1.) FULE V.

CA286SCRA 698 (1998)

FACTS: Gregorio Fule, a banker and a jeweller, offered to sell his parcel of land to Dr. Cruz in exchange
for P40,000 and a diamond earring owned by the latter. A deed of absolute sale was prepared by Atty.
Belarmino, and on the same day Fule went to the bank with Dichoso and Mendoza, and Dr. Cruz arrived
shortly thereafter. Dr. Cruz got the earrings from her safety deposit box and handed it to Fule who, when
asked if those were alright, nodded and took the earrings. Two hours after, Fule complained that the
earrings were fake. He files a complaint to declare the sale null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit.

ISSUE: Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud

HELD: It is evident from the facts of the case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner and
Dr. Cruz. As such, they are bound by the contract unless there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its
nullification.
Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting
parties are: (1) those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract; and (2) those
where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
The records, however, are bare of any evidence manifesting that private respondents employed such
insidious words or machinations to entice petitioner into entering the contract of barter. It was in fact
petitioner who resorted to machinations to convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay
property.
Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code
within which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied
with the same. By taking the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which was more consistent
with his exercise of ownership over it. This gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself had
earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing his signature to the contract of sale. That after
two hours he later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in exchange for his Tanay property,
could not sever the juridical tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and value of the thing he had
taken preclude its return after that supervening period within which anything could have happened, not
excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its being switched with an inferior kind.

2.) ANDRE T. ALMOCERA VS. JOHNNY ONG
G.R. No. 170479 (February 18, 2008)
FACTS: Plaintiff Johnny Ong tried to acquire from the defendants a "townhome" described as Unit No. 4
of Atrium Townhomes in Cebu City. As reflected in a Contract to Sell, the selling price of the unit
was P3,400,000.00 pesos, for a lot area of eighty-eight (88) square meters with a three-storey building. Out
of the purchase price, plaintiff was able to pay the amount of P1,060,000.00. Prior to the full payment of this
amount, plaintiff claims that defendants Andre Almocera and First Builders fraudulently concealed the fact
that before and at the time of the perfection of the aforesaid contract to sell, the property was already
mortgaged to and encumbered with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). In addition, the construction of
the house has long been delayed and remains unfinished. On March 13, 1999, Lot 4-a covered by TCT No.
148818, covering the unit was advertised in a local tabloid for public auction for foreclosure of mortgage. It
is the assertion of the plaintiff that had it not for the fraudulent concealment of the mortgage and
encumbrance by defendants, he would have not entered into the contract to sell.
On the other hand, defendants assert that on March 20, 1995, First Builders Multi-purpose Coop. Inc.,
borrowed money in the amount of P500,000.00 from Tommy Ong, plaintiffs brother. This amount was
used to finance the documentation requirements of the LBP for the funding of the Atrium Town Homes.
This loan will be applied in payment of one (1) town house unit which Tommy Ong may eventually
purchase from the project. When the project was under way, Tommy Ong wanted to buy another
townhouse for his brother, Johnny Ong, plaintiff herein, which then, the amount of P150,000.00 was given
as additional partial payment. However, the particular unit was not yet identified. It was only on January
10, 1997 that Tommy Ong identified Unit No. 4 plaintiffs chosen unit and again tendered P350,000.00 as
his third partial payment. When the contract to sell for Unit 4 was being drafted, Tommy Ong requested
that another contract to sell covering Unit 5 be made so as to give Johnny Ong another option to choose
whichever unit he might decide to have. When the construction was already in full blast, defendants were
informed by Tommy Ong that their final choice was Unit 5. It was only upon knowing that the defendants
will be selling Unit 4 to some other persons for P4million that plaintiff changed his choice from Unit 5 to
Unit 4.
The RTC decision found petitioner Andre T. Almocera, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of First
Builder Multi-Purpose Cooperative (FBMC), solidarily liable with FMBC for damages. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has incurred delay.

RULING: It cannot be disputed that the contract entered into by the parties was a contract to sell. The
contract was denominated as such and it contained the provision that the unit shall be conveyed by way of
an Absolute Deed of Sale, together with the attendant documents of Ownership the Transfer Certificate of
Title and Certificate of Occupancy and that the balance of the contract price shall be paid upon the
completion and delivery of the unit, as well as the acceptance thereof by respondent. All these clearly
indicate that ownership of the townhouse has not passed to respondent.
In the case at bar, the obligation of petitioner and FBMC which is to complete and deliver the townhouse
unit within the prescribed period, is determinative of the respondents obligation to pay the balance of the
contract price. With their failure to fulfill their obligation as stipulated in the contract, they incurred delay
and are liable for damages. They cannot insist that respondent comply with his obligation. Where one of the
parties to a contract did not perform the undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the agreement
to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party.

3.) GAITE V. FONACIER

FACTS: Gaite was appointed by Fonacier as attorney-in-fact to contract any party for the exploration and
development of mining claims. Gaite executed a deed of assignment in favor of a single proprietorship
owned by him. For some reasons, Fonacier revoked the agency, which was acceded to by Gaite, subject to
certain conditions, one of which being the transfer of ores extracted from the mineral claims for P75,000, of
which P10,000 has already been paid upon signing of the agreement and the balance to be paid from the first
letter of credit for the first local sale of the iron ores. To secure payment, Fonacier delivered a surety
agreement with Larap Mines and some of its stockholders, and another one with Far Eastern Insurance.
When the second surety agreement expired with no sale being made on the ores, Gaite demanded the
P65,000 balance. Defendants contended that the payment was subject to the condition that the ores will be
sold.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the sale is conditional or one with a period
(2) Whether there were insufficient tons of ores

HELD:
(1) The shipment or local sale of the iron ore is not a condition precedent (or suspensive) to the payment of
the balance of P65,000.00, but was only a suspensive period or term. What characterizes a conditional
obligation is the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force (as distinguished from its demandability) is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event; so that if the suspensive condition does not
take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
A contract of sale is normally commutative and onerous: not only does each one of the parties assume a
correlative obligation (the seller to deliver and transfer ownership of the thing sold and the buyer to pay the
price),but each party anticipates performance by the other from the very start. While in a sale the obligation
of one party can be lawfully subordinated to an uncertain event, so that the other understands that he
assumes the risk of receiving nothing for what he gives (as in the case of a sale of hopes or expectations,
emptio spei), it is not in the usual course of business to do so; hence, the contingent character of the
obligation must clearly appear. Nothing is found in the record to evidence that Gaite desired or assumed to
run the risk of losing his right over the ore without getting paid for it, or that Fonacier understood that Gaite
assumed any such risk. This is proved by the fact that Gaite insisted on a bond a to guarantee payment of
the P65,000.00, an not only upon a bond by Fonacier, the Larap Mines & Smelting Co., and the company's
stockholders, but also on one by a surety company; and the fact that appellants did put up such bonds
indicates that they admitted the definite existence of their obligation to pay the balance of P65,000.00.
The appellant have forfeited the right court below that the appellants have forfeited the right to compel
Gaite to wait for the sale of the ore before receiving payment of the balance of P65,000.00, because of their
failure to renew the bond of the Far Eastern Surety Company or else replace it with an equivalent guarantee.
The expiration of the bonding company's undertaking on December 8, 1955 substantially reduced the
security of the vendor's rights as creditor for the unpaid P65,000.00, a security that Gaite considered
essential and upon which he had insisted when he executed the deed of sale of the ore to Fonacier.
(2) The sale between the parties is a sale of a specific mass or iron ore because no provision was made in
their contract for the measuring or weighing of the ore sold in order to complete or perfect the sale, nor was
the price of P75,000,00 agreed upon by the parties based upon any such measurement.(see Art. 1480, second
par., New Civil Code). The subject matter of the sale is, therefore, a determinate object, the mass, and not
the actual number of units or tons contained therein, so that all that was required of the seller Gaite was to
deliver in good faith to his buyer all of the ore found in the mass, notwithstanding that the quantity delivered
is less than the amount estimated by them.




4.) LAO VS CA

FACTS: Father Artelijo Palijo was investing with Premiere Investment House through the latters trader
Rosemarie Lachenal. Through the course of his business with Premiere Investment, he was issued three
Traders Royal Bank checks in the amounts of P150k, P150k, and P26k respectively. These checks were
eventually dishonored.
The checks, before they were issued to Palijo went through the normal procedure within Premiere
investment, to wit; First, the checks are required to be co-signed by Lina Lim Lao, a junior officer of
Premiere Investment. Second, the checks are then forwarded to her head office to be co-signed by one
TeoduloAsprec. Third, Asprec would then decide to whom the checks were to be ultimately issued and
delivered, in this case to Palijo.
Since the checks were dishonored, Palijo sent notices of dishonor to Premiere Investment but he sent the
same to the latters main office in Cubao (note that Lao and Asprec were holding office in the Binondo
Branch of Premiere Investment). Premiere Investment was only able to pay P5k and no further payment was
made. Apparently, Premiere Investment was going insolvent and was subsequently placed under
receivership.
Palijo filed a criminal case against Lao and Asprec for violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lao is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD: No. The elements of violations against BP 22 are as follows:
1. That a person makes or draws and issues any check.
2. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value.
3. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment.
4. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
In the present case, the fact alone that petitioner was a signatory to the checks that were subsequently
dishonored merely engenders the prima facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds, but it
does not render her automatically guilty under B.P. 22. After a thorough review of the case at bar, the SC
finds that Petitioner Lao did not have actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the corporate
accounts at the time she affixed her signature to the checks involved in this case, at the time the same were
issued, and even at the time the checks were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The scope of
Laos duties and responsibilities did not encompass the funding of the corporations checks; her duties were
limited to the marketing department of the Binondo branch.
Further, there can be no prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in the instant case
because no notice of dishonor was actually sent to or received by Lao. Pariljo sent the notices of dishonor to
Premiere Investments main branch. The main branch did not send the notices to the Binondo branch
because it deemed it futile because at that time it knows that it does not have sufficient funds to cover the
debt anyway. Notice to the main branch does not serve as constructive notice to Lao. BP 22 is a personal
crime hence notice should have been sent to her personally if she were to be made liable.

5.) POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
368 SCRA 691

FACTS: The National Development Corporation (NDC) had in its disposal a 10-hectare property located
along Pureza St., Sta. Mesa, Manila which was popularly known as the NDC compound. Respondent
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. (Firestone) entered into three contracts of lease with NDC: The first contract was a
lease covering 2.90118 hectares (2.60 hectares) of the property for use as a manufacturing plant, for a term of
10 years renewable for another 10 years under the same terms and conditions. The second contract was the
lease of NDCs 4-unit pre-fabricated steel warehouse, which was co-extensive with the lease of the
LESSEE with the LESSOR on the 2.60 hectare-lot. The third contract concerned a 6-unit pre-fabricated
steel warehouse which would expire on December 2, 1978. Prior to the expiration of the third contract, a
resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the NDC which was subject to several conditions
including with the approval of higherauthorities, decide to dispose and sell these properties including the lot,
priority should be given to the LESSEE. In pursuance of the resolution, the lease was extended for another
10 years, renewable for another 10 years and expressly granting Firestone the first option to purchase the
leased premises in the event that NDC decides to dispose and sell these properties including the
lot... Relationships between the parties went smoothly until early 1988 when the lease agreement was
about to expire. Firestone sent notices to NDC but they were unacknowledged. FIRESTONE's predicament
worsened when rumors of NDC's supposed plans to dispose of the subject property in favor of petitioner
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP) came to its knowledge. Forthwith, FIRESTONE served
notice on NDC conveying its desire to purchase the property in the exercise of its contractual right of first
refusal. Apprehensive that its interest in the property would be disregarded, FIRESTONE instituted an
action for specific performance to compel NDC to sell the leased property in its favor. Meanwhile, on
21 February 1989 PUP moved to intervene and asserted its interest in the subject property, arguing that a
"purchaser pendente lite of property which is subject of a litigation is entitled to intervene in the
proceedings." PUP referred to Memorandum Order No. 214 issued by then President Aquino ordering the
transfer of the whole NDC compound to the National Government, which in turn would convey the
aforementioned property in favor of PUP at acquisition cost. The issuance was supposedly made in
recognition of PUP's status as the "Poor Man's University" as well as its serious need to extend its campus in
order to accommodate the growing student population. The order of conveyance of the 10.31-hectare
property would automatically result in the cancellation of NDC's total obligation in favor of the National
Government in the amount ofP57,193,201.64. NDC argued that the transaction between PUP and NDC
amounted to a sale considering that "ownership of the property remained with the government." Petitioner
NDC introduced the novel proposition that if the parties involved are both government entities the
transaction cannot be legally called a sale.

ISSUE:Whether or not there was a sale.

HELD: YES. We believe that the courts a quo did not hypothesize, much less conjure, the sale of the
disputed property by NDC in favor of petitioner PUP. Aside from the fact that the intention of
1 NDC and PUP to enter into a contract of sale was clearly expressed in the
Memorandum Order No. 214, a close perusal of the circumstances of this case strengthens the theory that
theconveyance of the property from NDC to PUP was one of absolute sale, for a valuableconsideration, and
not a mere paper transfer as argued by petitioners. A contract of sale, as defined in the Civil Code, is a
contract where one of the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate
thing to the other or others who shall pay therefore a sum certain in money or its equivalent. It is therefore a
generalrequisite for the existence of a valid and enforceable contract of sale that it be mutuallyobligatory,
i.e., there should be a concurrence of the promise of the vendor to sell a determinate thing and the promise
of the vendee to receive and pay for the property so delivered and transferred. The Civil Code provision is,
in effect, a "catch-all" provision which effectively brings within its grasp a whole gamut of
transfers whereby ownership of a thing is ceded for aconsideration.Contrary to what petitioners PUP and
NDC propose, there is not just one party involved in the questioned transaction. Petitioners NDC and PUP
have their respective charters and therefore each possesses a separate and distinct individual personality. The
inherent weakness of NDC's proposition that there was no sale as it was only the government which was
involved in the transaction thus reveals itself. Tersely put, it is not necessary to write an extended
dissertation on government owned and controlled corporations and their legal personalities. Beyond cavil, a
government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that
of the government. The intervention in the transaction of the Office of the President through the Executive
Secretary did not change the independent existence of these entities. The involvement of the Office of the
President was limited to brokering the consequent relationship between NDC
and PUP. But the withdrawal of the appeal by the Executive Secretary isconsidered significant as he knew,
after a review of the records, that the transaction was subject to existing liens and encumbrances,
particularly the priority to purchase the leased premises in favor of FIRESTONE. The preponderance of
evidence shows that NDC sold to PUP the whole NDC compound, including the leased
premises,without the knowledge much less consent of private respondentFIRESTONE which had a valid
and existing right of first refusal. All three (3) essential elements of a valid sale, without which there can be
no sale, were attendant in the "disposition" and "transfer" of the property from NDC to PUP - consent of the
parties, determinate subject matter, and consideration there for. Consent to the sale is obvious from
the prefatory clauses of Memorandum Order No. 214 Which explicitly states the acquiescence of the parties
to the sale of the property -WHEREAS, PUP has expressed its willingness to acquire said NDC
properties and NDC has expressed its willingness to sell the properties to PUP. The defendants-appellants'
interpretation that there was a mere transfer, and not a sale, apart from being specious sophistry and a mere
play of words, is too strained and hairsplitting. For itis axiomatic that every sale imposes upon the vendor
the obligation to transfer ownership as an essential element of the contract. Transfer of title or an agreement
to transfer title for a price paid, or promised to be paid, is the very essence of sale. At whatever legal angle
we view it, therefore, the inescapable fact remains that all the requisites of a valid sale were attendant in the
transaction between co-defendants-appellants NDC and PUP concerning the realities subject of the present
suit. What is more, the conduct of petitioner PUP immediately after the transaction is in itself an admission
that there was a sale of the NDC compound in its favor. Thus, after the issuance of Memorandum
Order No. 214. Petitioner PUP asserted its ownership residents and occupants to vacate the premises. In its
Motion for Intervention petitioner PUP also admitted that its interest as a "purchaser pendent lite" would be
better protected if it was joined as party-defendant in the controversy thereby confessing that it indeed
purchased the property.



6.) CARRASCOSO JR. vs CA
December 14, 2005. 477 scra 666

Contract to Sell vs Contract of Sale
FACTS: In March 1972, El Dorado Plantation Inc, through board member Lauro Leviste, executed a Deed
of Sale with Carrascoso. The subject of the sale was a 1825 hectare of land. It was agreed that Carrascoso is
to pay P1.8M. P290K would be paid by Carrascoso to PNB to settle the mortgage placed on the said land.
P210k would be paid directly to Leviste. The balance of P1.3M plus 10% interest would be paid over the
next 3 years at P519k every 25
th
of March. Leviste also assured that there were no tenants hence the land
does not fall under the Land Reform Code. Leviste allowed Carrascoso to mortgage the land which the
latter did.
Carrascoso obtained a total of P1.07M as mortgage and he used the same to pay the down payment agreed
upon in the contract. Carrascoso defaulted from his obligation which was supposed to be settled on March
25, 1975. Leviste then sent him letters to make good his end of the contract otherwise he will be litigated.
In 1977, Carrascoso executed a Buy and Sell Contract with PLDT. The subject of the sale was the same land
sold to Carrascoso by Leviste but it was only the 1000 sq m portion thereof. The land is to be sold at P3M.
Part of the terms and conditions agreed upon was that Carrascoso is to remove all tenants from the land
within one year. He is also given a 6 month extension in case hell need one. Thereafter, PLDT will notify
Carrascoso if whether or not PLDt will finalize the sale. PLDT gained possession of the land.
El Dorado filed a civil case against Carrascoso. PLDT intervened averring that it was a buyer in good faith.
The RTC ruled in favor of Carrascoso. CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE: What is the nature of each contract?

