Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28946 January 16, 1929
In re estate of Piraso, deceased.
SIXTO ACOP, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SALMING PIRASO, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Gibbs and McDonough and Roman Ozaeta for appellant.
Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J .:
This appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Benguet, denying the
probate of the instrument Exhibit A, as the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso.
The proponent-appellant assigns the following as alleged errors of the lower court:
1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in the
Ilocano dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to
understand a will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.
The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as follows:
The evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly,
and could make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will
should have been written in that dialect.
Such statements were not unnecessary for the decision of the case, once it has been proved without
contradiction, that the said deceased Piraso did not know English, in which language the instrument
Exhibit A, alleged to be his will, is drawn. Section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly
provides that:
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a
resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall
be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator," etc. (Emphasis supplied.) Nor can the presumption in
favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that
the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to
the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate of said document Exhibit A, as a will,
because, in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of
Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where Exhibit A was drawn, but that the record
contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a
smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which Exhibit A is written. So
that even if such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly
contradicted and destroyed.
We consider the other question raised in this appeal needless and immaterial to the adjudication of
this case, it having been, as it was, proven, that the instrument in question could not be probated as
the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso, having been written in the English language with
which the latter was unacquainted.
Such a result based upon solidly established facts would be the same whether or not it be
technically held that said will, in order to be valid, must be written in the Ilocano dialect; whether or
not the Igorrote or Inibaloi dialect is a cultivated language and used as a means of communication in
writing, and whether or not the testator Piraso knew the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a
will written in said dialect. The fact is, we repeat, that it is quite certain that the instrument Exhibit A
was written in English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know, and this is sufficient to
invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevents
its probate.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEA, J .:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the
name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains
only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of
these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by
letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of
the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one
applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the
substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely
purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration,
undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which
the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would
assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We
cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator
and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of
the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary;
and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another part of same sheet, would add
nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where the testator
and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the
bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient
security.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any
sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one
sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering
whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the
will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the
numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring
specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation
clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator
since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and
the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and
the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded. lawphil.net
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the
dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was
executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which
this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

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