1

G.R. No. 95697 August 5, 1991

PEREGRINO ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, the Hon. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BASILAN, Branch 2, the Hon. EDUARDO F. CARTAGENA
and the ESTATE OF WEE YEK SUI alias GREGORIO WEE, represented by DANIEL WEE,
respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
The main issue in this case is whether or not respondent Court of Appeals was correct in
appreciating that the petition for review therein filed by herein petitioner involved a
complete change of theory. If so, respondent court properly applied Our ruling in Tible v.
Aquino
1
that a new theory could not be raised for the first time on appeal for being unfair
to the adverse party.
The factual antecedents are not disputed: Wee Yek Sui also known as Gregorio Wee was the
registered owner of a commercial lot situated at Roxas Avenue, Isabela, Basilan, with an
area of 287 square meters as described under TCT No. T-906. Petitioner Peregrino Rosales
was the occupant of a certain portion of this property by virtue of a lease agreement on a
month-to-month basis dated April 13, 1962 with rent at the rate of P50.00 per month.
Pursuant to this lease agreement, Peregrino Rosales constructed a commercial building
wherein he established his photography studio, known as Rosales Studio. On April 3, 1966,
Wee died leaving bend as heirs his son, Daniel Wee and widow, Kuaya Ong. His estate
through his son on several occasions requested petitioner to vacate the lot because the
heirs wished to put up their own building. Petitioner refused despite the termination of the
term of the lease, Hence, the estate of Wee, herein private respondent, was constrained to
file an action for ejectment against petitioner.
2

The present petition is the upshot of what should have been an ordinary ejectment case.
However, the procedural background of this case is a virtual comedy fraught with
procedural errors committed by all parties involved, i.e., the complainant, the defendant
and the lower courts. This case presents the classic example of a simple factual background
wittingly or unwittingly made more complicated by ill-prepared counsel and judges who
know no better, that it behooves this Court to make a discussion on the same with the end
in view of obviating the repetition of these lapses and for the guidance of the Bench and
Bar.
3

In the complaint for unlawful detainer
4
private respondent alleged that petitioner
occupied the property by virtue of a lease agreement. However, the substance of the lease
agreement was not set forth in the complaint and no copy of the lease agreement was
attached as an exhibit, a violation of Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, the rule on
actionable documents.
5
Private respondent also alleged that petitioner stopped paying
rent as early as 1979 and prayed for the recovery of the outstanding rental of P51,660.00
computed at the new rate of P160.00 a month. Additionally, private respondent prayed for
damages for loss of expected income in an amount to be fixed by the court and attorney's
fees equivalent to 30% of the recoverable amount but not less than P10,000.00. In effect,
the sum of at least P61,660.00 was specified as the total amount sought to be recovered by
private respondent.
At this point it should be clear that respondent Municipal Trial Court judge erred when he
did not motu proprio dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the rule on actionable
2

documents,
6
as he is empowered to do under the Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 3A
of which provides:
SEC. 3. Duty of court upon filing of complaint. Upon the filing of the
complaint, the court, from a consideration of the allegations thereof:
A. may dismiss the case outright due to lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
failure to state a cause of action, or for any other valid ground for the dismissal
of a civil action; or
B. if a dismissal is not ordered, shall make a determination whether the case
falls under summary procedure. In the affirmative case, the summons must
state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The trial court judge further compounded the mistake when he made a finding that the
Rule on Summary Procedure was applicable in gross disregard of Section 1(A)(1) thereof,
7

notwithstanding that the damages and unpaid rentals sought exceed P20,000.00, and
required petitioner to file an answer and not a motion to dismiss.
8

