Case Digest: The Holy Seevs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949 01December 1994

FACTS:
This petition arose from acontroversy over a parcel of landconsisting of 6,000 square meterslocated in the Municipality
of Paranaque. Said lot wascontiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to RamonLicup. In view of the refusal of
thesquatters to vacate the lots sold, adispute arose as to who of theparties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing
the land of squatters. Complicating therelations of the parties was the saleby petitioner of the lot of concernto Tropicana.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immunefrom suit insofar as its businessrelations regarding selling a lot to aprivate entity
RULING: As expressed in Section 2 of ArticleII of the 1987 Constitution, we have
adopt ed t he gener al l y ac c ept ed p r i n c i p l e s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w . Even without this affirmation,
such principl es of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the l and as a conditi on and
c ons equenc e of our admi ss i on i n
t h e s o c i e t y o f n a t i o n s . I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , i f p e t i t i o n e r h a s
b o u g h t a n d s o l d l a n d s i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e o f r e a l e s t a t e
b u s i n e s s , s u r e l y t h e s a i d transacti on can be categori zed as
anact j ur e ges t i oni s . However , p e t i t i o n e r h a s d e n i e d t h a t t h e a c q u i s i t i o n a n d
s u b s e q u e n t di s pos al of t he l ot wer e made f or profit but claimed that i t acquired
s a i d p r o p e r t y f o r t h e s i t e o f i t s mission or the Apostolic Nunciature inthe
Philippines. The Holy See is immune from suitf o r t h e a c t o f s e l l i n g t h e l o t o f c o n c e r n i s n o
n - p r o p r i e t a r y i n nat ur e. The l ot was ac qui r ed
bypet i t i oner as a donat i on f r om t heA r c h d i o c e s e o f M a n i l a . T h e d o n a t i o n w a s
m a d e n o t f o r c ommer c i al pur pos e, but f or t heu s e o f p e t i t i o n e r t o c o n s t r u c t t h
e r e o n t h e o f f i c i a l p l a c e o f residence of the
Papal Nuncio. Thedec i s i on t o t r ansf er t he pr oper t ya n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t d i s p o s a l thereof
are l ikewise cl othed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.It merely wanted to
dispose of the same because t he squatters l ivi ngthereon made it almost impossible
f o r p e t i t i o n e r t o u s e i t f o r t h e purpose of the donation.

R e p u b l i c v . P u r i s i ma
F a c t s :
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that
time, the leading case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service
where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against
any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown,
had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
I s s u e :
WON the respondents decision is valid
R u l i n g :
No.
R a t i o n a l e :
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the
present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent.""The doctrine of non-suability
recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of
the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right
asagainst the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all,
even if such aprinciple does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government
enabling it to engage in businesspursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the
analytical school of thought alone that calls for itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause
private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of theirmoney claims by pursuing the statutory
remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence WashingtonInsurance
decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated
inpractice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the
vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for
private claimants may still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of
interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy
the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no bindingforce on the government


VETERANS MANPOWER VSCOURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 91359

FACTS:
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA 5487(Private Security
Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfaircompetition and combinations of
restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO(Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions theprovision on requiring all private security agencies or
company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within the region. On May 12,
1986, a Memorandum of Agreement wasexecuted by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for 8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00
outside of MetroManila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged
MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As
aresult, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil
caseagainst the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security andInvestigation
Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case isagainst the State which
had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the Statewithout its
consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts inbad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PCChief and PC-SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their officialduties, without malice, gross
negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in theirprivate capacities. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that theMemorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not
constitute an implied consent by the State tobe sued.The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, notfrom a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court
did not acquired jurisdiction over thepublic respondents.Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed
from is affirmed in toto.



DOH vs PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH INC. Case Digest


THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH et al. v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.
518 SCRA 240 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

Defense of state immunity does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts
that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

FACTS: Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for additional
guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with
petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Respondent Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a
request for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic Penicillin
G Benzathine.

