Guerrilla Warfare By Ernesto "Che" Guevara

Written in 1961
Guevara, "Socialism and Man in Cuba" Letter to the
editor of the Uruguaan !ee"l maga#ine Marcha, earl
196$
Guevara, "Message to the %ricontinental Congress"&
"'ietnam and the World Struggle to (reedom" )"Create *, +,
man 'ietnams",, -ublished .-ril 196$
Guevara, ".ddress to the United /ations" 11 0ecember
1961
Table of Contents
Clic" on a title to move to that section of the boo"2 %he boo"
consists of three cha-ters, !ith several numbered
subsections in each2 . t!o3-art a--ende4 and e-ilogue
conclude the !or"2 5ecall that ou can search for te4t
strings in a long document li"e this2 %a"e advantage of the
electronic format to research intelligentl2
CHAPTER I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
GUERRILLA WARFARE
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CHAPTER II: THE GUERRILLA BAND
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CHAPTER III: ORGANIZATION OF THE
GUERRILLA FRONT
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APPENDICES
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3. 6-ilogue
4. 6nd of the boo"
CHAPTER I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
GUERRILLA WARFARE
1 ESSENCE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
%he armed victor of the
Cuban -eo-le over the
:atista dictatorshi- !as
not onl the trium-h of
heroism as re-orted b
the ne!s-a-ers of the
!orld> it also forced a
change in the old
dogmas concerning the
conduct of the -o-ular
masses of Latin
.merica2 8t sho!ed
-lainl the ca-acit of
the -eo-le to free
themselves b means of
guerrilla !arfare from a
government that o--resses them2
We consider that the Cuban 5evolution contributed three
fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionar
movements in .merica2 %he are&
)1, =o-ular forces can !in a !ar against the arm2
)*, 8t is not necessar to !ait until all conditions for ma"ing
revolution e4ist> the insurrection can create them2
)+, 8n underdevelo-ed .merica the countrside is the basic
area for armed fighting2
7f these three -ro-ositions the first t!o contradict the
defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or -seudo3
revolutionaries !ho remain inactive and ta"e refuge in the
-rete4t that against a -rofessional arm nothing can be
done, !ho sit do!n to !ait until in some mechanical !a all
necessar ob?ective and sub?ective conditions are given
!ithout !or"ing to accelerate them2 .s these -roblems !ere
formerl a sub?ect of discussion in Cuba, until facts settled
the @uestion, the are -robabl still much discussed in
.merica2 /aturall, it is not to be thought that all conditions
for revolution are going to be created through the im-ulse
given to them b guerrilla activit2 8t must al!as be "e-t in
mind that there is a necessar minimum !ithout !hich the
establishment and consolidation of the first center is not
-racticable2 =eo-le must see clearl the futilit of
maintaining the fight for social goals !ithin the frame!or" of
civil debate2 When the forces of o--ression come to
maintain themselves in -o!er against established la!>
-eace is considered alread bro"en2
8n these conditions -o-ular discontent e4-resses itself in
more active forms2 .n attitude of resistance finall
crstalli#es in an outbrea" of fighting, -rovo"ed initiall b
the conduct of the authorities2 Where a government has
come into -o!er through some form of -o-ular vote,
fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an a--earance of
constitutional legalit, the guerrilla outbrea" cannot be
-romoted, since the -ossibilities of -eaceful struggle have
not et been e4hausted2
%he third -ro-osition is a fundamental of strateg2 8t ought to
be noted b those !ho maintain dogmaticall that the
struggle of the masses is centered in cit movements,
entirel forgetting the immense -artici-ation of the countr
-eo-le in the life of all the underdevelo-ed -arts of .merica2
7f course the struggles of the cit masses of organi#ed
!or"ers should not be underrated> but their real -ossibilities
of engaging in armed struggle must be carefull anal#ed
!here the guarantees !hich customaril adorn our
constitutions are sus-ended or ignored2 8n these conditions
the illegal !or"ersA movements face enormous dangers2
%he must function secretl !ithout arms2 %he situation in
the o-en countr is not so difficult2 %here, in -laces beond
the reach of the re-ressive forces, the armed guerrillas can
su--ort the inhabitants2 We !ill later ma"e a careful
analsis of these three conclusions that stand out in the
Cuban revolutionar e4-erience2 We em-hasi#e them no!
at the beginning of this !or" as our fundamental
contribution2
Guerrilla !arfare, the basis of the struggle of a -eo-le to
redeem itself, has diverse characteristics, different facets,
even though the essential !ill for liberation remains the
same2 8t is obvious 3and !riters on the theme have said it
man times3that !ar res-onds to a certain series of
scientific la!s> !hoever ignores them !ill go do!n to defeat2
Guerrilla !arfare as a -hase of !ar must be ruled b all of
these> but besides, because of its s-ecial as-ects, a series
of corollar la!s must also be recogni#ed in order to carr it
for!ard2 %hough geogra-hical and social conditions in each
countr determine the mode and -articular forms that
guerrilla !arfare !ill ta"e, there are general la!s that hold
for all fighting of this t-e2
7ur tas" at the moment is to find the basic -rinci-les of this
"ind of fighting and the rules to be follo!ed b -eo-les
see"ing liberation> to develo- theor from facts> to
generali#e and give structure to our e4-erience for the -rofit
of others2
Let us first consider the @uestion& !ho are the combatants in
guerrilla !arfareB 7n one side !e have a grou- com-osed
of the o--ressor and his agents, the -rofessional arm, !ell
armed and disci-lined, in man cases receiving foreign hel-
as !ell as the hel- of the bureaucrac in the em-lo of the
o--ressor2 7n the other side are the -eo-le of the nation or
region involved2 8t is im-ortant to em-hasi#e that guerrilla
!arfare is a !ar of the masses, a !ar of the -eo-le2 %he
guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of
the -eo-le2 8t dra!s its great force from the mass of the
-eo-le themselves2 %he guerrilla band is not to be
considered inferior to the arm against !hich it fights sim-l
because it is inferior in fire-o!er2 Guerrilla !arfare is used
b the side !hich is su--orted b a ma?orit but !hich
-ossesses a much smaller number of arms for use in
defense against o--ression2
%he guerrilla fighter needs full hel- from the -eo-le of the
area2 %his is an indis-ensable condition2 %his is clearl seen
b considering the case of bandit gangs that o-erate in a
region2 %he have all the characteristics of a guerrilla arm,
homogeneit, res-ect for the leader, valor, "no!ledge of the
ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics
to be em-loed2 %he onl thing missing is su--ort of the
-eo-le> and, inevitabl, these gangs are ca-tured and
e4terminated b the -ublic force2
.nal#ing the mode of o-eration of the guerrilla band,
seeing its form of struggle and understanding its base in the
masses, !e can ans!er the @uestion& !h does the guerrilla
fighter fightB We must come to the inevitable conclusion that
the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he ta"es u-
arms res-onding to the angr -rotest of the -eo-le against
their o--ressors, and that he fights in order to change the
social sstem that "ee-s all his unarmed brothers in
ignomin and miser2 ;e launches himself against the
conditions of the reigning institutions at a -articular moment
and dedicates himself !ith all the vigor that circumstances
-ermit to brea"ing the mold of these institutions2
When !e anal#e more full the tactic of guerrilla !arfare,
!e !ill see that the guerrilla fighter needs to have a good
"no!ledge of the surrounding countrside, the -aths of
entr and esca-e, the -ossibilities of s-eed maneuver,
good hiding -laces> naturall also, he must count on the
su--ort of the -eo-le2 .ll this indicates that the guerrilla
fighter !ill carr out his action in !ild -laces of small
-o-ulation2 Since in these -laces the struggle of the -eo-le
for reforms is aimed -rimaril and almost e4clusivel at
changing the social form of land o!nershi-, the guerrilla
fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionar2 ;e inter-rets
the desires of the great -easant mass to be o!ners of land,
o!ners of their means of -roduction, of their animals, of all
that !hich the have long earned to call their o!n, of that
!hich constitutes their life and !ill also serve as their
cemeter2
8t should be noted that in current inter-retations there are
t!o different t-es of guerrilla !arfare, one of !hich3a
struggle com-lementing great regular armies such as !as
the case of the U"rainian fighters in the Soviet Union3does
not enter into this analsis2 We are interested in the other
t-e, the case of an armed grou- engaged in struggle
against the constituted -o!er, !hether colonial or not, !hich
establishes itself as the onl base and !hich builds itself u-
in rural areas2 8n all such cases, !hatever the ideological
aims that ma ins-ire the fight, the economic aim is
determined b the as-iration to!ard o!nershi- of land2
%he China of Mao begins as an outbrea" of !or"er grou-s
in the South, !hich is defeated and almost annihilated2 8t
succeeds in establishing itself and begins its advance onl
!hen, after the long march from 9enan, it ta"es u- its base
in rural territories and ma"es agrarian reform its
fundamental goal2 %he struggle of ;o Chi Minh is based in
the rice3gro!ing -easants, !ho are o--ressed b the
(rench colonial o"e> !ith this force it is going for!ard to the
defeat of the colonialists2 8n both cases there is a frame!or"
of -atriotic !ar against the Ca-anese invader, but the
economic basis of a fight for the land has not disa--eared2
8n the case of .lgeria, the grand idea of .rab nationalism
has its economic counter-art in the fact that a million (rench
settlers utili#e nearl all of the arable land of .lgeria2 8n
some countries, such as =uerto 5ico, !here the s-ecial
conditions of the island have not -ermitted a guerrilla
outbrea", the nationalist s-irit, dee-l !ounded b the
discrimination that is dail -racticed, has as its basis the
as-iration of the -easants )even though man of them are
alread a -roletariat, to recover the land that the 9an"ee
invader sei#ed from them2 %his same central idea, though in
different forms, ins-ired the small farmers, -easants, and
slaves of the eastern estates of Cuba to close ran"s and
defend together the right to -ossess land during the thirt3
ear !ar of liberation2
%a"ing account of the -ossibilities of develo-ment of
guerrilla !arfare, !hich is transformed !ith the increase in
the o-erating -otential of the guerrilla band into a !ar of
-ositions, this t-e of !arfare, des-ite its s-ecial character,
is to be considered as an embro, a -relude, of the other2
%he -ossibilities of gro!th of the guerrilla band and of
changes in the mode of fight until conventional !arfare is
reached, are as great as the -ossibilities of defeating the
enem in each of the different battles, combats, or
s"irmishes that ta"e -lace2 %herefore, the fundamental
-rinci-le is that no battle, combat, or s"irmish is to be fought
unless it !ill be !on2 %here is a malevolent definition that
sas& D%he guerrilla fighter is the Cesuit of !arfare2D : this
is indicated a @ualit of secretiveness, of treacher, of
sur-rise that is obviousl an essential element of guerrilla
!arfare2 8t is a s-ecial "ind of Cesuitism, naturall -rom-ted
b circumstances, !hich necessitates acting at certain
moments in !as different from the romantic and s-orting
conce-tions !ith !hich !e are taught to believe !ar is
fought2
War is al!as a struggle in !hich each contender tries to
annihilate the other2 :esides using force, the !ill have
recourse to all -ossible tric"s and stratagems in order to
achieve the goal2 Militar strateg and tactics are a
re-resentation b analsis of the ob?ectives of the grou-s
and of the means of achieving these ob?ectives2 %hese
means contem-late ta"ing advantage of all the !ea" -oints
of the enem2 %he fighting action of each individual -latoon
in a large arm in a !ar of -ositions !ill -resent the same
characteristics as those of the guerrilla band2 8t uses
secretiveness, treacher, and sur-rise> and !hen these are
not -resent, it is because vigilance on the other side
-revents sur-rise2 :ut since the guerrilla band is a division
unto itself, and since there are large #ones of territor not
controlled b the enem, it is al!as -ossible to carr out
guerrilla attac"s in such a !a as to assure sur-rise> and it
is the dut of the guerrilla fighter to do so2 D;it and runD
some call this scornfull, and this is accurate2 ;it and run,
!ait, lie in ambush, again hit and run, and thus re-eatedl,
!ithout giving an rest to the enem2 %here is in all this, it
!ould a--ear, a negative @ualit, an attitude of retreat, of
avoiding frontal fights2 ;o!ever, this is conse@uent u-on the
general strateg of guerrilla !arfare, !hich is the same in its
ultimate end as is an !arfare& to !in, to annihilate the
enem2
%hus it is clear that guerrilla !arfare is a -hase that does not
afford in itself o--ortunities to arrive at com-lete victor2 8t is
one of the initial -hases of !arfare and !ill develo-
continuousl until the guerrilla arm in its stead gro!th
ac@uires the characteristics of a regular arm2 .t that
moment it !ill be read to deal final blo!s to the enem and
to achieve victor2 %rium-h !ill al!as be the -roduct of a
regular arm, even though its origins are in a guerrilla arm2
Cust as the general of a division in a modern !ar does not
have to die in front of his soldiers, the guerrilla fighter, !ho
is general of himself, need not die in ever battle2 ;e is
read to give his life, but the -ositive @ualit of this guerrilla
!arfare is -recisel that each one of the guerrilla fighters is
read to die, not to defend an ideal, but rather to convert it
into realit2 %his is the basis, the essence of guerrilla
fighting2 Miraculousl, a small band of men, the armed
vanguard of the great -o-ular force that su--orts them,
goes beond the immediate tactical ob?ective, goes on
decisivel to achieve an ideal, to establish a ne! societ, to
brea" the old molds of the outdated, and to achieve, finall,
the social ?ustice for !hich the fight2
Considered thus, all these dis-araged @ualities ac@uire a
true nobilit, the nobilit of the end at !hich the aim> and it
becomes clear that !e are not s-ea"ing of distorted means
of reaching an end2 %his fighting attitude, this attitude of not
being dismaed at an time, this infle4ibilit !hen
confronting the great -roblems in the final ob?ective is also
the nobilit of the guerrilla fighter2
! GUERRILLA STRATEG"
8n guerrilla terminolog, strateg is understood as the
analsis of the ob?ectives to be achieved in the light of the
total militar situation and the overall !as of reaching these
ob?ectives2
%o have a correct strategic a--reciation from the -oint of
vie! of the guerrilla band, it is necessar to anal#e
fundamentall !hat !ill be the enemAs mode of action2 8f
the final ob?ective is al!as the com-lete destruction of the
o--osite force, the enem is confronted in the case of a civil
!ar of this "ind !ith the standard tas"& he !ill have to
achieve the total destruction of each one of the com-onents
of the guerrilla band2 %he guerrilla fighter, on the other hand,
must anal#e the resources !hich the enem has for tring
to achieve that outcome& the means in men, in mobilit, in
-o-ular su--ort, in armaments, in ca-acit of leadershi- on
!hich he can count2 We must ma"e our o!n strateg
ade@uate on the basis of these studies, "ee-ing in mind
al!as the final ob?ective of defeating the enem arm2
%here are fundamental as-ects to be studied& the
armament, for e4am-le, and the manner of using this
armament2 %he value of a tan", of an air-lane in a fight of
this t-e must be !eighed2 %he arms of the enem, his
ammunition, his habits must be considered> because the
-rinci-al source of -rovision for the guerrilla force is
-recisel in enem armaments2 8f there is a -ossibilit of
choice, !e should -refer the same t-e as that used b the
enem, since the greatest -roblem of the guerrilla band is
the lac" of ammunition, !hich the o--onent must -rovide2
.fter the ob?ectives have been fi4ed and anal#ed, it is
necessar to stud the order of the ste-s leading to the
achievement of the final ob?ective2 %his should be -lanned in
advance, even though it !ill be modified and ad?usted as the
fighting develo-s and unforeseen circumstances arise2
.t the outset, the essential tas" of the guerrilla fighter is to
"ee- himself from being destroed2 Little b little it !ill be
easier for the members of the guerrilla band or bands to
ada-t themselves to their form of life and to ma"e flight and
esca-e from the forces that are on the offensive an eas
tas", because it is -erformed dail2 When this condition is
reached, the guerrilla, having ta"en u- inaccessible
-ositions out of reach of the enem, or having assembled
forces that deter the enem from attac"ing, ought to
-roceed to the gradual !ea"ening of the enem2 %his !ill be
carried out at first at those -oints nearest to the -oints of
active !arfare against the guerrilla band and later !ill be
ta"en dee-er into enem territor, attac"ing his
communications, later attac"ing or harassing his bases of
o-erations and his central bases, tormenting him on all
sides to the full e4tent of the ca-abilities of the guerrilla
forces2
%he blo!s should be continuous2 %he enem soldier in a
#one of o-erations ought not to be allo!ed to slee-> his
out-osts ought to be attac"ed and li@uidated sstematicall2
.t ever moment the im-ression ought to be created that he
is surrounded b a com-lete circle2 8n !ooded and bro"en
areas this effort should be maintained both da and night> in
o-en #ones that are easil -enetrated b enem -atrols, at
night onl2 8n order to do all this the absolute coo-eration of
the -eo-le and a -erfect "no!ledge of the ground is
necessar2 %hese t!o necessities affect ever minute of the
life of the guerrilla fighter2 %herefore, along !ith centers for
stud of -resent and future #ones of o-erations, intensive
-o-ular !or" must be underta"en to e4-lain the motives of
the revolution, its ends, and to s-read the incontrovertible
truth that victor of the enem against the -eo-le is finall
im-ossible2 Whoever does not feel this undoubted truth
cannot be a guerrilla fighter2
%his -o-ular !or" should at first be aimed at securing
secrec> that is, each -easant, each member of the societ
in !hich action is ta"ing -lace, !ill be as"ed not to mention
!hat he sees and hears> later, hel- !ill be sought from
inhabitants !hose loalt to the revolution offers greater
guarantees> still later, use !ill be made of these -ersons in
missions of contact, for trans-orting goods or arms, as
guides in the #ones familiar to them> still later, it is -ossible
to arrive at organi#ed mass action in the centers of !or", of
!hich the final result !ill be the general stri"e2
%he stri"e is a most im-ortant factor in civil !ar, but in order
to reach it a series of com-lementar conditions are
necessar !hich do not al!as e4ist and !hich ver rarel
come to e4ist s-ontaneousl2 8t is necessar to create these
essential conditions, basicall b e4-laining the -ur-oses of
the revolution and b demonstrating the forces of the -eo-le
and their -ossibilities2
8t is also -ossible to have recourse to certain ver
homogeneous grou-s, !hich must have sho!n their efficac
-reviousl in less dangerous tas"s, in order to ma"e use of
another of the terrible arms of the guerrilla band, sabotage2
8t is -ossible to -aral#e entire armies, to sus-end the
industrial life of a #one, leaving the inhabitants of a cit
!ithout factories, !ithout light, !ithout !ater, !ithout
communications of an "ind, !ithout being able to ris" travel
b high!a e4ce-t at certain hours2 8f all this is achieved,
the morale of the enem falls, the morale of his combatant
units !ea"ens, and the fruit ri-ens for -luc"ing at a -recise
moment2
.ll this -resu--oses an increase in the territor included
!ithin the guerrilla action, but an e4cessive in3 crease of this
territor is to be avoided2 8t is essential al!as to -reserve a
strong base of o-erations and to continue strengthening it
during the course of the !ar2 Within this territor, measures
of indoctrination of the inhabitants of the #one should be
utili#ed> measures of @uarantine should be ta"en against the
irreconcilable enemies of the revolution> all the -urel
defensive measures, such as trenches, mines, and
communications, should be -erfected2
When the guerrilla band has reached a res-ectable -o!er in
arms and in number of combatants, it ought to -roceed to
the formation of ne! columns2 %his is an act similar to that
of the beehive !hen at a given moment it releases a ne!
