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Introduction to Requirement Management

for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems



SARE-vst, May 2013


Urban Ingelsson
Safety-Critical Systems Competence Center
urban.ingelsson@semcon.com
What is functional safety?
Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by
malfunctioning behavior of E/E systems
Brakes, steering,
Electronics and software
could cause an accident
certifiably safe embedded systems in automotive context
ISO 26262 Functional Safety Road Vehicles
Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013

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ISO 26262
Structured way of working
Scope
Specification and management of requirements
Hazard analysis and risk assessment
Automotive Safety Integrity Levels ASIL

3 Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
ASIL D
ASIL C
ASIL B
ASIL A
Quality Management (QM)
C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y

E
f
f
o
r
t


Case study
Windshield Wiper
Is it a safety-related function?
4 Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
Washer Liquid
Spray Activate
Windshield
controller
Wiper Angle
Washer Liquid
Spray Enable
Wiper Activate
Wiper Enable
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment
5 Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
ASIL D
ASIL C
ASIL B
ASIL A
Quality Management (QM)
The drivers view might be obscured
Exposure
High

Controllability
Medium

Severity
High
Failure mode
Contineous spray
of washer liquid
Driving situation
High speed, curvy
road, medium traffic
Safety goal
A malfunction shall not lead to the drivers view being obscured
Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
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Hazard Analysis
Risk Assessment
Functions
Analysis of functions and safety goals
Safety goal violations
Hazards
Safety goals with ASIL classification
Fault tolerant time interval
Analysis to choose safety measure
to mitigate safety goal violations
Safety measures
Formulate functional safety requirements
Driving situations
Design patterns
Functional safety requirements
HAZOP, etc.
Exposure
Controlability
Severity
FTA, etc.
Design space exploration
Compare design patterns
Quality attributes,
notation, etc.
ASIL C? It takes much effort!
Reduce effort by requirement decomposition!
A divide-and-conquer approach
Encourages use of safe architectures
2 independent modules
freedom from interference

lower ASIL --- typically less effort
7 Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
A A1 A2
ASIL C ASIL B(C) + ASIL A(C)
ASIL D ASIL B(D) + ASIL B(D)
ASIL D ASIL D(D) + QM(D)
Req A
ASIL C
Req A1
ASIL B(C)
Req A2
ASIL A(C)
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FSR1
The washer liquid spray shall
not be enabled for >5s

FSR2
The washer liquid spray shall
not be enabled for >1s if the
wiper is inoperational


FSR3
The washer liquid spray
controller shall disable the
washer liquid spray, if the
windshield wiper angle is
constant for >1s

FSR4
The wiper controller shall
disable the washer liquid spray,
if the washer liquid spray is
enabled for >5s

Decomposition
Washer Liquid Spray Activate
Washer
liquid
spray
controller
ASIL A(C)
Wiper Angle
Washer Liquid Spray Enable
Wiper Activate
Wiper Enable
Wiper
controller
ASIL B(C)
Override
Washer Liquid
Spray Activate
Windshield
controller ASIL C
Wiper Angle
Washer Liquid
Spray Enable
Wiper Activate
Wiper Enable
Quality attributes for requirements
Each requirement
Uniquely identified
Allocated in the design
Unambiguous
Comprehensible
Atomic
Internally consistent
Feasible
Verifiable
High ASIL: spec. in semi-formal notation
Traceable
Up and down the hierarchy
Verification activities, operating
modes and system states
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The set of requirements
Organized in a hierarchy
Complete
Grouped
Consistent
Maintainable
Free from duplicated information
10
Functional safety
Technical safety
HW
SW
Safety goal
Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
SG1: A malfunction shall not lead
to the drivers view being
obscured
FSR3: The washer liquid spray
controller shall disable the washer
liquid spray, if the windshield
wiper angle is constant for >1s
FSR4: The wiper controller shall
disable the washer liquid spray, if
the washer liquid spray is enabled
for >5s
TSR42: Counter1 shall be reset
within 20ms when Comparator3
indicates that PreviousAnglePWM
anglePWM
HWSR71: Register anglePWM
shall connect on the same bus as
inputA of Comparator3
SWSR50: Control loop L1 shall
reset Counter1 if
Comparator3.output == false
Conclusion
The impact of ISO 26262
Requirement-heavy
ASIL
Quality attributes, traceability and semi-formal notation

Effort

Architecture
11 Introduction to Requirement Management for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems,
May 2013
Introduction to Requirement Management
for Safety-Critical Embedded Vehicle Systems

SARE-vst, May 2013


Urban Ingelsson
Safety-Critical Systems Competence Center
urban.ingelsson@semcon.com

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