HELD: The contract executed between El Dorado and Carrascoso was a contract of sale. It was perfected
by their meeting of the minds and was consummated by the delivery of the property to Carrascoso.
However, El Dorado has the right to rescind the contract by reason of Carrascosos failure to perform his
obligation.
A contract of sale is a reciprocal obligation. The seller obligates itself to transfer the ownership of and
deliver a determinate thing, and the buyer obligates itself to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent. The non-payment of the price by the buyer is a resolutory condition which extinguishes the
transaction that for a time existed, and discharges the obligations created thereunder. Such failure to pay the
price in the manner prescribed by the contract of sale entitles the unpaid seller to sue for collection or to
rescind the contract.
The contract between Carrascoso and PLDT is a contract to sell. This is evidenced by the terms and
conditions that they have agreed upon that after fulfillment of Carrascosos obligation PLDT has to notify
Carrascoso of its decision whether or not to finalize the sale.
Carrascoso also averred that there was a breach on El Dorados part when it comes to warranty. Carrascoso
claimed that there were tenants on the land and he spent about P2.9M relocating them. The SC ruled that
Carrascoso merely had a bare claim without additional proof to support it.
Requisites of Express warranty in a Contract of Sale
(1) the express warranty must be an affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the subject
matter of the sale;
(2) the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the thing; and
(3) the buyer purchases the thing relying on such affirmation or promise thereon.

7.) PERPETUA VDA. DE APE VS COURT OF APPEALS, 456 SCRA 193
FACTS: Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The children never
formally divided the property amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal whereby each just occupied
a certain portion and developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the land so they started buying the portion of
land that each of the heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato, entered into a contract
of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his lot, Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in advance
P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by Lumaynos son in law (Andres Flores). Flores also acted
as witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions with Fortunatos siblings separately.
In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to her of the registrable deed of sale over
Fortunatos portion of the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of the contract of sale. He also
invoked his right to redeem (as a co-owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno. Fortunato
died during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale.

RULING: No. Fortunato was a no read no write person. It was incumbent for the the other party to
prove that details of the contract was fully explained to Fortunato before Fortunato signed the receipt.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born
from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the sale and upon the
price. Upon its perfection, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may
compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand the
vendee to pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the following elements
must be present: consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.
For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:
(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(b) it should be free and;
(c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation
or undue influence; spontaneity by fraud.
Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to Fortunato, but Flores testimony belies it. Flores
said there was another witness but the other was a maid who also lacked education. Further, Flores himself
was not aware that the receipt was to transfer the ownership of Fortunatos land to her mom-in-law. It
merely occurred to him to explain the details of the receipt but he never did.
8.) G.R. NO. L-30786: OLEGARIO CLARIN VS ALBERTO RULONA AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS

FACTS: 20 February 1984, 127 SCRA 512 Perfected Contract of SaleClarin was the owner of a 10 hectare
land in Carmen, Bohol. The same was said to be his share from the other co-owners. In 1959, he executed a
Contract of Sale with Rulona as he was selling his 10 hectare land. It was agreed that the purchase price
would be P2500.00. Downpayment would be P1000.00 and the remaining balance would be paid monthly
at P100.00 per month. Rulona paid the down payment as well as the 1
st
installment but then later on Clarin
returned the P1100.00 against Rulonas will. Clarin said he could not convince the other co-owners about
the selling of his share. Clarin also said there was no perfected sale between him and Rulona as he said that
the sale was subject to the condition that the other co-owners should give their consent to the sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale.

HELD: Yes there is. During trial there were 3 documents shown. Exhibit A shows that upon payment of
P800.00 by Rulona, a survey of the land was authorized. Exhibit B shows thatP200.00, part of the down
payment was paid to Clarin and that the 1
st
installment of P100.00was also made. Though these exhibits are
not the Contract of Sale, they show that there was a contract of sale between Rulona and Clarin. Construing
Exhibits A and B together, it can be seen that the Clarin agreed to sell and Rulona agreed to buy a definite
object, that is, 10 hectares of land which is part and parcel of Lot 20PLD No. 4, owned in common by the
Clarin and his sisters although the boundaries of the 10hectares would be delineated at a later date. The
parties also agreed on a definite price which isP2,500.00. Exhibit B further shows that Clarin has received
from Rulona as initial payment, the amount of P800.00. Hence, it cannot be denied that there was a
perfected contract of sale between the parties and that such contract was already partially executed when the
petitioner received the initial payment of P800.00. The latter's acceptance of the payment clearly showed his
consent to the contract thereby precluding him from rejecting its binding effect. Further, Clarins letter to
Rulona marked Exhibit C stated;"My dear Mr. Rulona: Replying to your letter of recent date, I deeply regret
to inform you that my daughter, Alice, who is now in Manila, could not be convinced by me to sell the land
in question, that is, the ten (10) hectares of land referred to in our tentative agreement. It is for this reason
that I hereby authorize the bearer, Mr. Paciano Parmisano, to return to you in person the sum of
OneThousand and One Hundred (P1,100.00) Pesos which you have paid in advance for the proposed sale of
the land in question."The reasons given by the Clarin cannot operate against the validity of the contract in
question. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his better judgment.

9.) PROVINCE OF CEBU, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF RUFINA MORALES, NAMELY: FELOMINA V.
PANOPIO,NENITA VILLANUEVA, ERLINDA V. ADRIANO and CATALINA V. QUESADA,
Respondents.

FACTS: Province of Cebu leased in favor of Rufina Morales a 210-square meter lot. Petitioner donated
thelot occupied by Morales to the City of Cebu. The city, then, sold the subject lot at public auction.
Thehighest bidder for the said lot was Hever Bascon but Morales was allowed to match the highest bid
sinceshe had a preferential right to the lot as actual occupant thereof. Morales thus paid the required
depositand partial payment for the lot. Later, the subject lot was returned to petitioner and registered in
itsname. Morales died and apart from the deposit and down payment, she was not able to make any
otherpayments on the balance of the purchase price for the lot. Now the surviving heirs of Morales are
askingfor the formal conveyance of subject lot, in accordance with the award earlier made by the City of
Cebu.They also consigned with the court the amount representing the balance of the purchase price
whichpetitioner allegedly refused to accept.

ISSUE: Can respondents still tender payment of the full purchase price? Yes.

HELD: Article 1592 of the Civil Code pertinently provides that In the sale of immovable property,
eventhough it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon
therescission of the contract shall of right take place,the vendee may pay,even after the expiration of
theperiod,as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judiciallyor by
notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.Thus, respondents could still tender
payment of the full purchase price as no demand for rescission hadbeen made upon them, either judicially
or through notarial act. While it is true that it took a long timefor respondents to bring suit for specific
performance and consign the balance of the purchase price, it isequally true that petitioner or its predecessor
did not take any action to have the contract of salerescinded. Article 1592 allows the vendee to pay as long
as no demand for rescission has been made.The consignation of the balance of the purchase price before the
trial court thus operated as fullpayment, which resulted in the extinguishment of respondents obligation
under the contract of sale.

10.) HYATT ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS CORPORATION VS. CATHEDRAL HEIGHTS
BUILDING COMPLEX ASSOCIATION INC.

FACTS: Petitioner entered into an "Agreement to Service Elevators" with respondent, where petitioner was
contracted to maintain four passenger elevators installed in respondent's building. Under the Service
Agreement, the duties and obligations of petitioner included monthly inspection, adjustment and lubrication
of machinery, motors, control parts and accessory equipments, including switches and electrical wirings. It
also provides that respondent shall pay for the additional charges incurred in connection with the repair and
supply of parts.
Petitioner claims it had incurred expenses amounting to Php 1,161,933.47 in the maintenance and repair of
the four elevators as itemized in a statement of account. Petitioner demanded from respondent the payment
of the aforesaid amount allegedly through a series of demand letter. Respondent, however, refused to pay
the amount.
RTC held that a contract of sale of goods was entered into between the parties. Since the petitioner was
able to fulfill its obligation, the RTC ruled that it was incumbent on respondent to pay for the services
rendered. CA ruled otherwise finding that respondent did not give consent to the purchase of the spare parts
installed in the defective elevators. As such, there was no perfected contract of sale because there was no
meeting of the minds.

ISSUE: WON there is a perfected contract of sale between the parties with regards to the spare parts
delivered and installed as to render respondent liable.

HELD: Respondent contends that petitioner had failed to follow the SOP since no purchase orders from
respondent's Finance Manager, or Board of Directors relating to the supposed parts used were secured prior
to the repairs. Consequently, since the repairs were not authorized, respondent claims that it has no way of
verifying whether the parts were actually delivered and installed as alleged by petitioner.
Petitioner's petition and evidence in the RTC shows that the main thrust of its case is premised on the
following claims: first, that the nature and operations of a hospital necessarily dictate that the elevators are
in good running condition at all times; and, second, that there was a verbal agreement between petitioner's
service manager and respondent's building engineer that the elevators should be running in good condition
at all times and breakdowns should only last one day.
In order to prove its allegations, petitioner presented Wilson Sua, its finance manager, as its sole witness. In
civil cases, the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff, with respect to his complaint. In the case at bar,
it is petitioner's burden to prove that it is entitled to its claims during the period in dispute.This Court rules
that petitioner has failed to discharge its burden. This Court finds that the testimony of Sua alone is
insufficient to prove the existence of the verbal agreement, especially in view of the fact that respondent
insists that the SOP should have been followed.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and
deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. The
absence of any of the essential elements will negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale.
A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal or real
property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the parties. Price is an essential element in
the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the
decision of one of the contracting parties. But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by
the other, gives rise to a perfected sale.




11.) DOLES vs. ANGELES
G.R. No. 149353 June 26, 2006

FACTS: Ma. Aura Tina Angeles (respondent) filed with the RTC a complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages against Jocelyn B. Doles (petitioner). Respondent alleged that petitioner was indebted to the
former in the concept of a personal loan. representing the principal amount and interest; that by virtue of a
"Deed of Absolute Sale", petitioner, as seller, ceded to respondent, as buyer, a parcel of land, as well as the
improvements thereon and located at a subdivision project known as Camella Townhomes Sorrente in
Bacoor, Cavite, in order to satisfy her personal loan with respondent; that this property was mortgaged to
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) to secure petitioners loan with that entity; that
as a condition for the foregoing sale, respondent shall assume the undue balance of the mortgage and pay
the monthly amortization for the remainder of the 25 years which began on September 3, 1994; that the
property was at that time being occupied by a tenant paying a monthly rental; that upon verification with
the NHMFC, respondent learned that petitioner had incurred arrearages inclusive of penalties and interest;
that upon informing the petitioner of her arrears, petitioner denied that she incurred them and refused to pay
the same; that despite repeated demand, petitioner refused to cooperate with respondent to execute the
necessary documents and other formalities required by the NHMFC to effect the transfer of the title over the
property; that petitioner collected rent over the property and refused to remit the proceeds to respondent;
and that respondent suffered damages as aa result and was forced to litigate.The RTC hereby orders the
dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Respondent appealed to the CA. The CA
promulgated its Decision, granting the appeal.Hence, an appeal was filed to the SC by the Petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is supported by a valid consideration.

HELD: The Court cannot entertain thepossibility that respondent agreed to assume the balance of the
mortgage loan which petitioner allegedly owed to the NHMFC, especially since the record is bereft of any
factual finding that petitioner was, in the first place, endowed with any ownership rights to validly mortgage
and convey the property. As the complainant who initiated the case, respondent bears the burden of proving
the basis of her complaint. Having failed to discharge such burden, the Court has no choice but to declare
the sale void for lack of cause. And since the sale is void, the Court finds it unnecessary to dwell on the issue
of whether duress or intimidation had been foisted upon petitioner upon the execution of the sale.Moreover,
even assuming the mortgage validly exists, the Court notes respondents allegation that the mortgage with
the NHMFC was for 25 years which began September 3, 1994. Respondent filed her Complaint for Specific
Performance in 1997. Since the 25 years had not lapsed, the prayer of respondent to compel petitioner to
execute necessary documents to effect the transfer of title is premature.The petition is granted. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The complaint of respondent in
Civil Case No. 97-82716 is DISMISSED.

12.) MONTECILLO VS REYNES

FACTS: Respondents Ignacia Reynes and Spouses Abucay filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity and
Quieting of Title against petitioner Rido Montecillo. Reynes asserted that she is the owner of a lot situated
in Mabolo, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 74196 and containing an area of 448
square meters. In 1981, Reynes sold 185 square meters of the Mabolo Lot to the Abucay Spouses who built
a residential house on the lot they bought. Reynes alleged further that on March 1, 1984 she signed a Deed
of Sale of the Mabolo Lot in favor of Montecillo. Montecillo promised to pay the agreed P47,000.00
purchase price within one month from the signing of the Deed of Sale. Montecillo failed to pay the purchase
price after the lapse of the one-month period, prompting Reynes to demand from Montecillo the return of
the Deed of Sale. Since Montecillo refused to return the Deed of Sale, Reynes executed a document
unilaterally revoking the sale and gave a copy of the document to Montecillo. Subsequently, on May 23,
1984 Reynes signed a Deed of Sale transferring to the Abucay Spouses the entire Mabolo Lot, at the same
time confirming the previous sale in 1981 of a 185-square meter portion of the lot. Respondents alleged that
they received information that the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issued Certificate of Title No. 90805 in
the name of Montecillo for the Mabolo Lot. They argued that for lack of consideration there (was) no
meeting of the minds between Reynes and Montecillo. Thus, the trial court should declare null and
void ab initio Montecillos Deed of Sale, and order the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 90805 in the
name of Montecillo. In his Answer, Montecillo claimed he was a buyer in good faith and had actually paid
the P47,000.00 consideration stated in his Deed of Sale. Montecillo, however, admitted he still owed
Reynes a balance of P10,000.00. He also alleged that he paid P50,000.00 for the release of the chattel
mortgage which he argued constituted a lien on the Mabolo Lot. He further alleged that he paid for the real
property tax as well as the capital gains tax on the sale of the Mabolo Lot. In their reply, respondents
contended that Montecillo did not have authority to discharge the chattel mortgage, especially after Reynes
revoked Montecillos Deed of Sale and gave the mortgagee a copy of the document of revocation. Reynes
and the Abucay Spouses claimed that Montecillo secured the release of the chattel mortgage through
machination. They further asserted that Montecillo took advantage of the real property taxes paid by the
Abucay Spouses and surreptitiously caused the transfer of the title to the Mabolo Lot in his name.
During pre-trial, Montecillo claimed that the consideration for the sale of the Mabolo Lot was the amount
he paid to Cebu Ice and Cold Storage Corporation for the mortgage debt of Bienvenido Jayag. Montecillo
argued that the release of the mortgage was necessary since the mortgage constituted a lien on the Mabolo
Lot. Reynes, however, stated that she had nothing to do with Jayags mortgage debt except that the house
mortgaged by Jayag stood on a portion of the Mabolo Lot. Reynes further stated that the payment by
Montecillo to release the mortgage on Jayags house is a matter between Montecillo and Jayag. The
mortgage on the house, being a chattel mortgage, could not be interpreted in any way as an encumbrance on
the Mabolo Lot. Reynes further claimed that the mortgage debt had long prescribed since the P47,000.00
mortgage debt was due for payment on January 30, 1967.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the Deed of Sale to Montecillo null and void, producing no
effect whatsoever for want of consideration.
Montecillo appealed to the CA but CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Also, the CA denied Montecillos
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of payment is separate from the consideration and does not affect the validity
of the contract.

RULING: Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides that payment shall be made to the person in whose favor
the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Thus,
Montecillos payment to Cebu Ice Storage is not the payment that would extinguish Montecillos obligation
to Reynes under the Deed of Sale.
Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, [T]here is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1)
Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of
the obligation which is established. Article 1352 of the Civil Code also provides that [C]ontracts without
cause produce no effect whatsoever.
The manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract
of sale can exist. Although the Civil Code does not expressly state that the minds of the parties must also
meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise there is no sale. An
agreement on the price but a disagreement on the manner of its payment will not result in consent, thus
preventing the existence of a valid contract for lack of consent. This lack of consent is separate and distinct
from lack of consideration where the contract states that the price has been paid when in fact it has never been
paid. A contract of sale is void and produces no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears thereon
as paid, has in fact never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor. Such a sale is non-existent or cannot be
considered consummated. The deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
In summary, Montecillos Deed of Sale is null and void ab initio not only for lack of consideration, but also
for lack of consent. The cancellation of TCT No. 90805 in the name of Montecillo is in order as there was
no valid contract transferring ownership of the Mabolo Lot from Reynes to Montecillo.

13.) SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES VS. SPS. HUANG

FACTS: San Miguel Properties is engaged in the purchase and sale of real properties, of which include two
parcels of land. These properties were offered for sale at P52,140,000.00. Such offer was made to Atty. Dauz
on behalf of Sps. Huang. Atty. Dauz wrote San Miguel informing the respondents interest to buy the
property and enclosed therein a check (P1,000,000.00) as earnest deposit subject to certain conditions, to
wit: (1) that they be given the exclusive option to purchase the property within 30 days from acceptance of
the offer; (2) that during the option period, the parties would negotiate the terms and conditions of the
purchase; and (3) petitioner would secure the necessary approvals while respondents would handle the
documentation. Sobrecarey, San Miguel Properties VP indicated his conformity to the offer; signed the
letter; and accepted the earnest deposit. By agreement of the parties, they agreed that respondents will be
given 6 months within which to pay. Upon failure of respondents to pay despite the extension of time given,
petitioner through its Pres& CEO Gonzales, wrote Atty. Dauz, that they are returning the earnest deposit.
Respondent spouses through counsel, wrote petitioner demanding the execution of a deed of conveyance in
their favor. They attempted to return the earnest deposit but was refused by San Miguel. Respondent
spouses filed a complaint for specific performance. Trial court, upon motion, dismissed the complaint,
which was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE: WON the earnest deposit could have been given as earnest money contemplated in Art. 1482, and
thus there was a perfected contract of sale.

HELD: No, hence, there was no perfected contract of sale.
In the present case, the P1 million earnest-deposit could not have been given as earnest money as
contemplated in Art. 1482 because, at the time when petitioner accepted the terms of respondents offer,
their contract had not yet been perfected. The first condition for an option period of 30 days sufficiently
shows that a sale was never perfected. Such option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the
properties within the period agreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale which the parties
may enter.

