REPUBLIC VS.

CASTELVI
[58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974]

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a
lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

Issue:

Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that
just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as
of that year.

The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of
authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use
must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The
taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation
to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a
lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by
express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land
in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669,
New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil
Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation
because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of
contract.
















Republic v. Sarabia; G.R. No. 157847; 25 August 2005.
Facts: Sometime in 1956, the petitioner took possession and control of the substantial
portion of the lot owned by the private respondents. The occupied portion was used as
an airport parking area and in time, several structures were erected on it.
In 1998, petitioner filed an action for the expropriation of the entire lot. However,
expropriation and writ of possession was granted only as to the actual portion occupied
and not on its entirety. Through the court-appointed commissioners reports, the trial
court fixed the just compensation for the occupied portion at its current market value in
1999. The trial court fixed the just compensation based on the current market value not
at the time of the taking which was in 1956, but at the time of the issuance of the writ of
possession in 1999. To the trial court, the date of the issuance of the writ has to be
considered in fixing the just compensation because the same signified petitioners proper
acquisition and taking of the property which involves not only physical possession but
also the legal right to possess and own the same. CA affirmed the trial courts order.
Issue: The precise time at which just compensation should be fixed: whether as of the
time of actual taking of possession by the expropriating entity, as insisted by petitioner,
or at the issuance of the writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings, as
maintained by the respondents and sustained by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.
Held: Compensation for property expropriated must be determined as of the time the
expropriating authority takes possession thereof and not as of the institution of the
proceedings.
The value of the property should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and
not the date of the filing of the proceedings. For where property is taken ahead of the
filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of
the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is
taken. This is the only way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just" not
only to the individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it.


























EPZA VS. DULAY
[148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987]

Facts:

The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export
Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that
under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the
assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in
PD 1533 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment
to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may
only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation,
but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination
but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the
decreed compensation.
























Sumulong vs Guerrero

Facts: On December 5, 1997 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Hosing Project to
provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees, covering approximately
twenty five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal. This included the lots of petitioners Lorenzo
Sumulong (6,667 sq.m.) and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing (3,333 sq.m.). The land sought to
be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting
the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential
decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Phil. Natl Bank, representing
the total market value of the subject 25 ha. of land, pursuant to P.D. No. 1224 which
defines the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation.

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge Buenaventura S. Guerrero issued a writ of
possession pertaining to the subject parcels of land. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their
property without due process of law. This was however, denied. Hence, this petition
challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1224, as amended.

Petitioners contend that the taking of their property subsumed under the topics of public
use, just compensation, and due process.

Issues:
(1) Whether socialized housing as defined in P.D. 1224, as amended, for the purpose
of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of
people, bereft of public character, hence it is not a valid exercise of the States power of
eminent domain.

(2) Whether NHA has the discretion to determine the size of the property/properties to
be expropriated.

(3) Whether P.D. 1224, as amended, allows unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed
by government assessors.

(4) Whether petitioners were denied due process because their parcels of land were
immediately possessed by the NHA by virtue of the writ of possession ordered by the
respondent judge.

Held:
(1) P.D. 1224 defines socialized housing as, the construction of dwelling units for the
middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and other facilities. The public use requirement for a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. The taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is
accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Ergo, socialized housing falls
within the confines of public use.

(2) The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the
particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much
thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse
of discretion, which petitioners failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to
and leave undisturbed the NHAs choice and the size of the site for the project. The right
to use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered by and has to yield to the
demands of the common good.

(3) Yes. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential Decrees No. 1224,
1259, and 1313 are the same provisions found in P.D. No.s 76, 464, 794, and 1533
which were declared unconstitutional for being encroachments on judicial prerogative.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot
be absolute substitute for just compensation.

(4) Yes. The petitioners were denied of due process. P.D. 1224, as amended, violates
procedural due process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and
disposition of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without hearing


