumstances in Beijing one day more
approximate those of present-day Hong Kong. To parallel major mainland Internet sources
used by Liu, such as the Strong Nation Forum (SNF, Qiangguo Luntan), Internet forums
focusing on political discussion established in Hong Kong will be our primary sources of
reference. Major forums studied include the following:

The Yahoo! Hong Kong Forum (YHKF)
1
: An extension of The Yahoo! Hong Kong,
ranked as the most-visited forum in Hong Kong by Alexa Internets statistics. Yet
political discussion is relatively unheated
2
.
The Hong Kong Discussion Forum (HKDF)
3
: Founded in 2004, claims to have 2
million registered members. It ranks as the second most-visited website in Hong
Kong.
The Uwants Forum (UF)
4
: Founded in 2003, managed by the Uwants Company
155
Limited and consists of 200 thematic forums. It claims to have over 1,200,000
registered members, ranking it as the third most-visited forum in Hong Kong.
The Xocat II Forum (XIIF)
5
: Specializes in discussion relating to social science
subjects in general.
The Hong Kong Golden Forum (HKGF)
6
: Popular among the youth when it relates
to computer hardware and software, generally seen as pro-democratic in Hong Kong.
J apanese Knowledge Forum (J KF/Zhiri Bowu)
7
: A forum supported by The Chinese
University of Hong Kong Student Union, and the students and professors in its
Department of J apanese Studies. It aims to promote J apanese culture in Hong Kong
and to exchange opinions in J apanese culture and politics.
The History Forum KTzone (HFKTZ)
8
: A forum focusing on history.
The Diaoyu Islands Defending Forum (DIDF)
9
: Run by the Action Committee for
Defending the Diaoyu Islands (ACDDI), whose members are mainly activists.
The Leftwing Forum (LF)
10
: A forum established by a local student named Li
Roufou whose position it is to support the legacy of the New Leftists on the
mainland.

Anti-J apanese Nationalism Online:
Comparison between Mainland China and Hong Kong

In 2005, when mainland nationalists launched a series of physical demonstrations against
J apan, crowds also gathered at Victoria Park, Hong Kongs trademark of protest, and
marched to government headquarters. But it was reported that only about 500 people
participated in the protest, a disapproval similar to that shown for the Japanese bid for the
UNSC permanent membership, a rightist version of a J apanese history textbook, J apanese
prime minister Junichiro Koizumis visit to Yasukuni J injya and Tokyos sovereignty claim
over the disputed Diaoyu (Senkoku) Islands, etc. (HK police, 2005). In comparison with the
protest on the mainland, Hong Kong was entirely peaceful and there were no reports of
damage to J apanese supermarkets or cars. As emphasized by one of the organizers, Albert Ho,
vice-chairman of the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (ACDDI), we
shall not shatter glass or overturn cars, but we shall express our deepest sense of anger against
J apan (Anti-Japanese protests, 2005). Unlike other larger-scale demonstrations organized in
Hong Kong in recent years, such as the notable July 1st demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, the
anti-J apanese demonstration in Hong Kong was far more formality-oriented with relatively
little passion shown among the crowd. Similar responses toward anti-J apanese Chinese
nationalism in Hong Kong are also found in the local Internet community, which has never
been as fervent as its mainland counterparts when foreign affairs are the topic of discussion.
The differences between Hong Kong and mainland forums in response to anti-J apanese
nationalism have three well-defined features and are described as follows.

Rational Cynicism Against Mainland Fenqings

To start with, the rationale for anti-J apanese Chinese nationalism was, in principle, shared
by Hong Kong cybermen. However, most Hong Kong cybermen regardless of their
sentiments toward J apan saw themselves as rational critics, but labeled the fervent anti-
156
J apanese mainland nationalists as fenqings (furious teens)
11
. Some users in Hong Kong,
exemplified by the following posted in the JKF, juxtaposed fenqings with disdained J apanese
rightists:

Fenqings and J apanese rightists are basically the same: nationalist, and subjective.
They share the same mentality, except in different positions The kind of people
who are unable to think are the same in any place, arent they? (Message ID351,
2005)

The appearance of this sort of argument in Hong Kong forums was significantly more
frequent than on the mainland. From the logic they demonstrated, many Hong Kong
cybermen identify themselves as Chinese nationalists and in registering mild protests against
the J apanese cannot be simply described as pro-Western liberals. But at the same time, they
were desperate to exhibit their disapproval of extreme anti-J apanese behavior in China. As
one suggested in the HKGF, Hong Kong patriots were not coming from the SNF, whose
cybermen are all but fenqings (Message ID894554, 2007).
Such cynicism ran parallel with rationality in the Hong Kong cyberworld. Many
messages in the SNF and other mainland forums were not only expressional but also
functional, as they served the purpose of mobilizing participants to join the anti-J apanese
demonstration or signature campaign. For instance, messages similar to the following were
repeatedly found in the SNF:

Kofi Annan has already pledged his support to the J apanese application for UNSC
Permanent Membership. I am inviting my fellow countrymen to sign our names to
express our opposition online. For those who do not want to sign, please forward
this to your friends. (Message ID4210, 2006)

In fact, the entire anti-J apanese demonstration in Shenzhen and Beijing was cyber-
rooted (Chinas cyber-warriors, 2005). This mode of online mobilization is by no means
unfamiliar to Hong Kong cybermen, whose contribution in mobilizing participants for the
J uly 1 demonstrations from 2005 to 2007 is well noted. Even on and before 1 J uly 2007, when
the demonstration had waned considerably in Hong Kong compared with that of 2005,
various messages were still posted mobilizing fellow users to join the protest (Message
ID976441, 2007). However, there was almost no effort made in the Hong Kong cyberworld to
mobilize other users to join the anti-J apanese demonstration, suggesting most Hong Kong
cybermen were disinclined to organize massive nationalist movements themselves. Instead, a
cool rational calculation of the effectiveness of any anti-J apanese movement was commonly
found. Even non-violent and politically correct movements organized by fellow Hong Kong
citizens, such as those aimed at signalling Chinese sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, were
dismissed as representing extreme nationalism. A representative use of this calm and
rational approach is seen in a posting titled fenqings are as pitiful as J apanese youngsters:

The protestors for the Diaoyu Islands from Hong Kong and Taiwan are patriotic.
However, have they ever thought about the effectiveness of such protests? Screaming
and shouting cannot force the J apanese government to relinquish their claim over the
157
Diaoyu Islands. Theyd better think of more practical means. Nationalism is not
extremism! (Message ID4353112, 2007)

Understanding of the J apanese Arguments

Another feature of the Hong Kong cyberworlds response to anti-J apanese Chinese
nationalism that was largely absent on the mainland was the high degree of understanding of
the J apanese arguments, no matter whether the arguments were being endorsed or not. For
instance, Koizumis visit to Yasukuni J injya, which received constant criticism from Chinese
leaders like Premier Wen J iabao
12
, as well as mainland cybermen, went almost unnoticed by
the Hong Kong cyberworld (Wen J iabao, 2007). In the SNF, most cybermen strongly
disagreed with categorizing the Yasukuni J injya issue as a religious issue, and regarded the
worship as a cult owing to the presence of souls of Class A war criminals like Hideki Tojo
(Message ID613611, 2006). Yet many Hong Kong cybermen who expressed a slight degree of
anti-J apanese sentiment found the visit to be a normal activity of the J apanese, and chose to
dismiss its political implications:

I am not speaking on behalf of the J apanese. But actually, paying respect to war
heroes souls is understandable. Whether they are top-level war criminals is not a
problem. The only problem is the social status of the visitor, Koizumi. If Koizumi is
an ordinary citizen, then everyone would accept it, right? If so, why bother?
(Message ID703472, 2006)

In addition, some cybermen in Hong Kong seemed to be able to gather information
released by the J apanese. For instance, a user of the HFKTZ simply treated those being
worshipped in Yasukuni J injya as martyrs:

Besides the eleven top-ranking war criminals from WWII, Yasukuni J injya hosts
many heroes and martyrs from the founding stages of modern J apan. Koizumis visit
may not represent his agreement with the war criminals. It may only represent his
respect for the founding heroes of J apan. (Message ID703472, 2006)

Another typical example showing Hong Kong cybermens general understanding of the
J apanese argument and subsequently their distance from the mainland Chinese took place
on 23 J une 2006. On that day, two Chinese men reportedly attempted to attack a J apanese
policeman in Tokyo, resulting in the death of one and the arrest of the other. In response,
Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked for a full investigative report, and mainland forums
were again crowded with anti-J apanese messages. In contrast, most Hong Kong cybermen
saw this as a minor issue that deserved no official diplomatic response. Quite a number of
cybermen, such as the author of the following post on the JKF, even accused Beijing of
stirring up trouble, as if it was only a local incident involving no foreigners:

