Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46825 October 18, 1939
ARSENO C. ROL!AN, "#$%e-&t-L&r%e o' ()r*t +*t&+ce &**)%+e$ to t,e Pro-)+ce o'
.#/&c&+, &+$ 0GO S. !A1A, &* Pro-)+c)&/ ()*c&/ o' .#/&c&+, petitioners,
vs.
PE!RO 2LLAROMAN, !EGO CUE2AS, &+$ T3E COURT O( APPEALS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Ozaeta for petitioners.
Vicente Francisco for respondents.

MPERAL, J.:
By this petition for prohibition, petitioners would have the Court of Appeals abstain
absolutely from tain! co!ni"ance of, hearin! and decidin! the certiorari proceedin!s
instituted by the respondents Pedro #illaroman and $ie!o Cuevas a!ainst %ud!e Arsenio C.
Roldan and provincial fiscals &'i!o (. $a"a and Roman de %esus, the first two bein!
petitioners, bearin! CA)*.R. No. +,-+ of said Court of Appeals, and would further have,
durin! the pendency of this petition, a writ of preliminary in.unction issued to the end that
the Court of Appeals abstain from e/ecutin! or carryin! out the writ of preliminary in.unction
issued by it in the aforesaid certiorari proceedin!s.
0n 1ebruary 2, 3-4- the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, &'i!o (. $a"a, filed an
information in the .ustice of the peace court of (an Rafael, Bulacan, a!ainst the
respondents Pedro #illaroman and $ie!o Cuevas, Pablo de la Cru" and one, %ohn $oe,
char!in! them with havin! committed the crime of murder upon the person of %oa5uin
#enturina, on November 46, 3-42, in the municipality of (an Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
with treachery and the a!!ravatin! circumstances of evident premeditation and price or
reward. #illaroman and Cuevas were arrested and at the preliminary investi!ation they
pleaded not !uilty. Both were set a liberty under bail for P,6,666 which each of them put up.
As a result of the preliminary investi!ation, the .ustice of the peace elevated the case to the
Court of 1irst &nstance of Bulacan and there doceted as criminal case No. 72+,. &n the said
Court of 1irst &nstance the same provincial fiscal reproduced the very alle!ations of the
information filed by him in the .ustice of the peace court.
8pon arrai!nment in the Court of 1irst &nstance, #illaroman and Cuevas also pleaded
not !uilty. 9he trial of the case went forward a!ainst the two accused and the prosecution
presented the !reater part of all its evidence. :hile the prosecution was adducin! its
evidence, Cuevas was taen ill and to be confined in the Manila Central ;ospital. 9he
petitioner .ud!e, who was hearin! the case, denied various petitions for postponements filed
indiscriminately by the attorneys for the respondents)defendants. :hen the fiscal rested his
case, waivin! the testimony of many !overnment witnesses appearin! in the list which he
had prepared and served upon the attorneys for the defense, the latter reiterated the
petition for postponement on the !round, principally, that the accused Cuevas was absent
due to sicness. 9he court denied the petition and compelled the attorney for #illaroman to
present the evidence in defense if this accused. 9he attorney felt bound to abide by the
order and so presented some witnesses for the defense. :hen he ran short of available
witnesses, as the others were not present, he a!ain ased for the postponement of the trial
to which the court acceded< but before #illaroman left the courtroom, the prosecutin!
attorneys filed a written motion asin! for the cancellation of the bonds filed by the accused.
9he attorneys for the latter sharply opposed this, but the court sustained the motion,
cancelled the bonds and ordered the arrest of the accused. As a result, #illaroman was
rearrested as well as Cuevas who was confined in the Bilibid Prison ;ospital.
At this sta!e of the case, Pedro #illaroman and $ie!o Cuevas
instituted certiorari proceedin!s in the Court of Appeals a!ainst of the petitioners and fiscal
Roman de %esus, CA)*.R. No. +,-+, impu!nin! in their petition the .urisdiction of the
petitioner .ud!e to proceed with the criminal case for murder in the absence of $ie!o
Cuevas, and asin! that a writ of preliminary in.unction be issued, en.oinin! the petitioner
.ud!e from settin! the continuation of the trial of the criminal case until further order. 9he
Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary in.unction prayed for and ordered the
petitioner .ud!e to abstain from !oin! forward with the trial of said case until further order.
