45

45
ROGER POSADAS, ET. AL. VS.
OMBUDSMAN, ET. AL.,
G.R. NO. 131492, 29 SEPTEMBER 2000
By: Casaa, Sh!"#y L$%&!' D.
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the supremacy of the constitutional rights of
Filipino citizens over attempts by law enforcers to harass the lawyers and officials of the
University of the Philippines (UP) whose only fault was to defend and protect the basic right of
two of their college students (who were suspects in a fraternityrelated death of a UP student) to
be free from any form of search and seizure without valid warrants of arrest issued by the courts
for the purpose! The "ational #ureau of $nvestigation ("#$) retaliated against the UP lawyers
and officials by filing a criminal complaint against them for alleged violation of P!%! "o! &'()
(SSUES:
(&) *hether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the "#$ could be validly
made without a warrant!
(() *hether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P!%! "o!
&'()!
+ELD:
(&) The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed! "either
were the students fugitives from +ustice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement! The
,uestion was whether -ule &&. Sec! / paragraph (b) of the -ules of Court applies because a
crime had +ust been committed and the "#$ agents had personal 0nowledge of facts indicating
that the two students "arag and Taparan were probably guilty!
The "#$ contended that a peace officer may1 without a warrant1 arrest a person 2when an
offense has in fact +ust been committed and he has personal 0nowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it2 and that a law enforcer 3who had 0nowledge of facts
gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation4 may arrest a suspect without a
warrant of arrest!
45
45
,UDGE ADORAC(ON G. ANGELES
VS. +ON. MANUEL B. GA(TE, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 1-.2/-, 2. NOVEMBER 2009
By: Casaa, Sh!"#y L$%&!' D.
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
The Supreme Court however noted that in contrast1 the "#$ agents in the case at bar
tried to arrest "arag and Taparan 3four days after the commission of the crime4! They had 3no
personal 0nowledge of any fact4 which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty
of the crime! *hat they had were the 3supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses1 which is insufficient to +ustify the arrest without a warrant by the "#$4!
(() The Court stressed that to allow the arrest which the "#$ agents intended to ma0e
without warrant 3would in effect allow them to supplant the courts4! The determination of the
e5istence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the
+udge to ma0e! The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal
offenders only if the latter are 3committing or have +ust committed a crime4! 6therwise1 3we
cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect
our civil liberties4!
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
6n &. 7pril &)))1 petitioner filed a complaint for 8idnapping under 7rticle (9& of the
-evised Penal Code ($nducing a :inor to 7bandon ;is ;ome) against :ichael <istan1 the
Tolentino spouses1 the "azareno spouses and =uevarra spouses1 all maternal relatives of :aria
:ercedes <istan!
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off
the hoo0 from the 0idnapping charge1 :ichael <istan had deliberately1 maliciously1 selfishly and
insensitively caused undue physical1 emotional and psychological sufferings to :aria :ercedes
<istan1 all of which were greatly pre+udicial to her wellbeing and development!
Thus1 on & %ecember &)))1 petitioner filed a complaint against :ichael <istan before the
6ffice of the Provincial Prosecutor in :alolos1 #ulacan for five counts of <iolation of Section &>
(a)1 7rticle <$ of -7 9?&>1 otherwise 0nown as the Child 7buse 7ct1 and for four counts of
<iolation of Sec! & (e) of P% &'()! She li0ewise filed a complaint for @ibel against :aria Cristina
<istan1 aunt of :ichael and :aria :ercedes!
;owever1 Provincial Prosecutor 7mando C! <icente denied the recommendation of the
$nvestigating Prosecutor that :ichael <istan be indicted for <iolation -7 9?&>! ;e also
approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for <iolation of P% &'()! 6n&'
:arch (>>. petitioner contended in the Court of 7ppeals that the %epartment of Austice (%6A)
erred in dismissing the complaint against respondent :ichael <istan for violations of Presidential
%ecree "o! &'() (P% "o! &'())! The C7 ruled1 however1 that the facts of the case as portrayed
by petitioner do not warrant the filing of a separate $nformation for violation of Section &(e) of P%
"o! &'()!
(SSUE:
45
45
SOLLER VS. SAND(GANBA0AN
G.R. N$. 1442-1)-2. 09 MA0 2001
By: A12!a, A""a A1yssa
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*hether the Court of 7ppeals erred in upholding the dismissal by the %6A secretary of
the complaint of violation of Section &(e) of P!%! &'() (6bstruction of Austice) against private
respondent :ichael <istan!
