Performance-based Budgeting

A Review of Experience and Lessons

R. RAMAKUMAR
This article is a review of efforts to introduce performance-based budgeting in India. It
attempts to discuss the context in which these new methods of budgeting have
emerged and assess, with the help of published literature, their utility and impact.
First, it deals with the global context in which the increasing concern with
governmental efficiency has emerged. Second, it looks at the experiences of
developed countries in the use of performance budgeting and results-based
management (RBM). Third, it looks at the specific experience of India in the use of
two major performance-based budgeting tools: performance budget and outcome
budget. Fourth, in the light of the evidence, the article suggests a sharp turn away
from certain prevalent orthodoxies in public expenditure management towards
adopting practises that help deepen democracy and transparency.
R. Ramakumar is Associate Professor, Centre for Development Studies, School of
Social Sciences, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
I
INTRODUCTION
There are two im por tant di men sions to the effectiveness of the state in pro -
vid ing basic so cial ser vices to the cit i zens. First, a fea ture of so ci et ies that
have sig nifi cantly im proved the con ditions of life of people is their high lev -
els of pub lic spending on the so cial sec tors. As an il lus tra tion, com pare the
case of India, which has one of the most back ward edu cational and health in -
dicators
1
, with a few other coun tries with advanced health in di cators. On an av -
erage, for the pe riod 20072011, India spent just about 1.4 per cent of its Gross
Do mestic Product (GDP) on health. The cor re sponding share in the United
States was 7.9 percent, in the United King dom was 7.8 per cent, in Cuba was 11
per cent and in Costa Rica was 7.1 percent. For the year 2008, India spent an av -
erage of about 3 percent of its GDP on ed u cation. The correspond ing fig ure in
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
484 R. Ramakukar
the United States was 5.5 per cent, in the United King dom was 5.4 percent, in
Cuba was 13.6 per cent and in Costa Rica was 6.3 per cent.
In other words, it is ex tremely im por tant to raise the lev els of pub lic
spend ing on the so cial sec tor; ec ono met ric stud ies have shown that there is
a high level of tem po ral as soci a tion between lev els of public spend ing and
human development outcomes
2
. Of course, a one-to-one re la tion ship be -
tween social spending and indicators of human development is difficult to
make. How ever, higher lev els of pub lic ex pen di ture in the so cial sectors do
denote a particular public policy stance, and public expenditure can be
used as a good proxy to measure it.
Sec ond, there is an increasing concern over im prov ing the ef ficiency of
public spending in the so cial sec tor. Such con cern is part of a grow ing strand
of lit er a ture called as New Pub lic Man age ment (NPM), where gov ernment
func tions are seen pri mar ily as man a ge rial. The NPM lit er a ture typ i cally ar -
gues that im proving the effi ciency of gov ernm ent re quires it to melt the fat,
turn bureaucratic initiatives into entrepreneurial institutions, ready to kill
off obso lete initiatives [and] will ing to do more with less (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992, p. 23, em pha sis added). In other words, a rise in pub lic
spend ing is seen as unneces sary, if gov ernm ents are able to function more
efficiently. Fol lowing this lit era ture, a large num ber of new con cepts, such
as performance budgeting, results-based management (RBM) and outcome
budgeting, have emerged as dom i nant in the sphere of pub lic ad min is tra tion.
This ar ti cle dis cusses the sec ond di men sion listed above. First, it deals
with the global con text in which the increas ing concern with gov ern men tal
ef fi ciency has emerged. Sec ond, it looks at the ex pe ri ences of de vel oped
coun tries in the use of per form ance bud geting and RBM. Third, it looks at
the spe cific ex pe ri ence of India in the use of two major per for mance-based
budgeting tools: performance budget and outcome budget
3
. Fourth, in
the light of the evi dence, the note suggests a sharp turn away from cer tain
prevalent orthodoxies in public expenditure management towards adopt-
ing prac tises that help deepen de mocracy and trans par ency.
II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
There are clearly three phases in the emer gence and pop u lar ity of the con -
cept of per form ance-based budget ing, as is seen today. The first phase is
the phase of perfor mance bud get ing, which emerged in the United States in
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 485
the early part of the twen ti eth cen tury. The sec ond phase is the phase of
New Pub lic Man age ment (NPM), where the focus was on cre at ing a mana -
ge rial atm o sphere for the gov ern ment to per form like any other pri vate en -
tity. The third phase is the phase where NPM ar gu ments came to be nested
within new frame works, such as good gov er nance and de centrali sa -
tion, as de fined by in terna tional or gani sations like the World Bank.
Phase 1: Early Forms of Performance Budgeting
The literature on public finance and public administration shows that de-
mands for leg is la tive ac count abil ity of the states fi nances have been raised
in vari ous coun tries from the 19th century it self. How ever, this account -
abil ity was lim ited to the pre senta tion of a set of ac counts re flect ing the
transactions of the gov ernm ent. In other words, the pro cess gener ally fol -
lowed was of a fi nan cial or ap pro pria tion audit. The effectiveness of these
ex pen di tures was never ana lysed in these doc u ments. Some authors have
called this an input budgeting sys tem.
It is su premely im por tant to note that over the years, the idea of in tro -
ducing performance-based assessment of public expenditure emerged pri-
mar ily from deci sions to con trol or reduce govern ment spend ing. One of
the first ef forts at as sess ing the per form ance of pub lic ex pen di ture was
made in the United States in the 1930s. In 1938, Clar ence E. Ridley and
Her bert A. Simon put to gether a vol ume titled Mea suring Mu nic i pal Ac tiv -
ities (Ridley and Simon, 1938). This volume is con sidered as the first in a
se ries of efforts that cul mi nated in the in troduc tion of per form ance bud get -
ing in the US. The Hoo ver Com mis sion, chaired by Herbert Hoo ver and
which subm it ted its re port in 1949, was an im portant milestone in this se -
ries of ef forts to as cer tain whether gov ernm ents were spend ing wisely
(Premchand, 1993). The Hoo ver Com mission was asked how ef fi ciently
and economically an ap proved programme was being im ple mented, and
how the same amount of work could be performed sat is factorily through
other arrangements or through improved procedures at less cost (ibid.,
emphasis added).
