SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128750. January 18, 2001]

CARQUELO OMANDAM and ROSITO ITOM,i[1] petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, BLAS TRABASAS and AMPARO
BONILLA, respondents.

respondents herein nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever

in possession of the land. Citing Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 17 SCRA 71 (1966), Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124
SCRA 358 (1983) and Padre vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
446 (1992), the trial court disposed:

Camilo Lasola, private respondents predecessor-in-interest, had

already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that
petitioners action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest
with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their answer to the
complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs have no equitable right

to the possession of the land under litigation, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff-

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on

February 21,1997. Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners
make the following assignment of errors, alleging that the Court
of Appeals erred in:

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petitionii[2] for review seeks the reversal of the decision
dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 44442, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23, dated
November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City
issued in favor of Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40
covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, the Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in
his name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas bought the land
from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of said
land. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo
Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on
July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of the
OCT. Upon Saysons advice, Trabasas repurchased the land
from Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September
24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a new transfer
certificate of title.
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla
filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession
and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they were the true and
registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom should
vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one
Godofredo Sela who had been in possession for almost twenty
years.
After the parties were duly heard, the Regional Trial Court issued
its decision on November 15, 1993 declaring that neither

1) Finding the defendants to have equitable right to the

possession of the land in litigation.
2) Ordering the plaintiffs to reconvey the title of the land under
litigation in the name of the plaintiffs to the defendants within 30
days from the date this decision becomes final and executory,
and upon their failure to so comply, ordering the Clerk of Court to
execute in behalf of the plaintiffs the necessary deed of
conveyance over the said land in favor of the defendants which
deed would be considered sufficient to authorize the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City, to cause the
cancellation of the Torrens Certificate of Title in the names of the
plaintiffs, and in lieu thereof, to issue another in the common
names of the defendants.
SO ORDERED.iii[3]
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending
the appeal, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) - Region IX dismissed Omandams protest
previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. iv[4] It said that
Omandam failed to prove that Lasola, respondents predecessorin-interest, committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring
the patent, hence there is no ground for its revocation and
cancellation of its corresponding title.
On October 29,1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court. It decided thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, a new one is hereby issued
ordering defendants-appellees to vacate the subject land and
surrender it to plaintiff -appellant.
Cost against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.v[5]
The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners collateral attack
on the homestead title, to defeat private respondents accion
publiciana, was not sanctioned by law; that the patent and title of

I. ...HOLDING THAT ONE OF THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IS

THAT On April 28,1983, plaintiff bought the subject land from
Dolores Sayson who presented herself to be the true owner of
the subject land;
II. ...HOLDING THAT ANOTHER UNDISPUTED FACT IS THAT
...sometime in 1984 plaintiff discovered that defendants had
entered and had occupied the subject land. Upon instructions of
Dolores Sayson, plaintiff approached Camilo Lasola and again
bought the subject land, this time from Camilo Lasola;
III. ...IGNORING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT
WHICH
THOROUGHLY
DISCUSSED
THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT LED TO ITS CONCLUSION THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND CAMILO LASOLA HAD
NO EQUITABLE POSSESSION ON THE SUBJECT LAND,
WHICH LACK OF EQUITABLE POSSESION MAKES SOME OF
THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE.vi[6]
In the first two assigned errors, petitioners apparently question
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals while disputing the claim
of possession by private respondents and their predecessors-ininterest. The appellate court had stated firstly that respondent
Trabasas bought the subject land from Sayson who presented
herself as the true owner, then secondly, that he bought the land
from Lasola also. The first two issues, in our view, raise
questions of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that the Courts
jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or
revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.
Findings of fact below are generally conclusive on the Court. It is
not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.vii[7] There are
instances where the Court departs from this rule. viii[8] However,
petitioners did not show that involved here is an exceptional
instance. Hence, we need not tarry on the first two assignments.
In the third assignment of error, petitioners aver that public
respondent erred in ignoring the trial courts finding that private
respondents had no equitable possession of the subject land.
Again, we are confronted with a question of fact. But petitioners
claim the appellate court had disregarded or even contradicted