+ELD:
"6! There is no +urisprudence that would support the stance ta0en by petitioner!
"otwithstanding petitionerBs vehement ob+ection in the manner the C7 had disposed of the said
issue1 this Court agrees with the same! The C7 ruled that the position ta0en by petitioner was
contrary to the spirit of the law on 2obstruction of +ustice14 in the wiseC
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that
unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice."
Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of
obstruction of justice if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the former offense! charge is
unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life " and that the accused should be
charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." #hat if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge
$"obstruction of justice"% is again unserved during its life or returned unserved& 'o follow the line
of thinking of petitioner( another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed
against the accused. )nd if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served(
again( a third charge of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the
accused. 'hus( petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of
justice" is counting and!or countless( unless and until the accused is either arrested or
voluntarily surrendered. #e( therefore( find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the
intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x
7s correctly observed by the C71 the facts of the case1 as portrayed by petitioner1 do not
warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section &(e) of P% "o! &'()! This
Court agrees with the C7 that based on the evidence presented by petitioner1 the failure on the
part of the arresting officerDs to arrest the person of the accused ma0es the latter a fugitive from
+ustice and is not e,uivalent to a commission of another offense of obstruction of +ustice!
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
This was a case for certiorari1 prohibition and mandamus raising the issue of the
propriety of the assumption of +urisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases entitled
3People of the Philippines vs! Prudente %! Soller1 Preciosa :! Soller1 -odolfo Salcedo1 Aosefina
:orada1 :ario :atining and -ommel @uarca4 wherein petitioners are charged with 6bstruction
of 7pprehension and Prosecution of Criminal 6ffenders as defined and penalized under P!%!
"o! &'()!
$t appears that in the evening of :arch &E1 &))91 Aerry :acabael a municipal guard1 was
shot and 0illed along the national highway at #ansud1 6riental :indoro while driving a
motorcycle together with petitioner SollerFs son1 <incent :! Soller! ;is body was brought to a
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner %r! Prudente Soller1 the :unicipal :ayor1 and his
wife %r! Preciosa Soller1 who is the :unicipal ;ealth 6fficer! 7n autopsy was conducted on the
same night on the cadaver by petitioner %r! Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner
-odolfo Salcedo1 Sanitary $nspector1 and petitioner Aosefina :orada1 -ural ;ealth :idwife!
7 complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Aerry :acabael with
the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the
fatal shootout of Aerry :acabael byC
(a) altering his wound G
(b) concealing his brainG
(c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he
had only oneG and
(d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blac0ening around his wound
when in truth there was!

Petitioners Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Aerry :acabael1 and
claimed1 among others that Aerry :acabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting1 that petitioner Prudente
Soller1 who is also a doctor1 was merely re,uested by his wife Preciosa Soller1 who was the
:unicipal ;ealth 6fficer1 to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing
which re,uired male strength1 and that :rs! :acabaelFs consent was obtained before the
autopsy!
#ut two $nformation were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the petitioners for
criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Aerry :acabael with
intent to impair its veracity1 authenticity1 and availability as evidence in the investigation of
criminal case for murder against the accused <incent Soller1 the son of herein respondents!
Petitioners filed a :otion to Huash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had
no +urisdiction over the offenses charged! The Sandiganbayan denied petitionersF :otion to
Huash on the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one
of the accused public officials1 and if the :ayor is indeed properly charged together with that
official1 then the Sandiganbayan has +urisdiction over the entire case and over all the co
accused!
+ELD:
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious! The court held that the rule is that in
order to ascertain whether a court has +urisdiction or not1 the provisions of the law should be
in,uired into! Furthermore1 the +urisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law
or it will not be held to e5ist! $t cannot be presumed or implied! For this purpose in criminal
cases1 the +urisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of
the action!
The Court foundC
The action here was instituted with the filing of the $nformations on :ay (/1 &)))
charging the petitioners with the offense of 6bstruction of 7pprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal 6ffenders as defined and penalized under Section &1 Paragraph b of P!%! &'()!

5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
$n cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
=rade 3(94 or higher1 as prescribed in the said -epublic 7ct ?9/'1 or military and P"P officers
mentioned above1 e5clusive original +urisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court1 metropolitan trial court1 municipal trial court1 and municipal circuit trial court1 as the
case may be1 pursuant to their +urisdictions as provided by #atas Pambansa #lg! &()1 amended!
The Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention here is whether the offenses
charged may be considered as committed 3in relation to their office4 as this phrase is employed
in Section E of P% &')(!
7s early as *ontilla vs. +ilario1

the Supreme Court interpreted the re,uirement that an
offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that 3the offense cannot e5ist without the
office4 or 3that the office must be a constituent element of the crime!

People vs.
*ontejo
I/&J
enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office
of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance1 though improper or irregular of
his official functions!
$n this case1 the $nformations sub+ect of Criminal Cases "os! (//(& and (//(( ,uoted
earlier1 fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their
offices! "either are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relationDconnection
between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the
offenders1 i!e! that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders
was committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller1 whose office as :ayor is
included in the enumeration in Section E (a) of P!%! &?>? as amended! 7lthough the petitioners
were described as being 3all public officers1 then being the :unicipal :ayor1 :unicipal ;ealth
6fficer1 SP6 $$1 P6 $1 Sanitary $nspector and :idwife41 there was no allegation that the offense of
altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity1
authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder
(Criminal Case "o! (//(&) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report and
police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the
offender (Criminal Case "o! (//(() was done in the performance of official function! $ndeed the
offenses defined in P!%! &')( may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a
private citizen1 and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense! :oreover1 the
$nformation in Criminal Case "o! (//(( states that the fabrication of information in the police
and autopsy report 3would indicate that the victim was shot by <incent Soller1 the son of herein
45
45
PEOPLE V. MED(NA AND CARLOS
G.R. NO. 12/1./, 10 ,UL0 1993
B0: A12!a, A""a A1yssa
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller4! Thus there is a categorical indication that
the petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would
have committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of
:unicipal :ayor or :unicipal ;ealth 6fficer!
Conse,uently1 for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused :ayor Soller1 the offenses
charged in the sub+ect criminal cases fall within the e5clusive original function of the -egional
Trial Court1 not the Sandiganbayan! So the petition was granted and the orders were set aside
for being void for lac0 of +urisdiction!

45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
$n this case1 Aaime #! :edina and accused <irgilio Carlos were apprehended by
members of the "arcotics $ntelligence and Suppression Unit ("$SU) under the Philippine
"ational Police "arcotics Command (P"P"7-C6:) for selling :ethamphetamine
hydrochloride without authority of law! The two were brought before 7ssistant City Prosecutor
@illian ;! -amiro for in,uest! Carlos denied any involvement in the transaction by claiming that
he merely accompanied appellant to the place of the sale1 while :edina stated that he was only
supposed to buy the regulated drug at the agreed price of P(/>1>>>!>> when the policemen
arrived and arrested them! 7ppellant added that1 at his re,uest1 Carlos merely drove the car
used by them!
They were however charged in an $nformation where they were alleged to have
conspired and confederated together and mutually helped each other1 not having been
authorized by law to sell1 dispense1 deliver1 transport or distribute any regulated drug1 did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale .>?!9& grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride1 which is a regulated drug!
The court below rendered +udgment holding that appellant conspired with accused Carlos
in the illegal sale of .>?!9& grams of shabu! 7s the trial court appreciated the presence of craft1
fraud or disguise as aggravating circumstances against herein appellant1 he was sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of death! $n the same decision1 an alias warrant of arrest was issued
by the court for the arrest of accused <irgilio Carlos!
:edina sought the reversal of the ruling1 saying that the lower court erred in finding a
conspiracy between him and <irgilio Carlos!
+ELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court! $t held that in the case at bar1
appellant was not merely present in a passive manner at the scene of the crime as he contends!
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
;e definitely too0 an active participation in the sale of the shabu! ;e was positively identified as
the driver of the car carrying accused Carlos and the regulated drugs! *hen the duo arrived at
the agreed place1 appellant went down to chec0 if the buyer brought the money while Carlos
waited inside the car! Then1 upon learning that the poseurbuyer had the money1 appellant
signaled to his companion indicating such fact!
"o other conclusion could follow from appellantBs actions e5cept that he had a prior
understanding and community of interest with Carlos! ;is preceding in,uiry about the money
and the succeeding signal to communicate its availability reveal a standing agreement between
appellant and his coaccused under which it was the role of appellant to verify such fact from the
supposed buyer before Carlos would hand over the shabu! *ithout such participation of
appellant1 the sale could not have gone through as Carlos could have withdrawn from the deal
had he not received that signal from appellant! $t is undeniable1 therefore1 that appellant and his
coaccused acted in unison and1 moreover1 that appellant 0new the true purpose of Carlos in
going to the restaurant!