Municipal Trial Court judges should well take note of Section 3A of the foregoing rule
which, unlike the rules of ordinary procedure, equips them with the relatively unfettered
discretion to immediately dismiss a complaint for any of the grounds mentioned therein
without prior need of an opposing party calling attention thereto.
9
It should also be
emphasized that this section confers on the judge the discretion to dismiss complaints on
the lower courts concerned dealing with cases properly covered both by summary
procedure and by regular procedure; in the sequence of events, the ascertainment of
whether or not a case falls under summary procedure is made after an assessment has
been done on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the complaint.
For, indeed, the solution to the problem of overcrowded court dockets need not be limited
to the expeditious disposition of pending cases. An approach should also be conducted
from the other end, at the inception or filing of cases. With proper exercise of the discretion
conferred by this powerful tool, not order will the number of cases be trimmed in the short
term, but the long run effect will be an improvement in the quality of questions and issues
presented for judicial inquiry and adjudication. In other words, municipal trial courts, and
subsequently the higher courts by way of the hierarchy of appeal and review, will be asked
to resolve each case on the merits of the legal issues presented and no longer on procedural
technicalities. Legal pettifogging would thus be greatly obviated.
Going back to the present case, instead of filing an answer as the appropriate pleading
under the rule on summary procedure, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss
10
the complaint where he alleged as grounds, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of
action and failure to comply with the rule on actionable documents. Anent the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argued that, under the complaint, inasmuch as the demand to
vacate was made in 1979, also the year petitioner allegedly stopped paying rent, the
unlawful detainer action was filed beyond the mandatory one-year period. Private
respondent's remedy should have been an accion publiciana. With regard to lack of cause of
action, petitioner contended that his continued stay in the premises was protected by -P.D.
No. 20, the rent control law then in force.
On the other hand, because petitioner did not file the appropriate responsive pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, private respondent moved to declare defendant in
default itself, like petitioner's motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading under Section 15 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3

The judgment rendered by respondent Municipal Trial Court recognized and resolved the
motion to dismiss filed by petitoner but addressed only one of the grounds raised therein
by petitioner, that of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent Municipal Trial Court ruled that it had
jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint also alleged that the latest demand was made barely
over a month before the filing of the complaint in 30 January 1990; a copy of said demand
letter dated 27 December 1988 was subsequently admitted in evidence and labeled as
Exhibit "C". The trial court found in favor of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
vacate the premises and awarded all the damages prayed for by private respondent. The
judgment, however, did not deal with the other grounds raised by petitioner.
11

Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding it being
labeled as a motion to dismiss, said pleading should have been considered as his answer
pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch as the grounds
involved therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this instance the Court
agrees. Indeed, the rule on summary procedure was conceptualized to facilitate the
immediate resolution of cases such as the present one. Well-settled is the rule that forcible
entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving disturbance of social
order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided
12
and should not be allowed to
override substantial justice.
13
With this premise in mind and having insisted, however
erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, it certainly would have been more prudent
for the lower court to have treated the motion to dismiss as the answer of petitioner and
examined the case on its merits. As will be shown shortly, the long drawn out proceedings
that took place would have been avoided.
The procedural infirmities did not stop there. Petitioner further revealed his ignorance of
the Rules by filing a motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court,
14
another pleading prohibited under the rule on summary procedure. Action
on the same being unfavorable, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Before said
forum, petitioner again committed a blunder: he failed to comply with the order of the
court requiring the parties to submit memoranda and thus was not able to sufficiently
argue his appeal.
The Regional Trial Court contributed its fair share to the succession of mistakes when it
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court with
the finding that no error was committed by the lower court in applying the rule on
summary procedure.
15
The Regional Trial Court further ruled that because petitioner
failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the lease agreement, the
same is deemed admitted. Apparently, the Regional Trial Court did not consider that said
agreement was not properly pleaded in the complaint as an actionable document.
Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals
assigning the following as errors committed by the lower courts:
1. The respondent estate does not have any legal personality and its alleged
representative has no authority to represent it.
2. The respondents Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court do not
have original or appellate jurisdiction over the case that gave rise to this
recourse.
3. The respondent did not have any ground under P.D. No. 20 (as amended by
B.P. Blg. 25) to eject the petitioner, thereby lacking in cause of action.
4. The complaint failed to set forth or attach to itself (sic) [al copy of the
supposed lease contract as an actionable document under Section 7, Rule 8 of
4

the Rules of Court, although one of the grounds alleged for ejectment was the
claimed expiration of its terms and compliance with this rule was the only
chance to determine the matter of expiration of the term since there was no
trial or formal presentation of evidence before any of the respondent courts.
5. The respondent Municipal Trial Court fared to comply with its duty under
Section 3 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
6. The demolition of petitioner's building which was ordered right in the
decision or judgment (Annex "E") is null and void for lack of hearing, lack of
evidence on petitioner's failure to remove the same, and lack of special order
under Rule 39, Section 14, Rules of Court.
16

In its decision, respondent Court of Appeals
17
did not discuss any of the foregoing errors
assigned by petitioner and denied due course to the petition solely on the ground that, as
claimed by private respondent, the issues raised therein involved a complete change of
theory which could not be made for the first time on appeal, citing Tible v. Aquino.
18

