CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 1

BARRIOS V MARTINEZ
PER CURIAM; November 12, 2004
FACTS
- Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of BP 22
- Complainant submitted Resolution dated March 13, 1996, and the Entry of judgment dated March 20, 1996 in an action for
disbarment against Martinez
- July 3, 1996 the Court required respondent to comment on said petition within 10 days from notice
- February 17, 1997 a second resolution was issued requiring respondent to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for failure to comply with the earlier Resolution and to submit Comment
- July 7, 1997 the Court imposed a fine of P1000 for respondents failure to comply with previous resolution within 10 days
- April 27, 1998 the Court fined the respondent an additional P2000 and required him to comply with the resolution under pain
of imprisonment and arrest for a period of 5 days or until his compliance
- February 3, 1999 the Court declared respondent Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec 3(b) of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid resolution
- April 5, 1999 NBI reported that respondent was arrested in Tacloban City on March 26, 1999 but was subsequently released
after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of February 17, 1997 and April 27, 1998 by remitting the amount of
P2000 and submitting his overdue Comment:
1. He failed to respond to the Resolution dated February 17, 1997 as he was at that time undergoing medical treatment at
Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte
2. Complainant passed away sometime in June 1997
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in respondents favor. Respondent avers that
as a result of his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family of complainant, the latter
filed the present administrative case
- September 11, 1997 Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First Division
Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC of Tacloban City, as well
as a civil case involving the victims of the Dona Paz tragedy in 1987 for which the RTC of Basey, Samar rendered a decision against
him, his appeal thereto having been dismissed by the CA.
- June 16, 1999 the Court referred the present case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation
- The report of IBP stated:
1. Respondent filed a motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died and that dismissal is
warranted because the case filed by him does not survive due to his demise as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his
death. The IBP disagrees, pursuant to Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the SC or the IBP may initiate the
proceedings when they perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by any one and a
probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer which requires disciplinary sanctions.
2. Propensity to disregard orders of the SC, as shown by respondent, is an utter lack of good moral character
3. Respondents conviction of a crime of moral turpitude clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice
and therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him
4. It is recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys immediately
- September 27, 2003 the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of its Investigating Commissioner
- December 3, 2003 Atty. Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation
- January 14, 2004 the Court required the complainant to file a comment within 10 days
- February 16, 2004 complainants daughter sent a Manifestation and Motion alleging they have not been furnished with a copy
of respondents Motion

ISSUE
WON the crime respondent was convicted of is one involving moral turpitude

HELD
Yes. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.
- The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law is also
untenable. The practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.
- Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministrations of
persons unfit to practice them.
- The court is also disinclined to take respondents old age and the fact that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his
favor. If at all, the respondent was held to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence, and his conduct should be above reproach.
- The Court based the determination of the penalty from previously decided cases, holding that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime of moral turpitude.
Disposition Respondent was disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

UI V BONIFACIO
DE LEON; June 8, 2000

NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

FACTS
Mrs. Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly
carrying on an illicit relationship with her husband Mr. Ui. In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty.
Bonifacio attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and Mr. Ui got married in 1985, but according to the
certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they were married in 1987. She claims that she
entered the relationship with Mr. Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor
can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Mr. Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his
true civil status, she parted ways with him.

ISSUE
WON Atty. Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law

HELD
- No. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply
by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates
his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. One of the conditions prior to the admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of
the privilege of law practice. Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
- A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers,
as keepers of the public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their affairs with
great caution. Atty. Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship
with Mr. Ui, clothed as it was with what she believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the
same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
- A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave
himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Atty. Bonifacios act
of immediately distancing herself from Mr. Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she fad no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. On the matter of the
falsified certificate of marriage, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her
marriage or that she failed to check that the information in the document which she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.