#ut the lower court considered the ruling sentencing the appellant to death due to its
appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of craft1 fraud or disguise! The Supreme Court
found that a comprehensive search in the records of this case do not reveal these
circumstancesC
The reason for this can be found in the very rationale adopted by the lower court in appreciating
the said circumstances against appellant in the dispositive portion of its decision! The court
stated that craft1 fraud or disguise led to the escape and nonarrest of <irgilio Carlos1 hence it
apparently imputes the same to appellant!
*hile we share the trial courtBs disgust over the still une5plained escape of accused
Carlos1 we cannot approve its attribution to herein appellant as the author of such craft1 fraud or
disguise or even that the same should aggravate his liability in the present case! For1 even
assuming e5 gratia argumenti that appellant had a part in the release of Carlos1 it is obvious that
the aggravating circumstances involved do not pertain to the offense charged in the information
and are completely unrelated to the crime of illegal sale of shabu!
'he court a ,uo should have borne in mind that the charge against appellant is for illegal
sale of shabu and not for obstructing the apprehension and prosecution of a criminal offender or(
for that matter( perjury. In fact( if such circumstances in themselves constitute punishable
45
45
PEOPLE V. EL(AS LOVED(ORO
G.R. NO. 11223., 29 NOVEMBER 199.
By: A12!a, A""a A1yssa
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
crimes( or are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor( they
cannot be considered as aggravating circumstances.
To be considered as an aggravating circumstance and thereby resultantly increase the
criminal liability of an offender1 the same must accompany and be an integral part or concomitant
of the commission of the crime specified in the informationG and although it is not necessarily an
element thereof1 it must not be factually and legally discrete therefrom! #esides1 it is highly
problematical whether the Spanish legal concept of astucia1 fraude and disfraz1 adopted in our
-evised Penal Code1 can find application at all to the dismissal of the case against Carlos!
$n view of the foregoing1 the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in considering
against herein appellant the supposed aggravating circumstances of craft1 fraud or disguise! The
violation of Section &/ sub+ect of the amended indictment was conse,uently committed without
any aggravating circumstance!
The Supreme Court here verified that acts punishable under Presidential %ecree "o!
&'() cannot be construed or constituted as mere aggravating circumstances1 if indeed they
were present in the case! They are penalized under the law as liable under P% &'() and they
must be made liable as such!
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
7n offduty policeman was wal0ing when a man suddenly wal0ed beside him fired a gun
at the policemanBs right ear and 0illed the policeman! The man who shot @ucilo had three other
companions with him1 one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground!
7fter ta0ing the latterBs gun1 the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled! 7 witness
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Klias @ovedioro y Castro! Klias @ovedioro y
Castro was charged and convicted in the -egional Trial Court for the crime of :urder under
7rticle (E' of the -evised Penal Code!
7ppellant claims that the lower court erred in holding him liable for murder and not
rebellion! ;e claims that 7rmenta1 a police informer1 identified him as a member of the "ew
PeopleBs 7rmy! 7dditionally1 he contends that because the 0illing of @ucilo was 2a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends12 should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion
under 7rts! &.E and &./ of the -evised Penal Code! Finally1 claiming that he did not fire the fatal
shot but merely acted as loo0out in the li,uidation of @ucilo1 he avers that he should have been
charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph ( of
7rticle &./ of the -evised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty
of prision mayor by the lower court!
The Solicitor =eneral in turn avers that the crime committed by appellant may be
considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent
for the 0illing of the policeman was for 2political and subversive ends!2
+ELD:
The Supreme Court held that the gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public
uprising against the government! #y its very nature1 rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action1 which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined
bounds! 6ne aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its
pursuance are1 by law1 absorbed in the crime itself because they ac,uire a political character!
This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. +ernande-! thusC
$n short1 political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order1 as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose! The decisive factor is the
intent or motive! $f a crime usually regarded as common1 li0e homicide1 is perpetrated for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to the =overnment the territory of the Philippine $slands
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
or any part thereof1 then it becomes stripped of its 2common2 comple5ion1 inasmuch as1 being
part and parcel of the crime of rebellion1 the former ac,uires the political character of the latter!
%ivested of its common comple5ion therefore1 any ordinary act1 however grave1 assumes
a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion1 which carries a lighter penalty than
the crime of murder! $n deciding if the crime committed is rebellion1 not murder1 it becomes
imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political
end! The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated!
