II.

Cases for discussion

A. Constitutional Interpretation
1. Francisco vs House of Representatives (GR No. 160261, November 10,
2003)
Facts: The case is a consolidation of several petitions filed before the Court for the
determination of validity of the second impeachment complaint filed against Chief
Justice Davide by members of the Congress.

This second impeachment complaint filed on August 5, 2003 was preceded by an
impeachment complaint filed on June 2, 2003. Art XI Sec 5 of the Constitution states
that No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
that once within a period of one year.

Issues: 1.Whether or not the impeachment complaint initiated by the members of
House of Representative is subject to judicial review.
2.Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is valid.

Ruling: The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances
to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
The judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. Judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three departments.

The judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Courts cannot evade the duty to settle matters by
claiming that such matter constitutes political question as in the present case. Thus,
the second impeachment complaint is subject to judicial review and does encroach
upon the principle of separation of powers.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Doctrine: Constitutional Construction
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. We
look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What
it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

2. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, February 03, 1997
Facts: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell
30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MPH). Two bidders participated, MPH and
Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RH). MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs
bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered
as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches
RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12
of the 1987 Constitution, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid
the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law
because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be
proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const.
This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that -
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings.

Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary
meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could
have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now)
Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and
frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

B. Effect of Revolutionary Government on the Constitution
3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO,
Respondents. (G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003)
FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1")
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1
primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as
may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and
the power "(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purpose of this order." The PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R.
Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports
of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired. The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained
wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). The Board finds
that a prima facie case exists against Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
Ramas claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated
from Dimaanos( mistress of Ramas) house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since
these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents
if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
The Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present
during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the
search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two
magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution." Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that
time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice
President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people." Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government
may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not
enjoy any constitutional right.
ISSUES: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective
take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of
the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the
interregnum.
RULING: Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution
was "done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or
legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de
jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under
the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke
any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system,
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." In Kelsen's book,
General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the
legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more
popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented
rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising
when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said that "the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution."
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers
of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during
the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine
Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-
over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would
violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of
Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
C. Amendment and revision of the constitution

4. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
FACTS: On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition
in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD
Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition.
Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no
such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three
systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles
II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the
Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo
Tolentino.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.

HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17
of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide
for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when
ten justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:

Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru
a peoples initiative.

Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution

On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The
COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering
all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers
of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners
and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al
filed a special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues
among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution
NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power
(particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of
peoples initiative.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the
constitution or does it constitute a revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of,
the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision
of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The
prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in
the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is
to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

5. LAMBINO vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006)(CARPIO, J.)
Requirements for Initiative Petition
Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735.
The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give
it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling.

ISSUES:Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or
revision
Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance withthe
constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people

RULING: Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec.
2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the
petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of
the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt
relevant American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people
must first seethe full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign ona petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. 2 el ements of initiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition
must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be
informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed and
failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void. In the
case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence
of text of the proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature
sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet
merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are
asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers
signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people. Thats why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue
as amending the nations fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power
of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The initiative violates Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution
speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a peoples initiative. Section 1 of
Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the
third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was
intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A peoples
initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution
and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can
propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Does the Lambino Groups
initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under
any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation
of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change
alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an
amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age
from 18years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an
amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not
a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or
articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These
changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-
balances among or within the three branches. However, there can be no fixed rule
on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in
Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis
of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles,
or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions
allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies
or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions. Tests to
determine whether amendment or revision In California where the initiative clause
allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution,
courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test.
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the
number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The
qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such
far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan
includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check
and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Groups
initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in
the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the
basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision A
change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the
three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced
into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of
the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber
of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the
difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not
of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same
substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments
because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation,
profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express
intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical
intent and language.

D. Power of Judicial Review

6. Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil 139)
FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the
respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the
position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed
the last date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be
nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that
last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme
Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE(S): 1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy ?
2. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the election protest?

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with
the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or
agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.

That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

7. Mirasol vs Court of Appeals (February 1, 2001)
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank
(PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture from 1973-1975 under a crop
loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to
the payment of their obligations to it.

President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange
Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to
finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might
realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the
proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and
to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked
petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners,
conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still
had a deficiency claim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account
since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
National Government.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and
damages against PNB.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed
to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.