De Knecht v. Bautista
Eminent Domain> Genuine Necessity
Facts:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the
Cavite Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties
along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City.
Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the
proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
Because of the protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on Human
Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan, but the Ministry
argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government
filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan streets, among whom was petitioner De Knecht
Petitioners contention:
The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or reason.
The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature has
delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the necessity for taking a
particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee
power subject however to review by the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross
abuse of discretion. The choice of property must be examined for bad faith,
arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process determination as to whether or
not the proposed location was proper in terms of the public interests. Even the
claim of respondent's Secretary Baltazar Aquino that there would be a saving of
P2 million under his new plan must be reviewed for it bears no relation to the site
of the proposed EDSA extension As envisioned by the government, the EDSA
extension would be linked to the Cavite Expressway. Logically then, the
proposed extension must point to the south and not detour to the north.
Respondents counter-argument:
There was no sudden change of plan in the selection of the site of the EDSA
Extension to Roxas Blvd.
When the Ministry of Public Highways decided to change the site of EDSA
Extension to Roxas Boulevard from Cuneta Avenue to the Del Pan - Fernando
Streets, the residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein Streets who were to be
adversely affected by the construction of EDSA Extension to Roxas Boulevard
along Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed
project. Petitioner herein was one of those notified.
It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward and outward (from
the city center while the Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward
and inward direction. It must be stated that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del
Pan - Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design
criteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting the Del Pan - Fernando
Rein Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted to save the
motel located along Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the social
impact factor or problem involved
Issue: WON there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht
and others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be
expropriated seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH

Ruling:
NO. The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost
factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines.
The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the
residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice
between people, on one hand, and progress and development, on the other, it is to be
remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The order of
June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon the
possession of the properties sought to be condemned is set aside and the respondent
Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on Civil Case No. 7001-P,
entitled"Republic of the Philippines vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, etc."
except to dismiss said case.


Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990]
First Division, Gancayco (J): 3 concur

Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of
the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them Cristina De
Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some 15 other defendants (Civil Case
7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of
complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties.

On 29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial
court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the taking of
immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In June
1979, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property
to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the
complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be
condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just compensation for
the lands involved in the proceedings.

On 16 July 1979, de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
(GR No. L-51078) and directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979
praying that the Republic be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the
expropriation action and from implementing said order. On 30 October 1980, the
Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition
and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista

On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde, Francisco Elizalde and
Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the
dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which had become
final and in order to avoid further damage to latter who were denied possession of their
properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among
others, that it had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in accordance with
the aforestated decision. However, on 2 September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to
dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340 expropriating the
same properties and for the same purpose.

The lower court in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the
enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the
order of the lower court dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht appealed from said order
to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on 28 December
1988, setting aside the order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation
proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of
the Supreme Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject
becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the
Republic to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with
the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340 expropriating the
very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears
that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme
Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through the
Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to
consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have
been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA
extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this
project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize
the traffic bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative
arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the
circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the
properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in
this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.


MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the
trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding
the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.

Issue:

Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his
travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

ANOTHER MANOTOC DIGEST
FACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in
US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending
disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of
Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect
was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which
was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the
petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and
was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating
his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was
opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for
certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request
denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD: NO.

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because
this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel,
duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not
able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person
in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial court in
releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
provision on right to travel.















City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the
Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the
Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months
from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution
requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction
of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City
Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002)
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City
Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64
null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government
and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property
without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the
total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered
by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide
its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries.

This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the
land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to homeowners


HEIRS OF TIMOTEO MORENO AND MARIA ROTEA v.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY G.R.
No. 156273, 9 August 2005, Second Division (Callejo, Sr, J.)

When the State reconveys land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations in
land values. Any increase or decrease in market value due to the proposed
improvement may not be considered in determining the market value. Thus,
reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he was paid by the
government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the
lands highest and best use when the sale to the State occurred.

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), as the predecessor of herein
respondent sought to acquire Lot No. 916 and Lot No. 920 for the proposed expansion
of the Lahug Airport. The two parcels of land located in Lahug, Cebu City were owned by
the spouses Timoteo Moreno and Maria Rotea. The spouses refused to sell their
properties because the proposed price was unacceptably way below the market value of
the lands at that time. As an incentive for the other owners to cede their lots adjoining
the then existing Lahug Airport, NAC guaranteed them or their successors-in-interest the
right to repurchase their properties for the same price paid by the government in the
event that these properties were no longer used for purposes of the airport. Some
landowners executed deeds of conveyance while others who refused to cede their
properties became defendants in an action for expropriation filed by the Republic of the
Philippines before the CFI of Cebu. Lot Nos. 916 and 920 were among those included in
the expropriation case.

The trial court declared Lot Nos. 916 and 920, along with the other adjoining
lands, condemned for public use after payment of just compensation. The subject lands
were transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently turned
over to MCIAA under Republic Act 6958 in 1990. Subsequently, when the Lahug Airport
was abandoned and all its functions and operations were transferred to the Mactan
Airport, the heirs of Moreno wrote then President Ramos and the MCIAA General
Manager, requesting for the exercise of their right to repurchase the lot. Written and
verbal demands were ignored by the respondent.

Petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages with the RTC of
Cebu City against the respondent asserting their right to reacquire the subject
properties. During the pendency of the case, one Richard E. Unchuan filed a Motion for
Transfer of Interest, alleging that some of the petitioners had already assigned to him
their respective rights, interests, participation, and ownership over the subject properties.
On April 12, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, granting
them the right to repurchase the properties at the amount originally paid by the
respondent in Civil Case No. R-1881, including consequential damages.

The CA reversed the trial courts decision on the premise that the judgment
affirming the states right to exercise its power of eminent domain was unconditional.
The SC reversed the decision of the CA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Additionally, it also filed a Motion to Resolve the Motion for Reconsideration by the
Honorable Court En Banc dated November 11, 2003, alleging that the present case
involves novel questions of law. The petitioners filed an Opposition to the respondents
Motion for Reconsideration stating that no new arguments have been proffered by the
respondent to warrant the reversal of the Courts decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to reconveyance or repurchase of the lots
in question when the public purpose for which the eminent domain was exercised no
longer subsists

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration denied.

The Supreme Court reiterated what was said in the former decision: It has been
declared that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land
as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. If land is expropriated
for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or
abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the
purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated. Also, if land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is
granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, it returns to the
former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. And if, upon the
contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then,
of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the
State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect
of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. When land has been
acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent
domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use
may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

It must be pointed out that nothing in this jurisprudence that bespeaks that there
should foremost be an express condition in the dispositive portion of the decision before
the condemned property can be returned to its former owner after the purpose for its
taking has been abandoned or ended. The indisputable certainty in the present case is
that there was a prior promise by the predecessor of the respondent that the
expropriated properties may be recovered by the former owners once the airport is
transferred to Mactan, Cebu. In fact, the witness for the respondent testified that 15 lots
were already reconveyed to their previous owners. This belated news further bolsters
the fact that the purpose for which the properties were condemned has been
abandoned.

A more pressing discovery unearthed by this Court is that a significant portion of
the subject properties had been purchased by the Cebu Property Ventures, Inc. for the
development of a commercial complex. The respondent, in its answer, did not deny this
allegation in the petitioners complaint.

The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned
for public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of
the land if the condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose;
however, if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose,
property reverts to the owner in fee simple. The governments taking of private property,
and then transferring it to private persons under the guise of public use or purpose is the
despotism found in the immense power of eminent domain. Moreover, the direct and
unconstitutional states power to oblige a landowner to renounce his productive and
invaluable possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for his own
private gain, is offensive to our laws.

There are historic and rational bases for affording the petitioners the right of
repurchase. The Court is cognizant of the incontestable fact that some landowners
immediately sold their properties upon the assurance that they could repurchase them at
the cessation of the Lahug Airports operations. And, indeed, these landowners who
chose to cede their properties were fortunate to have a stipulation in their contract of
sale vouching for their right of repurchase. Meanwhile, the landowners who found it
burdensomely difficult to part with their cherished lands underwent the costly
expropriation proceedings which lasted for a number of years. Inevitably, justice and
equity dictates the reconveyance of the expropriated lots to their previous
owners. One must never fail to overlook the reality that the power to condemn property
is an awesome power of the State and that to compel a citizen to forcibly surrender his
precious property to the enormous governmental power is too much a sacrifice which
deserves more consideration than those landowners, who, from the very beginning
voluntarily relinquished their ownership.

As to the amount of repurchase price, the Supreme Court maintains its stand.
When the State reconveys land, it should not profit from sudden appreciations in
land values. Any increase or decrease in market value due to the proposed
improvement may not be considered in determining the market value. Thus,
reconveyance to the original owner shall be for whatever amount he was paid by the
government, plus legal interest, whether or not the consideration was based on the
lands highest and best use when the sale to the State occurred.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes [GR L-60549, 60553 to 60555; 26 October 1983]
En Banc, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 on leave