Petitioner, therefore, felt constrained to bring this present petition for review mainly on
the ground that respondent Court of Appeals erred in its assessment that petitioner
changed his theory oil appeal, In this regard.
The Court finds that the present petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the errors assigned by petitioner before respondent court reveals that its
assessment is true only in so far the first assigned error, that is, the issue dealing with the
legal personality of the estate of Wee and the authority of his son to represent it. The
other's concern the questions of jurisdiction, of cause of action and the violation of Rule 8,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court, all of which were timely raised before the lower courts.
Further, unlike Tible which involves a complete change of theory, no such change of theory
obtains in this case. Petitioner merely added another ground to his list of assigned errors
committed by the lower courts to buttress his contention that the complaint should have
been dismissed. At best, respondent court may have chosen not to deal with said issue on
the well settled rule that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
19
The real to entertain the petition as to the other validly raised
grounds, however, cannot be justified on the basis of Tible alone whose application is
clearly misplaced. Respondent Court of Appeals should, therefore, have gone into the
merits of the petition for review filed by petitioner.
Having passed upon the first three assigned errors raised by petitioner with respondent
court, We now take a look at his defense of lack of cause of action. He argues that his
continued stay on the leased premises is protected by Presidential Decree No. 20 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 inasmuch as the reason relied upon by private
respondent, i.e., construction of a bigger commercial building for higher rental income, is
not one of those enumerated by the law as grounds for ejectment. Unfortunately for
petitioner, he is mistaken. It is clear from Presidential Decree No. 20
20
that the same
pertains only to dwelling units or to land on which dwelling units are located, in other
words, residential buildings. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, entitled an Act
Regulating Rentals of dwelling Units or of Land on Which Another's Dwelling is Located and
for Other Purposes, defines the term residential unit as referring to
an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used
for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units
thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel room, hotels,
hotel rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent,
5

but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other business
purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it
principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail store,
home industry or business, the capitalization thereof shall not exceed five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00): Provided, further, That in the operation of the
store, industry or business, the owner thereof shall not require the services
of any person other than the immediate members of his family.
21

In the case of petitioner, it is clear that the building he constructed on the lot of private
respondent is devoted purely to commercial purposes. Petitioner operates Ms photography
business therein. Not once has petitioner claimed to use the Premises also as a place of
residence. The lot itself is located in the commercial district of the municipality. This has
been the consistent finding of the lower courts and the same is supported by the
representations of petitioner since the beginning. His stay on the leased lot owned by
private respondent is unmistakably not countenanced by the rent control laws. To allow
petitioner to continue occupying the land would be to deny private respondent the
effective exercise of property rights over the same.
To settle this matter once and for all, therefore, the Court finds that petitioner should
vacate the land and remove his improvements thereon at his expense. Back rental
outstanding must also be paid by petitioner which shall be computed with legal interest at
the original monthly rate of P50.00 as if the defective complaint brought by private
respondent was not filed at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to vacate
the premises and pay back rental at the monthly rate of P50.00 with legal interest. No other
pronouncement as to costs. Let copies of this decision be finished all judges of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
SO ORDERED.

6

G.R. No. 80739 August 20, 1992
GRACIA R. JOVEN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL A. PATRON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Branch 59, Lucena City, Roberto Paguia & Fernando Lasala, respondents.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for petitioner.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner was the registered owner of three parcels of land which she mortgaged in
favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines. Upon the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage due to her failure to pay her loan, the properties were sold at public auction to
DBP as the biggest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued and annotated on the certificate
of title on November 17, 1982.
After the expiration of the redemption period, no redemption having been made by the
petitioner, DBP sold the subject properties to Roberto Paguia, one of the herein private
respondents, through a deed of sale executed on December 17, 1985. On January 30, 1986,
Paguia took possession of the properties through his representative, Fernando Lasala, the
other private respondent.
Earlier, the petitioner had filed on December 3, 1985, an action before the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City (raffled later to Branch 55) for the annulment of the mortgage and its
foreclosure. Named as defendants were DBP and the private respondents. Later, when her
application for preliminary injunction and restraining order was denied, she lodged with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc complaint against the private
respondents for forcible entry with a prayer for writ of mandatory injunction. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 155.
In a decision dated May 14, 1986, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But on
May 29, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. In a
resolution dated July 11, 1986,
1
the private respondents were ordered to: 1) immediately
restore and deliver possession of the subject properties to the petitioner; 2) render to the
petitioner an accounting of all the fruits and products gathered from said property from the
time they took possession thereof until they vacate the same; and 3) reimburse the
petitioner the total cost of such accounting.
This resolution was reversed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch
59,
2
which held that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case because of
the issue of ownership raised therein and that, assuming such jurisdiction, the decision had
already become final and executory when the resolution dated July 11, 1986, was rendered.
The petitioner elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the
assailed decision in toto.
3

