SULPICIO LINES VS.

NLRC

Petitioner Sulpicio Lines, owner of Cotabato princess vessel dismissed PR Jaime Cagatan, a messman of the said
vessel for allegedly being absent without for six months. Cagatan filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the NLRC
thru the NCR Arbitration Branch. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner
contends that it should be filed with Cebu City where the office was located. Labor Arbiter Amansec denied the Motion
to dismiss and ruled that since the complainant is a ship steward traveling on board the ship along the Manila-
Enstancia-Iloilo-Zamboanga0Cotabato vice versa route, Manila can be said to be part of territorial workplace.

NLRC upheld the LAs decision because it is consistent with the principle that the State shall afford full protection to
labor and NLRC is not bound by strict technical rules of procedure. Hence the petition via special civil action for
certiorari, NLRC-GOADLOEJ

Petioner contends that a ship or vessel as workplace is an extension of its homeport or principal place of business,
and that being part of the territory of the homeport, (such) vessel is governed to a large extent by the laws and is
under the jurisdiction of the homeport. Thus, action should be filed in Cebu.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on venue should be applied strictly in labor cases

HELD: NO.

the question of venue essentially relates to the trial and touches more upon the convenience of the parties, rather than
upon the substance and merits of the case. Our permissive rules underlying provisions on venue are intended to
assure convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. It is of paramount
consideration is that the State shall afford full protection to labor.

Its virulent insistence on holding the proceedings in the NLRCs regional arbitration branch in Cebu City is obviously a
ploy to inconvenience the private respondent, a mere steward who resides in Metro Manila, who would obviously not
be able to afford the frequent trips to Cebu City in order to follow up his case.

Section 1. Venue - (a) All cases in which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the
Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner.
This provision is obviously permissive, for the said section uses the word may, allowing a different venue when the
interests of substantial justice demand a different one. In any case, as stated earlier, the Constitutional protection
accorded to labor is a paramount and compelling factor, provided the venue chosen is not altogether oppressive to the
employer.

Moreover, Section 1, Rule IV of the 1990 NLRC Rules additionally provides that, for purposes of venue, workplace
shall be understood as the place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of action
arose. Since the private respondents regular place of assignment is the vessel MV Cotabato Princess which plies the
Manila-Estancia-Iloilo-Zamboanga-Cotabato route, Manila is deemed part of of complainants territorial workplace.

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NATIONAL UNION BANK OF EMPLOYEERS VS LAZARO


In 1977 The Commercial Bank and Trust Company (CBTC) entered into a CBA with CBTC Union representing the
rank and file employees. The agreement was effective until June 30, 1980 with an automatic renewal clause until the
parties execute a new one. On May 20, 1980, the union, together with NUBE submitted some proposals to the bank
for the renogatiation of a new CBA. The following day however, the bank suspended the renegotiation. It entered into
a merger with the BPI which assumed all the assets and liabilities of CBTC.
The union filed an action before the CFI of Manila for a complaint of SP and claim for damages. It alleged that BPI
induced CBTC to violate the existing CBA in the process of re-negotiation.

PR (CBTC and BPI) moved for the dismissal OTG of lack of jurisdiction of the Court. The court dismissed the case for
LOJ because the complaint partook of an unfair labor practice notwithstanding the incidental claim for damages,
jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether it is regular court or labor tribunal which has jurisdiction

HELD.

NLRC has jurisdiction.


The claim made by union in this case partakes of an unfair labor practice falling under Art. 248 of the Labor Code.

Since it involves collective bargaining whether or not it involved an accompanying violation of the Civil Code it
may rightly be categorized as an unfair labor practice. The civil implications thereof do not defeat its nature as a
fundamental labor offense.

The damages (allegedly) suffered by the petitioners only form part of the civil component of the injury arising from the
unfair labor practice. Under Article 247 of the Code, "the civil aspects of all cases involving unfair labor practices,
which may include claims for damages and other affirmative relief, shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.

Petitioners claimed injury as a consequence of tort committed by PR under Art 1314 of the Civil Code does not
necessarily give the courts jurisdiction to try the damage suit. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by the nature of
the action.

The fact that the BPI is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement, for which it "cannot be sued for unfair labor
practice at the time of the action," cannot bestow on the respondent court the
jurisdiction it does not have.

it is not filing of an unfair labor case in the Industrial Court that divests the court of first instance jurisdiction
over actions properly belonging to the former. It is the existence of a controversy that properly falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Court and to which the civil action is linked or connected that removes
said civil case from the competence of the regular courts.

For the court of first instance to lose authority to pass upon a case, therefore, it is enough that unfair labor
practice case is in fact involved in or attached to the action, such fact of course being established by sufficient
proof

to hold that the alleged tortious act now attributed to the Bank of the Philippine Islands may be the
subject of a separate suit is to sanction split jurisdiction long recognized to be an offense against the orderly
administration of justice.



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KAWACHI VS QUERO

PR Quero works as a clerk in AJ Raymundo Pawnshop owned by petitioners Kawachi. He filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-execution of contract, violation of the minimum wage law and non-payment of OT pay against
petitioners before the NLRC. He alleged that he was not paid his OT pay and that he was scolded by the petitioners in
public about the way she treated the customers of the pawnshop, and was thereafter terminated without due process.

PR Quero also filed an action for damages against the Kawachis before the MeTC of QC. The petitioners moved for
the dismissal of the complaint OTG of LOJ or splitting cause of action. MeTC and RTC upheld their jurisdiction over
the case by holding that the action for damages was based on the tortious acts committed by her employers and did
not seek any relief under the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not regular courts has jurisdiction over a claim for damages arising out of the same cause of
action (ULP) filed with the NLRC

HELD:

The NLRC has jurisdiction. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter
EOJ over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter
has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code.

As a rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee
relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of our labor courts. In the absence of such nexus, it is the regular
courts that have jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the allegations in private respondents complaint for damages show that her injury was the
offshoot of petitioners immediate harsh reaction as her administrative superiors to the supposedly sloppy manner
by which she had discharged her duties.

Where the damages claimed for were based on tort, malicious prosecution, or breach of contract, as when
the claimant seeks to recover a debt from a former employee or seeks liquidated damages in the enforcement of a
prior employment contract, the jurisdiction of regular courts was upheld. The scenario that obtains in this case is
obviously different. The allegations in private respondents complaint unmistakably relate to the manner of her
alleged illegal dismissal. Her claims for damages arose from her illegal dismissal.

For a single cause of action, the dismissed employee cannot be allowed to sue in two forums: one, before the labor
arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages or for separation pay, upon the theory that the dismissal was
illegal; and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that the
manner of dismissal was unduly injurious or tortious.

In the instant case, the NLRC has jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and damages
arising therefrom. She cannot be allowed to file a separate or independent civil action for damages where the
alleged injury has a reasonable connection to her termination from employment. Consequently, the action for
damages filed before the MeTC must be dismissed.


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