Petitioner DOH issued an Invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine.
Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding Pharmawealths request for inclusion of additional items in its list
of accredited products, the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest bid
thereof. . In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract
was awarded to Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS).

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the
trial court nullify the award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct petitioners
DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth as the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and
that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff company and adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez
liable, jointly and severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss praying for the
dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The trial court, however, denied the motion to
dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied DOHs petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against the public officers acting in their official capacity will prosper

HELD: The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his official
or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or
financial liability against the government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against
petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an unincorporated
agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are preliminary injunction and
mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party
or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action
which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection with their
alleged act of illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be
awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth
of their powers given by law is permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds
the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability
personally.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, Petitioner, vs.SPOUSES DAVID
*
ELISEA RAMOS, Respondents

POINT: The States immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is anagency of the State engaged in an
enterprise that is far from being the States exclusive
Prerogative.
NOTE (Difference of Govermental v. Proprietary)-

A governmental function includes services that only the government does, such asrestaurant inspection, animal control,
health and safety permits and licenses, sanitation,vital statistics, and related functions.-

A proprietary function is one that a private entity can perform, and is not uniquely forthe benefit of the general public. The
discretionary function defense applies todiscretionary governmental functions, but not for proprietary (or ministerial)
functions.

FACT:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their landregistered in the Baguio
City was being used as part of the runway and running shoulderof the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner
Air Transportation Office (ATO).

The respondents (Spouses Ramos) agreed after negotiations to convey the affectedportion by deed of sale to the
ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00.

However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

The respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials inthe RTC

In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense theissuance of Proclamation No.
1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certainparcels of land that included the r
espondents affected portion for use of the Loakan
Airport.

They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States
consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC denied the ATOs motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense.

ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs orders.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailedorders were not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC rendered its decision on the merits, ORDERING the defendant AirTransportation Office to pay the
plaintiffs DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS

CA AFFIRMED

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issue
: The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the
States consent.

Ruling
: The petition for review has no merit. The Court denies the petition for review oncertiorari, and affirms the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals.
Ratio:

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunityor non-suability of the
State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987Constitution, viz:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, cando no wrong.

Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.

Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely
obstructed and public safety endangered because of the numberof suits that the State has to defend against.

According to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit:

[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for asagainst the inconvenience that
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far.



CIR V PASCOR REALTYG.R 128315 June 29, 1999

Facts:
The CIR authorized certain BIR officers
toexamine the books of accounts andother accounting records of Pascor Realty andDevelopment Corp. (PRDC) for
1986, 1987 and1988. The examination resulted inrecommendation for the issuance of an assessmentof
P7,498,434.65 and P3,015,236.35 for 1986 and1987, respectively.On March 1, 1995, Commissioner filed a
criminalcomplaint for tax evasion against PRDC, itspresident and treasurer before the DOJ. Privaterespondents
filed immediately an urgent requestfor reconsideration on reinvestigation disputing thetax assessment and tax
liability.On March 23, 1995, private respondents received asubpoena from the DOJ in connection with thecriminal
complaint. In a letter dated, May 17, 1995, the Commissioner denied private respondents request for
reconsideration (reinvestigation on theground that no formal assessment has been issuedwhich the latter elevated
to the CTA on a petition for review. The Commissioners motion to dismiss on the ground of the CTAs lack of
jurisdiction In as much as no formal assessment was issuedagainst private respondent was denied by CTA
andordered the Commissioner to file an answer but didnot instead filed a petition with the CA alleginggrave abuse
of discretion and lack of jurisdiction onthe part of CTA for considering the affidavit/reportof the revenue
officers and the endorsement of said report as assessment which may be appealedto he CTA. The CA sustained the
CTA decision anddismissed the petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the criminal complaintfor tax evasion can be construed as an assessment.2. Whether or not an
assessment is necessarybefore criminal charges for tax evasion may beinstituted.
Held:
The filing of the criminal complaint with theDOJ cannot be construed as a formal assessment.Neither the Tax
Code nor the revenue regulationsgoverning the protest assessments provide aspecific definition or form of an
assessment.An assessment must be sent to and received by thetaxpayer, and must demand payment of the
taxesdescribed therein within a specific period. The
revenue officers affidavit merely contained acomputation of respondents
tax liability. It did notstate a demand or period for payment. It wasaddressed to the Secretary of Justice not to
thetaxpayer. They joint affidavit was meant to supportthe criminal complaint for tax evasion; it was notmeant to
be a notice of tax due and a demand toprivate respondents for the payment thereof. Thefact that the complaint
was sent to the DOJ, andnot to private respondent, shows thatcommissioner intended to file a criminal
complaintfor tax evasion, not to issue an assessment.An assessment is not necessary before criminalcharges can
be filed. A criminal charge need notonly be supported by a prima facie showing of failure to file a required return.
The CIR had, insuch tax evasion cases, discretion on whether toissue an assessment, or to file a criminalcase
against the taxpayer, or to do both.
MARCOS II V CA GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997
Following the death of former President Marcos in1989, a Special Tax Audit Team was created onJune 27, 1990 to
conduct investigations andexaminations of tax liabilities of the late president,his family, associates and cronies.
The investigationdisclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a writtennotice of death of the decedent estate tax
returnand income tax returns for the years 1982 to 1986,all in violation of the Tax Code. Criminal chargeswere
field against Mrs. Marcos for violation of Secs. 82, 83 and 84, NIRC