9he (olicitor)*eneral, on behalf of the then respondents, ased that certiorari proceedin!s
be transferred to the (upreme Court of Appeals to try and decide the same, and ased
liewise for the settin! aside of the writ of preliminary in.unction as well as to tae
co!ni"ance of and decide the certiorari proceedin!s. 9he resolution thus promul!ated.
%ustice Ena!e dissentin! and %ustices Paras, Montemayor and A. Reyes reservin! their
votes, are the ones which !ave rise to the remedy by prohibition now before us.
Passin! upon the petition of the herein petitioners, this court !ranted the writ of
preliminary in.unction prayed for and ordered the Court of Appeals to abstain from carryin!
out and e/ecutin! the writ of preliminary in.unction issued by it.
9he petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no ori!inal .urisdiction to tae
co!ni"ance of the petition for certiorari filed by #illaroman and Cuevas under section 3=+)*
of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 4,
readin!> Main &ssue
(EC. 3=+)*. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. ? 9he Court of
Appeals shall have ori!inal .urisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
in.unction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other au/iliary writs and process in aid
of its appellate .urisdiction.
9he (panish translation of said section is couched in the followin! lan!ua!e>
AR9. 3=+)*. Jurisdiction originaria del tribunal de Apelacion. ? El 9ribunal de
Apelacion tendra .urisdiction ori!inaria para librar mandamientos perentorios de
inhibicion, de avocacion y de habeas corpus, interdictos prohibitorios y todos los
demas mandamientos y providencias au/iliares necesarios en el e.ercicio de su
.urisdiccion en apelacion.
Comparin! both te/ts, it will be noted that the (panish translation is incorrect
because the En!lish phrase @in aid of its appellate .urisdiction@ was translated @necesarios
en el e.ercicio de du .urisdiccion en apelacion.@ 9he (panish translation of the phrase does
not 5uite convey the idea e/pressed in the En!lish phrase. Commonwealth Act No. 4 was
finally approved in En!lish by the 1irst National Assembly, wherefore, the En!lish te/t of the
entire law should !overn Asection 3+ of the Revised Administrative Code of 3-37B.
(ection 3=+)* is the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 4, which confers on the
Court of Appeals ori!inal .urisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
in.unction, certiorari, and habeas corpus, and all other au/iliary writs nown and permitted
by the law of procedure< but the !ranted power or .urisdiction is sub.ect to the condition that
such writs should be in aid of its appellate .urisdiction. No other thin! is meant by the phrase
@in aid of its appellate .urisdiction@ but the le!al true.
9he resolution of the Court of Appeals denyin! the motions of the (olicitor)*eneral,
and now assailed in this petition, rely principally upon its decision rendered in the case
of Mujer s. Court of First !nstance of "aguna ACA)*.R. No. 234, (eptember ,3, 3-42B,
holdin! that the phrase @in aid of its appellate .urisdiction@ only refers to its appro/imate
antecedent @ and all other au/iliary writs and process@, and not to the writ of mandamus or
to the writs of prohibition, in.unction, certiorari, and habeas corpus mentioned in the only
sentence if said section, in reliance upon the rule of interpretation that a 5ualifyin! phrase
should be understood as referrin! to the nearest antecedent. 9he rule of interpretation
applied is in fact the !eneral rule in the interpretation of 5ualifyin! or condition phrases
found in a law A+- C.%., sec. +C=, p. -C+ but the rule is sub.ect to the e/tension that where
the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the
provision, the same should be made e/tensive to the whole. 9his e/ception is summari"ed
in the same volume of the Corpus %uris, at pa!es -C+ and -C2, as follows> @9his rule is,
however, merely an aid to construction and will not be adhered to where the e/tension to a
more remote antecedent is clearly re5uired by a consideration of the entire act. (li!ht
indication of le!islative intent so to e/tend the relative term is sufficient. :here several
words are followed by a clause as much applicable to the first and other words as to the
last, the clause should be read as applicable to all.@ A(tevens vs. &llinois Cent. R. Co., 347
N.E., C+-< :arner vs. Din!, 367 N.E., C47< *renou!h vs. Phoeni/ &ns. Co. of ;artford, -,
N.E., ==7< (tate vs. (t. Eouis, 74 (.:., 2,4< Nebrasa (tate Ry. Commission vs. Alfalfa