She is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari, contending that the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court had jurisdiction over the ejectment case and that the private
respondents were guilty of forcible entry on the subject premises for occupying the same
without judicial authorization.
The petition has merit:
The respondents argue that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
action for forcible entry on the principal ground that a question of ownership was involved
7

therein. This view does not jibe with the following observations from Chief Justice Moran
based on a consistent line of decisions from this Court:
4

It would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a question of title
merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that he is the owner
of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his title in order to
show the character of his (sic) prior possession, so be may allege ownership
in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the insertion of such
an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility place the cause
beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate's court, provided it otherwise
sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the restoration of
possession as against an intruder who has seized the property within the
period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an action defeat the
jurisdiction of the magistrate's court by setting up title in himself. In this
connection it should be borne in mind that the factor which defeats the
jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the necessity to
adjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of title is
introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by either or
both of the parties is not material
This ruling is embodied in Sec. 33, (2), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which vests municipal
courts with:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer; Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership
should be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
It is true that before the petitioner instituted the action for forcible entry in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Lucban-Sampaloc, the case for annulment of the mortgage and
foreclosure sale, which necessarily involves recovery of ownership, was already being
litigated in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Even so, the municipal court could,
pending final adjudication of that case, exercise its jurisdiction to determine the right of
possession (only) over the subject properties in the ejectment case.
The private respondents also contend that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry because; a) under Section 19 par. (2) of
BP 129, as amended, the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest
therein; and b) under Section 1, par. A (1) of the Rule on Summary Procedure, cases of
forcible entry and detainer involving the question of ownership are expressly excluded
from the summary jurisdiction of the municipal court.
Curiously, however, they also insist that an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129 and
that the petitioner is now estopped from assailing the applicability of that Rule.
There is no question that under Section 1, par. A (1), of the said Rule, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer except where the question of ownership is
involved or where the damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered by the plaintiff
exceed P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of the complaint. *
8

However, it is incorrect to say that the question of ownership was involved in the ejectment
case filed by the petitioner simply because she alleged in her complaint that she was the
original owner of the subject properties. That the petitioner instituted a separate action for
the annulment of the mortgage is not a valid reason either for defeating the summary
remedy of ejectment. On the contrary, it only bolsters the conclusion that the ejectment
case did not involve the question of title as this was the subject of the annulment case
before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. The Rule on Summary Procedure was clearly
applicable because the ejectment case involved only the restoration of possession of the
subject land and not its ownership.
The respondent court also sustained the ruling of the Regional Trial Court that the motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not
stop the running of the reglementary period to appeal because such motion was a
prohibited pleading under Section 15 (c) ** of the Rule on Summary Procedure. Its
conclusion was that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had already lost jurisdiction to issue
the resolution dated July 11, 1986, because the decision sought to be reconsidered had then
become already final and executory.
We do not agree. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court did not err in holding that the motion
for reconsideration was not covered by the prohibition under Section 15 (c). The motion
prohibited by this section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by
the court after trial on the merits of the case.
5
The decision dismissing the petitioner's
ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits. Review
thereof could therefore be sought by the petitioner through her motion for reconsideration
and this motion, which was not pro forma, had the effect of suspending the running of the
period to appeal.
Now, on the issue of possession:
Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides that in case of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, the court *** may issue as a matter of course a writ of possession
in favor of the purchaser even during the redemption period, provided that a proper
motion has been filed, a bond is approved, and no third person is involved.
Section 6 of the Act provides that where an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall be
governed by the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act."
Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and
Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in turn were replaced by Sections 29 to
31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 35 provides that "if no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the
sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and the possession of
property, . . . The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment debtor."
To give effect to his right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the courts and
ask for a writ of possession. He cannot simply take the law into his own hands and enter
the property without judicial authorization.
6
We have consistently held that he need not
bring a separate and independent suit for this purpose.
7
Nevertheless, it is essential that he
ask for and be granted a writ of possession in order that he may be legally installed in the
property he has bought.
9