The Hoo ver re port led to the in troduction of the per form ance bud get ing
sys tem in the United States in the 1950s. This sys tem sought to change the
ex ces sive em pha sis on in puts to bud get ary out puts. The per for mance bud -
get ing sys tem also stressed on the mea sure ment of costs, better clas si fi ca -
tion of government transactions, measurement of productivity in
government departments and the evaluation of success of programmes
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
486 R. Ramakukar
after com ple tion. There is con sensus, how ever, that despite its many posi -
tive features, per form ance bud get ing in the US was marked by poor im ple -
mentation (Premchand, 1993). Efforts towards per for mance budgeting
remained confined to just programme evaluation studies.
Phase 2: Performance Budgeting under New Public Management
Over time, with the sys tem of per form ance bud get ing fail ing to cut pub lic
ex pen di tures ad e quately, focus shifted to wards cre at ing a man a ge rial at -
mo sphere that would be atten tive to per for mance (Premchand, 1993). In
other words, the focus was on putting in place a contin uous system of
good management practises, cost consciousness and cost responsiveness
through out the manage ment chain. As Premchand noted:
4
ascertaining the continued relevance of programmes in the changing
economic environment was emphasised. The major issue for the overall
welfare of the community was (and is) whether some of the services provided
could have been better performed outside the government sphere. Continuing
pursuit of these themes contributed on the one hand to contracting out services
on a competitive basis, and on the other to specifying an annual performance
agreement with the agencies.
According to this new man age rial frame work, budgets were to be
moulded into a con tract for per for mance with peo ple. The contract ing out
of pub lic ser vices to pri vate agen cies be came a major ob jec tive of this new
frame work. Thus, in most coun tries where New Pub lic Manage ment
(NPM) was adopted, it went hand-in-hand with the adop tion of in creas -
ingly free-mar ket pol i cies aimed at down sizing the state. As Polidano
(1999) noted:
In so far as we can generalise, two of the more commonly adopted elements of
the NPM agenda are privatisation and downsizing (or retrenchment, as it is
known in Africa). Such initiatives are part and parcel of the economic
structural adjustment programmes which the majority of developing countries
throughout the world have undertaken at some point in time; they are often the
first stage of public sector reform (pp. 5-6).
According to another writer, the NPM had be come a new pol icy fash -
ion or fad, a perva sive zeit geist dif fused by in ter national bod ies, such as
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
na tional gov ern ments, business schools, ar mies of consul tants, and re -
search insti tutes (Wright, 1994, cited in Suleiman, 2003). A large num ber
of countries in the West adopted this frame work in the late-1970s, 1980s
and 1990s. Some of the ini tia tives were the following:
1. United Kingdom: Financial Management Initiatives (FMI), 1982;
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 487
2. Canada: Increased Ministerial Authority and Accountability (IMAA),
1970s;
3. Australia: Financial Management Improvement Programme (FMIP)
and Programme Man agem ent and Budget ing (PMB), 1980s;
4. Denmark: Budgeting for Productivity Improvement, 1983;
5. Sweden: Triennial Budgeting, late-1970s;
6. New Zea land: The Public Fi nance Act, 1989; and
7. United States: Gov ern ment Per for mance and Re sults Act (GPRA),
1993.
The evo lu tion of the NPM frame work in all the coun tries listed above
evolved parallelly with the neo-lib eral ad vo cacy for pub lic ex pen di ture
cuts. The aim for adopt ing the NPM was the main te nance of cur rent lev els
of per for mance at re duced levels of spend ing, rather than im prove per for -
mances concur rent to a rise in spend ing. The fis cal con straint of the state
was cited as the rea son why a rise in spend ing was not a fea sible op tion.
The ex am ples of Aus tra lia, Denm ark and Sweden illustrate this point.
In Aus tra lia, the FMIP and PMB in the 1980s were in tro duced in a pe -
riod when the gov ern ment was ac tively prac tising a tril ogy pol icy of
stabilising budget outlays, tax revenue and deficit as a percentage of the
gross do mes tic prod uct (Schick, 1990, p. 29). The ef fect, as Schick at trib -
utes to of fi cial sources, was a squeeze on re sources (ibid.). On Den mark,
Schicks study notes the following:
Through most of the 1980s, the government has imposed a two percent cut on
operating expenditures. The intention has been to force agencies to be more
productive by squeezing the resources allocated to them. The 1985 Public
Expenditure White Paper announced that future spending limits would be set in
terms of desired improvements in productivity (Schick, 1990, p. 30).
In Swe den too, Tri ennial Bud get ing was a pol icy that went
hand-in-hand with cuts in pub lic ex pen di ture. A study notes that the policy
has been introduced following a long period, beginning in the late-1970s,
during which annual across-the-board cuts of two percent (in real terms) were
imposed on administrative expenditures. This cheese slicer, as the two per
cent cut is often referred to, has been made more flexible in recent years by
requiring agencies to save five per cent over a three-year periodThe enforced
cutbacks reflect the governments determination to stabilise the size of the
public expenditure relative to the gross national product (Schick, 1990, p. 30).