Butter Co., 37C N.:., 722< Myer vs. Ada Founty, ,-4 P., 4,,< Porto Rico Ry., Ei!ht and
Power Co. vs. Mor, ,+4 8.(., 4=+.B
9he cardinal rule in the interpretation of laws is to ascertain and !ive effect to the
intention of the le!islator ABorromeo vs. Mariano, =3 Phil., 4,,< People vs. Concepcion, ==
Phil., 3,2B< and when the lan!ua!e of a law is reasonably susceptible of two or more
interpretations, that should be adopted which tends to !ive effect to the manifest intention of
the le!islator and to promote the purpose for which it was enacted, and that interpretation
should be re.ected which tends to defeat the purpose which the le!islators has intended to
attain by its enactment A8.(. vs. 9oribio, 3+ Phil., C+< 8.(. vs. Navarro, 3- Phil., 34=B. A
close study of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 4 and those of the amendin! Act,
No. ,+-, will disclose that the purpose of the national Assembly was to confer upon the
Court of Appeals as appellate .urisdiction that is special and limited, unlie the ori!inal and
appellate .urisdiction conferred upon the (upreme Court and upon the Courts of 1irst
&nstance of the Archipela!o.l #$phi%.n&t
Commonwealth Act No. 4 reor!ani"ed the membership of the (upreme Court,
created the Court of Appeals and defined the ori!inal and appellate .urisdiction of both.
(ection , amended section 34C of the Revised Administrative Code relative to the
.urisdiction of the (upreme Court. (ection 34C was subse5uently modified by section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. ,+- which amended para!raphs A=B and A+B. (ection 34C, as finally
amended reads>
(EC. 34C. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ? 9he (upreme Court shall
have such ori!inal .urisdiction as may be possessed and e/ercised by the (upreme
Court of the Philippines at the time of the approval of this Act, includin! cases
affectin! ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.
9he (upreme Court shall have e/clusive .urisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm, on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final .ud!ments of inferior courts may provide, final .ud!ments and decrees
of inferior courts as herein provided, in ?
A3B All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or e/ecutive order or re!ulation is in 5uestion<
A,B All cases involvin! the le!ality of any ta/, compost, assessment of toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto<
A4B All cases in which the .urisdiction of any inferior court is in issue<.
A=B All criminal cases involvin! offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment, and those involvin! other offenses which,
althou!h not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may
have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that !ivin!
rise to the more serious offense, re!ardless of whether the accused are
char!ed as principals, accomplices or accesories, or whether they have been
tried .ointly or separately<
A+B All civil cases in which the value in controversy e/ceeds fifty thousand
pesos, e/clusive of interest and costs, or in which the title or possession of
real estate e/ceedin! in value the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be
ascertained by the oath of a party to the cause or by other competent
evidence, is involved or brou!ht in 5uestion. 9he (upreme Court shall
liewise have e/clusive .urisdiction over all appeals in civil cases, even
thou!h the value in controversy, e/clusive of interests and costs, is fifty
thousand pesos or less, when the evidence involved in said cases is the
same as the evidence submitted in an appealed civil case within the e/clusive
.urisdiction of the (upreme Court as provided herein.
(ection 3=+)1 of the Revised Administrative Code, inserted by section 4 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 4, also reads>
(EC. 3=+)1. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. ? 9he Court of Appeals
shall have e/clusive appellate .urisdiction of all cases, actions, and proceedin!s, not
enumerated in section one hundred and thirty)ei!ht of this Code, properly brou!ht to
it from Courts of 1irst &nstance. 9he decision of the Court of Appeals in such cases
shall be final< 'roided( ho$eer, 9hat the (upreme Court in its discretion may, in
any case involvin! a 5uestion of law, upon petition of the party a!!rieved by the
decision and under rules and conditions that it may prescribe by certiorari that the
said case be certified to it for review and determination, as if the case had been
brou!ht before it on appeal.