@ueen, !ho goes to another region !ith a -art of the s!arm2
%he mother hive !ith the most notable guerrilla chief !ill
sta in the less dangerous -laces, !hile the ne! columns
!ill -enetrate other enem territories follo!ing the ccle
alread described2
. moment !ill arrive in !hich the territor occu-ied b the
columns is too small for them> and in the advance to!ard
regions solidl defended b the enem, it !ill be
necessar to confront -o!erful forces2 .t that instant
the columns ?oin, the offer a com-act, fighting front,
and a !ar of -ositions is reached, a !ar carried on b
regular armies2 ;o!ever, the former guerrilla arm
cannot cut itself off from its base, and it should create
ne! guerrilla bands behind the enem acting in the
same !a as the original bands o-erated earlier,
-roceeding thus to -enetrate enem territor until it is
dominated2
8t is thus that guerrillas reach the stage of attac", of
the encirclement of fortified bases, of the defeat of
reinforcements, of mass action, ever more ardent, in the
!hole national territor, arriving finall at the ob?ective of the
!ar& victor2
# GUERRILLA TACTICS
EChe smo"ing his -i-e in the mountains of :oliviaF 8n militar
language, tactics are the -ractical methods of achieving the
grand strategic ob?ectives2
8n one sense the com-lement strateg and in an3other the
are more s-ecific rules !ithin it2 .s means, tactics are much
more variable, much more fle4ible than the final ob?ectives,
and the should be ad?usted continuall during the struggle2
%here are tactical ob?ectives that remain constant
throughout a !ar and others that var2 %he first thing to be
considered is the ad?usting of guerrilla action to the action of
the enem2
%he fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is
mobilit2 %his -ermits it in a fe! minutes to move far from a
s-ecific theater and in a fe! hours far even from the region,
if that becomes necessar> -ermits it constantl to change
front and avoid an t-e of encirclement2 .s the
circumstances of the !ar re@uire, the guerrilla band can
dedicate itself e4clusivel to fleeing from an encirclement
!hich is the enemAs onl !a of forcing the band into a
decisive fight that could be unfavorable> it can also change
the battle into a counter3encirclement )small bands of men
are -resumabl surrounded b the enem !hen suddenl
the enem is surrounded b stronger contingents> or men
located in a safe -lace serve as a lure, leading to the
encirclement and annihilation of the entire troo-s and su--l
of an attac"ing force,2 Characteristic of this !ar of mobilit is
the so3called minuet, named from the analog !ith the
dance& the guerrilla bands encircle an enem -osition, an
advancing column, for e4am-le> the encircle it com-letel
from the four -oints of the com-ass, !ith five or si4 men in
each -lace, far enough a!a to avoid being encircled
themselves> the fight is started at an one of the -oints, and
the arm moves to!ard it> the guerrilla band then retreats,
al!as maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attac"
from another -oint2 %he arm !ill re-eat its action and the
guerrilla band the same2 %hus, successivel, it is -ossible to
"ee- an enem column immobili#ed, forcing it to e4-end
large @uantities of ammunition and !ea"ening the morale of
its troo-s !ithout incurring great dangers2
%his same tactic can be a--lied at nighttime, closing in more
and sho!ing greater aggressiveness, because in these
conditions counter3encirclement is much more difficult2
Movement b night is another im-ortant characteristic of the
guerrilla band, enabling it to advance into -osition for an
attac" and, !here the danger of betraal e4ists, to mobili#e
in ne! territor2 %he numerical inferiorit of the guerrilla
ma"es it necessar that attac"s al!as be carried out b
sur-rise> this great advantage is !hat -ermits the guerrilla
fighter to inflict losses on the enem !ithout suffering
losses2 8n a fight bet!een a hundred men on one side and
ten on the other, losses are not e@ual !here there is one
casualt on each side2 %he enem loss is al!as re-arable>
it amounts to onl one -ercent of his effectiveness2 %he loss
of the guerrilla band re@uires more time to be re-aired
because it involves a soldier of high s-eciali#ation and is ten
-ercent of the o-erating forces2
. dead soldier of the guerrillas ought never to be left !ith his
arms and his ammunition2 %he dut of ever guerrilla soldier
!henever a com-anion falls is to recover immediatel these
e4tremel -recious elements of the fight2 8n fact, the care
!hich must be ta"en of ammunition and the method of using
it are further characteristics of guerrilla !arfare2 8n an
combat bet!een a regular force and a guerrilla band it is
al!as -ossible to "no! one from the other b their different
manner of fire& a great amount of firing on the -art of the
regular arm, s-oradic and accurate shots on the -art of the
guerrillas2
7nce one of our heroes, no! dead, had to em-lo his
machine guns for nearl five minutes, burst after burst, in
order to slo! u- the advance of enem soldiers2 %his fact
caused considerable confusion in our forces, because the
assumed from the rhthm of fire that "e -osition must have
been ta"en b the enem, since this !as one of the rare
occasions !here de-arture from the rule of saving fire had
been called for because of the im-ortance of the -oint being
defended2
.nother fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is
his fle4ibilit, his abilit to ada-t himself to all circumstances,
and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the
action2 .gainst the rigidit of classical methods of fighting,
the guerrilla fighter invents his o!n tactics at ever minute of
the fight and constantl sur-rises the enem2
8n the first -lace, there are onl elastic -ositions, s-ecific
-laces that the enem cannot -ass, and -laces of diverting
him2 (re@uentl the enem, after easil overcoming
difficulties in a gradual advance, is sur-rised to find himself
suddenl and solidl detained !ithout -ossibilities of moving
for!ard2 %his is due to the fact that the guerrilla3defended
-ositions, !hen the have been selected on the basis of a
careful stud of the ground, are invulnerable2 8t is not the
number of attac"ing soldiers that counts, but the number of
defending soldiers2 7nce that number has been -laced
there, it can nearl al!as hold off a battalion !ith success2
8t is a ma?or tas" of the chiefs to choose !ell the moment
and the -lace for defending a -osition !ithout retreat2
%he form of attac" of a guerrilla arm is also different>
starting !ith sur-rise and fur, irresistible, it suddenl
converts itself into total -assivit2
%he surviving enem, resting, believes that the attac"er has
de-arted> he begins to rela4, to return to the routine life of
the cam- or of the fortress, !hen suddenl a ne! attac"
bursts forth in another -lace, !ith the same characteristics,
!hile the main bod of the guerrilla band lies in !ait to
interce-t reinforcements2 .t other times an out-ost
defending the cam- !ill be suddenl attac"ed b the
guerrilla, dominated, and ca-tured2 %he fundamental thing is
sur-rise and ra-idit of attac"2
.cts of sabotage are ver im-ortant2 8t is necessar to
distinguish clearl bet!een sabotage, a revolutionar and
highl effective method of !arfare, and terrorism, a measure
that is generall ineffective and in3discriminate in its results,
since it often ma"es victims of innocent -eo-le and destros
a large number of lives that !ould be valuable to the
revolution2 %errorism should be considered a valuable tactic
!hen it is used to -ut to death some noted leader of the
o--ressing forces !ell "no!n for his cruelt, his efficienc in
re-ression, or other @ualit that ma"es his elimination
useful2 :ut the "illing of -ersons of small im-ortance is
never advisable, since it brings on an increase of re-risals,
including deaths2
%here is one -oint ver much in controvers in 7-inions
about terrorism2 Man consider that its use, b -rovo"ing
-olice o--ression, hinders all more or less legal or
semiclandestine contact !ith the masses and ma"es
im-ossible unification for actions that !ill be necessar at a
critical moment2 %his is correct> but it also ha--ens that in a
civil !ar the re-ression b the governmental -o!er in
certain to!ns is alread so great that, in fact, ever t-e of
legal action is su--ressed alread, and an action of the
masses that is not su--orted b arms is im-ossible2 8t is
therefore necessar to be circums-ect in ado-ting methods
of this t-e and to consider the conse@uences that the ma
bring for the revolution2 .t an rate, !ell3managed sabotage
is al!as a ver effective arm, though it should not be
em-loed to -ut means of -roduction out of action, leaving a
sector of the -o-ulation -aral#ed )and thus !ithout !or",
unless this -aralsis affects the normal life of the societ2 8t
is ridiculous to carr out sabotage against a soft3drin"
factor, but it is absolutel correct and advisable to carr out
sabotage against a -o!er -lant2 8n the first case, a certain
number of !or"ers are -ut out of a ?ob but nothing is done to
modif the rhthm of industrial life> in the second case, there
!ill again be dis-laced !or"ers, but this is entirel ?ustified
b the -aralsis of the life of the region2 We !ill return to the
techni@ue of sabotage later2
7ne of the favorite arms of the enem arm, su--osed to be
decisive in modern times, is aviation2 /evertheless, this has
no use !hatsoever during the -eriod that guerrilla !arfare is
in its first stages, !ith small concentrations of men in rugged
-laces2 %he utilit of aviation lies in the sstematic
destruction of visible and organi#ed defenses> and for this
there must be large concentrations of men !ho construct
these defenses, something that does not e4ist in this t-e of
!arfare2 =lanes are also -otent against marches b
columns through level -laces or -laces !ithout cover>
ho!ever, this latter danger is easil avoided b carring out
the marches at night2
7ne of the !ea"est -oints of the enem is trans-ortation b
road and railroad2 8t is virtuall im-ossible to maintain a vigil
ard b ard over a trans-ort line, a road, or a railroad2 .t
an -oint a considerable amount of e4-losive charge can be
-lanted that !ill ma"e the road im-assable> or b e4-loding
it at the moment that a vehicle -asses, a consider3able loss
in lives and materiel to the enem is caused at the same
time that the road is cut2
%he sources of e4-losives are varied2 %he can be brought
from other #ones> or use can be made of bombs sei#ed from
the dictatorshi-, though these do not al!as !or"> or the
can be manufactured in secret laboratories !ithin the
guerrilla #one2 %he techni@ue of setting them off is @uite
varied> their manufacture also de-ends u-on the conditions
of the guerrilla band2
8n our laborator !e made -o!der !hich !e used as a ca-,
and !e invented various devices for e4-loding the mines at
the desired moment2 %he ones that gave the best results
!ere electric2 %he first mine that !e e4-loded !as a bomb
dro--ed from an aircraft of the dictatorshi-2 We ada-ted it
b inserting various ca-s and adding a gun !ith the trigger
-ulled b a cord2 .t the moment that an enem truc"
-assed, the !ea-on !as fired to set off the e4-losion2
%hese techni@ues can be develo-ed to a high degree2 We
have information that in .lgeria, for e4am-le, tele3e4-losive
mines, that is, mines e4-loded b radio at great distances
from the -oint !here the are located, are being used toda
against the (rench colonial -o!er2
%he techni@ue of ling in ambush along roads in order to
e4-lode mines and annihilate survivors is one of the most
remunerative in -oint of ammunition and arms2 %he
sur-rised enem does not use his ammunition and has no
time to flee> so !ith a small e4-enditure of ammunition large
results are achieved2 .s blo!s are dealt the enem, he also
changes his tactics, and in -lace of isolated truc"s, veritable
motori#ed columns move2 ;o!ever, b choosing the ground
!ell, the same result can be -roduced b brea"ing the
column and concentrating forces on one vehicle2 8n these
cases the essential elements of guerrilla tactics must al!as
be "e-t in mind2 %hese are& -erfect "no!ledge of the
ground> surveillance and foresight as to the lines of esca-e>
vigilance over all the secondar roads that can bring su--ort
to the -oint of attac"> intimac !ith -eo-le in the #one so as
to have sure hel- from them in res-ect to su--lies,
trans-ort, and tem-orar or -ermanent hiding -laces if it
becomes necessar to leave !ounded com-anions behind>
numerical su-eriorit at a chosen -oint of action> total
mobilit> and the -ossibilit of counting on reserves2
8f all these tactical re@uisites are fulfilled, sur-rise attac"
along the lines of communication of the enem ields
notable dividends2
. fundamental -art of guerrilla tactics is the treatment
accorded the -eo-le of the #one2 6ven the treatment
accorded the enem is im-ortant> the norm to be follo!ed
should be an absolute infle4ibilit at the time of attac", an
absolute infle4ibilit to!ard all the des-icable elements that
resort to informing and assassination, and clemenc as
absolute as -ossible to3!ard the enem soldiers !ho go into
the fight -erforming or believing that the -erform a militar
dut2 8t is a good -olic, so long as there are no
considerable bases of o-erations and invulnerable
-laces, to ta"e no -risoners2 Survivors ought to be
set free2 %he !ounded should be cared for !ith all
-ossible resources at the time of the action2
Conduct to!ard the civil -o-ulation ought to be
regulated b a large res-ect for all the rules and traditions of
the -eo-le of the #one, in order to demonstrate effectivel,
!ith deeds, the moral su-eriorit of the guerrilla fighter over
the o--ressing soldier2 64ce-t in s-ecial situations, there
ought to be no e4ecution of ?ustice !ithout giving the
criminal an o--ortunit to clear himself2
$ WARFARE ON FA%ORABLE GROUND
EChe Guevara addressing the United /ations in /e! 9or"
CitF .s !e have alread said, guerrilla fighting !ill not
al!as ta"e -lace in countr most favorable to the
em-loment of its tactics> but !hen it does, that is, !hen the
guerrilla band is located in #ones difficult to reach, either
because of dense forests, stee- mountains, im-assable
deserts or marshes, the general tactics, based on the
fundamental -ostulates of guerrilla !arfare, must al!as be
the same2 .n im-ortant -oint to consider is the moment for
ma"ing contact !ith the enem2 8f the #one is so thic", so
difficult that an organi#ed arm can never reach it, the
guerrilla band should advance to the regions !here the
arm can arrive and !here there !ill be a -ossibilit of
combat2
.s soon as the survival of the guerrilla band has been
assured, it should fight> it must constantl go out from its
refuge to fight2 8ts mobilit does not have to be as great as in
those cases !here the ground is unfavorable> it must ad?ust
itself to the ca-abilities of the enem, but it is not necessar
to be able to move as @uic"l as in -laces !here the enem
can concentrate a large number of men in a fe! minutes2
/either is the nocturnal character of this !arfare so
im-ortant> it !ill be -ossible in man cases to carr out
datime o-erations, es-eciall mobili#ations b da, though
sub?ected to enem observation b land and air2 8t is also
-ossible to -ersist in a militar action for a much longer
time, above all in the mountains> it is -ossible to underta"e
battles of long duration !ith ver fe! men, and it is ver
-robable that the arrival of enem reinforcements at the
scene of the fight can be -revented2
. close !atch over the -oints of access is, ho!ever, an
a4iom never to be forgotten b the guerrilla fighter2 ;is
aggressiveness )on account of the difficulties that the
enem faces in bringing u- reinforcements, can he greater,
he can a--roach the enem more closel, fight much more
directl, more frontall and for a longer time, though these
rules ma be @ualified b various circumstances, such, for
e4am-le, as the amount of ammunition2
(ighting on favorable ground and -articularl in the
mountains -resents man advantages but also the
inconvenience that it is difficult to ca-ture in a single
o-eration a considerable @uantit of arms and ammunition,
o!ing to the -recautions that the enem ta"es in these
regions2 )%he guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that
it is the enem that must serve as his source of su--l of
ammunition and arms2, :ut much more ra-idl than in
unfavorable ground the guerrilla band !ill here be able to
"dig in," that is, to form a base ca-able of engaging in a !ar
of -ositions, !here small industries ma be in3stalled as
the are needed, as !ell as hos-itals, centers for education
and training, storage facilities, organs of -ro-aganda, etc2,
ade@uatel -rotected from aviation or from long3range
artiller2
%he guerrilla band in these conditions can number man
more -ersonnel> there !ill be noncombatants and -erha-s
even a sstem of training in the use of the arms that
eventuall are to fall into the -o!er of the guerrilla arm2
%he number of men that a guerrilla band can have is a
matter of e4tremel fle4ible calculation ada-ted to the
territor, to the means available of ac@uiring su--lies, to the
mass flights of o--ressed -eo-le from other #ones, to the
arms available, to the necessities of organi#ation2 :ut, in
an case, it is much more -racticable to establish a base
and e4-and !ith the su--ort of ne! combatant elements2
%he radius of action of a guerrilla band of this t-e can be
as !ide as conditions or the o-erations of other bands in
ad?acent territor -ermit2 %he range !ill be limited b the
time that it ta"es to arrive at a #one of securit from the
#one of o-eration> assuming that marches must be made at
night, it !ill not be -ossible to o-erate more than five or si4
hours a!a from a -oint of ma4imum securit2 Small
guerrilla bands that !or" constantl at !ea"ening a territor
can go farther a!a from the #one of securit2
%he arms -referable for this t-e of !arfare are long3range
!ea-ons re@uiring small e4-enditure of bullets, su--orted
b a grou- of automatic or semi3automatic arms2 7f the
rifles and machine guns that e4ist in the mar"ets of the
United States, one of the best is the M31 rifle, called the
Garand2 ;o!ever, onl -eo-le !ith some e4-erience should
use this, since it has the disadvantage of e4-ending too
much ammunition2 Medium3heav arms, such as tri-od
machine guns, can be used on favorable ground, affording a
greater margin of securit for the !ea-on and its -ersonnel,
but the ought al!as to be a means of re-elling an enem
and not for attac"2
.n ideal com-osition for a guerrilla band of *$ men !ould
be& 1G to 1$ single3shot rifles and about 1G automatic arms
bet!een Garands and hand machine guns, including light
and easil -ortable automatic arms, such as the :ro!ning
or the more modern :elgian (.L and M311 automatic rifles2
.mong the hand machine3guns the best are those of nine
millimeters, !hich -ermit a larger trans-ort of ammunition2
%he sim-ler its construction the better, because this
increases the case of s!itching -arts2 .ll this must be
ad?usted to the armament that the enem uses, Since the
ammunition that he em-los is !hat !e are going to use
!hen his arms fall into our hands2 8t is -racticall im-ossible
for heav arms to be used2 .ircraft cannot see anthing and
cease to o-erate> tan"s and cannons cannot do much o!ing
to the difficulties of advancing in these #ones2
. ver im-ortant consideration is su--l2 8n general, the
#ones of difficult access for this ver reason -resent s-ecial
-roblems, since there are fe! -easants, and therefore
animal and food su--lies are scarce2 8t is necessar to
maintain stable lines of communication in order to be able
al!as to count on a minimum of food, stoc"-iled, in the
event of an disagreeable develo-ment2 8n this "ind of #one
of o-erations the -ossibilities of sabotage on a large scale
are generall not -resent> !ith the inaccessibilit goes a
lac" of constructions, tele-hone lines, a@ueducts, etc2, that
could be damaged b direct action2
(or su--l -ur-oses it is im-ortant to have animals, among
!hich the mule is the best in rough countr2 .de@uate
-asturage -ermitting good nutrition is essential2 %he mule
can -ass through e4tremel hill countr im-ossible for
other animals2 8n the most difficult situations it is necessar
to resort to trans-ort b men2 6ach individual can carr
t!ent3five "ilograms for man hours dail and for man
das2
%he lines of communication !ith the e4terior should include
a series of intermediate -oints manned b -eo-le of
com-lete reliabilit, !here -roducts can be stored and
!here contacts can go to hide themselves at critical times2
8nternal lines of communication can also be created2 %heir
e4tension !ill be determined b the stage of develo-ment
reached b the guerrilla band2 8n some #ones of o-erations
in the recent Cuban !ar, tele-hone lines of man "ilometers
of length !ere established, roads !ere built, and a
messenger service maintained sufficient to cover all #ones
in a minimum of time2
%here are also other -ossible means of communication, not
used in the Cuban !ar but -erfectl a--licable, such as
smo"e signals, signals !ith sunshine reflected b mirrors,
and carrier -igeons2
%he vital necessities of the guerrillas are to maintain their
arms in good condition, to ca-ture ammunition, and, above
everthing else, to have ade@uate shoes2 %he first
manufacturing efforts should therefore be directed to!ard
these ob?ectives2 Shoe factories can initiall be cobbler
installations that re-lace halfsoles on old shoes, e4-anding
after!ards into a series of organi#ed factories !ith a good
average dail -roduction of shoes2 %he manufacture of
-o!der is fairl sim-le> and much can be accom-lished b
having a small laborator and bringing in the necessar
materials from outside2 Mined areas constitute a grave
danger for the enem> large areas can be mined for
simultaneous e4-losion, destroing u- to hundreds of men2
& WARFARE ON UNFA%ORABLE GROUND
8n order to carr on !arfare in countr that is not ver hill,
lac"s forests, and has man roads, all the fundamental
re@uisites of guerrilla !arfare must be observed> onl the
forms !ill be altered2 %he @uantit, not the @ualit, of
guerrilla !arfare !ill change2 (or e4am-le, follo!ing the
same order as before, the mobilit of this t-e of guerrilla
should be e4traordinar> stri"es should be made -referabl
at night> the should be e4tremel ra-id but the guerrilla
should move to -laces different from the starting -oint, the
farthest -ossible from the scene of action, assuming that
there is no -lace secure from the re-ressive forces that the
guerrilla can use as its garrison2
. man can !al" bet!een +G and $G "ilometers during the
night hours> it is -ossible also to march during the first hours
of dalight, unless the #ones of o-eration are closel
!atched or there is danger that -eo-le in the vicinit, seeing
the -assing troo-s, !ill notif the -ursuing arm of the
location of the guerrilla band and its route2 8t is al!as
-referable in these cases to o-erate at night !ith the
greatest -ossible silence both before and after the action>
the first hours of night are best2 ;ere too there are
e4ce-tions to the general rule, since at times the da!n
hours !ill be -referable2 8t is never !ise to habituate the
enem to a certain form of !arfare> it is necessar to var
constantl the -laces, the hours, and the forms of o-eration2
We have alread said that the action cannot endure for long,
but must be ra-id> it must be of a high degree of
effectiveness, last a fe! minutes, and be follo!ed b an
immediate !ithdra!al2 %he arms em-loed here !ill not be
the same as in the case of actions on favorable ground> a
large @uantit of automatic !ea-ons is to be -referred2 8n
night attac"s mar"smanshi- is not the determining factor,
but rather concentration of fire> the more automatic arms
firing at short distance, the more -ossibilities there are of
annihilating the enem2
.lso, the use of mines in roads and the destruction of
bridges are tactics of great im-ortance2 .ttac"s b the
guerrilla !ill be less aggressive so far as the -ersistence
and continuation are concerned, but the can be ver
violent, and the can utili#e different arms, such as mines
and the shotgun2 .gainst o-en vehicles heavil loaded !ith
men, !hich is the usual method of trans-orting troo-s, and
even against closed vehicles that do not have s-ecial
defenses3 against buses, for e4am-le3the shotgun is a
tremendous !ea-on2 . shotgun loaded !ith large shot is the
most effective2 %his is not a secret of guerrilla fighters> it is
used also in big !ars2 %he .mericans used shotgun
-latoons armed !ith high3@ualit !ea-ons and baonets for
assaulting machine3gun nests2
%here is an im-ortant -roblem to e4-lain, that of
ammunition> this !ill almost al!as be ta"en from the
enem2 8t is therefore necessar to stri"e blo!s !here there
!ill be the absolute assurance of restoring the ammunition
e4-ended, unless there are large reserves in secure -laces2
8n other !ords, an annihilating attac" against a grou- of
men is not to be under3ta"en at the ris" of e4-ending all
ammunition !ithout being able to re-lace it2 .l!as in
guerrilla tactics it is necessar to "ee- in mind the grave
-roblem of -rocuring the !ar materiel necessar for
continuing the fight2 (or this reason guerrilla arms ought to
be the same as those used b the enem, e4ce-t for
!ea-ons such as revolvers and shotguns, for !hich the
ammunition can be obtained in the #one itself or in the
cities2
%he number of men that a guerrilla band of this t-e should
include does not e4ceed ten to fifteen2 8n forming a single
combat unit it is of great im-ortance al!as to consider the
limitations on numbers& ten, t!elve, fifteen men can hide
an!here and at the same time can hel- each other in
-utting u- a -o!erful resistance to the enem2 (our or five
!ould -erha-s be too small a number, but !hen the number
e4ceeds ten the -ossibilit that the enem !ill discover them
in their cam- or on the march is much greater2
5emember that the velocit of the guerrilla band on the
march is e@ual to the velocit of its slo!est man2 8t is more
difficult to find uniformit of marching s-eed !ith t!ent,
thirt, or fort men than !ith ten2 .nd the guerrilla fighter on
the -lain must be fundamentall a runner2 ;ere the -ractice
of hitting and running ac@uires its ma4imum use2 %he
guerrilla bands on the -lain suffer the enormous
inconvenience of being sub?ect to a ra-id encirclement and
of not having sure -laces !here the can set u- a firm
resistance> therefore the must live in conditions of absolute
secrec for a long time, since it !ould be dangerous to trust
an neighbor !hose fidelit is not -erfectl established2 %he
re-risals of the enem are so violent, usuall so brutal,
inflicted not onl on the head of the famil but fre@uentl on
the !omen and children as !ell, that -ressure on individuals
lac"ing firmness ma result at an moment in their giving
!a and revealing information as to !here the guerrilla band
is located and ho! it is o-erating2 %his !ould immediatel
-roduce an encirclement !ith conse@uences al!as
disagreeable, although not necessaril fatal2 When
conditions, the @uantit of arms, and the state of insurrection
of the -eo-le call for an increase in the number of men, the
guerrilla band should be divided2 8f it is necessar, all can
re?oin at a given moment to deal a blo!, but in such a !a
that immediatel after!ards the can dis-erse to!ard
se-arate #ones, a gain divided into small grou-s of ten,
t!elve, or fifteen men2
8t is entirel feasible to organi#e !hole armies under a single
command and to assure res-ect and obedience to this
command !ithout the necessit of being in a single grou-2
%herefore the election of the guerrilla chiefs and the
certaint that the coordinate ideologicall and -ersonall
!ith the overall chief of the #one are ver im-ortant2
%he ba#oo"a is a heav !ea-on that can be used b the
guerrilla band because of its eas -ortabilit and o-eration2
%oda the rifle3fired anti3tan" grenade can re-lace it2
/aturall, it !ill be a !ea-on ta"en from the enem2 %he
ba#oo"a is ideal for firing on armored vehicles, and even on
unarmored vehicles that are loaded !ith troo-s, and for
ta"ing small militar bases of fe! men in a short time> but it
is im-ortant to -oint out that not more than three shells -er
man can be carried, and this onl !ith considerable
e4ertion2
.s for the utili#ation of heav arms ta"en from the enem,
nothing is to be scorned2 :ut there are !ea-ons such as the
tri-od machine gun, the heav fift3millimeter machine gun+
etc2, that, !hen ca-tured, can be utili#ed !ith a !illingness
to lose them again2 8n other !ords, in the unfavorable
conditions that !e are no! anal#ing, a battle to defend a
heav machine gun or other !ea-on of this t-e cannot be
allo!ed> the are sim-l to be used until the tactical moment
!hen the must be abandoned2 8n our Cuban !ar of
liberation, to abandon a !ea-on constituted a grave
offense, and there !as never an case !here the necessit
arose2 /evertheless, !e mention this case in order to
e4-lain clearl the onl situation in !hich abandonment
!ould not constitute an occasion for re-roaches2 7n
unfavorable ground, the guerrilla !ea-on is the -ersonal
!ea-on of ra-id fire2
6as access to the #one usuall means that it !ill be
habitable and that there !ill be a -easant -o-ulation in
these -laces2 %his facilitates su--l enormousl2 ;aving
trust!orth -eo-le and ma"ing contact !ith establishments
that -rovide su--lies to the -o-ulation, it is -ossible to
maintain a guerrilla band -erfectl !ell !ithout having to
devote time or mone to long and dangerous lines of
communication2 .lso it is !ell to reiterate that the smaller
the number of men the easier it !ill be to -rocure food for
them2 6ssential su--lies such as bedding, !ater-roof
material, mos@uito netting, shoes, medicines, and food !ill
be found directl in the #one, since the are things of dail
use b its inhabitants2
Communications !ill be much easier in the sense of being
able to count on a larger number of men and more roads>
but the !ill be more difficult as a -roblem of securit for
messages bet!een distant -oints, since it !ill be necessar
to rel on a series of contacts that have to be trusted2 %here
!ill be the danger of an eventual ca-ture of one of the
messengers, !ho are constantl crossing enem #ones2 8f
the messages are of small im-ortance, the should be oral>
if of great im-ortance, code !riting should be used2
64-erience sho!s that transmission b !ord of mouth
greatl distorts an communication2
(or these same reasons manufacture !ill have much less