FIGUEROA V BARRANCO, JR.
ROMERO; July 31, 1997

FACTS
- In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Barranco passed the
1970 bar exams on the fourth attempt.
- Figueroa avers that she and Barranco had been sweethearts, that a child was born to them out of wedlock and that respondent
did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
- Figueroa and Barranco were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo and were steadies since 1953. Figueroa first acceded to sexual congress
in 1960. A son, Rafael Barranco, was born on Dec 11, 1964. Barranco promised to marry Figueroa after he passes the bar exams.
Their relationship continued, with more than 20 or 30 promises of marriage. Barranco gave only P10 for the child on Rafaels
birthdays. In 1971, Figueroa learned Barranco married another woman.
- From 1972 to 1988, several motions to dismiss and comments were filed.
- On Sept 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath.
- Nov 17, 1988, the Court, in response to Figueroas opposition, resolved to cancel Barrancos scheduled oath-taking.
- June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the IBP. On May 17, 1997, IBP recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyers oath

ISSUE
WON the facts constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of Barranco from the legal profession
HELD
No. To justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral
act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless acts which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community.
- Barrancos engaging in premarital sexual relations with Figueroa and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character on
his part but it does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
- Barranco and Figueroa were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
- Respondent, at the time of this decision, is already 62.

Disposition Petition is dismissed. Simeon Barranco, Jr. is allowed to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of proper fees.

CORDOVA V CORDOVA
PER CURIAM; November 29, 1989
(giulia pineda)

NATURE
Administrative case in the SC for Immorality of a member of the Bar

FACTS
- Savacion Delizo Cordova sent an unsworn letter-complaint to then CJ Teehankee charging her husband Atty. Laurence Cordova
with immorality and acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The complaint was forwarded to the IBP, Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and investigation.
- The Commission required the complainant to submit a verified complain to which she complied and submitted on Sept 27, 1988
a revised and verified version of her long and detailed complaint against her husband.
- On Dec 16, she was required to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte. She requested for the rescheduling several
times. The hearings never took place as she failed to appear.
- The respondent never moved to set aside the order of default, even though notices were sent to him.
- In a telegraphic message dated Apr 6, the complainant informed the commission that she and her husband have already
reconciled.
- In an order dated Apr 17, 1989, the Commission required the parties to appear before it for the confirmation and explanation of
the telegraphic message and to file formal motion to dismiss the complaint. Neither responded and nothing was heard from either
party since then.

The findings of the IBP Board of Governors:
- Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born.
- In 1985, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went
to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado.
- Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and
Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife,
using the name Fely Cordova.
- Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while failing
to support his legitimate family.
- On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he
would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig
- Respondent would, however, frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of
his legitimate family.
- In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila that respondent Cordova was no longer living with
her children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, Luisita Magallanes, and had taken
his younger daughter along with him
- Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainants, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back
her daughter by habeas corpus. The RTC of Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
- Notwithstanding respondent's promise to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to
fail to give support to his legitimate family.

ISSUE
WON the recent reconciliation of the Cordovas and the failure of the complainant to pursue the case have dismissed the case.

HELD
The most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe
away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent earn carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon
him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.

Ratio
- An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
- The lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the discharge of
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community.

Disposition WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the
Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up
the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.


GUEVARA VS EALA
Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiance Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had
three children.

After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as
messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went
home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked
about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More
so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was
revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said
that his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment.

Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if
not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Furthermore, respondent violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed,
unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior
to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married,
he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

SORIANO V DIZON
PER CURIAM; January 25, 2006
(romy ramirez)

NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment

FACTS
- Respondent, Atty. Manuel Dizon, was convicted by final judgment by the RTC of Baguio City for frustrated murder. He applied
and was granted probation by the said court based on several conditions which included among others the satisfaction of the civil
liabilities imposed in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver who was rendered paralyzed on the left side of
the body as a result of his being shot by the defendant.
- The defendant despite the condition that he pay the civil liabilities imposed on him as a condition for the probation, appealed
said civil liability to the Court of Appeals.
- From the records of the trial court, it appears that defendant was drunk at the time of the incident and that the case arose out of
the apparent resentment of the defendant from having been overtaken by the victim who was then driving a taxi. From the
testimony of a witness, it further appears that the taxi driver was merely defending himself and that defendant was the aggressor
during said incident.
- Upon the complaint for the disbarment filed by Soriano against Dizon, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines rendered its report and recommendation which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. The
Commssion recommended the disbarment of the defendant for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for
exhibiting an obvious lack of good moral character.

ISSUES
1. WON Dizons crime of frustrated murder involves moral turpitude and that his guilt warrants disbarment

HELD
Ratio
- The totality of the facts of the case unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. Given that membership in the legal
profession demands a high degree of good moral character not only as a condition to admission but also a continuing requirement
for the practice of law, the defendant has shown in all his actuations that he lacks the fitness to remain in the law profession.