&t is inferred from a readin! of sections 34C and 3=+)f that the Court of Appeals has
e/clusive appellate .urisdiction only in all cases not enumerated in the first of said sections,
brou!ht to it on appeal from Courts of 1irst &nstance. (ection 3=+)1 does not enumerate the
cases appealable e/clusively to the Court of Appeals has not enumerate the case
appealable e/clusively to the Court of Appeals, but bearin! in mind the other le!al
provisions relative to cases which may be appealed from Courts of 1irst &nstance, it will be
seen that cases, whether civil or criminal, appealable to the Court of Appeals are limited as
to ind, amount and nature. 9he Court of Appeals has no power of supervision, unlie the
(upreme Court and the Courts of 1irst &nstance. 8nder Commonwealth Act Nos. 4 and ,+-,
the decisions of the Court of Appeals are final only with respect to disputed and ad.udicated
facts< all 5uestions of law are appealable to the (upreme Court. *enerally, in the special
remedies by mandamus, prohibition, in.unction and certiorari and in habeas
corpus proceedin!s, the 5uestions raised by the parties are le!al in character. &n the li!ht of
these le!al provisions, it is evident that the National Assembly, in conferrin! ori!inal
.urisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to tae co!ni"ance of petitions for mandamus ,
prohibition, in.unction, certiorari and habeas corpus , did so with the limitation that it should
be e/ercised in aid of its appellate .urisdiction. &t is !roundless to assume that the National
Assembly meant to confer this .urisdiction without any limitation if, ultimately, the decisions
to be rendered by the Court of Appeals may a!ain be appealed to the (upreme Court
because involvin!, in many cases, 5uestions of law.
&n the case of Mujer s. Court of First !nstance of "aguna( supra, invoed as a
precedent upon which the 5uestioned resolutions are based, is cited as authority the case
of )*att s. Allen A+= Cal., 4+4, 4+7B, and the case of +*ler s. )oughton A,+ Cal., ,2B, cited
with approval in the first, wherein the (upreme Court of the (tate of California, interpretin!
section =, 9itle #&, of the Constitution of the (tate, held that it had .urisdiction to pass upon
petitions for mandamus, prohibitions, in.unction, certiorari and habeas corpus. 9he
constitutional provision relied upon by the (upreme Court of California is couched in the
followin! lan!ua!e>
9he court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the
complete e/ercise of its appellate .urisdiction.
Comparin! this constitutional provision with section 3=+)* of the Revised
Administrative Code, inserted by the amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 4, it
will be seen that both provisions differ substantially in their wordin!s, inasmuch as the first
does not contain the phrase @in aid of its appellate .urisdiction@ which is found in the record.
9he lan!ua!e of both provisions not bein! identical, the rulin! of the (upreme Court of
California in the case of )*att s. Allen and +*ler . )oughton does not constitute and
cannot be invoed as a precedent to bulwar the conclusion reached in the Mu.er case as
well as in the Resolutions complained of.
(ection ,, article #&&, of the Constitution of the (tate of Eouisian, provides@
( ,. )abeas Corpus ? Power to issue writ ? (upervisory powers of appellate
courts. ? 9he (upreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and each of the .ud!es thereof
sub.ect to review by the court of which he is a member, and each district .ud!e
throu!hout the (tate includin! .ud!es of the Civil and Criminal $istrict Courts in the
Parish of 0rleans, may issue writs of habeas corpus, in behalf of any person in
actual custody in cases within their respective .urisdictions< and may also in aid of
their respective .urisdictions, ori!inal, appellate, or supervisory, issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, ,uo $arranto, and all other needful writs, orders
and process, and where any of said writs are refused, the appellate courts shall
indicate the reasons therefor.