16.) GMARSMAN AND COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
VS
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, and NATIONAL
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-13946 May 31, 1960

FACTS: On various occasions during the latter part of 1955, Marsman & Company, Inc. imported from the
United states goods and merchandise amounting to P1,409,231.05, upon which the Central Bank of the
Philippines collected, and said importer paid under protest, the total sum of P239,635.62 as special excise
tax under Republic Act 601, as amended, on the foreign exchange utilized for said importations. The
corresponding drafts drawn on the letters of credit opened by the importer in favor of its creditors in the
United States in connection with said importations were paid for and liquidated by the former on various
dates between January 16 and April 6, 1956. As Republic Act 601 under which the excise tax was assessed
and paid, was repealed effective December 31, 1955, refund of the amount paid after that date when the law
was no longer in force was demanded, and when the demand was not heeded, the present action was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance
and the National Treasurer.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause. Hence this appeal.

For the importations involved in this case, appellant Marsman & Company, Inc., opened,from February 24
to November 15, 1955, with the Philippines National Bank and the Bank of America, letters of credit in
favor of its creditors and business associates in the UnitedStates. Upon said letters of credit, drafts were
drawn and accepted during the period of from June 1, 1955 to December 28, 1955, except with respect to
Letters of Credit No.23689 and No. 6998-55 upon which the corresponding drafts were accepted on January
4and 19, 1956, respectively. The different amounts in dollars covered by all these drafts,were paid and
liquidated in equivalent amounts of pesos to the corresponding banks between January 16 and April 6, 1956,
or after the repeal of Republic Act 601.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of 17% excise tax is proper

HELD: The payment made after the repeal, can be refunded. The 17% excise tax collectible under Republic
Act 601, as amended, is imposed on the foreign exchange sold or authorized to be sold by the Central Bank
of the Philippines or any of its agents during the effectivity of said law. As already held by this Court, the
sale of foreign exchange is effected or consummated upon payment or delivery to the creditor by the agent
or corresponding bank, of the amount in foreign currency authorized by the transmitting bank to be paid or
drawn under the letter of credit. The determinative factor for purposes of imposing the aforementioned 17%
excise tax, therefore, is not the date of maturity of the obligation to pay for the foreign currency involved,
but the date the foreign currency allowed under the draft is delivered to the drawee. As, admittedly, with the
exception of those covered by Letters of Credit Nos. 23689 and 6990-55 (as to which refund of the excise tax
collected is proper), the drafts involved herein were all accepted during the effectivity of Republic Act 601, it
is clear that they are subject to the imposition of the excise tax on foreign exchange.
17.) ROBLE vs. ARBASA
G.R. No. 130707 July 31, 2001

FACTS: On January 2, 1976, spouses DominadorArbasa and Adelaida Roble (hereinafter referred to as
respondents) purchased from Fidela Roble an unregistered parcel of land located at Poblacion, Isabel,
Leyte.As reflected on the deed of sale, the property had a total land area of two hundred forty (240) square
meters. Due to their diligent efforts in reclaiming a portion of the sea, using stones, sand and gravel, the
original size of two hundred forty (240) square meters increased to eight hundred eighty four (884) square
meters.Constructed over the eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters lot were three (3) concrete
houses. One of the houses was located over the two hundred forty (240) square-meter parcel of land that
spouses Arbasa bought from Fidela. The other houses belonged to Fidela, located at the central portion, and
Gualberto, which was constructed over the southernmost portion of the eight hundred eighty four (884)
square meters land. The 644 square meters was then divided into two (2) lots of equal proportion, evidenced
by Tax Declaration Nos. 8141 and 8142 in the names of Fidela and Gualberto, respectively. The two lots
located at the southern portion, according to Veronica Roble and Lilibeth Roble as well as the latters spouse
Bobby Portugaliza(hereinafter referred to as petitioners), were owned by their predecessors-in-interest
FidelaRoble (322 square meters) and Gualberto Roble (322 square meters) who had open, public and
continuous possession in the concept of owner. Like Fidelas house, the two (2) parcels of land had been
possessed in the concept of owners by their predecessors-in-interest, and were not included in the deed of
sale.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale executed on January 2, 1975 by Fidela Roble in favor of respondents
conveyed the entire eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters parcel of land, including the house of
Fidela, or it covered only two hundred forty (240) square meters located at the northern portion of the
property.
HELD: The trial court rendered a decision finding that the January 2, 1976 deed of absolute sale executed
by Fidela Roble covered only a total area of two hundred forty (240) square meters in favor of respondents
and not the entire eight hundred eighty four (884) square meters claimed by respondents. Moreover, the
house of Fidela was not found on the 240 square meters parcel subject of the deed of sale, and such
improvement was not included in the sale.
The trial court held that pursuant to Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the deed of sale
was the best evidence of the contents of the agreement. Based on the documentary evidence consisting of the
deed of absolute sale and tax declarations issued over the property, the house of Fidela Roble was not
situated on the part of the property that was sold to respondents. Hence, respondents claim has no basis.

18.) MIGUEL KATIPUNAN, INOCENCIO VALDEZ, EDGARDO BALGUMA and LEOPOLDO
BALGUMA, JR., petitioners, vs. BRAULIO KATIPUNAN, JR.,respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Braulio Katipunan, Jr. is the owner of a 203 square meter lot and a five-door
apartment constructed thereon located at 385-F Matienza St., San Miguel, Manila. The apartment units are
occupied by lessees.On December 29, 1985, respondent, assisted by his brother, petitioner Miguel
Katipunan, entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with brothers Edgardo Balguma and Leopoldo Balguma,
Jr. (co-petitioners), represented by their father Atty. Leopoldo Balguma, Sr., involving the subject property
for a consideration of P187,000.00. Consequently, respondents title to the property was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, was registered and issued in the names of the Balguma brothers. In January, 1986, Atty.
Balguma, then still alive, started collecting rentals from the lessees of the apartments.On March 10, 1987,
respondent filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21,a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. He averred that his brother Miguel, Atty. Balguma and Inocencio Valdez (defendants therein, now
petitioners) convinced him to work abroad. They even brought him to the NBI and other government offices
for the purpose of securing clearances and other documents which later turned out to be falsified. Through
insidious words and machinations, they made him sign a document purportedly a contract of employment,
which document turned out to be a Deed of Absolute Sale. By virtue of the said sale, brothers Edgardo and
Leopoldo, Jr. (co-defendants), were able to register the title to the property in their names. Respondent
further alleged that he did not receive the consideration stated in the contract. He was shocked when his
sister Agueda Katipunan-Savellano told him that the Balguma brothers sent a letter to the lessees of the
apartment informing them that they are the new owners. Finally, he claimed that the defendants, now
petitioners, with evident bad faith, conspired with one another in taking advantage of his ignorance, he
being only a third grader.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale can be rescinded on the ground of vitiated consent?

RULING: The circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract manifest a vitiated consent on the
part of respondent. Undue influence was exerted upon him by his brother Miguel and Inocencio Valdez
(petitioners) and Atty. Balguma. It was his brother Miguel who negotiated with Atty. Balguma. However,
they did not explain to him the nature and contents of the document. Worse, they deprived him of a
reasonable freedom of choice. It bears stressing that he reached only grade three. Thus, it was impossible for
him to understand the contents of the contract written in English and embellished in legal jargon. According
to Dr. Revilla, based on the tests she conducted, she found that respondent has a very low IQ and a mind of
a six-year old child. Thus, his lack of education, coupled with his mental affliction, placed him not only at a
hopelessly disadvantageous position vis--vis petitioners to enter into a contract, but virtually rendered him
incapable of giving rational consent. A contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent or
where consent is vitiated by mistake, fraud, or intimidation is not void ab initio but only voidable and is
binding upon the parties unless annulled by proper Court action. The effect of annulment is to restore the
parties to the status quo ante insofar as legally and equitably possible-- this much is dictated by Article 1398
of the Civil Code. As an exception however to the principle of mutual restitution, Article 1399 provides that
when the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not
obliged to make any restitution, except when he has been benefited by the things or price received by him.
19.) LONDRES ET AL VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS , DPWH , DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ELENA ALOVERA SANTOS AND
CONSOLACION ALIVIO ALOVERA

FACTS: The present case stemmed from a battle of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 both located in
Barrio Baybay, Roxas City, Capiz. Paulina Arcenas originally owned these two parcels of land. After
Paulinas death, ownership of the lots passed to her daughter, Filomena VidaI. The surviving children of
Filomena, now claim ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333.
On the other hand, private respondents Consolacion Alivio Alovera and Elena Alovera Santos anchor their
right of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 on the Absolute Sale executed by Filomena. Julian purchased
the lots from Filomena in good faith and for a valid consideration. After the sale, Julian and Consolacion
took possession of the lots. Up to now, the spouses successors-in-interest are in possession of the lots in the
concept owners.
Petitioners claims they are the owners of Lots 1320 and 1333, that these two lots were never sold to Julian(
husband of Consolacion). Petitioners doubt the validity of the Absolute Sale because it was tampered. The
lot number of the second lot has a different number written as Lot 1333 instead of Lot 2034 as it appears in
the registry.
Petitioners filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of contract, damages and just compensation.
Petitioners sought to nullify the Absolute Sale conveying Lots 1320 and 1333 and to recover just
compensation from public respondents Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of
Transportation and Communication.
The cross-claim of petitioners against public respondents was for the recovery of just compensation for the
conversion of the 3,200-square meter portion of Lot 1320 to be used for vehicular parking.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the two parcels of Land?

HELD: There is no void ground for annulling the Absolute Sale. The absolute sale is clear as to the first
parcel of lot sold. In civil cases the party with the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance
of evidence. It means that the evidence as whole adduced by one is superior to that of the other. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals found the evidence of private respondents far more convincing in explaining
the alteration in their copy of the Absolute Sale. Both courts ruled that the correction was made by the
parties to reflect the true object of the sale.
Petitioners anchor their right of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 as the sole heirs of their mother,
Filomena, who previously owned the lots. However, Filomena had already ceded her right of ownership
over Lots 1320 and 1333 to private respondents when she executed the Absolute Sale. A sale of real property
is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold. Proof of the conveyance of
ownership is the fact that from the time of the sale, or after more than 30 years, private respondents have
been in possession of Lots 1320 and 1333. Petitioners on the other hand, have never been in possession of
the two lots.

20.) PACIFIC OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. V. CENTRAL BANK
GR L-21881, Mar. 1, 1968

FACTS: On Jan. 17, 1962, the Philippine Trust Company purchased foreign exchange from the Central
Bank (now Bangko Sentral) for use in the United States with the Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Co. The Illinois Bank honored the negotiable instrument only in Feb. 1962. Under the law at the time
of purchase (Jan. 17, 1962) from the Central Bank (Bangko Sentral), the said Bank could impose a certain
fee (called margin fee). Later, however, the law was changed.

ISSUE: As of what date was the sale of the foreign exchange perfected?

HELD: The sale was made by the Central Bank (Bangko Sentral), and was therefore perfected on Jan. 17,
1962. As of said date, there was a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract,
and upon the price. The fact that the negotiable instrument was honored only the following month is not
important since the law speaks only of the sale of the foreign exchange. The margin fee was, therefore,
lawfully imposed.

21.) LEABRES VS. CA
GR No. L-41847

Doctrine: A receipt is not a valid basis for a contract of sale. Essential requisites of a contract of sale.

FACTS: Clara Tambunting de Legarda died testate on April 22, 1950. Among the properties left by the
deceased is the LegardaTambunting Subdivision located on Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila.
Shortly after the death of said deceased, plaintiff CatalinoLeabres bought, on a partial payment of Pl,000.00
a portion (No. VIII, Lot No. 1) of the Subdivision from surviving husband Vicente J. Legarda who acted as
special administrator, the deed or receipt of said sale appearing to be dated May 2, 1950. On August 28,
1950, the Probate Court of Manila appointed Vicente Legarda as an administrator together with Pacifica
Price and Augusto Tambunting over the testate estate of said Clara Tambunting and authorized through its
order of November 21, 1951 the sale of the property.
Vicente L. Legarda was relieved as a regular Administrator and the Philippine Trust Co. which took over as
such administrator advertised the sale of the subdivision which includes the lot subject matter herein in
various issues of the Manila Times and Daily Mirror. No adverse claim or interest over the subdivision or
any portion thereof was ever presented by any person, and in the sale that followed, the Manotok Realty,
Inc. emerged the successful bidder. By order of the Probate Court, the Philippine Trust Co. executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale of the subdivision in favor of the Manotok Realty, Inc. which deed was judicially
approved on March 20, 1959, and recorded immediately in the proper Register of Deeds which issued the
corresponding Certificates of Title to the Manotok Realty, Inc., the defendant appellee herein.
A complaint dated February 8, 1966, was filed by herein plaintiff, which seeks, among other things, for the
quieting of title over the lot subject matter herein, for continuing possession thereof, and for damages.
Leabres anchors his claim on the receipt dated May 2, 1950, which he claims as evidence of the sale of said
lot in his favor. However, CatalinoLeabres has not registered his supposed interest over the lot in the records
of the Register of Deeds, nor did he present his claim for probate in the testate proceedings over the estate of
the owner of said subdivision, in spite of the notices advertised in the papers. Both the RTC and CA
dismissed the petitioners claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not a receipt is a valid basis for a contract of sale.

HELD: An examination of the receipt reveals that the same can neither be regarded as a contract of sale or a
promise to sell. There was merely an acknowledgment of the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
There was no agreement as to the total purchase price of the land nor to the monthly installment to be paid
by the petitioner. The requisites of a valid Contract of Sale namely 1) consent or meeting of the minds of the
parties; 2) determinate subject matter; 3) price certain in money or its equivalent-are lacking in said receipt
and therefore the sale is not valid nor enforceable. Furthermore, it is a fact that Dona Clara Tambunting
died on April 22, 1950. Her estate was thereafter under custodialegis of the Probate Court which appointed
Don Vicente Legarda as Special Administrator on August 28, 1950. Don Vicente Legarda entered into said
sale in his own personal-capacity and without court approval, consequently, said sale cannot bind the estate
of Clara Tambunting. Petitioner should have submitted the receipt of alleged sale to the Probate Court for its
approval of the transactions. Anent his possession of the land, petitioner cannot be deemed a possessor in
good faith in view of the registration of the ownership of the land. To consider petitioner in good faith
would be to put a premium on his own gross negligence. The Court resolved to DENY the petition for lack
of merit and to AFFIRM the assailed judgment.

22.) PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION vs. CA
133 SCRA 777, G.R. No. L-61623 December 26,1984

FACTS: The PHHC board of directors passed Resolution No. 513 wherein it stated that subject to the
approval of the Quezon City Council of the above-mentioned Consolidation Subdivision Plan, Lot 4
containing 4,182.2square meters be awarded to Spouses Rizalino and Adelaida Mendoza, at a price of
twenty-one pesos(P21.00) per square meter and that this award shall be subject to the approval of the OEC
(PHHC)Valuation Committee and higher authorities. However, the city council disapproved the
proposedconsolidation subdivision plan of which the spouses were advised. Another subdivision plan was
preparedand submitted to the city council for approval. The revised plan, which included Lot 4, with a
reducedarea of 2,608.7, was approved by the city council.The PHHC board of directors, however, passed a
resolution recalling all awards of lots to personswhofailed to pay the deposit or down payment for the lots
awarded to them. The Mendozas never paid theprice of the lot nor made the 20% initial deposit. Thereafter,
PHHC board of directors passed ResolutionNo. 218, withdrawing the tentative award of Lot 4 to the
Mendoza spouses and re-awarding said lotjointly and in equal shares to MiguelaSto. Domingo, Enrique
Esteban, Virgilio Pinzon, Leonardo Redubloand Jose Fernandez. The five awardees made the initial
deposit. The corresponding deeds of sale wereexecuted in their favor. The subdivision of Lot 4 into five lots
was approved by the city council and theBureau of Lands. The Mendoza spouses asked for reconsideration
of the withdrawal of the previousaward to them of Lot 4 and for the cancellation of the re-award of said lot
to Sto. Domingo and fourothers. Before the request could be acted upon, the spouses filed the instant action
for specificperformance and damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected sale of the Lot 4, with the reduced area, to the
Mendozaswhichthey can enforce against the PHHC by an action for specific performance.

HELD: No, there was no pertected sale of Lot 4. It was conditionally or contingently awarded to the
Mendozassubject to the approval by the city council of the proposed consolidation subdivision plan and
theapproval of the award by the valuation committee and higher authorities. The city council did not
approvethe subdivision plan.TheMendozas were advised in 1961 of the disapproval. In 1964, when the plan
with the area of Lot 4reduced to 2,608.7 square meters was approved, the Mendozas should have
manifested in writing theiracceptance of the award for the purchase of Lot 4 just to show that they were still
interested in itspurchase although the area was reduced and to obviate ally doubt on the matter. They did
not do so.The PHHC board of directors acted within its rights in withdrawing the tentative award.The
contract of sale is perfect at the moment there is meeting of the minds upon the thing which is theobject of
the contract, and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demandperformance,
subject to the law governing the form of contracts (Art. 1475, Civil). Under the facts of this case, we cannot
say there was a meeting of minds on the purchase of Lot 4 with an area of 2,608.7square meters at P21 a
square meter.

23.) HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ZAMBALES and JOAQUINA ZAMBALES VS COURT OF APPEALS
120 SCRA 897, G.R. No. L-54070

FACTS: The Zambales spouses were the homestead patentees of a parcel of land in the Municipality of Del
Pilar, Roxas, Palawan. Claiming that the Nin Bay Mining Corporation (Corporation, for short) had
removed silica sand from their land and destroyed the plants and others improvements thereon, the
Zambaleses instituted, on November 10, 1958 a Civil Case No. 316 before the CFI of Palawan claiming
damages in the total sum of P48,000.00.
On October 29, 1959, the Zambaleses, duly assisted by their counsel and the Corporation, entered into a
Compromise Agreement where the corporation agreed to pay the petitioners a rental of twenty pesos
(P20.00) from September 9, 1955 to September 30, 1960 or a total rental price of P1,784.74. Respondent also
agreed to purchase and pay for the aforesaid property at the fixed selling rice of P500.00 per hectare or a
total purchase price of P8,923.70.
On September 10, 1960, the Corporation sold the disputed property to Joaquin B. Preysler for the sum of
P8,923.70 fixed in the Compromise Agreement. On October 18, 1960, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources approved the sale to Preysler of the subject property.
On. December 6, 1969, or ten (10) years after the Trial Courts Decision based on the Compromise
Agreement, and nine (9) years after the sale to Preysler, the Zambaleses filed Civil Case No. 678 before the
Court of First Instance of Palawan for Annulment of a Deed of Sale with Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages, contending that the land was acquired and registered in the latters name
through fraud and deceit.
After trial, the lower Court rendered judgment in favor of the Zambaleses. On appeal by the Corporation,
the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court, after finding that the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in the
execution of the Compromise Agreement had not been substantiated by evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the execution of the Compromise Agreement dated October 29, 1959 and the the
subsequent Deed of Sale, dated 10 September 1960 is valid.