Held: On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or
executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial
Courts. Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule
on the conformity of laws or treaties with the Constitution.

The pivotal issue, which we must address, is whether it was proper for the trial court
to have exercised judicial review.

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was improper for
the trial court to have declared P.D. No. 579 unconstitutional, since petitioners had
not complied with Rule 64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that
said Rule specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an ordinary
action for accounting, specific performance, and damages.

Petitioners contentions are bereft of merit. The purpose of the mandatory notice in
Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny
the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of his day in
court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners stand, the mandatory notice
requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies.
The rule itself provides that such notice is required in any action and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in
the rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a
statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor
General is mandatory.

In this case, the Solicitor General was never notified about Civil Case No. 14725. Nor
did the trial court ever require him to appear in person or by a representative or to file
any pleading or memorandum on the constitutionality of the assailed decree. Hence,
the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that lack of the required notice made it
improper for the trial court to pass upon the constitutional validity of the questioned
presidential decrees.

As regards the second issue, petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its
implementing issuances are void for violating the due process clause and the
prohibition against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power:
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third,
the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge.
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.

As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds. The present case was instituted primarily for
accounting and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNBs
obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without
having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D.
No. 579, which is applicable to PNBs intransigence in refusing to give an accounting.
The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed that PNB acted as
petitioners agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in
question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 579.

8.
9.
10.
11. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF
MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent. (G.R.
No. 122846 January 20, 2009)
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW (pero ung buong kaso parang pang police power
talaga..)
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the
Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was
made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance
of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have
the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace,
good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and
it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of
its constituents in general. Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issues: W/N Ordinance No. 7774 is subject to judicial review of the court.
W/N Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: Yes. The exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected. No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise
of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
On the two standards of judicial review.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is
best tested when assessed with the evolved test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products. The case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to
the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." Consequently, two standards of
judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the
mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and
legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, after
the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the test may have first been
articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied
in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability
of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought
to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test
the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict
scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate
travel.
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to
its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most
deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to
the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are
trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the
sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their
cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those
"trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which the people reflexively exercise any day
without the impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence that accurately
reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as
a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style
enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of
freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they
interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
On police power and judicial review.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of
State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and
patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where
illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the
Ordinance,
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic],
wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in
hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible
to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and
could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures
such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police
work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement
of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the
lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more
than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
12.


E. National territory

13. PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al vs HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July
2011

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth
or distance from the coast.

Facts: R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some base points around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
or legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments
contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic
waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage
under UNCLOS III, including over flight. Petitioners have contended that these
passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters
to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters
into archipelagic waters

HELD: Petition DISMISSED.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with thePhilippines
national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the
countrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf.

The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters intoarchipelagic waters will
not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic
State has sovereign power that extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth from the coast.
It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the
status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air
space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein.

14. WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-
26379 December 27, 1969)
FACTS: William C. Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing
technical assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines. Petitioner imported on
April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83,
including freight, insurance and other charges. More than (2) months after the 1960
Cadillac car was imported into the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base
Commander, Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was granted provided
that the sale was made to a member of the US Armed Forces or a citizen of the United
States employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. Petitioner sold his car
for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. (Private first class), United States Marine
Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines. As a result of this transaction, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be
at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed
tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt.
Reagan dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR on
an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine
Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It
is his contention, seriously and earnestly expressed, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional
power to tax.

ISSUE: Whether that the Clark Air Base in legal contemplation, is a base outside the
Philippines?

RULING: Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and
sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion
thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must
submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
its sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a
restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise
is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation,
which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence.

Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does
the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in
the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it
by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They
retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to
the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are
not and cannot be foreign territory.

The Clark Air Force Base is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to
such assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. The Philippines
jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been
preserved. As to certain matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying the
refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs
against petitioner.