Main &ssue> %urisdiction of the Courts
&t will be noted that the closin! portion of the constitutional provision is closely similar
to section 3=+)* of our law in providin! @and may also in aid of their respective .urisdictions,
ori!inal, appellate, or supervisory, issue writs of mandamus, . . . .@ &nterpretin! this
constitutional provision in connection with the ori!inal .urisdictions of the Court of Appeals of
Eouisiana to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, ,uo $arranto and habeas
corpus, the (upreme Court of said (tate, in the cases of -iccobono s. .earne* A33= (o.,
767B, resolved the 5uestion ne!atively, on the !round that the ori!inal .urisdiction of said
Court of Appeal to issue the said writs is confined to cases in which it is e/ercised in aid of
its appellate .urisdiction. &n said case the (upreme Court of Eouisiana said>
1rom the fore!oin! provisions of the Constitution it appears that the Court of Appeal
for the Parish of 0rleans has appellate .urisdiction only, with the e/ception of the ri!ht to
issue the writ of habeas corpus, and the ri!ht to issue in aid of its .urisdiction, which is
appellate only, save as here stated, writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and other
needful orders and process. 9herefore, as the Court of Appeal for the Parish of 0rleans has
appellate .urisdiction only, save as above stated, the 5uestion is resolved into whether the
rule that issued was in aid of the appellate .urisdiction of that court, for the limited ori!inal
.urisdiction which it possesses is not here involved.
@&n our opinion, the rule was not in aid of the appellate .urisdiction of that court. 9he
fact that true recorder refused to re!ister the .ud!ment could not affect in any manner the
.urisdiction of that court, which was appellate only, over the case in which the .ud!ment was
rendered. 9he ri!ht, if it e/isted, to have the .ud!ment re!istered in the mort!a!e office, is a
ri!ht distinct from the appeal, and not in separately connected with it. &t is one which should
have been enforced independently of the appeal by proceedin!s be!un in a court
possessin! ori!inal .urisdiction, in this instance the civil district court for the parish of
0rleans.
@9he present case is unlie the cases of $annenmann G Charlton vs. Charlton A334
Ea., ,72< 42 (o., -2+B< Cluseau vs. :a!ner A3,2 Ea., 47+< +, (o., +=7B< and $aly vs. Broo
A344 Ea., 7+,< 24 (o., 43CB, cited by plaintiff, and relied on by the Court of Appeal in
overrulin! the plea to the .urisdiction. &n the $annenmann G Charlton case a moneyed
.ud!ment was recovered in the trial court, and recorded in the mort!a!e records, while a
suspensive appeal was pendin! in this Court from the .ud!ment rendered. &n each of the
remainin! cases cited, moneyed .ud!ments were obtained in the trial court, and recorded in
the mort!a!e records prior to the tain! of a suspensive appeal. &n each of these cases the
appellant proceeded by rule in this court to force the appellee and the recorded in the
mort!a!es to cancel the inscriptions of the .ud!ment. 9his court in each of those cases,
held or considered that the re!istry of the .ud!ment was a partial e/ecution of them, in
violation of the ri!ht of suspensive appeal, and maintained .urisdiction in order to preserve
intact the suspensive appeal in each case, and to prevent any interference wit it. 9he fact in
the present case are entirely different. ;ere there was no partial e/ecution of the .ud!ment,
which was rendered for the first time on appeal, and no interference with the appeal. ;ere
the issue simply is whether the Court of Appeal has .urisdiction, in a proceedin!
commenced before it, to force the recorder of mort!a!es to re!ister in the mort!a!e records
a .ud!ment rendered by it while the appeal in the case is still pendin!. 9o this we answer
no, and do so because the proceedin! is not in aid of the appellate .urisdiction of the court.
1or these reasons, the .ud!ment under review is annulled and set aside, the
e/ception to the .urisdiction is sustained, and the rule issued by the Court of Appeal
is dismissed.
9he Court of Appeal of Eouisiana followed the same interpretation in the cases
of /all s. +angipahoa School 0oard A33- (o., 473B< State e1 rel. +ru1illo s. Gilbert A3,C
(o., ,6=< and State e1 rel. Griffin s. MorganA346 (o., C2CB.