Avail able lit er a ture pro vides no ev i dence to the suc cess of NPM ini tia -
tives. A study by two IMF schol ars concluded that the em pir i cal lit er ature on
government-wide per for mance bud get ing does not pro vide a basis for
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
488 R. Ramakukar
strong con clusions about the ef fi cacy of these sys tems (Rob in son and
Brum by, 2005, pp. 43-44). Re view ing the re sults from the United States,
Gilmour and Lewis (2006) noted that there was lit tle sys tem atic ev i dence
thus far that perfor mance bud get ing, as it has been im plem ented in states and
cities, has had a major im pact on budget ing de cisions (p. 743). Reviewing
results from across coun tries, Suleiman (2003) con cluded the fol low ing:
It appears clear that the NPM agenda is indeed problem-ridden. Its claim to be
a new and modern solution that will cure all ills does not sand up against
empirical and analytical tests, and it loses much of its grandeur when measured
against historical comparisons. Even when we strip the NPM agenda to
something approaching its bare essentials and view it as a mere attempt to align
the public sector with the private sector, it remains a highly problematic
concept (pp. 127-128).
Gilmour and Lewis (2006) also noted prac ti cal dif fi culties in the adop -
tion of a per for mance-based bud geting sys tem. They pointed out that:
Performance budgeting is a troublesome enterprise because it is difficult to
know how to use performance information. If a program performs poorly, does
that mean that it should be cut because it is wasting money or increased so that
it can do better?...A program that is performing poorly might perform better if
given additional resources, whereas another very successful program may need
no more than its current allocationIn practise, performance budgeting may
reflect merit no more than traditional budgeting (p. 743750).
Phase 3: Performance Budgeting under Good Governance
By the late-1990s, the failure of the Wash ing ton Consen sus was being in -
creas ingly re cog nised at the global level. Along side, it was also becoming
clear that the em pha sis on mana ge rial changes had failed to cre ate any pos -
itive im pact on bud get ing meth ods. From the late-1990s on wards, in the
global dis course on pol icy, per for mance budgeting came to be nested
under the rhet o ric of good gov ernance by in sti tu tions like the World
Bank. Good gov ernance did not just in clude account abil ity; it also in -
cluded de cen trali sa tion and civil so ci ety. How ever, these terms had
spe cific mean ings within the World Bank dis course.
Decen trali sa tion was an el e ment in the World Banks pol icy discourse
from the early-1980s it self. The Banks po sition on de centrali sation
evolved over time; be gin ning with a more ex plicit char ac terisation of de -
cen trali sa tion as the flour ish of market-based ac tors and in stitu tions at the
local level in the 1980s, the po sition was mod i fied into support ing de cen -
trali sation within the larger frame work of good gov er nance in the 1990s.
In the World De vel opment Report 1983, the World Bank argued that, de -
cen trali sa tion should be seen as part of a broader mar ket-sur ro gate
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 489
strat egy (World Bank, 1983, p. 123), and that the aim was re plac ing the
bur den of cen tral ad min is tra tion by de cen tral ised mar ket forces (ibid., p.
87). The Bank argued that where gov ern ments are sim ply di vest ing them -
selves of ac tiv i ties that they can not man age, the trans fer of own er ship
[read, privatisation] it self con fers the autonomy that is needed to make
decentralisation work. The Bank also noted that:
Decentralizing is not solely a matter of involving a wider range of people in
discharging the responsibilities of the public sector. Governmentscan also
make greater use of markets and prices, since they avoid the heavy
administrative requirements of centralized planning controls. While greater
reliance on markets may appear to carry risks, many governments have learned
that their own interventions can easily misfireThe practical advantage of
relying more on markets is that the public sector can then concentrate on
improvements in those activities for which market solutions are inappropriate
(World Bank, 1983, p. 5).
Thus, the World Bank in tegrated de cen tralisa tion into the policy frame -
work set by neo-clas si cal eco nom ics. The Bank noted that the par tic i pa -
tion of local busi nesses can also play a cru cial role in de cen trali sa tion,
shaping in cen tives at the local level (ibid., p. 123). Thus, the concept of
firm-level decentralisation was given more importance than political, or
government-level, decentralisation (see Patnaik, 2000). At the firm-level
(or any pro duc tion unit), de cen tralisa tion was pre mised up on the neo-clas -
si cal as sump tion that when every firm in an econ omy maxi mises its re turns
(or func tions ef fi ciently), the econ omy as a whole also reaches an ef fi cient
equilib rium. The World Bank view of de centrali sa tion in volved firm-level
decentralisation (to be attained through privatisation, deregulation and
denationalisation) complementing government-level decentralisation so
that every firm in the econ omy could at tain ef fi ciency. Ac tors in civil so ci -
ety who are pri marily mar ket-based, es pe cially NGOs, were an im portant
type among firms en cour aged at the local level.
5
By the 1990s, the po sition of the Bank evolved into one where the old
NPM agenda, de cen trali sa tion and neo-lib eral eco nomic pol icy were har -
moniously in terwo ven and nested within the larger slo gan of good gov er -
nance. Shah (2006) noted these link ages from the stand point of re duc ing
corruption in public service delivery:
The new public management (NPM) paradigms have clear implications for the
study of localization and corruption as it argues for contractual arrangements in
provision of public services. Such a contractual framework may encourage
competitive service delivery through outsourcing, purchaser-provider split
under a decentralized structure of governance. The NPM goals are harmonious
with localization as greater accountability for results reinforces government
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
490 R. Ramakukar
accountability to citizens through voice and exit mechanisms. Conceptually,
therefore, the NPM is expected to reduce opportunities for corruption
The good gov er nance slo gan of the Bank did not rep re sent any sub -
stan tive dif ference from its po si tion of the 1980s. As Jenkins (2001)
noted, the operationalisation of the idea of good gov ernance included a
package: restructuring state bureaucracies, reforming legal systems,
supporting democratic decentralisation and creating accountability-en-
hancing civil societies. In practice, nevertheless, governance has come
to be as so ci ated with in sti tu tions de signed to sup port mar ket-led de vel -
op ment (ibid.). Citing the work of Wil liams and Young (1994), Jenkins
(2006, pp. 250251) noted that the Banks en cour age ment of civil so ci ety
in Africa was nothing less than a backdoor at tempt to trans form Af rican
so ciet ies from the ground up [to] per form the roles as signed to them in
liberal political theory and neo-liberal economic policy.
