REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)

Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters away
the Laguna de Bay.Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its
alleged title over the lot.

The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On the other hand,
the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement
and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA
filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not be alienated and disposed
since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so,
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the property?

Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land. However,
respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of limitations with regard to
public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of
the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such
possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the
petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

ANGELITA BUENAVENTURA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GR. NO. 166865, March 2, 2007)

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may apply for registration of land:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. Because of Section 14 (2) of the said decree, those who are in possession of
alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30
years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945.
Spouses Amado and Irene Buenaventura acquired a parcel of land, located at San Dionisio Paraaque, from the
Heirs of Lazaro de Leon even before the World War II. However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that a Deed of Sale was
executed in favor of the spouses. This land was transferred, subsequently, to their heirs, including petitioners Angelita and
Preciosa Buenaventura (Buenaventuras).
A new tax declaration was issued in their name.
On 05 June 2000, the Buenaventura filed with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque an
Application for the Registration of Title of the land. When the case was set for hearing no formal opposition had been filed.
The Buenaventuras, then, proceeded to present evidence and witnesses to prove that they have acquired vested rights
over the land thru open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years
completely unmolested by any adverse claim as required by law and that the land is alienable and disposable.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the application, ordering the registration of the parcel of land in favor of the
Buenaventuras.
Respondent Republic appealed the trial court's order with the Court of Appeals, who ruled in favor of the
Republic, declaring that the land was public. Moreover, the appellate court while recognizing that the Buenaventuras and
their predecessors'-in-interest had acquired possession of the land since 1948, it ruled that they failed to show possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject property is an alienable and disposable land of public domain, hence susceptible
of application for registration under the Property Registration Decree
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the decision of the trial court confirming petitioners' title
over the subject property for not being allegedly supported by substantial evidence as required by law

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.
The subject property is an alienable and disposable land of public domain since 3 J anuary 1968 as certified by
the DENR.
Section 14 of the Property Registration enumerates the persons who may apply for registration of land: (1) those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws. Under the first classification, three requisites must be complied with for the filing of an
application for registration of title, to wit: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of public
domain; (b) that the applicants themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945. The second classification relates to prescription.
In this case the Court disagreed with the Republic's claim that the land in questioned is not alienable and
disposable, invoking Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and the Regalian Doctrine, which states that all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing within private ownership are presumed to belong
the State. Such presumption, however, is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicant's presentation of
incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of application for registration is alienable and disposable.
Petitioners presented a certification issued by the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources showing that the
land is an alienable and disposable land of public domain since 3 January 1968. Such certification is sufficient to establish
the true nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys the presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence. Therefore, the alienable and disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has been
clearly established by the evidence of the Buenaventuras, by 3 January 1968, at the latest.
As to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, the Court agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that their possession of the subject property started since 12
June 1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the questioned parcel of land was acquired by spouses
Buenaventura only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous owners.
Moreover, petitioners' possession of the subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the
same became alienable and disposable. In Republic v. Herbieto (G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCR\ 183, 201-
202), the Court ruled that "any period of possession prior to the date when the subject property was classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto."
Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 J une 1945,
application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
The fact that they failed to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14
(1) will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to have title to the subject property registered in their names.


The Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCR\ 442, 451-452) declared
that the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. 1073, both providing 12 June
1945 or earlier as the reckoning period of possession necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands
of the public domain, did not preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of public domain,
possession over which commenced only after 12 J une 1945, considering Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the possession of alienable lands of the
public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by
virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Article 1137 of the Code states
that "ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof
for thirty years without need of title or of good faith."
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such property now falls within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14 (2), over which title by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of
Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to
register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners' possession over
the subject property can be reckoned on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subject property
became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section 14
(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, 32
years to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject property was finally declared alienable and disposable
by the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration of title over the subject property on 5 June 2000.
Petitioners' possession of the subject property since 1968 has been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner. By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land
had been effectively converted into private property over which petitioners have acquired ownership through prescription
to which they are entitled to have title through registration proceedings.