Lee Hong Kok vs.

David
G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
Distinction between IMPERIUM and
DOMINIUM
Only the government can question a
void certificate of title issued pursuant
to a government grant.
FACTS:

This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano
David acquired lawful title thereto, pursuant to
his miscellaneous salesapplication. After
approval of his application, the Director of Lands
issued an order of award and issuance of sales
patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent.
The Register of Deeds then issued an
original certificate of title to David.

During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not
oppose nor file any adverse claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may
question the government grant
HELD:

Only the Government, represented by
the Director of Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an
action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by
said officers but by private parties like the
plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and
title issued for the land involved are void since
they are not the registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as owners in the
cadastral proceedings after claiming it as
their private property.

The fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant
was in conformity with the law or not is a
question which the government may raise, but
until it is raised by the government and set
aside, the defendant cannot question it. The
legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government.

IMPERIUM vs. DOMINIUM:

The government authority possessed by the
State which is appropriately embraced int eh
concept of sovereignty comes under the heading
of imperium; its capacity to own or acquire
property under dominium. The use of this term
is appropriate with reference to lands held by
the State in its proprietary character. In such
capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and
use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by
the Constitution.
Cario vs Insular Government, 41 Phil 935(Land
Titles and Deeds Native Title)
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a
certain land. He and his ancestors had held the land
as owners for more than 50 years, which he
inherited under Igorot customs. There was no
document of title issued for the land when he
applied for registration. The government contends
that the land in question belonged to
the state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged
to the Spanish Crown except those with
permit private titles. Moreover, there is no
prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the
Spanish Crown under the Regalian Doctrine.

Held:
No. Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted title to his land. The United States
Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:It
might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land.There is an
existence of native title to land, or ownership of land
by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of
ownership since time immemorial and independent
of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.







MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULARGOVERNMENT
Land Titles and Deeds Regalian Doctrine Statute
of Limitations

On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to
the Court of Land Registration to
petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare
land hes been possessing in the then municipality
of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory
information and no other documentation. The State
opposed the petition averring that the land is part of
the US military reservation. The CLR
ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo
lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to
him by reason of immemorial use and occupation as
in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs
Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the
land by virtue of his possession of itfor some time.

HELD:
No. The statute of limitations did not run against the
government. The government is still the absolute
owner of the land (regalia doctrine). Further,
Mateos possession of the land
has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for
many years. It was never used for anything but
pasturage of animals, except
insignificant portions thereof, and since the
insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been
used by the petitioner for any purpose. While the
State has always recognized the right
of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until he did the
State remained the absolute owner.


Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946
GR: All lands are acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant.
EXCEPTION: Lands under private ownership since
time
immemorial. Application for decree of registration is
a condition precedent to acquisition of title. Non-
compliance gives rise to mere possessory right. An
alien cannot acquire title to lands of the public
domain by prescription.

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the
Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which
they openly, continuously and adversely possessed
since 1880. On January 17, 1940,
OhCho applied for registration of this land. The
Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh
Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was
an alien.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not Oh Cho had title
Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree
of registration
HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot,
which may be confirmed under the Land Registration
Act. All lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain. An exception to the rule would
be any land that should have been in
the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for
such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception,
for the earliest possession of the lot by his first
predecessor in interest began in 1880.Under the
Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would
have been entitled to a decree of registration had
they applied for the same. The application for the
registration of the land was a condition precedent,
which was not complied with by the Lagmeos.
Hence, the most they had was mere possessory
right, not title. This possessory right was what was
transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an
alien, the possessory right could never ripen to
ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is
disqualified from acquiring title over public land by
prescription





[G.R. No. 122269. September 30, 1999]
REPUBLIC vs . CA, ET. AL.

