SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 116049, March 20, 1995 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BRANCH 47, PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, ARNE STROM AND
GRACE REYES, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N
BIDIN, J.:
116049
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the order dated March
18, 1994 of respondent judge, the Hon. Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, granting the Motion
to Quash filed by the accused, now herein respondents Arne Strom and
Grace A. Reyes in Criminal Case No. 11529 of said court.

On February 2, 1994, a complaint (Criminal Case No. 11529) for violation of
the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor
Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power
to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic
Act. No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out
that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of
Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however,
respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter
of Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the "law"
contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law
such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March
18, 1994 held as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing facts and consideration, as the
City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute this case for
reasons amply discussed above, the Court hereby orders this case quashed
in the interest of justice, without costs" (Rollo, p. 27).

The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent judge
denied the same in an order dated April 12, 1994, the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:
"x x x. It may be ignorance of the law to insist that the law, Republic Act
1130 was repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction (sic) No. 2, Series of
1972 as what the City Prosecutor has harped all along. A Letter of
Instruction (sic) is not a law by any standard and neither has it the force and
effect of law. A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 of the New
Civil Code which provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and of the Rules of Statutory Construction.

"Besides, penal statues are strictly construed against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused. The rules in all criminal prosecutions is that all
doubts are resolved in favor of the accused. In the case at bar, the Court
seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the power or the authority to
investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and to file and prosecute cases
of this kind before our courts, as that is lodged with the Anti-Dummy Board
under R.A. 1130.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration
mentioned above is hereby denied for sheer lack of merit, and the Order
dated March 18, 1994 quashing this case is maintained (Rollo, p. 5).

Hence, the present petition.

After the filing of the comments by respondents, this Court gave due course
to the petition, in a resolution dated October 24, 1994.

The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent judge
in granting the Motion to Quash, gravely abused his discretion as to warrant
the issuance of a writ of certiorari as prayed for by petitioners herein.

In resolving this issue, it must be recalled that immediately after the
proclamation of martial law, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1 to reorganize the entire Executive Branch of the
National Government. To carry out the intent of P.D. No. 1, various Letters
of Implementation were issued from time to time. It was in the course of
this reorganization that Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972 was
issued for the purpose of reorganizing certain agencies in the Department of
Justice. One such agency was the Anti-Dummy Board which was abolished
by the aforesaid LOI, to wit:
Anti-Dummy Board

1. The investigation function of the Anti-Dummy Board shall be absorbed by
the National Bureau of Investigation, and its prosecution function by the
Prosecution Staff in the Department of Justice and the various Provincial and
City Fiscals. Its corresponding appropriation, records, equipment, property,
and subordinate personnel are transferred to the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Prosecution Staff in the Department of justice.

2. The services of the present members of the Anti-Dummy Board are
hereby terminated.

3. The Anti-Dummy Board shall cease to exist as of the date hereof.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of September in the year of our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two." (underscoring supplied)

Later, P.D. No. 1275 was issued which reorganized the entire prosecution
system of the government with the creation of the National Prosecution
Service (NPS) under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice,
tasked with the investigation and prosecution of all violations of penal laws,
including violation of C.A. No. 108, the Anti-Dummy Law.

In his Comment on the petition, respondent judge insists that the dismissal
of the case is supported by the law and existing jurisprudence. Inasmuch as
the City Prosecutor relied mainly on LOI No. 2, which according to
respondent judge, is not even a law, the Anti-Dummy Board cannot be
considered as having been effectively abolished.

We reverse.

The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite
obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275
aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have
been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming
that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his
opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2
would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI
No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2
reads:
"Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 23, 1972,
Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National Government, the
following agencies of the Department of Justice are hereby reorganized or
activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: x x x" (underscoring
supplied).

Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited
LOI; otherwise, he would have readily acknowledged the validity of the
argument advanced by the prosecution. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the
former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force
and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by
subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order issued by former President
Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1.
Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly or
impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and
effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8).

Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly ordains:
"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked."

But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to
check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to
inform the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely
upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.
Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take
judicial notice of all the laws of the land (Sec. 1, Rule 129 Rules of Court).
Being the trier of facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the
existing laws, recent enactments and jurisprudence, in keeping with their
sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal
developments. As provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
"CANON 5 - A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.

"CANON 6 - These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks.

The Court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present
case, the error could have been entirely avoided were it not for public
respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his duties, it is but proper
that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside
for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error is not a simple
error in judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of the law which
could easily undermine the public's perception of the court's competence.

The responsibility to keep abreast with the changes in the law espoused in
Canon 5 above is applicable with equal force to counsel for private
respondents, Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo who first raised the issue at hand
before the trial court. By insisting upon the authority of an already abolished
Anti-Dummy Board, counsel displayed blatant irresponsibility, not to mention
ignorance of the law. She should be reminded that "The law, (it is not to be
forgotten), is a progressive science.There is less than full compliance with
the demands of professional competence, if a member of a bar does not
keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative pronouncements" (Bautista
v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 [1978], underscoring supplied).

Equally deplorable is the terse half-paged pleading entitled Comment filed in
behalf of private respondents by the same counsel Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo,
before this Court, wherein she alleges:
1. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES was (sic) properly
represented by the undersigned attorney;
2. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES has (sic) nothing to
do with the decision of HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR.

"WHEREFORE, upon premises considered it is most respectfully prayed of this Court that said
certiorari (sic) be dismissed." (Rollo, p. 33)

It need not be emphasized that the order of dismissal of the criminal case
against private respondents arose out of the resolution of the Motion to
Quash/Dismiss filed by private respondents themselves, through counsel
Bermejo, on the ground of lack of authority of the City Fiscal to prosecute.
In other words, such dismissal was not ordered by respondent judge motu
proprio but rather, as prayed for by, and on motion of, private respondents
through said counsel. It is quite disturbing, therefore, for counsel to brazenly
deny before this Court that private respondents had "nothing to do" with the
assailed resolution, the issuance of which was based on their very own
pleading.

Moreover, counsel did not even bother to defend the position of private
respondents before this Court by restating in the Comment, their arguments
before the trial court, being content instead with the short allegations
aforequoted. These acts are indicative of counsel's incompetence and lack of
respect which this Court cannot countenance.

Undoubtedly, counsel for private respondents failed to observe the
responsibility imposed upon members of the bar to keep abreast with the
developments of the law under Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as to exercise candor, fairness and good faith before
the court as prescribed by Canon 10 of the same Code, for which omissions,
she should likewise be reprimanded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of respondent judge dated
March 18, 1994 dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE and the aforesaid criminal case is REINSTATED. Respondent
judge is hereby REPRIMANDED AND FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense shall merit serious consequences. Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo
is likewise REPRIMANDED AND FINED P10,000.00 for ignorance of the law
and for her failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before this
Court, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely by this Court. Let a copy of this decision be
spread on the personal records of Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. and Atty.
Elvira T. Bermejo.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


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