HELD: Although we find that the Zambaleses were not misled into signing the Compromise Agreement,
we hold that there has been violation of the Public Land Act. The evidence on record shows that the land in
question was awarded to the Zambaleses as a homestead on September 6, 1955. The sale of a homestead lot
within the five-year prohibitory period is illegal and void. The law does not distinguish between executory
and consummated sales.
The bilateral promise to buy and sell the homestead lot at a price certain, which was reciprocally
demandable, was entered into within the five-year prohibitory period and is therefore, illegal and void.
Further, the agency to sell the homestead lot to a third party was coupled with an interest inasmuch as a
bilateral contract was dependent on it and was not revocable at will by any of the parties. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, there was an actual executory sale perfected during the period of prohibition except that
it was reciprocally demandable thereafter and the agency to sell to any third party was deferred until after
the expiration of the prohibitory period. That rentals were ostensibly to be paid during the five-year
prohibitory period, and the agency to sell made effective only after the lapse of the said period, was merely a
devise to circumvent the prohibition.
The approval of the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources after the lapse of five years
from the date of the patent would neither legalize the sale. The homestead in question should be returned to
the Zambaleses, petitioners herein, who are, in turn, bound to restore to the Corporation the sum of
P8,923.70 as the price thereof.

25.) BABASA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124045 May 21, 1998

FACTS: The Babasa spouses (vendor) entered into a contract of conditional sale of registered lands with
Tabangao Realty (vendee) over 3 parcels of land in Batangas City for P2M, P300K as down payment.
It was agreed that the balance of the purchase price shall be paid by Tabangao upon presentation by the
Babasas of transfer certificates of titles in their name in favor of Tabangao within twenty (20) months from
the signing of the contract.
Consequently, Tabangao leased the parcels of land to Shell. Shell immediately started the construction
thereon of a Liquefied Petroleum Gas Terminal Project, an approved zone export enterprise of the Export
Processing Zone.
Two days prior to the expiration of the 20-month period, specifically on 31 December 1982, the Babasas
asked Tabangao for an indefinite extension within which to deliver clean titles over the lots because
Tabangao did not want to pay the monthly interests.
The Babasa spouses executed a notarized unilateral rescission dated 28 February 1983 to which
TABANGAO responded by reminding the BABASAS that they were the ones who did not comply with
their contractual obligation to deliver clean titles within the stipulated 20-month period, hence, had no right
to rescind their contract. The BABASAS insisted on the unilateral rescission and demanded that SHELL
vacate the lots. The Babasas put up structures to impede the movements of persons and vehicles in the lot.
Babasas contention: Their contract with Tabangao became null and void with the expiration of the 20-
month period given them within which to deliver clean certificates of title. The contract was a lease contract,
not of sale. Even assuming that it was indeed a sale, its nature was conditional only, the efficacy of which
was extinguished upon the non-happening of the condition (non-delivery of clean certificates of title w/in 20
mos.).

ISSUES: 1. WON the contract was a lease contract?
2. WON the Babasas have the right to rescind the contract on the premise that they have not complied with
their obligation to deliver the titles to Tabangao (thus making such contract null and void)?

HELD:1. NO, It was a CONTRACT OF SALE. The contract is laden with terms and stipulations clearly
indicative of a contract of sale. The parties desire and mutually agreed on the sale and purchase of the three
parcels of land. There was a vendor and a vendee, not lessor and lessee. In fact, Tabangao was granted
absolute and unconditional right to take immediate possession of the premises. Even if there was no word
ownership mentioned in the contract, it does not mean that the contract was one of lease. It is too late for
petitioners to insist that the contract is not what they intended it to be.
Even if it was titled as a contract of conditional sale, it is one of absolute sale. There is absolutely no proviso
reserving title to the Babasas until full payment of the purchase price, nor any stipulation giving them the
right to unilaterally rescind the contract in case of non-payment. A deed of sale is absolute in nature
although denominated a conditional sale absent such stipulations. In such cases, ownership of the thing
sold passes to the vendee upon the constructive or actual delivery thereof. Constructive delivery was
accomplished upon the execution of the contract without any reservation to the Babasas. Actual delivery
was made when Tabangao took unconditional possession of the lots and leased them to Shell.
2. NO. Babasas act of unilaterally rescinding their contract with Tabangao was improper. In fact, it should
Tabangao who has the right to rescind the contract on account of Babasas failure to do its obligation to
deliver clean certificates of title. Besides, it would be the height of inequity to allow the BABASAS to
rescind their contract of sale with TABANGAO by invoking as a ground therefor their own failure to deliver
the titles over the lots within the stipulated period.
A condition imposed to perfect a contract is different from a condition imposed for the performance of an
obligation. The non-fulfillment of a condition to perfect a contract results in the failure of a contract. The
failure to comply with the conditions imposed for a performance of a contract merely gives the other party
(Tabangao) the option to either refuse to proceed with the sale or to waive the condition.
26. ) HEIRS OF INGJUG-TIRO VS. SPOUSES CASALS
G.R. No. 134718. August 20, 2001

FACTS: A 5,354-square meter parcel of land is at the epicentrum of the controversy. Originally titled in
the name of MamertoIngjug, the property is located in the former Municipality of Opon, Province of
Cebu (now Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City). The claimants are the descendants of MamertoIngjug on one
hand who allege that they have been deprived of their successional rights through fraud and
misrepresentation, and a group of vendees on the other hand claiming to have acquired the property for
value and in good faith. The case filed by the descendants of MamertoIngjug was dismissed by the trial
court on the ground of prescription and laches. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
During the Second World War, or some sixty (60) years ago, MamertoIngjug died leaving behind the
subject parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0376 in his name as owner in fee
simple. Upon his death title thereto devolved upon his five (5) children, namely, Romana, Francisco,
Francisca, Luisa and Maria, all surnamed Ingjug. On 9 July 1965, or more than two (2) decades later,
Luisa, Maria, one EufemioIngjug, and GuillermaIngjug Fuentes-Pagubo, daughter of Francisca, sold the
disputed land to herein respondents, the spouses Leon V. Casals and Lilia C. Casals, the spouses Carlos L.
Climaco and Lydia R. Climaco, the spouses Jose L. Climaco, Jr. and Blanquita C. Climaco, and Consuelo
L. Climaco. The vendors allegedly represented to the vendees that the property was inherited by them from
the late MamertoIngjug, and that they were his only surviving heirs. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of
Sale of Unregistered Landi and an Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale executed by the
vendors in favor of the vendees.

ISSUE: WON petitioners' right to institute a complaint for partition and reconveyance is effectively barred
by prescription and laches.

HELD: A cursory reading of the complaint, however, reveals that the action filed by petitioners was for
partition, recovery of ownership and possession, declaration of nullity of a deed of sale of unregistered land
and extrajudicial settlement and confirmation of sale. Petitioners' causes of action are premised on their
claim that: (a) the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land is void and of no effect since their respective shares in
the inheritance were included in the sale without their knowledge and consent, and one of the vendor-
signatories therein, EufemioIngjug (EufemioTiro, husband of RomanaIngjug), was not even a direct and
compulsory heir of the decedent; and (b) the Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale is simulated
and therefore null and void ab initio, as it was purportedly executed in 1967 by, among others, EufemioTiro
who was not an heir, and by Francisco Ingjug who died in 1963. Also, the prayer in the same complaint
expressly asks that all those transactions be declared null and void. In other words, it is the nullity of the
deeds of sale and the extrajudicial settlement and confirmation of the sale which is the basic hypothesis
upon which the instant civil action rests. Thus, it appears that we are dealing here not with simple voidable
contracts tainted with fraud, but with contracts that are altogether null and void ab initio.
The property should have been divided equally among them, but prior to its partition these heirs of
MamertoIngjug owned the property in common. It follows then that Luisa, Maria and Guillerma
(daughter of Francisca) and EufemioIngjug could not, by themselves, validly dispose of the entire litigated
property to the exclusion of and without the knowledge and consent of the other heirs since Luisa, Maria,
Guillerma and Eufemio are not the exclusive owners thereof. More so in the case of Eufemio, who is
claimed to be a total stranger to and therefore has no legal interest whatsoever in the inherited property not
being a direct heir.It is essential that the vendors be the owners of the property sold otherwise they cannot
dispose that which does not belong to them.
Without any evidence on record relating to these points, this Court cannot affix its imprimatur to the
peremptory dismissal of the complaint in light of the pleas of petitioners for their just share in the inheritance
and for the partition of their common predecessor's estate. Indeed, it is but fair and just that, without
prejudging the issues, the parties be allowed to substantiate their respective claims and defenses in a full-
blown trial, and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their respective pleadings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the RTC-Br. 27, Lapu-Lapu City, for trial and judgment
on the merits. No costs.
27.) DOMINGO ET AL VS CA ET AL
GR No. 127540. October 17, 2001

FACTS: Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte,
including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the
spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio
Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives,
allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate
the same. Consequently, on February 2, 1976, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint
for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. On July 3, 1977,
he amended the complaint and included his wife as co-plaintiff. They alleged that they were the owners of
the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on January 28, 1965; that
since then, they had been in continuous possession of the subject properties and had introduced permanent
improvements thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally, and they
refused to leave them when asked to do so. Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs
claims. According to defendants, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as
lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to anyone. As her nearest
surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the three lots and the permanent
improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in possession of the contested
properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages against plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents sufficiently establish the existence and due execution of the
Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property.

DECISIONS: No. The Court note that: First, private respondents as plaintiffs presented only a carbon copy
of this deed. When the Register of Deeds was subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten deed
but only a carbon copy was presented to the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a duplicate
original, the deed contained filled in blanks and alterations. None of the witnesses directly testified to
prove positively and convincingly Paulinas execution of the original deed of sale. The carbon copy did not
bear her signature, but only her alleged thumbprint. Secondly, the Court agrees with the trial court that
irregularities abound regarding the execution and registration of the alleged deed of sale. The original was
nowhere to be found and none could be presented at the trial. Also, the carbon copy on file, which is
allegedly a duplicate original, shows intercalations and discrepancies when compared to purported copies in
existence. The deed was apparently registered long after its alleged date of execution and after Paulinas
death on March 20, 1966. Noteworthy, the same parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still
included in the will subsequently executed by Paulina and notarized by the same notary public, Atty.
Tagatag. These circumstances, taken together, militate against unguarded acceptance of the due execution
and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale. Thirdly, the Court to take into account the element of
consideration for the sale. The price allegedly paid by private respondents for nine (9) parcels, including the
three parcels in dispute, a house and a warehouse, raises further questions. Consideration is the why of a
contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract. On record, there
is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to several
people.
[26]
The Court sees no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of land with a
house and warehouse at a meager price of P850 only.
In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of
advanced age and senile. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired
the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her
property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows
that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and
mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances,
there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her
parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to and received by her.

28.) THE PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, AS GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF THE
MINOR,MARIANO L. BERNARDO, PETITIONER, VS. SOCORRO ROLDAN,
FRANCISCOHERMOSO, FIDEL C. RAMOS AND EMILIO CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. L-8477, May31, 1956 ]

FACTS: Mariano L Bernardo, a minor, inherited from his father, Marcelo Bernardo 17 parcels of land
located in Guiguinto, Bulacan. In view of his minority, guardianship proceedings were instituted on July 27,
1947, where Socorro Roland, surviving spouse of Marcelo and step-mother of Mariano, was appointed as
guardian of the latter. Also, Socorro filed a motion asking authority to sell as guardian the 17 parcels for the
sum of P14,700 to his brother-in-law, Dr. Fidel C. Ramos, the purpose of the sale being allegedly to invest
money in a residential house, which the minor desired to have on Tindalo St., Manila. The motion was
granted. On August 5, 1947 Socorro, as guardian, then executed the proper deed of sale in favor of Fidel
Ramos and on August 12, 1947, she asked for and obtained judicial confirmation of the sale. However, on
August 13, 1947, Fidel Ramos executed in favor of Socorro personally, a deed of conveyance covering the
same 17 parcels for the sum of P15,000. And on October 21, 1947Socorro sold 4 out of the 17 parcels to
Emilio Cruz for P3,000, reserving herself the right to repurchase. On August 10, 1948, petitioner Phil. Trust
Co. replaced Socorro as guardian. Petitioner filed a complaint to annul two contracts regarding the 17
parcels of land: a) the sale thereof by Socorro, as guardian, to Fidel Ramos; and b) sale thereof by Fidel
Ramos to Socorro personally. Petitioner contends that the step-mother in effect, sold to herself, the
properties of her ward thus should be annulled as it violates Art. 1459 of the Civil Code prohibiting the
guardian from purchasing either in person or through the mediation of another the property of her ward.
As to the third conveyance, that Socorro had acquired no valid title to convey to Cruz. The trial court held
that Art 1459 was not controlling as there was no proof that Ramos was a mere intermediary or that the
latter agreed with Socorro to but the parcels of land for her benefit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment, adding that the minor new the particulars of, and approved the transactions, and that only clear
and positive evidence of fraud and bad faith, and not mere insinuations and interferences will overcome the
presumptions that a sale was concluded in all good faith for value. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the two contracts of sale made by Socorro was valid.

HELD: No. The court held that even without proof that Socorro had connived with Fidel Ramos.
Remembering the general doctrine that guardianship is a trust of the highest order, and the trustee cannot be
allowed to have any inducement to neglect his ward's interest and in line with the court's suspicion
whenever the guardian acquires the ward's property we have no hesitation to declare that in this case, in the
eyes of the law, Socorro Roldan took by purchase her ward's parcels thru Dr. Ramos, and that Article 1459
of the Civil Code applies.
The temptation which naturally besets a guardian so circumstanced, necessitates the annulment of the
transaction, even if no actual collusion is proved (so hard to prove) between such guardian and the
intermediate purchaser. This would uphold a sound principle of equity and justice.

30.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PHILIPPINE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION AND COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines in representation of the Bureau of Prisons instituted against
Macario Apostol and the Empire Insurance Co. a complaint alleging that defendant Apostol submitted the
highest bid the amount P450.00 per ton for the purchase of 100 tons of Palawan Almaciga from the Bureau
of Prisons; that a contract therefore was drawn and by virtue of which, Apostol obtained goods from the
Bureau of Prisons valued P15,878.59; that of said account, Apostol paid only P691.10 leaving a balane
obligation of P15,187.49. The complaint further averes, that Apostol submitted the best bid with the Bureau
of Prisons for the purchase of three million board feet of logs at P88.00 per 1,000 board feet; that a contract
was executed between the Director of Prisons and Apostol pursuant to which contract Apostol obtained
deliveries of logs valued at P65.830.00, and that Apostol failed to pay a balance account of P18,827.57. All
told, for the total demand set forth in complaint against Apostol is for P34,015.06 with legal interests. The
Empire lnsurance Company was included in the complaint having executed a performance bond of
P10,000.00 in favor of Apostol.
The Philippine Resources Development Corporation moved to intervene. The complaint recites that
Apostol, then the president of the corporation but without the knowledge or consent of the stockholders
thereof, disposed of goods (GI sheets, black sheets, round bars etc.) by delivering the same to the Bureau of
Prisons to satisfy his personal debts with the Bureau of Prisons; that upon discovery, the corporation took
steps to recover said goods by demanding from the Bureau of Prisons the return thereof; and that upon the
refusal of the Bureau to return said goods, the corporation sought leave to intervene in Civil Case No.
26166.
ISSUE: 1.WON the respondent could file for a Motion to Intervene
2.WON the respondent has the legal capacity to sue

HELD: 1.The petitioner possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation and that such interest is of an
actual, material , direct and immediate nature as to entitle petitioner to intervene, and should be given due
cause. While it is true that the subject matter of the original case is a sum of money but it is likewise borne
out by the records that the materials belonging to the petitioner corporation have been assessed and
evaluated and their price have been determined as tokens of payment of a private debt.
1. Petitioner is a duly organized corporation with offices and is endowed with a personality distinct
and separate from that of its president or stockholders. It has the right to bring suit to safeguard its interest.
Granting that the counsel has not been actually authorized by the board of Directors to appear for in their
behalf, counsel as a stockholder and director of the respondent corporation may sue in its behalf and file the
complain in intervention in the proper court.
31.) ORTIGAS & COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. JUDGE JOSE B. HERRERA
G.R. No. L-36098 January 21, 1983

FACTS: On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private respondent entered into an agreement thereby for and
in consideration of P55,430.00, the former agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a special
condition that should private respondent as purchaser complete the construction including the painting of
his residential house on said lot within two (2) years from August 14, 1969, petitioner, as owner, has agreed
to refund to private respondent the amount of P10.00 per square meter.When the aforesaid special condition
was fulfilled, private respondent, on May 17, 1971 accordingly notified in writing the petitioner of the same
and requested for his refund amounting to P4,820.00.
Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation, private respondent on May 6, 1972 filed a complaint for
sum of money and damages with the City Court of Manila, Branch II. A motion to dismiss was filed by
petitioner on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and improper
avenue.City Court Judge Jose B. Herrera in his order dated June 27, 1972 held in abeyance the resolution on
the motion until after the trial of the case on the merits.
A reconsideration of the said order having been denied, petitioner on October 12, 1972 filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila Branch XXVII, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 88510. A motion to dismiss was filed by private
respondent, and on November 17, 1972, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim of private
respondent in his complaint, being less than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the city court.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues among others that: (a) as determined from the
allegations of the complaint, the action is for specific performance of contract; and (b) actions in which the
subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation such as complaints for specific performance of
contract are exclusively cognizable by the Court of First Instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City Court of Manila, Branch II, has jurisdiction over the complaint.