Can such minor stuff be regarded as a Sino-J apanese diplomatic issue? The Chinese
government is just so tense. Why doesnt it simply attempt to govern the Chinese
mobs in J apan? (Message ID69, 2007)
158

In a similar vein, many Hong Kong cybermen wish to be thought of as experts on J apan:
even the pro-Beijing LF feature many rational analyses such as the following:

Abe Shinzo may repeat the deeds of Junichiro Koizumi to gain more support from
the extreme rightists. Strangely, although there are few extreme rightists in J apan,
their influence in the economic and political arenas is not small. We are just not sure
whether the J apanese seniors in the politics and business sectors have strong passions
for the rightist thoughts or not. (Message ID8457, 2007)

Localization vs. Nationalization: Absence of Criticism toward Beijing,
Abundance of References Made to Hong Kong

Although mainland forums are still heavily censored, according to Lius study, some
extreme anti-Japanese opinions had gone far beyond the official line (Liu, 2006). For instance,
the online critics Zaopao.com compared the PRC regime directly with the weak late Qing
dynasty:

Now we are in a critical moment. We hope Beijing is not imitating the government of
the late Qing dynasty. Weakness would encourage the arrogance of our enemy. We
are unhappy to witness a successful China being as weak as the late Qing in handling
Sino-J apanese relations. (Message ID903, Zaopao, 2007 J uly 9)

This post is cross-referenced in many mainland forums, such as the China918 Forum,
which was later renamed the Patriotic Alliance Website (Wang, 2007). Since anti-J apanese
protests in China were nominally illegal, some 40 protestors were arrested by the police.
(Shanghai arrested, 2007) Not unexpectedly, the arrests were heavily condemned by mainland
cybermen. Following that, on 22 April 2005, three mainland discussion forums hosted by the
Chinese Federation of the Diaoyu Islands Defenders , China918 and Guangdong918, were
shut down by the government (Some anti-J apanese, 2005).
Indeed, it is not uncommon for Chinese nationalists to criticize their government by
speaking in a patriotic tone. Dating back to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing in 1999, many
online messages on the mainland have explicitly targeted the regime for its weak response
toward the U.S. (Sang, 1999). Similar criticism of Beijings J apan policy after 2005 has
indeed helped channel anti-government sentiments as well (Message ID113817, 2006). In
contrast, Hong Kong cybermen who are usually more critical of Beijing than their mainland
colleagues expressed far less criticism of Beijings J apan policy and took no advantage of
the situation to advance their criticism of the central government, not even the like-minded
Hong Kong new leftists on the LF (Message ID8507, 2007). The focus of nationalists in Hong
Kong who had shown anger toward J apan in local forums was rarely directed at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, perhaps partly owing to the one country, two systems principle, which
allowed no diplomatic and national defensive issues to be handled in Hong Kong. Lacking an
inclination to take part in national diplomacy, Hong Kong citizens criticized Beijings official
foreign policy, not unsurprisingly, somewhat mutedly.
One of the only exceptions to this in Hong Kong in recent years was found in an article
159
that questioned Beijings concessive attitude to Russian territorial claims. This was titled
When the Kuril Islands Become Sakhalin Islands, which was published in the mainstream
media platform Apple Daily as well as on the author Lin J is Internet blog diary (Lin, 2007).
Yet, the article received little attention from either the press or from the Internet, in sharp
contrast to the online movies and commentary articles on local politics produced by the same
author. He has a record of receiving tens of thousands of hits for one of his entries ridiculing
the Hong Kong governments celebration of its tenth anniversary (Message ID8507, 2007).
More importantly, the focus of the article criticizing Hong Kong Observatory for its use of
the Russian name still targeted the HKSARG only, instead of Beijing.
As a mark of difference, it is unlikely that mainland cybermen would link Sino-J apanese
relations to provincial politics in Guangdong or Shanghai. Yet when Hong Kong cybermen
attempted to distance themselves from the anti-J apanese fenqings on the mainland, instead of
commenting further on Chinese politics or Chinese diplomacy, they were more inclined to use
the differences to talk about local politics in Hong Kong. In particular, many Hong Kong
cybermen made reference to the official promotion of patriotic education as an attempt at
decolonization of the Special Administration Region (SAR): the increasingly intensive anti-
J apanese sentiment mobilized in Hong Kong is mainly owing to patriotic education promoted
after the handover in 1997 (Message ID8, 2006). In the radically pro-democratic HKGF,
many cybermen tied the anti-J apanese demonstration in China to the growing anti-J apanese
sentiments featured in Hong Kongs history syllabus:

Questions in the history examination for college entrance only emphasize facts.
Students trained in this system would focus on J apanese war crimes of the past,
rather than Sino-J apanese cooperation of the future. National humiliation in the past
should not be forgotten, of course, but we need to face the future. (Message
ID978601, 2007)

Limitations of Collection Sources

Before explaining the differences found between mainland and Hong Kong Chinese
cybermens responses to anti-J apanese nationalism since 2005, we need to acknowledge the
limitations of the collection sources for this article. First, theoretically, is the establishment of
the Internet aimed at promoting the free flow of information without geographical boundaries.
We can only distinguish mainland and Hong Kong forums by two features: their different
domain names and the different modes of Chinese used. In the Internet community, there are
two major Chinese-character input systems: Traditional Chinese (coded in Big5) used in
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and Simplified Chinese (coded in GB2312) used on the mainland.
However, it is possible for Hong Kong cybermen to post messages on mainland forums by
using Simplified Chinese, and the other way around. The HKLF, for example, is famous for
the presence of mainland-originated members. It is technically impossible to completely
separate the forums from one another, even though a differentiation between the two regions
is obvious at present.
Second, on the mainland, the Partys Propaganda Department (PPD) is responsible for
containing anti-J apanese demonstrations, both physical and virtual, to a controllable level (Xu,
2005; Liu, 2005). On 17 April 2005, the J iefang Daily propagandized the importance of
160
preserving stability, calling protesters to act calmly and reasonably (lengjing lizhi)
(Shanghai government, 2005). Two days later, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told the PPD
that the masses must believe in the Party and the governments ability to properly handle
all issues relating to Sino-J apanese relations (Foreign Minister, 2005). In response to Lis
instructions, the PPD issued new guidelines for websites and media, resulting in the
disappearance of most incendiary articles about J apan from mainstream online forums,
effectively banning the latter. In contrast, online censorship basically does not exist in Hong
Kong. It might, therefore, be logical to assume there is an even greater contrast between the
two online environments while censorship is lifted from the mainland one day.
Lastly, owing to the fact that Sino-J apanese relations have not become a very hot topic
among the Hong Kong Internet community, we have to reference ten different forums to
remap the mosaics. For instance, anti-J apanese nationalism has never been given focus in the
Independent Media Hong Kong (Xianggang Duli Meiti), a left-wing interactive forum in
Hong Kong famous for its tendency to mobilize Internet users to participate in local political
issues (The Independent Media Hong Kong, 2007). In addition, it is possible for some Hong
Kong cybermen to mention the topic in passing, perhaps as part of their discussion on pop
culture, but their comments are nonetheless recorded by our research. In other words, while
anti-J apanese sentiment on the mainland would likely be more powerful if censorship was
lifted, it may already be overstated in Hong Kong.

Interpreting the Differences

In the Journal of Contemporary China, Yang Guobin once argued that with the
popularization of Internet usage on the mainland, anti-J apanese ideology was likely to spread
fast and wide. This would both mobilize the mainland public to become engaged in additional
activities and also muster an anti-J apanese public across the border (Yang, 2003). While
Yangs former prophecy is probably correct, the latter is yet to happen in Hong Kong. There
may be three major reasons for the different responses to anti-J apanese nationalism seen in
the mainland and Hong Kong forums discussed above. The first two relate to anti-J apanese
nationalism in Hong Kong in general, and the third more central to the argument of this
article is about the relationship between anti-J apanese nationalism and its online format in
particular. These explanations are important to China in the sense that they may provide a
reference point for ascertaining anti-J apanese nationalism in China should full democracy
ever be granted to the country, which will be discussed in the conclusion.