&n the (tate of &ndiana, section C64, Chapter C7 of the Eaws of 3-3+, section 3,==,
BurnsH 3-,2, confers ori!inal .urisdiction on the (upreme Court and on the Court of Appeals
on the (tate to issue writs of mandamus and prohibition in aid of their appellate .urisdiction
and functions in the followin! lan!ua!e>
:rits of mandate and prohibition may issue in aid of the appellate Courts of
this (tate in aid of the appellate Courts of this (tate in aid of the appellate powers
and functions of said courts respectively.
9he (upreme Court of the (tate of &ndiana, interpretin! its ori!inal .urisdiction to issue
the aforesaid writs in section C64, said the followin! in the case of State e1. rel. )anrahan
s. Chambers A3C3 N. E., ,C,.B@
&n the case of .esinger s. Co1 A3=3 N.E., ,,+B, the (upreme Court of &ndiana,
interpretin! the same law, said>
9he petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in the (upreme Court on
(eptember ,2, 3-,4, which was ,+- days after the decision is alle!ed to have been
made and the .ud!ment to have been rendered in the election contest, and it does
not alle!e that a motion for a new trial had been ruled on which postponed the
runnin! of the time allowed A3C6B days for tain! an appeal, nor does it aver that an
appeal already had been perfected, ion aid of which this writ is ased.
And the (upreme Court has .urisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus only
when necessary for the e/ercise of its powers as an appellate tribunal, and has no
authority to re5uire a bill of e/ceptions to be certified or the filin! of a motion for a
new trial to be noted, unless such acts are to be done ion aid of an appeal which the
law authori"es to be taen. A(ection 3,,=, BurnsH (upp., 3-,3, Acts 3-3+, c. C7, p.
,67< Collins vs. Eaybold, 3C, &nd., 3,2, 3,-< 36= N.E. -73.B
&n the followin! cases, the 1ederal Court of Appeals of &ndiana adhered to the
interpretation laid down by the (upreme Court of the same (tate in the cited cases>
&n the State e1. rel. Green s. Jeffries A3=- N.E., followin!>
A 5uestion havin! been raised as to the .urisdiction of this court over the
sub.ect)matter, that 5uestion will be considered first. 9his court has .urisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus only in aid of its appellate powers and functions. A(ection
3,,=, BurnsH 3-,3 IActs 3-3+, p. ,67, c. C7J< (tate e/ rel. vs. Co/, 3-4 &nd., +3-< 3=3
N.E., ,,+.B &f the relatri/ were in a position to appeal from the action of the #i!o
circuit court, should her appeal be to the (upreme Court or to this courtK &f to this
court, we have .urisdiction to entertain her petition filed herein. &f that appeal should
be to the (upreme Court, we have no .urisdiction to act upon her petition for want of
.urisdiction. &f it were an appeal instead of an ori!inal action, and, if we had no
.urisdiction, it would be our duty to transfer the appeal to the (upreme Court.
&n the case of Fran2el s. /oodrough A7 1ed. I,dJ, 7-2, 7-7B, the same 1ederal Court
said>
9his character of action Aan ori!inal writB is somewhat unusual in Courts of
Appeals and it is proper that this court e/amine its .urisdiction to entertain it. 9he
purpose of the petition is to compel the determination of a criminal action a!ainst
petitioner which, he avers, the trial court will not hear althou!h it is its duty to do
so. +his jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is purel* and the* hae no original
jurisdiction e1cept such as is necessar* to aid( protect or enforce their appellate
jurisdiction. A:hitney vs. $ic, ,6, 8.(., 34,< ,2 (. Ct., +C=< +6 Eaw. ed., -24<
8nited (tates vs. Meyer, ,4+ 8.(., ++< 4+ (. Ct., 32< +- Eaw. ed., 3,-.B
9he petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals has no ori!inal .urisdiction to tae
co!ni"ance of thecertiorari proceedin!s instituted by the respondents #illaroman and
Cuevas because the decision to be rendered in the criminal case a!ainst the latter, if
appealed, would have to be passed upon by the (upreme Court because of the death
penalty which has to be imposed in view of the alle!ations of the information and the
evidence presented. &n opposition the respondents contend that the appeal which may be
interposed should not be the basis in the determination of the ori!inal .urisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to entertain the petition for certiorari, because if no appeal is taen from
the decision to be rendered, there would be no way of determinin! if the Court of Appeals
has ori!inal .urisdiction to act upon the certiorari proceedin!s. 1ollowin! the rulin! in the
case of Re Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. A27 E.9.A., 723, 72C, 72-B, cited in the memorandum of
counsel for the respondents, we hold that the basis of the ori!inal .urisdiction of the Court of
Appeals should not be the appeal which may be interposed in the criminal case a!ainst the
respondents #illaroman and Cuevas, but the ri!ht to appeal. 0therwise stated, the ori!inal
.urisdiction of the Court of Appeals to try and decide the petition for certiorari instituted by
#illaroman and Cuevas should be determined by the e/istin! ri!ht of appeal from the
decision to be rendered in the criminal case and not only by the contin!ency of whether or
not such appeal will be taen.