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by
condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more specifically, for the
development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value, specifically for the construction of a sports complex (basketball courts,
tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball diamonds, and swimming
pools), clubhouse, gold course, children's playground and a nature area for picnics and horseback
riding for the use of the public. The Heirs of Juancho Ardona (Represented by Gloria
Ardona)Anastacio C. Cabilao, Heirs of Cipriano Cabilao (Represented by Jose Cabilao) Modesta
Cabilao, Heirs of Roman Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas), Agripino Gabisay and
Prudencia Mabini, Antonio Labrador and Lucia Gabisay, Geronimo Mabini and Marcelina Sabal,
Inocencio Mabini and Arsenia Reyes, Patricio Mabini and Gregoria Borres, Aniceto Gadapan and
Maxima Gabisay, Bartolome Magno and Calineca E. Magno, Alberto Cabuenas, Narciso Cabuenas
and Victoria Cabuenas, Eutiquioseno, Heirs of Esperidion Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto
Cabuenas), Maximina Navaro, Sulpicio Navaro, Eduardo Navaro, Martiniano Roma (In
Representation of Arcadio Mabini, Deceased), Martin Seno, Fausto Arda, Maxima Cabilao, Estrella
Seno, Eduvegis S. Cabilao, Rosario Cabilao, Minors Danilo, Socorro, Josefina and Marites, All
Surnamed Cabilao, Juan Borres (Represented by Francisca Borres), Ramon Jabadan, Jesus Alipar
and Leonila Kabahar, Antonio Labrador, Heirs of Nicasio Gabisay (Represented by Arsenio
Gabisay), Pacifico Labrador, Demetrio Labrador and Fructosa Tabura, Venancio Del Mar, Marino
Del Mar, Heirs of Teodora Arcillo (Represented by Brigida Arcillo) Dionisia Gabunada, Heirs of
Buenaventura Francisco (Represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), Heirs of Victoria C.
Cabuenas (Represented by Alberto Cabuenas) Heirs of Cipriano Gabunada (Represented by
Claudio Gabunada) filed their oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution; alleging that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that
assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of
the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court
of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the
expropriation cases.The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National
Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take
immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs
of Ardona, et. al. filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports
complex, including a golf course, by the Philippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for
public use.

Held: There are three provisions of the 1973 Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to transfer to public ownership,
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV
states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving
citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just
compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of
police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional
objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. The
restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes the scope of
government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public
lands that obviate the need to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance
applies to the Philippines. The Philippines has never been a laissez faire State, and the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or
limited government resources. There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional
purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,
hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public
use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded. The Philippine
Tourism Authority has stressed that the development of the 808 hectares includes plans that would
give the Heirs of Ardona, et. al. and other displaced persons productive employment, higher
incomes, decent housing, water and electric facilities, and better living standards. The Courts
dismissal of the petition is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right of the PTA to proceed
with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already identified as fit for the establishment of a resort
complex to promote tourism is, therefore, sustained.

Manosca vs. Court of Appeals [GR 106440, 29 January 1996]
First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur

Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the
parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birthsite of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986,
pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical
landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the
legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the
affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-
General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and
in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an
order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property.

The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August
1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of
the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would
have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas
moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity,
contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for
reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed
the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court
on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of
the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes public use.

Held: Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not
be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent
domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in
the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature
of a forced purchase by the State.

It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a
public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form
and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." This prescription is
intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced. The term "public use," not having
been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of
meeting a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses.

The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been
discarded. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is
the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of
the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from
the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public
use.


Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GR L-72126, 29 January
1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a
parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs
215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's
heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon
pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large
diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal
Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution 258,
Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered
by TCT 37879.

An opposition to the resolution was filed by the PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor,
which, in turn, created a special committee of four members to investigate the matter. On 10
March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan
disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a public road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238, Series of
1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan.

The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit
to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983,
for the purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved
the aforesaid resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14
February 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil
action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of
the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of
possession in favor of the municipality. On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order
declaring the taking of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan
as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the
property.

PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by
PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no
genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other
roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The
court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that the land is
more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished products.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court on
petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

Issue: Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMCs property for the purpose of a
connecting road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

Held: There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public
use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine
necessity therefor. The foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private
property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public
character. Consequently, the courts have the power to require into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The
government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
taken and how much thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it
is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely
affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection clause will not allow.
The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that "there is no genuine
necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the
Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road.

Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale
situated similarly as the lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated
which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn
the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause
unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public
road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other
available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment
doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the
vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongestion of
traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken will
only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and
decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area."

There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed
road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to
expropriate assuming there is a real need for another connecting road.

MASIKIP VS CITY OF PASIG
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by
statute

FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig
sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and recreational activities of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged
purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The
Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was
genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals,
which dismissed petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and
inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to
the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional
limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value
of the property based on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at
Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the
expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation,
indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.