Reaction toward Patriotic Education after the Handover

As expected, Chinese nationalism was never encouraged during Hong Kongs colonial
period. National education in Hong Kong at that time featured a de-politicized curriculum,
talking about Chinese culture and history only from the Anglo-centric approach (Luk, 1991;
Sweeting, 1996). Hong Kong citizens were, however, also discouraged from full integration
with London. As a result, local identity in Hong Kong has only recently gradually developed,
particularly since the 1970s (Lui, 2002). After 1997, former Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa
explicitly voiced his concerns about an identity confusion in respect to regional and national
contexts and suggested promoting national education (guomin jiaoyu) in Hong Kong. The
161
Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education (CPCE) of the Home Affairs Bureau (HAB)
is responsible for promoting national education in the SAR via a soft approach such as
television programs and advertisements (RoadShow Civic Education Series, 2006). In 2004,
the CPCE and the Commission on Youth jointly set up the Working Group on National
Education (NEWG) to formulate strategies and plans to promote national education to the
general public. The Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB) is responsible for designing a
new curriculum for students. For instance, the topic of national identity and Chinese culture
has been added to the subject of general studies. As questioned by the HKGF user
introduced in the last section, the new design of the history syllabus expects students to
merely remember hard facts, which could end up increasing anti-J apanese sentiment among
the next generation.
However, anti-J apanese nationalism was yet to be propagandized by the new education
system for a series of reasons. First, unlike the mainland history curriculum, that of Hong
Kong focused on British colonial rule more than the J apanese invasion of China, making anti-
J apanese nationalism a less notable theme from the start. As one person said in the XIIF, the
tragedy perpetrated by the J apanese on the Chinese will not be easily acknowledged by the
new generation of Hong Kong (Message ID167892, 2006). Second, according to a research
survey, many frontline teachers educated in the colonial curriculum were strongly hesitant
about promoting patriotism in schools. Conscious of avoiding brainwashing the new
generation, they taught national education in a way that usually resulted in discouraging
students to react to Chinas modern history nationalistically (12% of schools, 2007). Third,
despite the dual nationalist and democratic identity possessed by many local politicians, as
previously discussed, national education interpreted as a top-down attempt by the central
government to indirectly influence Hong Kong had been a target of attack by pro-
democratic politicians:

Without doubt, the people promoting national education aim at assimilating our next
generation into agreeing with the political values of the mainland. The national
educator believes that assimilation would bring harmony to Hong Kong, eliminate
opposition parties and dismiss anti-PRC sentiments. Yet, should that happen, Hong
Kong will no longer uphold one country, two systems as its administrative
principle. One country, one system will be the case. (Wong, 2006)

This partly explains why anti-J apanese democratic politicians failed to produce a large
pool of anti-J apanese young people among their supporters. Lastly, some attempts to promote
national education, such as a short advertisement clip called Our Home, Our Country which
uses the Chinese national anthem The March of the Volunteers as theme music, were
considered old-fashioned, causing some youngsters to label anti-J apanese sentiment and
patriotism unstylish. For instance, several online messages commented that the short
advertisement was hard to put up with (Message ID756019, 2006).

162
The Role of J apanese Culture in the Hong Kong Identity

While mainland Chinese remain rather resistant to J apanese culture (and are interestingly
more receptive to Korean idols), J apanese culture in Hong Kong has since the 1970s, with
increasing financial transactions and trade taking place between Hong Kong and J apan (as
represented by the influx of J apanese movies, idols, music, video games and all kinds of
trendy utilities), been well merged into the local scene
13
. More importantly, this process
overlapped the stage in the 1970s and 1980s when local people were developing their sense of
a Hong Kong identity. Even the Hong Kong activists who initiated a social movement against
J apans sovereign claim to the Diaoyu Islands in the 1970s were heavily influenced by the
influx of J apanese culture at the time. As a result, Chinese nationalists in Hong Kong have
always taken a more rational stance toward J apan, as their innate emotions about J apanese
culture were completely different from those found on the mainland. It is thus very difficult
for people in Hong Kong to entertain boycotting J apanese products, both practically and
emotionally, in the way mainland cybermen have proposed. The psychological complexity of
the Hong Kong Chinese can be observed from messages such as the following:

Do you know the J apanese constitution? How much do you know about J apan? You
know nothing about J apan, but you are now initiating an anti-J apanese protest. I am
against your behavior and see it as a silly and ignorant decision. Could you please
understand more about J apan before getting furious about her?! (Message ID8, 2006)

The importance of the above message, which was aimed at mainland cybermen initiating
anti-J apanese protests, is its subtle reference to the fact that one of the themes of Hong Kongs
local culture was to complain about the mainlands ignorance, or misunderstanding, of their
compatriots in Hong Kong. The post implied that while there was a lack of understanding
among mainland cybermen on J apan, from Hong Kongs perspective, a similar
misunderstanding among the same people could also be applied to Hong Kong.
When the cultural aspect is taken into consideration, the stereotypical image of mainland
anti-J apanese fenqings in Hong Kong becomes even more destructive. It can best be seen
from the controversies aroused by mainland Chinese actresses Zhao Wei and Zhang Ziyi.
Zhao positioning herself alongside the J apanese military flag as a fashion statement sparked a
massive Internet protest, which ended up with a nationalist physically assaulting her at a
concert (ZhaoWei, 2001). Likewise, Zhang was seriously criticized by mainland cybermen as
a hanjian (traitor to the Han ethnicity) because of her leading role in the movie Memoirs of
a Geisha; geishas are mistakenly seen as low-ranking J apanese prostitutes in China. Zhang
was asked to give up her Chinese citizenship, or to verify her loyalty to China by
committing suicide (Zhang Ziyi, 2006). Therefore, when more serious anti-J apanese
demonstrations are launched on the mainland, Hong Kong cybermen tend to make immediate
reference to these two widely circulated examples which represent the parochial judgment and
misunderstanding of mainland Chinese about external cultures, and resort to self-restraint
against actively echoing their mainland fellows views. For instance, when the anti-Zhang
online movement became the finale to the anti-J apanese movement in 2005, most Hong Kong
cybermen commented on it negatively, calling it blind nationalism, and found it totally
unacceptable. This was because the so-called wrongdoings of Zhao and Zhang were
163
considered quite permissible by Hong Kongs mainstream society:

Have you ever seen Memoirs of a Geisha? I have. The movie talks about J apanese
society in the Warring period, and describes humanitarianism in detail. I dont think
it is promoting any feudalist thoughts. Zhang is starring in a real society and
representing the lower-class It is only a social history movie; has it promoted any
ideology? I cannot understand the reasons stated by the mainland extreme leftists
against this film. (Message ID4991, 2006)

Multiple Identities of Anti-J apanese Organizations in a Free Society

A number of non-governmental organizations have been set up in Hong Kong whose
aims are to demand compensation from Tokyo for the Japanese occupation of the territory
from 1941 to 1945. There are also now anti-J apanese organizations developing on these
grounds. The Hong Kong Reparation Association (HKRA) founded by pro-Beijing activists is
a typical example. (Hong Kong Reparation Association Website, 2007) It has, however, close
ties with its maternal political organizations. Notably, the HKRA frequently co-organizes anti-
J apanese protests with the pro-Beijing political party the Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), which was proudly included in their websites front page.
They tend to promote anti-J apanese nationalism to the public in Hong Kong only for their
own political interests; their identities rest on their political stance, not their anti-J apanese
take.
Another prominent anti-J apanese organization is the Action Committee for Defending the
Diaoyu Islands (ACDDI) (Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands Website,
2007); the ACDDI can be considered the HKRA from the other side of Hong Kongs political
spectrum. When many HKRA members were seen as having dual membership with the DAB,
the ACDDI was set up by pro-democratic politicians, many of whom belonged to the
Democratic Party (DP), or the more radical League of Social Democrats (LSD)
14
. For
example, Albert Ho Chun-yan, vice-president of the ACDDI, is currently the secretary-general
of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China as well as
the chairman of the Democratic Party (Hong Kong). Chan King-sing, an active member of the
ACDDI who went to the Diaoyu Islands in October 2006, is the convener of a tiny political
party called the Saving Force of Democratic Hong Kong (Minzhu J iugang Liliang), mainly
formed by exiled democrats from the mainland, and a committee member of the radical
democratic party, LSD. When it comes to nationalist issues, mainstream pro-democratic
politicians in Hong Kong indeed never go beyond Beijings line. However, to the public, the
anti-J apanese gestures of the ACDDI and its members are more like part of their social
activist movements than anything else. Since organizing social movements is a major way for
the democrats to gain social influence and challenge the establishment in Hong Kong,
ironically, the anti-J apanese stance assumed by Hong Kong democrats is often taken at merely
face value by the public.
In his paper, Liu repeatedly stresses the bottom-up, autonomous network struggle as
being the trademark nature of his coined online Chinese nationalism. However, as previously
indicated, such a bottom-up network was formed not only against Tokyo but also against
Beijing as a euphemist way to advance Chinese rights to discuss official censorship. In
164
Hong Kong, where freedom of expression still exists, there is no need for politicians and
cybermen to overuse anti-J apanese discourse for their own political purposes, or for the sake
of activating civil society. Since Sino-J apanese relations have been viewed by the general
public in Hong Kong as one of the many calculations used by politicians from all sides for
gathering their own political momentum, those opting for an independent and autonomous
civil discussion online have simply tended to avoid joining the anti-J apanese debate, no
matter their personal views.. And those interested in politics would simply be attracted by the
more prominent policies, without need to speak out indirectly via an authorized nationalist
tone. To a certain extent, the anti-J apanese politicians are already alienated from the public in
Hong Kong and only manage to absorb new members from their other political identities and
affiliations. The relatively aloof response of the Hong Kong cyberworld toward Sino-J apanese
relations, contrasted with the concurrent hot debates on other local political topics online in
Hong Kong and the heated discussions on Japan in mainland forums, is simply an extension
of the above.