F. State Immunity
15. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL. (G.R. No. L-30671 November 28,
1973)
Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R
infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in
the amount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against
the Philippine Government. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honourable Guillermo
Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and executory. Villasor directed
the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.
The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,
specially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances
of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge
Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution .It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from
suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be
the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since the government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion
of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

16. KHOSROW MINUCHER v. CA and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. 142396 , February 11,
2003) Ponente: J. Vitug
Facts: Minucher is an Iranian national who came to study in UP in 1974 and was appointed Labor
Attache for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo and Manila; he continued to stay in the Philippines
when the Shah of Iran was deposed by Khomeini, he became a refugee of the UN and he headed the
Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. On the other hand, Scalzo was a special
agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make
the actual arrest. Minucher and one Abbas Torabian were charged for a violation of Act. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Pasig RTC, such criminal charge was followed by a buy-
bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents to which Scalzo was a witness for
the prosecution. They were acquitted. Later on, Minucher filed a complaint for damages against
Scalzo. It was said that Minucher and Scalzo came to know of each other thru Jose Iigo; they
conducted some business i.e. the former sold to the latter some caviar and Persian carpets. Scalzo
then represented himself as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration; DOJ of US.
Minucher expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for him and his Abbass wife. Scalzo told him that
he could help him for a$2,000 fee per visa. After a series of business transactions between the two,
when Scalzo came to deliver the visas to Minuchers house, he told the latter that he would be
leaving the Philippines soon and requested him to come out of the house so he can introduce him to
his cousin waiting in the cab. To his surprise, 30-40 armed Filipino soldiers came to arrest him. In
his complaint for damages, he said that some of his properties were missing like Persian carpets, a
painting together withhis TV and betamax sets. There was nothing left in his house. He averred that
his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized and that when we got arrested, he was not given
any food or water for 3 days. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced
by a Diplomatic Note. He contended that it was recognized by the US Government pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive
Department and DFA. The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the ground that as a special agent of
the US Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. Hence, the
present recourse of Minucher.

Issue: WON Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity

Held: Yes. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or Internuncios
accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign
affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative
staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the
mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an
understanding that the same be restrictively applied.

The main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature.

Scalzo was an Assistant Attach of the US diplomatic mission. An attach belongs to a category of
officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or
financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or
departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by
their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air,
commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of
mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe,
analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and
submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. These officials are
not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as
having diplomatic rank. Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive
branch of the government. The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be
acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department
policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic
title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the
possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a
diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the
holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic
functions on an essentially full-time basis. Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most
accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office
of the Protocol would then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category.

17. SEAFDEC VS. NLRC (241 SCRA 580)
FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the
petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City.
In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from
their employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization
composed of various Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged
the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner
is not immune from suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit?

HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner
SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already
been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs.
National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),
enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose
territory its office is located. One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal
writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority
of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions
of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.

18. NIA vs. Court of Appeals (September 18, 1992)
Facts: Sometime in 1967, petitioner National Irrigation Administration (NIA for
brevity) constructed an irrigation canal on the property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson
which passed through the private respondents landholdings as said irrigation canal
traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal
has two (2) outlets which provide private respondents landholdings with water coming
from said canal and at the same time serve to drain the excess water of said
landholdings.

On February 13, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint for the abatement of
nuisance with damages against petitioners NIA and/or the Administrator of the
National Irrigation Administration alleging that the two (2) outlets constructed on both
sides of the irrigation canal were not provided with gates to regulate the flow of water
from the canal to their landholdings which resulted to the inundation of said
landholdings causing the former to sustain damages consisting in the destruction of
the planted palay crops and also prevented them from planting on their landholdings.

RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. CA affirms.

NIA then filed a petition before the SC contendin that NIA is immune from suit for
quasi-delict or tort.

Issue: Whether or not NIA is immune from suit.

Held: NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION; BEING A CORPORATE BODY
PERFORMING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT. As
correctly ruled by the court below, the NIA "is not immune from suit, by virtue of the
express provision of P.D. No. 552." A reading of Section 2, sub-paragraph (f) of P.D.
No. 552, amending Republic Act No. 3601 shows the granting to NIA the power "to
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide
that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of actions, whether
contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in
the instant case considering that private respondents action is based on damages
caused by the negligence of petitioners. This Court had previously held that "the
National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government
but a corporate body performing proprietary functions" as it has its own assets and
liabilities as well as its own corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.