$n such cases1 the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense1 motive1
being a state of mind which the accused1 better than any individual1 0nows!
Clearly1 political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crimealleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penaltycould benefit from the
lawBs relatively benign attitude towards political crimes! The Court said that the ruling in .nrile v.
)min
IE/J
was instructive in this regard! The Supreme Court observed and ruledC
5 5 5 This Court held1 against the prosecutionBs contention1 that rebellion and violation of
P!%! &'() could be tried separately &E (on the principle that rebellion is based on the -evised
Penal Code while P!%! &'() is a special law)1 that the act for which the senator was being
charged1 though punishable under a special law1 was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being
motivated by1 and related to the acts for which he was charged in Knrile vs! Salazar (=!-! "os!
)(&?. and )(&?E) a case decided on Aune /1 &))>! -uling in favor of Senator Knrile and holding
that the prosecution for violation of P!%! "o! &'() cannot prosper because a separate
prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided1 the Court saidC
The attendant circumstances in the instant case1 however constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to
offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense!

I$Jintent or motive is a decisive factor! $f Senator Ponce Knrile is not charged with rebellion and
he harbored or concealed Colonel ;onasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate1 the motive for the act is completely different! #ut if the act is committed with political
or social motives1 that is in furtherance of rebellion1 then it should be deemed to form part of the
crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately!
45
45
MAR(ETTA 4. (LUSOR(O
VS. S0LV(A 4. (LUSOR(O, ET. AL.
G.R. N$. 1/1-.9, 13 DECEMBER 200/
By: Ta", A5!6a1
LLB ()1
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
$t follows1 therefore1 that if no political motive is established and proved1 the accused
should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion! $n cases of rebellion1 motive
relates to the act1 and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of
rebellion would not1 by and of itself1 suffice! The burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused! Political motive must be alleged in the
information! $t must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence!
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
*ACTS:
Petitioner1 :arietta 8! $llusorio filed a complaint for robbery1 ,ualified trespass to dwelling1
and violation of Presidential %ecree (P!%!) "o! &'() against private respondents Sylvia 8!
$lusorio (Sylvia)1 Cristina 7! $lusorio (Cristina)1 Aovito Castro (Aovito)1 and five (/) Aohn %oes!
:arietta alleged that she together with . $llusorios1 owns and controls the ma+ority of the shares
of stoc0 of @a0eridge Corporation (@a0eridge)1 the registered owner of Penthouse Unit E.C
(Penthouse Unit E.C) of the Pacific Plaza Condominium
She was given the full authority to ta0e care of the said Penthouse unit! 6n "ovember
&)))1 herein respondents forcibly entered the penthouse and caused the loss of +ewelry (this is
the sub+ect of the robbery case)! Aovito1 chief security of the Pacific Plaza permitted the forcible
entry of five un0nown persons and he failed to cooperate with the police and even concealed
information pertinent to the incident!
6n their counteraffidavit1 they alleged that there could not be robbery and ,ualified
trespass to dwelling because1 as officers of @a0eridge1 they had the right to enter Penthouse
Unit E.C!
$n his separate Counter7ffidavit1 Aovito e5plained that the incident cited by :arietta in
her Complaint7ffidavit where she claimed that Penthouse Unit E.C was forced open by
brea0ing the door and loc0s was really an act of maintenance of the property upon written
re,uest made by Sylvia as one of the legitimate unit owners per the records of Pacific Plaza!
$n a -esolution dated February &1 (>>>1 Prosecutor $$ 6ffice of the City Prosecutor of
:a0ati City dismissed the charges against private respondents for lac0 of probable cause!
:ariettaFs motion for reconsideration of the -esolution was denied in an 6rder dated :ay
(1 (>>>!
(SSUE:
*hether or not the charge against Aovito for violation of P!%! "o! &'() should prosper!
+ELD:
45
45
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
The evidence adduced does not support afinding of probable cause for the offenses
defined in the provisions cited above! :arietta failed to prove1 by competent evidence1 thatC (&)
Penthouse Unit E.C was the dwelling place of KrlindaG (() she has authority over the said unitG
(.) Sylvia and Cristina had no authority to enter the unit and conduct acts of maintenance
thereonG and (E) Sylvia and Cristina were armed when they effected entrance! #ased on these
circumstances1 the charges of robbery and ,ualified trespass to dwelling must inevitably fail!
Perforce1 the charge against Aovito for violation of P!%! "o! &'() should also be dismissed!