Conclusion: Previewing Chinese Online Nationalism after Democracy

To summarize, we found the response of Hong Kong cybermen to anti-J apanese
nationalism differed from that of their mainland counterparts in four ways. There was a
general display of rational cynicism toward the labelled mainland fenqings; more
understanding was expressed of the J apanese point of view; there was a relative absence of
criticism of Beijings official J apan policy; and more references were made to local politics in
Hong Kong. These differences might be explained by the reaction in Hong Kong toward
patriotic education promoted after the handover and the role played by J apanese culture in the
Hong Kong identity. Yet, more importantly, anti-J apanese sentiments in Hong Kong are also
diluted by the multiple identities of anti-J apanese organizations, whose members having
stronger identities in other political fronts in a free society find it unattractive to exploit the
anti-J apanese debate to voice their other opinions. The remaining question is: Would the same
situation be observed in mainland China should freedom of speech and press one day mirror
Hong Kong?
We have stated earlier that if online censorship were to be lifted in China solely on
nationalism, fiercer anti-J apanese sentiments might be witnessed. However, if censorship
were lifted for all topics in China, the answer is likely to be different. As a matter of fact, the
current political structure in China makes the nationalist discourse one of the only platforms
for ordinary citizens to use in order to apply the strategy of kicking the ball from the side
(chabianqiu) if they wish to promote their freedom, interests and identity. They, indeed, have
no or little intention of pressing the party-state to act on their expressions. The subtlety of this
has not gone entirely unnoticed. Liu Shih-diing also remarks that the ordinary citizens in
China are developing their own form of nationalism (renmin minzuzhuyi) an autonomous
political domain that is independent of the state nationalism (Liu, 2006). Ordinary people
have no other option but to use the online forum. This freely accessible network provides an
outlet for the public to discuss Chinese politics. By using extreme wording or postings,
activists can garner public attention and package the political message in terms of nationalism,
which seems to stand for the state. Once the new generation of Chinese had been equipped
with the art of using split identity in the nationalist discourse, this became their platform for
165
carrying out public discursive rights. Christopher Hughes analyzed the discourse of various
identified Chinese nationalists and found that most of them were either not particularly
interested in nationalism or [were] highly skeptical concerning its possibilities for solving the
problems faced by the Chinese state (Hughes, 2005). Considering the fact that public
discursive rights have generally been lacking in the Peoples Republic since its establishment,
mainland cybermen have achieved much from taking part in the nationalist discourse.
Yet, should full democracy and civil rights be granted in China, online users would no
longer need to use nationalist discourse to speak for their intrinsic values and basic rights of
expression. At such a time, no matter whether Beijing opts for a stronger J apan policy or not,
at least within the online community fervent anti-J apanese sentiment is likely to be toned
down significantly. This may not happen to as unresponsive a degree as observed in the Hong
Kong Internet forums today, but the extravagant atmosphere described in Lius article is also
unlikely to recur.

Notes

1
The Yahoo! Hong Kong Forum Yahoo! hk.message.yahoo.com; accessed on 15
December 2006).
2
Alexa rankings for discuss.com.hk (alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details, accessed on 12
J uly 2007). Same for the quoted rankings of other forums in the following section.
3
The Hong Kong Discussion Forum (www.discuss.com.hk, accessed on 15
December 2006).
4
The Uwants Forum (forum.uwants.com, accessed on 15 December 2006).
5
The Xocat II Forum XocatII (forum.timway.com, accessed on 15 December 2006).
6
The Hong Kong Golden Forum (forum.hkgolden.com/default.asp,
accessed on 15 December 2007).
7
The J apanese Knowledge Forum (www.cuhkacs.org/~benng/Bo-
Blog/index.php?go=category_18, accessed on 15 December 2006).
8
The History Forum KTzone KTzone
(www.ktzhk.com/forumdisplay.php?fid=77&sid=K45nL, accessed on 15 December 2006).
9
The Diaoyu Islands Defending Forum (forum.diaoyuislands.org, accessed on
20 February 2007).
10
The Leftwing Forum (http://leftwing.hk-dn.com/bbs/index.php, accessed on
20 August 2007).
11
In Cantonese, the character fen can be pronounced to mean human waste.
12
On 3 April 2007, Wen again commented that the issue was something deeply hurtful to
Chinese emotions and demanded the J apanese stop visiting the shrine.
13
J apan is Hong Kongs third largest trading partner after mainland China and the U.S., and
Hong Kong is J apans ninth largest trading partner. Bilateral trade in 2006 totaled 4.41 trillion
yen, with J apans exports accounting for 4.24 trillion yen and its imports for 177 billion yen.
166
14
Interestingly, members of the Civic Party, a new pro-democratic party in Hong Kong
gaining increasing popularity, are trying to deviate further from the nationalist line and avoid
declaring high-profile stances in Sino-J apanese relations.

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168
Intercultural Communication Studies XVII: 3 2008 Vaagan & Wang

Robert Vaagan Yu Wang
Oslo University College Communication University of China

The paper identifies key determinants for government media policy formulation in
China and Norway regarding the shift to digital television (DTV) taking place in
many countries. Drawing mainly on documentary analysis of key policy documents,
the paper finds that d
1
espite obvious differences between the two countries, Chinese
and Norwegian authorities face broadly similar challenges with respect to DTV: a
need to weigh public interest, state broadcasting services and, ultimately, political
control against commercial market pressure, viewership preferences, and
affordability.

Compared to other media, television has, since the 1950s-60s, come to play a dominant
role in many countries as a means of mass communication and entertainment; global
television has become an important aspect of globalization (Cottle, 2003; Langer, 2003;
Bignell, 2004). DTV is widely seen as a major paradigm shift in television history. The U.S.
Federal Communications Commission states that DTV will transform your television
viewing experience (FCC, 2007). Many developments technological, commercial, political
and cultural are converging as the analog switch-off and digital roll-out take place globally
(Carlsson, 2006; Harrie, 2006; Iosifides, 2006; Leiva, Starks & Tambini, 2006; Wang, 2005;
Zhou, 2007). The second media age involves media convergence and the blending of
traditional broadcasting with interactive networking (Bolin, 2005; Holmes, 2005). Although
digitization is technology-driven and global, including programs and formats, it is important
to realize that television content remains largely local (Bignell, 2004). At the same time,
emerging interactive networking technologies (e.g. EPG and e-commerce through TV) seem
to confirm the validity of narrowcasting (i.e. individual preferences of the viewer-consumer
become decisive criteria for business development) (Hirst & Harrison, 2007). The public
sphere model is vying with the business model as public broadcasters limited to license
fees, struggle to compete with the marketing and advertisement-driven commercial
broadcasting of big business media conglomerates (Carlsson, 2006; Croteau & Hoynes, 2006).
All these developments converge in DTV.

Theory, Methodology and Research Focus

While China and Norway are both rich countries by many standards, their differences are
obvious not least in terms of demographics, geography, politics and culture. Yet these factors
also make them interesting to compare, regarding media digitization. For instance, their
governments have chosen different DTV platforms. In China, where DTTV has never been a
real option, policy makers have opted for cable TV as the main platform for DTV
development. Analog switch-off and digital roll-out is planned region-by-region over a 10-
year-period: 2005-2015. Despite enormous economic growth over the last decade, there is
uncertainty about the willingness of Chinese viewers long accustomed to free television
169
services from the national broadcaster CCTV, to adapt to a new environment of pay-TV which
DTV ushers in. At the same time, the main policy goal of the ruling Communist Party is the
development of a harmonious society (Hu, 2005). Policy makers are therefore attempting to
find a business model that will prove attractive to developers and viewers alike and at the
same time allow Chinese authorities retention of political control. In Norway, switchover will
take place region-by-region from 2007-2010. European public broadcasters are promoting
DTTV (Aslama & Syvertsen, 2006), but Norwegians are questioning whether their
governments longstanding advocacy of DTTV is viable in the face of commercial DTV
competition based on satellite, cable or IPTV transmissions.
Several theories and methodologies are relevant in a comparative article like ours. The
choice of theory and methodology depends on the focus of analysis, typically either audiences,
institutions or texts (Bruhn, 2002; Holmes, 2005; Williams, 2003). Here we are mostly
concerned with the formulation of government DTV policies in two quite different countries.
Syvertsen (2004) in her study of Norwegian media policy distinguishes between analysis of
policy content and consequences (normative theory, policy goals, and policy consequences)
and descriptive studies of policy formulation (stakeholders and structure). In this brief paper
which is a first draft of a larger research project, we have chosen to limit the discussion to a
description of policy formulation focussed on stakeholders and structures. This research focus
will be developed in later works with comparative analysis of key institutions and audiences,
drawing on appropriate theories and methodologies.