FACTS:
The parcel of land that is presently the subject of the
dispute in the instant case
Lot 3 Portion forms part of the above-
mentioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable
Court as belonging to the public domain,
classified/zonified land available for fishpond
development.
This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Secretary of Agriculture,for a period of 25 years, or
up to December 31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease
Agreement.On July 6, 1988, however, the late
Zenaida
Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed acomplaint a
gainst Porfirio Morado in theRegional Trial Court of
Alaminos, Pangasinan for ownership and possession
over the lot in question. Herein petitioner, the
Republic of the Philippines, was not made a party to
that suit. In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed
absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful
possession of several lots under PSU-
155696surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro
Bustria. She further asserted that said
PorfirioMorado maliciously applied for a fishpond
permit
with the Bureau of Fisheries and AquaticResources
over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot),well-
knowing that said lot had always been occupied,
possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-
in-
interest.Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in th
e complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part
of the public domain which he developed and
converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to
Porfirio Morados and his counsels failure to
appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court
hearings, the trial court subsequently declared
Porfirio Morado as in
default.Respondent Judge rendered a decision
declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute
owner of the land in question. Petitioner (REPUBLIC),
filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the
trial courts decision. Petitioner alleged that the land
in question is within the classified/zonified alienable
and disposable land for fishpond development
and that since the land formed part of the public
domain, the BFAR
has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance
with P.D. No. 704, 4. CA rendered a decision
dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition
for review. The judgment rendered in a case may be
annulled on any of the following grounds: (a)
the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or
for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained
through extrinsic fraud. The question in this case
is whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
void on any of these grounds. The
preliminary question, however, is whether the
government can bring such action even though
was not a party to the action in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered. We shall deal
with these questions in inverse order.
RULING:
First, is the question whether petitioner has
personality to bring the actionbelow. To begin with,
an action to recover aparcel of land isin
personam. As such, it is binding only between the
parties thereto, as this Court explained in
Ching v. Court of Appeals
, viz:
An action to redeem, or to recover title toor
possession of, real property is not
anaction in rem or an action against thewhole world,
like a land registration proceeding or the probate of
a will; it is
anaction in personam, so much so that a judgment
therein is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or giv
en an opportunity to beheard. Actions in personam
and
actionsin rem differ in that the former aredirected ag
ainst specific persons and seek personal judgments,
while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and
seek judgmentswith respect thereto as against the
wholeworld. An action to recover a parcel of land is a
real action but it is an action
in personam, for it binds a particular individual only
although it concerns theright to a tangible thing.

The appellate court, holding that the
proceedings before the trial court werein personam,
ruled that since petitioner was nota party to Civil
Case No. A-1759, it is not areal party-in-interest and,
therefore, has no personality to bring the action for
annulmentof the judgment rendered in that case.
The appellate court is in error. In
Islamic Dawah Council of the Phils. v. Court of App
eals, this Court held that a party claiming ownership
of a parcel of land which is
thesubject of foreclosure proceedings has asufficient
interest to bring an action for annulment of the judg
ment rendered in theforeclosure proceedings even
though it was nota party in such proceedings.
It was held:
[A] person need not be a party to the judgment soug
ht to be annulled. What is essential is that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained
by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.
Private respondents do not deny that IsidroBustria, t
o whom they trace their ownership,previously filed a
fishpond application with theBFAR over the disputed
land. Neither do they deny that the disputed land
formed part of the public
domain.We agree with petitioner. The State clearlyst
ands to be adversely affected by the trialcourts
disposition of inalienable public land. The
land involved in this case was classified as public
land suitable for fishpond development. In
controversies involving the disposition of public land,
the burden of overcoming the presumption of state
ownership of lands of the public domain
lies upon the private claimant. Private respondents
have not discharged this burden. The fact that the
land in dispute was transformed into a fully
developed fishpond does not mean that it has
lost its character
as one declaredsuitable for fishpond purposes und
er thedecree. By applying for a fishpond permit with
BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character
of the land as one suitable for fishpond development
since the disposition of such lands is vested in the
BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his
successors-in-interests, are stopped from claiming
otherwise.It is settled under the Public Land Law tha
talienable public land held by a possessor,personally
or through his predecessor-in-
interest,openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30
years is ipso jure converted to private property by
the mere lapse of time. However, only public lands
classified as agricultural are
alienable. Lands declared for fishery
purposes are not alienable and their possession, no
matter how long continued, cannot ripen into
ownership. Since the disposition of lands declared
suitable for fishpond purposes fall within
the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in accordance with P.D.
No 704, 4, the trial courts decision is
null and void. The trial court has no jurisdiction to m
ake a disposition of inalienable public land




G.R. No. 32266. February 27, 1989.*
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner, vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL,respondent.

