TAKING A RE-LOOK AT INDIA-MYANMAR RELATIONS

Guest Column-by Col R Hariharan (retd.)

The recent upsurge in violent insurgent activities in the Northeast has made it
urgent for India to take action to clear Indian insurgent groups camps across the
borders of Bangladesh and Burma. Bangladesh had been denying their
existence and refuted such information in every forum. Myanmar's attitude has
been more positive. It is in this context the visit of Myanmar’s head of state Gen.
Than Shwe’s visit to Delhi on October 25, 2004 assumes significance. Than
Shwe also heads the ruling military junta’s State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC). No doubt discussions on joint or coordinated military operation
between the two countries to eliminate Indian insurgents’ hideouts in Northern
Myanmar will figure high on the agenda of Myanmar’s head of state. According to
media reports this issue had already figured in the discussions of Home
Secretary Dhirendra Singh and the visiting Myanmar Deputy Home Minister
Brigadier General Bhon Swe on October 5, 2004.
India has a 1670 km long land border with Myanmar along the strategic eastern
frontier. Relations between India and Myanmar date back to the third century BC,
when Buddhism reached Myanmar from India. During the British colonial era for
a period of over 50 years Myanmar was under the administrative control of British
India. The struggle against colonial rule brought the national leaders of the two
countries together. Till Gen Ne Win seized power India and Myanmar shared the
common ethos of nonalignment. Strategically for India’s national security, a
friendly regime in Myanmar is vital. However, with the rise of Myanmar’s military
regime, the two countries fell apart; China assiduously cultivated Myanmar and
built a close relationship since early 70s.
The pro-democracy uprising in Myanmar spearheaded by the National League
for Democracy (NLD) led to the annulment of the election by the military junta.
India’s moral support to the struggle for democracy under Aung San Suu Kyi’s
leadership led to further souring of relations between the two countries. The
Indian government awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Peace Prize in 1995 to Aung
San Suu Kyi as a token of its appreciation of her contribution to democracy in
Myanmar.
However, even during this period of India’s muted relations, limited cooperation
at the ground level in the border areas to contain insurgency had always existed.
With the military firmly in the saddle, Delhi had been slowly waking up to the
reality of coming to terms with it. The need to counter the Chinese influence in
Myanmar, the growing economic clout of ASEAN (Myanmar is a member of
ASEAN) and the national security interest of northeast have compelled India to
have a re-think on its attitude to the military regime. The NDA coalition in Delhi
took the initiative in the year 2000 to impart more meaning and content to the
relationship between the two countries, as a part of its look east policy. Since
then much progress has been made at various levels – military cooperation,
stepping up of bilateral trade, improving the land links, IT cooperation etc.
In 2001, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh inaugurated the "India-Myanmar
Friendship Road" linking the town of Moreh in Manipur to central Myanmar and
on to Mandalay. A number of visits by dignitaries including ministers from
Myanmar and India have taken place. The Vice-President of India visited
Myanmar in November 2003. Since then the relationship between the two
countries has flourished rapidly. The India-Myanmar-Thailand meeting on
transport linkages was held at New Delhi in December 2003. The meeting
attended by the foreign ministers of Myanmar and Thailand reviewed the
progress made in the project for construction of the Trilateral Highway from
Moreh in India to Mae Sot in Thailand to Bagan in Myanmar.
Within the military junta a pro-India faction is believed to exist. This is said to be
led by Vice-Senior General Maung Aye and foreign minister U Win Aung.
Apparently this faction had been spearheading the growth of political ties with
India.
Joint operations
Now the upsurge in insurgent actions in the Northeast has thrown up the
possibility of joint or coordinated military operations by both countries. To
translate the concept of military cooperation into effective operations against
ethnic insurgents will require a great deal of joint planning, coordination and
execution. Moreover, for meaningful results joint military cooperation between
India and Myanmar should not be a one-shot affair. It has to have depth and
content if the border region is to be kept sanitized of insurgency. There are a
number of riders in carrying out such operations by the armies of both sides:
· The terrain of the border region is difficult for operations. The
communication infrastructure on both sides is poor.
 Particularly on the Myanmar side it is abysmal. As the tertiary
communication routes are almost non-existent, land
operations will be slow and ponderous. So good air support
and lift will be required. Myanmar has very limited air support
elements. The area is poorly developed and ineffectively
administered. Forces operating in the region will have to be
totally supported from hinterland.
· As the tribal population on both sides of the border,
particularly in Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, are ethnically
similar, there is close social and cultural affinity between them.
Myanmar has not been able to exercise sovereignty over this
region due to a number of powerful ethnic insurgent groups,
which have been waging war against Yangon’s rule for over
four decades. That was how the Naga insurgents, and with
their blessing the Assamese insurgent groups had been
finding refuge on the Myanmar side. Any military operations in
this region need to be coupled with social upliftment of the
local population. Otherwise, it would be only a police action. It
is doubtful whether the military regime is ready for such social
action.
· The Myanmar army is poorly equipped and administered. If
they are to render meaningful support in the long term, it will
have to be upgraded.