China

Development of DTV Policy

Digitization is making considerable impact on the broadcasting industry, on individual
families and on society as a whole. All governments attach great importance to digitization
and formulate policies and plans, reflecting active encouragement of digitization. Many
countries have made a timetable for digital switchover and analog switch-off.
Depending on the differentiation of the transmission signals of the television, digital
television consists of three types terrestrial DTV, cable DTV and satellite DTV. The
development of these three types of digital TV is also a factor any government will take into
consideration in establishing a policy for the digital TV industry. As it is conceived by the
European Commission (EU, 2005), the term switch-off refers to the termination of terrestrial
transmission of analog television; switchover refers to the transition from analog to digital
broadcasting of all networks, including terrestrial, cable, satellite and DSL (digital subscribe
lines).
In China, the State Council has prioritized broadcasting digitization since 2004. The State
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT ), which is the authority over the radio,
TV and film industries in China and a main stakeholder, has established a policy for digital
TV regulation in the form of a series of rules and regulations in recent years. (SARFT, 2000-
2005). Thus in 2004, SARFT estimated in the 10
th
five-year plan of radio, film and TV
technology and plan of 2010 prospect that digital television users will exceed 30 million
households in 2005, that digital broadcasting will be fully applied in 2010, and that analog
switch-off will be achieved by 2015 (SARFT, 2004b). In terms of China, digital television
170
policy refers to the digital television policy in mainland China, excluding Taiwan, the Hong
Kong Special Administration Region and the Macao Special Administration Region. The
Cable TV Corporation of Hong Kong SAR closed the simulating signal on June 10th in 2004
and all network users shifted to digital TV. Digital ground broadcasting opened in 2004 in
Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Economic Plan and Development Committee, the current
frequency channel of simulating ground TV will be cancelled by 2010 and digital TV
broadcasting will be applied fully.

DTV Policy of SARFT

Chinese digital television policy took shape from the mid-1990s. SARFT began to do
some research of digital television policy from 1996. In theTransition plan of the digitization
of satellite broadcasting (SARFT, 2000), SARFT made it clear that the promotion of digital
television begins with cable DTV. In November 2001, SARFT approved that cable DTV will
be a pilot commercial operation in the first 13 cities nationwide. That number had grown to
49 at the end of 2006.
On J anuary 17, 2003, SARFT issued a Work outline of the radio, film, TV in 2003, in
which it was stated clearly that the focus is to establish the new system of the cable DTV, to
construct four platforms, to promote the transformation of the broadband, optical-cable and
bi-direction in the cable DTV, to clarify the key technology on the user regulation system,
electrical program guide information and the set-top-box (SARFT, 2003a).
In May 2003, SARFT promulgated a Transition Time Schedule of the Cable TV
Digitalization in China (SARFT, 2003b). This document defined the strategy of Chinas
digital switchover beginning with Cable TV. A plan was advanced to fulfill the transition
period of cable TV digitalization region-by-region. The digitization in the East, Central and
West regions will be conducted in four stages in the years 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2015
gradually, then realizing the digitization of the cable TV in full scale.
In the first stage from 2003 to 2005, cable digitization will be fulfilled in the
municipalities directly under the central government, the cities at higher levels of the
municipality of the East region and the capitals of the provinces in the Central region. In the
second stage from 2006 to 2008, cable digitization will be fulfilled in the cities at higher
levels of the districts, the districts in the Central region, the majority counties, part of the
cities at higher levels of districts, and the minority counties in the West region. In the third
stage from 2009 to 2010, cable digitization will be realized in the counties in the Central
region and the cities at higher levels of counties in the West region. In the fourth stage from
2011 to 2015, cable digitization will be carried out in the counties of the West region and
simulating radio and TV will be cancelled.
From J une to November 2003, the SARFT approved a total of 46 cable digital TV pilot
areas, covering 26 provinces (automatic regions/municipalities) and 4 municipalities directly
under the central government. A month later, the SARFT issued Implementation advice on
establishing the new system of the cable digital TV technology (SARFT, 2003c). This formally
raised Chinas digital television industry chain constructed by four platforms and
emphasized the strategy of the overall parallel movement of set-top and the core of the new
system of new cable digital television technology the orientation, technology standard and
the construction requirement of all links of the four platforms.
171
2004 was the ground-breaking year for Chinas digital switchover. That year was
nominated as the Digital Development Year by the broadcasting system. SARFT formally
made it clear that the target strategy of the digital transition is to fully transfer to digital cable
television. After the release of the Work Outline of the Radio, Film and TV Development Year
(SARFT, 2004a), SARFT tried to get support from national governments and relative
authorities. It introduced a series of circulars promoting and standardizing digital pay-TV
channels. This applied to the running scale, the industry operation, the business criteria and
the introduction of the competition. These elements combined to bring the gradual industry
policy transition to maturity.
In 2004, SARFT also issued the Circular on Speeding up the Surveillance Platform
Construction of the Cable Digital TV. Here it pointed out the establishment of the national
cable digital surveillance platform could guarantee the sound development of coordinating
and monitoring the program platform, transmitting platform, the operating order of the service
platform, the service quality, and the cable DTV (SARFT, 2004c). SARFT furthermore
promulgated a Guideline of the Cable DTV Service Platform Construction (SARFT, 2004d),
10 major forms of basic business of cable DTV. The ten forms of basic business of cable DTV
in China are: (a) the basic business of standard definition TV; (b) the paying business of
standard definition TV; (c) the business of multi-direction radio; (d) the guide for the
electronic program; (e) the radio information service; (f) the business of pay-view on-demand
to be; (g) the business of pay-view on-demand; (h) the commercial service; (i) the games
business; (j) the business of high-definition TV. These forms cover the current program
service, information service and commercial service of cable DTV. By the end of 2004,
SARFT had approved 134 pay-TV channels and 31 pay-radio frequencies (Wang, 2005).
So far, there are five comprehensive operation platforms of digital TV approved by
SARFT: (a) CCTV; (b) SMG, the Program Production Center of the Satellite TV Channel; (c)
the Corporation of the Central Radio, Film, TV Transmitting Network; (d) the financial group
formed by Beijing Broadcasting Group, Tianjin TV Station, National Radio Station, Shandong
Radio and TV Station; and (e) Anhui TV Station.
In 2005, SARFT further defined the strategic mission of three steps and the
development target: promoting cable TV digitization in full scale from 2003, implementing
the broadcasting experiment of terrestrial DTV and the business of the satellite television live
broadcasting in 2006, and promoting all-round terrestrial digital broadcasting and expanding
its prevalence in 2008.

Major Determinants for DTV Policy of SARFT

Why did China begin its digital switchover from cable DTV and not from terrestrial DTV,
as did most countries in the world? Chinas choice must be seen against the background of
Chinas situation. We know that the development of digital television depends on at least three
factors: support of government, mature business models, advanced technology standards and
economics. The Chinese governments support is evident in all the circulars mentioned earlier.
As regards business models, not only China, but nearly all other countries in the world are
struggling to find effective business models for digital television progress. The third element,
technology, is therefore very important to policy makers.
Chinese people could not watch cable television until the middle of the 1980s. The cable
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television system formed little by little, and now cable subscribers in China amount to around
130 million households. The cable system covers cities, towns and some villages, and had by
2005 become the largest cable network system in the world. The cable network has been the
most popular platform for Chinese people to watch TV, be informed and be entertained. The
cable system is technologically advanced. It has the possibility to transmit digital signals only
through a set-top-box. Though Chinese broadcasters began to transfer from analog to digital
television around ten years ago, the Chinese government only decided the terrestrial digital
television standard in September 2006, and China just launched its first broadcasting satellite
that same year. These are the main technical reasons why SARFT has chosen switchover from
cable DTV.
Economic considerations are also important. Although the Chinese cable system is the
largest in the world, it only covers 2/3 of the Chinese population. Most cable TV subscribers
live in cities, either big or small, and they are more affluent than villagers. Urban subscribers
require more TV channels, especially the target channels and qualified programs. Most cable
digital pay-TV includes these types of channels. They have more need and can pay more for
the service.
Cable companies give the cable subscriber a free set-top-box, but cable DTV users still
have to pay more than before. In China, TV viewers do not need to pay a license fee for
watching TV, although payment is required every month for cable system maintenance. With
the transfer from analog to digital television, maintenance expenses grow and cable viewers
will have to pay more. This is not a big deal for urban citizens, but it is a burden for some
suburban people. It is therefore a good choice to begin the transition in urban areas.
In 2005, altogether 4.13 million Chinese mostly urban and high-income viewers
subscribed to digital TV, which was a twofold increase compared to 2004. Among these, 3.97
million were digital cable subscribers.