HELD: The action involved in this case is one for specific performance and not for a sum of money and
wherefore incapable of pecuniary estimation because what private respondent seeks is the performance of
petitioner's obligation under a written contract to make a refund but under certain specific conditions still to
be proven or established. In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as the collection of a debt, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs. Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the
obligation to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific fact or matter. But when a party to a contract
has agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions
and only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the written contract be demanded,
the action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of money is only incidental
which can only be ordered after a determination of certain acts the performance of which being the more
basic issue to be inquired into.
Court RESOLVED to reverse the order appealed from and the complaint filed with the City Court of
Manila, Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No. 211673 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

32.) TAN SHUY vs. Spouses GUILLERMO MAULAWIN and PARING CARIO MAULAWIN
G.R. No. 190375 February 8, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra and corn in the Fourth District of
Quezon Province. Guillermo Maulawin (Guillermo), respondent in this case, is a farmer-businessman
engaged in the buying and selling of copra and corn. On 10 July 1997, Tan Shuy extended a loan to
Guillermo in the amount of P 420,000. In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to pay the
loan and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner.
Most of the transactions involving Tan Shuy and Guillermo were coursed through Elena Tan, daughter of
petitioner. She served as cashier in the business of Tan Shuy, who primarily prepared and issued the pesada.
In case of her absence, Vicente would issue the pesada. A pesada is a document containing details of the
transaction, including the date of sale, the weight of the crop delivered, the trucking cost, and the net price
of the crop. ). According to Vicente, part of their agreement with Guillermo was that they would put the
annotation "sulong" on the pesada when partial payment for the loan was made.
Petitioner alleged that despite repeated demands, Guillermo remitted only P 23,000 in August 1998
and P 5,500 in October 1998, or a total of P 28,500. He claimed that respondent had an outstanding balance
of P 391,500. Thus, convinced that Guillermo no longer had the intention to pay the loan, petitioner
brought the controversy to the LuponTagapamayapa. When no settlement was reached, petitioner filed a
Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondent Guillermo countered that he had already paid the subject loan in full. According to him, he
continuously delivered and sold copra to petitioner from April 1998 to April 1999. Respondent said they had
an oral arrangement that the net proceeds thereof shall be applied as installment payments for the loan.
On 27 July 2007, the trial court issued a Decision, ruling that the net proceeds from Guillermos copra
deliveries represented in the pesadas, which did not bear the notation "pd" should be applied as
installment payments for the loan. However, the court did not credit the net proceeds from 12 pesadas, as
they were deliveries for corn and not copra.Accordingly, the trial court found that respondent had not made
a full payment for the loan, as the total creditable copra deliveries merely amounted to P 378,952.43, leaving
a balance of P 41,047.57 in his loan.
On 31 July 2009, the CA issued its assailed Decision, which affirmed the finding of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the delivery of copra amounted to installment payments for the loan obtained by
respondents from petitioner.

HELD: Factual findings of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this
Court except if unsupported by the evidence on record.There is a question of fact when doubt arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts; or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence, considering mainly
the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to one another and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation.
Here, a finding of fact is required in the ascertainment of the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas,
as well as the determination of the true intention behind the parties oral agreement on the application of
the net proceeds from the copra deliveries as installment payments for the loan. This function was already
exercised by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
We found no clear showing that the trial court and the CA committed reversible errors of law in giving
credence and according weight to the pesadas presented by respondents. According to Rule 132, Section 20
of the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving the due execution and authenticity of a private
document, to wit:
SEC. 20.Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
The pesadas having been admitted in evidence, with petitioner failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are already deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein. We hereby uphold the factual
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in that the pesadas served as proof that the net proceeds from
the copra deliveries were used as installment payments for the debts of respondents.
Indeed, pursuant to Article 1232 of the Civil Code, an obligation is extinguished by payment or
performance. There is payment when there is delivery of money or performance of an obligation. Article
1245 of the Civil Code provides for a special mode of payment called dation in payment (dacin en pago).
There is dation in payment when property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.
Here, the debtor delivers and transmits to the creditor the formers ownership over a thing as an accepted
equivalent of the payment or performance of an outstanding debt. In such cases, Article 1245 provides that
the law on sales shall apply, since the undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale; that
is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, the payment for which is to be charged
against the debtors obligation.
23
Dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of
the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement
express or implied, or by their silence consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the
obligation is totally extinguished.
The subsequent arrangement between Tan Shuy and Guillermo can thus be considered as one in the nature
of dation in payment. There was partial payment every time Guillermo delivered copra to petitioner, chose
not to collect the net proceeds of his copra deliveries, and instead applied the collectible as installment
payments for his loan from Tan Shuy. We therefore uphold the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, that the net proceeds from Guillermos copra deliveries amounted to P 378,952.43. With this partial
payment, respondent remains liable for the balance totaling P 41,047.57.

33.) PNB vs TERESITA TAN DEE ,et al
Gr. NO. 182128 , February 19, 2014

FACTS: Dee bought from PEPI (Prime Eat Properties Inc.), a installment basis residential lot, located in
Binangonan, Rizal. Subsequently, PEPI assigned its right over a property, including the property purchased
be Dee, to Arm Forces of the Philippines- Retirement and Separation Benefit System Inc. (AFP-RSBS).
Thereafter,PEPI obtained a P205M loan from PNB, secured mortgage on several properties inlcuding
Dee's property. The mortgage was cleared by Housing and Land Use Rrgilatory Board(HLURB). After the
full payment of the purchased price, a deea of sale was executed in Dee's favor. Dee sought from the
petitioner the delivery of the owner's duplicate title over the property,to no avail. Thus, she filed with the
HLURB for specific performance. HLURB ruled in Dee's favor.
An appeal was raised by the petitioner but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering outright release of TCT No. 619608 despite PNB's duly
registered and HLURB-approved mortgage on TCT No. 619608.

RULING: Despite the apparent validity of the mortgage between the petitioneer and PEPI, the former is
still boundto respect thetrasactions between PEPI and Dee. The petitioner was well aware that the properties
mortgaged by PEPI were also subject of existing contracts to sell with othr buyers. While it may be that the
petitioner is protected by Act No. 3135, as amended, it cannot claim any superior right as against the
installment buyers. This is because the contract between the respondents is protected by P.D. NO. 957, a
social justice measure enacted primarily to protect innocent lot buyers
Wherefore, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the decision dated
March 13,2008 of the CA in CA- GR. SP. NO.86033 are AFFIRMED.
34.) MARIA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE ESPIRITU vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANASTACIA TOPACIO, JOSEFA
JARDINIANO and REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE
G.R. No. L-30486 October 31, 1972
FACTS: Sometime in 1948 the defendants verbally sold to her the two parcels of land in question for
P3,000.00 Pesos and, inconsequence, delivery thereof together with the corresponding transfer certificates
of title (TCT) was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because private respondents
promised they would do so as soon as the titles which were then in the name of their predecessor in
interest were transferred to their names , and that despite demands made by her for the execution of
such deed, said respondents, "without justifiable cause therefor adamantly failed and refused to comply with
(such) just and valid demand."
In their answer, defendants denied that the transaction was a sale and alleged that it was merely a contract of
antichresis whereby petitioner had loaned to them P1, 500.00, for which she demanded the delivery of the
lands in question and the titles thereto as security, with the right to collect or receive the income there from
pending the payment of the loan. And by way of affirmative defenses, respondents interposed (1)
unenforceability by action of the alleged sale, under the statute of frauds, and(2) prescription of petitioner's
action, the same having allegedly accrued in 1948. Subsequently, respondents reiterated their said affirmative
defense of prescription in a formal motion to dismiss and as no opposition thereto was filed by petitioner, on
July 31,1967, respondent court issued the impugned order of dismissal reading as follows:
Submitted for resolution is a motion to dismiss filed counsel for the defendants to which no
opposition has been filed despite the fact that the plaintiff was furnished with a copy thereof. Finding the
said motion to dismiss to be well-taken for the reasons stated therein, this Court grants the same and the
complaint, dated October 16, 1964, is hereby dismissed with costs against the plaintiff. Petitioner filed the
complaint of October 20, 1964

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to demand the execution of the TCTs already prescribed.

HELD: The right to demand the execution of the document required under Article 1358 is not
imprescriptible. The nature of petitioners action may be said to be one founded on an oral contract, which,
to be sure, cannot be considered among those rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds, for the simple
reason that it has already been, from petitioners own point of view, almost fully consummated by the
delivery of the lands and the corresponding titles to her.
The petitioners action, based as it is upon oral contract, prescribes in 6 years according to Article 1145 of
the Civil Code. Assuming otherwise, the only other possibility is that petitioners case comes under Article
1149 and the action prescribes in 5 years. In either case, since the cause of action of petitioner accrued in
1948 and the present suit was instituted in 1964 or sixteen years later, and none interrupting circumstances
enumerated in Article 1155 has been shown to have intervened, it is unquestionable that petitioners action
filed in the court below has already prescribed.

35.) LICHAUCO vs. OLEGARIO
G.R. No. L-17709 June 20, 1922

Doctrine: An execution debtor has the perfect right to sell his right of redemption.

FACTS: A judgment was rendered against Olegario in a case, where he is also a defendant, wherein certain
real properties of his are sold at a public auction in which he shall receive Php 10,000, as offered, for these
properties. Gregorio Olegario sold to his cousin and brother-in-law DalmacioOlegario, the other defendant
in this case, his right of redemption over the aforesaid properties, executing the proper deed of sale, which
was registered in the registry on the date of the conveyance. The plaintiff alleges that this sale is fictitious,
the result of a fraudulent conspiracy between the herein defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not an execution debtor has the authority to sell his right of redemption

HELD: Yes. An execution debtor has the perfect right to sell his right of redemption.

36.) ARTATES VS URBI (L-2942I )

FACTS: A homestead patent was issued to appellants Lino Artates and Manuela Pojas on September 23,
1952. It was sold at a public auction to Marcela Soliven by the Provincial Sheriff of Cagayan to satisfy a
judgment against Lino Artates by the Justice of the Peace of Calanlugan, Cagayan for physical inj uries
inflicted by him upon Daniel Urbi on October 21, 1955. The appellants Artates and Pojas alleged that the
sale violated the provision of Public Land Law exempting said property from execution for any debt
contracted within 5 years from date of the issuance of the patent.Appellants prayed that the execution sale of
the land to the defendant Urbi, as well as the deed of sale executed by the latter in favor of the defendant
Soliven be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the purchaser Marcela Soliven has acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee
over the land.

HELD: No. The execution sale being null and void, the possession of the land should be returned to the
owners, the herein appellants. There would even no need to order appellee Urbi to execute a deed of
reconveyance thereof to the owners. It appears that what was issued here to the judgment creditor or
purchaser was only the sheriffs provisional certificate, under which he derived no definite title or right until
the period made, or issuance of a final deed or certificate of sale. In other words, the purchaser herein has
not acquired an absolute ownership or title in fee over the land that would necessitate a deed of
reconveyance to revert ownership to appellant spouses.

37.) DIGNOS YS. COURT OF APPEALS158 SCRA 378

FACTS: The spouses Silvestre and Isabel Dignos were. owners of a parcel of land in Opon, Lapu-Lapu
City. On June 7, 1965, appellants, herein petitioners Dignos spouses sold the said parcel of land to
respondent Atilano J. Jabil for the sum of P28,000.00, payable in two instalments, with an assumption
of indebtedness with the First Insular Bank of Cebu in the sum of PI 2,000.00, which was paid and
acknowledged by the vendors in the deed of sale executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant, and the next
instalment in the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid on or before September 15, 1965.On November 25, 1965, the
Dignos spouses sold the same land in favor of defendants spouses, Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. De
Cabigas, who were then U.S. citizens, for the price of P35,000.00. A deed of absolute sale was executed by
the Dignos spouses in favor of the Cabigas spouses, and which was registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3344.As the Dignos spouses refused to accept from plaintiff-
appellant the balance of the purchase price of the land, and as plaintiff- appellant discovered the second
sale made by defendants-appellants to the Cabigas spouses, plaintiff-appellant brought the present suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an absolute contract of sale; and Whether or not the contract of sale
was already rescinded when the Digros spouses sold the land to Cabigas.

HELD: Yes. That a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional
Sale" where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or stipulation to the effect that title to the
property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price, nor is there a stipulation
giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the vendee fails to pay within a
fixed period. A careful examination of the contract shows that there is no such stipulation reserving the title
of the property on the vendors nor does it give them the right to unilaterally rescind the contract upon non-
payment of the balance thereof within a fixed period. On the contrary, all the elements of a valid contract of
sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2)
determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the
same Code provides that "The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or
constructive delivery thereof." While it may be conceded that there was no constructive delivery of the land
sold in the case at bar, as subject Deed of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there was
actual delivery thereof. As found by the trial court, the Dignos spouses delivered the possession of the land
in question to Jabil as early as March 27,1965 so that the latter constructed thereon Sally's Beach Resort also
known as Jabil's Beach Resort in March, 1965; Mactan White Beach Resort on January 15, J 966 and
Bevirlyn's Beach Resort on September 1, 1965. Such facts were admitted by petitioner spouses.2. No.
The contract of sale being absolute in nature is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed
that petitioners never notified private respondents Jabil by notarial act that they were rescinding the
contract, and neither did they file a suit in court to rescind the sale. There is no showing that Amistad was
properly authorized by Jabil to make such extra-judicial rescission for the latter who, on the contrary,
vigorously denied having sent Amistad to tell petitioners that he was already waiving his rights to the land in
question. Under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, it is required that acts and contracts which have for their
object extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document. Petitioners
laid considerable emphasis on the fact that private respondent Jabil had no money on the stipulated date of
payment on September 15,1965 and was able to raise the necessary amount only by mid-October 1965. It
has been ruled, however, that where time is not of the essence of the agreement, a slight delay on the part of
one party in the performance of his obligation is not a sufficient ground for the rescission of the agreement.
Considering that private respondent has only a balance of P4,000.00 and was delayed in payment only for
one month, equity and justice mandate as in the afore cited case that Jabil be given an additional period
within which to complete payment of the purchase price.

38.) NOOL vs COURT of APPEALS
GR No. 116635 July 24, 1997

FACTS: Conchita Nool owned a lot which was mortgaged to DBP when she secured a loan. Upon non-
payment of loan it was foreclosed by DBP. Within the time of redemption Conchita contacted Anacleto
Nool to redeem the foreclosed property which the latter did. The titles were transferred to Anacleto but it
was agreed that Conchita can get back the property soon when she has money. Conchita asked the Anacleto
for the return of the property but the latter refused even after the intervention of the barangay. The case was
filed.
Anacleto theorized that the lands were acquired by them from DBP through negotiated sale. He argued that
he was made to believe that the property was still owned by Conchita when they agreed of redemption.
RTC ruled in favour of the defendants; said it was DBP who was the owner of the property when the sale to
Anacleto was made. DBP became the absolute owner of the property after the redemption period of the
foreclosed property had lapsed. RTC denied the action by Conchita. It was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract of Repurchase is valid.

HELD: No, a contract of repurchase arising out of a contract of sale where the seller did not have any title
to the property sold is not valid. Since nothing was sold, then there is also nothing to repurchase. In the
case at bar, DBP became the absolute owner of the property and not Conchita Nool. Hence, Nemo dat quod
non habet, No one can give what he does not have; Contract of repurchase inoperative thus void.
Article 1505 of the Civil Code provides that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no
better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from
denying the sellers authority to sell. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, teaches us that a person can sell
only what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the
seller can legally transfer. No one can give what he does not have nemo dat quod non habet. In the
present case, there is no allegation at all that petitioners were authorized by DBP to sell the property to the
private respondents. Further, the contract of repurchase that the parties entered into presupposes that
petitioners could repurchase the property that they sold to private respondents. As petitioners sold
nothing, it follows that they can also repurchase nothing. In this light, the contract of repurchase is also
inoperative and by the same analogy, void.

The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. CAs decision is
AFFIRMED and the Petition is DENIED by the Supreme Court.

** DOCTRINE: A contract of repurchase arising out of a contract of sale where the seller did not have any
title to the property "sold" is not valid. Since nothing was sold, then there is also nothing to repurchase.

39.) RODOLFO TIGNO AND SPOUSES EDUALINO and EVELYN CASIPIT, petitioners, Vs
COURT OF APPEALS AND EDUARDO TIGNO, respondents. G.R. No. 110115. October 8, 1997

FACTS: Sometime in January, 1980, Bienvenido Sison, Remedios Sison and the heirs of Isaac Sison,
namely: Manuel Sison, Gerardo Sison and Adelaida Sison appointed Dominador Cruz as agent to sell three
(3) parcels of land adjoining each other located at Padilla St., Lingayen, Pangasinan. Upon learning that the
said properties were for sale, petitioner Rodolfo Tigno told Cruz to offer these parcels of land to his brother,
private respondent Eduardo Tigno. Eventually, Eduardo was convinced by Rodolfo Tigno to buy the
properties.
Bienvenido , Remedios and the heirs of Isaac, namely: Manuel and Adelaida went to Atty. Manuel for the
preparation of the appropriate deeds of sale. However, for failure of Sisons to bring the necessary
documents, no ded of sale was prepared on that day. Despite such fact, they requested Eduardo to pay fifty
percent downpayment for the properties, to which the latter acceded. After giving the downpayment,
Eduardo instructed Cruz and Atty. Manuel to place the name of Rodolfo as vendee in the deeds of sale to
be subsequently prepared to enable the latter to mortgage the said properties. Eduardo then settled the
remaining balance with the Sisons after the deeds of sale was prepared.
Thereafter, Rodolfo without the knowledge and consent of his brother, sold to spouses Edualino and Evelyn
Casipit a portion of land previously owned by Bienvinido. At the time of sale, the Casipits were aware that
the portion of land they bought was owned by Eduardo, not Rodolfo. Upon learning that the sale was
already consummated, Eduardo asked his brother and the Casipits to annul the sale, but his request was not
heeded. As such, private respondent filed a complaint against his brother and the spouses Casipit. The Trial
Curt dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was an implied trust created between petitioner Rodolfo Tigno and private
respondent Eduardo Tigno?
2. Whether or not the Casipit are purchasers in Good Faith?