im-ortance, at the same time that it !ould be much more
difficult to carr it out2 8t !ill not be -ossible to have factories
ma"ing shoes or arms2 =racticall s-ea"ing, manufacture
!ill have to be limited to small sho-s, carefull hidden,
!here shotgun shells can be recharged and mines, sim-le
grenades, and other minimum necessities of the moment
manufactured2 7n the other hand, it is -ossible to ma"e use
of all the friendl sho-s of the #one for such !or" as is
necessar2
%his brings us to t!o conse@uences that flo! logicall from
!hat has been said2 7ne of them is that the favorable
conditions for establishing a -ermanent cam- in guerrilla
!arfare are inverse to the degree of -roductive develo-ment
of a -lace2 .ll favorable conditions, all facilities of life
normall induce men to settle> but for the guerrilla band the
o--osite is the case2 %he more facilities there are for social
life, the more nomadic, the more uncertain the life of the
guerrilla fighter2 %hese reall are the results of one and the
same -rinci-le2 %he title of this section is "War on
Unfavorable Ground," because everthing that is favorable
to human life, communications, urban and semi3urban
concentrations of large numbers of -eo-le, land easil
!or"ed b machine, all these -lace the guerrilla fighter in a
disadvantageous situation2
%he second conclusion is that if guerrilla fighting must
include me e4tremel im-ortant faction of !or" on the
masses, this !or" is even more im-ortant in the unfavorable
#ones, !here a single enem attac" can -roduce a
catastro-he2 8ndoctrination should be continuous, and so
should be the struggle for unit of the !or"ers, of the
-easants, and of other social classes that live in the #one, in
order to achieve to!ard the guerrilla fighters a ma4imum
homogeneit of attitude2 %his tas" !ith the masses, this
constant !or" at the huge -roblem of relations of the
guerrilla band !ith the inhabitants of the #one, must also
govern the attitude to be ta"en to!ard the case of an
individual recalcitrant enem soldier& he should be
eliminated !ithout hesitation !hen he is dangerous2 8n this
res-ect the guerrilla band must be drastic2 6nemies cannot
be -ermitted to e4ist !ithin the #one of o-erations in -laces
that offer no securit2
' SUBURBAN WARFARE
8f during the !ar the guerrilla bands close in on cities and
-enetrate the surrounding countr in such a !a as to be
able to establish themselves in conditions of some securit,
it !ill be necessar to give these suburban bands a s-ecial
education, or rather, a s-ecial organi#ation2
8t is fundamental to recogni#e that a suburban guerrilla band
can never s-ring u- of its o!n accord2 8t !ill be born onl
after certain conditions necessar for its survival have been
created2 %herefore, the suburban guerrilla !ill al!as be
under the direct orders of chiefs located in another #one2
%he function of this guerrilla band !ill not be to carr out
inde-endent actions but to coordinate its activities !ith
overall strategic -lans in such a !a as to su--ort the action
of larger grou-s situated in another area, contributing
s-ecificall to the success of a fi4ed tactical ob?ective,
!ithout the o-erational freedom of guerrilla bands of the
other t-es2 (or e4am-le, a suburban band !ill not be able
to choose among the o-erations of destroing tele-hone
lines, moving to ma"e attac"s in another localit, and
sur-rising a -atrol of soldiers on a distant road> it !ill do
e4actl !hat it is told2 8f its function is to cut do!n tele-hone
-oles or electric !ires, to destro se!ers, railroads, or !ater
mains, it !ill limit itself to carring out these tas"s efficientl2
8t ought not to number more than four or five men2 %he
limitation on numbers is im-ortant, because the suburban
guerrilla must be considered as situated in e4ce-tionall
unfavorable ground, !here the vigilance of the enem !ill
be much greater and the -ossibilities of re-risals as !ell as
of betraal are increased enormousl2 .nother aggravating
circumstance is that the suburban guerrilla band cannot
de-art far from the -laces !here it is going to o-erate2 %o
s-eed of action and !ithdra!al there must be added a
limitation on the distance of !ithdra!al from the scene of
action and the need to remain totall hidden during the
datime2 %his is a nocturnal guerrilla band in the e4treme,
!ithout -ossibilities of changing its manner of o-erating until
the insurrection is so far advanced that it can ta"e -art as an
active combatant in the siege of the cit2
%he essential @ualities of the guerrilla fighter in this situation
are disci-line )-erha-s in the highest degree of all, and
discretion2 ;e cannot count on more than t!o or three
friendl houses that !ill -rovide food> it is almost certain that
an encirclement in these conditions !ill be e@uivalent to
death2 Wea-ons, furthermore, !ill not be of the same "ind
as those of the other grou-s2 %he !ill be for -ersonal
defense, of the t-e that do not hinder a ra-id flight or
betra a secure hiding -lace2 .s their armament the band
ought to have not more than one carbine or one sa!ed3off
shotgun, or -erha-s t!o, !ith -istols for the other members2
%he !ill concentrate their action on -rescribed sabotage
and never carr out armed attac"s, e4ce-t b sur-rising one
or t!o members or agents of the enem troo-s2
(or sabotage the need a full set of instruments2 %he
guerrilla fighter must have good sa!s, large @uantities of
dnamite, -ic"s and shovels, a--aratus for lifting rails, and,
in general, ade@uate mechanical e@ui-ment for the !or" to
be carried out2 %his should be hidden in -laces that are
secure but easil accessible to the hands that !ill need to
use it2
8f there is more than one guerrilla band, the !ill all be
under a single chief !ho !ill give orders as to the necessar
tas"s through contacts of -roven trust!orthiness !ho live
o-enl as ordinar citi#ens2 8n certain cases the guerrilla
fighter !ill be able to maintain his -eacetime !or", but this
is ver difficult2 =racticall s-ea"ing, the suburban guerrilla
band is a grou- of men !ho are alread outside the la!, in a
condition of !ar, situated as unfavorabl as !e have
described2
%he im-ortance of a suburban struggle has usuall been
underestimated> it is reall ver great2 . good o-eration of
this t-e e4tended over a !ide area -aral#es almost
com-letel the commercial and industrial life of the sector
and -laces the entire -o-ulation in a situation of unrest, of
anguish, almost of im-atience for the develo-ment of violent
events that !ill relieve the -eriod of sus-ense2 8f from the
first moment of the !ar, thought is ta"en for the future
-ossibilit of this t-e of fight and an organi#ation of
s-ecialists started, a much more ra-id action !ill be
assured, and !ith it a saving of lives and of the -riceless
time of the nation2
CHAPTER II: THE GUERRILLA BAND
1 THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER: SOCIAL
REFOR(ER
EChe Guevara !ith ChileAs -resident
Salvador .llendeF We have alread
described the guerrilla fighter as
one !ho shares the longing of the
-eo-le for liberation and !ho, once
-eaceful means are e4hausted,
initiates the fight and converts
himself into an armed vanguard of
the fighting -eo-le2 (rom the ver
beginning of the struggle he has the
intention of destroing an un?ust order and therefore an
intention, more or less hidden, to re-lace the old !ith
something ne!2
We have also alread said that in the conditions that -revail,
at least in .merica and in almost all countries !ith deficient
economic develo-ment, it is the countrside that offers ideal
conditions for the fight2 %herefore the foundation of the
social structure that the guerrilla fighter !ill build begins !ith
changes in the o!nershi- of agrarian -ro-ert2
%he banner of the fight throughout this -eriod !ill be
agrarian reform2 .t first this goal ma or ma not be
com-letel delineated in its e4tent and limits> it ma sim-l
refer to the age3old hunger of the -easant for the land on
!hich he !or"s or !ishes to !or"2
%he conditions in !hich the agrarian reform !ill be reali#ed
de-end u-on the conditions !hich e4isted before the
struggle began, and on the social de-th of the struggle2 :ut
the guerrilla fighter, as a -erson conscious of a role in the
vanguard of the -eo-le, must have a moral conduct that
sho!s him to be a true -riest of the reform to !hich he
as-ires2 %o the stoicism im-osed b the difficult conditions of
!arfare should be added an austerit born of rigid self3
control that !ill -revent a single e4cess, a single sli-,
!hatever the circumstances2 %he guerrilla soldier should be
an ascetic2
.s for social relations, these !ill var !ith the develo-ment
of the !ar2 .t the beginning it !ill not be -ossible to attem-t
an changes in the social order2
Merchandise that cannot be -aid for in cash !ill be -aid for
!ith bonds> and these should be redeemed at the first
o--ortunit2
%he -easant must al!as be hel-ed technicall,
economicall, morall, and culturall2 %he guerrilla fighter !ill
be a sort of guiding angel !ho has fallen into the #one,
hel-ing the -oor al!as and bothering the rich as little as
-ossible in the first -hases of the !ar2 :ut this !ar !ill
continue on its course> contradictions !ill continuousl
become shar-er> the moment !ill arrive !hen man of those
!ho regarded the revolution !ith a certain sm-ath at the
outset !ill -lace themselves in a -osition diametricall
o--osed> and the !ill ta"e the first ste- into battle against
the -o-ular forces2 .t that moment the guerrilla fighter
should act to ma"e himself into the standard bearer of the
cause of the -eo-le, -unishing ever betraal !ith ?ustice2
=rivate -ro-ert should ac@uire in the !ar #ones its social
function2 (or e4am-le, e4cess land and livestoc" not
essential for the maintenance of a !ealth famil should
-ass into the hands of the -eo-le and be distributed
e@uitabl and ?ustl2
%he right of the o!ners to receive -ament for -ossessions
used for the social good ought al!as to be res-ected> but
this -ament !ill be made in bonds )"bonds of ho-e," as
the !ere called b our teacher, General :ao,+ referring to
the common interest that is thereb established bet!een
debtor and creditor,2 %he land and -ro-ert of notorious and
active enemies of the revolution should -ass immediatel
into the hands of the revolutionar forces, (urthermore,
ta"ing advantage of the heat of the !ar3those moments in
!hich human fraternit reaches its highest intensit3all "inds
of coo-erative !or", as much as the mentalit of the
inhabitants !ill -ermit, ought to be stimulated2
%he guerrilla fighter as a social reformer should not onl
-rovide an e4am-le in his o!n life but he ought also
constantl to give orientation in ideological -roblems,
e4-laining !hat he "no!s and !hat he !ishes to do at the
right time2 ;e !ill also ma"e use of !hat he learns as the
months or ears of the !ar strengthen his revolutionar
convictions, ma"ing him more radical as the -otenc of
arms is demonstrated, as the outloo" of the inhabitants
becomes a -art of his s-irit and of his o!n life, and as he
understands the ?ustice and the vital necessit of a series of
changes, of !hich the theoretical im-ortance a--eared to
him be3fore, but devoid of -ractical urgenc2
%his develo-ment occurs ver often, because the initiators
of guerrilla !arfare or rather the directors of guerrilla
!arfare, are not men !ho have bent their bac"s da after
da over the furro!2 %he are men !ho understand the
necessit for changes in the social treatment accorded
-easants, !ithout having suffered in the usual case this
bitter treatment in their o!n -ersons2 8t ha--ens then )8 am
dra!ing on the Cuban e4-erience and enlarging it, that a
genuine interaction is -roduced bet!een these leaders, !ho
!ith their acts teach the -eo-le the fundamental im-ortance
of the armed fight, and the -eo-le themselves !ho rise in
rebellion and teach the leaders these -ractical necessities of
!hich !e s-ea"2 %hus, as a -roduct of this interaction
bet!een the guerrilla fighter and his -eo-le, a -rogressive
radicali#ation a--ears !hich further accentuates the
revolutionar characteristics of the movement and gives it a
national sco-e2
! THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER AS CO(BATANT
%he life and activities of the guerrilla fighter, s"etched thus in
their general lines, call for a series of -hsical, mental, and
moral @ualities needed for ada-ting oneself to -revailing
conditions and for fulfilling com-letel an mission assigned2
%o the @uestion as to !hat the guerrilla soldier should be
li"e, the first ans!er is that he should -referabl be an
inhabitant of the #one2 8f this is the case, he !ill have friends
!ho !ill hel- him> if he belongs to the #one itself, he !ill
"no! it )and this "no!ledge of the ground is one of the most
im-ortant factors in guerrilla !arfare,> and since he !ill be
habituated to local -eculiarities he !ill be able to do better
!or", not to mention that he !ill add to all this the
enthusiasm that arises from defending his o!n -eo-le and
fighting to change a social regime that hurts his o!n !orld2
%he guerrilla combatant is a night combatant> to sa this is
to sa at the same time that he must have all the s-ecial
@ualities that such fighting re@uires2 ;e must be cunning
and able to march to the -lace of attac" across -lains or
mountains !ithout anbod noticing him, and then to fall
u-on the enem, ta"ing advantage of the factor of sur-rise
!hich deserves to be em-hasi#ed again as im-ortant in this
t-e of fight2 .fter causing -anic b this sur-rise, he should
launch himself into the fight im-lacabl !ithout -ermitting a
single !ea"ness in his com-anions and ta"ing advantage of
ever sign of !ea"ness on the -art of the enem2 Stri"ing
li"e a tornado, destroing all, giving no @uarter unless the
tactical circumstances call for it, ?udging those !ho must be
?udged, so!ing -anic among the enem combatants, he
nevertheless treats defenseless -risoners benevolentl and
sho!s res-ect for the dead2
. !ounded enem should be treated !ith care and res-ect
unless his former life has made him liable to a death
-enalt, in !hich case he !ill be treated in accordance !ith
his deserts2 What can never be done is to "ee- -risoners,
unless a secure base of o-erations, invulnerable to the
enem, has been established2 7ther!ise, the -risoner !ill
become a dangerous menace to the securit of the
inhabitants of the region or to the guerrilla band itself
because of the information that he can give u-on re?oining
the enem arm2 8f he has not been a notorious criminal, he
should be set free after receiving a lecture2
%he guerrilla combatant ought to ris" his life !henever
necessar and be read to die !ithout the least sign of
doubt> but, at the same time, he ought to be cautious and
never e4-ose himself unnecessaril2 .ll -ossible
-recautions ought to be ta"en to avoid a defeat or an
annihilation2 (or this reason it is e4tremel im-ortant in
ever fight to maintain vigilance over all the -oints from
!hich enem reinforcements ma arrive and to ta"e
-recautions against an encirclement, the conse@uences of
!hich are usuall not -hsicall disastrous but !hich
damages morale b causing a loss of faith in the -ros-ects
of the struggle2
;o!ever, he ought to be audacious, and, after carefull
anal#ing the dangers and -ossibilities in an action, al!as
read to ta"e an o-timistic attitude to!ard circumstances
and to see reasons for a favorable decision even in
moments !hen the analsis of the adverse and favorable
conditions does not sho! an a--reciable -ositive balance2
%o be able to survive in the midst of these conditions of life
and enem action, the guerrilla fighter must have a degree
of ada-tabilit that !ill -ermit him to identif himself !ith the
environment in !hich he lives, to become a -art of it, and to
ta"e advantage of it as his all to the ma4imum -ossible
e4tent2 ;e also needs a facult of ra-id com-rehension and
an instantaneous inventiveness that !ill -ermit him to
change his tactics according to the dominant course of the
action2
%hese faculties of ada-tabilit and inventiveness in -o-ular
armies are !hat ruin the statistics of the !arlords and cause
them to !aver2
%he guerrilla fighter must never for an reason leave a
!ounded com-anion at the merc of the enem troo-s,
because this !ould be leaving him to an almost certain
death2 .t !hatever cost he must be removed from the #one
of combat to a secure -lace2 %he greatest e4ertions and the
greatest ris"s must be ta"en in this tas"2 %he guerrilla
soldier must be an e4traordinar com-anion2
.t the same time he ought to be closemouthed2 6verthing
that is said and done before him should be "e-t strictl in his
o!n mind2 ;e ought never to -ermit himself a single useless
!ord, even !ith his o!n comrades in arms, since the enem
!ill al!as tr to introduce s-ies into the ran"s of the
guerrilla band in order to discover its -lans, location, and
means of life2
:esides the moral @ualities that !e have mentioned, the
guerrilla fighter should -ossess a series of ver im-ortant
-hsical @ualities2 ;e must be indefatigable2 ;e must be
able to -roduce another effort at the moment !hen
!eariness seems intolerable2 =rofound conviction,
e4-ressed in ever line of his face, forces him to ta"e
another ste-, and this not the last one, since it !ill be
follo!ed b another and another and another until he arrives
at the -lace designated b his chiefs2
;e ought to be able to endure e4tremities, to !ith3stand not
onl the -rivations of food, !ater, clothing, and shelter to
!hich he is sub?ected fre@uentl, but also the sic"ness and
!ounds that often must be cured b nature !ithout much
hel- from the surgeon2 %his is all the more necessar
because usuall the enem !ill assassinate the individual
!ho leaves the guerrilla #one to recover from sic"ness or
!ounds2
%o meet these conditions he needs an iron constitution that
!ill enable him to resist all these adversities !ithout falling ill
and to ma"e of his hunted animalAs life one more factor of
strength2 With the hel- of his natural ada-tabilit, he
becomes a -art of the land it3self !here he fights2
.ll these considerations bring us to as"& !hat is the ideal
age for the guerrilla fighterB %hese limits are al3!as ver
difficult to state -recisel, because individual and social
-eculiarities change the figure2 . -easant, for e4am-le, !ill
be much more resistant than a man from the cit2 . cit
d!eller !ho is accustomed to -hsical e4ercise and a
health life !ill be much more efficient than a man !ho has
lived all his life be3hind a des"2 :ut generall the ma4imum
age of combatants in the com-letel nomadic stage of the
guerrilla struggle ought not to e4ceed fort ears, although
there !ill be e4ce-tional cases, above all among the
-easants2 7ne of the heroes of our struggle, Commandant
Crescencio =ere#, entered the Sierra at 6$ ears of age and
!as immediatel one of the most useful men in the troo-2
We might also as" if the members of the guerrilla band
should be dra!n from a certain social class2 8t has alread
been said that this social com-osition ought to be ad?usted
to that of the #one chosen for the center of o-erations,
!hich is to sa that the combatant nucleus of the guerrilla
arm ought to be made u- of -easants2 %he -easant is
evidentl the best soldier> but the other strata of the
-o-ulation are not b an means to be e4cluded or de-rived
of the o--ortunit to fight for a ?ust cause2 8ndividual
e4ce-tions are also ver im-ortant in this res-ect2
We have not et fi4ed the lo!er limit of age2 We believe that
minors less than si4teen ears of age ought not to be
acce-ted for the fight, e4ce-t in ver s-ecial circumstances2
8n general these oung bos, onl children, do not have
sufficient develo-ment to bear ti- under the !or", the
!eather, and the suffering to !hich the !ill be sub?ected2
%he best age for a guerrilla fighter varies bet!een *$ and +$
ears, a stage in !hich the life of most -er3 sons has
assumed definite sha-e2 Whoever sets out at that age,
abandoning his home, his children, and his entire !orld
must have thought !ell of his res-onsibilit and reached a
firm decision not to retreat a ste-2 %here are e4traordinar
cases of children !ho as combatants have reached the
highest ran"s of our rebel arm, but this is not the usual
case2 (or ever one of them !ho dis-laed great fighting
@ualities, there !ere tens !ho ought to have been returned
to their homes and !ho fre@uentl constituted a dangerous
burden for the guerrilla band2
%he guerrilla fighter, as !e have said, is a soldier !ho
carries his house on his bac" li"e the snail> therefore, he
must arrange his "na-sac" in such a !a that the smallest
@uantit of utensils !ill render the greatest -ossible service2
;e !ill carr onl the indis-ensable, but he !ill ta"e care of
it at all times as something fundamental and not to be lost
e4ce-t in e4tremel adverse situations2
;is armament !ill also be onl that !hich he can carr on
his o!n2 5e-rovisioning is ver difficult, above all !ith
bullets2 %o "ee- them dr, al!as to "ee- them clean, to
count them one b one so that none is lost> these are the
!atch!ords2 .nd the gun ought al!as to be "e-t clean,
!ell greased, and !ith the barrel shining2 8t is advisable for
the chief of each grou- to im-ose some -enalt or
-unishment on those !ho do not maintain their armaments
in these conditions2
=eo-le !ith such notable devotion and firmness must have
an ideal that sustains them in the adverse conditions that !e
have described2 %his ideal is sim-le, !ithout great
-retensions, and in general does not go ver far> but it is so
firm, so clear that one !ill give his life for it !ithout the least
hesitation2 With almost all -easants this ideal is the right to
have and !or" a -iece of land of their o!n and to en?o ?ust
social treatment2 .mong !or"ers it is to have !or", to
receive an ade@uate !age as !ell as ?ust social treatment2
.mong students and -rofessional -eo-le more abstract
ideas such as libert are found to be motives for the fight2
%his brings us to the @uestion& !hat is the life of the guerrilla
fighter li"eB ;is normal life is the long hi"e2 Let us ta"e as
an e4am-le a mountain guerrilla fighter located in !ooded
regions under constant harassment b the enem2 8n these
conditions the guerrilla band moves during dalight hours,
!ithout eating, in order to change its -osition> !hen night
arrives, cam- is set u- in a clearing near a !ater su--l
according to a routine, each grou- assembling in order to
eat in common> at dus" the fires are lighted !ith !hatever is
at hand2
%he guerrilla fighter eats !hen he can and everthing he
can2 Sometimes fabulous feasts disa--ear in the gullet of
the combatant> at other times he fasts for t!o or three das
!ithout suffering an diminution in his ca-acit for !or"2
;is house !ill be the o-en s"> bet!een it and his hammoc"
he -laces a sheet of !ater-roof nlon and beneath the cloth
and hammoc" he -laces his "na-sac", gun, and
ammunition, !hich are the treasures of the guerrilla fighter2
.t times it is not !ise for shoes to be removed, because of
the -ossibilit of a sur-rise attac" b the enem2 Shoes are
another of his -recious treasures2 Whoever has a -air of
them has the securit of a ha-- e4istence !ithin the limits
of the -revailing circumstances2
%hus, the guerrilla fighter !ill live for das !ithout
a--roaching an inhabited -lace, avoiding all contact that
has not been -reviousl arranged, staing in the !ildest
#ones, "no!ing hunger, at times thirst, cold, heat> s!eating
during the continuous marches, letting the s!eat dr on his
bod and adding to it ne! s!eat !ithout an -ossibilit of
regular cleanliness )although this also de-ends some!hat
u-on the individual dis-osition, as does everthing else,2
0uring the recent !ar, u-on entering the village of 6l Uvero
follo!ing a march of si4teen "ilometers and a fight of t!o
hours and fort3five minutes in a hot sun )all added to
several das -assed in ver adverse conditions along the
sea !ith intense heat from a boiling sun, our bodies gave off
a -eculiar and offensive odor that re-elled anone !ho
came near2 7ur noses !ere com-letel habituated to this
t-e of life> the hammoc"s of guerrilla fighters are "no!n for
their characteristic, individual odor2
8n such conditions brea"ing cam- ought to be done ra-idl,
leaving no traces behind> vigilance must be e4treme2 (or
ever ten men slee-ing there ought to be one or t!o on
!atch, !ith the sentinels being changed continuall and a
shar- vigil being maintained over all entrances to the cam-2
Cam-aign life teaches several tric"s for -re-aring meals,
some to hel- s-eed their -re-aration> others to add
seasoning !ith little things found in the forest> still others for
inventing ne! dishes that give a more varied character to
the guerrilla menu, !hich is com3-osed mainl of roots,
grains, salt, a little oil or lard, and, ver s-oradicall, -ieces
of the meat of some animal that has been slain2 %his refers
to the life of a grou- o-erating in tro-ical sectors2
Within the frame!or" of the combatant life, the most
interesting event, the one that carries all to a convulsion of
?o and -uts ne! vigor in everbodAs ste-s, is the battle2
%he battle, clima4 of the guerrilla life, is sought at an
o--ortune moment either !hen an enem encam-ment
sufficientl !ea" to be annihilated has been located and
investigated> or !hen an enem column is advancing
directl to!ard the territor occu-ied b the liberating force2
%he t!o cases are different2
.gainst an encam-ment the action !ill be a thin
encirclement and fundamentall !ill become a hunt for the
members of the columns that come to brea" the
encirclement2 .n entrenched enem is never the favorite
-re of the guerrilla fighter> he -refers his enem to be on
the move, nervous, not "no!ing the ground, fearful of
everthing and !ithout natural -rotections for defense2
Whoever is behind a -ara-et !ith -o!erful arms for
re-elling an offensive !ill never be in the -light, ho!ever
bad his situation, of a long column that is attac"ed suddenl
in t!o or three -laces and cut2 8f the attac"ers are not able
to encircle the column and destro it totall, the !ill retire
-rior to an counteraction2
8f there is no -ossibilit of defeating those entrenched in a
cam- b means of hunger or thirst or b a direct assault, the
guerrilla ought to retire after the encirclement has ielded its
fruits of destruction in the relieving columns2 8n cases !here
the guerrilla column is too !ea" and the invading column
too strong, the action should be concentrated u-on the
vanguard2 %here should be a s-ecial -reference for this
tactic, !hatever the ho-ed3for result, since after the leading
ran"s have been struc" several times, thus diffusing among
the soldiers the ne!s that death is constantl occurring to
those in the van, the reluctance to occu- those -laces !ill
-rovo"e nothing less than mutin2 %herefore, attac"s ought
to be made on that -oint even if the are also made at other
-oints of the column2
%he facilit !ith !hich the guerrilla fighter can -erform his
function and ada-t himself to the environment !ill de-end
u-on his e@ui-ment2 6ven though ?oined !ith others in small
grou-s, he has individual characteristics2 ;e should have in
his "na-sac", besides his regular shelter, everthing
necessar to survival in case he finds himself alone for
some time2
8n giving the list of e@ui-ment !e !ill refer essentiall to that
!hich should be carried b an individual located in rough
countr at the beginning of a !ar, !ith fre@uent rainfall,
some cold !eather, and harassment b the enem> in other
!ords, !e -lace ourselves in the situation that e4isted at the
beginning of the Cuban !ar of liberation2
%he e@ui-ment of the guerrilla fighter is divided into the
essential and the accessor2 .mong the first is a hammoc"2
%his -rovides ade@uate rest> it is eas to find t!o trees from
!hich it can be strung )see =icture *31,> and, in cases
!here one slee-s on the ground, it can serve as a mattress2
Whenever it is raining or the ground is !et, a fre@uent
occurrence in tro-ical mountain #ones, the hammoc" is
indis-ensable for slee-ing2 . -iece of !ater-roof nlon cloth
is its com-lement2 %he nlon should be large enough to
cover the hammoc" !hen tied from its four corners, and !ith
a line strung through the center to the same trees from
!hich the hammoc" hangs2 %his last line serves to ma"e the
nlon into a "ind of tent b raising a center ridge and
causing it to shed !ater2
. blan"et is indis-ensable, because it is cold in the
mountains at night2 8t is also necessar to carr a garment
such as a ?ac"et or coat !hich !ill enable one to bear the
e4treme changes of tem-erature2 Clothing should consist of
rough !or" trousers and shirt !hich ma or ma not be of a
uniform cloth2 Shoes should be of the best -ossible
construction and also, since !ithout good shoes marches
are ver difficult the should be one of the first articles laid
u- in reserve2
Since the guerrilla fighter carries his house in his "na-sac",
the latter is ver im-ortant2 %he more -rimitive t-es ma be
made from an "ind of sac" carried b t!o ro-es> but those
of canvas found in the mar"et or made b a harness ma"er
are -referable2 %he guerrilla fighter ought al!as to carr
some -ersonal food besides that !hich the troo- carries or
consumes in its cam-s2 8ndis-ensable articles are lard or oil,
!hich is necessar for fat consum-tion> canned goods,
!hich should not be consumed e4ce-t in circumstances
!here food for coo"ing cannot be found or !hen there are
too man cans and their !eight im-edes the march>
-reserved fish, !hich has great nutritional value> condensed
mil", !hich is also nourishing, -articularl on account of the
large @uantit of sugar that it contains> some s!eet for its
good taste2 =o!dered mil" can also be carried2 Sugar is
another essential -art of the su--lies, as is salt, !ithout
!hich life becomes sheer martrdom, and something that
serves to season the meals, such as onion, garlic, etc2,
according to the characteristics of the countr2 %his
com-letes the categor of the essentials2
%he guerrilla fighter should carr a -late, "nife, and for",
cam-ing stle, !hich !ill serve all the various necessar
functions2 %he -late can be cam-ing or militar t-e or a
-an that is usable for coo"ing anthing from a -iece of meat
to a -otato, or for bre!ing tea or coffee2
%o care for the rifle, s-ecial greases are necessar> and
these must be carefull administered3se!ing machine oil is
ver good if there is no s-ecial oil avail3able2 .lso needed
are cloths that !ill serve for cleaning the arms fre@uentl
and a rod for cleaning the gun inside, something that ought
to be done often2 %he ammunition belt can be of commercial