Section 63 (b) of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, requires
that in case of non-redemption, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale shall file with the
Register of Deeds either a final deed of sale executed by the person authorized by virtue of
the power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage or his sworn statement attesting
to the fact of non-redemption. The Register of Deeds shall thereupon issue a new certificate
in favor of the purchaser after the owner's duplicate certificate shall have been previously
delivered and canceled.
In F. David Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 8 this Court held:
It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of
the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended. No such bond is required after the
redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land
then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon
proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, there is no showing that after the lapse of the redemption period without
the petitioner having redeemed the lands, DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership of the subject properties. Neither has it filed with the Register of deeds a final
deed of sale or a sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-redemption. The
circumstance that the properties are still in the name of the petitioner shows that DBP has
also not yet obtained a new certificate of title in its name. And neither does it appear that
DBP, on the basis of its purchase of the lands at the foreclosure sale, ever secured a writ of
possession to authorize its entry into the said lands.
Not having done any of these, DBP had as yet not acquired any perfected right of
possession that it could transfer to the private respondents. And as the petitioner
continued in actual possession of the subject premises, she could undoubtedly maintain an
action for forcible entry against the private respondents when, not being armed with a
court order or a writ of possession, they simply entered and took possession of the subject
lands.
The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying
this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party
in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In
affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the peace and
criminal disorder which might ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy. Another purpose
is to discourage those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the
property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in the courts to assert their
claims.
9

Under Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, there is forcible entry when one in physical
possession of a land or building is deprived of that possession by another through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully
10

enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession thereof. To
constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision, the
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use
violence against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the
property, and this is all that is necessary.
10

It is noted that the petitioner instituted the action for annulment of mortgage on December
3, 1985, while the deed of sale in favor of the private respondent was executed on
December 17, 1985. Paguia cannot say that when he took possession of the subject land on
January 30, 1986, he was acting in good faith. Neither can be claim that he had no
knowledge of the pendency of that litigation because he was in fact one of the defendants in
that case. In any event, the fact that the titles were still in the name of the petitioner should
have warned him of the need to ascertain the status of the properties before he took
possession of them.
The private respondents also assert that the institution of the ejectment case resulted in
the splitting of a single cause of action into two, one for the recovery of ownership and
possession and the other for recovery of possession de facto.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana,
11
this Court held:
It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause
of action (Rule 2, Sec. 3, Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more
complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the
filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4
Revised Rules of Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer
action has an entirely different subject from that of an action for
reconveyance of title. What is involved in a forcible entry case is merely the
issue of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for
reconveyance, ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an
action for reconveyance of title over the same property does not divest the
city or municipal court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of judgment in the
ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or
possession de facto (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520 [1984]).
While there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the two actions, the issues
involved and the reliefs prayed for are not the same. In the annulment suit, the issue is the
validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale whereas the issue in the
ejectment case is whether, assuming the mortgage and foreclosure sale to be valid, the
private respondents have the right to take possession of the property. In the former case,
the relief prayed for is recovery of ownership of the subject land while in the latter it is
restoration of possession thereof to the petitioner. Hence, the municipal court had
jurisdiction to try the ejectment case while the annulment suit was being litigated in the
regional trial court.
The contention that the petitioner was forum-shopping must also be rejected. As an
injunction cannot be a substitute for the other suits for recovery of possession,
12
such as
an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and accion publiciana, denial of the
injunction did not bar the petitioner from availing herself of the more appropriate remedy,
to wit, the action for forcible entry.
13

11

In sum, the respondent court erred when it affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court declaring that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
ejectment case filed by the petitioner. We find that it had.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Lucban, Sampaloc dated July 11, 1986, in Civil Case No. 155 is REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

12

SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000]
GLORIA LUCAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila,
respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint1[1] dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged
respondent, Judge Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No. 151248
entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment".
Jksm
Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia A.
Fabros issued an Order2[2] dated February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration of the Order3[3] dated January 13, 1997, which dismissed the case for
failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary
Procedure, that a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in
violation of the rule, granted the motion for reconsideration. She added that,
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the
case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure,4[4] the judge ordered the revival of
the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to complainant.
Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in blatant disregard of
the established rules on procedure, and it is an instance where the doctrine of IPSA
LOQUITOR may once again may be applied by the Court to discipline judges.
On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative
complaint. In her Comment5[5] dated September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted
the motion for reconsideration even if the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case.
She explained, however, that it was granted in the interest of justice.