Key Challenges and Issues Ahead

The digital television industry has grown quickly since 2004. There were more than 1.2
million cable DTV users in 2004, and the number was nearly 4 million in 2005. According to
SARFT, the number of cable DTV users is over 12 million at the end of 2006.
SARFT has set pilot areas in 49 cities and made a series policy about cable DTV policy,
including technical, programming, operating, etc. At the same time, they tried to work
together with other ministries to create tax and fee policies . There are 25 cities, including
Qingdao, Dalian, Shenzhen, Hangzhou, Foshan, Taiyuan, Nanjing, Xining, Yinchuan, that
have finished the cable DTV switch-off. Other cities began the switchover in 2006. They
believe user numbers will be around 20 million at the end of 2007.
SARFT hoped the number of Chinese digital television viewers would exceed 30 million
in 2005 when they made the10
th
Five-Year Plan of Radio, Film and TV Technology and Plan
of 2010 Prospect (SARFT, 2004b),but unfortunately, the actual number of subscribers was
only 4.13 million. Even at the end of 2006, the number was around 10 million, which is
considerably less than expected.
How has this happened and what can be done in the future? The digital television switch-
over not only affects broadcasters and audiences, it also changes the industry. For political
reasons, it took China nearly ten years to decide on the terrestrial digital television standard.
173
The slow development of digital television was in some ways caused by this uncertainty
regarding technology standards. Cable companies bought set-top-boxes from production
factories and sent them to customers for free. The price for a set-top-box is about 500 RMB,
so if there are 400 thousand cable users in a city, the cable company has to pay nearly 200
million RMB just for the set-top-boxes. A cable company therefore needs a minimum of 80-
100 thousand subscribers to cover its costs. It takes at least 3 to 4 years for a cable company
to get its investment back. If we want to have more cable DTV users, one way would be to
first reduce the price of set-top-boxes.
Pay-TV is a new phenomenon in China. Nearly all the income of TV stations comes from
advertising. With digital television, traditional business models do not work. A major
challenge is turning cable users into paying cable subscribers. Customers care about price
and content, and customers only pay for what they see as worth while. Most Chinese TV
viewers are accustomed to watching free TV programs. They sometimes complain about too
many commercials during programs. Given the choice between paying for the programs
without commercials or enduring commercials without paying, most Chinese will opt for the
latter alternative. Chinese TV viewers will only want to pay for TV channels and content
which is substantially different from what they have previously been watching for free. For
TV producers and distributors in China, success will ultimately depend on the provision of
quality multi-channel programs and content.
Most cable users who want to watch pay-TV have a university education and high-
income jobs, and they are not satisfied with traditional programs and TV channels. Cable
companies will therefore probably tailor some channel and programs toward these viewers.
But the vast majority of Chinese cannot afford to invest large amounts of money in pay-TV.
J ust as in some European countries, not all Chinese want to switch from analog to digital
television. Therefore, SARFT has requested regional cable companies to let TV audiences
choose whether they want to transfer to digital television. Cable companies have to transmit
six analog channels, including CCTV-1 and their own provinces first channel (Zhou T, 2007).

Summary

Analysis of policy development regarding digital television in China (and some other
countries) shows that government support is a crucial factor in television digitization. SARFT
is a main stakeholder in China, where complete switchover is not an insurmountable problem,
although government regulation and phase-by-phase strategy make it a gradual process. Main
problems are balancing the public service and business and protecting consumer choice
during the period of switchover and switch-off. Technology and an adequate business model
are important factors in promoting digital television successfully. Finding a successful
business model suited to Chinas needs with regard to digital television will contribute to a
harmonious society.

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Norway

Development of DTV and DTTV Policies

In Norway, the use of digital technology for the transfer and reception of television (DTV)
is considered to have started in 1974 with the introduction of text television. The analog
television technology developed between 1930 and 1950 did not allow signal compression
and demanded considerable transmission capacity. Digitization and the use of computers,
however, allow signal compression, new services and regulation of access to content
(Norwegian Post and Telecommunication Authority, 2007).
A national policy on DTV and DTTV has emerged since 1999, under shifting minority
governments headed first by the Christian Peoples Party (October 1997- March 2000 and
again October 2001-October 2005) and The Labour Party (March 2000 - October 2001). As
for the term national policy it needs to be understood that management by objectives
(MBO) was introduced in 1989 as the main planning tool throughout the public sector, despite
its known weaknesses (Christensen, Lgreid, Rones & Rvik 2004). National policy here
refers to official policy goals identified by the government and sanctioned by Parliament. In
Norway, several stakeholders can be identified both in the public and private sectors, as we
shall see. In the public sector DTV and DTTV are inextricably linked since the authorities
from the late 1990s have advocated the development of a digital terrestrial television system
(DTTV), as the process of digitization and market-driven DTV has evolved. The main
arguments in favor of DTTV were its alleged better provision of coverage and better
possibilities for mobile and portable reception, as well as more stable sound and picture
quality. Cost efficiency was another key argument in that a digital terrestrial network was seen
to be cheaper to maintain in the long run than an analog network. Adding to this, DTTV, it
was argued, would free valuable band frequency. Signal compression made it possible to
transfer four to five digital channels on the same frequency as one program in analog format.
Politicians were made aware that digital signal format can be transferred in most
electronic communication networks, not only terrestrial and satellite broadcasting and cable-
TV but also telenetworks and data networks such as ADSL and VDSL broadband or mobile-
TV. Still, the key argument in favor of DTTV was that it would be under political control. As
such, it was perceived to offer national public broadcasters better survival possibilities than
leaving digitization of broadcasting to commercial digital satellite and cable operators
(Syvertsen, 2004).
Digital signal format allows various new services, and TV suppliers expect interactive
services to be profitable, including electronic program guides (EPG), super text-TV,
additional information about programs, electronic games, interactive response services e-
commerce, 16:9 broadband transmissions, high resolution TV (HDTV), innumerable radio
channels, high quality sound and more sound channels, and Internet access (Norwegian Post
and Telecommunication Authority 2007).
Many critical voices for the governments advocacy of DTTV were brushed aside, due to
concern about the considerable cost involved in parallel analog and digital distribution which
had caused financial problems for DTTV in many other countries. To secure a rapid closure of
the analog network, it was decided that the analog net should be closed when the entire
Norwegian population could technically receive digital transmissions. There is provision for
175
the use of alternative technology to achieve complete national coverage. A further
requirement concerns real access to reception equipment and technical assistance. Norwegian
authorities have stated that the cost for reception equipment must be limited (to 1500 NOK
for a decoder), and switchover must represent an added value for viewers (St.melding nr. 44,
2002-2003; Syvertsen, 2004).
The development of national DTV and DTTV policies has been influenced by the
European Union (EU) and the Nordic region. DTV plays an important role in the EU
information society vision, and several EU directives and standards have made an impact.
Two examples here are The Law on Electronic Communication passed in 2004, and a
common definition of SMP (Significant Market Position). Through DVB (Digital Video
Broadcasting) 33 countries have developed specifications for the broadcasting of DTV by
satellite, cable and terrestrial networks. On this basis, standards for European DTV have been
defined by ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) and CENERLEC
(Comit Europeen de Normalisation Electrotechnique). In addition, input has come from
neighboring Nordic countries through the creation of Nordig and recommended standards for
network configuration for carrying digital television signals to Nordig-compliant IRD.
In Norway, DTV and DTTV policies have been formulated by the Ministry of Transport
and Communications (MTC) and the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs (MCCA), and
passed by the Norwegian Parliament (NP). Compared with the relaxed laissez-faire policies
of successive minority governments from 1997-2005, the current majority coalition
government has adopted a very active stance, heralded by the high-profiled Minister of
Culture and Church Affairs, Mr. Trond Giske of the Labour Party. On May 15 he presented a
White Paper to Parliament on Broadcasting in a Digital Age, and has intervened several times
on key issues, for example defending the DTTV concept by promising the creation of a free,
(i.e. license fee-based) state digital-TV channel NRK3 to be launched on September 1,
2007.
The MTC supervises The Post and Telecommunications Authority and is responsible for
all technical aspects in the telecommunications sector. This includes the Law on electronic
communications passed in 2003 regulating technical standards and band frequencies. Recently,
the MTC rejected a demand by MTG to broadcast Viasat 4 for free in the digital terrestrial
network, on the same conditions as the commercial public broadcaster TV 2. Currently, the
main MTC priority is the auction of the vacant license to build and operate a 3G-network in
Norway (MTC, 2007). The MCCA supervises the Norwegian Media Authority regarding
media and sports. The Ministrys Department of Media Policy and Copyright was established
in 1991 to be responsible for broadcasting legislation, copyright issues, press subsidies and
film policy. In the 1990s, several administrative responsibilities in the media sector were
delegated to the Mass Media Authority, while the Norwegian Media Ownership Authority was
established pursuant to a special Act. In 2005, the Mass Media Authority merged with the
Media Ownership Authority and the Norwegian Board of Film Classification and the new
authority was named the Norwegian Media Authority (Medietilsynet). The MCCA has just
presented a White Paper to parliament entitled Broadcasting in a digital future (St.melding 30,
2006-2007), to be discussed below.
While the ministries have left the detailed supervision of DTV and DTTV policies to the
Norwegian Post and Telecommunications Authority and The Norwegian Media Authority,
parts of its implementation have been entrusted to three limited companies, demonstrating a
176
mixture of state and private ownership which reflects Norways mixed economy. All seven
stakeholders play important roles regarding DTV policy. In February 2004, Parliament passed
guidelines involving the scheduled switchover region-by-region 2007-2010. In J une 2006, the
MTC and MCCA granted the company Norges televisjon AS (NTV) a license to develop a
DTTV network. NTV, which was set up in 2002 and was the only applicant for a license,
consists of NRK, TV2 and Telenor Broadcast Holding AS (a subsidiary of Telenor) which
each own 1/3 of NTV. While NTV will be the license holder and network operator, another
company RiksTV AS was established for pay-TV services (including channel packages, PPP
TV, VOD/NVOD). In July 2006, NTV contracted Norkring, a fully owned subsidiary of
Telenor ASA and Norways largest distribution company for terrestrial broadcasting, to
develop and operate the digital terrestrial network for television. NTV will lease capacity
from Norkring. The contract involves development and operation of the transmission network
for 15 years.
By 2006 almost half of the Norwegian population (47%), had access to cable-TV,
compared with 32% to private dish/satellite, 35% to ordinary antenna with multi-channel and
4% to communal/joint antenna. Some had several systems. The analog terrestrial network
system comprises the two last groups. As for IPTV (Internet-TV), about 85% of all
Norwegians in the same period from 1999-2006 acquired home PCs and 80% had broadband
access. Of these, about 20% report using IPTV. The Government announced on 15 May 2007
when presenting the revised budget for 2007, that additional funds will be made possible so
that the remaining 80,000 Norwegians without broadband will have it before year-end 2007.