Reasoning
- Not all cases involving homicide involves moral turpitude. The question as to what may be a crime involving moral turpitude
would depend on the individual facts surrounding the case and the surrounding circumstances.
- In the case at bar, it was shown that Dizon was the aggressor as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected
it. The actuations of the victim in this case can be considered as reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the attack of Dizon.
- The defendants use of an unlicensed firearm and his refusal to satisfy his civil liability to the victim is a serious transgression of
Canon 1 of the code of Professional Responsibility.
- Defendant has continuously display his dishonest and duplicitous behavior by first seeking to arrive at an out of court settlement
with the family and when the same failed, making it appear that it was the family would sought a conference with him. He also lied
to the court by claiming that he incident was the result of the mauling he got at the hands of the victim and two other persons. This
story was belied by the physical evidence as testified to by no less than three doctors.

Disposition Manuel Dizon is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.estrada

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1474. January 28, 2000]
CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARBRAHAM A. SULLER, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly immoral conduct for having raped
his neighbor's wife.
In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller went to the complainant's
abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.
As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in. Thereafter, respondent began
touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested, respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. At that moment, complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the
house, he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.
[1]
She was kicking respondent with one foot while the
latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending herself.
On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal complaint
[2]
for rape against
respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance, Agoo, La Union.
On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Abraham A. Suller.
[3]

On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice.
[4]

On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.
[5]

On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation.
[6]

From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties appeared with their respective
counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination
of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.
[7]
Kycalr
On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been referred to him previously.
[8]

In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. On
August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.
[9]

On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering the case submitted for
resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent failed to appear despite due notice.
[10]

On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution recommending that the
disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year be meted on respondent.
[11]

The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not determinative of this administrative case.
The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to show that respondent acted
in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.
"A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court."
[12]

In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not sufficient
punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar.
The privilege to practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally.
[13]
"Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be
possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."
[14]

WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

ESTRADA V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; November 25, 2003
(boots tirol)

NATURE
RESOLUTION of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

FACTS
-Joseph Estrada, through Atty Alan Paguia, filed a Petition for Certiorari under the Rules of Court against Sandiganbayan, which
prayed 1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing
and deciding the petition; 2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and 3.That Criminal
Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
-Atty Paguia, speaking for Estrada, asserted that the inhibition of the members of the SC from hearing the petition is called for
under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any partisan political activity
which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption
of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contended that the
justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision
of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo is, according to petitioner, a patent mockery of justice and due process.
-The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit (Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion) and the SC warned Atty
Paguia of his conduct -- his attacks on the Court and making public statements on the case (violating Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility). He was given 10 days SHOW CAUSE why he should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
- On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in
an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court (for
discussion on political partisanship please see original case), and continued to make public statements about Estradas case.

ISSUES
WON Atty Paguia should be suspended from the practice of law

HELD
YES.
-Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
-The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-
founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of the peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
-The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or
against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-meant admonition. The Court has already
warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer
of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

Disposition Atty Paguia indefinitely suspended from the practice of law


SABURNIDO VS MADRONO
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001]
MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FLORANTE E. MADROO,i[1] respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaintii[2] for disbarment of respondent, Atty. Florante E. Madroo, filed by spouses Venustiano and
Rosalia Saburnido. Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to
committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife
Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate administrative cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,iii[3] complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary
against respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at complainant, who was unarmed at the time,
during a heated altercation. Respondent was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in government but without
forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madrono, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps.
Saburnido v. Judge Madrono, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.iv[4] In the first case, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that
respondent granted and reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the spouses Saburnido charged
that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not issue the
corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found
guilty of both charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,v[5] for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano
lent his service firearm to an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while posing as a member of the then
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,vi[6] for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that
Venustiano, with the help of his co-respondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of Venustianos firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67,vii[7] for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido. Respondent alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into custody a prisoner by final judgment
who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,viii[8] filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that
Rosalia Saburnido served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections despite being related to a candidate for
barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against
Rosalia Saburnido was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that
resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against them, they suffered much moral, mental,
physical, and financial damage. They claim that their children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in attending to their
cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did
not constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints he filed against
complainants was manufactured. He adds that he was so unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted.ix[9] He claims that the complaint for
serious irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating
that his service firearm was lost. He also points out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped during his watch. As for his
complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends that by mentioning this case in the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of
his right to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were meant only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido
stressed that she served in the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated that she told the other BEI members
and the pollwatchers that she was related to one candidate and that she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody objected, she
proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her relative lost in that election while respondents son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996,x[10] we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in
the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to have waived his right to present evidence in
his behalf during said hearing. Neither did respondent submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts
constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court.xi[11] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were instrumental in
respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the persistence of
one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. xxx
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the court.xii[12] While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the
evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.xiii[13] In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to
protect the public and the legal profession.xiv[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon
his receipt of notice of this decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:

Facts: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Florante Madro Complainants
allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty. The
cases filed were:

1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755, for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido.

2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758, for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido and two others.

3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido.

4. Adm. Case No. 95-33, filed by respondent against Rosalia

Saburnido for violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
Previous to this case, complainants (spouses Saburnido) also filed 3 separate administrative cases against respondent, which led to the latters
dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement benefits.

SC referred this case to the IBP, the latter concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts
constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Madronos act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross misconduct that will warrant the imposition of
administrative sanctions.

Held: YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer
of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession. Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were
instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we
may add, is not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.


CASTANEDA V AGO
CASTRO; July 30, 1975

NATURE
- Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- 1955 Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI of Manila to recover certain machineries.
-1957 judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson

- 1961 SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Agos motion denied, levy was made on Agos house and
lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC affirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions
were denied
- 1963 sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- 1964 sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
- 1964 Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation
and that his wife share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made; CFI of QC issued writ of
preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of sale; the
battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order continued
- 1966 Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it;
Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE
WON the Agos lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

HELD
- No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale, justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos abetted by
their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
- Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth
and moral justice.
- A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended;
what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position.
It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his clients cause as defenseless, then he
is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims
and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate.



CANON 2

LEDESMA V CLIMACO
FERNANDO; June 28, 1974

NATURE
Original action in the SC, Certiorari

FACTS
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On
October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced
discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him
and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately
the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE
WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar

HELD
No.
1. The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been postponed
at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused, and his
task as an election registrar.
2. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to
have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and
is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice.
The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
3. The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable

role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough
for the Court to apprise the accused of his right to an atty, but is essential that the court assign on de oficio for him if he desires/ is
poor.
Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing.

Disposition Petition for certiorari dismissed.




ALGURA VS THE CITY OF NAGA
506 SCRA 81 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Rule 141 Indigent Litigants
In 1999, the City of Naga demolished a portion of the house owned by spouses Antonio and Lorencita Algura for allegedly being a
nuisance as the said portion of the house was allegedly blocking the road right of way.
In September, the spouses then sued Naga for damages arising from the said demolition (loss of income from boarders), which to
the spouses is an illegal demolition. Simultaneous to their complaint was an ex-parte motion for them to litigate as indigent
litigants. The motion was granted and the spouses were exempted from paying the required filing fees.
In February 2000, during pre-trial, the City of Naga asked for 5 days within which to file a Motion to Disqualify Petitioners as
Indigent Litigants. Under the Rules of Court (then Sec. 16, Rule 141), a party may be qualified as a pauper litigant (for those
residing outside Metro Manila) if he submits an affidavit attesting that a.) his gross monthly income does not exceed P1,500.00
(now not more than double the monthly minimum wage) and b.) he should not own property with an assessed value of not more
than P18,000.00 (now not more than P300k market value). The City asserted that the combined income of the Alguras is at least
P13,400 which is way beyond the threshold P1.5k. The City presented as proof Antonios pay slip as a policeman (P10,400) and
Lorencitas estimated income from her sari-sari store. The claim of the spouses that they were property-less, as proven by the City
Assessors Certification, was not disputed by the City.
The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by the city, they only relied on the income of Antonio which
was barely enough to cover their familys need like food, shelter, and other basic necessities for them and their family (they have 6
children).
The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses were disqualified as pauper-litigants. Subsequently, the
case filed by the spouses against the City was dismissed for the spouses failure to pay the required filing fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-litigants.
HELD: No, there was no hearing on the matter hence the case was remanded back to the lower court. In this case, the Supreme
Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19, Rule 141 (then Sec. 16, Rule 141).
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to pay the filing fees. On the other
hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a party must meet before he can be qualified as an indigent party and
thus be exempt from paying the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses could not qualify because their income
exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if Sec. 21, Rule 3 is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be
given a chance in a hearing to satisfy the court that notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they
have no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for their family, and are thus,
qualified as indigent litigants under said Rule. Therefore, the court should have conducted a trial in order to let the spouses satisfy
the court that indeed the income theyre having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was not sufficient to cover food, shelter, and
their other basic needs.