Para!raph A=B of section 34C of the Administrative Code, as amended by section , of
Commonwealth Act No. ,+-, reads>
A=B All criminal cases involvin! offenses for which the penalty imposed is death
or lite imprisonment, and those involvin! other offenses which, althou!h not so
punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by
the accused on the same occasion, as that !ivin! rise to the more serious offense,
re!ardless of whether the accused are char!ed as principals, accomplices, or
accessories, or whether they have been tried .ointly or separately.
&n accordance with this provision, appeals from decisions in criminal cases imposin!
the penalties of death or reclusion perpetua and those taen from decisions in which, while
lesser penalties have been imposed, the facts constitutin! the less !rave offenses,
however, arose out of the same occurrence as that !ivin! rise to the more serious offense,
correspond to the (upreme Court and appellate .urisdiction shall be e/ercised by the latter.
:here criminal case has not yet been decided, the bases in determinin! what court has
ori!inal .urisdiction over a petition for certiorari founded upon 5uestions arisin! from said
criminal case, should be the penalty fi/ed by law for the offense char!ed in the information.
Applyin! this criterion to the case at bar, it follows that the Court of Appeals has no ori!inal
.urisdiction to pass upon the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents #illaroman and
Cuevas, not to issue the au/iliary writ of preliminary in.unction issued by it, because in both
cases the .urisdiction assumed by it was not in aid of its appellate .urisdiction, which it does
not have for the followin! reasons> 1irst, because under para!raph A=B of section 34C of the
Administrative Code, as amended, the appeal to be taen from any .ud!ment of conviction
which may be rendered in the criminal case would, in any avert, correspond to the (upreme
Court< and, secondly, because no decision havin! rendered in the criminal case, the penalty
imposable under the alle!ations of the information is the capital penalty, in which case the
appellate .urisdiction would liewise be e/ercised by the (upreme Court.
9he respondent #illaroman and Cuevas ased in their answer that this court pass
upon the le!ality of the order issued by the petitioner .ud!e in the aforesaid criminal case,
cancellin! the bonds put up by said respondents and orderin! their re)arrest. :e hold that it
is not in order to pass upon said 5uestion in this petition for prohibition not bein! necessarily
included therein. 1or all the appears, the 5uestion was one of the !rounds of the petition
for certiorari filed by the said respondents, a petition which has to be dismissed because it
was filed before an incompetent court.
9he writ prayed for by the petitioners is !ranted< it is held that the Court of Appeals
has no ori!inal .urisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari filed before it by the
respondents #illaroman and Cuevas, not to issue the writ of preliminary in.unction which it
issued< the resolutions of the Court of Appeals holdin! that it has power and .urisdiction to
tae co!ni"ance of the said petition for certiorari, as set aside< and the writ of preliminary
in.unction issued in this made permanent, with costs to the respondents Pedro #illaroman
and $ie!o Cuevas. (o ordered.
Aance3a( C.J.( Villa4-eal( 5iaz( "aurel and Concepcion( JJ.( concur.