6
This new con -
cept of civil so ciety has been put to use for dif ferent purposes in the de -
vel op ing world by the World Bank, aid or gani sations like the USAID and
Western governments: to speed up neo-liberal reforms, topple democrati-
cally elected governm ents and weaken gov ern ments with an avowed
anti-imperial ist agenda. In deed, it was not in ci den tal that the fresh wave
of pop ularity for the idea of civil soci ety in the 1990s began with the
promotion of the Solidarity movement in Poland.
In sum, if we look at the global ex pe rience, the idea of per for mance bud -
get ing came to be used pri marily as an in strum ent to down size the state,
con trol public spend ing and en cour age the role of pri vate play ers in the
process of governance.
Such a critique of per form ance bud geting is not a re jec tion of the im por -
tance of the quality of pub lic ex pen di ture. The ef fective translation of pub -
lic spend ing into pub lic goods and ser vices is in deed an im por tant task for
any pro gres sive state. In de pend ent of the lev els of spend ing, there is scope
for improvement in the institutional mechanisms of public service deliv-
ery. The at tempt in this sec tion, on the con trary, was to argue that under the
neo-liberal policy frame work, and within the rhet o ric of NPM and good
gov er nance, lev els of pub lic spend ing be came a ca sualty. Low and stag -
nat ing, if not fall ing, lev els of pub lic spend ing, adversely affected the qual -
ity of de liv ery of pub lic ser vices.
The In dian ex pe ri ence with per for mance bud gets, and later out come
bud gets, needs to be dis cussed in this global con text. The au thor at tempts
to do this in the next sec tion.
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 491
III
PERFORMANCE BUDGET AND OUTCOME BUDGET IN INDIA
Performance Budgets in India
The in troduc tion of per for mance bud gets in India was in spired by its in tro -
duc tion in the United States.
7
In 1953, Paul H. Appleby, a con sul tant with
the Ford Foun da tion, was in vited by the then Fi nance Minis ter, C. D.
Deshmukh, to study the possibilities of reforming public administration in
India. Appleby, how ever, was not an en thusi ast of perfor mance bud gets in
the United States: he noted in his re port that the re cently in tro duced per -
for mance bud get in the United States has cer tain spe cial val ues, re veal ing
what it is de signed to re veal, but not re veal ing what it is not designed to
show (Appleby, 1953, p. 35). Notwith stand ing Applebys ap pre hen sion,
de mands to in troduce per for mance bud gets were made by mem bers of the
Lok Sabha in 1954. In 1958-59, a fa vourable sug gestion came from the Es -
timates Committee of the Lok Sabha; its report noted:
the Performance-cum-Programme System of budgeting would be ideal for a
proper appreciation of the schemes and outlays included in the budget,
especially in the case of large scale developmental activities. Performance
Budgeting should be the goal which should be reached gradually and by
progressive stages without any serious budgeting dislocation. (cited in Madan
and Mukerjee, 1989).
This recommendation was repeated by the Estimates Committee in
1960, which was accepted by the Fi nance Min istry in 1961. In 1964 and
1965, the Plan ning Com mission ini ti ated a set of pilot studies on per for -
mance budgeting (Toye, 1981). According to the Planning Com mis sion,
the stage has reached when ap pro priate meth ods of Per for mance Bud get -
ing should be evolved, so that these be come an in tegral part of the machin -
ery for plan ning and su per vision over plan ful film ent (cited in Madan and
Mukerjee, 1989). In 1965, a Per for mance Bud get ing Unit was formed
within the Com mission of fice. Toye (1981) gave spe cial em phasis to the
tim ing of the Plan ning Com mission efforts: it was at this time, when the
politi cal lead er ship of the Con gress Party had become anxious and
sceptical about the achieve ments of planning as it had oper ated dur ing the
Nehru years, that the deci sion to introduce performance budgeting seems
to have been taken (p. 123).
The pilot stud ies of the Plan ning Com mis sion be came a da tabase that
came to be analysed by a work ing group on per for mance bud gets of the
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
492 R. Ramakukar
first Ad minis trative Re forms Com mis sion (ARC) set up in 1965-66. In
1969-70, the first per for mance bud get was pub lished, ti tled Performance
Budgets of Selected Organisations, 19681969. Over the years, some state
governments also introduced performance budgets for specific depart-
ments.
Eval uations of perfor mance bud gets after 1969 do not re port en cour ag -
ing find ings. In a detailed eval uation, Toye (1981) re ported that while there
was steady prog ress in purely quan ti ta tive terms, there was lit tle cause
for satisfaction in qualitative terms. Toye argued that:
the enthusiastic expectations which greeted the introduction of performance
budgeting in India have been disappointed. Performance budgets have not been
extended over the five-year planning horizon, new measures of the analysis of
performance have not been developed and an integral system of planning and
budgeting with ex post evaluation being used as feedback has not been
constructed (p. 141).
Toye identi fied three major prob lems in In dian perfor mance bud gets.