t-e or homemade, according to the circumstances, but it
ought to be so made that not a single bullet !ill be lost2
.mmunition is the basis of the fight !ithout !hich everthing
else !ould be in vain> it must be cared for li"e gold2
. canteen or a bottle for !ater is essential, since it !ill
fre@uentl be necessar to drin" in a situation !here !ater
is not available2 .mong medicines, those of general use
should be carried& for e4am-le, -enicillin or some other t-e
of antibiotic, -referabl the t-es ta"en orall, carefull
closed> medicines for lo!ering fever, such as as-irin> and
others ada-ted to treating the endemic diseases of the area2
%hese ma be tablets against malaria, sulfas for diarrhea,
medicines against -arasites of all t-es> in other !ords, fit
the medicine to the characteristics of the region2 8t is
advisable in -laces !here there are -oisonous animals to
carr a--ro-riate in?ections2 Surgical instruments !ill
com-lete the medical e@ui-ment2 Small -ersonal items for
ta"ing care of less im-ortant in?uries should also be
included2
. customar and e4tremel im-ortant comfort in the life of
the guerrilla fighter is a smo"e, !hether cigars, cigarettes, or
-i-e tobacco> a smo"e in moments of rest is a great friend
to the solitar soldier2 =i-es are useful, because the -ermit
using to the e4treme all tobacco that remains in the butts of
cigars and cigarettes at time of scarcit2 Matches are
e4tremel im-ortant not onl for lighting a smo"e, but also
for starting fires> this is one of the great -roblems in the
forest in rain -eriods2 8t is -referable to carr both matches
and a lighter, so that if the lighter runs out of fuel, matches
remain as a substitute2
Soa- should be carried, not onl for -ersonal cleanliness,
but for !ashing eating utensils, because intestinal infections
or irritations are fre@uent and can be caused b s-oiled food
left on dirt coo"ing !are2 With this set of e@ui-ment, the
guerrilla fighter can be assured that he !ill be able to live in
the forest under adverse conditions, no matter ho! bad, for
as long as is necessar to dominate the situation2
%here are accessories that at times are useful and others
that constitute a bother but are ver useful2 %he com-ass is
one of these> at the outset this !ill be used a great deal in
gaining orientation, but little b little "no!ledge of the
countr !ill ma"e it unnecessar2 8n mountainous regions a
com-ass is not of much use, since the route it indicates !ill
usuall be cut off b im-assable obstacles2 .nother useful
article is an e4tra nlon cloth for covering all e@ui-ment
!hen it rains2 5emember that rain in tro-ical countries is
continuous during certain months and that !ater is the
enem of all the things that the guerrilla fighter must carr&
food, ammunition, medicine, -a-er, and clothing2
. change of clothing can be carried, but this is usuall a
mar" of ine4-erience2 %he usual custom is to carr no more
than an e4tra -air of -ants, eliminating e4tra under!ear and
other articles, such as to!els2 %he life of the guerrilla fighter
teaches him to con3serve his energ in carring his
"na-sac" from one -lace to another, and he !ill, little b
little, get rid of everthing that does not have essential
value2
8n addition to a -iece of soa-, useful for !ashing utensils as
!ell as for -ersonal cleanliness, a toothbrush and -aste
should be carried2 8t is !orth!hile also to carr a boo",
!hich !ill be e4changed !ith other members of the band2
%hese boo"s can be good biogra-hies of -ast heroes,
histories, or economic geogra-hies, -referabl of the
countr, and !or"s of general character that !ill serve to
raise the cultural level of the soldiers and discourage the
tendenc to!ard gambling or other undesirable forms of
-assing the time2 %here are -eriods of boredom in the life of
the guerrilla fighter2
Whenever there is e4tra s-ace in the "na-sac"1 it ought to
be used for food, e4ce-t in those #ones !here the food
su--l is eas and sure2 S!eets or food of lesser
im-ortance com-lementing the basic items can be carried2
Crac"ers can be one of these, although the occu- a large
s-ace and brea" u- into crumbs2 8n thic" forests a machete
is useful> in ver !et -laces a small bottle of gasoline or
light, resinous !ood, such as -ine, for "indling !ill ma"e
firebuilding easier !hen the !ood is !et2
. small noteboo" and -en or -encil for ta"ing notes and for
letters to the outside or communication !ith other guerrilla
bands ought al!as to be a -art of the guerrilla fighterAs
e@ui-ment2 =ieces of string or ro-e should be "e-t
available> these have man uses2 .lso needles, thread, and
buttons for clothing2 %he guerrilla fighter !ho carries this
e@ui-ment !ill have a solid house on his bac", rather heav
but furnished to assure a comfortable life during the
hardshi-s of the cam-aign2
# ORGANIZATION OF A GUERRILLA BAND
/o rigid scheme can be offered for the organi#ation of a
guerrilla band> there !ill be innumerable differences
according to the environment in !hich it is to o-erate2 (or
convenience of e4-osition !e !ill su--ose that our
e4-erience has a universal a--lication, but it should be "e-t
in mind that it is onl one !a, that there !ill -ossibl be
ne! forms that ma !or" better !ith the -articular
characteristics of another given armed grou-2
%he si#e of the com-onent units of the guerrilla force is one
of the most difficult -roblems to deal !ith& there !ill be
different numbers of men and different com-ositions of the
troo-, as !e have alread e4-lained2 Let us su--ose a force
situated in favorable ground, mountainous !ith conditions
not so bad as to necessitate -er-etual flight, but not so good
as to afford a base of o-erations2 %he combat units of an
armed force thus situated ought to number not more than
one hundred and fift men, and even this number is rather
high> ideal !ould be a unit of about one hundred men2 %his
constitutes a column, and in the Cuban organi#ation is
commanded b a commandant2 8t should be remembered
that in our !ar the grades of cor-oral and sergeant !ere
omitted because the !ere considered reminiscent of the
trann2
7n this -remise, the commandant commands this !hole
force of one hundred to one hundred fift men> and there !ill
be as man ca-tains as there are grou-s of thirt to fort
men2 %he ca-tain has the function of directing and unifing
his -latoon, ma"ing it fight almost al!as as a unit and
loo"ing after the distribution of men and the general
organi#ation2 8n guerrilla !arfare, the s@uad is the functional
unit2 6ach s@uad, made u- of a--ro4imatel eight to t!elve
men, is commanded b a lieutenant, !ho -erforms for his
grou- functions analogous to those of the ca-tain, to !hom
he must al!as be in constant subordination2
%he o-erational tendenc of the guerrilla band to function in
small grou-s ma"es the s@uad the true unit2 6ight to ten
men are the ma4imum that can act as a unit in a fight in
these conditions& therefore, the s@uad, !hich !ill fre@uentl
be se-arated from the ca-tain even though the fight on the
same front, !ill o-erate under the orders of its lieutenant>
there are e4ce-tions, of course2 . s@uad should not be
bro"en u- nor "e-t dis-ersed at times !hen there is no
fighting2 6ach s@uad and -latoon should "no! !ho the
immediate successor is in case the chief falls, and these
-ersons should be sufficientl trained to be able to ta"e over
their ne! res-onsibilities immediatel2
7ne of the fundamental -roblems of the troo- is food
su--l> in this everone from the last man to the chief must
be treated ali"e2 %his ac@uires a high im-ortance, not onl
because of the chronic shortage of su--lies, but also
because meals are the onl events that ta"e -lace dail2
%he troo-s, !ho have a "een sense of ?ustice, measure the
rations !ith a shar- ee> the least favoritism for anone
ought never to be -ermitted2 8f in certain circumstances the
meal is served to the !hole column, a regular order should
be established and observed strictl, and at the same time
the @uantit and @ualit of food given to each one ought to
be carefull chec"ed2 8n the distribution of clothing the
-roblem is different, these being articles of individual use2
;ere t!o considerations -revail& first, the demand for
necessities of those !ho need them, !hich !ill almost
al!as be greater than the su--l> and, second, the length
of service and merits of each one of the a--licants2 %he
length of service and merits, something ver difficult to fi4
e4actl, should be noted in s-ecial boo"lets b one assigned
this res-onsibilit under the direct su-ervision of the chief of
the column2 %he same should be said about other articles
that become available and are of individual rather than
collective utilit2 %obacco and cigarettes ought to be
distributed according to the general rule of e@ual treatment
for everbod2
%his tas" of distribution should be a s-ecificall assigned
res-onsibilit2 8t is -referable that the -ersons designated be
attached directl to the command2 %he command -erforms,
therefore, administrative tas"s of liaison !hich are ver
im-ortant as !ell as all the other s-ecial tas"s that are
necessar2 7fficers of the greatest intelligence ought to be
in2 it2 Soldiers attached to the command ought to be alert
and of ma4imum dedication, since their burdens !ill usuall
be greater than those borne b the rest of the troo-2
/evertheless, the can have no s-ecial treatment at
mealtime2
6ach guerrilla fighter carries his com-lete e@ui-ment> there
is also a series of im-lements of use to the grou- that
should be e@uitabl distributed !ithin the column2 (or this,
too, rules can be established, de3 -ending u-on the number
of unarmed -ersons in the troo-2 7ne sstem is to distribute
all e4tra materiel, such as medicines, medical or dental or
surgical instruments, e4tra food, clothing, general su--lies,
and heav !ea-ons e@uall among all -latoons, !hich !ill
then be res-onsible for their custod2 6ach ca-tain !ill
distribute these su--lies among the s@uads, and each chief
of s@uad !ill distribute them among his men2 .nother
solution, !hich can be used !hen a -art of the troo- is not
armed, is to create s-ecial s@uads or -latoons assigned to
trans-ort> this !or"s out !ell, since it leaves the soldier !ho
alread has the !eight and res-onsibilit of his rifle free of
e4tra cargo2 8n this !a danger of losing materiel is reduced,
since it is concentrated> and at the same time there is an
incentive for the -orter to carr more and to carr better and
to demonstrate more enthusiasm, since in this !a he !ill
!in his right to a !ea-on in the future2 %hese -latoons !ill
march in the rear -ositions and !ill have the same duties
and the same treatment as the rest of the troo-2
%he tas"s to be carried out b a column !ill var according
to its activities2 8f it is encam-ed, there !ill be s-ecial teams
for "ee-ing !atch2 %hese should be e4-erienced, s-eciall
trained, and the should receive some s-ecial re!ard for
this dut2 %his can consist of increased inde-endence, or, if
there is an e4cess of s!eets or tobacco after -ro-ortional
distribution to each column, something e4tra for the
members of those units that carr out s-ecial tas"s2 (or
e4am-le, if there are one hundred men and one hundred
and fifteen -ac"ages of cigarettes, the fifteen e4tra -ac"s of
cigarettes can be distributed among the members of the
units referred to2 %he vanguard and the rearguard units,
se-arated from the rest, !ill have s-ecial duties of vigilance>
but, besides, each -latoon ought to have such a !atch of its
o!n2 %he farther from the encam-ment the !atch is
maintained, the greater is the securit of the grou-,
es-eciall !hen it is in o-en countr2
%he -laces chosen should be high, dominating a !ide area
b da and difficult to a--roach b night2 8f the -lan is to
sta several das, it is !orth!hile to construct defenses that
!ill -ermit a sustained fire in case of an attac"2 %hese
defenses can be obliterated !hen the guerrilla band moves,
or the can be left if circumstances no longer ma"e it
necessar to hide the -ath of the column2
8n -laces !here -ermanent encam-ments are established,
the defenses ought to be im-roved constantl2 5emember
that in a mountainous #one on ground carefull chosen, the
onl heav arm that is effective is the mortar2 Using roofs
reinforced !ith materials from the region, such as !ood,
roc"s, etc2, it is -ossible to ma"e good refuges !hich are
difficult for the enem forces to a--roach and !hich !ill
afford -rotection from mortar shells for the guerrilla forces2
8t is ver im-ortant to maintain disci-line in the cam-, and
this should have an educational function2 %he guerrilla
fighters should be re@uired to go to bed and get u- at fi4ed
hours2 Games that have no social function and that hurt the
morale of the troo-s and the consum-tion of alcoholic drin"s
should both be -rohibited2 .ll these tas"s are -erformed b
a commission of internal order elected from those combat3
ants of greatest revolutionar merit2 .nother mission of
these -ersons is to -revent the lighting of fires in -laces
visible from a distance or that raise columns of smo"e
before nightfall> also to see2 that the cam- is "e-t clean and
that it is left in such a condition !hen the column leaves as
to sho! no signs of -assage, if this is necessar2
Great care must be ta"en !ith fires !hich leave traces for a
long time2 %he must be covered !ith earth> -a-ers, cans,
and scra-s of food should also be burned2 0uring the march
com-lete silence must -revail in the column2 7rders are
-assed b gestures or b !his-ers that go from mouth to
mouth until the reach the last man2 8f the guerrilla band is
marching through un"no!n -laces, brea"ing a road, or
being led b a guide, the vanguard !ill be a--ro4imatel
one hundred or t!o hundred meters or even more in front,
according to the characteristics of the ground2 8n -laces
!here confusion ma arise as to the route, a man !ill be left
at each turning to a!ait those !ho follo!, and this !ill be
re-eated until the last man in the rearguard has -assed2
%he rearguard !ill also be some!hat se-arated from the
rest of the column, "ee-ing a !atch on the roads in the rear
and tring to erase trac"s of the troo-s as much as -ossible2
8f there is a road coming from the side that offers danger, it
is necessar al!as to have a grou- "ee-ing a !atch on it
until the last man has -assed2 8t is more -ractical that each
-latoon utili#e its o!n men for this s-ecial dut, !ith each
having the obligation to -ass the guard to members of the
follo!ing -latoon and then to re?oin his o!n unit> this
-rocess !ill be continued until the !hole troo- has -assed2
%he march should be uniform and in an established order,
al!as the same2 %hus it !ill al!as be "no!n that =latoon
H1 is the vanguard, follo!ed b =latoon H* and then =latoon
H+, !hich ma be the command> then H1, follo!ed b the
rearguard or =latoon H$ or other -latoons that ma"e u- the
column, al!as in the same order2 8n night marches silence
should be even stricter and the distance bet!een each
combatant shorter, so that no one !ill get lost and ma"e it
necessar to shout and turn on lights2 Light is the enem of
the guerrilla fighter at nighttime2
8f all this marching has attac" as its ob?ective, then u-on
arriving at a given -oint, the -oint to !hich all !ill return
after the ob?ective has been accom-lished, e4tra !eight !ill
be set do!n, such things as "na-sac"s and coo"ing
utensils, for e4am-le, and each -latoon !ill -roceed !ith
nothing more than its arms and fighting e@ui-ment2 %he
-oint of attac" should have been alread studied b
trust!orth -eo-le !ho have reconnoitered the ground and
have observed the location of the enem guards2 %he
leaders, "no!ing the orientation of the base, the number of
men that defend it, etc2, !ill ma"e the final -lan for the
attac" and send combatants to their -laces, al!as "ee-ing
in mind that a good -art of the troo-s should be assigned to
interce-t reinforcements2 8n cases !here the attac" u-on
the base is to be merel a diversion in order to -rovo"e the
sending of reinforcements along roads that can be easil
ambushed, a man should communicate the result ra-idl to
the command as soon as the attac" has been carried out, in
order to brea" the encirclement, if necessar to -revent
being attac"ed from the rear2 8n an case there must al!as
be a !atch on the roads that lead to the -lace of combat
!hile the encirclement or direct attac" is being carried out2
: night a direct attac" is al!as -referable2 8t is -ossible to
ca-ture an encam-ment if there is enough drive and
necessar -resence of mind and if the ris"s are not
e4cessive2
.n encirclement re@uires !aiting and ta"ing cover, closing in
steadil on the enem, tring to harass him in ever !a,
and, above all, tring to force him b fire to come out2 When
the circle has been closed to short range, the "Molotov
coc"tail" is a !ea-on of e4traordinar effectiveness2 :efore
arriving at a range for the "coc"tail," shotguns !ith a s-ecial
charge can be em-loed )See -icture *3*,2 %hese arms,
christened in our !ar !ith the name of "M316," consist of a
163calibre sa!ed3off shotgun !ith a -air of legs added in
such a !a that !ith the butt of the gun the form a tri-od2
%he !ea-on !ill thus be mounted at an angle of about 1$
degrees> this can be varied b moving the legs bac" and
forth2 8t is loaded !ith an o-en shell from !hich all the shot
has been removed2 . clindrical stic" e4tending from the
mu##le of the gun is used as the -ro?ectile2 . bottle of
gasoline resting on a rubber base is -laced on the end of
the stic"2 %his a--aratus !ill fire the burning bottles a
hundred meters or more !ith a fairl high degree of
accurac2 %his is an ideal !ea-on for enrichments !hen the
enem has man !ooden or inflammable material
constructions> also for firing against tan"s in hill countr2
7nce the encirclement ends !ith a victor, or, having
com-leted its ob?ectives, is !ithdra!n, all -latoons retire in
order to the -lace !here the "na-sac"s have been left, and
normal life is resumed2
%he nomadic life of the guerrilla fighter in this stage
-roduces not onl a dee- sense of fraternit among the men
but at times also dangerous rivalries bet!een grou-s or
-latoons2 8f these are not channeled to -roduce beneficial
emulation, there is a ris" that the unit of the column !ill be
damaged2 %he education of the guerrilla fighter is im-ortant
from the ver beginning of the struggle2 %his should e4-lain
to them the social -ur-ose of the fight and their duties,
clarif their understanding, and give them lessons in morale
that serve to forge their characters2 6ach e4-erience should
be a ne! source of strength for victor and not sim-l one
more e-isode in the fight for survival2
7ne of the great educational techni@ues is e4am-le2
%herefore the chiefs must constantl offer the e4am-le of a
-ure and devoted life2 =romotion of the soldier should be
based on valor, ca-acit, and a s-irit of sacrifice> !hoever
does not have these @ualities in a high degree ought not to
have res-onsible assignments, since he !ill cause
unfortunate accidents at an moment2
%he conduct of the guerrilla fighter !ill be sub?ect to
?udgment !henever he a--roaches a house to as" for
something2 %he inhabitants !ill dra! favorable or
unfavorable conclusions about the guerrilla band according
to the manner in !hich an service or food or other
necessit is solicited and the methods used to get !hat is
!anted2 %he e4-lanation b the chief should be detailed
about these -roblems, em-hasi#ing their im-ortance> he
should also teach b e4am-le2 8f a to!n is entered, all
drin"ing of alcohol should be -rohibited and the troo-s
should be e4horted before3 hand to give the best -ossible
e4am-le of disci-line2
%he entrances and e4its to the to!n should be constantl
!atched2
%he organi#ation, combat ca-acit, heroism, and s-irit of the
guerrilla band !ill undergo a test of fire during an
encirclement b the enem, !hich is the most dangerous
situation of the !ar2 8n the ?argon of our guerrilla fighters in
the recent !ar, the -hrase "encirclement face" !as given to
the face of fear !orn b someone !ho !as frightened2 %he
hierarch of the de-osed regime -om-ousl s-o"e of its
cam-aigns of "encirclement and annihilation2" ;o!ever, for
a guerrilla band that "no!s the countr and that is united
ideologicall and emotionall !ith its chief, this is not a
-articularl serious -roblem2 8t need onl ta"e cover, tr to
slo! u- the advance of the enem, im-ede his action !ith
heav e@ui-ment, and a!ait nightfall, the natural all of the
guerrilla fighter2 %hen !ith the greatest -ossible stealth, after
e4-loring and choosing the best road, the band !ill de-art,
utili#ing the most ade@uate means of esca-e and
maintaining absolute silence2 8t is e4tremel difficult in these
conditions at night to -revent a grou- of men from esca-ing
the encirclement2
$ THE CO(BAT
Combat is the most im-ortant drama in the guerrilla life2 8t
occu-ies onl a short time> nevertheless, these brilliant
moments ac@uire an e4traordinar im-ortance, since each
small encounter is a battle of a fundamental "ind for the
combatants2
We have alread -ointed out that an attac" should be
carried out in such a !a as to give a guarantee of victor2
8n addition to general observations concerning the tactical
function of attac" in guerrilla !arfare, the different
characteristics that each action can -re3sent ought to be
noted2 We !ill refer initiall, for -ur-oses of descri-tion, to
the t-e of fight carried out on favorable ground, because
this is the original model of guerrilla !arfare> and it is in this
connection that certain -rinci-les must be e4amined before
dealing !ith other -roblems through a stud of -ractical
e4-erience2 Warfare on the -lain is al!as the result of an
advance b the guerrilla bands conse@uent on their being
strengthened and on changes in conditions> this im-lies an
increase of e4-erience on the -art of the guerrilla and !ith it
the -ossibilit of using that e4-erience to advantage2
8n the first stage of guerrilla !arfare, enem columns !ill
-enetrate insurgent territor dee-l> de-ending on the
strength of these columns t!o different t-es of guerrilla
attac"s !ill be made2 7ne of these, first in chronological
order, is for a fi4ed number of months to cause sstematic
losses in the enemAs offensive ca-acit2 %his tactic is
carried out on the vanguards2 Unfavorable ground im-edes
flan" defenses b the advancing columns> therefore, there
must al!as be one -oint of the vanguard that, as it
-enetrates and e4-oses the lives of its com-onents, serves
to give securit to the rest of the column2 When men and
reserves are insufficient and the enem is strong, the
guerrilla should al!as aim for the destruction of this
vanguard -oint2 %he sstem is sim-le> onl a certain
coordination is necessar2 .t the moment !hen the
vanguard a--ears at the selected -lace3the stee-est
-ossible3a deadl fire is let loose on them, after a
convenient number of men have been allo!ed to -enetrate2
. small grou- must hold the rest of the column for some
moments !hile arms, munitions, and e@ui-ment are being
collected2 %he guerrilla soldier ought al!as to have in mind
that his source of su--l of arms is the enem and that,
e4ce-t in s-ecial circumstances, he ought not to engage in
a battle that !ill not lead to the ca-ture of such e@ui-ment2
When the strength of the guerrilla band -ermits, a com-lete
encirclement of the column !ill be carried out> or at least
this im-ression !ill be given2 8n this case the guerrilla front
line must be strong enough and !ell enough covered to
resist the frontal assaults of the enem, considering,
naturall, both offensive -o!er and combat morale2 .t the
moment in !hich the enem is detained in some chosen
-lace, the rearguard guerrilla forces ma"e an attac" on the
enemAs rear2 Such a chosen -lace !ill have characteristics
ma"ing a flan" maneuver difficult> sni-ers, outnumbered,
-erha-s, b eight or ten times, !ill have the !hole enem
column !ithin the circle of fire2 Whenever there are sufficient
forces in these cases, all roads should be -rotected !ith
ambushes in order to detain reinforcements2 %he
encirclement !ill be closed graduall, above all at night2 %he
guerrilla fighter "no!s the -laces !here he fights, the
invading column does not> the guerrilla fighter gro!s at
night, and the enem feels his fear gro!ing in the dar"ness2
8n this !a, !ithout too much difficult, a column can be
totall destroed> or at least such losses can be inflicted
u-on it as to -revent its returning to battle and to force it to
ta"e a long time for regrou-ing2 When the force of the
guerrilla band is small and it is desired above all to detain
and slo! do!n the advance of the invading column, grou-s
of sni-ers fluctuating bet!een t!o and ten should be
distributed all around the column at each of the four cardinal
-oints2 8n this situation combat can be begun, for e4am-le,
on the right flan"> !hen the enem centers his action on that
flan" and fires on it, shooting !ill begin at that moment from
the left flan"> at another moment from the rearguard or from
the vanguard> and so forth2
With a ver small e4-enditure of ammunition it is -ossible to
hold the enem in chec" indefinitel2
%he techni@ue of attac"ing an enem convo or -osition
must be ada-ted to the conditions of the -lace chosen for
the combat2 8n general, the first at3tac" on an encircled
-lace should be made during night hours against an
advance -ost, !ith sur-rise assured2 . sur-rise attac"
carried out b s"illful commandos can easil li@uidate a
-osition, than"s to the advantage of sur-rise2 (or a regular
encirclement the -aths of esca-e can be controlled !ith a
fe! men and the roads of access defended !ith ambushes>
these should be distributed in such a !a that if one is
unsuccessful, it falls bac" or sim-l !ithdra!s, !hile a
second remains, and so on successivel2 8n cases !here
the sur-rise factor is not -resent, victor in an attem-t to
ta"e an encam-ment !ill de-end on the ca-acit of the
encircling force to detain the at3tem-ts of the rescue
columns2 8n these cases there !ill usuall be su--ort on the
enemAs side b artiller, mortars, air-lanes, and tan"s2 8n
favorable ground the tan" is an arm of small danger> it must
travel b roads that are narro! and is an eas victim of
mines2 %he offensive ca-acit of these vehicles !hen in
formation is here generall absent or reduced, since the
must -roceed in 8ndian file or at most t!o abreast2 %he best
and surest !ea-on against the tan" is the mine> but in a
close fight, !hich ma easil ta"e -lace in stee- -laces, the
"Molotov coc"tail" is an arm of e4traordinar value2 We !ill
not tal" et of the ba#oo"a, !hich for the guerrilla force is a
decisive !ea-on but difficult to ac@uire, at least in the first
stages2 .gainst the mortar there is the recourse of a trench
!ith a roof2 %he mortar is an arm of formidable -otenc
!hen used against an encircled -lace> but on the other
hand, against mobile attac"ers it loses its effectiveness
unless it is used in large batteries2 .rtiller does not have
great im-ortance in this t-e of fight, since it has to be
-laced in locations of convenient access and it does not see
the targets, !hich are constantl shifting2 .viation
constitutes the -rinci-al arm of the o--ressor forces, but its
-o!er of attac" also is much reduced b the fact that its onl
targets are small trenches, generall hidden2 =lanes !ill be
able to dro- high e4-losive or na-alm bombs, both of !hich
constitute inconveniences rather than true dangers2
:esides, as the guerrilla dra!s as close as -ossible to the
defensive lines of the enem, it becomes ver difficult for
-lanes to attac" these -oints of the vanguard effectivel2
When encam-ments !ith !ood or inflammable
constructions are attac"ed, a Molotov coc"tail is a ver
im-ortant arm at a short distance2 .t longer distances
bottles !ith inflammable material !ith the fuse lighted can
be launched from a si4teen3caliber shotgun, as described
earlier2
7f all the -ossible t-es of mines, the most effective,
although re@uiring the most technical ca-acit, is the
remotel e4-loded mine> but contact, fuse, and above all
electric mines !ith their lengths of cord are also e4tremel
useful and constitute on mountainous roads defenses for
the -o-ular forces that are virtuall invulnerable2
. good defense against armored cars along roads is to dig
slo-ing ditches in such a !a that the tan" enters them
easil and after!ards cannot get out, as =icture *3+ sho!s2
%hese can easil be hidden from the enem, es-eciall at
nighttime or !hen he has no infantr in advance of the tan"s
because of resistance b the guerrilla forces2
.nother common form of advance b the enem in #ones
that are not too stee- is in truc"s that are more or less o-en2
%he columns are headed b armored vehicles and the
infantr follo!s behind in truc"s 0e-ending u-on the force
of the guerrilla band it ma be -ossible to encircle the entire
column, follo!ing the general rules> or it can be s-lit b
attac"ing some of the truc"s and simultaneousl e4-loding
mines2 8t is necessar to act ra-idl in this case, sei#ing the
arms of the fallen enem and retiring2
(or an attac" on o-en truc"s, an arm of great im-ortance
!hich should be used !ith all its -otential is the shotgun2 .
si4teen3caliber shotgun !ith large shot can s!ee- ten
meters, nearl the !hole area of the truc", "illing some of
the occu-ants, !ounding others, and -rovo"ing an
enormous confusion2 Grenades, if the are available, are
also e4cellent !ea-ons for these cases2
(or all these attac"s sur-rise is fundamental because, at
least at the moment of firing the first shot, it is one of the
basic re@uirements of guerrilla !arfare2 Sur-rise is not
-ossible if the -easants of the #one "no! of the -resence of
the insurgent arm2 (or this reason all movements of attac"
should be made at night2 7nl men of -roven discretion and
loalt can "no! of these movements and establish the
contacts2 %he march should be made !ith "na-sac"s full of
food, in order to be able to live t!o, three, or four das in the
-laces of ambush2
%he discretion of the -easants should never be trusted too
much, first because there is a natural tendenc to tal" and to
comment on events !ith other members of the famil or !ith
friends> and also because of the inevitable cruelt !ith
!hich the enem soldiers treat the -o-ulation after a defeat2
%error can be so!n, and this terror leads to someoneAs
tal"ing too much, revealing im-ortant information, in the
effort to save his life2
8n general, the -lace chosen for an ambush should be
located at least one daAs march from the habitual cam- of
the guerrilla band, since the enem !ill al3most al!as "no!