our holdings in the cited cases of Director of Lands , Abanilla,

and Padre.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 71(1966), we
ruled that a void title may be cancelled. A title over a disposable
public land is void if its grantee failed to comply with the
conditions imposed by law. In Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124
SCRA 358 (1983), we held that the indefeasibility of a Torrens
Title cannot be used as a defense in an action for cancellation of
title acquired through fraud. These two cases refer to actions for
cancellation of title initiated by the government, through the
Solicitor General, after a finding of fraud by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. In Padre vs. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 446 (1992) we said that in an action for
quieting of title, the court may determine incidentally the right to
the possession thereof, in order to provide complete relief to the
parties.
The last case refers to determination of rightful
possession in possessory actions.
Notwithstanding the formulation by the petitioners in the third
assigned error, the real issue raised in this case involves the trial
courts jurisdiction vis--vis administrative agencies. What is the
effect of the trial courts decision in a possessory action on the
order of Bureau of Lands regarding a homestead application and
decision of the DENR on the protest over the homestead patent?
Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and 4 to the Director of
Lands primarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now the Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources) ultimately the authority to dispose and
manage public lands.ix[9] In this regard, courts have no
jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of registration
issued by the Director of Lands. x[10] Only the DENR Secretary
can review, on appeal, such decree.
It will be recalled that the Bureau of Lands approved Lasolas
homestead application on May 21, 1968. No appeal was made
therefrom. Nineteen years after, or on July 9, 1987, Omandam
filed the protest with the Bureau of Lands. Thereafter,
respondents Trabasas and Bonilla instituted the present action in
the Regional Trial Court for recovery of possession and/or
ownership. As mentioned earlier, the trial court held that
petitioners were entitled to a declaration of equitable possession
over the area in question. Said trial court then ordered the
cancellation of respondents title and the issuance of a new one.
In effect, the courts order reversed the award made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Lasola. This reversal was in error, for
the proper administrative agency, the DENR under CA 141, had
prior jurisdiction over the patent on the subject matter, which is
the contested homestead area.

and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not
settled the respective rights of public land claimants. xi[11] But
once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later,
its decision prevails.
In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the
contested area in 1967. His application was granted on May 21,
1968. The Order for the issuance of the patent was issued by the
Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds
on April 28, 1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal was
made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years from the date of
the Order directing the issuance of the patent that petitioners
protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of Lands. Despite
the said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to
the protest relying on our ruling in Director vs. Abanillaxii[12] that
the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not apply when the
grant is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation. From this date,
Lasolas right of possession based on his OCT and eventually
that of respondents were put on issue. In their desire to get
possession of the property, respondents instituted an action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership on April 16, 1990 with
the Regional Trial Court. Said court rendered its decision against
respondents on November 15, 1993. Respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995,
the DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest on the ground
of absence of fraud and misrepresentation committed by
respondents predecessors-in-interest.xiii[13] On October 29,
1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the decision subject of
this petition in favor of respondents. Petitioners then brought the
instant case to us.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the

Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1996, and its resolution
dated February 21, 1997, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

We note that the parties did not manifest as to whether an appeal

was made from the decision of the Regional Director of DENR-IX.
Further, no mention was ever made in their pleadings regarding
the matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Director
up to the present, five years have lapsed. From this, we can
conclude that no appeal has been made and that the DENR
decision dismissing the petitioners protest and upholding
respondents right on the contested area has attained finality.
By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses
Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly confirmed in their right to
possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of the
deed of sale executed by OCT holder Camilo Lasola as early as
September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then secured a
transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondents clearly
have superior right over the land claimed by petitioners
Omandam and Itom. The appellate court did not err in upholding
the right of private respondents, and in ordering the petitioners to
vacate and surrender the land to said respondents.

DENRs jurisdiction over public lands does not negate the

authority of courts of justice to resolve questions of possession

i
ii
iii
iv
vRepublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2326

May 31, 1949

FERNANDO ALEJO, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,

vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
Diosdado
V.
Salamanca
and
Godofredo
V.
Salamanca
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellees.

for

appellants.

REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari to review and
set aside the decision of the Director of Lands and the confirmatory decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on a
land dispute between homesteaders.
Complaining against said decision, petitioners alleged that the same was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction, being contrary to the findings in the investigations conducted for the purpose and in which the parties were duly heard, and
based on false assumptions and inferences from another investigation alleged to have been made at an earlier date of which no record
exists and of which petitioners were not even notified, the decision being furthermore the consequence of a fraud and misrepresentation
perpetrated by the opposing party.
The respondents denied the allegation of fraud and grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction and attached to their answer a
copy of each of the challenged decisions.
Without receiving any evidence and merely upon motion of the Solicitor General, the lower court dismissed the petition on the theory
that the decision of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is conclusive upon the courts.
The appeal involves a point of procedure and presents the question of whether or not a case of this nature could be dismissed without
giving plaintiff an opportunity to prove those allegations of his complaint which would justify judicial review of an executive's decision.
This Court has already held that "any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected
by the courts." (Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59, Phil., 440.) And while the law declares that the decision of that officer in the
disposition of public lands when approved by the head of the department is conclusive "as to questions of fact" (section 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the rule only holds "in the absence of a showing that such a decision was rendered in consequence of
fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence." (Ortua vs. Singson
Encarnacion, supra.) "It certainly was not intended," said this Court in that case, "by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction
of courts all right to review decisions of the Director of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something could not be
done legally." Also to the point is the following pronouncement in an earlier decision:
It is incumbent upon the courts of justice to examine and declare at the instance of the interested party, whether in the
enforcement of any statute there has been any violation of its provisions in order to prevent, in the use of the discretion
commended to the public official authorized to apply the law the commission of abuses detrimental to the citizen whose rights
are expressly insured by the exact fulfillment of the law. (Rojas vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil., 196.)
To bring their case within the orbit of judicial review, petitioners allege that the decision of the Director of Lands as well as that of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "was a consequence of fraud and misrepresentation of respondents Francisco
Pagaduan and Miguel Alfonso in that in their homestead applications they included the portions which have already been occupied by
petitioners and made it appear that the land applied for was unoccupied when in fact said land was occupied by petitioners;" that the
said Secretary made an erroneous application of section 95 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 in not giving petitioners, as actual occupants
of the land, priority in the acquisition thereof; that he exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion "in deciding the case on
inferences from an alleged investigation in 1934 and on inferences from a mythical survey in 1937, no records of which exist," thus
adjudicating petitioners' case "not on the facts of the inquiry in which they were heard and upon which they have relied for decision;" that
notwithstanding investigations "duly conducted and of record and in which the parties were duly heard and represented, the Director of
Lands on February 5, 1947, with grave abuse of discretion, decided adversely against the petitioners by dismissing their claims and
adjudicating the case on inferences from an investigation allegedly conducted by Public Lands Inspector Miguel Tuason in 1934, no

records of which exist and in which the petitioners were not even notified nor were they made parties, and also on inferences regarding
an alleged survey in 1937 no records of which exist and which in turn is falsely assumed from a blueprint plan copied from an index map
of Sto. Domingo Cadastre."
Briefly stated, petitioners' complaint is that the decisions sought to be reviewed were the consequence of fraud and misrepresentation
and rendered with grave abuse of discretion in that they were based upon fictitious facts or mere inferences from an alleged
investigation in which they were not heard and of which there is no record, and contrary to findings made in other investigations to which
they were parties. These charges, if proved, would, we think, justify judicial intervention. But petitioners were not given an opportunity to
prove them, the lower court, as already stated, having dismissed the petition upon mere motion of the opposing party. This is clear
judicial error which must be corrected.
The lower court held that the decisions sought to be reviewed, copies of which were attached to the answer, are conclusive so that there
is nothing for it to review. It does not appear that petitioners agreed to a judgment on the pleadings or waived their right to present proof.
If a petition to have such decisions set aside on the ground of fraud, grave abuse of discretion, lack of factual basis or proper hearing
could be defeated by the mere presentation of copies of such decisions, unaccompanied by supporting papers or record, before the
petitioner has presented proof to establish those grounds, then the courts might as well close their doors to cases of this kind.
The brief for the respondents charges unreasonable delay (120 days) in taking the matter to the courts after final decision in the
executive branch of the Government. The law, however, does not fix any period for that purpose, and in such case the rule is that the
recourse to the courts may be availed of within a reasonable time. But what is a reasonable time in any given case depends upon the
circumstances of that case, of which proof must be adduced if they are not admitted. There being no such proof or admission, the plea
of laches or unreasonable delay cannot as yet be decided.
In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the petition for certiorari is revoked and the case remanded to the court below for further
proceedings, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought
to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates
of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988

Benguet

&

Atok

vs.

Court

of

Appeals

&

De

La

Rosa

Cruz, J.:
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up
to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his
own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 69
to
his
children
by
Mamaya
Balbalio
and
Jaime
Alberto,
respectively,
in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of
its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These
claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the
de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the
sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were
not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over
it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to
be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons.
The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and nonmining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.

vi
vii
viii
ix
x
xi

xii
xiii