19.
20.
21.
22. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM
I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,petitioners, vs.HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding
Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents. (G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985)
Facts: At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement
between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the
following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
x x x
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. A
request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to
defendant United States' bidding practices. Later the herein respondents were
informed by the petitioners that the company did not qualify to receive an award for
the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair
contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. The
respondent then instituted an action for specific performance and/or damages.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning
the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons
of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the
individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign
sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes
of action asserted in the complaint.
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included
an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: W/N there is a need for the consent to be sued from the US for the prosecution
of the action for specific performance in this case.
Ruling: Yes. The projects in this are an integral part of the naval base which is
indisputably a governmental function. Hence, state immunity is an available defense.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule
in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
The respondent judge, however contends that it is the Court's considered opinion that
entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a
governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character as the
basis for its denial of the petition before him.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level
of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued
only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest
order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge
are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the
Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the
mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary
citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a
contract
Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its
contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for
the project by the United States government, through its agency at Subic Bay should
not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims
against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would
render a Filipino citizen, as in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his
own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign
government professing to act in its name.
Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in
this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. Its
application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from
transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or
facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces-because the difficulty,
if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly executed contract and of seeking judicial
remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents
of the United States government, always, looms large, thereby hampering the growth
of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by United
States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices
and agencies operating in the Philippines.
The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be over
emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to be
reasonably assumed and expected that the undertakings in the
contract will be complied with in good faith.

23. Sanders vs Veridiano

Facts: Petitioners Sanders and Moreau were the special services director and
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base respectively while respondents Rossi and
Wyer were American citizens with permanent residence in the Philippines.

The respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably with the rules of US
Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who
conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the
observation that Special Services management practices an autocratic form of
supervision. Sanders disagreed with the report and rejected the recommendation
with statements regarding the respondents attitude.

Thereafter, respondents filed a case for damages against the petitioners in their
private or personal capacity.

Issues: Whether or not the act complained of has been done in personal capacity?

Ruling: Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude
that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the
claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied
not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government
as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its
consent.
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the
sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet
imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section
2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.

G. Police Power
24.

25.ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE CA and ISMAEL G. MATHAY
III, respondents. G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000)
FACTS: Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1,
Block 21, Psd-66759, with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills
Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that the lot:

1. (1) be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and not more than one
single-family residential building will be constructed thereon,

6. The BUYER shall not erectany sign or billboard on the rooffor advertising
purposes

11. No single-family residential building shall be erecteduntil the building plans,
specificationhave been approved by the SELLER

14....restrictions shall run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants
until December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminate

Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for
the National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion
of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where
the lot is located.

Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso
Realty Corp.. He constructed a single story commercial building for Greenhills
Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.

Petitioner filed a complaint against Emilia Hermoso with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 261. Docketed as Civil Case No. 64931, the complaint sought the
demolition of the said commercial structure for having violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Complainant prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit petitioner from
constructing the commercial building and/or engaging in commercial activity on the
lot. Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the
lot were duly annotated on the title it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must
prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before
the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.

ISSUE: Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its
effectivity?

RULING: In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective
operation. Lex prospicit, non respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of
the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the
latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
7
A later law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the contract
necessarily impairs the contract itself
8
and cannot be given retroactive effect without
violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.

But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power.
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or
transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights
or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but
equally to those already in existence.
10
Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights
clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police
power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people.
11
Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be
read into every contract.
12
Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,
13
we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power
measure.

Following our ruling in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. vs. Feati Bank & Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533
(1979), the contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas
relies, must yield to the ordinance. When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from
Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone by the
Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of
sale between Ortigas and Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to
single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by the retroactive
operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. While our legal
system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a contract is deemed law between the
contracting parties,
17
nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene "law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy." Otherwise such stipulations
would be deemed null and void.



26. PRC VS. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL., June 21, 2004
Facts: After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of
successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines
observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees
were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most difficult subjects of the
exam, i.e., Biochemistry and Obstetrics and Gynecology.

The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of
all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared with other examines
from other schools, the results of those from Fatima were not only incredibly high but
unusually clustered close to each other. The NBI Investigation found that the Fatima
examinees gained early access to the test questions.

On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the
RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine.
Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging
the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended
that the test results of the Fatima Examinees be nullified.

On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC
to allow the respondents to take the physicians oath and to register them as
physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which
sustained the RTC decision.

Hence, this petition.

Held: It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or
pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or
oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions.

But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will
not lie to compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to
practice medicine.

RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine,
the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct
of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physicians
license, or revoking a license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the
examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions and
requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege to
practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.

27. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs.HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES
E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THECHIEF OF THE PNP, et al (G.R. No.
157036. June 9, 2004)
Facts: Petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
the Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence (Guidelines) issued by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of
the Philippine National Police (PNP).Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun
owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he
filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP;
Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-
Firearms and Explosives Division.