13

In her Comment, respondent stated:
"The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997
dismissing the complaint for ejectment for failure of the plaintiff to appear
for preliminary conference and more importantly her lawyer, Atty. Jose
Suing, who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary conference by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney. Chief
Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of
attorneys fees, Atty. Suing filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 17,
1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a sudden
excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the
Court but to no avail until finally the call came through and she was informed
that the case was dismissed. Over the objection of the defendant that the
Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading which this Presiding
Judge is fully aware of under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Motion for
Reconsideration was nonetheless granted in the interest of justice. The
question is poised. Are the actuations of judges to be governed strictly by the
Rule on Summary Procedure despite their belief in good faith that in special
cases, its observance would result in a miscarriage of justice? This Presiding
Judge does not think so. Judges are supposed to responsible Public Officials
and should be able to perceive and discern circumstances which might lead
to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purpose and essence of the
Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a
straight jacket and it is believed it was never meant to be that. This is the
reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5 (g) of Rule 135 which is
one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
Ignorance of the law, to the mind of the undersigned, is the act of a judge in
taking legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly aware that they are
contrary to established Rules which should be known to the judge. This
Presiding Judge in this particular case was fully aware of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. She fully knew that the Motion for Reconsideration was
a prohibited pleading but she still considered it because to deny it would
result in a miscarriage of justice. It was not a capricious, whimsical and
despotic act when viewed in the light of this circumstance.
With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was
compounded by the failure to issue a writ of execution, it bears stressing that
the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality because the plaintiff
was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day
period, that is, on January 17, 1997. But even if it is argued validly that the
Motion for Reconsideration being a prohibited pleading did not interrupt the
running of the period of appeal, still the said Order did not gain finality as far
as defendant Gloria Lucas is concerned because as the record shows, it was
she who received the Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit." Esm
The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation after the case was docketed as an administrative
matter. On August 25, 1997, OCA in a Memorandum, submitted the following findings:
14

"After a careful perusal of the records of the case, we find that respondent
Judge Fabros abused her discretion in granting the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as she knows that a motion for reconsideration of
judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained that
although there is already a judgment dismissing the case, she granted the
plaintiffs motion for reconsideration in the interest of justice since the
reasons stated in the motion for reconsideration are meritorious.
Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law
and that when the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for
interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could not free her from
liability.
Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other
judicial remedies like appeal."6[6]
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the
amount of P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this
recommendation without factual and legal basis.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.
xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for
reopening of trial;
xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one
rendered on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the
Rules on Summary Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
effective November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the
case."7[7] Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party
to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits
after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the
prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she
guilty of ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration
subject of the present complaint. Esmsc





15

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

16

G.R. No. 105866 July 6, 1993
VICTORIA D. BAYUBAY, represented by her attorney-in-fact, MARIBEL MAMARIL,
petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Fourth Division and BIG MAK BURGER, INC.,
respondents.
Rodolfo P. Orticio for petitioner.
Robles, Ricafrente & Aguirre Law Firm for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The proceeding at bar traces its origin to an action for ejectment filed by petitioner Victoria
D. Bayubay in the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baos, Laguna, on April 11, 1990, on the
ground of expiration of the contract of lease.
Private respondent Big Mak Burger argued in its answer that it had the option to renew the
term of the lease contract "under such conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties"
and set up the defense of estoppel. It also alleged a counterclaim for damages and
reinbursement of expenses allegedly inccured by it on the leased promises.
The Municipal Trial Court issued summons with the notification that the case would be
heard under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
After three pre-trial meetings and the marking of the exhibits, which included the lease
contract and the exchange of letters between the parties, Judge Romulo G. Carteciano
rendered a decision holding that the contract of lease had expired because no extension
had been agreed upon by the parties as required by the agreement.
1

The private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, on the
ground that "the MTC violated Secs. 6 and 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure by
rendering judgment without ordering the parties to submit their respective position papers
and affidavits of their respective witnesses, as a consequence of which, defendant's right to
due process was violated."
2

On December 23, 1991, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
3

However, it was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the remand of the case to
the Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings.
4

The decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us. The petitioner contends that the
respondent court erred in ruling that: (1) the failure of the MTC to give the private
respondent the opportunity to submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses
constituted a denial of due process; (2) the questions raised were not only questions of law
because the answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement of improvements
allegedly made by the lessee on the premises, and damages; and (3) there was still a
necessity for the MTC to issue an order following the close of the pre-trial conference.
In its Comment, the private respondent refutes these contentions and argues that (1) the
petition raises questions of fact as well as law, such as the expenses incurred by the lessor
in the improvement of the leased premises and the damages sustained by it as a result of
the filing of the complaint; (2) it was deprived of the opportunity to submit its position
paper and/or affidavits of witnesses and so denied due process; and (3) there was a need
to remand the case to the MTC so that evidence could be presented to prove the factual
issues through position papers and affidavits.
17