· The area of operations is astride the routes of flourishing drug
trade and traffic as well as arms traffic. Vested interests,
including those from the Burmese Army and criminal elements
involved in such traffic will also have to be tackled (of course,
this will be a happy fallout.).
· India has been engaged in peace parleys with the NSCN for
sometime now. Carrying out joint or closely coordinated
operations in areas of their proximity without jeopardizing the
peace talks will require a lot of finesse.
Restoring democracy
In the context of the renewed interest in its growing relationship with Myanmar,
India faces the moral dilemma in building up of a close relationship for the long
term with an anti-democratic military dictatorship, which will not hesitate to use it
to perpetuate its own rule. Knowing this fully, how far can we under write the
illegitimate credentials of the military rulers there? It would appear that India is
following the ASEAN model of building a relationship with the military junta,
without going into the regime’s moral right to rule, so that it has a foothold in the
geo-strategically vital region.
Though strategic security compulsions may dictate the pragmatism of building
better relations with ruling junta, as a major power India has a crucial role in
restoring democracy there. If India abrogates this role, the initiative will pass on
to the U.S. and the European Union. They have been putting tremendous
pressure on the military junta for restoring democracy. The continued
incarceration of Aung San Suu Kyi has been a matter of international concern.
The UN has also been taking a keen interest and Razali Ismail, the UN Secretary
General’s special envoy was deputed to intervene and workout a rapprochement
to usher in democracy. But all these efforts have been of no avail. In July 2003,
the U.S. enacted the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act to apply sanctions
on the country as President Bush considered the policies of the junta hostile to
U.S. interests and posed a "continuing unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S.
national security and foreign policy. The EU has imposed a visa ban against the
Myanmar regime. Britain has been EU’s harshest opponent of having any
dealings with Yangon.
To defuse these pressures, and prodded by the UN Special Envoy, the military
rulers made a rather clumsy face saving effort and organized a National
Convention on May 17, 2004 The Convention was summoned to produce a new
constitution for Myanmar. Myanmar has been without a constitution since 1988.
The Convention ended in a predictable failure as opposition party the National
League for Democracy (NLD), which won a landslide election in 1990, chose to
boycott the convention after the military government refused to free two of its
leaders U Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest and allow them to
attend the convention. The United Nationalities Alliance, which includes the Shan
Nationalities League for Democracy, also chose to boycott the convention citing
the convention’s restrictions on meaningful dialogue.
Though a total of 1,076 delegates, the majority hand-picked by the military
regime participated in the Convention, it carried little credibility. Premier Khin
Nyunt claimed the convention was a manifestation of "unity and solidarity" among
the country’s ethnic groups, it was clear that that the military regime's aim was to
implement its “roadmap to democracy.” It is significant that the Convention’s
“sixth principle” permanently guarantees the military’s role in the governance
(apparently inspired by Pakistan’s example!). Predictably, the ethnic groups
rejected military domination of politics and demanded a federal system of
government.
International reaction to the National Convention had been adverse. The UN,
rights groups, and western governments expressed serious concern on
organizing it without the participation of the NLD. UN spokesman expressed the
Secretary-General’s concern that, “for the national convention to be credible, it
must be all-inclusive and that all the delegates must be able to express their
views without sanction." The U.S. State Department and the European Union
were also highly critical of the Convention.
India’s attitude
India’s attitude to these developments had been one of benign silence. In this
respect it appears to have taken the cue from ASEAN. Thailand, the main
supporter of the regime’s “roadmap to democracy”, expressed muted
disappointment. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra told reporters "I am
trying not to intervene in their internal affairs but if you ask me personally, I would
like to see all parties included." He also added "democracy must be step by
step." Indonesian foreign ministry expressed its disappointment thus: "We had
hoped that the process of implementation of the roadmap would be all-inclusive,
with the involvement of all groups with different ethnic and political orientation."
ASEAN leaders pressurized the EU under a threat of boycott to permit Myanmar,
Cambodia and Laos to participate in the Asia Europe Economic Meeting (ASEM)
currently underway. Despite allowing their participation in the ASEM, the EU
made its stand clear and announced that it would tighten sanctions against
Myanmar after seeing no "positive development" on a list of demands on human
rights and democracy.
There are a number of joint projects contemplated involving India and Myanmar.
Some projects like the trilateral road linking all three countries and the deep-sea
port in Daiwe, in Southern Myanmar to facilitate Indian and Thai ships to refuel
rather than cross the Malacca Straits are of special security interest to India.
When the nation is developing such long-term strategic interest, can it wish away
its responsibility in helping Myanmar move into a democratic set up peacefully?
In the past India had ignored playing its legitimate role to intervene in Tibet when
the country was invaded by China, under the slogan of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.
Nations legitimize power by action and not rhetoric. If India remains on the
sidelines without playing a more important and constructive role in Myanmar, it
will only usher in Western influence into its own backyard. Because it is only a
matter of time before democracy comes to Myanmar. And when that happens,
will the people of Myanmar forgive India for its indifference in their years of
oppression and distress? This is a conundrum waiting to be solved by our foreign
policy pundits.
(Col R Hariharan is a specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence. He had seen active staff and
field service in counter-insurgency operations in Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Punjab,Tripura and lastly in Sri Lanka with the IPKF e-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)