Issues: 1.whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines;
2.whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling: 1 . Au t h o r i t y o f t h e P NP Ch i e f
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. The power to
make laws the legislative power is vested in Congress. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that delegata potestas non potest
delegari delegated power may not be delegated.The rule which forbids the
delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits
of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative
body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns,
boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such
licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. Act
No. 1780 delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to
approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or
to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes;
and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized him to issue regulations
which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. By virtue of
Republic Act No. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latters licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of
PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue
detailed implementing policies and instructions on such matters as may be
necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of the PNP.

2 . P o l i c e P o w e r
At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected
by theConstitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond
the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

The Court laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus: (1)The
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and(2)The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need
for peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly
those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace
of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun
ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
the interest of the public in general. The only question that can then arise is whether
the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case,
the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they
proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who
wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a
new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for
their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all
PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the
other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them. The petition is hereby
DISMISSED

28. Camarines Norte Electric vs. Torres (February 27,1998)
FACTS: Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the
provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration Decree, as amended by P.D. No. 1645
seek to (a) annul and set aside Memorandum Order No. 409 of the Office of the
President dated 3 December 1996 constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to take over and
manage the affairs of the Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., (hereafter
CANORECO) until such time as a general membership meeting can be called to
decide the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is
restored"; and (b) prohibit the respondents from performing acts or continuing
proceedings pursuant to the Memorandum Order.

Memorandum Order No. 409 purpose was to efficiently and effectively address the
worsening intra-cooperative dispute problem of the Camarines Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the interest
of the people who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity, an AD
HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO until such time as a general membership meeting can be called to decide
the serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is
restored. Further, if and when warranted, the present Board of Directors may be
called upon by the Committee for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of
their per diems as may be authorized by existing rules and regulations.

ISSUE(S): May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to
take over and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?

HELD: Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed
Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals,
and general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels,
including the barangay. Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted
in Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.

The pertinent laws on
cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by
P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take
over the internal management of a cooperative.

The Supreme Court does not hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no
constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined
in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that
their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed
upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of
R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of
non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.

29. Ynot vs IAC (March 20, 1987)
Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos
(EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down
the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is a valid exercise of police power

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.

30.


H. Power of Eminent Domain
31.
32.
33. MARINA Z. REYES; ALFREDO A. FRANCISCO; petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondent. (G.R. No. 147511, January 20,
2003)
Facts: National Housing Authority filed several expropriation complaints on the
sugarland owned by the petitioners Reyes. The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite.
The purpose of the expropriation is for the expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement
Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from Manila. The trial court
rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots with payment of just
compensation. It was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Reyes: The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of the respondents to comply with
the Supreme Court order, so they filed a complaint for forfeiture of their rights before
the RTC of Quezon City. They also said that NHA did not relocate squatters from
Manila on the expropriated lands which violate the reason for public purpose. The
petitioners prayed that NHA be enjoined from disposing and alienating the
expropriated properties and that judgment be rendered forfeiting all its rights and
interests under the expropriation judgment.

NHA: In its Answer,

respondent NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial
amount to herein petitioners and that the expropriation judgment could not be
executed in view of several issues raised by respondent NHA before the expropriation
court concerning capital gains tax, registration fees and other expenses for the
transfer of title to respondent NHA

RTC: The trial court dismissed the case. It held that NHA did not abandon the public
purpose because the relocation of squatters involves a long and tedious process. It
also entered into a contract with a developer for the construction of a low-cost housing
to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries. The payment of just compensation is
independent of the obligation of the petitioners to pay capital gains tax. Lastly, the
payment of just compensation is based on the value at the time the property was
taken.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the property expropriated is taking for public purpose.