CANON 3


KHAN, JR. V SIMBILLO
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 19, 2003
(apple maramba)

NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

FACTS
- Atty. Rizalino Simbillo publicized his legal services in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer via a paid
advertisement which read: Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.
- A staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court took notice and called the number posing as an interested
party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who said that her husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, and that the fee was P48,000.
- Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that similar ads were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star.
- Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
- The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
- IBP found respondent guilty
- Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
- Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE
WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court

HELD
Yes. Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

Ratio The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is the primary
consideration.

Reasoning
- Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
- The following elements distinguish legal profession from business:
1. A duty of public service
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
- Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage
encouraging people who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
- Solicitation of legal business sis not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession.









IN RE: TAGORDA

MALCOLM; March 23, 1929
(boots tirol)

FACTS
Luis Tagorda, a practicing lawyer and a member of the Provincial Board of Isabela admits that the previous election he used a card
which states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and a notary public (he can execute deed of sales, etc). He also admits that
he wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that despite his election as
member of the Board, he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public, even adding that he will only charge three
pesos for registration of their land titles.

ISSUES
1. WON Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment
2. WON Tagorda should be disbarred

HELD
1. YES.
Sec 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act 2828) states that "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally, or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics
provide:
27- The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional... Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and
are intolerable.
28 -It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit, or to
breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
- The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional.
- With the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
2. NO. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are: first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his
acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.


DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE
AQUINO; May 10, 1985
(ice baguilat)

NATURE
Administrative Case

FACTS
Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and 9 other lawyers from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois,
USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay
Products Intl. Inc. to HE Gabriel (a client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented
by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this Administrative
Case.

ISSUE
WON the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie

HELD
Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law in the country. Using the name
constitutes representation of being associated with the firm which is deemed to be unethical. Respondents are enjoined from
practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.



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CANON 4

RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING
FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC

Facts: The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of
2008. The resolution requested the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.

Issue: Should indigent litigant be exempted from paying docket fees?

Ruling: Yes. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by exempting them from
the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the
guarantee of Section 11, Article III of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient,
but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.


CANON 5

B.M 850, Oct.2, 2001 (MCLE)

Members of the IBP, except those exempt under Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850 (Mandatory Continuing Legal Education),
are required every 3 years to complete at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities, with appropriate penalties for
failure to do so.


CANON 6

VITRIOLO V DASIG
PER CURIAM; April 1, 2003


NATURE
Administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).

FACTS
- Almost all complainants are high-ranking officers of the CHED. They allege that while respondent was OIC of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
- During her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests
before her office
- Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless,
and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.
- Complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful
failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks
she issued, the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.
- Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion
and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident,
a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, was lodged
- Complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which
maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of
preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.
- The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline concluded that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education. It was recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further
warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
- The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Respondent was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) years.

ISSUE
WON respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her
malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist,
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.

HELD

YES.

Ratio Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for
disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Reasoning Respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of
the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as
consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.
- Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office
violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
- A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code.
- Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in
government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one
occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might
tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at
all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.

Disposition Respondent was found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the

Code of Professional Responsibility, and was ordered DISBARRED.