G.R. Nos. 166309-10 November 25, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONEROF CUSTOMS,
Petitioner, vs.

UNIMEXMICRO-ELECTRONICSGmBH,
Respondent.
Facts:
The March 9, 2007 Decision on cases CA-G.R. SP Nos.75359 and 75366 became final and executory on August 2, 2007
and entry of judgment of the March 9, 2007 decision was made on November 7, 2007.Upon motion of respondent Unimex
Micro-Electronics GmBH, an elucidationof the March 9, 2007 decision was made in a resolution dated December 10,2007.
The December 10, 2007 resolution also included a directive to theparties that no further pleadings would be entertained.
Despite this, however,respondent filed another motion for further clarification on the manner ofdetermining the reckoning
point of the imposition of the 6% legal interest whilepetitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for clarification of
theresolution dated December 10, 2007 (to which motion respondent filed acomment/opposition). In view of the resolution
dated December 10, 2007which ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained, the Court
expunged respondents motion for further clarification from the records and noted without action petitioners motion for
clarification in resolutions dated January 30, 2008 and April 16, 2008.However, respondent filed yet another urgent motion
for the immediate resolution of all [alleged] pending issues for clarification.
ISSUE:
WON the urgent motion for the immediate resolution of all pending issues for clarification BE
DENIED
RULING: YES.
The expunction of respondents motion for further clarification and the notation without action of petitioners motion for
clarification meant that the said motions were denied. Moreover, the Court has sufficiently and clearly explained the basis
of its action in this case in its March 9, 2007 decision and December 10, 2007
resolution. A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has
already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to
the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all of the orders of this Court, it must be strictly
observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented by filing motions
Ill-disguised as requests for clarification



REPUBLIC vs. LIM

GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005
FACTS:

In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City forthe purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and
Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, onMay 1940, the
CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as justcompensation. The
Denzons appealled to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment wasmade on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for thetwo lots, but
it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressedwillingness to pay
the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20,
1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of
possession with damages against the Republicand AFP officers in possession of the property.On November 1961, Titles
of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with theannotation "subject to the priority of the
National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value".On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are
theowners and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of P

4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
orderedto execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registeredowners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that theyare not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only
demand the payment of their fair market value.Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim
,

herein respondent, assecurity for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed
in 1976. The lottitle was issued in his name.On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for
quieting of title
with the RTC against the petitioners herein.On 2001,

the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lotwith all the
rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated
September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ...This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "
just"...Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot
932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

.