We see nothing wrong with the decision of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the
Municipal Trial Court for further proceedings. The respondent court was merely enforcing
the mandatory provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The record shows that the Municipal Trial Court failed to take into account the following
pertinent provisions of the Rule:
Sec. 6. Preliminary Conference. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed, the case shall be calendared for a preliminary conference.
Among other matters, should the parties fail to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the court must clarify and define the issues of the case, which
must be clearly and distinctly set forth in the order to be issued immediately
after such preliminary conference, together with the other matters taken up
during the same.
Sec. 7. Submission of affidavits. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of witnesses and other evidences on the factual issues defined
therein, together with a brief statement of their petitions setting forth the
law and the facts relied upon by them.
The above provisions require that immediately after the preliminary conference, the
Municipal Trial Court should issue an order clearly and distinctly setting forth the issues of
the case and the other matters taken up during the preliminary conference.
The order is an important part of the summary procedure because it is its receipt by the
parties that begins the ten-day period to submit the affidavits and other evidence
mentioned in Sec. 7.
The minutes of the Municipal Trial Court dated August 22, 1989, contained a notation that
the pre-trial had been "terminated" and that the parties were to submit position papers.
5

However, there was no order to this effect nor was there an indication of when the position
papers were to be submitted for the purpose of discussing the factual questioning raised.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals
We think that the failure of the MTC to give the petitioner the opportunity to
submit its position paper and/or affidavit of witnesses constituted a denial of
due process. True, between August 22, 1989 and December 18, 1989, when
the MTC rendered its decision was a period
of more than three months. But under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
ten-day period for submitting affidavits and position papers did not
commence to run, until receipt by a party of the order of the court
embodying the results of the pre-trial conference. Here, as already stated, the
MTC never issued such an order and so the ten day period never started to
run.
It is not true, as the MTC said, that the only questions raised were questions
of law. The petitioner's answer contained a counterclaim for reimbursement
of improvements allegedly made by it on the premises, as well as claim for
damages for alleged bad faith of private respondent in bringing the case
questions which obviously, required at least the affidavits of witnesses.
The Court of Appeals did not err therefore in calling for the remand of the case to the
Municipal Trial Court. While the municipal judge may be commended for his zeal in
speeding up the resolution of the case, he nevertheless cannot be sustained for his non-
observance of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
18

We conclude with the following reminder:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extra-judicial
proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective law
are contradictory to each other or, as has been often suggested, that
enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the
concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact the policy of the courts is
to give affect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just
and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both
substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute
or a rule of court.
6

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

19

A.M. No. MTJ-93-799 May 18, 1994
RURAL BANK OF MALALAG, INC., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

QUIASON, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated March 11, 1993, the Rural Bank of Malalag Inc., through its
manager, Antonio P. Dulanas, charged Judge Segundino D. Maniwang of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malalag-Sulop, Davao del Sur, with undue delay in the
disposition of six collection cases, namely Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 and 231.
I
Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 were filed on September 10, 1991. Complainant alleged
that no action was taken by respondent with respect to these civil actions except for the
pre-trial conference on March 12, 1992. Respondent admitted that he did not take any
action on the cases but he claimed that two of the cases were not triable under the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure.
Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15, 1991. The defendants were
served with summons on November 27, 1991; hence, the answers were due on December
12, 1991. As no answers were filed as of May 6, 1992, complainant filed a motion for the
resolution of said cases on May 7, 1992.
On June 2, 1992, the defendants filed a motion to admit their answers. On June 10, 1992,
respondent admitted the answers and denied the motion for resolution on the grounds that
the answers raised "factual matters which need to be clarified in a formal hearing."
On June 26, 1992, complainant filed a second motion for resolution of the cases.
In his Order dated July 10, 1992, respondent denied complainant's motion to declare
defendants in default, stating: (a) that the said motion was a prohibited pleading under
Section 15 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) that he could not just disregard
the answers filed by defendants for they raise a meritorious defense; and (c) that there
were factual matters which should be clarified in a formal hearing.
After the preliminary conference on August 20, 1992, respondent issued pre-trial orders
stating, in common, that the following factual issues had yet to be resolved:
1. Whether or not defendants have fully paid their indebtedness to plaintiff.
2. Whether or not defendants signed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Mrs. Dulanas (complainant's representative) to withdraw all the checks due
them as public school teachers (Rollo, p. 25).
As required by respondent, complainant filed its position paper. The defendants, however,
did not file their position paper.
On September 15, 1992, complainant again filed a motion to resolve the cases, arguing that
the defendants had waived their right to present evidence after having failed to submit
their position papers.
In his Order dated October 27, 1992, respondent denied complainant's motion to resolve,
stating that there was a need to conduct a hearing in order to resolve the factual issues.
Furthermore, he claimed that the records pertinent to the said factual issues were in the
hands of the officials of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
necessitating the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He also noted that the hearing "would
20

