Case for Safety

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RUSSEL A REBELLO
FIIRSM-RSP WSO CSS-CSM GIFireE
Cases for Safety are used for the Control of
Major Accident Hazards ( COMAH )
Applicable to sites where activities have the
potential to cause multiple fatalities or
significant environmental damage.
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Case for Safety
They are a mechanism to demonstrate that
all major accident hazards (MAH) relating to
the operation have been identified.
They help to ensure that arrangements are
in place to reduce the risks to a level that is
As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
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Case for Safety
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Case for Safety
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Part 1:
The Introduction describes the scope, objectives and structure
of the Case.
Part 2:
Is a comprehensive description of the facilities, the equipment
and an inventory of hazardous materials.
Most of these descriptions were written by offshore operations
personnel and can be used as a reference document to guide
personnel unfamiliar with the installations.
Part 3:
Provides a description of the HSE system in place.
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Part 4:
Details the audit process that systematically reviews the
effectiveness of its Health and Safety Management Systems,
Standards and Procedures.
It also tracks actions arising from internal and external audits
to completion.
Note: Action tracking register to be developed to ensure
monitoring & tracking for completion.
This will include review verification audits of the Safety Critical
Elements performance Standards
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Part 5:
Hazard Assessment.
It provides a demonstration that:
All potential major hazards have been identified.
The risk from the hazards evaluated and understood.
The controls to manage the cause and consequences are in
place.
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Part 6:
Details HSE-Critical Task Catalogue & Emergency Response:
The identification of the barriers and controls in the hazard
bow-tie diagrams is to be linked to those HSE-critical tasks
carried out prior to, or during, operations.
It is only by conducting these tasks (design, inspection and
maintenance, operational or administrative ) that assurance
is provided that the major accident hazards will be managed.
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The Emergency response plan is established as part of
identified controls to prevent the consequence/ reduce effect
of consequence.
Part 7:
Remedial action plan.
Established to resolve any outstanding actions.
Records improvements or shortfalls identified.
Ensures improvements to the operations are made.
It is the responsibility of the Case Custodian to ensure that
these actions are satisfactorily completed.
5 Hazard Assessment Process
Step 1: Identification of major accident hazards
through HAZID. A HAZID is a structured brainstorming
technique using personnel from a variety of
backgrounds to identify and provide initial scoping of
hazards present within an operation or process
Step 2: Bowtie Analysis - This analysis took the form of
structured, specialist brainstorming sessions to develop
the hazard bow-tie diagrams, which identify the
controls to be put in place for the identified hazards.
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Bow Ties - MAH and Top Event (from HAZID)
From the results of the HAZID, credible Top Events
are identified for each major accident hazard.
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Bow-tie - Threats
The threats that might cause the top event to be realised are
identified like so:
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Bow-tie - Barriers to Threats
The systems in place as barriers against each threat are inserted into the
threat branch.
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Bow-tie Escalation Factors
Some barriers are weakened by current circumstances.
This is termed an escalation factor.
In this case the fact that no Responsible Electrical Person (REP)
is appointed weakens the maintenance barrier.
However, the E&I Supervisors role in electrical maintenance
becomes a control against the escalation factor.
AS DETAILED OVERLEAF:
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Bow-tie Escalation Factors
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Bow-tie Escalation Factors (contd)
When there are no controls against escalation factors the
barrier remains weakened.
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CONTROLS INTOLERABLE
RISK HAZARDS
ALARP ZONE
HAZARDS
LOW RISK
HAZARDS
Threat Barriers Minimum of 3 Independent
effective barriers to be in
place for each identified
threat
Minimum of 2 independent
effective barriers to be in
place for each identified
threat
No acceptance criterion
because outside of scope of
hazard analysis
Recovery Preparedness
Barriers
Minimum of 3 independent
effective recovery measures
required for each identified
consequence (including one
to detect automatically
occurrence of top
event, and one other to
prevent automatically
further escalation)
Minimum of 2 independent
effective recovery measures
required for each identified
consequence (one to detect
occurrence of top event and
other to prevent further
escalation)
No acceptance criterion
because outside of scope of
hazard analysis
Escalation Factor Controls Minimum of 1 independent
effective recovery measure
for each identified escalation
factor
Minimum of 1 independent
effective recovery measure
for each identified escalation
factor
No acceptance criterion
because outside of scope of
hazard
analysis
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Bow-tie Remedial Action Plan
The absence of a formal verification
scheme weakens the Safety Critical status
of electrical equipment in that nobody is
verifying that we maintain it to assure
continued fitness for purpose.
This escalation factor becomes an item in
Part 7 of the case, the Remedial Action
Plan.
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Case for Safety - Consequences
Similarly the consequences of the top event should it be realised are
evaluated.
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Safety Critical Elements
Systems and equipment identified in the
bowties as being able to cause or
contribute to, or prevent, detect or
mitigate a MAH are given SAFETY
CRITICAL status.
A list of Safety Critical Elements has been
developed and Technical Authorities
Appointed.
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Case for Safety - Conclusions
The Case for Safety is a tool used to assure a
Company that personnel working on the offshore
assets are not subject to intolerable risks.
Tool that helps to manage continual improvement.
It was prepared on behalf of the offshore
workforce and is a living document that will be
updated as changes occur.
Please use it and share the knowledge with other
personnel who may not be aware of its existence.
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References:
BowTieXP v5.2CGE Risk Management Solutions
http://www.cgerisk.com/support-a-downloads/support/bowtie-method-support/56-
the-bowtie-method
Offshore InstallationRegulations ( Safety Case) 2005
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/3117/pdfs/uksi_20053117_en.pdf
COMAH- Safety Report Assessment Manual (V2)
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sram/index.htm
GAS SAFETY (SAFETY CASE) REGULATIONS 2008
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol_reg/gscr2008318/
Review of Safety Case contents at least every three years.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1996/551/regulation/4/made