First, the expenditure classification used in the performance budgets were
typ i cally in stitu tional and hence, does not allow one to ex am ine the dif -
fer ent ac tiv i ties of the govern ment in a sim pler and more funda men tal
sense. Sec ond, the in di ca tors of per for mance used were highly in ade -
quate for any meaningful assessment of the governments activities.
8
Third, the form at for the prep a ration of per for mance bud gets was un chang -
ing over the years, which showed very lit tle ev i dence of ex per i ments or
innovations. Thus, performance budgets embodied description, and not
analysis.
An im por tant prob lem with the way per for mance bud gets were at -
tempted in India was its me chani cal ap pli ca tion, di vorced from local con -
texts. As Toye (1981) noted, perfor mance bud gets were pre pared in the
spirit of rou tine doc u ment com pi la tion rather than of ad min is tra tive pi o -
neer ing (p. 126). In a broader re view across de vel op ing countries, Peter
Dean noted that:
Performance budgeting was not tried, tested and proven as an operational
system at the time developing countries adopted it. On the contrary,
dissatisfaction was beginning to emerge in the USA about its usefulness. When
it was exported to developing countries, these reservations were suppressed.
Instead, exaggerated claims were made about what it would accomplish.
Developing countries tried to fulfil these claims but they encountered a range
of difficulties similar to those already experienced in USA (Dean, 1990, p. 16).
In sum, perfor mance bud gets in India did not lead to any improve ment
in the ef fectiveness of pub lic spending. Nei ther did they meaning fully
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 493
pro vide in formation to bud get-mak ers on the di rec tions to adopt, nor did
they pro vide in for ma tion to the pub lic on how well gov ern ment schemes
are performing.
From Performance Budgets to Outcome Budgets
The fail ure of perfor mance bud gets to mean ing fully con trib ute to the bud -
get ary pro cess was well-ap pre ci ated in the In dian of fi cial cir cles by the
2000s. The em pha sis, then, slowly shifted from perfor mance bud gets to
outcome budgets.
An out come bud get is a doc u ment that links out lays of the gov ern ment
to out comes through the pro vision of in puts and the creation of out puts.
There are, of course, di verse def i nitions for this term in the lit er a ture on
public administration. According to one study, outcome budget is any
bud get that pres ents infor ma tion on what agen cies have done or ex pect to
do with the money provided (Curristine, 2005, pp. 130131). More spe -
cif i cally, it is de fined else where as a form of bud get ing that re lates funds
al lo cated to measur able re sults (OECD, 2003, p. 3).
In any out come bud get, there are four terms of sig nif i cance: out lays, in -
puts, out puts and out comes. Outlays are the fi nancial al loca tions made by
the gov ernm ent in its budget on dif fer ent programmes. Inputs are the dif -
ferent tangible and intangible provisions made by the government (and/or
the ben e fi cia ries) in order to achieve the ob jec tives of these programmes.
For example, scholar ships for stu dents or the in vest ment in the construc -
tion of a school build ing in ed ucation-re lated schemes are con sid ered as in -
puts of the gov ernm ent. Pri vate costs in curred by the ben e ficiaries and
dif fer ent forms of vol un tary/free pro vi sions are also con sid ered as in puts.
Out puts are the as sets and ser vices cre ated under the programme. For ex -
am ple, the school build ing is an out put in the edu cation-related
programme. How ever, the con struc tion of a school may not be suf fi cient to
achieve the ob jec tive of con ceiv ing the scheme, which may have been to
raise the en roll ment rates or re duce the dropout rates. This is where the dif -
fer ence be tween an out put (the school build ing) and an out come (rise in en -
rollm ent rates resulting from the con struc tion of a school) is of im portance.
An out come is the re sult we want from a programme at the bot tom line,
which fol lows the uti li sa tion of as sets and ser vices cre ated.
A snap shot of the major dif fer ences between per for mance bud gets and
out come budgets is given in Table 1. An outcome bud get dif fers from a per -
for mance bud get in that it fo cuses on how well the as sets and ser vices
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
494 R. Ramakukar
cre ated are uti lised, and not just cre ated. In our ex am ple of ed u ca tion-re lated
schemes, an outcome bud get would docu ment the ex tent to which the con -
struc tion of a school build ing has been success ful in im prov ing, say, the en -
roll ment rate. It would thus ana lyse the ex tent to which the creation has been
success ful in rais ing uti li sation. In cases where it is found to be fail ing, the
out come budget would discuss the reasons for the poor uti li sation of the as -
sets. It would put for ward con crete suggestions for reforming organi sations
and in sti tu tions so that uti li sation of as sets, and ser vices, could be im proved.
TABLE 1: Major Differences between Performance Budgets and Outcome
Budgets
Performance Budgets Outcome Budgets
Emphasis on outputs Emphasis on outcomes and
effectiveness
Emphasis on creation of assets and Emphasis on utilisation of assets and
services services
Seeks to optimise programmes Seeks to improve organisations for
better spread and reach of programmes
Emphasis on processes, compliance Emphasis on results, performance and
and management control management improvement
Source: collated from different sources.
While the term out come budget earns its name from the em pha sis on
out comes rather than out puts, the con cept is used under dif ferent names in
dif fer ent coun tries; the re lated terms in clude RBM, en tre pre neur ial bud -
get ing and mis sion budgeting.