its location more or less accuratel2 We said before that the
form of fire in a battle indicates the location of the o--osing
forces> on one side violent and ra-id firing b the soldier of
the line, !ho has the customar abundance of ammunition>
on the other side the methodical, s-oradic fire of the
guerrilla fighter !ho "no!s the value of ever bullet and !ho
endeavors to e4-end it !ith a high degree of econom,
never firing one shot more than necessar2 8t is not
reasonable to allo! an enem to esca-e or to fail to use an
ambush to the full in order to save ammunition, but the
amount that is to be e4-ended in determined circumstances
should be calculated in advance and the action carried out
according to these calculations2
.mmunition is the great -roblem of the guerrilla fighter2
.rms can al!as be obtained2 (urthermore, those !hich are
obtained are not e4-ended in guerrilla !arfare, !hile
ammunition is e4-ended> also, generall, it is arms !ith their
ammunition that are ca-tured and never or rarel
ammunition onl2 6ach !ea-on that is ta"en !ill have its
loads, but it cannot contribute to the others because there
are no e4tras2 %he tactical -rinci-le of saving fire is
fundamental in this t-e of !arfare2
. guerrilla chief !ho ta"es -ride in his role !ill never be
careless about !ithdra!al2 %his should be timel, ra-id, and
carried out so as to save all the !ounded and the e@ui-ment
of the guerrilla, its "na-sac"s, ammunition, etc2 %he rebels
ought never to be sur-rised !hile !ithdra!ing, nor can the
-ermit themselves the negligence of becoming surrounded2
%herefore, guards must be -osted along the chosen road at
all -laces !here the enem arm !ill eventuall bring its
troo-s for!ard in an attem-t to close a circle> and there
must be a sstem of communication that !ill -ermit ra-id
re-orts !hen a force tries to surround the rebels2
8n the combat there must al!as be some unarmed men2
%he !ill recover the guns of com-anions !ho are !ounded
or dead, guns sei#ed in battle or belonging to -risoners>
the !ill ta"e charge of the -risoners, of removing the
!ounded, and of transmission of messages2 :esides, there
ought to be a good cor-s of messengers !ith iron legs and
a -roven sense of res-onsibilit !ho !ill give the necessar
re-orts in the least -ossible time2
%he number of men needed besides the armed combatants
varies> but a general rule is t!o or three for each ten,
including those !ho !ill be -resent at the scene of the battle
and those !ho !ill carr out necessar tas"s in the
rearguard, "ee-ing !atch on the route of !ithdra!al and
-erforming the messenger services mentioned above2
When a defensive t-e of !ar is being fought, that is to sa,
!hen the guerrilla band is endeavoring to -rohibit the
-assage of an invasion column beond a certain -oint, the
action becomes a !ar of -ositions> but al!as at the outset
it should have the factor of sur-rise2 8n this case, since
trenches as !ell as other defensive sstems that !ill be
easil observable b the -easants are going to be used, it is
necessar that these latter remain in the friendl #one2 8n
this t-e of !arfare the government generall establishes a
bloc"ade of the region, and the -easants !ho have not fled
must go to bu their basic foods at establishments located
outside the #ones of guerrilla action2 Should these -ersons
leave the region at critical moments, such as those !e are
no! describing, this !ould constitute a serious danger on
account of the information that the could eventuall su--l
to the enem arm2 %he -olic of com-lete isolation must
serve as the strategic -rinci-le of the guerrilla arm in these
cases2
%he defenses and the !hole defensive a--aratus should be
arranged in such a manner that the enem vanguard !ill
al!as fall into an ambush2 8t is ver im-ortant as a
-schological factor that the man in the vanguard !ill die
!ithout esca-e in ever battle, because this -roduces !ithin
the enem arm a gro!ing consciousness of this danger,
until the moment arrives !hen nobod !ants to be in the
vanguard> and it is obvious that a column !ith no vanguard
cannot move, since somebod has to assume that
res-onsibilit2 .lso encirclements can be carried out if these
are e4-edient> or diversionar maneuvers such as flan"
attac"s> or the enem can sim-l be detained frontall2 8n
ever case, -laces !hich are susce-tible of being utili#ed b
the enem for flan" attac"s should be fortified2
We are no! assuming that more men and arms are
available than in the combats described hitherto2 8t is
evident that the bloc"ade of all -ossible roads con3verging
into a #one, !hich ma be ver numerous, re@uires a large
-ersonnel2 %he various "inds of tra-s and attac"s against
armored vehicles !ill be in3 creased here, in order to give
the greatest securit -G$3sible to the sstems of fi4ed
trenches !hich can be located b the enem2 8n general in
this t-e of fight the order is to defend the -ositions unto
death if necessar> and it is essential to assure the
ma4imum -ossibilities of survival to ever defender2
%he more a trench is hidden from distant vie!, the better>
above all, it is im-ortant to give it a cover so that mortar fire
!ill be ineffective2 Mortars of 6G21 or I$ millimeters, the
usual cam-aign caliberAs, cannot -enetrate a good roof
made !ith sim-le materials from the region2 %his ma be
made from a base of !ood, earth, and roc"s covered !ith
some camouflage material2 .n e4it for esca-e in an
e4tremit must al!as be constructed, so that the defender
ma get a!a !ith less danger2
%he s"etch Eabove, See =icture *31 ed2F sho!s the form in
!hich these defenses !ere constructed in the Sierra
Maestra2 %he !ere sufficient to -rotect us from mortar fire2
%his outline clearl indicates that fi4ed lines of fire do not
e4ist2 %he lines of fire are something more or less
theoretical> the are established at certain critical moments,
but the are e4tremel elastic and -ermeable on both sides2
What does e4ist is a !ide no manAs land2 :ut the
characteristics of no manAs land in guerrilla !arfare are that
it is inhabited b a civil -o-ulation, and that this civil
-o-ulation collaborates in a certain measure !ith either of
the t!o sides, even though in an over!helming ma?orit !ith
the insurrectionar band2 %hese -eo-le cannot be removed
en masse from the #one on account of their numbers and
because this !ould create -roblems of su--l for either one
of the con3tenders !ho tried to -rovide food for so man
-eo-le2 %his no manAs land is -enetrated b -eriodic
incursions )generall during the datime, b the re-ressive
forces and at night b the guerrilla forces2 %he guerrilla
forces find there a maintenance base of great im-ortance
for their troo-s> this should be cared for in a -olitical !a,
al!as establishing the best -ossible relations !ith the
-easants and merchants2
8n this t-e of !arfare the tas"s of those !ho do not carr
arms, of those !ho are not direct combat3 ants, are
e4tremel im-ortant2 We have alread indicated some of the
characteristics of liaison in -laces of combat> but liaison is
an institution throughout the !hole guerrilla organi#ation2
Liaison out to the most distant command or out to the most
distant grou- of guerrilla fighters ought to be lin"ed in such a
!a that messages !ill travel from one -lace to an3other via
the most ra-id sstem available in the region2 %his holds for
regions of eas defense, that is to sa, in favorable ground,
as !ell as in unfavorable ground2 . guerrilla band o-erating
in unfavorable ground !ill not be able to use modern
sstems of communication, such as telegra-h, roads, etc2,
e4ce-t some radios located in militar garrisons ca-able of
being defended2 8f these fall into the hands of the enem
force, it is necessar to change codes and fre@uencies, a
tas" that is rather troublesome2
8n all these matters !e are s-ea"ing from memor of things
that occurred in our !ar of liberation2 %he dail and accurate
re-ort on all activities of the enem is com-lemented !ith
liaison2 %he sstem of es-ionage should be carefull
studied, !ell !or"ed out, and -ersonnel chosen !ith
ma4imum care2 %he harm that a counter3s- can do is
enormous, but even !ithout such an e4treme case, the
harm that can result from e4aggerated information !hich
mis?udges the danger is ver great2 8t is not -robable that
danger !ill be underrated2 %he tendenc of -eo-le in the
countr is to overrate and e4aggerate it2 %he same magic
mentalit that ma"es -hantasms and various su-ernatural
beings a--ear also creates monstrous armies !here there
is hardl a -latoon or an enem -atrol2 %he s- ought to
seem as neutral as -ossible, not "no!n b the enem to
have an connection !ith the forces of liberation2 %his is not
as difficult a tas" as it a--ears> man such -ersons are
found in the course of the !ar& businessmen, -rofessional
men, and even clergmen can lend their hel- in this t-e of
tas" and give timel information2
7ne of the most im-ortant characteristics of guerrilla
!arfare is the notable difference bet!een the in3 formation
that reaches the rebel forces and the information -ossessed
b the enem2 While the latter must o-erate in regions that
are absolutel hostile, finding sullen silence on the -art of
the -easants, the rebels have in nearl ever house a friend
or even a relative> and ne!s is -assed about constantl
through the liaison sstem until it reaches the central
command of the guerrilla force or of the guerrilla grou- that
is in the #one2
When an enem -enetration occurs in territor that has
become o-enl -ro3guerrilla, !here all the -easants
res-ond to the cause of the -eo-le, a serious -roblem is
created2 %he ma?orit of -easants tr to esca-e !ith the
-o-ular arm, abandoning their children and their !or">
others even carr the !hole famil> some !ait u-on events2
%he most serious -roblem that an enem -enetration into
guerrilla territor can -rovo"e is that of a grou- of families
finding themselves in a tight, at times des-erate situation2
Ma4imum hel- should be given to them, but the must be
!arned of the troubles that can follo! u-on a flight into
inhos-itable #ones so far from their habitual -laces of
livelihood, e4-osed to the hardshi-s that usuall befall in
such cases2
8t is not -ossible to describe an -attern of re-ression on the
-art of the enemies of the -eo-le2 .l3 though the general
methods of re-ression are al!as the same, the enemies of
the -eo-le act in a more or less intensel criminal fashion
according to the s-ecific social, historic, and economic
circumstances of each -lace2 %here are -laces !here the
flight of a man into the guerrilla #one, leaving his famil and
his house, does not -rovo"e an great reaction2 %here are
others !here this is enough to -rovo"e the burning or
sei#ure of his belongings, and still others !here the flight !ill
bring death to all members of his famil2 .de@uate
distribution and organi#ation of the -easants !ho are going
to be affected b an enem advance must of course be
arranged according to the habits that -revail in the !ar #one
or countr concerned2
7bviousl -re-arations must be made to e4-el the enem
from such territor b moving against his su-3-lies,
com-letel cutting his lines of communication, destroing b
means of small guerrilla bands his at3tem-ts to su--l
himself, and in general forcing him to devote large @uantities
of men to his su--l -roblem2
8n all these combat situations a ver im-ortant factor is the
correct utili#ation of reserves !herever battle begins2 %he
guerrilla arm, because of its characteristics, can rarel
count on reserves, since it al!as stri"es in such a !a that
the efforts of ever individual are regulated and em-loed at
something2 /evertheless, des-ite these characteristics it
should have at some-lace, men read to res-ond to an
unforeseen develo-ment, to detain a counteroffensive, or to
ta"e care of a situation at an moment2 Within the
organi#ation of the guerrilla band, assuming that the
conditions and -ossibilities of the moment -ermit, a utilit
-latoon can be held in readiness, a -latoon that should
al!as go to the -laces of greatest danger2 8t can be
christened the "suicide -latoon" or something similar> this
title in realit indicates its functions2 %his "suicide -latoon"
should be in ever -lace !here a battle is decided& in the
sur-rise at3tac"s u-on the vanguard, in the defense of the
most vulnerable and dangerous -laces, in a !ord, !herever
the enem threatens to brea" the stabilit of the line of fire2
8t ought to be made u- strictl of volunteers2 6ntrance into
this -latoon should be regarded almost as a -ri#e for merit2
8n time it becomes the favorite grou- of an guerrilla
column, and the guerrilla fighter !ho !ears its insignia
en?os the admiration and res-ect of all his com-anions2
& BEGINNING) DE%ELOP(ENT) AND END OF A
GUERRILLA WAR
We have no! abundantl defined the nature of guerrilla
!arfare2 Let us ne4t describe the ideal develo-ment of such
a !ar from its beginning as a rising b a single nucleus on
favorable ground2
8n other !ords, !e are going to theori#e once more on the
basis of the Cuban e4-erience2 .t the outset there is a more
or less homogeneous grou-, !ith some arms, that devotes
itself almost e4clusivel to hiding in the !ildest and most
inaccessible -laces, ma"ing little contact !ith the -easants2
8t stri"es a fortunate blo! and its fame gro!s2 . fe!
-easants, dis-ossessed of their land or engaged in a
struggle to conserve it and oung idealists of other classes
?oin the nucleus> it ac@uires greater audacit and starts to
o-erate in inhabited -laces, ma"ing more contact !ith the
-eo-le of the #one> it re-eats attac"s, al!as fleeing after
ma"ing them> suddenl it engages in combat !ith some
column or other and destros its vanguard2 Men continue to
?oin it> it has increased in number, but its organi#ation
remains e4actl the same> its caution diminishes, and it
ventures into more -o-ulous #ones2
Later it sets u- tem-orar cam-s for several das> it
abandons these u-on receiving ne!s of the a--roach of the
enem arm, or u-on suffering bombardments, or sim-l
u-on becoming sus-icious that such ris"s have arisen2 %he
numbers in the guerrilla band increase as !or" among the
masses o-erates to ma"e of each -easant an enthusiast for
the !ar of liberation2 (inall, an inaccessible -lace is
chosen, a settled life is initiated, and the first small
industries begin to be established& a shoe factor, a cigar
and cigarette factor, a clothing factor, an arms factor, a
ba"er, hos-itals, -ossibl a radio transmitter, a -rinting
-ress, etc2
%he guerrilla band no! has an organi#ation, a ne!
structure2 8t is the head of a large movement !ith all the
characteristics of a small government2 . court is established
for the administration of ?ustice, -ossibl la!s are
-romulgated2 and the !or" of indoctrination of the -easant
masses continues, e4tended also to !or"ers if there are an
near, to dra! them to the cause2 .n enem action is
launched and defeated> the number of rifles increases> !ith
these the number of men fighting !ith the guerrilla band
increases2 . moment arrives !hen its radius of action !ill
not have increased in the same -ro-ortion as its -ersonnel>
at that moment a force of a--ro-riate si#e is se-arated, a
column or a -latoon, -erha-s, and this goes to another
-lace of combat2
%he !or" of this second grou- !ill begin !ith some!hat
different characteristics because of the e4-erience that it
brings and because of the influence of the troo-s of
liberation on the !ar #one2 %he original nucleus also
continues to gro!> it has no! received substantial su--ort in
food, sometimes in guns, from various -laces> men continue
to arrive> the administration of government, !ith the
-romulgation of la!s, continues> schools are established,
-ermitting the indoctrination and training of recruits2 %he
leaders learn steadil as the !ar develo-s, and their
ca-acit of command gro!s under the added
res-onsibilities of the @ualitative and @uantitative increases
in their forces2
8f there are distant territories, a grou- de-arts for them at a
certain moment, in order to confirm the advances that have
been made and to continue the ccle2
:ut there !ill also e4ist an enem territor, unfavorable for
guerrilla !arfare2 %here small grou-s begin to -enetrate,
assaulting the roads, destroing bridges, -lanting mines,
so!ing dis@uiet2 With the u-s and do!ns characteristic of
!arfare the movement continues to gro!> b this time the
e4tensive !or" among the masses ma"es eas movement
of the forces -ossible in unfavorable territor and so o-ens
the final stage, !hich is suburban guerrilla !arfare2
Sabotage increases considerabl in the !hole #one2 Life is
-aral#ed> the #one is con@uered2 %he guerrillas then go
into other #ones, !here the fight !ith the enem arm
along defined fronts> b no! heav arms have been
ca-tured, -erha-s even some ,tan"s> the fight is more
e@ual2 %he enem falls !hen the -rocess of -artial victories
becomes transformed into final victories, that is to sa, !hen
the enem is brought to acce-t battle in conditions im-osed
b the guerrilla band> there he is annihilated and his
surrender com-elled2
%his is a s"etch that describes !hat occurred in the different
stages of the Cuban !ar of liberation> but it has a content
a--ro4imating the universal2 /evertheless, it !ill not al!as
be -ossible to count on the degree of intimac !ith the
-eo-le, the conditions, and the leadershi- that e4isted in our
!ar2 8t is unnecessar to sa that (idel Castro -ossesses
the high @ualities of a fighter and statesman& our -ath, our
struggle, and our trium-h !e o!ed to his vision2 We cannot
sa that !ithout him the victor of the -eo-le !ould not have
been achieved> but that victor !ould certainl have cost
must more and !ould have been less com-lete2
CHAPTER III: ORGANIZATION OF THE
GUERRILLA FRONT
1 SUPPL"
. good su--l sstem is of basic im-ortance to the guerrilla
hand2 . grou- of men in contact !ith the soil must live from
the -roducts of this soil and at the same time must see that
the livelihood continues of those !ho -rovide the su--lies,
the -easants> since in the hard guerrilla struggle it is not
-ossible, above all at the beginning, for the grou- to
dedicate its o!n energies to -roducing su--lies, not to
mention that these su--lies !ould be easil discovered and
destroed b enem forces in a territor li"el to be
com-letel -enetrated b the action of re-ressive columns2
Su--l in the first stages is al!as internal2
.s the guerrilla struggle develo-s, it !ill be necessar to
arrange su--l from outside the limits or territor of the
combat2 .t the beginning the band lives solel on !hat the
-easants have> it ma be -ossible to reach a store
occasionall to bu something, but never -ossible to have
lines of su--l since there is no territor in !hich to
establish them2 %he line of su--l and the store of food are
conditioned b the develo-ment of the guerrilla struggle2
%he first tas" is to gain the absolute confidence of the
inhabitants of the #one> and this confidence is !on b a
-ositive attitude to!ard their -roblems, b hel- and a
constant -rogram of orientation, b the defense of their
interests and the -unishment of all !ho attem-t to ta"e
advantage of the chaotic moment in !hich the live in order
to use -ressure, dis-ossess the -easants, sei#e their
harvests, etc2 %he line should be soft and hard at the same
time& soft and !ith a s-ontaneous coo-eration for all those
!ho honestl sm-athi#e !ith the revolutionar movement>
hard u-on those !ho are attac"ing it outright, fomenting
dissentions, or sim-l communicating im-ortant information
to the enem arm2
Little b little the territor !ill be cleared, and there !ill then
be a greater ease of action2 %he fundamental -rinci-le that
ought to -revail is that of -aing al!as for all merchandise
ta"en from a friend2 %his merchandise can consist of cro-s
or of articles from commercial establishments2 Man times
the !ill be donated, but at other times the economic
conditions of the -easantr -revent such donations2 %here
are cases in !hich the necessities of !arfare force the band
to ta"e needed food from stores !ithout -aing for it, sim-l
because there is no mone2 8n such cases the merchant
ought al!as to be given a bond, a -romissor note,
something that certifies to the debt, "the bonds of ho-e"
alread described2 ft is better to use this method onl !ith
-eo-le !ho are outside the limits of the liberated territor,
and in such cases to -a as soon as -ossible all or at least
a -art of the debt2 When conditions have im-roved
sufficientl to maintain a territor -ermanentl free from the
dominion of the o--osing arm, it is -ossible to set u-
collective -lantings, !here the -easants !or" the land for
the benefit of the guerrilla arm2 8n this !a an ade@uate
food su--l of a -ermanent character is guaranteed2
8f the number of volunteers for the guerrilla arm is much
greater than the number of arms, and -olitical
circumstances -revent these men from entering #ones
dominated b the enem, the rebel arm can -ut them to
!or" directl on the land, harvesting cro-s> this guarantees
su--l and adds something to their record of service loo"ing
to!ard future -romotion to the status of combatants2
;o!ever, it is more advisable that the -easants themselves
so! their o!n cro-s> this results in !or" -erformed more
effectivel, !ith more enthusiasm and s"ill2 When conditions
have ri-ened even more, it is -ossible, de-ending on the
cro-s involved, to arrange -urchases of entire harvests in
such a !a that the can remain in the field or in
!arehouses for the use of the arm2
When agencies also charged !ith the dut of su--ling the
-easant -o-ulation have been established, all food su--lies
!ill be concentrated in these agencies in order to facilitate a
sstem of barter among the -easants, !ith the guerrilla
arm serving as intermediar2
8f conditions continue to im-rove, ta4es can be established>
these should be as light as -ossible, above all for the small
-roducer2 8t is im-ortant to -a attention to ever detail of
relations bet!een the -easant class and the guerrilla arm,
!hich is an emanation of that class2
%a4es ma be collected in mone in some cases, or in the
form of a -art of the harvest, !hich !ill serve to increase the
food su--lies2 Meat is one of the articles of -rimar
necessit2 8ts -roduction and conservation must be assured2
(arms should be established under -easants having no
a--arent connection !ith the arm, if the #one is not secure>
the !ill de3vote themselves to the -roduction of chic"ens,
eggs, goats, and -igs, starting !ith stoc" that has been
bought or confiscated from the large lando!ners2 8n the
#ones of big estates there are usuall large @uantities of
cattle2 %hese can be "illed and salted and the meat
maintained in condition for consum-tion for a long -eriod of
time2
%his !ill also -roduce hides2 . leather industr, more or less
-rimitive, can be develo-ed to -rovide leather for shoes,
one of the fundamental accessories in the struggle2 8n
general, necessar foods are the follo!ing )de-ending on
the #one,& meat, salt, vegetables, starches, or grains2 %he
basic food is al!as -roduced b the -easants> it ma be
"malanga," as in the mountainous regions of 7riente
=rovince in Cuba> it ma be corn, as in the mountainous
regions of Me4ico, Central .merica, and =eru> -otatoes,
also in =eru> in other #ones, such as .rgentina, cattle>
!heat in others> but al!as it is necessar to assure a
su--l of the fundamental food for the troo- as !ell as some
"inds of fat !hich -ermit better food -re-aration> these ma
be animal or vegetable fats2
Salt is one of the essential su--lies2 When the force is near
the sea and in contact !ith it, small drers should be
established immediatel> these !ill assure some -roduction
in order al!as to have a reserve stoc" and the abilit to
su--l the troo-s2 5emember that in !ild -laces such as
these, !here onl some of the foods are -roduced, it is eas
for the enem to establish an encirclement that can greatl
hurt the flo! of su--lies to the #one2 8t is !ell to -rovide
against such eventualities through -easant organi#ation and
civil organi#ations in general2 %he inhabitants of the #one
should have on hand a minimum food su--l that !ill -ermit
them at least to survive, even though -oorl, during the
hardest -hases of the struggle2 .n attem-t should be made
to collect ra-idl a good -rovision of foods that do not
decom-ose 3such grains, for e4am-le, as corn, !heat, rice,
etc2, !hich !ill last @uite a long time> also flour, salt, sugar,
and canned goods of all t-es> further, the necessar seeds
should be so!n2
. moment !ill arrive !hen all the food -roblems of the
troo-s in the #one are solved, but large @uantities of other
-roducts !ill be needed& leather for shoes, if it has not been
-ossible to create an industr for su--ling the #one> cloth
and all the accessor items necessar for clothing> -a-er, a
-ress or mimeogra-h machine for ne!s-a-ers, in", and
various other im-lements2 8n other !ords, the need for
articles from the outside !orld !ill increase in the measure
that the guerrilla bands become organi#ed and the
organi#ation becomes more com-le42 8n order for this need
to be met ade@uatel it is necessar that the organi#ed lines
of su--l function -erfectl2 %hese organi#ations are
com-osed basicall of friendl -easants2 %he should have
t!o -oles, one in the guerrilla #one and one in a cit2
0e-arting and radiating from the guerrilla #ones, lines of
su--l !ill -enetrate the !hole territor, -ermitting the
-assage of materials2 Little b little the -easants accustom
themselves to the danger )in small grou-s the can !or"
marvels, and come to -lace the material that is needed in
the indicated s-ot !ithout running e4treme ris"s2 %hese
movements can be carried out at night !ith mules or other
similar trans-ort animals or !ith truc"s, de-ending on the
#one2 %hus, a ver good su--l ma be achieved2 %his t-e
of line of su--l is for areas near -laces of o-eration2
8t is also necessar to organi#e a line of su--l from distant
areas2 %hese organi#ations should -roduce the mone
needed for ma"ing -urchases and also the im-lements that
cannot be -roduced in small to!ns or -rovincial cities2 %he
organi#ation !ill be nourished !ith direct donations from
sectors sm-athetic to the struggle, e4changed for secret
"bonds," !hich should be delivered2 . strict control over the
-ersonnel charged !ith the management of this o-eration
should al!as be maintained2 Serious conse@uences should
follo! an neglect of the indis-ensable moral re@uisites
involved in this res-onsibilit2 =urchases can be made !ith
cash and also !ith "bonds of ho-e" !hen the guerrilla arm,
having de-arted from its base of o-erations, menaces a
ne! #one2 8n these cases there is no !a to avoid ta"ing the
merchandise from an merchant> he must rel on the good
faith and ca-abilities of the guerrilla armies to ma"e good on
his account2
(or all lines of su--l that -ass through the countr, it is
necessar to have a series of houses, terminals, or !a3
stations, !here su--lies ma be hidden during the da !hile
!aiting to be moved b night2 7nl those directl in charge
of the food su--lies should "no! these houses2 %he least
-ossible number of inhabitants should "no! about this
trans-ort o-eration, and these should be -ersons in !hom
the organi#ation has the greatest confidence2
%he mule is one of the most useful animals for these tas"s2
With an incredible resistance to fatigue and a ca-acit to
!al" in the hilliest #ones, the mule can carr more than 1GG
"ilograms on its bac" for man das2 %he sim-licit of its
food needs also ma"es it an ideal means of trans-ort2 %he
mule train should be !ell su--lied !ith shoes> the muleteers
should understand their animals and ta"e the best -ossible
care of them2 8n this !a it is -ossible to have regular four3
footed armies !ith an unbelievable utilit2 :ut fre@uentl,
des-ite the strength of the animal and its ca-acit to bear u-
through the hardest das, difficult of -assage !ill ma"e it
necessar to leave the cargo in fi4ed sites2 8n order to avoid
this necessit, there should be a team charged !ith ma"ing
trails for this class of animals2 8f all these conditions are met,
if an ade@uate organi#ation is created, and if the rebel arm
maintains e4cellent relations as needed !ith the -easants,
an effective and lasting su--l for the !hole troo- is
guaranteed2
! CI%IL ORGANIZATION
%he civil organi#ation of the insurrectional movement is ver
im-ortant on both fronts, the e4ternal and the internal2
/aturall, these t!o have characteristics that are as different
as their functions, though the both -erform tas"s that fall
under the same name2 %he collections that can be carried
out on the e4ternal front, for e4am-le, are not the same as
those !hich can ta"e -lace on the internal front> neither are
the -ro-aganda and the su--l2 Let us describe first the
tas"s on the internal front2 ;ere !e are dealing !ith a -lace
dominated, relativel s-ea"ing, b the forces of liberation2
.lso, it is to be su--osed that the #one is ada-ted to
guerrilla !arfare, because !hen these conditions do not
e4ist, !hen the guerrilla fighting is ta"ing -lace in -oorl
ada-ted terrain, the guerrilla organi#ation increases in
e4tension but not in de-th> it embraces ne! -laces, but it
cannot arrive at an internal organi#ation, since the !hole
#one is -enetrated b the enem2 7n the internal front !e
can have a series of organi#ations !hich -erform s-ecific
functions for more efficienc in administration2 8n general,
-ro-aganda belongs directl to the arm, but it also can be
se-arated from the arm if "e-t under its control2 )%his -oint
is so im-ortant that !e !ill treat it se-aratel2, Collections
are a function of the civil organi#ation, as are the general
tas"s of organi#ing the -easants and !or"ers, if these are
-resent2 7ne council should govern both of these classes2
5aising su--lies, as !e e4-lained in a -revious cha-ter, can
be carried out in various !as& through direct or indirect
ta4es, through direct or indirect donations, and through
confiscations> all this goes to ma"e u- the large cha-ter on
su--lies for the guerrilla arm2
Jee- in mind that the #one ought b no means to be
im-overished b the direct action of the rebel arm, even
though the latter !ill be res-onsible indirectl for the
im-overishment that results from enem encirclement, a fact
that the adversarAs -ro-aganda !ill re-eatedl -oint out2
=recisel for this reason conflicts ought not to be created b
direct causes2 %here ought not be, for e4am-le, an
regulations that -revent the farmers of a #one in liberated
territor from selling their -roducts outside that territor,
save in e4treme and transitor circumstances and !ith a full
e4-lanation of these interru-tions to the -easantr2 6ver
act of the guerrilla arm ought al!as to be accom-anied b
the -ro-aganda necessar to e4-lain the reasons for it2
%hese reasons !ill generall be !ell understood b a
-easantr that has sons, fathers, brothers, or relations
!ithin this arm, !hich is, therefore, something of their o!n2
8n vie! of the im-ortance of relations !ith the -easants, it is
necessar to create organi#ations that ma"e regulations for
them, organi#ations that e4ist not onl !ithin the liberated
area, but also have connections in the ad?acent areas2
=recisel through these connections it is -ossible to
-enetrate a #one for a future enlargement of the guerrilla
front2 %he -easants !ill so! the seed !ith oral and !ritten
-ro-aganda, !ith accounts of life in the other #one, of the
la!s that have alread been issued for the -rotection of the
small -easant, of the s-irit of sacrifice of the rebel arm> in a
!ord, the are creating the necessar atmos-here for
hel-ing the rebel troo-s2
%he -easant organi#ations should also have connections of
some t-e that !ill -ermit the channeling and sale of cro-s
