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United Airlines vs Fontanilla

Facts:On March 1, 1989, private respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner
United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three (3) Visit the U.S.A.
tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal for the following routes:
(a) San Francisco to Washington (15 April 1989);
(b) Washington to Chicago (25 April 1989);
(c) Chicago to Los Angeles (29 April 1989);
(d) Los Angeles to San Francisco (01 May 1989 for petitioners wife and 05 May 1989 for
petitioner and his son).
The Fontanillas proceeded to the United States as planned, where they used the first coupon from
San Francisco to Washington. On April 24, 1989, Aniceto Fontanilla bought two (2) additional
coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles
Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets
with corresponding boarding passes with the words CHECK-IN REQUIRED, for United
Airlines Flight No. 1108, set to leave from Los Angeles to San Francisco at 10:30 a.m. on May
5, 1989.i[3]
The cause of the non-boarding of the Fontanillas on United Airlines Flight No. 1108 makes up
the bone of contention of this controversy.
Private respondents' version is as follows:
Aniceto Fontanilla and his son Mychal claim that on May 5, 1989, upon their arrival at the Los
Angeles Airport for their flight, they proceeded to United Airlines counter where they were
attended by an employee wearing a nameplate bearing the name LINDA. Linda examined their
tickets, punched something into her computer and then told them that boarding would be in
fifteen minutes.ii[4]
When the flight was called, the Fontanillas proceeded to the plane. To their surprise, the
stewardess at the gate did not allow them to board the plane, as they had no assigned seat
numbers. They were then directed to go back to the check-in counter where Linda
subsequently informed them that the flight had been overbooked and asked them to wait.
The incident prompted the Fontanillas to file Civil Case No. 89-4268 for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Decisions:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaim is
likewise dismissed as it appears that plaintiffs were not actuated by legal malice when they filed
the instant complaint.iii[15]


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Decisions:On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Fontanillas. The appellate court
found that there was an admission on the part of United Airlines that the Fontanillas did in fact
observe the check-in requirement. It ruled further that even assuming there was a failure to
observe the check-in requirement, United Airlines failed to comply with the procedure laid down
in cases where a passenger is denied boarding.
Issue: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
WAS WRONG IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE ALLEGED ADMISSION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
OBSERVED THE CHECK-IN REQUIREMENT.
Held: On the first issue raised by the petitioner, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled that when
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,iv[18] there was an implied admission in petitioner's
answer in the allegations in the complaint that private respondent and his son observed the
check-in requirement at the Los Angeles Airport. Thus:
A perusal of the above pleadings filed before the trial court disclosed that there exists a blatant
admission on the part of the defendant-appellee that the plaintiffs-appellants indeed observed the
check-in requirement at the Los Angeles Airport on May 5, 1989. In view of defendant-
appellees admission of plaintiffs-appellants material averment in the complaint, We find no
reason why the trial court should rule against such admission.v[19]
We disagree with the above conclusion reached by respondent Court of Appeals. Paragraph 7 of
private respondents' complaint states:
7. On May 5, 1989 at 9:45 a.m., plaintiff and his son checked in at defendants designated
counter at the airport in Los Angeles for their scheduled flight to San Francisco on defendants
Flight No. 1108.vi[20]
Responding to the above allegations, petitioner averred in paragraph 4 of its answer, thus:
4. Admits the allegation set forth in paragraph 7 of the complaint except to deny that plaintiff and
his son checked in at 9:45 a.m., for lack of knowledge or information at this point in time as to
the truth thereof.vii[21]
The rule authorizing an answer that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial, does
not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily
within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue.viii[22]
Whether or not private respondents checked in at petitioner's designated counter at the airport at
9:45 a.m. on May 5, 1989 must necessarily be within petitioner's knowledge.
While there was no specific denial as to the fact of compliance with the check-in requirement
by private respondents, petitioner presented evidence to support its contention that there indeed
was no compliance.


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Private respondents then are said to have waived the rule on admission. It not only presented
evidence to support its contention that there was compliance with the check-in requirement, it
even allowed petitioner to present rebuttal evidence. In the case of Yu Chuck vs. "Kong Li Po,"
we ruled that:
The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense in proving in the first
instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-existence of which is necessarily within the
knowledge of the adverse party, and of the necessity (to his opponents case) of establishing
which such adverse party is notified by his opponents pleadings.
The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must be considered to have done
(sic) by introducing evidence as to the execution of the document and failing to object to the
defendants evidence in refutation; all this evidence is now competent and the case must be
decided thereupon.


















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Eugenio Cuaresma vs Marcelo Daquis et al
On September 11, 2012
63 SCRA 257 Legal Ethics A lawyer owes candor to the court
An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge
pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no knowledge of
the said civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later
found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said civil case. The
Supreme Court then directed Directo to show cause why he should not be disciplined.
In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly
learned of the civil case; that had there been a mistake committed, it had been an honest one,
and would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of
misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions.
HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave Directo
the benefit of the doubt although it did say that Directos reasoning could very well be just an
afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in good faith
especially so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or
his lack of English proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo to prepare pleadings
carefully in the future so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained.
Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very
essence of honorable membership in the profession.












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Republic vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Re p u b l i c ( p e t i t i o n e r ) , t h r o u g h t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Co mmi s s i o n
o n Go o d Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379
declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten
wealth.

The f unds wer e pr evi ous l y hel d by 5 account gr oups , us i ng various foreign
foundations in certain Swiss banks.

In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million
in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries

, other lawful income as well as income f r om l egi t i mat el y acqui r ed pr oper t y.
The t r eas ur y not es ar e f r o z e n a t t h e Ce n t r a l Ba n k o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ,
n o w Ba n g k o Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by
thePCGG.

B e f o r e t h e c a s e w a s s e t f o r p r e - t r i a l , a G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t
a n d t h e Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the
Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a globals ettlement of the
assets of the Marcos family.
o
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify,collate, cause the
inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its
premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-s i x Mi l l i on U. S.
dol l ar s ( US$356 mi l l i on) bel ongs i n pr i nci pl e t o t he Republic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met x xx."

Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements.

I n a r es ol ut i on dat ed 31 J anu ar y 2002, t he Sandi ganba yan deni ed t he
Republic's motion for summary judgment.

"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the
Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as
to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The
basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been
established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."



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The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: WoN a summary judgement is proper (Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.1)
Held: We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their
pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a
matter of right.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the
Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for
forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently
lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents defenses of
lack of knowledge for lack of privity or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time
ago or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired are fully insufficient
to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated
to compound and confuse the issues.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the
petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like
they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time
ago, and, as to Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating the basis of
such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify
so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made
in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.2[28]
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts
which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely
upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent







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unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the
table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,3[29]
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the
subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which
each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing
aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers
thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she
failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of
acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other
respondents that the funds were lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds
were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the
funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can
prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired
legitimately by the Marcos family.
Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the
petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement
that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the material averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial
in respondents answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think
so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,4[30] this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and
specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by
simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in
the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.5[31]








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To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture
stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both
respondents clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland and hid the same
under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection.
Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate
entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of
the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified accounts
groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a
supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.6[32]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents
clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and
layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents
aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.7[33]
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a
negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at.8[34] Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable
to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.9[35]












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In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not
specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in
paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for
forfeiture that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities. Paragraph 22 of the
respondents answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank
deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents
in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
xxx.10



















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