PEOPLE V PINEDA
SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967

FACTS
- On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in
Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid
succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house,
entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and wounding
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.
- Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5)
separate cases for murder. The five informations were based on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation.
- Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof
into one (1) criminal case. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The
respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the
motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of
the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime
though the series of shots killed more than one victim; and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to
obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.
Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

ISSUE
WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information

HELD
- YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other (delito complejo). It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.
The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the
necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge
the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.
Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for
murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar is that official duty has been regularly performed. A
prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion.
This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize
that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him
the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope, the
Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of
offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."
- The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of
what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by
him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot
ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in
exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a)
for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive
manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the
present case fits into any of the situations just recited.

Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted.


COLLANTES V RENOMERON
PER CURIAM; August 16, 1991
(aida villanueva)

FACTS
- A complaint of disbarment is filed with a related administrative case against Renomeron of the Registrar of Deeds in Tacloban.

- Collantes was the house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision and filed the case with regard to the application of V & G
for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision in Jan 1987.
- Feb 16, 1987 no action was made by Renomeron despite follow-ups made by Collantes. Renomeron requested Collantes to
submit additional requirements which Collantes complied with.
- Renomeron suspended the registration of the documents pending compliance of V&G with certain special agreement between
then that V&G would provide Renomeron with a weekly Tacloban-Manil round trip ticket with P2,000 pocket money. He said he
would act favorably on their application if that agreement would be fulfilled.
- Collantes sent plane fare (P800) to Renomeron through his niece. But pocket money was not given.
- Renomeron then imposed additional requirements which angered Collantes, leading the latter to challenge Renomeron to act on
the 163 pending applications by V&G within 24 hours.
- May 22, 1987 Renomeron denied the application for ambiguity of the subject matter.
- Collantes appealed for a reconsideration and elevated the matter to the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration.
- The NLTDRA ruled that the documents were registrable.
- The NLTDRA recommended Renomerons case to the DOJ and the Secretary of Justice found him guilty. The president then
dismissed Renomeron from public service.
- A disbarment case was then filed by Collantes against Renomeron.

ISSUE
WON the disbarment case against Renomeron would prosper given the administrative case

HELD
- Yes, the administrative complaint has to do with his position in public service. The disbarment case has to do with his status as
member of the Integrated Bar.
- Renomeron violated the lawyers oath.
- The Code of Professional Responsibility 1.01 forbids a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez
A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006

(Legal Ethics)

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen.
Accused of falsely representing that it was needed in complainants application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent
denied misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and
children in their application for visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the complainant, and promised her
several times that he would repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but which later
bounced.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be
believed must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence, respondents letters to the complainant, shows
that he made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is
true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and
official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the
return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these
actions of respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated
the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want
of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry

of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and
integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued
checks to cover up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those
who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the
legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for,
among other acts, gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return the amount he received from
the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action.

MISAMIN V SAN JUAN
FERNANDO; August 31, 1976

FACTS
- It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain. in the Metro Manila Police force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A.
San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese
descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges filed by him
against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on
the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the
explanation for the non-appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General
to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught.
- Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that
there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the
complaints being dismissed. This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot
be found guilty of malpractice. Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel
for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.
However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his
appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the
suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the
NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise,
the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila."

ISSUE
WON a lawyer-public officer may represent a private client during his tenure

HELD

NO, but since evidence is lacking to discipline Atty. Miguel San Juan, the case is dismissed. The Court noted that the Report of the
Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as
"this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or
removal of an attorney.
- The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far
back as in re Tionko, decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of
the court in accordance with his oath." The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to.

- This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in
view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a
matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless,
while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all
appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a
public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that
laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass
unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts
and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of
membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied


PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN
PUNO; April 12, 2005
(marge alias)

NATURE
Special civil action in the SC. Certiorari and prohibition.