FACTS:
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its
registration on January 25, 1949,alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After
trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then
came to this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. Both the petitioner and the private
respondent agree that the land is mangrove land.
ISSUE:
What is the legal classification of mangrove swamps,
or manglares, as they are commonly known? Part of
our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution or are they considered public
agricultural lands; they may be acquired under
private ownership.

RULING:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be
understood as comprised within the public forests of
the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section
1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no
authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion.
The statutory definition remains unchanged to date
and, no less noteworthy is accepted and invoked by
the executive department. More importantly, the
said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary
or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed
valid and so must be respected. As such,they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the
subject of private ownership until and unless they
are first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land. WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
application for registration of title of private
respondent is DISMISSED.
PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997

FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels
of land covered by Executive Order No. 40. On
1916, he ordered the registration of these lands
and donated the same to his heirs, Ignacio and
Carmen Palomo two months before his death in
April 1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original
certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of
Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of
Albay issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October
1953. Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting
the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into
the "Tiwi Hot Spring National Park," under the
control, management, protection and
administration of the defunct Commission of Parks
and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as
alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Law nor registerable under the Land Registration
Act. The Palomos, however, continued in
possession of the property, paid real estate taxes
thereon and introduced improvements by planting
rice, bananas, pandan and coconuts. On April 8,
1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and
spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual
mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan
of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine
Islands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not forest land may be
owned by private persons.

HELD:
The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of
imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands
of the public domain. It is in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
by private persons. It is not registerable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot
convert it into private property, unless such lands
are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. There is no question that the lots here
forming part of the forest zone were not alienable
lands of the public domain. As to the forfeiture of
improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact
that the government failed to oppose the
registration of the lots in question is no justification
for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing
improvements on the lots.










































Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-43938, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
228Cruz, J.
FACTS:
An application for registration of a parcel of
land was filed on February 11,1965, by Jose de
la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his
three children. The land, situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9
lots. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were
sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. In support of the
application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified
that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have
received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9
in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She was
corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled the
earlier possession of the land byAlberto's
father. Benguet opposed on the ground that the
June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and
recorded it on October 14,1909. From the date
of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous andexclusive possession of the land
in concept of owner. Atok alleged that a portion
of Lots1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by
the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located
byHarrison and Reynolds on December 25,
1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
theoffice of the mining recorder of Baguio.
These claims were purchased from
theselocators on November 2, 1931, by Atok,
which has since then been in open,
continuousand exclusive possession of the said
lots. The Bureau of Forestry Development
alsointerposed its objection, arguing that the
land sought to be registered was covered bythe
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16,1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of
1935 and 1973.The trial court denied the
application, holding that the applicants had
failed to prove their claim of possession and
ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent
court, which reversed the trial court and
affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving
thesub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguetand
Atok appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking
their superior right of ownership. TheRepublic
filed its own petition for review and reiterated
its argument that neither theprivate
respondents nor the two mining companies had
any valid claim to the landbecause it was not
alienable and registerable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a better
right over the property inquestion.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and includedin the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did
not impair the rights already vestedin Benguet
and Atok at that time. The perfection of the
mining claim converted theproperty to mineral
land and under the laws then in force removed
it from the publicdomain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land,
against even31

the government, without need of any further
act such as the purchase of the land or
theobtention of a patent over it. As the land
had become the private property of
thelocators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.It is
true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that
such private property was subject tothe
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to
forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or,
asthe private respondents aver, by acquisitive
prescription. The Court of Appeals justified this
by saying there is "no conflict of interest"
between the owners of the surface right sand
the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral
underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. However, the
rights over the land are indivisible and that the
land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical;
theland must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case,
asalready observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be
soand became mineral and completely
mineral once the mining claims
wereperfected. As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath,it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so,
because it wasenclosed with a fence and was
cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying thesurface.This is an application of
the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the owner
of agriculturalland in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not
give him theright to extract or utilize the said
minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong.Benguet and Atok
have exclusive rights to the property in question
by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935prohibited the alienation of
all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes. The decision is set aside and that
of the trial court is reinstated