The In dian govern ment first an nounced its plan to launch out come bud -
gets in the Fi nance Min is ters bud get speech for 2005-2006. Fol low ing
this an nounce ment, Prime Min is ter Manmohan Singh wrote to all min is -
ters in 2005 stress ing the im por tance of converting fi nan cial out lays into
phys i cal out comes, with fixed quar terly mea sur able and monitorable tar -
gets, to improve the quality of implementation of development
programmes (cited in Gupta, 2010). To coor di nate the prep a ra tion of out -
come budgets, the Plan ning Com mis sion cre ated a new di vi sion called the
Programme Out come and Response Mon i toring Di vision in 2005. A core
group was set up in 2005 itself with of fi cers from the Plan ning Com mis -
sion and the Min is try of Fi nance to issue uni form guide lines for the prepa -
ra tion of out come budgets. The first out come budget for the year
IJSW, 72(4), 483-504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 495
20052006 was re leased in 2006; this was fol lowed by sim i lar budgets for
20062007, 20072008, 20082009, 20092010 and 20102011. The ear -
lier per form ance bud gets were dis con tin ued and merged into the prepa ra -
tion of out come bud gets. In the foreword writ ten for the outcome bud get of
20052006, the Fi nance Min ister noted the im por tant steps in the pro cess:
Outcomes should be specifically defined in measurable and
monitorable terms, and intermediate outputs should also be defined
wherever required;
Standardising unit cost of delivery;
Benchmarking the standards/quality of outcomes and services;
Capacity building for requisite efficiency at all levels, in terms of
equipment, technology, knowledge and skills;
Ensuring flow of right amount of money at the right time to the right
level, with neither delay nor parking of funds;
Effective monitoring and evaluation systems; and
Involvement of the community/target groups/recipients of the
service, with easy access and feedback systems.
There have not been many evalu ations of out come budgets of the cen tral
gov ern ment, but avail able stud ies note lit tle dif fer ence be tween the ear lier
per for mance bud gets and out come bud gets. It would appear that the rea -
sons for the fail ure of per for mance bud gets were, clearly, not ap pre ci ated
and the same er rors are al lowed to be re peated. Even staunch propo nents of
outcome budgets have expressed disappointment; Premchand (2006)
noted that the Outcome Budget (OB) as is for mu lated now is noth ing
more than the per for mance bud get (p. 1). Mathur (2010) re viewed the
first six out come bud gets of the cen tral gov ern ment and con cluded thus:
A study of these budgets does not provide any clue as to how various schemes
and programmes are functioning and the intended outcomes are being
achieved. The enthusiasm with which Outcome Budget was launched in
February 2005 seems to have petered out, as in the budget speech of the
Finance Minister for 20082009, 20092010 and 20102011 there is not a
single line making a mention of the Outcome Budget as a tool for monitoring
performance of various schemes and development programmes
...the Outcome Budgets of each ministry have become a huge mass of
incoherent data and figures, having no relation with outcome of development
schemes with which the public is concernedIt is obvious that Outcome
Budgets of various ministries are not serving any purpose and have become an
exercise in futility. (Mathur, 2010).
Gupta (2010) ar gued that the failure of out come budgets in India had
many rea sons. First, gov ern ment of fi cials did not have any spe cific in cen tive
to pre pare out come bud gets in any mean ingful way. Sec ond, no min is try or
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
496 R. Ramakukar
de partm ent had the req ui site skills or tech niques required to prepare out -
come bud gets. Ac cord ing to him, due to these and many other rea sons,
the [outcome budget] has failed. This failure has happened because the
assumptions of the theory of change underlying the [outcome budgets] have
not been satisfied. It is business as usual, with no visible improvement in the
effectiveness of the GoIs spending, and with no positive change even in the
mindset of those who manage the GoIs spending. (2010, p. 571)
A com mon thread that runs through the three cri tiques pre sented above
is an as sump tion that one al ready has ro bust meth od olo gies on the table to
pre pare meaning ful out come budgets. In this sense, all the three critiques
above miss the point. In fact, one of the most in trigu ing el e ments in the
preparation of an outcome budget remains its methodology. The reports of
the Gov ern ment of India are more forthright in ad mit ting this la cuna than
the three cri tiques listed above. Ac cord ing to Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the
Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission:
The exercise of outcome budget of manipulating existing data did not get the
desired results. It is easy to evaluate whether investment made in a steel plant
has delivered. But measurement of outcomes in health and education are
difficult and complex.
9
In the draft ap proach paper for the elev enth five year plan, the Plan ning
Commission noted that there are internal difficulties in the preparation of
out come bud gets. The ap proach paper also gave two exam ples to illus trate
these difficulties, which were primarily methodological:
In the case of education for example, starting from expenditures as a first step,
one can track intermediate outcomes such as the construction of school facilities,
the filling of vacancies and training of teachers, success in enrolment and
reductions in drop out rates but the final outcome is really the quality of
education provided. All the intermediate steps are relevant and also well worth
monitoring, but the ultimate test of the strategy must be defined in terms of final
outcomes. Often this can only be determined over a period of time. At times the
causal chain may involve factors outside the program itself. This is evident, for
example, in the case of health where improvements in health status are often the
result not of interventions in the area of curative health but in the provision of
clean drinking water and sanitation (Planning Commission, 2006, pp. 94-95).
These methodological difficulties in preparing an outcome budget
should be ob vi ous. As long as there is no one-to-one re la tion ship be tween
the in puts and out comes (that is, as long as ex trane ous fac tors in de pend -
ently affect outcomes), the methodological difficulties in preparing out-
come budgets would re main. Such a method ologi cal prob lem can not be
transcended by assum ing away the ex tra neous fac tors or by try ing to con -
trol for them. These dif fi cul ties need to be ac cepted and al ter na tive ways
of evaluating programmes and schemes need to be explored.
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 497
IV
LESSONS AND ALTERNTIVE DIRECTIONS
To con clude, first, the fail ure of out come bud gets at the central level in
India brings to fore the per ils of me chan i cally adopt ing meth ods and tech -
niques that are de vel oped out of his tori cal con texts and local re ali ties. This,
pre cisely, was the prob lem with per form ance bud gets of the 1970s, and
they re main the prob lem with out come budgets in the 2000s.