FACTS
-1976: General Bank and Trust Co. (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties, prompting the Central Bank to extend to it
emergency loans reaching a total of P310 million. Despite this, Genbank failed to recover and the following year Central Bank had
to issue a resolution declaring Genbank insolvent and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held;
Lucio Tan Group submitted the winning bid.
-Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza field a petition with CFI praying for the courts assistance and supervision in the
liquidation as mandated by RA 265, section 29.
-After EDSA I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and his cronies.
Pursuant to this mandate, PCGG filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan Group and the Marcos family. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the 2
nd
division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB). In connection with this, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on the properties of the Lucio Tan
Group.
-Lucio Tan Group questioned the writs through petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and injunction with the SC. The latter referred
the cases to the SB for proper disposition. In these cases docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 Lucio Tan Group was represented
by their counsel, former SolGen Estelito Mendoza who has then resumed private practice.
-05 Feb 1991: PCGG, invoking Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), filed motions to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0005 & 0096-0099. The motions allege that Atty. Mendoza intervened in
the acquisition of Genbank by the Lucio Tan Group when, in his capacity as then SolGen, he advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about Genbanks liquidation& appeared as counsel for the central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation.
-22 April 1991: SB denied the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 for PCGGs failure to prove the existence
of an inconsistency between Mendozas former function as SolGen and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group;
it also ruled that Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. PCGG did not file a MFR.
-When Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the SBs 2
nd
Division to the 5th Division, the latter also denied the
motion to disqualify. PCGGs MFR was denied. Hence this petition.



KEY ISSUE
WON Rule 6.03 of the CPR applies to Atty. Mendoza.

Rule 6.03: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.

Obiter
The History of Rule 6.03
-17
th
and 18
th
centuries: ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe; the principal thrust of
the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in
litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
-colonial and early post-revolutionary America: The forms of lawyer regulation did not differ markedly from those in England.
Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-
revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.
-19
th
century: the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.

-mid 19
th
century: American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways: (1) David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers; (2) legal educators, such as
David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties.
-As in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive
statement of a lawyer's duties.
-end of 19
th
century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal
ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. 2 primary sources of ethical guidance:
academic discourses & the bar association codes
-1887: Alabama - the 1
st
state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for
several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.
-1917: Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
-1924: some ABA members start to question the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door
or the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees
in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.
(a) Adverse-interest conflicts - exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private
practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the
current and former are adverse.
(b) Congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government
lawyers.
-ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. To
deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted to disqualify such lawyers both for adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.
Canon 36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a
judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment
in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.
-1946: the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.
-mid 20
th
century: growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. 1964: ABA President-elect Lewis
Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The unfairness of
Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it with Canon 9 in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 states:
A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

-The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility which was approved by the
ABA House of Delegates in August 1969. Canon 9 was supplemented by Disciplinary Rule 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept
private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee.
-Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards.
-August 1983: ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, doing away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless
dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.
-1980: Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility which it submitted to SC
for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new
realities.
-21 June 1988: SC promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility. CPR Rule 6.03 which deals particularly with former
government lawyers retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to both
adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.

SUB-ISSUES
1. WON this case involves the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03
2. WON there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing the Lucio Tan
Group.
2a. WON Atty. Mendozas act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate Genbank is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03
2b. WON the intervention of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is significant and substantial

HELD

2a. NO.

Ratio American Bar Association Formal Opinion 342s definition of matter : any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable
transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Reasoning Based on PCGGs case for disqualification, the matter or the act of Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General involved here
is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.

-The procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, sec. 29. Said legal provision provides for the role
of the SolGen in proceedings upon insolvency.
-Also, CPR Rule 6.03 cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a SolGen in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 (liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096
(sequestration of the stocks in Allied Bank, the successor of Genbank, on the ground that they are ill-gotten).
2b. NO.

Ratio in light of the history of CPR Rule 6.03, the 2nd meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention. The
intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.

Reasoning 2 interpretations of the intervene (basis: Webster):
(a) intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence.
(b) intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings.
-The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by Atty. Mendoza as the then sitting
Solicitor General. The record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings.
-The principal role of the court in this proceeding for dissolution is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors
against the Genbank. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

Obiter
Balancing Policy Considerations
-CPR Rule 6.03 represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government
service. It should not be interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent.
-At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that
government will be able to reverse that situation. It is true that the only card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is
have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private
practice. To make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter.
-In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as
deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is
not a mere guesswork.
-Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its
misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.
-The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of
lawyers in the government service.
-No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession.
Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm.
-As well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward
results. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
-Also the switching sides concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. The danger that confidential official information
might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. There are no inconsistent sides to be bothered about in the case at bar. In lawyering
for the Lucio Tan Group, Atty. Mendoza is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating Genbank
and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding.

Disposition Petition denied. No costs.