SECOND DIVISION

JUANITA MANAOIS, ADM. CASE No. 5364

Complainant,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,
Respondent. Promulgated:

August 20, 2008

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R E S O L U T I O N

TINGA, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Juanita Manaois (complainant) against Atty. Victor
V. Deciembre (respondent) for willful and deliberate falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.

Complainant gave the following account of the facts that spawned the present administrative Complaint.
[1]


Complainant is a government employee working as a mail sorter at the Manila Central Post Office. Sometime in 1998, she applied
for a loan of P20,000 from Rodella Loans, Inc., through respondent. As security for the loan, respondent required her to issue and deliver
to him blank checks that he would fill out according to their agreed monthly installments. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan,
respondent allegedly failed to return the remaining blank checks. Respondent told complainant that the loan had not yet been paid and
that the payments had been credited to the interest on the loan. Respondent threatened complainant with a lawsuit in the event of
nonpayment. Respondent allegedly filled out the blank checks with different amounts and made it appear that complainant had them
exchanged them for cash in the total amount of P287,500.00 for use in her business venture. Using these checks as basis, respondent
filed several cases against complainant for estafa and for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the City Prosecutors Office
of Quezon City and Pasig City.
[2]


Complainant contended that no man of respondents stature would be too foolish to extend a P287,500.00 loan to a mere mail
sorter earning barely P6,000.00 a month on the bare assurance that her postdated checks would be encashed on their due dates.
[3]


In his Comment
[4]
dated 20 March 2001, respondent countered that complainants allegations are devoid of any truth and
merit. He maintained that it was in fact complainant who deceived him by not honoring her commitment under the transactions. Those
transactions had allegedly been covered by the postdated checks which were subsequently dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED.
Thus, he filed the criminal cases against her. He also claimed that the checks had already been fully filled out when complainant affixed
her signature thereon in his presence. Respondent further asserted that he had given complainant the amount of money indicated in the
checks because he was convinced, based on their previous transactions, that complainant had capacity to pay.

In a Resolution
[5]
dated 17 October 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation or decision within 90 days from notice.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes conducted hearings on the matter. In his Report and Recommendation
[6]
dated 7 August
2007, he found complainants version of the facts more credible than that of respondent and, accordingly, found respondent guilty of
tampering with the checks of complainant. He likewise noted that this is not just an isolated case as several of complainants officemates
had also fallen prey to respondents cunning scheme. Thus, he recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for five
(5) years. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners report and recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-133 dated 28 September 2007.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the recommended penalty.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.


The Code of Professional Responsibility likewise mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.
[7]
To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree
the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
[8]







Evidently, respondent failed to comply with the foregoing canons. As shown by the records and as found by the Commissioner,
complainant had supplied respondent with blank personal checks as security for the P20,000 loan she had contracted and
which respondent subsequently deceitfully filled out with various amounts they had not agreed upon and with full knowledge that the
loan had already been paid. After the filled-out checks had been dishonored upon presentment, respondent even imprudently filed
multiple lawsuits against complainant. Verily, respondent is guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an
act indicative of moral depravity not expected from and highly unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
[9]
The fact that the conduct
pertained to respondents private dealings with complainant is of no moment. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but also a continuing
qualification for all members of the Bar.
[10]


For the record, respondent has already been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in A.C. No. 5365
entitled Olbes v. Deciembre,
[11]
a case involving an offense and a set of facts similar to the case at bar. In the said case, the Court notes
that complainants therein averred that many of their officematesamong them, Juanita Manaois,Honorata Acosta and Eugenia
Mendozahad suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent (Deciembre).
[12]
This demonstrates respondents propensity to
employ deceit and misrepresentation. As such, following our ruling in Olbes, the Court hereby imposes the same penalty upon
respondent in the present case.


WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED indefinitely from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant which is directed to append a
copy hereof to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.






DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice



WE CONCUR:








LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson








CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice







ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
R E S O L U T I O N
PADILLA, J .:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to
homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the
accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of
the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on
Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an
untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of this
Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled
for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant [herein
petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."
[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The
feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy
and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and
public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious
and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As
a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date
to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

Case Digest:
In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino was previously
involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless
imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years imprisonment where he applied for a probation
thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to
take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorneys oath of office averring that his probation was already
terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession
of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have
become a responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for
truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of
the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to the family/relatives of Raul
Camaligan.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

Paredes, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief
before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by
counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his
appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such,
was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would
not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for
the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case
is a violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in
this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of
Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of
Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which
read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule
appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his
services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases
coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D.
Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy
of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State
vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan,
4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of
the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against appellant hqXv.

*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary
actions, a succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such
services. The mere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. It is also
worth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior to represent
the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.