HELD:
1. Yes, Based from the credible and straightforward testimony of two witnesses, Cruz and Atty. Manuel, it is
clear that the name of Rodolfo Tigno appeared in the deeds of sale not for the purpose of transferring
ownership of the properties to him but to enable him to hold the properties in trust for his brother. Aside
from the trust and confidence reposed in him by his brother, petitioner Rodolfo was named as vendee to
facilitate the loan and mortgage the brothers were applying to rehabilitate the fishponds.

From the foregoing, it is ineludible that Article 1448 of the Civil Code finds application in this case.
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but
the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is
the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary.
Although the deeds of sale was in the name of Rodolfo, the purchase price was paid by the private
respondent who was the real owner of the property. Petitioner Rodolfo is the trustee, and the private
respondent is the beneficiary.

2.No, Spouses Edualino and Evelyn Casipit contend that they are purchasers in good faith and for
valuable consideration; thus, they cannot be deprived of the land they bought from Rodolfo Tigno is
unacceptable.
First, unrebutted is the emphatic testimony of private respondent that Edualino was invited on May 2, 1980
to a picnic in the fishpond. At the picnic, private respondent informed Petitioner Edualino Casipit that he
was the owner of the property.
Second, also uncontested is the testimony of Dominador Cruz that he met Edualino on April 24, 1989, or
five (5) days before the consummation of the sale between Rodolfo and Spouses Casipit. During that
meeting, Cruz told Edualino that he bought from private respondent a portion of the subject property for the
purpose of building a dike. Thereafter, Edualino asked Cruz to buy a portion of the property from private
respondent.
Third, and in any event, Spouses Casipit did not acquire absolute ownership over the property since the
apparent vendor, Petitioner Rodolfo, did not have the right to transfer ownership thereof. Be it remembered
that the fishponds were not registered under the Torrens system. Again, we cite public respondents ruling,
which we find totally persuasive.
No valid sale in the first place was made between defendant-appellees covering the portion of land in
question. The fact is, as established by the evidence on record, that defendant Rodolfo M. Tigno is not the
owner of the lands in question, but a mere trustee thereof, and could not have transferred ownership of said
lands, by way of sale, to his co-defendant-appellee spouses. As a matter of basic principle in the law on
sales, a person cannot transfer ownership, by way of sale, of something over which he has no right to
transfer.

42.) DIONISIO ESGUERRA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-14313 (July 26, 1960)

FACTS: The accused, Dionisio Esguerra, claimed that he had copras ready for delivery to Yu Yek Huy &
Co. He took and received from manager Yu Yek Bio the sum of P 4,400.00 under the express obligation on
part of the said accused to deliver to the said company the equivalent worth of copras at its bodega at Siain,
Atimonan, Quezon as follows: P2,400.00 worth of copras on or before January 31, 1952, and P2,000.00
worth of copras on or before fifteen days from March 11, 1952, or the same sum of money on the respective
dates aforestated. The said accused, once in possession of the said sum of money and far from complying
with aforesaid obligation, despite repeated demands made upon him to do so, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud the aforesaid company, misapply, misappropriate and
convert the said amount to his own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the Yu Yek
Huy & Co., in the aforestated amount of P4,400.00 Philippine Currency. The Court of Appeals held the
accused guilty of the crime of Estafa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused, on appeal, could be convicted of an entirely different offense with
different elements, that of false pretenses of possessing property or business made prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud.

RULING: It is undisputed that the information contains no allegation of misrepresentation, bad faith or
false pretense, essential element in the crime of which appellant was found guilty by the Court of Appeals.
This is so, evidently, because, as already stated, the fiscal and the private prosecutor avowedly were
prosecuting the accused for the crime of misappropriation and conversion committed with unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence for which the appellant went to trial and was convicted by the lower court.
An accused may be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge, or of an
offense charged which is included in that proved. Stated differently, an accused can be convicted offense
only when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In
other words, variance between the allegation and proof cannot justify conviction for either the offense
charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other.
The Court held that the transaction was that of sale of copra for future delivery. Obviously, an
advance payment is subject to the disposal of the vendor. If the transaction fails, the liability arising
therefrom is of a civil and not of a criminal nature.

43.) JOSE ESCANO, ETC., PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS
VS COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEES
G.R. No. L-47207 September 25, 1980

FACTS: Petitioners complain about the judgment of the CA, engrafting conditions on their repurchase of
10 lots, which were expropriated to form part of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, as well as failure of the
Appellate Court to grant them compensation for the use of the lots by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
from the time that they tendered the redemption price.Those lots were sold by Mamerto Escano to the
Republic for use by the CCA. The sale was subjected to the condition that when CCA would no longer use
the lots as airport, the title thereto would revert to the seller upon reimbursement of the price without
interest. By means of 2 deeds of assignment, the petitioners became the successors of Mamerto
Escano.Then later, after CCA used the lots, petitioners made on a written tender to the CCA of the
repurchase price. But Director of Civil Aviation rejected the tender for the reason that the lots were still used
for general aviation.So petitioners sued the RP CCA in CFI of Cebu for the reconveyance of the ten lots.
The trial court ordered CCa to reconvey the petitioners. Petitioners appealed because the lower court did not
award to them the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the lots from the time that they
tendered the redemption price. The government appealed because it believed that the condition had not yet
materialized.
CA affirmed the trial court's judgment but went further on the conditions like tax and rental fees. Petitioners
appealed.

HELD:
CA erred in imposing the said conditions on the reconveyance.
The fact that the contract of sale does not mention those conditions means that they were never within the
contemplation of the parties. The Court of Appeals, in gratuitously imposing those conditions, made a new
contract for them.
We hold that, while petitioners' claim for compensation may be justified on the ground that the CAA should
have reconveyed the ten lots upon the tender of the redemption price, nevertheless, it would seem to be
inequitable to require the CAA to pay compensation when it had not derived any benefit from the lots.

44.) ONG V. ONG [G.R. NO. L-67888. OCTOBER 8, 1985.]

FACTS: On 25 February 1976, Imelda Ong for and in consideration of P1 and other valuable
considerations, executed in favor of Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed whereby she
transferred, released, assigned and forever quitclaimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and assigns, all
her rights, title, interest and participation in 1/2 undivided portion of a parcel of land (Lot 10-B of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-157841, a portion of lot 10 Block 18 of PSD-13288 LCR (GLRC) Record 2029,
situated in Makati, containing 125 square meters. On 19 November 1980, Imelda Ong revoked the aforesaid
Deed of Quitclaim and, thereafter, on 20 January 1982 donated the whole property to her son, Rex Ong
Jimenez. On 20 June 1983, Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed with the
RTC Makati an action against Imelda Ong, for the recovery of ownership/possession and nullification of
the Deed of Donation over the portion belonging to her and for accounting. Imelda Ong claimed that the
Quitclaim Deed is null and void inasmuch as it is equivalent to a Deed of Donation, acceptance of which by
the donee is necessary to give it validity. Further, it is averred that the donee, Sandra Maruzzo, being a
minor, had no legal personality and therefore incapable of accepting the donation. Upon admission of the
documents involved, the parties filed their responsive memoranda and submitted the case for decision. On
12 December 1983, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Maruzzo and held that the Quitclaim Deed
is equivalent to a Deed of Sale and, hence, there was a valid conveyance in favor of the latter.
Imelda Ong appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 20 June 1984, IAC promulgated its Decision
affirming the appealed judgment and held that the Quitclaim Deed is a conveyance of property with a valid
cause or consideration; that the consideration is P1 which is clearly stated in the deed itself; that the
apparent inadequacy is of no moment since it is the usual practice in deeds of conveyance to place a
nominal amount although there is a more valuable consideration given. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari.On 15 March 1985, Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an
Omnibus Motion informing this Court that she has reached the age of majority as evidenced by her Birth
Certificate and she prays that she be substituted as private respondent in place of her guardian ad litem. On
15 April 1985, the Court issued a resolution granting the same.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision of the IAC, with costs against Imelda Ong.
1. Consideration or cause is not P1 alone but also other valuable considerations. The subject deed reveals
that the conveyance of the 1/2 undivided portion of the property was for and in consideration of P1 and the
other valuable considerations paid by Sandra Maruzzo, through her representative, Alfredo Ong, to
petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently, the cause or consideration is not P1 alone but also the other
valuable considerations.
2. Cause not stated in contract is presumed existing unless proven to the contrary; Execution of deed a
prima facie evidence of existence of valuable consideration. Although the cause is not stated in the contract
it is presumed that it is existing unless the debtor proves the contrary (Article 1354 of the Civil Code). One
of the disputable presumptions is that there is a sufficient cause of the contract (Section 5, (r), Rule 131,
Rules of Court). It is a legal presumption of sufficient cause or consideration supporting a contract even if
such cause is not stated therein (Article 1354, New Civil Code) This presumption cannot be overcome by a
simple assertion of lack of consideration especially when the contract itself states that consideration was
given, and the same has been reduced into a public instrument with all due formalities and solemnities. To
overcome the presumption of consideration the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence in a proper action. (Samanilla vs. Cajucom, et al.,
107 Phil. 432). The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie
evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden
of proving such allegation. (Caballero, et al. vs. Caballero, et al., (CA), 45 O.G. 2536).
3. Acceptance by legal representatives of minor applies to onerous and conditional donations Granting that
the Quitclaim deed is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the requirement of the
acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives applies only to onerous and
conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges or burdens (Article 726, Civil
Code). The acceptance by a legal guardian of a simple or pure donation does not seem to be necessary
(Perez vs. Calingo, CA-40 O.G. 53). Thus, Supreme Court ruled in Kapunan vs. Casilan and CA (109 Phil.
889) that the donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if
said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not
important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything
nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim in question does not impose any condition.
4. Bad faith and inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render conveyance inexistent, assignors
liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract. It is not unusual in deeds of conveyance adhering to
the Anglo-Saxon practice of stating that the consideration given is the sum of P1, although the actual
consideration may have been much more. Moreover, assuming that said consideration of P1 is suspicious,
this circumstance, alone, does not necessarily justify the inference that the vendees were not purchasers in
good faith and for value. Neither does this inference warrant the conclusion that the sales were null and void
ab initio. Indeed, bad faith and inadequacy of the monetary consideration do not render a conveyance
inexistent, for the assignors liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract (Article 1350, Civil Code),
whereas fraud or bad faith may render either rescissible or voidable, although valid until annulled, a contract
concerning an object certain entered into with a cause and with the
consent of the contracting parties (See Morales Development v. CA, 27 SCRA 484)

45.) E. C. MCCULLOUGH, plaintiff-appellee, vs. R. AENLLE & CO., defendants-appellants.

FACTS: On August 27, 1901, the plaintiff, E.C McCullough entered into a contract of sale with the
defendant R. Aenelle and CO. It was stated in the contract that the defendant would sell, absolutely and in
fee simple, to E. C. McCullough, the tobacco and cigarette factory known as "La Maria Cristina," located at
No. 36 CalleEchague, Plaza de Goiti, Santa Cruz district, this city, said sale including the trade-mark "La
Maria Cristina," which was been duly registered, the stock of tobacco in leaf and manufacture, machinery,
labels, wrappers, furniture, fixtures, and everything else belonging to the said factory for the total amount of
P 131,000.
On September 30, they executed a contract acknowledging that the plaintiff had fully paid the agreed
price.
In December 1901, the plaintiff sold all the tobacco which he had bought from the defendant to a
purchaser. The purchaser upon examining the tobacco, declined to accept the tobacco claiming that it was
worthless and it was not of the quality indicated in the inventory. Upon knowing this, the plaintiff brought
an action against the defendant to recover what he paid therefor.
During the trial in the lower court, it was discovered that the real reason why the plaintiff bought the
factory and everything in it was that he was the owner of a printing establishment and he testified that he
desired to move it to the building in which the defendant had its cigar factory; that it was impossible for him
to get the building without buying the tobacco factory, and for that reason he bought it, intending to sell it as
soon as he could without loss.

ISSUE: WON there was a completed contract of sale.

HELD: Yes. The articles which were the subject of the sale were definitely and finally agreed upon. The
plaintiff-appellee agreed to buy, among other things, all of the leaf tobacco in the factory. This was sufficient
description of the thing sold. The contract is covered by article 1447 of the Civil Code. By the instrument of
August 27 the contract was perfected and thereafter each party could compel the other to fulfill it. (Art.
1258, Civil Code.) By its terms the plaintiff-appellee was bound to take all the leaf tobacco then belonging to
the factory and to pay therefor the prices named in the invoices. This obligation was absolute and did not
depend at all upon the quality of the tobacco or its value. The appellee did not, in this contract, reserve the
right to reject the tobacco if it were not of a specific crop. He did not buy tobacco of a particular kind, class,
or quality.

46.) ANTONIO M. A. BARRETTO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE SANTA MARINA, defendant-
appellee.
G.R. No. L-8169 December 29, 1913

FACTS: On January 5, 1911, for the plaintiff Antonio M.aBarretto filed suit against Jose Santa Marina,
alleging that the defendant, a resident of Spain, was then the owner and proprietor of the business known as
the La Insular Cigar and Cigarette Factory, established in these Islands, which business consisted in the
purchase of leaf tobacco and other raw material, in the preparation of the same, and in the sale of cigars and
cigarettes in large quantities; that on January 8, 1910, and for a long time prior thereto, the plaintiff held and
had held the position of agent of the defendant in the Philippine Islands for the management of the said
business in the name and for the account of the said defendant; that the plaintiff's services were rendered in
pursuance of a contract whereby the defendant obligated himself in writing to hire the said services for so
long a time as the plaintiff should not show discouragement and to compensate such services at the rate of
P37,000 Philippine currency per annum; that, on the aforesaid 8th day of January, 1910, the defendant,
without reason, justification, or pretext and in violation of the contract before mentioned, summarily and
arbitrarily dispensed with the plaintiff's services and removed him from the management of the business,
since which date the defendant had refused to pay him the compensation, or any part thereof, due him and
payable in full for services rendered subsequent to December 31, 1909; and that, as a second cause of action
based upon the facts aforestated, the plaintiff had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P100,000
Philippine currency. Said counsel therefore prayed that judgment be rendered against the defendant by
sentencing him to pay to the plaintiff P137,000 Philippine currency, and the interest thereon at the legal rate,
in addition to the payment of the costs, together with such other equitable remedies as the law allows.

ISSUE/S: With respect to law and existing jurisprudence on the matter what is the relevance of the most
important fact in this case, which stands out prominently from the evidence regarded as a whole, is that of
the plaintiff Barretto's renunciation or registration of the position he held as agent and manager of the said
factory, which was freely and voluntarily made by him on the occasion of the insolvency and disappearance
of the Chinaman Uy Yan, who had bought from the factory products aggregating in value the considerable
sum of P97,000 and, without paying this large debt, disappeared and has not been seen since.

RULING: Article 1733 of the civil Code, applicable to the case at bar, according to the provisions of article
2 of the Code of Commerce, prescribes: "The principal may, at his will, revoke the power and compel the
agent to return the instrument containing the same in which the authority was given."
Article 279 of the Code of Commerce provides: "The principal may revoke the commission intrusted to an
agent at any stage of the transaction, advising him thereof, but always being liable for the result of the
transactions which took place before the latter was informed of the revocation."1awphi1.net
From the above legal provisions it is clearly to be inferred that the contract of agency can subsist only so
long as the principal has confidence in his agent, because, from the moment such confidence disappears and
although there be a fixed period for the excercise of the office of agent, a circumstance that does not appear
in the present case the principal has a perfect right to revoke the power that he had conferred upon the agent
owing to the confidence he had in him and which for sound reasons had ceased to exist.
Article 300 of the same code prescribes: "The following shall be special reasons for which principals may
discharge their employees, even though the time of service of the contract has not elapsed: Fraud or breach
of trust in the business intrusted to them . . . "
By reason of these legal provisions the defendant, in revoking the authority conferred upon the plaintiff,
acted within his unquestionable powers and did not thereby violate any statute whatever that may have
limited them; consequently, he could not have caused the plaintiff any harm or detriment to his rights and
interests, for not only had Santa Marina a justifiable reason to proceed as he did, but also no period
whatever had been stipulated during which the plaintiff should be entitled to hold his position; and
furthermore, because, in relieving the latter and appointing another person in his place, the defendant acted
in accordance with the renunciation and resignation which the plaintiff had tendered. If the plaintiff is
entitled to any indemnity in accordance with law, such was awarded to him in the judgment of the lower
court by granting him the right to collect salary for one month and some odd days.