b the rebel arm agencies in enem territor through
intermediaries more or less benevolent, more or less
friendl to the -easant class2 Coined !ith a devotion to the
cause !hich brings the merchant to def dangers in such
cases, there also e4ists the devotion to mone that leads
him to ta"e advantage of the o--ortunit to gain -rofits2
We have alread s-o"en, in connection !ith su--l
-roblems, of the im-ortance of the de-artment of road
construction2 When the guerrilla band has achieved a
certain level of develo-ment, it no longer !anders about
through diverse regions !ithout an encam-ment> it has
centers that are more or less fi4ed2 5outes should be
established varing from small -aths -ermitting the -assage
of a mule to good roads for truc"s2 8n all this, the ca-acit of
the organi#ation of the rebel arm must be "e-t in mind, as
!ell as the offensive ca-acit of the enem, !ho ma
destro these constructions and even ma"e use of roads
built b his o--onent to reach the encam-ments more
easil2 %he fundamental rule should be that roads are for
assisting su--l in -laces !here an other solution !ould be
im-ossible> the should not be constructed e4ce-t in
circumstances !here there is a virtual certaint that the
-osition can be maintained against an attac" b the
adversar2 .nother e4ce-tion !ould be roads built !ithout
great ris" to facilitate communication bet!een -oints that
are not of vital im-ortance2
(urthermore, other means of communication ma be
established2 7ne of these that is e4tremel im-ortant is the
tele-hone2 %his can be strung in the forest !ith the
convenience that arises from using trees for -osts2 %here is
the advantage that the are not visible to the enem from
above2 %he tele-hone also -resu--oses a #one that the
enem cannot -enetrate2
%he council3or central de-artment of ?ustice, revolutionar
la!s, and administration3is one of the vital features of a
guerrilla arm full constituted and !ith territor of its o!n2
%he council should be under the charge of an individual !ho
"no!s the la!s of the countr> if he understands the
necessities of the #one from a ?uridical -oint of vie!, this is
better et> he can -roceed to -re-are a series of decrees
and regulations that hel- the -easant to normali#e and
institutionali#e his life !ithin the rebel #one2
(or e4am-le, during our e4-erience in the Cuban !ar !e
issued a -enal code, a civil code, rules for su--ling the
-easantr and rules of the agrarian reform2 Subse@uentl,
the la!s fi4ing @ualifications of candidates in the elections
that !ere to be held later throughout the countr !ere
established> also the .grarian 5eform La! of the Sierra
Maestra2 %he council is li"e!ise in charge of accounting
o-erations for the guerrilla column or columns> it is
res-onsible for handling mone -roblems and at times
intervenes directl in su--l2
.ll these recommendations are fle4ible> the are based
u-on an e4-erience in a certain -lace and are conditioned
b its geogra-h and histor> the !ill be modified in
different geogra-hical, historical, and social situations2 8n
addition to the council, it is necessar to "ee- the general
health of the #one in mind2 %his can be done b means of
central militar hos-itals that should give the most com-lete
assistance -ossible to the !hole -easantr2 Whether
ade@uate medical treatment can be given !ill de-end u-on
the stage reached b the revolution2 Civil hos-itals and civil
health administration are united directl !ith the guerrilla
arm, and their functions are -erformed b officers and men
of the arm, !ho have the dual function of caring for the
-eo-le and orienting them to!ard better health2 %he big
health -roblems among -eo-le in these conditions are
rooted in their total ignorance of elementar -rinci-les of
hgiene2 %his aggravates their alread -recarious situation2
%he collection of ta4es, as 8 have alread said, is also a
function of the general council2 Warehouses are ver
im-ortant2 .s soon as a -lace is ta"en that is to serve as a
base for the guerrilla band, !arehouses should be
established in the most orderl fashion -ossible2 %hese !ill
serve to assure a minimum care of merchandise and, most
im-ortant, !ill -rovide the control needed for e@uali#ing
distribution and "ee-ing it e@uitable at later times2
(unctions are different on the e4ternal front both in @uantit
and in @ualit2 (or e4am-le, -ro-aganda should be of a
national, orienting t-e, e4-laining the victories obtained b
the guerrilla band, calling !or"ers and -easants to effective
mass fights, and giving ne!s, if there is an, of victories
obtained on this front itself2 Solicitation of funds is
com-letel secret> it ought to be carried out !ith the greatest
care -ossible, isolating small collectors in the chain
com-letel from the treasurer of the organi#ation2
%his organi#ation should be distributed in #ones that
com-lement each other in order to form a totalit, #ones that
ma be -rovinces, states, cities, and villages, de-ending on
the magnitude of the movement2 8n each of them there must
be a finance commission that ta"es charge of the dis-osal
of funds collected2 8t is -ossible to collect mone b selling
bonds or through direct donations2 When the develo-ment
of the struggle is more advanced, ta4es ma be collected>
!hen industries come to recogni#e the great force that the
insurrectional arm -ossesses, the !ill consent to -a2
Su--l -rocurement should be fitted to the necessities of
the guerrilla bands> it !ill be organi#ed in the form of a chain
of merchandise in such a !a that the more common
articles are -rocured in nearb -laces, and the things that
are reall scarce or im-ossible to -rocure locall, in larger
centers2 %he effort al!as is to "ee- the chain as limited as
-ossible, "no!n to the smallest number of men> it can thus
-erform its mission for a longer time2
Sabotage should be directed b the civil organi#ation in the
e4ternal sector in coordination !ith the central command2 8n
s-ecial circumstances, after careful analsis, assaults on
-ersons !ill be used2 8n general !e consider that this is not
desirable e4ce-t for the -ur-ose of eliminating some figure
!ho is notorious for his villainies against the -eo-le and the
virulence of his re-ression2 7ur e4-erience in the Cuban
struggle sho!s that it !ould have been -ossible to save the
lives of numerous fine comrades !ho !ere sacrificed in the
-erformance of missions of small value2 Several times these
ended !ith enem bullets of re-risal on combatants !hose
loss could not be com-ared !ith the results obtained2
.ssaults and terrorism in indiscriminate form should not be
em-loed2 More -referable is effort directed at large
concentrations of -eo-le in !hom the revolutionar idea can
be -lanted and nurtured, so that at a critical moment the
can be mobili#ed and !ith the hel- of the armed forces
contribute to a favorable balance on the side of the
revolution2
(or this it is necessar also to ma"e use of -o-ular
organi#ations of !or"ers, -rofessional -eo-le, and
-easants, !ho !or" at so!ing the seed of the revolution
among their res-ective masses, e4-laining, -roviding
revolutionar -ublications for reading, teaching the truth2
7ne of the characteristics of revolutionar -ro-aganda must
be truth2 Little b little, in this !a, the masses !ill be !on
over2 %hose among them !ho do the best !or" ma be
chosen for incor-oration into the rebel arm or assignment
to other tas"s of great res-onsibilit2
%his is the outline of civil organi#ation !ithin and outside
guerrilla territor at a time of -o-ular struggle2 %here are
-ossibilities of -erfecting all these features to a high degree2
8 re-eat once more, it is our Cuban e4-erience !hich
s-ea"s through me> ne! e4-eriences can var and im-rove
these conce-ts2 We offer an outline, not a bible2
# THE ROLE OF THE WO(AN
%he -art that the !oman can -la in the develo-ment of a
revolutionar -rocess is of e4traordinar im-ortance2 8t is
!ell to em-hasi#e this, since in all our countries, !ith their
colonial mentalit, there is a certain underestimation of the
!oman !hich becomes a real discrimination against her2
%he !oman is ca-able of -erforming the most difficult tas"s,
of fighting beside the men> and des-ite current belief, she
does not create conflicts of a se4ual t-e in the troo-s2
8n the rigorous combatant life the !oman is a com-anion
!ho brings the @ualities a--ro-riate to her se4, but she can
!or" the same as a man and she can fight> she is !ea"er,
but no less resistant than he2 She can -erform ever class
of combat tas" that a man can at a given moment, and on
certain occasions in the Cuban struggle she -erformed a
relief role2
/aturall the combatant !omen are a minorit2 When the
internal front is being consolidated and it is desirable to
remove as man combatants as -ossible !ho do not
-ossess indis-ensable -hsical characteristics, the !omen
can be assigned a considerable number of s-ecific
occu-ations, of !hich one of the most im-ortant, -erha-s
the most im-ortant, is communication bet!een different
combatant forces, above all bet!een those that are in
enem territor2 %he trans-ort of ob?ects, messages, or
mone, of small si#e and great im-ortance, should be
confided to !omen in !hom the guerrilla arm has absolute
confidence> !omen can trans-ort them using a thousand
tric"s> it is a fact that ho!ever brutal the re-ression,
ho!ever thorough the searching, the !oman receives a less
harsh treatment than the man and can carr her message or
other ob?ect of an im-ortant or confidential character to its
destination2
.s a sim-le messenger, either b !ord of mouth or of
!riting, the !oman can al!as -erform her tas" !ith more
freedom than the man, attracting less attention and at the
same time ins-iring less fear of danger in the enem soldier2
;e !ho commits brutalities acts fre@uentl under the
im-ulse of fear or a--rehension that he himself !ill be
attac"ed, since this is one form of action in guerrilla !arfare2
Contacts bet!een se-arated forces, mess ages to the
e4terior of the lines, even to the e4terior of the countr> also
ob?ects of considerable si#e, such as bullets, are
trans-orted b !omen in s-ecial belts !orn beneath their
s"irts2 :ut also in this stage a !oman can -erform her
habitual tas"s of -eacetime> it is ver -leasing to a soldier
sub?ected to the e4tremel hard conditions of this life to be
able to loo" for!ard to a seasoned meal !hich tastes li"e
something2 )7ne of the great tortures of the !ar !as eating
a cold, stic", tasteless mess2, %he !oman as coo" can
greatl im-rove the diet and, furthermore, it is easier to "ee-
her in these domestic tas"s> one of the -roblems in guerrilla
bands is that all !or"s of a civilian character are scorned b
those !ho -erform them> the are constantl tring to get
out of these tas"s in order to enter into forces that are
activel in combat2
. tas" of great im-ortance for !omen is to teach beginning
reading, including revolutionar theor, -rimaril to the
-easants of the #one, but also to the revolutionar soldiers2
%he organi#ation of schools, !hich is a -art of the civil
organi#ation, should be done -rinci-all through !omen,
!ho arouse more enthusiasm among children and en?o
more affection from the school communit2 Li"e!ise, !hen
the fronts have been consolidated and a rear e4ists, the
functions of the social !or"er also fall to !omen !ho
investigate the various economic and social evils of the
#one !ith a vie! to changing them as far as -ossible2
%he !oman -las an im-ortant -art in medical matters as
nurse, and even as doctor, !ith a gentleness infinitel
su-erior to that of her rude com-anion in arms, a gentleness
that is so much a--reciated at moments !hen a man is
hel-less, !ithout comforts, -erha-s suffering severe -ain
and e4-osed to the man dangers of all classes that are a
-art of this t-e of !ar2
7nce the stage of creating small !ar industries has begun,
the !oman can also contribute here, es-eciall in the
manufacture of uniforms, a traditional em-loment of
!omen in Latin .merican countries2 With a sim-le se!ing
machine and a fe! -atterns she can -erform marvels2
Women can ta"e -art in all lines of civil organi#ation2 %he
can re-lace men -erfectl !ell and ought to do so, even
!here -ersons are needed for carring !ea-ons, though
this is a rare accident in guerrilla life2
8t is im-ortant to give ade@uate indoctrination to men and
!omen, in order to avoid all "inds of misbehavior that can
o-erate to hurt the morale of the troo-s> but -ersons !ho
are other!ise free and !ho love each other should be
-ermitted to marr in the Sierra and live as man and !ife
after com-ling !ith the sim-le re@uirements of the guerrilla
band2
$ (EDICAL PROBLE(S
7ne of the grave -roblems that confronts the guerrilla fighter
is e4-osure to the accidents of his life, es-eciall to !ounds
and sic"nesses, !hich are ver fre@uent in guerrilla !arfare2
%he doctor -erforms a function of e4traordinar im-ortance
in the guerrilla band, not onl in saving lives, in !hich man
times his scientific intervention does not count because of
the limited resources available to him> but also in the tas" of
reinforcing the -atient morall and ma"ing him feel that
there is a -erson near him !ho is dedicated !ith all his force
to minimi#ing his -ains2 ;e gives the !ounded or sic" the
securit of "no!ing that a -erson !ill remain at his side until
he is cured or has -assed danger2
%he organi#ation of hos-itals de-ends largel u-on the
stage of develo-ment of the guerrilla band2 %hree
fundamental t-es of hos-ital organi#ation corres-onding to
various stages can be mentioned2
8n this develo-ment !e have a first, nomadic -hase2 8n it the
doctor, if there is one, travels constantl !ith his
com-anions, is ?ust another man> he !ill -robabl have to
-erform all the other functions of the guerrilla fighter,
including that of fighting, and !ill suffer at times the
de-ressing and des-erate tas" of treating cases in !hich
the means of saving life are not available2 %his is the stage
in !hich the doctor has the most influence over the troo-s,
the greatest im-ortance for their morale2 0uring this -eriod
in the develo-ment of the guerrilla band the doctor achieves
to the full his character of a true -riest !ho seems to carr in
his scantil e@ui--ed "na-sac" needed consolation for the
men2 %he value of a sim-le as-irin to one !ho is suffering is
beond calculation !hen it is given b the friendl hand of
one !ho sm-atheticall ma"es the suffering his o!n2
%herefore the doctor in the first stage should be a man !ho
is totall identified !ith the ideals of the revolution, because
his !ords !ill affect the troo-s much more dee-l than
those s-o"en b an other member2
8n the normal course of events in guerrilla !arfare another
stage is reached that could be called "semi3 nomadic2" 8n it
there are encam-ments, more or less fre@uented b the
guerrilla troo-s> friendl houses of com-lete confidence
!here it is -ossible to store ob?ects and even leave the
!ounded> and a gro!ing tendenc for the troo- to become
settled2 .t this stage the tas" of the doctor is less tring> he
ma have emergenc surgical e@ui-ment in his "na-sac"
and another more com-lete outfit for less urgent o-erations
in a friendl house2 8t is -ossible to leave the sic" and
!ounded in the care of -easants !ho !ill give their hel-
!ith great devotion2 ;e can also count on a larger number
of medicines "e-t in convenient -laces> these should be
com-letel catalogued as !ell as -ossible, considering the
circumstances in !hich he lives2 8n this same semi3nomadic
state, if the band o-erates in -laces that are absolutel
inaccessible, hos-itals can be established to !hich the sic"
and !ounded !ill go for recover2
8n the third stage, !hen there are #ones invulnerable to the
enem, a true hos-ital organi#ation is constructed2 8n its
most develo-ed form, it can consist of three centers of
different t-es2 8n the combat categor there ought to be a
doctor, the combatant the most loved b the troo-, the man
of battle, !hose "no!ledge does not have to be too dee-2 8
sa this because his tas" is -rinci-all one of giving relief
and of -re-aring the sic" or !ounded, !hile the real medical
!or" is -erformed in hos-itals more securel situated2 .
surgeon of @ualit ought not to be sacrificed in the line of
fire2
When a man falls in the front line, stretcher3bearers, if these
are available given the organi#ation of the guerrilla band,
!ill carr him to the first -ost> if the are not available, his
com-anions themselves !ill -erform this dut2 %rans-ort of
the !ounded in rough #ones is one of the most delicate of
all tas"s and one of the most -ainful e4-eriences in a
soldierAs life2 =erha-s the trans-ort of a !ounded man is
harder on all concerned, because of his sufferings and of
the s-irit of sacrifice in the troo-, than the fact itself of being
!ounded, ho!ever grave it ma be2 %he trans-ort can be
carried out in different !as according to the characteristics
of the ground2 8n rough and !ooded -laces, !hich are
t-ical in guerrilla !arfare, it is necessar to !al" single file2
;ere the best sstem is to use a long -ole, !ith the -atient
carried in a hammoc" that hangs from it2
%he men ta"e turns carring the !eight, one before and one
behind2 %he should ield -lace to t!o other com-anions
fre@uentl, since the shoulders suffer severel and the
individual graduall !ears himself out carring this delicate
and heav burden2
When the !ounded soldier has -assed through this first
hos-ital, he then goes !ith the information as to !hat has
been done for him to a second center, !here there are
surgeons and s-ecialists de-ending u-on the -ossibilities of
the troo-2 ;ere the more serious o-erations needed for
saving life or relieving individuals from danger are
-erformed2
.fter!ards, at a third level, hos-itals !ith the greatest
comforts -ossible are established for direct investigation in
the #ones affected of the causes and effects of illnesses that
afflict the inhabitants of the area2 %hese hos-itals of the third
grou-, !hich corres-ond to a sedentar life, are not onl
centers of convalescence and of o-erations of less urgenc,
but also establishments serving the civil -o-ulation, !here
the hgienists -erform their orienting function2 0is-ensaries
that !ill -ermit an ade@uate individual surveillance should
also be established2 %he hos-itals of this third grou- can
have, if the su--l ca-abilit of the civil organi#ation
-ermits, a series of facilities that -rovide diagnosis even
!ith laborator and 43ra facilities2
7ther useful individuals are the assistants to the doctor2
%he are generall ouths !ith something of a vocation and
some "no!ledge, !ith fairl strong -hsi@ues> the do not
bear arms, sometimes because their vocation is medicine,
but usuall because there are insufficient arms for all !ho
!ant them2 %hese assistants !ill be in charge of carring
most of the medicines, an e4tra stretcher or hammoc", if
circumstances ma"e this -ossible2 %he must ta"e charge of
the !ounded in an battle that is fought2
%he necessar medicines should be obtained through
contacts !ith health organi#ations that e4ist in territor of
the enem2 Sometimes the can be obtained from such
organi#ations as the 8nternational 5ed Cross, but this
-ossibilit should not be counted u-on, es-eciall in the first
moments of the struggle2 8t is necessar to organi#e an
a--aratus that !ill -ermit ra-id trans-ort of needed
medicines in case of danger and that !ill graduall su--l
all the hos-itals !ith the su--lies needed for their !or",
militar as !ell as civil2 .lso, contacts should be made in the
surrounding areas !ith doctors !ho !ill be ca-able of
hel-ing the !ounded !hose cases are beond the
ca-acities or the facilities of the guerrilla band2
0octors needed for this t-e of !arfare are of different
characteristics2 %he combatant doctor, the com-anion of
men, is the t-e for the first stage> his functions develo- as
the action of the guerrilla band becomes more com-licated
and a series of connected organisms are constructed2
General surgeons are the best ac@uisition for an arm of
this t-e2 8f an anesthetist is available, so much the better>
though almost all o-erations are -erformed, not !ith gas
anesthesia, but using "largactil" and sodium -entothal,
!hich are much easier to administer and easier to -rocure
and conserve2 :esides general surgeons, bone s-ecialists
are ver useful, because fractures occur fre@uentl from
accidents in the #one> bullets -roducing this t-e of !ound
in limbs also fre@uentl cause them2 %he clinic serves the
-easant mass mainl, since in general, sic"nesses in the
guerrilla armies are so eas of diagnosis as to be !ithin the
reach of anbod2 %he most difficult tas" is the cure of those
-roduced b nutritional deficiencies2
8n a more advanced stage there ma even be laborator
technicians, if there are good hos-itals, in order to have a
com-lete outfit2 Calls should be made to all sectors of the
-rofession !hose services are needed> it is @uite li"el that
man !ill res-ond to this call and come to lend their hel-2
=rofessionals of all classes are needed> surgeons are ver
useful, dentists as !ell2 0entists should be advised to come
!ith a sim-le cam-aign a--aratus and a cam-aign3t-e
drill> !or"ing !ith this the can do -racticall everthing
necessar2
& SABOTAGE
Sabotage is one of the invaluable arms of a -eo-le that
fights in guerrilla form2 8ts organi#ation falls under the civil or
clandestine branch, since sabotage should be carried out, of
course, onl outside the territories dominated b the
revolutionar arm> but this organi#ation should be directl
commanded and oriented b the general staff of the
guerrillas, !hich !ill be res-onsible for deciding the
industries, communications, or other ob?ectives that are to
be attac"ed2
Sabotage has nothing to do !ith terrorism> terrorism and
-ersonal assaults are entirel different tactics2 We sincerel
believe that terrorism is of negative value, that it b no
means -roduces the desired effects, that it can turn a
-eo-le against a revolutionar movement, and that it can
bring a loss of lives to its agents out of -ro-ortion to !hat it
-roduces2 7n the other hand, attem-ts to ta"e the lives of
-articular -ersons are to be made, though onl in ver
s-ecial circumstances> this tactic should be used !here it
!ill eliminate a leader of the o--ression2 What ought never
to be done is to em-lo s-eciall trained, heroic, self3
sacrificing human beings in eliminating a little assassin
!hose death can -rovo"e the destruction in re-risal of all
the revolutionaries em-loed and even more2
Sabotage should be of t!o t-es& sabotage on a national
scale against determined ob?ectives, and local sabotage
against lines of combat2 Sabotage on a national scale
should be aimed -rinci-all at destroing communications2
6ach t-e of communication can be destroed in a different
!a> all of them are vulnerable2 (or e4am-le, telegra-h and
tele-hone -oles are easil destroed b sa!ing them almost
all the !a through, so that at night the a--ear to be in
normal condition> a sudden "ic" causes one -ole to fall and
this drags along !ith it all those that are !ea", -roducing a
blac"out of considerable e4tent2
:ridges can be attac"ed !ith dnamite> if there is no
dnamite, those made of steel can be made to fall ver
easil !ith an o4acetlene blo!torch2 . steel truss bridge
should be cut in its main beam and in the u--er beam from
!hich the bridge hangs2 When these t!o beams have been
cut at one end !ith the torch, the are then cut at the
o--osite end2 %he bridge !ill fall com-letel on one side and
!ill be t!isted and destroed2 %his is the most effective !a
to "noc" out a steel bridge !ithout dnamite2 5ailroads
should also be destroed, as should roads and culverts> at
times trains should be blo!n u-, if the -o!er of the guerrilla
band ma"es this -ossible2
Utili#ing the necessar e@ui-ment !ill also destro the vital
industries of each region at certain moments2 8n these cases
it is necessar to have an overall vie! of the -roblem and to
be sure that a center of !or" is not destroed unless the
moment is decisive, since this brings !ith it as a
conse@uence massive unem-loment of !or"ers and
hunger2 %he enter-rises belonging to the -otentates of the
regime should be eliminated )and attem-ts made to
convince the !or"ers of the need for doing so,, unless this
!ill bring ver grave social conse@uences2
We reiterate the im-ortance of sabotage against
communications2 %he great strength of the enem arm
against the rebels in the flatter #ones is ra-id
communication> !e must, then, constantl undermine that
strength b "noc"ing out railroad bridges, culverts, electric
lights, tele-hones> also a@ueducts and in general everthing
that is necessar for a normal and modern life2
.round the combat lines sabotage should be -erformed in
the same !a but !ith much more audacit, !ith much more
dedication and fre@uenc2 ;ere it is -ossible to count on the
invaluable aid of the fling -atrols of the guerrilla arm,
!hich can descend into these #ones and hel- the members
of the civil organi#ation -erform a given tas"2 .gain,
sabotage ought to be aimed -rinci-all at communications,
but !ith much more -ersistence2 .ll factories, all centers of
-roduction that are ca-able of giving the enem something
needed to maintain his offensive against the -o-ular forces,
ought also to be li@uidated2
6m-hasis should be -laced on sei#ing merchandise, cutting
su--lies as much as -ossible, if necessar frightening the
large lando!ners !ho !ant to sell their farm -roducts,
burning vehicles that travel along the roads, and using them
to bloc"ade the roads2 8t is e4-edient in ever action of
sabotage that fre@uent contact be made !ith the enem
arm at -oints not far a!a, al!as follo!ing the sstem of
hit and run2 8t is not necessar to -ut u- a serious
resistance, but sim-l to sho! the adversar that in the area
!here the sabotage has been carried out there are guerrilla
forces dis-osed to fight2 %his forces him to ta"e a large
number of troo-s, to go !ith care, or not to go at all2
%hus, little b little, all the cities in the #one surrounding
guerrilla o-erations !ill be -aral#ed2
' WAR INDUSTR"
8ndustries of !ar !ithin the sector of the guerrilla arm must
be the -roduct of a rather long evolution> the also de-end
u-on control of territor in a geogra-hic situation favorable
for the guerrilla2 .t a time !hen there are liberated #ones
and !hen the enem establishes strict bloc"ades over all
su--lies, different de-artments !ill be organi#ed as
necessar, in the manner alread described2 %here are t!o
fundamental industries, of !hich one is the manufacture of
shoes and leather goods2 8t is not -ossible for a troo- to
!al" !ithout shoes in !ooded #ones, hill, !ith man roc"s
and thorns2 8t is ver difficult to march !ithout shoes in such
conditions> onl the natives, and not all of them, can do it2
%he rest must have shoes2 %he industr is divided into t!o
-arts, one for -utting on half3soles and re-airing damaged
shoes> the other !ill be devoted to the manufacture of rough
shoes2 %here should be a small but com-lete a--aratus for
ma"ing shoes> since this is a sim-le industr -racticed b
man -eo-le in such regions it is ver eas to -rocure2
Connected !ith the shoe re-air !or"s there ought al!as to
be a sho- ma"ing all classes of canvas and leather goods
for use b the troo-, such as cartridge belts and "na-sac"s2
.lthough these articles are not vital, the contribute to
comfort and give a feeling of autonom, of ade@uate su--l,
and of self3reliance to the troo-2
.n armor is the other fundamental industr for the small
internal organi#ation of the guerrilla band2 %his also has
different functions& that of sim-le re-air of damaged
!ea-ons, of rifles, and other available arms> the function of
manufacturing certain t-es of combat arms that the
inventiveness of the -eo-le !ill create> and the -re-aration
of mines !ith various mechanisms2 When conditions -ermit,
e@ui-ment for the manufacture of -o!der ma be added2 8f
it is -ossible to manufacture the e4-losive as !ell as the
-ercussion mechanisms in free territor, brilliant
achievements can be scored in this categor, !hich is a
ver im-ortant one, because communications b road can
be com-letel -aral#ed b the ade@uate em-loment of
mines2
.nother grou- of industries that has its im-ortance !ill ma"e
iron and tin -roducts2 8n the iron !or"s !ill be centered all
labor connected !ith the e@ui--ing of the mules, such as
ma"ing their shoes2 8n the tin !or"s the fabrication of -lates
and es-eciall of canteens is im-ortant2 . foundr can be
?oined !ith the tin !or"s2 : melting soft metals it is -ossible
to ma"e grenades, !hich !ith a s-ecial t-e of charge !ill
contribute in an im-ortant !a to the armament of the troo-2
%here ought to be a technical team for general re-air and
construction !or" of varied t-es, the "service batter," as it
is called in regular armies2 With the guerrillas it !ould
o-erate as such, ta"ing care of all necessities, but !ithout
an vestige of the bureaucratic s-irit2
Someone must be in charge of communications2 ;e !ill
have as his res-onsibilit not onl -ro-aganda
communications, such as radio directed to!ard the outside,
but also tele-hones and roads of all t-es2 We !ill use the
civil organi#ation as necessar in order to -erform his duties
effectivel2 5emember that !e are in a -eriod of !ar sub?ect
to attac" b the militar and that often man lives de-end
u-on timel communication2
(or accommodating the troo- it is !ell to have cigarette and
cigar factories2 %he leaf can be bought in selected -laces
and carried to free territor !here the articles for
consum-tion b the soldiers can be manufactured2 .n
industr for -re-aring leather from hides is also of great
im-ortance2 .ll these are sim-le enter-rises that can
o-erate @uite !ell an!here and are eas to establish in the
guerrilla situation2 %he industr for ma"ing leather re@uires
some small construction !ith cement> also it uses large
amounts of salt> but it !ill be an enormous advantage to the
shoe industr to have its o!n su--l of ra! material2 Salt
should be made in revolutionar territor and accumulated
in large @uantities2 8t is made b eva-orating !ater of a high
saline concentration2 %he sea is the best source, though
there ma be others2 8t is not necessar to -urif it of other
ingredients for -ur-oses of consum-tion, though these give
it a flavor that is disagreeable at first2
Meat should be conserved in the form of ?er"ed beef, !hich
is eas to -re-are2 %his can save man lives among the
troo- in e4treme situations2 8t can be conserved !ith salt in
large barrels for a fairl long time, and it can then be eaten
in an circumstances2
* PROPAGANDA
%he revolutionar idea should be diffused b means of
a--ro-riate media to the greatest de-th -ossible2 %his
re@uires com-lete e@ui-ment and an organi#ation2 %his
organi#ation should be of t!o t-es !hich com-lement each
other in covering the !hole national area& for -ro-aganda
originating outside free territor, that is, from the national
civil organi#ation> and -ro-aganda originating !ithin, that is,
from the base of the guerrilla arm2 8n order to coordinate
these t!o -ro-agandas, the functions of !hich are strictl
related, there should be a single director for the !hole effort2
=ro-aganda of the national t-e from civil organi#ations
outside free territor should be distributed in ne!s-a-ers,
bulletins, and -roclamations2 %he most im-ortant
ne!s-a-ers !ill be devoted to general matters in the
countr and !ill inform the -ublic e4actl of the state of the
guerrilla forces, observing al!as the fundamental -rinci-le
that truth in the long run is the best -olic2 :esides these
-ublications of general interest there must be others more
s-eciali#ed for different sectors of the -o-ulation2 .