Ruling: Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision
of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation
from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is
no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use"
is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term
"public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
8
The rationale for this new
approach is well explained in the case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et
al.,
9
to wit:
"The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which
possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private
property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have
never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited
government resources.
x xx x xx x xx
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public
use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost
to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use."
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real estate
developer for the construction of low cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold
to qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the
stated public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation of
private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if
the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good
and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform
and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution

We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners' contention that the stated public purpose
was abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots by
relocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared
that respondent NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public
use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarias Resettlement Project." The taking here is
absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification. It was held in Fery vs.
Municipality of Cabanatuan that:
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted
to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner."
Petitioners further aver that the continued failure of respondent NHA to pay
just compensation for a long period of time justifies the forfeiture of its rights and
interests over the expropriated lots. They demand the return of the expropriated lots.
Respondent NHA justifies the delay to pay just compensation by reason of the failure
of petitioners to pay the capital gains tax and to surrender the owners' duplicate
certificates of title.
In several court decisions, it was ruled that non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lots.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides:
In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment,
respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriating authority is far from
that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might
perhaps apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title;
thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings
provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance."
With respect to the amount of the just compensation still due and demandable
from respondent NHA, the lower courts erred in not awarding interest computed from
the time the property is actually taken to the time when compensation is actually paid
or deposited in court.
We, however, likewise find the refusal of respondent NHA to pay just
compensation, allegedly for failure of petitioners to pay capital gains tax and surrender
the owners' duplicate certificates of title, to be unfounded and unjustified.
First, under the expropriation judgment the payment of just compensation is
not subject to any condition. Second, it is a recognized rule that although the right to
enter upon and appropriate the land to public use is completed prior to payment, title
to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as follows:
1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay petitioners the
amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed
from the taking of the expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have
been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National Housing Authority
the owners' duplicate certificates of title of the expropriated properties upon full
payment of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.

34. Lagcao vs Labra
Facts: In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of
these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048
square meters.In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But
then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of
Cebu.[2] Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. On July 9, 1986, the
court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute
the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court,
the Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029
in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was
issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao. When the petitioners tried to
take possession of the lot, it was discovered that the same was occupied by informal
settlers. An ejectment suit was filed after which, writ of execution and order of
demolition were issued. The Mayor requested for the deferment of demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for relocation site, which was granted by the
court. During the suspension, the SP of Cebu City issued an ordinance expropriating
the subject lot for purpose of benefiting the homeless.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance expropriating the subject lot was valid.

Ruling: There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws;[12] and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Thus, the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In
fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowners
right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary
for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected
with the rights to life and liberty.[14] Whether directly exercised by the State or by
its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of
private rights.[15] For this reason, the need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be
overemphasized.

The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders
the expropriation of a private
individuals property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply
because public use or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just
compensation has been fixed and determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we said:

It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due
process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state
power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of
justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the
exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by
the present Chief Justice, Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can
deny due process only under pain of nullity. xxx

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of public character.[17] Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there
was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site
of a socialized housing project.

Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random
expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is
certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This
is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible
benefit to the public.

It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The
judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of
execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to
suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation
site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the
suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The
unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.

35. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON. CEFERINO E.
DULAY,
in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Courtof First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI,
Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS:
O n J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e
s , i s s u e d Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public
domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the
establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing
Zone Authority(EPZA).Not all the reserved area, however, was public land.
The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of owned and registered
in the name
of t h e S a n A n t p o n i o De v e l o p me n t C o r p o r a t i o n . E P Z A , t h e r e f o
r e , o f f e r e d t o pur chase t he par cel s of l and i n acccor dance wi t h t h
e val uat i on set f or t h i n Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464,
as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of
the property. EPZA then filed with Court of First Instance a complaint for
expropriation, through which, a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the premises was issued. At the pre-trial conference, parties have
agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties.
Hearing on the merits was then
set. The r eaf t er , t he cour t i ssued an or der , decl ar i ng EPZA as havi n
g t he lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint and
a p p o i n t i n g c o mmi s s i o n e r s t o a s c e r t a i n a n d r e p o r t t o t h e c o
u r t t h e j u s t compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The
consolidated report of the three commissioners recommended the amount
of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just
compensation for the properties. EPZA filed an Objection to Commissioner' s
Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum
amount set by P.D. No. 1533
The trial court denied the motion, as a result of which, the petitioner flied this present
petition enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order and from further proceeding
with the hearing of the expropriation case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is still a need to appoint commissioners even af t er
t he ef f ect i vi t y of P. D. No. 1533 whi ch al r eady p r ovi de d f or a mode
i n determining just compensation.