48.) BOSTON BANK (FORMERLY BANK OF COMMERCE) V. PERLA MANALO
AND CARLOS MANALO.
Gr. No. 158149

FACTS: Xavi er vi l l e Estat e, Inc. (XEI) sol d to The Overseas Bank of Mani l a (OBM) some
resi denti al l ot s i n Xavierville subdivision. Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM. Carlos Manalo, Jr. proposed to XEI, through its President Emerito Ramos, to
purchase two lots in the Xavi er vi l l e subdivi si on and off ered as par t of the downpayment the
P34, 887. 66 Ramos owed hi m. XEI, t h r o u g h Ra mo s , a g r e e d . I n a l e t t e r t o Pe r l a
Ma n a l o, Ra mo s c o n f i r me d t h e reser vati on of the l ot s. In the l ett er he al so pegged
the pri ce of the l ot s at P348, 060 wi th a 20% downpayment of the purchase price amounting to
P69,612.00 (less the P34,887.66 owing from Ramos), payable as soon as XEI resumes its selling operations;
the corresponding Contract of Conditional Sale would then be signed on or before the same date. Perla
Manalo conformed to the letter agreement. Thereafter, the spouses constructed a house on the property. The
spouses were notified of XEIs resumption of selling operations. However, they did not pay the balance of
the downpayment because XEI failed to prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same to
them. XEI also billed them for unpaid interests which they also refused to pay.
XEI tur ned over i ts sel l i ng operati ons t o OBM. Subsequently, Commerci al Bank of
Mani l a (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-
going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no permission for
such construction.
Perl a i nformed them that her husband had a contract wi th OBM, through XEI, to
purchase the proper ty. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she failed to do so. Thus,
CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But later on, CBM moved to withdraw its
complaint because of theissues raised. In the meantime, CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the
Philippines.
Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank before the RTC.
The spouses alleged that they had always been ready and willing to pay the installments on the l ots sol d to
them but no contract was for thcomi ng and they fur ther al l eged that upon thei r par ti al
payment of the downpayment, they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale
coveri ng the subj ect l ots. Duri ng the tri al , the spouses adduced i n evi dence the separate
Contracts of Conditional Sale executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued
selling residential lots in the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there was a perfected contract to sell the property
2.) Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale executed by XEI in
favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms of 120 equal monthly
installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo spouses the same mode and
timeline of payment. ( Evidence, Disputable Presumptions, Habits and Customs Rule 130, Section 34)

HELD:
1.)NO. In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the price as
well as the amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the
balance of the purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer
makes a downpayment or portion thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the
perfection of any purchase and sale between the parties.
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and the price. The agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price, such
that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
We have meti cul ously revi ewed the records, i ncl udi ng Ramos Febr uar y 8, 1972 and
August 22, 1972 letters to respondents and find that said parties confined themselves to agreeing on the
price of the property (P348,060.00), the 20% downpayment of the purchase price (P69,612.00), and
credited respondents for the P34,887.00 owing from Ramos as part of the 20% downpayment. Based on
these two letters, the determination of the terms of payment of the P278,448.00 had yet to be agreed upon
on or before December 31, 1972, or even afterwards, when the parties sign the contract of conditional sale.
So l ong as an essent i al el ement enteri ng i nto the proposed obl i gati on of ei ther of the
par ti es remai ns to be determi ned by an agreement whi ch they are to ma ke, the contract i s
i ncompl ete and unenforceable.

2. )NO. The bare fact that other l ot buyers were al l owed to pay the bal ance of the
purchase pri ce of l ot s purchased by them i n 120 or 180 mont hly i nstal l ments does not
consti tute evi dence t hat XEI al so agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of
payment.
Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one
ti me i s not admi ssi bl e to prove that he di d the same or si mi l ar thi ng at another ti me,
al though such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the
parties. Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering party
must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere
tendency to act i n a given manner but rat her, conduct that i s semi - automati c i n nat ure.
The offeri ng par ty must al l ege and prove speci fi c, repeti tive conduct that mi ght const i tute
evi dence of habi t. The exampl es offered i n evi dence to prove habi t, or patt er n of
evi dence must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of
contracts does not present the k i n d o f s u f f i c i e n t l y s i mi l a r c i r c u ms t a n c e s t o o u t we i g h
t h e d a n g e r o f p r e j u d i c e a n d c o n f u s i o n . I n determining whether the examples are
numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of
response. It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to
lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are admissible.
Respondents f ai l ed t o al l ege and prove t hat, as a matter of busi ness usage, habi t or
patter n of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in
installments of 120 months of fi xed amounts wi th pre- computed i nterests, and that XEI and
the respondent s had i ntended to adopt such terms of payment rel ative to the sal e of the
two l ots i n questi on. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale
executed by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as
sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on the part of
XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price of said lots in 120
months.

49.) BRAVO-GUERRERO vs. BRAVO
G.R. No. 152658 July 29, 2005

FACTS: Spouses Mauricio Bravo ("Mauricio") and Simona Andaya Bravo ("Simona") owned two parcelsof
land ("Properties") located along Evangelista Street, Makati City, Metro Manila. They havethree children -
Roland, Cesar and Lily, all surnamed Bravo. Cesar died without issue. LilyBravo married David Diaz, and
had a son, David B. Diaz, Jr. ("David Jr."). Roland had sixchildren, namely, Lily Elizabeth Bravo-Guerrero
("Elizabeth"), Edward Bravo ("Edward"), RolandBravo, Jr. ("Roland Jr."), Senia Bravo, Benjamin Mauricio
Bravo, and their half-sister, OfeliaBravo ("Ofelia").Simona executed a General Power of Attorney ("GPA")
on 17 June 1966 appointing Mauricio asher attorney-in-fact. In the GPA, Simona authorized Mauricio to
"mortgage or otherwisehypothecate, sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or
mixed, of any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest
therein xxx." Mauriciosubsequently mortgaged the Properties to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
DevelopmentBank of the Philippines (DBP) for P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.
On 25 October 1970, Mauricio executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Real EstateMortgage ("Deed of
Sale") conveying the Properties to "Roland A. Bravo, Ofelia A. Bravo andElizabeth Bravo" ("vendees").
However, the Deed of Sale was not annotated on TCT Nos.58999 and 59000. Neither was it presented to
PNB and DBP. The mortage loans and the
receipts for loan payments issued by PNB and DBP continued to be in Mauricios name even
after his death on 20 November 1973. Simona died in 1977.On 23 June 1997, Edward, represented by his
wife, Fatima Bravo, filed an action for the judicialpartition of the Properties. Edward claimed that he and
the other grandchildren of Mauricio andSimona are co-owners of the Properties by succession. Despite this,
petitioners refused toshare with him the possession and rental income of the Properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Simona validly appointed Mauricio as her attorney-in-fact to dispose the properties
in question.

HELD: The SC also agree with the trial court that Simona authorized Mauricio to dispose of the Properties
when she executed the GPA. True, Article 1878 requires a special power of attorney for an agent to execute
a contract that transfers the ownership of an immovable.However, the Court has clarified that Article 1878
refers to the nature of the authorization, not toits form. Even if a document is titled as a general power
of attorney, the requirement of aspecial power of attorney is met if there is a clear mandate from the
principal specificallyauthorizing the performance of the act.In Veloso v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explained that a general power of attorney couldcontain a special power to sell that satisfies the requirement
of Article 1878, thus:While it is true that it was denominated as a general power of attorney, a perusal
thereof revealed that it stated an authority to sell, to wit:"2. To buy or sell, hire or lease, mortgage or
otherwise hypothecate lands, tenements andhereditaments or other forms of real property, more specifically
TCT No. 49138, upon suchterms and conditions and under such covenants as my said attorney shall deem
fit and proper."Thus, there was no need to execute a separate and special power of attorney since the
generalpower of attorney had expressly authorized the agent or attorney in fact the power to sell thesubject
property. The special power of attorney can be included in the general power when it isspecified therein the
act or transaction for which the special power is required.In this case, Simona expressly authorized
Mauricio in the GPA to "sell, assign and dispose of any and all of my property, real, personal or mixed, of
any kind whatsoever and wheresoever situated, or any interest therein xxx" as well as to "act as my general
representative and agent,with full authority to buy, sell, negotiate and contract for me and in my behalf."
Taken together,these provisions constitute a clear and specific mandate to Mauricio to sell the Properties.
Evenif it is called a "general power of attorney," the specific provisions in the GPA are sufficient for the
purposes of Article 1878. These provisions in the GPA likewise indicate that Simonaconsented to the sale of
the Properties.

50.) HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA

FACTS: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has 14 children. He owned several
fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra.
In order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear that he sold some of his lands to his children.
Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio,
Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, ValerianaDela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October
25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso
continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands
that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father's death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels
of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by
Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of
Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of
Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; 2. Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was
valid

RULING:
The Deed of Sale was void because it is simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As
such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. It is only made to
avoid tax purposes. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even
after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject
parcels of land and enjoyed their produce until his death.

Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient
consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown
to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the
evidence adduced.

2) It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it
is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir
who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict
dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The
requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by
the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to
each heir.

51.) GR. No.165748 HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M.URETA SR.,VS.HEIRS OF LIBERATO M.
URETA
and
G.R. No. 165930 HEIRS OF LIBERATO M.URETA VS. HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M.URETA SR.,

FACTS: Alfonso Ureta(Alfonso)begot 14 children namely Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencio,
Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela,Wenefreda, Melinda, Benedicto, Jorge and Andres.The
children of Policronio opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants (heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond( included in the
14,000 sq.hectares of land) , a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep and was engaged in buying and selling of
copras . Policronio ,the eldest son was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead
worked on his fathers land. In October, 1969, Alfonsos 4 children namely Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia,
and Francisco (who was the municipal judge) suggested that in order to reduce inheritance taxes ,through
his father to execute 4 deeds of sale covering parcels of land in favor of Policronio,4, Liberato,5; Prudencia
6; and his common law wife,Valeriana de la Cruz, 7. The Deed of Sale was executed on October 25, 1969 in
favor of Policronio covered 6 parcels of land which are the properties in dispute in this case. The sales were
made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration were given. When Alfonso died on October 11,
1972. Liberato acted as administrator of his fathers estate, succeded by his sister. Prudencia then her
daughter Carmencita Perlas except for partitions of parcel 5, the rest of the parcel were transferred to
Policronio which were tenanted by Fernandez family who never turned over their produce to Policronio and
heirs but to Alfonso and Administrator of his estate. Except for the portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio
nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands. Policronio died on November 22, 1974. On April 19,
1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition which covered the 4 Deeds of Sale.
Policronio was represented by his son Conrado. Believing that the 6 parcels of land belonged to Policronio,
filed a complaint of Declaration of Ownership and recovery of possession, Annulment of Documentary
Partition and damages against the heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid?
2. Whether or not Extra Judicial Partition valid?
RULING: G.R. 165748 was denied while in petition G.R. 165930 was granted.
April 20, 2004 decision and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the CA and CA G.R.CV no. 71399 modified.
The deed of Extrajudicial Partition of April 19, 1986 was valid while remanding of case to court of origin
was deleted.
The Deed of Absolute Sale on October, 1965 was simulated contract and not estopped to question the
validity bound by Art. 1412 and 1421 of the Civil code.
The Deed of Extra Judicial Partition is voidable for one party Conrado lacked legal capacity to give consent
of his heirs under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code which is binding until annulled by a proper action in court.
They are susceptible to recission where one party is incapable of giving consent to a contract, however by a
proper action in court duly approved it shall be valid.

52.) HILARIA AGUILAR,vs JUAN RUBIATO, and MANUEL GONZALEZ VILA.
G.R. No. 14823 December 9, 1919

FACTS: Juan Rubiato is a resident of the municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna, of somewhat
ordinary intelligence and astuteness. Early in the year 1915, he was the owner of various parcels of land
having a potential value of approximately P26,000. Rubiato was desirous of obtaining a loan of not to
exceed P1,000. Being in this state of mind, two men, Manuel Gonzalez Vila a procurador judicial and one
Gregorio Azucena, and possibly another, one MartoEncarnacion, came to the house of Rubiato and there
induced him to sign the second page of a power of attorney in favor of Manuel Gonzalez Vila.
By reason of the power thus given, Manuel Gonzalez formulated a document and sold the lot toHilaria
Aguilar of Manila, for the sum of P800, with right of repurchase within one year, Rubiato to remain in
possession of the land as lessee and to pay P120 every three months as lease rent.
The one year mentioned in the pacto de retro having expired without Hilaria Aguilar having received the
principal nor any part of the lease rent, she began to file an action against Juan Rubiato and Manuel
Gonzalez Vila to consolidate the eight parcels of land in her name.
After due trial,the court found that the power of attorney only authorized Manuel Gonzalez Vila to obtain a
loan subject to a mortgage, and not to sell the property. The judgment handed down was to the effect that
Aguilarrecover from the defendant Juan Rubiato the sum of P800.00with interest at the rate of 60 per cent
per annum from April 29, 1915 until May 1, 1916, and with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum
from May 1, 1916, until the payment of the principal, with the costs against the defendant. Both parties
appealed.
The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court and considers that Rubiato is only responsible to
the plaintiff for the loan of P800.

ISSUE: WON Usury Law is prevailing on this case.

HELD: Yes. The SC have held that the defendant is under obligation to the plaintiff for a mere loan, as this
loan fails to name a lawful rate of interest, and as interest at the rate of 60 per cent per annum is
unquestionably exorbitant and usurious under the Usury Law on and after the date when this law became
effective, the defendant would be liable for the legal rate of interest, which is 6 per cent per annum.
Furthermore, defendant Rubiatowould be liable only for such interest prior to the enactment of the Usury
Law. This we can do under the sanction of article 1255 of the Civil Code which condemns agreements
contrary to morals and public policy.
Judgment is affirmed, with the sole modification that the plaintiff shall only recover interest at the rate of 6
per cent per annum on the sum of P800 from April 29, 1915 until paid, without special finding as to costs in
this instance.

53.) SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA VS. CA

FACTS: Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by
defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children. The
petitioners contend that there was no actual valid consideration and that assuming that there was
consideration in the sums reflected the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than the
small sums appearing therein. The RTC ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case. RTCs
ruling was affirmed by CA. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid consideration in the deeds of sale

HELD: If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is valid, despite
the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the
contract, then the contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation.
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract,
unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale,
except as may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other
act or contract.
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of the Civil Code which
would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed, there is no requirement that the price be equal to
the exact value of the subject matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative
value of what they gave.

54.) OLIVARES AND ROBLES VS DE LA CRUZ SARMIENTO
Gr. No. 158384 June 12, 2008

FACTS: Sarmiento obtained a P12,000 loan from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
mortgaged a parcel of land as security for the pament of the said loan. Sarmiento failed to pay the monthly
amortization of the said loan.
In 1970, respondent allegedly obtained a loan of P35,000 from Luis Boteros n order to p[ay for her obligaton
to DBP and prevent the foreclosure of said land. Respondent alleged that nstead of getting the amount she
loaned from Boteros, she authorized Boteros anh his niece to pay her loan with the DBP. Respondent
accused Boteros and planta of forging her signatures in two deeds of sale making it appear that respondent
and her husband sold the land and house to Boteros.
According to Boteros, n 1979, respondent forced to sell the propert to him provided he would pay
respondent's loan with the DBP plus the nteres due theron. Agreement between Boteros and respondent was
put into writing through a Deed of Defnte Sale. After having paid respondent's loan with the DBP,
respondent and Boteros executed another document, a DEED of Absolute sale, signed bu both respondent
and husband. Respondent then sole the property to Sps. Juan Olivares and Dolores Robles. After title was
transferred to petitioner Olivares' name, he demanded that respondent vacate the property. Respondent
allegedly requested that she be given some tme to fina aplace where her famly coulf transfer. Petitioners
eventuall filed ath the MTC an illegal detaner case aganst respondent when they continued to stay despite
repeated demands from petitioner for them to vacate. The Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in the
illegal detainer case and ordered respondent and Manuel to vacate the property and deliver the possession
thereof to petitioners.
On 26 September 1986, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo a complaint for recovery of
ownership, annulment of title, and damages against Boteros, Planta, and petitioners. The RTC ruled in favor
of Olivares. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision and declared the Deed of DEfinte sale null and
void. And that possession of the subject property be returned to de la Cruz.

ISSUE: Whether the contract is that of an equitable mortgage.

HELD: The Supreme court held that the it cannot subscribe to respondent's bare allegation that the
agreement between her and Boteros was merely a loan for P35,000 and not the sale of the property.
Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that the transaction was merely a loan. In fact, there was no
written document evidencing the alleged loan transaction. It is quite improbable that Boteros, who knew
that respondent was unable to pay her P12,000 loan from the DBP, would agree to grant respondent a
P35,000 loan which is almost thrice as much as the DBP loan, without insisting that the loan be embodied
in a written document. Furthermore, respondent admitted that she has never paid a single centavo of her
alleged loan with Boteros.
On the other hand, the notarized Deed of Definite Sale and the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale signed by
respondent and Manuel clearly belie respondent's claim that the agreement was merely a loan transaction.
These circumstances clearly indicate that the agreement was indeed a sale of real property and not merely a
loan.
The contract was not an also an Equitable Mortgage. In this case, the land which was the subject of the
Deed of Absolute Sale was already mortgaged not to the buyer but to another entity who was not a party to
the contract. The land was already mortgaged to DBP by the sellers (respondent and her husband Manuel),
who were unable to pay their loan. The records show that the property was about to be foreclosed so
respondent and Manuel decided to sell the property to Boteros. Prior to their sale transaction, there is no
evidence that respondent had an existing debt with Boteros. There is likewise no substantial evidence on the
records that the parties to the contract agreed upon a different transaction other than the sale of real
property.




55.) BORTIKEY VS AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFIT SYSTEM
G.R. No.146708 (December 13, 2005)

FACTS: On May 13, 1992, petitioner bought from respondent Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSBS) a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 221416 of the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City. On June 28, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) alleging that the 24% annual interest stipulated in the contract was contrary to
law and public morals. In dismissing the complaint, the HLURB ruled that the stipulated interest was valid
because there was no ceiling on interest rates at the time of the perfection of the contract. Petitioner was
therefore under the legal and contractual obligation to comply with the stipulation. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the stipulated 24% annual interest was not contrary to law and public morals, having
been mutually agreed upon by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 24% annual interest stipulated in the contract is valid.

HELD: Basic is the principle that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Petitioner was free to decide on the manner
of payment, either in cash or installment. Since he opted to purchase the land on installment basis, he
consented to the imposition of interest on the contract price. He cannot now unilaterally withdraw from it
by disavowing the obligation created by the stipulation in the contract. The contract was entered into by the
parties freely and voluntarily. Therefore, the stipulated 24% annual interest on the price of the parcel of land
purchased by petitioner from respondent on installment basis is hereby declared valid and binding.