Second, performance-based assessments of budgets in developing
coun tries, which do not spend ade quately in pro vid ing their cit i zens with
basic needs, should be delinked from efforts to re duce ex pen di ture. Im -
proving the efficiency of public expenditure is a necessary measure inde-
pend ent of the lev els of spend ing. A major chal lenge in the prep ara tion and
implementation of outcome budgets in developing countries, then, is to
res cue it from the con ser va tive sound fi nance ar gu ments of neo-lib eral
economists and international financial agencies.
Third, any method that mechani cally links per for mances with bud get al-
locations sits uncomfortably with a rights-based approach to development.
When cer tain basic needs of the peo ple are re cog nised as rights, there is lit -
tle room for any cost-bene fit analy sis on the mat ter. Even if there is a loss
in the pro cess of achievem ent of an out come re lated to basic needs, the
government cannot withdraw from its responsibility of provision in the
name of inefficiency.
Fi nally, an im por tant prob lem with the methods and tech niques used in
out come budget ing is that they have re mained in su lated from poli tics. As
long as out comes are medi ated by po liti cal fac tors, outcome bud gets can-
not as sume pol i tics away and take a tech no cratic stance. It needs to be re -
cognised that budget making cannot be envisaged as independent of
pol itics. The au thor would argue that any dis cussion on im provem ents or
alternatives to outcome budgeting has to begin with the appreciation of
politics in budget making in a fundamentally democratic manner.
The au thor indi cates three major forms of de par ture from the prev a lent
or tho dox ies, all three of which in volve an ap pre ci a tion of pol i tics in pub lic
ad min is tration. First, the links be tween the nature of pub lic service de liv-
ery and the re forms re quired in the ad min is tra tive struc ture of the state has
been an im por tant theme in the In dian lit era ture from the 1950s on wards.
The Gorwala Com mit tee of 1950, the Appleby re ports of 1953 and 1956,
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
498 R. Ramakukar
the Santhanam Committee of 1962, the Administrative Reforms Commis-
sion of 1966 and the Sarkaria Com mis sion of 1983 were all dif fer ent en -
qui ries into the reforms re quired in Indian pub lic ad min istra tion to make it
more ef fi cient and ef fec tive. How ever, very few of the rec om men da tions
of these com mittees have been im ple mented till date. In stead, dis pro por -
tionate em pha sis is being placed on per form ance-based budget ing meth ods
to im prove pub lic ser vice de liv ery. The dan ger here is the side-lin ing of
fun da men tal changes in fa vour of su per fi cial changes.
Sec ond, it is im por tant to re cog nise the need and im portance of de cen -
tralisation financial and political in the efficient delivery of public ser-
vices. The au thor shall try to il lus trate the im por tance of decen trali sa tion in
pub lic ser vice de liv ery by briefly high light ing the ex pe rience of one state
Kerala.
De cen trali sa tion of gov ern ment (called as the Peo ples Plan Campaign,
or PPC) was a major po lit i cal and ad min is tra tive ini tiative of the Gov ern -
ment of Kerala from 1996 on wards. The PPC in volved a his toric de ci sion
to de volve 35 to 40 per cent of the plan funds to the local gov ernm ents. The
local gov ern ments were to draw up plans and pro jects for the de velopment
of their re gions using the plan funds de volved. The par tici pa tion of all sec -
tions of peo ple in the grama sabhas (village assem blies) and other fo rums
of the plan ning process trans formed this planning pro cess from a mere ad -
ministrative exercise to a mass movement for decentralisation.
Social scientists have given inadequate attention to the impact of
post-1996 decentralisation in Kerala on local-level corrup tion and nep o -
tism. In one anal y sis, T. M. Thomas Isaac ar gues that de cen trali sa tion had
a positive and significant impact on the reduction of corruption, nepotism
and leak age in pro ject im plem en tation (see de tailed table in Ap pen dix 1).
Higher levels of transparency in decentralisation made corruption more
vis i ble, which, in fact, was in strum en tal in re duc ing corrup tion. The les son
from Kerala is that decentralisation is primarily a political transfer of
power and such re dis tri bu tion of po lit i cal power can have sig nif i cant im -
pacts on the na ture of pub lic service de livery and its ef fi ciency. However,
pro po nents of performance-based budgeting have had nothing to offer on
such fundamental changes required.
Finally, it is im portant to un derline the im por tance of evalu ation by the
peo ple them selves. The au thor is re ferring to so cial audits here. A so cial
audit is a pro cess where the ben e fi cia ries of a programme come to gether
and exchange ideas, views and opin ions on all the in formation re gard ing
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 499
the programme from the standpoint of their per sonal ex pe rience. Ulti -
mately, the per for mance of a programme has to be mea sured in terms of
how peo ple ex peri ence and judge the programme and its ben e fits. A social
audit is also, thus, a po lit i cal process, which again has no place in a typical
performance-based budgeting system.
In conclusion, alternative directions that performance-based budgeting
should take has to be in terms of ap pre ci ating the cen tral ity of pol i tics in
public administration. Unfortunately, changes in these directions do not
ap pear to be forthcom ing under the cur rent dom i nant para digms of tech no -
cratic gov er nance. To con test and re write such par a digms is a major po liti -
cal challenge that the contemporary world faces.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Impact of decentralisation on different components of local
corruption in Kerala, 1997-2001
Type of Corruption Impact of Rationale
Decentralisation
Nepotism in beneficiary Drastically Introduction of transparent and
selection reduced participatory beneficiary selection
procedure
Corruption at the Eliminated Administrative sanction made
administrative sanction automatic with the approval of the
stage of public works plan
Corruption at the Virtually Not a single allegation of corruption
technical sanction stage eliminated raised against expert committees despite
of public works controversies that surrounded them
Corruption in the award Significantly Beneficiary committees promoted
of works to the reduced instead of contractors
contractors
Corruption during Reduced Only less than 25 per cent of the
actual implementation beneficiary committees were benami
committees. Nearly 25 per cent of the
beneficiary committees were
exemplary and raised substantial
additional resources.