HELD: Yes. The Court declares the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just
compensation unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just
compensationunder t he sai d decr ee const i t ut es i mper mi ssi bl e encr o
achment on j udi ci al prerogatives. It tends to render the Court inutile on a matter
which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, al t hough i n an expr opr i at i on pr oceedi ng, t he co
ur t t echni cal l y would still have the power to determine the just compensation for
the property, following the applicable decree, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor.
The strict application of the decree during proceedings would be nothing short of
ame r e f o r ma l i t y o r c h a r a d e a s t h e c o u r t h a s o n l y t o c h o o s e
b e t we e n t h e valuation of the owner and that of the assessor and its choice is
always
limitedt o t h e l o w e r o f t h e t w o . T h e c o u r t c a n n o t e x e
r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n o r independence in determining what is just or fair. The
trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may
onlys e r v e a s a g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e o r o n e o f t h e f a c t o r s i
n d e t e r m i n i n g j u s t compensation but it may not substitute the
court' s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine is more
in keeping with the principle that
the j u d i c i a r y s h o u l d l i v e u p t o i t s mi s s i o n " b y v i t a l i z i n g a n d
n o t d e n i g r a t i n g constitutional rights." The basic unfairness of the decree is
readily apparent. Just compensation means the value of the property at the
time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. In this
particular case, the tax declarations presented by EPZA as basis for just
compensation were made by the city assessor long before martial law, when land was
not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures
constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not
even the owner of the properties at the time. To get the value of the lots on the
basis of documents which are out of date and at
pr i ces bel ow t he acqui si t i on cost of pr esent owner s woul d be ar bi t
r ar y andconfiscatory

36.
37.
38. REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005)
FACTS: In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a
land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia
Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, onMay 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay
the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons appealed to the
CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April
5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On
September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay
for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest, Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with
damages against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property. On
November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and
Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment
of a reasonable market value". On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in
favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained
their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of
the Republic. They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there
having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they
are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of
their fair market value. Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot
932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to
pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was
issued in his name. On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in
favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all
the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated
the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC
Decision saying: ... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its
taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just"...Petitioner,
through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as
the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to
pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefore pursuant to
the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

RULING: In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable
time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.

39. AMOS P. FRANCIA JR., et. al. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MERCAUAYAN
(G.R. No. 170432, 24 March 2008)
FACTS: A Complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against the property of petitioners Amos Francia, Cecilia
Francia and Benjamin Francia. The Municipality of Meycauayan seeks to use the said
property in order to establish a common public terminal for all public utility vehicles.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the expropriation was for public purpose
and issued an Order of Expropriation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition. It nullified the Order of
Expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. It upheld the decision of
the RTC that in issuance of writ of possession, prior determination of the existence of
public purpose is necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not prior determination of existence of public purpose is necessary
before the issuance of writ of possession?

HELD: Section 19 of Republic Act 7160 provides: Section 19. Eminent Domain. A
local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted;
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of
the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated;
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to
be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the
property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not
make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a
writ of possession.

40. AGAN VS PIATCO (May 5, 2003)
Facts: On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the
Government through the DOTC/MIAA for the development of NAIA International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).

DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to the
NEDA, which approved the project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily
newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDCs
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and
Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted
their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo
Consortium. Because of that, it was incorporated into Philippine International Airport
Terminals Co., Inc.

AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and
reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for
the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III
(1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to
operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the
fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in
the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period
shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development
facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the
NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service
providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering,
passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions,
cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines
at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers,
claiming that they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned
agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

During the pendency of the cases, PGMA, on her speech, stated that she will not
honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branchs legal offices have concluded
(as) null and void.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with
public interest.
(2) Whether or not PIATCO has a right for just compensation

Held: PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene the Constitutional
provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government to pay
reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

The above provision pertains to the right of the State in times of national emergency,
and in the exercise of its police power, to temporarily take over the operation of any
business affected with public interest. The duration of the emergency itself is the
determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover by the government would
last. The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the
business and not to the ownership thereof. As such the government is not required to
compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of
ownership, whether permanent or temporary. The private entity-owner affected by the
temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of the said
business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise
of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain.

Article XII, section 17 of the 1987 Constitution envisions a situation wherein the
exigencies of the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount
consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular
business. Clearly, the State in effecting the temporary takeover is exercising its police
power. Police power is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. Its
exercise therefore must not be unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of
obligation by the government in the absence of damage due to arbitrariness of its
exercise. Thus, requiring the government to pay reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to the operation of the business contravenes
the Constitution.

I. Power of Taxation

41.