-ublication for the countrside should bring to the -easant
class a message from their com-anions in all the free #ones
!ho have alread felt the beneficial effects of the revolution>
this strengthens the as-irations of the -easantr2 . !or"ersA
ne!s-a-er !ill have similar characteristics, !ith the sole
difference that it cannot al!as offer a message from the
combatant -art of that class, since it is li"el that !or"ersA
organi#ations !ill not o-erate !ithin the frame!or" of
guerrilla !arfare until the last stages2
%he great !atch!ords of the revolutionar movement, the
!atch!ord of a general stri"e at an o--ortune moment, of
hel- to the rebel forces, of unit, etc2, should be e4-lained2
7ther -eriodicals can be -ublished> for e4am-le, one
e4-laining the tas"s of those elements in the !hole island
!hich are not combatants but !hich nevertheless carr out
diverse acts of sabotage, of attem-ts, etc2 Within the
organi#ation there can be -eriodicals aimed at the enemAs
soldiers> these !ill e4-lain facts of !hich the are other!ise
"e-t ignorant2 /e!s bulletins and -roclamations about the
movement are ver useful2
%he most effective -ro-aganda is that !hich is -re-ared
!ithin the guerrilla #one2 =riorit !ill be given to the diffusion
of ideas among natives of the #one, offering e4-lanations of
the theoretical significance of the insurrection, alread
"no!n to them as a fact2 8n this #one there !ill also be
-easant -eriodicals, the general organ of all the guerrilla
forces, and bulletins and -roclamations2 %here !ill also be
the radio2
.ll -roblems should be discussed b radio3for e4am-le, the
!a to defend oneself from air attac"s and location of the
enem forces, citing familiar names among them2
=ro-aganda for the !hole nation !ill use ne!s-a-ers of the
same t-e as those -re-ared outside free territor, but it can
-roduce fresher and more e4act ne!s, re-orting facts and
battles that are e4tremel interesting to the reader2
8nformation on international affairs !ill be confined almost
e4clusivel to commentar on facts that are directl related
to the struggle of liberation2
%he -ro-aganda that !ill be the most effective in s-ite of
everthing, that !hich !ill s-read most freel over the !hole
national area to reach the reason and the sentiments of the
-eo-le, is !ords over the radio2 %he radio is a factor of
e4traordinar im-ortance2 .t moments !hen !ar fever is
more or less -al-itating in ever one in a region or a
countr, the ins-iring, burning !ord increases this fever and
communicates it to ever one of the future combatants2 8t
e4-lains, teaches, fires, and fi4es the future -ositions of
both friends and enemies2 ;o!ever, the radio should be
ruled b the fundamental -rinci-le of -o-ular -ro-aganda,
!hich is truth> it is -referable to tell the truth, small in its
dimensions, than a large lie artfull embellished2 7n the
radio ne!s should be given, es-eciall of battles, of
encounters of all t-es, and assassinations committed b
the re-ression> also, doctrinal orientations and -ractical
lessons to the civil -o-ulation> and, from time to time,
s-eeches b the chiefs of the revolution2 We consider it
useful that the -rinci-al ne!s-a-er of the movement bear a
name that recalls something great and unifing, -erha-s a
national hero or something similar2 .lso, it should e4-lain in
articles of de-th !here the armed movement is going2 8t
ought to create a consciousness of the great national
-roblems, besides offering sections of more livel interest
for the reader2
+ INTELLIGENCE
"Jno! ourself and our adversar and ou !ill be able to
fight a hundred battles !ithout a single disaster2" %his
Chinese a-horism is as valuable for guerrilla !arfare as a
biblical -salm2 /othing gives more hel- to combatant forces
than correct information2 %his arrives s-ontaneousl from
the local inhabitants, !ho !ill come to tell its friendl arm,
its allies, !hat is ha--ening in various -laces> but in addition
it should be com-letel sstemati#ed2 .s !e sa!, there
should be a -ostal organi#ation !ith necessar contacts
both !ithin and outside guerrilla #ones for carring
messages and merchandise2 .n intelligence service also
should be in direct contact !ith enem fronts2 Men and
!omen, es-eciall !omen, should infiltrate> the should be
in -ermanent contact !ith soldiers and graduall discover
!hat there is to be discovered2 %he sstem must be
coordinated in such a !a that crossing the enem lines into
the guerrilla cam- can be carried out !ithout misha-2
8f this is !ell done !ith com-etent agents the insurgent
cam- !ill be able to slee- more @uietl2
%his intelligence !ill be concerned -rinci-all, as 8 have
alread said, !ith the front line of fire or the for!ard enem
encam-ments that are in contact !ith no manAs land> but it
ought also to develo- in the same measure as the guerrilla
band develo-s, increasing its de-th of o-eration and its
-otential to foresee larger troo- movements in the enem
rear2 %hough all inhabitants are intelligence agents for the
guerrilla band in the -laces !here it is dominant or ma"es
incursions, it is !ise to have -ersons es-eciall assigned to
this dut2 %he -easants, not accustomed to -recise battle
language, have a strong tendenc to e4aggerate, so their
re-orts must be chec"ed2 .s the s-ontaneous forms of
-o-ular collaboration are molded and organi#ed, it is
-ossible to use the intelligence a--aratus not onl as an
e4tremel im-ortant au4iliar but also as a !ea-on of attac"
b using its -ersonnel, for e4am-le, as "so!ers of fear2"
=retending to be on the side of the enem soldiers, the
so! fear and instabilit b s-reading discouraging
information2 : "no!ing e4actl the -laces !here the
enem troo- is going to attac", it is eas to avoid him or,
!hen the time is ri-e, to attac" him at -laces !here it is
least e4-ected2 Mobilit, the basic tactic, can be develo-ed
to the ma4imum2
, TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION
%he fundamental training of the soldier of liberation is the life
itself !ith the guerrilla band, and no one can be a chief !ho
has not learned his difficult office in dail, armed e4ercises2
Life !ith some com-anions !ill teach something about the
handling of arms, about -rinci-les of orientation, about the
manner of treating the civil -o-ulation, about fighting, etc2>
but the -recious time of the guerrilla band is not to be
consumed in methodical teaching2 %his begins onl !hen
there is a large liberated area and a large number of
-ersons are needed for carring out a combat function2
Schools for recruits !ill then be established2 %hese schools
then -erform a ver im-ortant function2 %he are to form
ne! soldiers from -ersons !ho have not -assed through
that e4cellent sieve of formidable -rivations, guerrilla
combatant life2 7ther -rivations must be suffered at the
outset to convert them into the trul chosen2 .fter having
-assed through ver difficult tests, the !ill arrive at
incor-orating themselves into the "ingdom of an arm that
lives from da to da and leaves no traces of its -ath
an!here2 %he ought to -erform -hsical e4ercises, mainl
of t!o t-es& an agile gmnastic !ith training for !ar of a
commando t-e, !hich demands agilit in attac" and
!ithdra!al> and hi"es that are hard and e4hausting that !ill
serve to toughen the recruit for this "ind of e4istence2 .bove
all, the should live in the o-en air2 %he should suffer all the
inclemencies of the !eather in close contact !ith nature, as
the guerrilla band does2
%he school for recruits must have !or"ers !ho !ill ta"e care
of its su--l needs2 (or this there should be cattle sheds,
grain sheds, gardens, dair, everthing necessar, so that
the school !ill not constitute a charge on the general budget
of the guerrilla arm2 %he students can serve in rotation in
the !or" of su-3 -l, either as -unishment for bad conduct
or sim-l as volunteers2 %his !ill de-end u-on
characteristics -ro-er to the #one !here the school is being
held2 We believe that a good -rinci-le is to assign
volunteers and to cover the remaining !or" @uotas !ith
those !ho have the -oorest conduct and sho! the -oorest
dis-osition for learning !arfare2
%he school should have its small medical organi#ation !ith
a doctor or nurse, according to the -G$3 sibilities> this !ill
-rovide the recruits !ith the best -ossible attention2
Shooting is the basic a--renticeshi- )See =icture +31,2 %he
guerrilla fighter should be carefull trained in this res-ect, so
that he !ill tr to e4-end the least -ossible amount of
ammunition2 ;e begins b -racticing !hat is called dr
shooting2 8t consists of seating the rifle firml on an "ind of
!ooden a--aratus as sho!n in the -icture2 Without moving
or firing the rifle the recruits direct the movement of a target
until the thin" the have a hole at the center e4actl in the
line of sight2 . mar" is made on a bac"board that remains
stationar2 8f the mar" for three tries gives a single -oint, this
is e4cellent2 When circumstances -ermit, -ractice !ith **3
calibre rifles !ill begin> this is ver useful2 8f there is an
e4cess of ammunition or a great need for -re-aring soldiers,
o--ortunit !ill be given to fire !ith bullets2
7ne of the most im-ortant courses in the school for recruits,
one !hich !e hold to be basic and !hich can be given in
an -lace in the !orld, is in meeting attac" from the air 7ur
school had been -ositivel identified from the air and
received attac"s once or t!ice dail2 %he form in !hich the
students resisted the im-act of these continuous
bombardments on their regular -laces of instruction virtuall
sho!ed !hich of the oung men had -ossibilities for
becoming useful soldiers in battle2
%he im-ortant thing, that !hich must never be neglected in
a school for recruits, is indoctrination> this is im-ortant
because the men arrive !ithout a clear conce-tion as to
!h the come, !ith nothing more than ver diffuse
conce-ts about libert, freedom of the -ress, etc2, !ithout
an clear foundation !hatever2 %herefore, the indoctrination
should be carried out !ith ma4imum dedication and for the
ma4imum amount of time -ossible2 %hese courses should
offer elementar notions about the histor of the countr,
e4-lained !ith a clear sense of the economic facts that
motivate each of the historic acts> accounts of the national
heroes and their manner of reacting !hen confronted !ith
certain in?ustices> and after!ards an analsis of the national
situation or of the situation in the #one2 . short -rimer
should be !ell studied b all members of the rebel arm, so
that it can serve as a s"eleton of that !hich !ill come later2
%here should also be a school for training teachers, !here
agreement can be reached on the choice of te4ts to be
used, ta"ing as a basis the contribution that each boo" can
ma"e to the educational -rocess2
5eading should be encouraged at all times, !ith an effort to
-romote boo"s that are !orth!hile and that enlarge the
recruitAs facilit to encounter the !orld of letters and great
national -roblems2 (urther reading !ill follo! as a vocation>
the surrounding circumstances !ill a!a"en ne! desires for
understanding in the soldiers2 %his result !ill be -roduced
!hen, little b little, the recruits observe in their routine tas"s
the enormous advantages of men !ho have -assed through
the school over the remainder of the troo-, their ca-acit for
anal#ing -roblems, their su-erior disci-line, !hich is
another of the fundamental things that the school should
teach2
%his disci-line should be internal, not mechanical but
?ustified b reasons and designed to -roduce formidable
benefits in moments of combat2
1- THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
AR(" OF A RE%OLUTIONAR" (O%E(ENT
.s !e have seen, a revolutionar arm of a guerrilla t-e,
!hatever its #one of o-erations, should also have a non3
combatant organi#ation for the -erformance of a series of
e4tremel im-ortant au4iliar missions2 We shall see later
that this !hole organi#ation converges to lend the arm
ma4imum hel-, since obviousl the armed fight is the crucial
factor in the trium-h2
%he militar organi#ation is headed b a commander3in3
chief, in the case of the Cuban e4-erience b a
commandant, !ho names the commanders of the different
regions or #ones> these latter have authorit to govern their
res-ective territories of action, to name column
commanders, that is to sa, the chiefs of each column, and
the other lo!er officers2
Under the commander3in3chief there !ill be the #one
commanders> under them several columns of varing si#e,
each !ith a column commander> under the column
commanders there !ill be ca-tains and lieutenants, !hich,
in our guerrilla organi#ation, !ere the lo!est grade2 8n other
!ords, the first ran" above the soldiers !as the lieutenant2
%his is not a model but a descri-tion of one realit, of ho!
the organi#ation !or"ed in one countr !here it -roved
-ossible to achieve trium-h over an arm that !as fairl !ell
organi#ed and armed2 6ven less here than in other res-ects
is our e4-erience a -attern2 8t sim-l sho!s ho! as events
develo- it is -ossible to organi#e an armed force2 %he ran"s
certainl have no im-ortance, but it is im-ortant that no ran"
should be conferred that does not corres-ond to the
effective battle force commanded2 5an"s should not be
given to -ersons !ho have not -assed through the sieve of
sacrifice and struggle, for that !ould conflict !ith moralit
and ?ustice2
%he descri-tion given above refers to a !ell3develo-ed
arm, alread ca-able of !aging a serious combat2 8n the
first stage of the guerrilla band, the chief can ta"e the ran"
he li"es, but he !ill still command onl a small grou- of
men2
7ne of the most im-ortant features of militar organi#ation is
disci-linar -unishment2 0isci-line must be one of the bases
of action of the guerrilla forces )this must be re-eated again
and again,2 .s !e have alread said, it should s-ring from a
carefull reasoned internal conviction> this -roduces an
individual !ith inner disci-line2 When this disci-line is
violated, it is necessar al!as to -unish the offender,
!hatever his ran", and to -unish him drasticall in a !a
that hurts2
%his is im-ortant, because -ain is not felt b a guerrilla
soldier in the same !a as b a soldier of the regular arm2
%he -unishment of -utting a soldier in ?ail for ten das
constitutes for the guerrilla fighter a magnificent -eriod of
rest> ten das !ith nothing to do but eat, no marching, no
!or", no standing the customar guards, slee-ing at !ill,
resting, reading, etc2 (rom this it can be deduced that
de-rivation of libert ought not to be the onl -unishment
available in the guerrilla situation2
When the combat morale of the individual is ver high and
self3res-ect strong, de-rivation of his right to be armed can
constitute a true -unishment for the individual and -rovo"e a
-ositive reaction2 8n such cases, this is an e4-edient
-unishment2 %he follo!ing -ainful incident is an e4am-le2
0uring the battle for one of the cities of Las 'illas -rovince
in the final das of the !ar, !e found an individual aslee- in
a chair !hile others !ere attac"ing -ositions in the middle of
the to!n2 When @uestioned, the man res-onded that he !as
slee-ing because he had been de-rived of his !ea-on for
firing accidentall2 ;e !as told that this !as not the !a to
react to -unishment and that he should regain his !ea-on,
not in this !a, but in the first line of combat2
. fe! das -assed, and as the final assault on the cit of
Santa Clara began, !e visited the first3aid hos-ital2 . ding
man there e4tended his hand, recalling the e-isode 8 have
narrated, affirmed that he had been ca-able of recovering
his !ea-on and had earned the right to carr it2 Shortl
after!ards, he died2
%his !as the grade of revolutionar morale that our troo-
achieved through the continual e4ercise of armed struggle2
8t is not -ossible to achieve it at the outset, !hen there are
still man !ho are frightened, and sub?ective currents serve
to -ut a bra"e on the influence of the 5evolution> but finall
it is reached through !or" and through the force of continual
e4am-le2
Long night !atches and forced marches can also serve as
-unishments> but the marches are not reall -ractical, since
the consume the individual to no -ur-ose other than that of
-unishment, and the re@uire guards !ho also !ear
themselves out2 %he guards suffer the further inconvenience
of having to "ee- a !atch on the -ersons being -unished,
!ho are soldiers of scant revolutionar mentalit2
8n the forces directl under m command 8 im-osed the
-unishment of arrest !ith -rivation of s!eets and cigarettes
for light offenses and a total de-rivation of food for !orse
offenses2 %he result !as magnificent, even though the
-unishment !as terrible> it is advisable onl in ver s-ecial
circumstances2
APPENDICES
1 ORGANIZATION IN SECRET OF THE FIRST
GUERRILLA BAND
Guerrilla !arfare obes la!s, some derived from the general
la!s of !ar and others o!ing to its o!n s-ecial character2 8f
there is a real intention to begin the struggle from some
foreign cou9tr or from distant and remote regions !ithin the
same countr, it is obvious that it must begin in small
cons-iratorial movements of secret members acting !ithout
mass su--ort or "no!ledge2 8f the guerrilla movement is
born s-ontaneousl out of the reaction of a grou- of
individuals to some form of coercion, it is -ossible that the
later organi#ation of this guerrilla nucleus to -revent its
annihilation !ill be sufficient for a beginning2 :ut generall
guerrilla !arfare starts from a !ell3considered act of !ill&
some chief !ith -restige starts an u-rising for the salvation
of his -eo-le, beginning his !or" in difficult conditions in a
foreign countr2
.lmost all the -o-ular movements underta"en against
dictators in recent times have suffered from the same
fundamental fault of inade@uate -re-aration2 %he rules of
cons-irac, !hich demand e4treme secrec and caution,
have not generall been observed2 %he governmental -o!er
of the countr fre@uentl "no!s in advance about the
intentions of the grou- or grou-s, either through its secret
service or from im-rudent revelations or in some cases from
outright declarations, as occurred, for e4am-le, in our case,
in !hich the invasion !as announced and summed u- in the
-hrase of (idel Castro2 "8n the ear A$6 !e !ill be free or !e
!ill be martrs2"
.bsolute secrec, a total absence of information in the
enemAs hands, should be the -rimar base of the
movement2 Secondl and also ver im-ortant is selection of
the human material2 .t times this selection can be carried
out easil, but at others it !ill be e4tremel difficult, since it
is necessar to rel on those elements that are available,
longtime e4iles or -ersons !ho -resent themselves !hen
the call goes out sim-l because the understand that it is
their dut to enroll in the battle to liberate their countr, etc2
%here ma not be the necessar facilities for ma"ing a
com-lete investigation of these individuals2 /evertheless,
even though elements of the enem regime introduce
themselves, it is un-ardonable that the should later be able
to -ass information, because in the -eriod ?ust -rior to an
action all those !ho are going to -artici-ate should be
concentrated in secret -laces "no!n onl to one or t!o
-ersons> the should be under the strict vigilance of their
chiefs and !ithout the slightest contact !ith the outside
!orld2 Whenever there are concentrations, !hether as a
-re-aration for de-arture or in order to carr out -reliminar
training or sim-l to hide from the -olice, it is necessar
al!as to "ee- all ne! -ersonnel about !hom there is no
clear "no!ledge available a!a from the "e -laces2
8n underground conditions no one, absolutel no one,
should "no! anthing more than the strictl indis-ensable>
and there ought not to be tal" in front of anone2 When
certain t-es of concentration have been carried out, it is
necessar even to control letters that leave and arrive in
order to have a total "no!ledge of the contacts that the
individuals maintain> no one should be -ermitted to live
alone, nor to go out alone> -ersonal contacts of the future
member of the liberating arm, contacts of an t-e, should
be -revented b ever means2 ;o!ever -ositive the role of
!omen in the struggle, it must be em-hasi#ed that the can
also -la a destructive -art2 %he !ea"ness for !omen that
oung men have !hen living a-art from their habitual
medium of life in s-ecial, even -schic conditions, is !ell
"no!n2 .s dictators are !ell a!are of this !ea"ness, the
tr to use it for infiltrating their s-ies2 .t times the
relationshi- of these !omen !ith their su-eriors is clear and
even notorious> at other times, it is e4tremel difficult to
discover even the slightest evidence of contact> therefore, it
is necessar also to -rohibit relations !ith !omen2
%he revolutionar in a clandestine situation -re-aring for
!ar should be a com-lete ascetic> this also serves to test
one of the @ualities that later !ill be the basis of his
authorit, disci-line2 8f an individual re-eatedl disobes
orders of his su-eriors and ma"es contacts !ith !omen,
contracts friendshi-s that arc not -ermitted, etc2, he should
be se-arated immediatel, not merel because of the
-otential dangers in the contacts, but sim-l because of the
violation of revolutionar disci-line2
Unconditional hel- should not be e4-ected from a
government, !hether friendl or sim-l negligent, that
allo!s its territor to be used as a base of o-erations> one
should regard the situation as if he !ere in a com-letel
hostile cam-2 %he fe! e4ce-tions that of course can occur
are reall confirmations of the general rule2
We shall not s-ea" here of the number of -ersons that
should be readied2 %his de-ends u-on so man and such
varied conditions that it is -racticall im-ossible to s-ecif2
:ut the minimum number !ith !hich it is -ossible to initiate
a guerrilla !ar can be mentioned2 8n m o-inion, considering
the normal desertions and !ea"nesses in s-ite of the
rigorous -rocess of selection, there should be a nucleus of
+G to $G men> this figure is sufficient to initiate an armed
fight in an countr of the .mericas !ith their conditions of
favorable territor for o-erations, hunger for land, re-eated
attac"s u-on ?ustice, etc2
Wea-ons, as has alread been said, should be of the same
t-e as those used b the enem2 Considering al!as that
ever government is in -rinci-le hostile to a guerrilla action
being underta"en from its territor, the bands that -re-are
themselves should not be greater than a--ro4imatel $G to
1GG men -er unit2 8n other !ords, though there is no
ob?ection to $GG men initiating a !ar, all $GG should not be
concentrated in one -lace2 %he are so numerous as to
attract attention and in case of an betraal of confidence or
of an raid, the !hole grou- falls> on the other hand, it is
more difficult to raid various -laces simultaneousl2
%he central head@uarters for meetings can be more or less
"no!n, and the e4iled -ersons !ill go there to hold meetings
of all t-es> but the leaders ought not to be -resent e4ce-t
ver s-oradicall, and there should be no com-romising
documents2 %he leaders should use as man different
houses as -ossible, those least li"el to be under
surveillance2 .rms de-osits should be distributed in several
-laces, if -ossible> these should be an absolute secret,
"no!n to onl one or t!o -eo-le2
Wea-ons should be delivered into the hands of those !ho
are going to use them onl !hen the !ar is about to be
initiated2 %hus a -unitive action against -ersons !ho are
training, !hile leading to their im-risonment, !ill not -roduce
a loss of arms that are ver difficult to -rocure2 =o-ular
forces are not in an condition to suffer such a loss2
.nother im-ortant factor to !hich due attention must be
given is -re-aration of the forces for the e4tremel hard fight
that is going to follo!2 %hese forces should have a strict
disci-line, a high morale, and a clear com-rehension of the
tas" to be -erformed, !ithout conceit, !ithout illusions,
!ithout false ho-es of an eas trium-h2 %he struggle !ill be
bitter and long, reverses !ill be suffered> the can be at the
brin" of annihilation> onl high morale, disci-line, faith in
final victor, and e4ce-tional leadershi- can save them2 %his
!as our Cuban e4-erience> at one time t!elve men !ere
able to form the nucleus of the future arm, because all
these conditions !ere met and because the one !ho led us
!as named (idel Castro2
:esides ideological and moral -re-arations, careful -hsical
training is necessar2 %he guerrillas !ill, of course, select a
mountainous or ver !ild #one for their o-erations2 .t an
rate, in !hatever situation the find themselves, the basic
tactic of the guerrilla arm is the march, and neither slo!
men nor tired men can be tolerated2 .de@uate training
therefore includes e4hausting hi"es da and night, da after
da, increasing graduall, al!as continued to the brin" of
e4haustion, !ith emulation used to increase s-eed2
5esistance and s-eed !ill be fundamental @ualities of the
first guerrilla nucleus2 .lso a series of theoretical -rinci-les
can be taught, for e4am-le, direction finding, reading, and
forms of sabotage2 8f -ossible, there should be training !ith
militar rifles, fre@uent firing, above all at distant targets, and
much instruction about the !a to economi#e bullets2
%o the guerrilla fighter, econom and utili#ation of
ammunition do!n to the last bullet should be al3 most li"e
religious tenets2 8f all these admonitions are follo!ed, the
guerrilla forces ma !ell reach their goal2
! DEFENSE OF POWER THAT HAS BEEN WON
/aturall victor cannot be considered as finall !on until
the arm that sustained the former regime has been
sstematicall and totall smashed2 (urther, all the
institutions that sheltered the former regime should be !i-ed
out2 :ut since this is a manual for guerrilla bands !e !ill
confine ourselves to anal#ing the -roblem of national
defense in case of !ar or aggression against the ne!