Major Determinants for DTV and DTTV Policies

The Norwegian TV market is estimated at 15 billion NOK. It comprises several segments,
especially distribution/subscriptions, license fees, advertisements and end user equipment,
and many stakeholders in terms of DTV and DTTV policy. Its structure is complicated, with
producers of content, artists, broadcasters, distributors, and end users. Also, there is an
umbrella organization for the protection of audio-visual intellectual property rights (Norwaco),
embracing 34 organizations representing 34,000 individual owners, and there are affiliated
industries in advertising/marketing and TV-equipment. The market is dominated by a few
large stakeholders: Norsk Rikskringkasting AS (the state-owned license-financed public
service broadcaster), TV2 (privately owned commercial public service broadcaster) and the
semi-private Telenor (Norways largest telecommunication company). These three
stakeholders have a financial market share of 75% (Norsk Telecom, 2007).
In 2007, Norway had one public and several private commercial TV companies. These
offered a total of 48 TV channels, of which all 12 of the public and several of the private
commercial channels target the Norwegian audience with programs either in Norwegian or
with Norwegian subtitles. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) has two national
and 10 regional channels, using a combination of terrestrial, cable and satellite distribution
systems and reaching almost 100% of the population. Among the commercial broadcasters,
TV2 has a license which expires in 2009, that makes it also a public broadcaster. This license
expires in 2009 and there is currently much uncertainty whether there will be a second public
broadcaster in addition to NRK from 2010. The private commercial companies are financed
through a combination of commercials and subscription fees, most are cable- and/or satellite-
177
distributed. TV2, the most profitable of the private commercial companies, opened up two
new TV channels in 2007 (TV2 Nyhetskanalen, TV2 Sport). Analog switch-off and digital
roll-out will start in the autumn of 2007 and be done region-by-region. The advent of digital-
TV will have repercussions on the established system of TV companies and channels,
including penetration rates and distribution systems. Matters are complicated since the
Norwegian authorities have consistently pushed for the development of a digital terrestrial
television network system DTTV.
In 2006, the most viewed channels broadcasting in Norwegian were NRK1 (47%), NRK2
(5%), TV2 (51%), TV Norge (18%), TV3 (11%), and local TV stations (1%). Foreign
channels (including Swedish and Danish channels which are easily understandable to most
Norwegians) not broadcasting in Norwegian were watched by only 16% (Vaage, 2007).
A number of critical voices have claimed that DTTV represents obsolete technology and
that pay-TV for everyone is a likely outcome. One prominent critic, Professor Rolf Hyer,
Norwegian School of Management, in an interview in Dagbladet 3 May 2007, reminded
readers he had been among the early dissenters who had cautioned against modernizing the
terrestrial system. Instead, he had recommended using a combination of satellite and cable TV
and keeping the old terrestrial system until a more technologically convincing and operable
distribution form had been found. The statistics in tables 2-3 support his views. More and
more of us switch to cable-TV, Internet-distributed TV and not to mention satellite/dish. Some
of those who have not yet acquired cable or satellite TV may feel no need to do so. Some may
be happy with todays analog network and may see no advantage in digital-TV. The
investments made by NTV to develop the digital network are estimated to cost somewhere
between 1.4 and 1.5 billion NOK, allowing for 20 channels, based on NTV figures. This is a
complete waste from the consumers point of view, according to Hyer. Digital terrestrial TV
may be a desperate attempt by NRK and TV2 to protect their market positions in the fierce
competition with new channels now being distributed through satellite and cable suppliers.
Cable or satellite suppliers like Canal Digital, Viasat, Get and Canal+can each offer far more
TV channels than NTV. In some years the investments in DTT may prove to be a scandal if
judged against what the consumer actually benefits. Hyer also believes NRK will attempt to
earn money from consumers in addition to their license fee. NRK has talked about pay-per-
view and if they succeed, they will benefit both from the license fee and pay-per-view. The
digital terrestrial system may already be outdated. Young consumers today demand
interactivity, and broadcasting is becoming interactive networking in the second media age
(Holmes, 2005). In contrast with the Internet and cable-TV, the digital terrestrial system has
no possibility for two-way communication with users. In addition the terrestrial system is
much more limited than satellite-dish and Internet. The digital terrestrial system was
conceived before interactivity such as YouTube, MySpace and Facebook took off.
Another prominent critical voice belongs to Associate professor Tanja Storsul, University
of Oslo. In an interview in Dagbladet 2 May 2007, it is noted that the free channels are
disappearing with DTV. The license fee-based NRK (an annual license costs more than 2,000
NOK) may prove to be the only free channel left when DTV is fully introduced. Riks-TV,
which has the exclusive right to distribute channels in the new DTTV network, is obliged to
offer TV2 free until its license expires at year-end 2009. From 2010, TV2 has made it clear
that it will be shifting to pay-TV. This leaves the three NRK channels as the only free
channels offered provided the license is paid. Tanja Storsul argues that Norway is the only
178
country in Europe where analog switch-off and digital rollout means a reduction of free
channels. In countries that Norway traditionally compares itself with, like Sweden and the UK,
the opposite is taking place. In Sweden, the government took more active part in the
development of DTTV, contributing financially. This allowed them to influence the channel
system. In Norway, the government announced objectives (cf. MBO) and then let private
companies take the entire risk and cost of developing DTTV. Pay-TV, therefore, may be the
price the Norwegian consumers must pay for insufficient government involvement. Instead of
DTTV for everyone, we are left with pay-TV for everyone, according to Storsul.