also give the defendants the opportunity to establish the merits of their defense and
prevent a denial of substantial justice" (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to resolve the civil cases pursuant to Section 6
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure after the defendants therein failed to file their
answers to the complaints, and pursuant to Section 10 thereof, after the defendants failed
to submit their position papers. It also alleged that respondent deviated from the Revised
Rule of Summary Procedure by conducting regular trials, under the guise of "clarificatory
hearings."
In his comment, respondent averred that when Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were
filed on November 15, 1991 in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, where he was the acting
presiding judge, he had other duties as acting judge of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur and as
permanent circuit judge in Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. In May 1991, he was
designated to try a case in the MCTC of Bansalan-Magsaysay. He could only conduct the
hearing of cases in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop once a week, giving preference to criminal
cases involving detained prisoners. Thus, not all the cases in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop
could be heard and tried by him, including the civil cases filed by complainant.
Respondent denied the charge of deviation from the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
in the handling of Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231. According to him, his denial of the
motions to resolve the cases filed by complainant was, in fact, consistent with due process
in order to give the defendants a chance to establish their claim of payment. He argued that
there would have been a failure of justice if he resolved the cases of complainant on the
basis of the complaints and its evidence alone, in disregard of the meritorious defense in
the answers.
He also denied the charge that he held full-blown trials in contravention of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure, asserting that what he conducted were only "clarificatory
hearings" for the purpose of allowing the DECS representatives to bring to court the
payrolls of the defendants. The first "clarificatory hearing" was continued on another date
because the payrolls submitted to the court were voluminous and one of the DECS
representative failed to attend the hearing.
II
We find respondent's explanations unsatisfactory.
Respondent's explanation for his inaction in Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 was that two
of the cases cannot be tried in accordance with the summary procedure because of the
amount involved. He was referring to Civil Case No. 226, which involved the collection of
the amount of P19,890.91 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00 and Civil Case No. 227, which
involved the amount of P19,666.07 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00.
It is true that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not apply where the total
amount of the plaintiff's claim exceeds P10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs. But if
Civil Cases Nos. 226 and 227 cannot be heard summarily, respondent has not explained
why he failed to set these cases for trial in accordance with the regular procedure. From
March 12, 1992, the date of the pre-trial, up to March 22, 1993, the date of the filing of the
administrative complaint, there was no action taken by respondent on these cases. While
these cases were filed on September 10, 1991, respondent set them for pre-trial only on
March 13, 1992.
Respondent has not explained either why Civil Case No. 228, which involved only the
amount of P7,390.95, was not heard under the summary procedure.
21

He has not shown his case load in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, MCTC of Padada-Kiblawan,
and MCTC of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. However, taking into account his multifarious duties,
respondent's culpability is slightly diminished.
As to Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231, respondent has not explained why after the
defendants failed to file their answer, he did not follow Section 6 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, which provides:
Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendants fail to answer the
complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein:
Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable . . . .
He has not explained the justification for allowing the admission of the answers, which
were filed more than five months after their due date.
He has not explained why he did not decide the cases after the defendants failed to submit
the affidavits of their witnesses on the factual issues defined in the orders, together with
their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is very explicit that:
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next
preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses
and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with
their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.
Said Section 9 should be read together with Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, the first paragraph of which provides:
Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers,
or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
While the third paragraph of Section 10 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows
the court, should it find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, to issue "an order
specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other
evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order," it has to
render judgment "within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits
or the expiration of the period for filing the same."
It is clear from said provisions, that a court cannot resort to "clarificatory procedure," when
the parties fail to submit their affidavits and position paper as required by Section 9 of the
Rule. The courts cannot issue subpoena duces tecum in cases triable summarily merely on
the basis of the answers. It is only after evaluating the affidavits and positions papers
submitted by the parties that the court can determine whether he should resort to the
"clarificatory procedure" provided in Section 10 of the Rule. If any of the parties fail to
submit their evidence and position paper within the reglementary period, the court cannot
thereby set the "clarificatory procedure" into motion. Otherwise, a party can derail the
proceedings and defeat the purpose of the summary procedure by not filing the affidavits
of his witnesses and his position paper, thus forcing the court to resort to said procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved the IMPOSE on respondent a FINE of P5,000.00, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
22

SO ORDERED.