Frauds in the purchase Reduced Better monitoring and public visibility
of materials than in the past
Source: Thomas Isaac (2007).
IJSW, 72(4), 483-504, October 2011
Type of Corruption
Nepotism in beneficiary
selection
Corruption at the
administrative sanction
stage of public works
Corruption at the
technical sanction stage
of public works
Corruption in the award
of works to the
contractors
Corruption during
actual implementation
Frauds in the purchase
of materials
Impact of
Decentralisation
Drastically
reduced
Eliminated
Virtually
eliminated
Significantly
reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Rationale
Introduction of transparent and
participatory beneficiary selection
procedure
Administrative sanction made
automatic with the approval of the
plan
Not a single allegation of corruption
raised against expert committees despite
controversies that surrounded them
Beneficiary committees promoted
instead of contractors
Only less than 25 per cent of the
beneficiary committees were benami
committees. Nearly 25 per cent of the
beneficiary committees were
exemplary and raised substantial
additional resources.
Better monitoring and public visibility
than in the past
500 R. Ramakukar
NOTES
1. All data used here are from http://data.worldbank.org
2. In a recent study using panel data from 120 developing countries between 1975 and
2000, Baldacci and others (2004) argued that public spending in education and health
had a positive and significant direct impact on the accumulation of education and
health capital (p. 28). They argued that an increase in education spending of 1
percentage point of GDP is associated with 3 more years of schooling on
averageSimilarly, an increase in health spending of 1 percentage point of GDP is
associated with an increase of 0.6 percentage points in the under-5 child survival rate
(ibid.). These pos i tive im pacts were stron gest in the case of low-in come coun tries and
countries from Af rica. In their widely-cited study of 22 coun tries, Anand and
Ravallion (1993) ar gued that the ef fect on life ex pec tancy rates of an in crease in pub lic
spend ing on health was twice as sig nifi cant as an in crease in per ca pita in come. They
con cluded that cer tain com po nents of pub lic spend ing can mat ter greatly in
en hanc ing human de vel op ment in poor coun tries, and that they mat ter quite
in de pend ently of what they do or dont de liver in terms of re duced in come pov erty (p.
147). Chakrabortys (2003) analy sis for selected developed and developing countries
showed that pub lic spend ing on ed u ca tion and health has a stron ger im pact on human
development than the growth of per capita income.
3. Throughout this paper, I have dis tin guished be tween the terms per formance-based
bud get ing, which is a ge neric term, and per for mance bud get, which is a spe cific
applica tion of the concept.
4. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN014322.pdf
5. The idea of firm-level decentralisation is theoretically misplaced. Prabhat Patnaik has
argued that firm-level and government-level decentralisation stand contradic tory to
each other as firm-level-decentralisation actually emasculates decentralised planning
and makes gov ern ment-level de cen trali sa tion vac u ous (Patnaik, 2000, p. 10).
According to him, decentralised decision-making, even when informed by individual
rationality, is fundamentally irrational because the units are in reality not separable
from one an other (ibid., p. 2). Every eco nomic de ci sion taken by a firm af fects other
firms as well. Due to this inter-re lated na ture of firm-level ac tions and outcomes, the
final out come would be ir ra tio nal for all the firms al though each firm would have acted
ra tio nally. This fal lacy of firm-level de cen trali sation can be corrected, (in other words,
a more ra tio nal out come for all firms to gether en sured) if every firm col luded with
every other or if the state in ter vened through eco nomic plan ning. The former being a
remote possibility, the latter emerges as the only possible solution.
6. Singh (2005) notes that in the 1990s, the USAID funded 60 local gov er nance
ini tia tives while the UNDP funded more than 250 de cen trali sa tion pro jects.
Ac cord ing to him, in the name of de cen trali sa tion and local self-gov er nance, es sen tial
de vel op men tal tasks and so cial re spon si bil i ties of the state are being handed over to
cash-starved, non-trans par ent, un ac count able NGOs and local bod ies with out
examining their performance and capacity to deliver[T]he welfare functions of the
na tion-state arebeing weak ened from below in the guise of decentralisation (p. 121).
7. The United Na tions too pub lished a man ual for Programme and Per for mance
Bud get ing in 1965 it self (Dean, 1990). As Toye (1981) noted in jest about the
in tro duc tion of per for mance bud gets in India: Govern ment of India tends to seize
with alacrity on foreign administrative innovations (p. 122). Dean (1990),
IJSW, 72(4), 483504, October 2011
Performance-based Budgeting 501
how ever, cau tions against the read ing that out sid ers thrust per for mance bud get ing on
de vel op ing coun tries. He notes that the rul ers in these coun tries also en thu si as ti cally
ac cepted the model, just as experimenters in the United States did.
8. According to Toye, the com bi na tion of fi nan cial and phys i cal data on pro jects
tar gets and ac tual achieve ments do not allow us to reach safe con clu sions about the
per for mance of any par tic u lar pro ject. (1981, p. 125).
9. Outcome budget serves no pur pose, says Montek, The Eco nomic Times, 13 Oc to ber
2009, avail able at: http://ar ticles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-10-13
/news/28414324_1_outcome-budget-monetary-policy-stimulus-package
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