Soria Moria Declaration and Broadcasting in a Digital Future

In September 2005, the Conservative minority coalition government led by Prime
Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Peoples Party lost the general election. In
October 2005, a majority coalition government came to power, headed by Prime Minister J ens
Stoltenberg of the Labour Party. For the first time in many years Norway got a majority
government. And for the first time ever, The Socialist Left Party was in government, putting
radical pressure on the Labour Party on several issues. This is also noticeable in the issues of
public broadcasting and DTV policy. In its joint Soria Moria Declaration policy platform of
December 2005, which sets out government policies on a broad range of issues, media policy
was defined in terms of:

Ensuring freedom of expression, due legal process and a living democracy.
Resisting uniformity and stimulate variation, quality and Norwegian ownership.
Maintaining public radio and TV broadcasting with clear commitments to broad
and narrow receiver groups.
Retaining NRK (the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) as a license fee based,
non-advertising public broadcaster and promote its role as a disseminator of culture,
language and national identity. NRKs district offices are to receive good
development possibilities.

In May 2007, The Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs presented a White paper to
Parliament, Broadcasting in a Digital Future (St. melding 30, 2006-2007). This document
sets out government policy regarding the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation and several
other issues related to public and commercial broadcasting. The document lists the goals set
out above, and in addition specifies a number of policy priorities bearing on digital-TV (of
which only the most pertinent are listed below):

EU legislation: Re-negotiation of the EU TV directive will include all audiovisual
media services independent of delivery platform. EU legislation on state subsidies,
competition rules, electronic communication and electronic commerce regulations as
well as intellectual property rights will affect Norway.
Public broadcasting: an unregulated TV market with a large number of competitors
cannot secure satisfactory public broadcasting services. There is accordingly still a
need for public regulations to secure public broadcasting in Norway, without
advertisements and marketing. NRK is retained as a state-owned license fee based
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public broadcaster. NRK need not be the only company offering public broadcasting
services in Norway. The government will consider offering a commercial broadcaster
distribution rights in the terrestrial system from 2010 when TV2s license expires.
Commercial activities: NRK is permitted but only through its subsidiaries to
engage in commercial activities, including with businesses outside media, provided
the board of NRK gives its approval.
Sponsors, charging for SMS: NRK can, as previously, identify sponsors through
immobile placards and can sell spin-off products and SMS services. Caution must be
demonstrated in exerting commercial pressure on viewers, esp. programs for children
and youths.
New media: NRK should as far as possible engage in new media, but advertising, e-
commerce and other services aimed at profit maximization are not part of the public
broadcasting mission.
Internet: NRK should offer most of its archived radio and TV productions as well as
current productions through the Internet, normally free of charge.

In response to the critical voices noted above, and anticipating that TV2 will not renew
its commitments as a public broadcaster from 2010, the Minister of Culture and Church
Affairs also stated the governments strong desire to have, in addition to NRK, a Norwegian
public broadcaster offering viewers non-commercial content. But efforts to attract TV
companies to apply for a license to provide a free channel with full distribution rights in both
the digital terrestrial network and cable networks have so far been futile. In the TV business
nobody seems interested, and these plans are met with considerable skepticism. Several view
the Ministers statements as tactics to deflect criticism that DTTV is proving too expensive.
Others point to the MTCs refusal to allow MTG to send Viasat 4 free, similar to TV2. In June
2007, Riks-TV, which as noted has the exclusive right to distribute channels in the new DTTV
network, presented its choice of channels, favoring the owners NRK, TV2 and Telenor. The
choice of channels excluded BBC and Swedish TV channels. This has caused a storm and
Riks-TV has since relented and agreed to include BBC. But many Norwegians are baffled that
the state-controlled DTTV excludes Swedish television channels which several generations of
Norwegians have been accustomed to watching free.

Key Challenges and Issues Ahead

Among the challenges and issues ahead are private commercial distributors and the
important forces of marketing and advertising. Although an important argument in the
formulation of a national policy was that DTTV would offer national public broadcasters
better survival possibilities than leaving the field to commercial digital satellite and cable
operators, the latter have not been idle. In 2007 the buzz-word is HDTV, and a number of
commercial distributors of cable, satellite and Internet-based suppliers are active in the
Norwegian market. These include Canal Digital (owned 100% by Telenor), Viasat (owned by
MTG AB), Canal+(owned by SBS Group) and Get (owned by Candover).
Advertising and marketing are important driving forces behind the development of
commercial TV, and hence also digital-TV. Advertisements provide an increasing share of
revenue for many distributors, and in Norway we now see that DTV distributors are launching
180
aggressive ad campaigns to win market shares. Director Roar Sletner, The Association of
Norwegian Media Agencies (ANMA), estimates 16 May 2007 that the annual turnover of the
Norwegian advertisement market is in the range of 25 billion NOK. This market is equally
split between brand and classified marketing. In 2006 brand advertising amounted to 6.5
billion NOK. The two dominating media channels for brand ads were daily print newspapers
(36%) and TV (35%). Other media had substantially lower market shares: weeklies/
magazines (7%), Internet (including electronic newspapers) (6%), radio (5%), outdoor
placards (3%), and direct marketing (3%) (ANMA 2007). General manager Brge Sandengen,
Interest Organization for Interactive Marketing (INMA), estimates 16 May 2007 that in 2006,
Internet marketing in Norway totaled 2 billion NOK. Brand marketing was roughly 1 billion
NOK and classified marketing amounted to 300 million NOK (INMA 2007).
Advertising and marketing are also important in the diffusion of innovations perspective.
All stakeholders competing in the HDTV market have employed one or several professional
marketing agencies. Get uses McCann, Canal Digital uses Grey, and Riks-TV uses
Bates/Omnicom groups PHD. Riks-TV plans to launch a large and expensive advertisement
campaign this year. Competition among Canal Digital, Get, Viasat and Riks-TV is fierce. At
stake are an estimated 500,000 - 800,000 TV viewers. Over the next few months they must
make decisions on how they want to watch digital-TV. The campaign slogan of Riks-TV is
Digital-TV with an ordinary antenna. The intention is to improve customer knowledge of
products before presenting channel content and products. The campaign will rely on a mixture
of print and net-based ads in national and regional dailies plus TV-ads. Riks-TV believes that
digitization is complicated and may frighten consumers. Their message and product are
simple, designed to communicate in simple terms a simple solution. Switchover to digital-TV
should not be complicated and Riks-TV wants customers to remember that (Hauger, 2007).

Summary

The Norwegian TV landscape structure is undergoing considerable change with analog
shutdown and digital rollout from 2007-2010, and there are a number of stakeholders -- public
and private. The situation is characterized by the spread of market-driven DTV and pay-TV
on the one hand while the government is advocating a DTTV policy on the other hand. The
government has become more vocal and interventionist with the access to power in October
2005 of a majority government. But the minority government laissez-faire policy from
1999-2005 has had its price, and leaving the market to implement government policy is a
course that is now proving hard to change for the very active and interventionist Minister of
Culture and Church Affairs, Mr. Trond Giske. DTTV is seen by many as an obsolete
technology with a price tag of 1.3-1.5 billion NOK. Some critics claim the Norwegian
governments policy has failed, and that the average viewer-consumer is the big loser.
Marketing and advertising are powerful driving forces, favoring commercial broadcasters
over public broadcasters. In a world where narrowcasting and pay-TV is becoming normal,
license fee-based public broadcasters are hard pressed by the many pay-TV suppliers.
Although the government launched a third license fee based channel (NRK3) on September 1,
2007, there is no indication yet of a second public commercial TV broadcaster in 2010 when
TV2s license expires and they turn to pay-TV. It is still unclear, as we write this paper,
whether roughly 600,000 Norwegians in the autumn of 2007 will choose DTTV or switch to
181
one of the alternative platforms: cable-TV, satellite/dish or IPTV.

Conclusion

The paper has identified key stakeholders and structures in China and Norway regarding
government policy formulation of digital TV. DTV (and DTTV in Norway) represent
considerable challenges to the governments, enterprises and populations of China and Norway,
two countries that are very different and yet so alike in several ways. Both countries face a
need to weigh public interest and state broadcasting services against market-driven pressures,
viewership preferences and affordability ushered in by globalization, economic progress and
technological advancement. Closer comparative analysis of institutions and stakeholders
(especially the state broadcasters CCTV and NRK) as well as audiences (especially urban
elites and trendsetters) are now the next likely units for further analysis.

Notes

1
A first version of this paper was published as Wang, Y. & Vaagan, R. (2007). National DTV
policies in China and Norway. In Collections. China Forum 2007 (pp.101-119). Beijing:
National Center for Radio and Television Studies at Communication University of China.

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