56.) LEQUIN VS VISCONDE, G.R. NO. 177710

FACTS: In 1995, petitioners, residents of Diamond Court, Brixton Ville Subdivision, Camarin, Caloocan
City, bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 square meters from one Carlito de Leon (de Leon). The
sale was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. The subject lot is located near the Sto. Rosario to
Magsaysay road in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. Adjacent thereto and located in between the subject lot and the
road is a dried up canal (or sapang patay in the native language).
In 1997, respondents represented to petitioners that they had also bought from Carlito de Leon a 1,012-
square meter lot adjacent to petitioners property and built a house thereon. As later confirmed by de Leon,
however, the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is part of the 10,115-square meter lot petitioners
bought from him. Petitioners believed the story of respondents, since it was Raymundo who negotiated the
sale of their lot with de Leon. With the consent of respondents, petitioners then constructed their house on
the 500-square meter half-portion of the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by respondents, as this was near the
road. Respondents residence is on the remaining 512 square meters of the lot.
Given this situation where petitioners house stood on a portion of the lot allegedly owned by respondents,
petitioners consulted a lawyer, who advised them that the 1,012-square meter lot be segregated from the
subject lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512 square meters
thereof. This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear that
respondents paid PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot. In reality,
the consideration of PhP 15,000 was not paid to petitioners. Actually, it was petitioners who paid
respondents PhP 50,000 for the 500-square meter portion where petitioners built their house on, believing
respondents representation that the latter own the 1,012-square meter lot.
In July 2000, petitioners tried to develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot and
the public road. Respondents objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang patay.
This prompted petitioners to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the 1,012 square-meter lot
claimed by respondents. Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the dried
up canal or sapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs to
petitioners.
Thus, on July 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint[4] for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum of
Money and Damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28 in Cabanatuan
City, praying, among others, for the declaration of the February 12, 2000Kasulatan as null and void ab
initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to respondents, and various damages. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4063.

ISSUES:
* Whether or not the Kasulatan covering the 512 square-meter lot is a valid contract of sale?
* Who is the legal owner of the other 500 square-meter lot.

RULING/HELD: The Kasulatan is null and void since it lacks the three essential elements. It is a well-
entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never
been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
On the second issue, the PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as consideration for the transfer of
the 500-square meter lot to petitioners must be restored to the latter. Otherwise, an unjust enrichment
situation ensues. The facts clearly show that the 500-square meter lot is legally owned by petitioners as
shown by the testimony of de Leon; therefore, they have no legal obligation to pay PhP 50,000 therefor.

57.) ZENAIDA K. CASTILLO and EMILIO CORDOVA, JR., vs. HORACIO K. CASTILLO
G.R. No. L-18238 January 22, 1980

FACTS: Isidro C. Castillo died on October 15, 1947 leaving as his heirs his wife Enriqueta Katigbak and
their nine children Horacio, Beatriz, Zenaida, Ysidro, Jr., Leonor, Crispin, Lourdes, Alicia and Ernesto.
Intestate proceedings for the settlement of the deceased's estate were instituted and in January, 1948,
Enriqueta Katigbak Vda. de Castillo was appointed administratrix. On June 21, 1948, she filed an inventory
of the properties as well as the obligations left by the deceased. Two months thereafter, she was ordered to
submit a project of partition. On August 23, 1948, she filed an urgent petition asking the Court to reconsider
its order on the ground that there were pending obligations of the estate amounting to P90,920.00. However,
on November 11, 1948, the surviving spouse as administratrix of the intestate estate of Ysidro C. Castillo
submitted a project of partition, stating that the properties which constituted the residuary hereditary estate
of the deceased Ysidro C. Castillo, after complete payment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, the allowance of the widow and inheritance and estate taxes are: (1) 38 parcels of land
which are properties brought to the marriage by the deceased Ysidro C. Castillo and (2) 19 parcels of land
which are conjugal properties of the spouses. Under said project of partition, all the 38 parcels of land
brought by the deceased into the marriage and 4 parcels of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to all
the nine children in equal shares, pro-indiviso; 8 parcels of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the
widow as her share in the conjugal partnership and the remaining 7 parcels given in usufruct to the widow.
Despite approval of the project of partition and the closing of the intestate proceedings, the properties
remained under the administration of Enriqueta K. Vda. de Castillo. On February 4, 1960, after an
extrajudicial demand for partition failed, herein plaintiff-appellant Zenaida K. Castillo, assisted by her
husband, filed an action for partition with accounting and receivership against her mother Enriqueta K.
Vda. de Castillo and her brothers and sisters (Civil Case No. 42496, CFI of Manila). Alleging that the
project of partition omitted to include certain properties acquired by the defendants using community funds
in their acquisition, she prayed that said properties be divided and partitioned accordingly. The complaint
was duly answered by the defendants-appellants. After hearing, the Court of First instance of Manila
rendered judgment on January 12, 1961, which was amended on February 4, 1961. From said judgment,
both parties appealed to this court, raising the following assignment of errors.

ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in not finding that the income and the fruits of the common properties
were used in the acquisition of those properties in the names of defendants and in consequently denying thru
partition of the same.

HELD: We agree with the plaintiffs-appellants that the version of Enriqueta K. Vda. de Castillo that the
controverted property is paraphernal cannot be given serious consideration. The improbability that her name
and that of her husband would not have been written as co- buyers of the land in Exhibit Plaintiff 2 unless
they were the actual co-purchasers thereof can easily be discerned It is indeed extremely difficult to believe
that the vendor Romeo Baldeo Ona would have acknowledged in the deed of sale receipt in full of the
purchase price of P30,000.00 from the vendees if he had not really received full payment from the latter,
This version of Enriqueta becomes even more doubtful in view of the fact that the vendor, Romeo Baldeo
Ona, signed and executed the said deed of sale not only in his personal capacity but also as attorney-in-fact
of his brother Claro Baldeo Ona and his sister Adelaida Baldeo Ona, for such fiduciary capacity naturally
and rightly would have made him more careful and cautious in entering into the transaction. It stands to
reason to conclude that Romeo Baldeo Ona would not have signed or executed the document in question
unless its recital were in truth and in fact as therein stated. Although the testimony of the surviving spouse
regarding the nature of the property is corroborated by defendant- appellant Horacio K. Castillo, the eldest
of the surviving children, such corroboration cannot carry weight, the same being self-serving. Indeed, the
right of plaintiff-appellant Zenaida Castillo to demand partition is indisputable, such right being embodied
in paragraph 1, Article 494 of the New Civil Code which provides thus: No co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned. With respect to Zenaida's brothers and sisters as co-owners, they
were necessary parties and had to be joined as defendants in compliance with the procedural requirement
embodied in Section 1, Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides thus: A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property. The finding of the trial
court that the firing of the complaint in the case at bar was not malicious is a finding of fact which is binding
and conclusive upon Us, thereby negating any award of damages against plaintiffs-appellants, following the
ruling that it is not a sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate (Koster Inc. vs. Zulueta, 99 Phil.
945; Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez, L-22183, Aug. 30, 1968), and that in order that
a person may be made liable to the payment of moral damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful.
The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so
precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously." (Barreto vs.
Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771).

58.) LABAGALA VS. SANTIAGO

FACTS: Jose Santiago owned a parcel of land. His two sisters filed an action alleging that they were part
owners of said property; the case was decided in their favor. The three of them own equal shared of the
property. A few years later Jose died intestate. The two sisters of Jose (respondents) filed for recovery of the
1/3 share of Jose. Ida Labagala (petitioner) told respondents that the whole property was sold to her.
Respondents alleged that the sale was a fraud. Petitioner then alleged that the property was in a form of a
sale but was a actually a donation to her because she was the daughter of Jose.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents can impugn legitimacy in a case of validity of sale
2. Whether or not the donation is valid

HELD:
1. Yes. In the chapter on filiation in the Civil Code, it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that
a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband or his heirs denies the childs filiation.
Petitioner had only a baptisimal certificate as evidence to prove her filiation. Rules on evidence
dictate that a baptismal certificate is not proof of filiation.
2. No. It is clearly a fraud. Why did Jose hide the true nature of the sale? Why did she donate it to
petitioner if petitioner would inherit it anyway? Why would Jose donate the whole property
knowing that he cannot do so?

The 1/3 share of Jose shall be divided equally among her two sisters.

59.) ACE FOODS, INC VS. MICRO PACIFIC TECHNOLOGIES CO.LTD.
G.R.No. 200602

FACTS: Ace Foods, Inc (Ace Foods) is a domestic corporation engaged in the trading and distribution of
consumer goods in wholesale and retail basis while Micro Pacific Technologies Co, Ltd. (MTCL) is one
engaged in the supply of computer hardware and equipment. MCTL sent a proposal to Ace Foods to sell
computer products in which conditions includes :price subject to change without prior notice ; term 30 days
upon delivery; one year warranty which was accepted by Ace Foods by issuing Purchase Order 100023
amounting to PHP646,464.00. MTLC delivered the products to Ace Foods reflected in Inv. No. 7733 which
states that properties is reserved in MTCLs until full compliance of the items and conditions of above
payment as stipulated in the reservation. After delivery, subject products were installed and configured in
AF premises followed by the demand for payment. Instead of payment, Ace Foods sent a letter to MTCL to
pull out the products through sales representative Mark Anteola who did not do it. Ace Foods lodge a
complaint against MTCL to pull out the subject products since MTCL breached its contract its after
delivery services. On the contrary, MTCL did comply all obligations and there was no contract of
agreement on after delivery services . Ace Foods refused to pay MTCL the purchase price for the period
of 9 months. RTC rendered a decision on Feb.28, 2007 ordering MTCL to pay actual damages and
attorneys fees of PHP200,000.00 and PHP 100,000.00 respectively. Case was elevated to CA whose ruling
on Oct. 21, 2011 ordering Ace Foods to pay to MTCL PHP646,464.00 plus legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum starting April 4, 2002 and attorneys fees amounting to PHP50,000.00. A dismissed Ace Foods
claim and MTCL s failure to perform delivery of services for it did not reflect in the contract. Aggrieved ,
Ace Foods in a resolution moved for a consideration on Feb. 8,2012.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ace Foods should pay to MTCL the Purchase Price for subject products.

RULING: Petition denied on Oct. 21, 2011 requiring Ace Foods to pay the Purchase Price plus legal
interest and attorneys fees. Resolution dated Feb.8, 2007 requiring MTCL to remove subject products and
to pay actual damages and attorneys fees hereby affirmed.
As stipulated in art. 1458 by the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
ownership and to deliver determinate thing and the order to pay a price certain on money or its equivalent.
Ace Foods failed to observe as to its allegations of breach which can not be sustained.

60.) MANILA MINING CORP VS. MIGUEL TAN

FACTS: Respondent is in the business of selling electrical materials. Petitioner ordered and received various
materials from respondent and agreed to pay within 30 days from delivery. Petitioner refused to pay his
outstanding balance to respondent after numerous attempts. Respondent filed an action for collection.
Petitioner contends that delivery does not give rise to the obligation to pay as they had agreed that
respondent present sales invoices before payment is made or respondent would not have consented to the
sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should pay.

HELD: Yes. Purchase orders are accepted offers. Requiring sales invoices is a condition that does not affect
the validity of sale. Delivery of the materials by respondent gives rise to the obligation of petitioner to pay.

61.) TITONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 111141 March 6, 1998

FACTS: Peitioner Mario Titong sold a portion of his land to Pablo Espinosa; the latter then sold it to herein
private respondents Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio. Titong however, continued cultivating and tilling
the land already sold and had been doing so for 20 years, when Laurio entered the property and attempted
to till it himself.
Titong then filed an action for quieting of title. The RTC of Masbate, Masbate ruled in favour of private
respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the
disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to the Supreme Court for a
favorable reversal.

ISSUE: WON Titong has right over the property.

HELD: No, when petitioner "sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed" the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo
Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the
latter. In the same manner, Espinosa's rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to
private respondent upon its sale to the latter in accordance with Art. 1458 of the Civil Code By the contract
of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed
ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.
Moreover, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo tilulo y buena fe (with color
of title and good faith). Titong's admitted acts of converting boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield
and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of others and
therefore "tantamount to bad faith. (Art. 1134 IRT Art. 1117, Civil Code)
Extraordinary prescription is likewise absent, possession being less than 30 years. (Art. 1137, Civil Code)
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

62.) ALCANTARA-DAUS vs. Spouses HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON
G.R. No. 149750 June 16, 2003

FACTS: Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father a certain piece of land by virtue of a deed of extra-
judicial partition. To arrange the documents for the properties of his parents, Hermoso engaged the services
of Atty Juan. After the death of Atty Juan, documents surfaced revealing that the properties have been
conveyed to Hermosos brothers and sisters and to Atty. Juan and his sisters, though Hermoso did not intend
such.
A deed of extra-judicial partition w/ quitclaim in favor of Rodolfo de Leon surfaced with Hermosos
signature in it (which was actually forged). Rodolfo sold the land to Aurora Alcantara-Daus. Hermoso
questioned the sale.
RTC ruled that Hermosos claim on the land is barred by laches since 18 years has passed since the land
was sold. It also ruled that the deed of extra-judicial partition, being a notarial document, regularity is
presumed and the same is authentic. The CA reversed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid transfer of ownership of the land to Alcantara-Daus.

HELD: No, there was no valid delivery as Rodolfo is not the rightful owner of the land. A contract of sale is
perfected by mere consent, upon meeting of the minds, on the offer and acceptance thereof based on subject

matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, sellers ownership of the land is not an element in the
perfection of the contract. However, this contract creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer
ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract.
It is during delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold. (Please
Bear this in mind )
It is through delivery or tradition that the buyer acquires the real rights of ownership over the thing sold. At
the time of delivery, Rodolfo was not the owner of the land, thus the consummation of the contract and the
consequent transfer would, then, depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in
accordance with Art 1434 of the Civil Code. But the extra-judicial partition was found to be forged hence
there was no valid transfer of ownershipRodolfo never became the owner of the land. Possession in good
faith and acquisition by virtue of prescription cannot be sustained if it is in derogation of the rights of the
registered owner.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CAs decision.
** DOCTRINE: While a contract of sale is perfected by mere consent, ownership of the thing sold is
acquired only upon its delivery to the buyer. Upon the perfection of the sale, the seller assumes the
obligation to transfer ownership and to deliver the thing sold, but the real right of ownership is transferred
only by tradition or delivery thereof to the buyer.

63.) MILAGROS MANONGSONG VS FELOMENAJUMAQUIO ESTIMO
G. R. No. 136773 June 25, 2003

FACTS: Allegedly, Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is
now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez,
the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio
sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to
her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated Oct. 11, 1957. Milagros and Carlito Manongsong
(petitioners) filed a Complaint on praying for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to
one/fifth, by right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject
to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character and that Agatona Guevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate under question
to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and,
therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the property
by Justina.

HELD: No, the sale embodied in the Kasulatan does not deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of
their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable
consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration,
there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced
by the equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of
the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. The presence of
these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by clear and
convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that the Property belonged to Guevarras estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint
for partition of the Property.
** DOCTRINE: (PARTIES OF A SALE) One explanation for the difference in this aspect between Articles
133 and 1490 is that a donation between spouses governed by the complete separation of property regime,
being a gratuitous contract, would necessarily reduce the estate of the donor and increase the estate of the
donee; while a sale between such spouses, being an onerous and commutative contract, would result in the
separate estates of the spouses being of the same value as before the sale and no fraud could result, either to
the spouses or to their creditors.

64.) EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. & CARMELO & BAUERMANN, INC. vs.
MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.
G.R. No. 106063 November 21, 1996

FACTS: Carmelo entered into a contract with respondent for the latter to lease A PORTION OF THE
SECOND FLOOR of the two-storey building, situated at C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, with a floor area of
1,610 square meters and THE SECOND FLOOR AND MEZZANINE of the two-storey building, situated
at C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, with a floor area of 150 square meters.
The contract is set for the next 20 years.

2 years later, the parties entered into yet another contract involving; A PORTION OF THE SECOND
FLOOR of the two-storey building, situated at C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, with a floor area of 1,610
square meters and THE SECOND FLOOR AND MEZZANINE of the two-storey building, situated at
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, with a floor area of 150 square meters.
Stipulated in the contract was; That if the LESSOR should desire to sell the leased premises, the LESSEE
shall be given 30-days exclusive option to purchase the same.
In the event, however, that the leased premises is sold to someone other than the LESSEE, the LESSOR is
bound and obligated, as it hereby binds and obligates itself, to stipulate in the Deed of Sale hereof that the
purchaser shall recognize this lease and be bound by all the terms and conditions thereof.
Sometime in 1974, Carmelo through Mr. Pascal by a telephone call told the respondent that it is
contemplating to sell the said property and that a certain Jose Araneta is willing to buy the same for
US$1,200,000. It also asked the respondent if its willing to the property for six to seven million pesos.
Respondent through Mr. Yang told the petitioner that it would respond once a decision was made.
Respondent in its reply mentioned a stipulated part of the contract as to when Carmelo would decide to sell
the property. Carmelo did not reply.
Four years later, on July 30, 1978, Carmelo sold its entire C.M. Recto Avenue land and building, which
included the leased premises housing the "Maxim" and "Miramar" theatres, to Equatorial by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale, for the total sum of P11,300,000.00.
Mayfair instituted the action a quo for specific performance and annulment of the sale of the leased
premises to Equatorial.
Carmelos defense; as special and affirmative defense (a) that it had informed Mayfair of its desire to sell the
entire C.M. Recto Avenue property and offered the same to Mayfair, but the latter answered that it was
interested only in buying the areas under lease, which was impossible since the property was not a
condominium; and (b) that the option to purchase invoked by Mayfair is null and void for lack of
consideration.
Equitorials allegation; that the option is void for lack of consideration (sic) and is unenforceable by reason
of its impossibility of performance because the leased premises could not be sold separately from the other
portions of the land and building. It counterclaimed for cancellation of the contracts of lease, and for
increase of rentals in view of alleged supervening extraordinary devaluation of the currency. Equatorial
likewise cross-claimed against co-defendant Carmelo for indemnification in respect of Mayfair's claims.
Trial Court rendered decision in favor of Carmelo and Equitorial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the OPTION CLAUSE IN THE CONTRACTS OF LEASE IS ACTUALLY A
RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL PROVISO.

HELD: We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the aforecited contractual stipulation provides
for a right of first refusal in favor of Mayfair. It is not an option clause or an option contract. It is a contract of a
right of first refusal.
In his Law Dictionary, edition of 1897, Bouvier defines an option as a contract, in the following language:
A contract by virtue of which A, in consideration of the payment of a certain sum to B, acquires the privilege
of buying from, or selling to B, certain securities or properties within a limited time at a specified price.
The rule so early established in this jurisdiction is that the deed of option or the option clause in a contract,
in order to be valid and enforceable, must, among other things, indicate the definite price at which the
person granting the option, is willing to sell.