-o!er2
%he first develo-ment !e meet is that !orld -ublic o-inion,
"the res-ectable -ress," the "truthful" ne!s agencies of the
United States and of the other countries belonging to the
mono-olies !ill begin an attac" on the liberated countr, an
attac" as aggressive and sstematic as the la!s of -o-ular
reform2 (or this reason not even a s"eleton of -ersonnel
from the for3former arm can be retained2 Militarism,
mechanical obedience, traditional conce-ts of militar dut,
disci-line and morale cannot be eradicated !ith one blo!2
/or can the victors, !ho are good fighters, decent and
"indhearted, but at the same time generall lac"ing
education, be allo!ed to remain in contact !ith the
van@uished, !ho are -roud of their s-eciali#ed militar
"no!ledge in some combat arm3 in mathematics,
fortifications, logistics, etc23and !ho hate the uncultured
guerrilla fighters !ith all their might2
%here are, of course, individual cases of militar men !ho
brea" !ith the -ast and enter into the ne! organi#ation !ith
a s-irit of com-lete coo-eration2 %hese -ersons are doubl
useful, because the unite !ith their love of the -eo-leAs
cause the "no!ledge necessar for carring for!ard the
creation of the ne! -o-ular arm . second ste- !ill be
conse@uent u-on the first& as the old arm is smashed and
dismembered as an institution and its former -osts occu-ied
b the ne! arm, it !ill be necessar to reorgani#e the ne!
force2 8ts former guerrilla character, o-erating under
inde-endent chiefs !ithout -lanning, can be changed> but it
is ver im-ortant to em-hasi#e that o-erational conce-ts of
the guerrilla band should still serve as the guide to structure2
%hese conce-ts !ill determine the organic formation and the
e@ui-ment of the -o-ular arm2 Care should be ta"en to
avoid the error that !e fell into during the first months of
tring to -ut the ne! -o-ular arm into the old bottles of
militar disci-line and ancient organi#ation2 %his error can
cause serious malad?ustments and can lead to a com-lete
lac" of organi#ation2
=re-aration should begin immediatel for the ne! defensive
!ar that !ill have to be fought b the -eo-leAs arm,
accustomed to inde-endence of command !ithin the
common struggle and dnamism in the management of
each armed grou-2 %his arm !ill have t!o immediate
-roblems2 7ne !ill be the in3 cor-oration of thousands of
last3hour revolutionaries, good and bad, !hom it is
necessar to train for the rigors of guerrilla life and to give
revolutionar indoctrination in accelerated and intensive
courses2 5evolutionar indoctrination that gives the
necessar ideological unit to the arm of the -eo-le is the
basis of national securit both in the long and short runs2
%he other -roblem is the difficult of ada-tation to the ne!
organi#ational structure2
. cor-s to ta"e charge of so!ing the ne! truths of the
5evolution among all the units of the arm should
immediatel be created2 8t should e4-lain to the soldiers,
-easants, and !or"ers, !ho have come out of the mass of
the -eo-le, the ?ustice and the truth of each revolutionar
act, the as-irations of the 5evolution, !h there is a fight,
!h so man com-anions have died !ithout seeing the
victor2 United to this intensive indoctrination, accelerated
courses of -rimar instruction that !ill begin to overcome
illiterac should also be given, in order to im-rove the rebel
arm graduall until it has become an instrument of high
technical @ualifications, solid ideological structure, and
magnificent combat -o!er2
%ime !ill create these three @ualities2 %he militar a--aratus
can continue to be -erfected as time goes on> the former
combatants can be given s-ecial courses to -re-are them to
serve as -rofessional militar men !ho !ill then give annual
courses of instruction to the -eo-le ?oining voluntaril or b
conscri-tion2 %his !ill de-end on national characteristics
and rules cannot be stated2
(rom this -oint for!ard !e are e4-ressing the o-inion of the
command of the 5ebel .rm !ith res-ect to the -olic to be
follo!ed in the concrete Cuban situation, given the menace
of foreign invasion, the conditions of the modern !orld at the
end of 19$9 or the beginning of 196G, !ith the enem in
sight, anal#ed, evaluated, and a!aited !ithout fear2 8n
other !ords, !e are no longer theori#ing for the instruction
of others about !hat has alread been done> rather !e
theori#e about !hat has been done b others in order to
a--l it ourselves in our o!n national defense2
.s our -roblem is to theori#e about the Cuban case, and
locate and test our h-othesis on the ma- of .merican
realities, !e -resent as an e-ilogue the follo!ing analsis of
the Cuban situation, its -resent and its future2
EPILOGUE
ANAL"SIS OF THE CUBAN SITUATION) ITS
PRESENT AND ITS FUTURE
. ear has no! -assed since the flight of the dictator, the
culmination of a long armed civil struggle b the Cuban
-eo-le2 %he achievements of the government in the social,
economic, and -olitical fields are enormous> nevertheless, it
is necessar to anal#e them, to evaluate each act and to
sho! -recisel the dimensions of our Cuban 5evolution2
%his national 5evolution, fundamentall agrarian, having the
enthusiastic su--ort of !or"ers, of -eo-le from the middle
class and toda even of o!ners of industr, has ac@uired a
continental and !orld3!ide im-ortance, enhanced b its
-eculiar characteristics and b the infle4ible !ill of the
-eo-le2
8t !ill not be -ossible to -resent a snthesis, ho!ever brief,
of all the la!s -assed, all of them undoubtedl of -o-ular
benefit2 8t !ill be enough to select a fe! for s-ecial
em-hasis and to sho! at the same time the logical chain
that carries us for!ard, ste- b ste-, in a -rogressive and
necessar order of concern for the -roblems of the Cuban
-eo-le2
%he first alarm for the -arasitic classes of the countr is
sounded in the rent la!, the reduction of electric rates, and
government intervention in the tele-hone com-an follo!ed
b a reduction in rates, all decreed in ra-id succession2
%hose !ho had thought (idel Castro and the men !ho
made this 5evolution to be nothing more than -oliticians of
the old stle, manageable sim-letons !ith beards their onl
distinction, no! began to sus-ect that something dee-er
!as emerging from the bosom of the Cuban -eo-le and that
their -rivileges !ere in danger2 %he !ord "Communism"
began to envelo- the figures of the leaders and of the
trium-hant guerrilla fighters> conse@uentl the !ord anti3
Communism, as the -osition dialecticall o--osed, began to
serve as a nucleus for all those !ho resented the loss of
their un?ust -rivileges2
%he la! on vacant lots and the la! on installment sales
aggravated this sensation of malaise among the usurious
ca-italists2 :ut these !ere minor s"irmishes !ith the
reactionaries> everthing !as still all right and -ossible2
"%his cra# fello!," (idel Castro, could be counseled and
guided to good -aths, to good "democratic" -aths, b a
0ubois or a =orter2 8t !as necessar to -lace ho-e in the
future2
%he .grarian 5eform la! !as a tremendous ?olt2 Most of
those !ho had been hurt no! sa! clearl2 7ne of the first
!as Gaston :a@uero, the voice of reaction> he had
accuratel inter-reted !hat !as going to ha--en and had
retired to @uieter scenes under the S-anish dictatorshi-2
%here !ere still some !ho thought that "the la! is the la!,"
that other governments had alread -romulgated such la!s,
theoreticall designed to hel- the -eo-le2 Carring out these
la!s !as another thing2 %hat brash and com-le4 child that
had the initials 8/5. for its familiar name !as treated at the
beginning !ith -eevish and touching -aternalism !ithin the
ivor to!ers of learning, -ervaded !ith social doctrines and
res-ectable theories of -ublic finance, to !hich the
uncultivated and absurd mentalities of the guerrilla fighters
could not arrive2 :ut 8/5. advanced li"e a tractor or a !ar
tan", because it is tractor and tan" at the same time,
brea"ing do!n the !alls of the great estates as it -assed
and creating ne! social relations in the o!nershi- of land2
%his Cuban .grarian 5eform a--eared !ith various
characteristics im-ortant for .merica2 8t !as anti3feudal in
the sense that it eliminated the Cuban3stle latifundia,
annulled all contracts that called for -ament of rent of land
in cro-s, and li@uidated the servile relations that e4isted
-rinci-all in coffee and tobacco -roduction, t!o im-ortant
branches of our agriculture2 :ut it also !as an .grarian
5eform in a ca-italist medium to destro the -ressure of
mono-ol on human beings, isolated or ?oined together, to
hel- them !or" their land honorabl and to -roduce !ithout
fear of the creditor or the master2 8t had the characteristic
from the first moment of assuring to -easants and
agricultural !or"ers, those !ho give themselves to the soil,
needed technical hel- from com-etent -ersonnel>
machiner> financial hel- -rovided through credits from
8/5. or -ara3state ban"s> and big hel- from the
".ssociation of =eo-leAs Stores" that has develo-ed on a
large scale in 7riente and is in -rocess of develo-ment in
other -rovinces2 %he state stores, re-lacing the old usurers,
-rovide ?ust financing and -a a ?ust -rice for the harvest2
Com-ared !ith the other three great agrarian reforms in
.merica )Me4ico, Guatemala, and :olivia, the most
im-ortant distinctive characteristic is the decision to carr
Cuban reform all the !a, !ithout concessions or
e4ce-tions of an "ind2 %his total .grarian 5eform res-ects
no rights that are not rights of the -eo-le nor singles out an
class or nationalit for discriminator treatment& the force of
the la! falls e@uall on the United (ruit Com-an and on the
Jing 5anch, as on the big Cuban lando!ners2
Under these conditions land is being cleared, mainl for the
-roduction of cro-s !hich are ver im-ortant to the countr,
rice, oil3-roducing grains and cotton> these are being
intensivel develo-ed2 :ut the nation is not satisfied and is
going to recover all its stolen resources2 8ts rich sub3soil,
!hich has been a field of mono-olist voracit and struggle,
is virtuall recovered b the -etroleum la!2 %his la!, li"e the
.grarian 5eform and all the others -romulgated b the
5evolution, res-onds to CubaAs irresistible necessities, to
urgent demands of a -eo-le that !ishes to be free, that
!ishes to be master of its econom, that !ishes to -ros-er
and to reach ever higher goals of social develo-ment2 :ut
for this ver reason it is an e4am-le for the continent and
feared b the oil mono-olies2 8t is not that Cuba directl
hurts the -etroleum mono-ol substantiall2 %here is no
reason to believe the countr to be rich in reserves of the
-ri#ed fuel, even though there are reasonable ho-es of
obtaining a su--l that !ill satisf its internal needs2 7n the
other hand, b its la! Cuba gives a -al-able e4am-le to the
brother -eo-les of .merica, man of them foraged b these
mono-olies or -ushed into intercine !ars in order to satisf
the necessities or a--etites of com-eting trusts2 .t the same
time Cuba sho!s the -ossibilit of acting in .merica and the
e4act hour !hen action ought to be considered2 %he great
mono-olies also cast their !orried loo" u-on Cuba> not onl
has someone in the little island of the Caribbean dared to
li@uidate the interests of the omni-otent United (ruit
Com-an, legac of Mr2 (oster 0ulles to his heirs> but also
the em-ires of Mr2 5oc"efeller and the 0eutsch grou- have
suffered under the lash of intervention b the -o-ular Cuban
5evolution2
%his la!, li"e the mining la!, is the res-onse of the -eo-le
to those !ho tr to chec" them !ith threats of force, !ith
aerial incursions, !ith -unishments of !hatever t-e2 Some
sa that the mining la! is as im-ortant as the .grarian
5eform2 We do not consider that it has this im-ortance for
the econom of the countr in general, but it introduces
another ne! feature& a *$ -ercent ta4 on the amount of
-roduct e4-orted, to be -aid b com-anies that sell our
minerals abroad )leaving no! something more than a hole
in our territor,2 %his not onl contributes to our Cuban
!elfare> it also increases the relative strength of the
Canadian mono-olies in their struggle !ith the -resent
e4-loiters of our nic"el2 %hus the Cuban 5evolution
li@uidates the latifundia, limits the -rofits of the foreign
mono-olies, limits the -rofits of the foreign intermediaries
that dedicate themselves !ith -arasitic ca-ital to the
commerce of im-ortation, launches u-on the !orld a ne!
-olic in .merica, dares to brea" the mono-olist status of
the giants of mining, and leaves one of them in difficult, to
sa the least2 %his signifies a -o!erful ne! message to the
neighbors of the great stronghold of mono-ol, and causes
re-ercussions throughout .merica2 %he Cuban 5evolution
brea"s all the barriers of the ne!s sndicates and diffuses
its truth li"e a sho!er of dust among the .merican masses
an4ious for a better life2 Cuba is the smbol of nationalit
rene!ed and (idel Castro the smbol of liberation2
: a sim-le la! of gravit the little island of one hundred
fourteen thousand s@uare "ilometers and si4 and one3half
million inhabitants assumes the leadershi- in the anti3
colonial struggle in .merica, in !hich serious handica-s in
other countries -ermit Cuba to ta"e the heroic, glorious and
dangerous advanced -ost2 %he economicall less !ea"
nations of colonial .merica, the ones in !hich national
ca-italism develo-s haltingl in a continuous, relentless, and
at times violent struggle against the foreign mono-olies,
no! cede their -lace graduall to this small, ne! cham-ion
of libert, since their governments do not have sufficient
force to carr the fight for!ard2 %his is not a sim-le tas", nor
is it free from danger and difficulties2 %he bac"ing of a !hole
-eo-le and an enormous charge of idealism and s-irit of
sacrifice are needed in the nearl solitar conditions in
!hich !e are carring it out in .merica2 Small countries
have tried to maintain this -ost before Guatemala, the
Guatemala of Kuet#al, that dies !hen it is im-risoned in a
cage, the Guatemala of the 8ndian %ecum Umam, fell before
the direct aggression of the colonialists2 :olivia, the countr
of Morillo, the -roto3martr of .merican inde-endence,
ielded to the terrible hardshi-s of the struggle after setting
three e4am-les that served as the foundation of the Cuban
5evolution& the su--ression of the arm, agrarian reform,
and nationali#ation of mines3ma4imum source of riches and
at the same time ma4imum source of traged2
Cuba "no!s about these -revious e4am-les, "no!s the
failures and the difficulties, but it "no!s also that !e are at
the da!ning of a ne! era in the !orld2 %he -illars of
colonialism have been s!e-t aside b the -o!er of the
national and -o-ular struggle in .sia and .frica2 Solidarit
among -eo-les does not no! come from religion, customs,
tastes, racial affinit or its lac"2 8t arises from a similarit in
economic and social conditions and from a similarit in
desire for -rogress and recu-eration2 .sia and .frica ?oined
hands in :andung> .sia and .frica come to ?oin hands !ith
colonial and indigenous .merica through Cuba, in ;avana2
7n the other hand, the great colonial -o!ers have lost
ground before the struggle of the -eo-les2 :elgium and
;olland are t!o caricatures of em-ires> German and 8tal
lost their colonies2 (rance is bitterl fighting a !ar that is
lost2 6ngland, di-lomatic and s"illful, li@uidates -olitical
-o!er !hile maintaining the economic connections2
.merican ca-italism re-laced some of the old colonial
ca-italisms in the countries that began their in3 de-endent
life2 :ut it "no!s that this is transitor and that there is no
real securit for its financial s-eculations in these ne!
territories2 %he octo-us cannot there a--l its suc"ers firml2
%he cla! of the im-erial eagle is trimmed2 Colonialism is
dead or is ding a natural death in all these -laces2
.merica is something else2 8t has been some time since the
6nglish lion !ith its voracious a--etite de-arted from our
.merica and the oung and charming 9an"ee ca-italists
installed the "democratic" version of the 6nglish clubs,
im-osing their sovereign domination over ever one of the
t!ent re-ublics2
%hese is the colonial realm of /orth .merican mono-ol, its
reason for being and last ho-e, the "bac"ard of its o!n
house2" 8f all the Latin .merican -eo-les should raise the
flag of dignit, as Cuba has done, mono-ol !ould tremble>
it !ould have to accommodate to a ne! -olitical3economic
situation and to substantial -runings of -rofits2 Mono-ol
does not li"e -rofits to be -runed, and the Cuban e4am-le,
this "bad e4am-le" of national and international dignit, is
gaining strength in the countries of .merica2 6ach time that
an im-udent -eo-le cries out for liberation, Cuba is
accused> and it is true in a sense that Cuba is guilt,
because Cuba has sho!n the !a, the !a of the armed
-o-ular fight against armies su--osed to be invincible, the
!a of struggle in !ild -laces to !ear do!n and destro the
enem far from his bases, in a !ord, the !a of dignit2
%his Cuban e4am-le is bad, a ver bad e4am-le, and
mono-ol cannot slee- @uietl !hile this bad e4am-le
remains at its feet, defing danger, advancing to!ard the
future2 8t must be destroed, voices declare2 8t is necessar
to intervene in this bastion of "Communism," cr the
servants of mono-ol disguised as re-resentatives in
Congress2 "%he Cuban situation is ver disturbing," sa the
artful defenders of the trusts> !e all "no! that their meaning
is& "8t must be destroed2"
'er !ell2 What are the different -ossibilities of aggressive
action to destro the bad e4am-leB 7ne could be called the
-urel economic2 %hese begins !ith a restriction on credit
b /orth .merican ban"s and su--liers to all businessmen,
national ban"s, and even the /ational :an" of Cuba2 Credit
is thus restricted in /orth .merica, and through the medium
of associates an attem-t is made to have the same -olic
ado-ted in all the countries of Western 6uro-e> but this
alone is not sufficient2
%he denial of credits stri"es a first strong blo! at the
econom, but recover is ra-id and the commercial balance
evens out, since the victimi#ed countr is accustomed to
living as best it can2 8t is necessar to a--l more -ressure2
%he sugar @uota is brought into the -icture& es, no, no, es2
;urriedl the calculating machines of the agents of
mono-ol total u- all sorts of accounts and arrive at the final
conclusion& it is ver dangerous to reduce the Cuban @uota
and im-ossible to cancel it2 Wh ver dangerousB :ecause
besides being bad -olitics, it !ould a!a"en the a--etite of
ten or fifteen other su--lier countries, causing them
tremendous discomfort, because the !ould all consider
the had a right to something more2 8t is im-ossible to
cancel the @uota, because Cuba is the largest, most
efficient, and chea-est -rovider of sugar to the United
States, and because si4t -ercent of the interests that -rofit
directl from the -roduction and commerce in sugar are
United States interests2 :esides, the commercial balance is
favorable to the United States> !hoever does not sell cannot
bu> and it !ould set a bad e4am-le to brea" a treat2
(urther, the su--osed /orth .merican gift of -aing nearl
three cents above the mar"et -rice is onl the result of /orth
.merican inca-acit to -roduce sugar chea-l2 %he high
!ages and the lo! -roductivit of the soil -revent the Great
=o!er from -roducing sugar at Cuban -rices> and b -aing
this higher -rice for a -roduct, the are able to im-ose
burdensome treaties on all beneficiaries, not onl Cuba2
8m-ossible to li@uidate the Cuban @uota2
We do not consider li"el the -ossibilit that mono-olists are
em-loing a variant of the economic a--roach in
bombarding and burning sugar cane fields, ho-ing to cause
a scarcit of the -roduct2 5ather this a--ears to be a
measure calculated to !ea"en confidence in the -o!er of
the revolutionar government2 )%he cor-se of the /orth
.merican mercenar stains more than a Cuban house !ith
blood> it also stains a -olic2 .nd !hat is to be said of the
gigantic e4-losion of arms destined for the 5ebel .rmB,
.nother vulnerable -lace !here the Cuban econom can be
s@uee#ed is the su--l of ra! materials, such as cotton2
;o!ever, it is !ell "no!n that there is an over3-roduction of
cotton in the !orld, and an difficult of this t-e !ould be
transitor2 (uelB %his is !orth some attention> it is -ossible
to -aral#e a countr b de-riving it of fuel, and Cuba
-roduces ver little -etroleum2 8t has some heav fuel that
can be used to o-erate its steam3driven machiner and
some alcohol that can be used in vehicles> also, there are
large amounts of -etroleum in the !orld2 6g-t can sell it,
the Soviet Union can sell it, -erha-s 8ra@ !ill be able to sell
it shortl2 8t is not -ossible to develo- a -urel economic
strateg
.s another -ossibilit of aggression, if to this economic
variant !ere added an intervention b some -u--et -o!er,
the 0ominican 5e-ublic, for e4am-le, it !ould be some!hat
more of a nuisance> but the United /ations !ould doubtless
intervene, !ith nothing concrete having been achieved2
8ncidentall, the ne! course ta"en b the 7rgani#ation of
.merican States creates a dangerous -recedent of
intervention2 :ehind the shield of the %ru?illo -rete4t,
mono-ol solaces itself b constructing a means of
aggression2 8t is sad that the 'ene#uelan democrac has -ut
us in the difficult -osition of having to o--ose an intervention
against %ru?illo2 What a good turn it has done the -irates of
the continentL
.mong the ne! -ossibilities of aggression is -hsical
elimination b means of an assault on the "old fello!," (idel
Castro, !ho has become b no! the focus of the
mono-oliesA !rath2 /aturall, measures must be arranged
so that the other t!o dangerous "international agents," 5aul
Castro and the author, are also eliminated2 %his solution is
a--ealing> if simultaneous assaults on all three or at least
on the directing head succeeded, it !ould be a boon to the
reaction2 ):ut do not forget the -eo-le, Messrs2 Mono-olists
and agents, the omni-otent -eo-le !ho in their fur at such
a crime !ould crush and erase all those !ho had anthing
to do directl or indirectl !ith an assault on an of the
chiefs of the 5evolution> it !ould be im-ossible to restrain
them2,
.nother as-ect of the Guatemalan variant is to -ut -ressure
on the su--liers of arms, in order to force Cuba to bu in
Communist countries and then use this as an occasion to let
loose another sho!er of insults2 %his could give results2 "8t
ma be," someone in our government has said, "that the
!ill attac" us as Communists, but the are not going to
eliminate us as imbeciles2"
%hus it begins to a--ear as if a direct aggression on the -art
of the mono-olies !ill be necessar> various -ossible forms
are being shuffled and studied in the 8:M machines !ith all
-rocesses calculated2 8t occurs to us at the moment that the
S-anish variant could be used2 %he S-anish variant !ould
be one in !hich some initial -rete4t is sei#ed u-on for an
attac" b e4iles !ith the hel- of volunteers, volunteers !ho
!ould be mercenaries of course, or sim-l the troo-s of a
foreign -o!er, !ell su--orted b nav and air, !ell enough
su--orted, shall !e sa, to be successful2 8t could also begin
as a direct aggression b some state such as the 0ominican
5e-ublic, !hich !ould send some of its men, our brothers,
and man mercenaries to die on these beaches in order to
-rovo"e !ar> this !ould -rom-t the -ure3intentioned
mono-olists to sa that the do not !ish to intervene in this
"disastrous" struggle bet!een brothers> the !ill merel limit
and confine and free#e the !ar !ithin its -resent limits b
maintaining vigilance over the s"ies and seas of this -art of
.merica !ith cruisers, battleshi-s, destroers, aircraft
carriers, submarines, mines!ee-ers, tor-edo boats, and
air-lanes2 .nd it could ha--en that !hile these #ealous
guardians of continental -eace !ere not allo!ing a single
boat to -ass !ith things for Cuba, some, man, or all of the
boats headed for the unha-- countr of %ru?illo !ould
esca-e the iron vigilance2 .lso the might intervene through
some "re-utable" inter3.merican organ, to -ut an end to the
"foolish !ar" that "Communism" had unleashed in our
island> or, if this mechanism of the "re-utable" .merican
organ did not serve, the might intervene directl, as in
Jorea, using the name of the international organ in order to
restore -eace and -rotect the interests of all nations2
=erha-s the first ste- in the aggression !ill not be against
us, but against the constitutional government of 'ene#uela,
in order to li@uidate our last -oint of su--ort on the
continent2 8f this ha--ens, it is -ossible that the center of the
struggle against colonialism !ill move from Cuba to the
great countr of :olivar2 %he -eo-le of 'ene#uela !ill rise to
defend their liberties !ith all the enthusiasm of those !ho
"no! that the are fighting a decisive battle, that behind
defeat lies the dar"est trann and behind victor the certain
future of .merica2 . stream of -o-ular struggles can disturb
the -eace of the mono-olist cemeteries formed out of our
sub?ugated sister re-ublics2
Man reasons argue against the chance of enem victor,
but there are t!o fundamental ones2 %he first is e4ternal&
this is the ear 196G, the ear that !ill finall hear the voices
of the millions of beings !ho do not have the luc" to be
governed b the -ossessors of the means of death and
-ament2 (urther, and this is an even more -o!erful reason,
an arm of si4 million Cubans !ill gras- !ea-ons as a
single man in order to defend its territor and its 5evolution2
Cuba !ill be a battlefield !here the arm !ill be nothing
other than -art of the -eo-le in arms2 .fter destruction in a
frontal !ar, hundreds of guerrilla bands under a dnamic
command and a single center of orientation, !ill fight the
battle all over the countr2 8n cities the !or"ers !ill die in
their factories or centers of !or", and in the countr the
-easants !ill deal out death to the invader from behind
ever -alm tree and from ever furro! of the ne!
mechanicall -lo!ed field that the 5evolution has given
them2
.nd around the !orld international solidarit !ill create a
barrier of hundreds of millions of -eo-le -rotesting against
aggression2 Mono-ol !ill see ho! its -illars are
undermined and ho! the s-ider !eb curtain of its
ne!s-a-er lies is s!e-t a!a b a -uff2 :ut let us su--ose
that the dare to def the -o-ular indignation of the !orld>
!hat !ill ha--en here !ithinB
%he first thing to be noted, given our -osition as an easil
vulnerable island !ithout heav arms, !ith a ver !ea" air
force and nav, is the necessit of a--ling the guerrilla
conce-t to the fight for national defense2 7ur ground units
!ill fight !ith the fervor, decision, and enthusiasm of !hich
the sons of the Cuban 5evolution are ca-able in these
glorious ears of our histor2 :ut if the !orst occurs, !e are
-re-ared to continue fighting even after the destruction of
our arm organi#ation in a frontal combat2 8n other !ords,
confronting large concentrations of enem forces that
succeed in destroing ours, !e !ould change immediatel
into a guerrilla arm !ith a good sense of mobilit, !ith
unlimited authorit in our column commanders, though !ith
a central command located some!here in the countr giving
the necessar direction and fi4ing the general overall
strateg2
%he mountains !ould be the last line of defense of the
organi#ed armed vanguard of the -eo-le, !hich is the 5ebel
.rm> but in ever house of the -eo-le, on ever road, in
ever forest, in ever -iece of national territor the struggle
!ould be fought b the great arm of the rearguard, the
entire -eo-le trained and armed in the manner no! to be
described2
Since our infantr units !ill not have heav arms, the !ill
concentrate on anti3tan" and anti3air defense2 Mines in ver
large numbers, ba#oo"as or anti3tan" grenades, anti3aircraft
cannon of great mobilit and mortar batteries !ill be the onl
arms of an great -o!er2 %he veteran infantr soldier,
though e@ui--ed !ith automatic !ea-ons, !ill "no! the
value of ammunition2 ;e !ill guard it !ith loving care2
S-ecial installations for reloading shells !ill accom-an
each unit of the arm, maintaining reserves of ammunition
even though -recariousl2
%he air force !ill -robabl be badl hurt in the first moments
of an invasion of this t-e2 We are basing our calculations
u-on an invasion b a first3class foreign -o!er or b a
mercenar arm of some other -o!er, hel-ed either o-enl
or surre-titiousl b this great -o!er of first magnitude2 %he
national air force, as 8 said, !ill be destroed, or almost
destroed& onl reconnaissance or liaison -lanes !ill
remain, es-eciall helico-ters for minor functions2
%he nav !ill also be organi#ed for this mobile strateg>
small launches !ill give the smallest target to the enem
and maintain ma4imum mobilit2 %he great des-eration of
the enem arm in this case as before !ill be to find
something to receive his blo!s2 8nstead he !ill find a
gelatinous mass, in movement, im-enetrable, that retreats
and never -resents a solid front, though it inflicts !ounds
from ever side2
8t is not eas to overcome an arm of the -eo-le that is
-re-ared to continue being an arm in s-ite of its defeat in a
frontal battle2 %!o great masses of the -eo-le are united
around it& the -easants and the !or"ers2 %he -easants have
alread given evidence of their efficienc in detaining the
small band that !as marauding in =inar del 5io2 %hese
-easants !ill be trained -rinci-all in their o!n regions> but
the -latoon commanders and the su-erior officers !ill be
trained, as is no! alread being done, in our militar bases2
(rom there the !ill be distributed throughout the thirt
#ones of agrarian develo-ment that form the ne!
geogra-hical division of the countr2 %his !ill constitute thirt
more centers of -easant struggle, charged !ith defending to
the ma4imum their lands, their social con@uests, their ne!
houses, their canals, their dams, their flo!ering harvests,
their inde-endence, in a !ord, their right to live2
.t the beginning the !ill o--ose also a firm resistance to
an enem advance, but if this -roves too strong for them,
the !ill dis-erse, each -easant becoming a -eaceful
cultivator of his soil during the da and a fearsome guerrilla
fighter at night, scourge of the enem forces2 Something
similar !ill ta"e -lace among the !or"ers> the best among
them !ill be trained also to serve thereafter as chiefs of their
com-anions, teaching them -rinci-les of defense2 6ach
social class, ho!ever, !ill have different tas"s2 %he -easant
!ill fight a battle t-ical of the guerrilla fighter> he should
learn to be a good shot, to ta"e advantage of all the
difficulties of the ground and to disa--ear !ithout ever
sho!ing his face2 %he !or"ers, on the other hand, have the
advantage of being !ithin a modern cit, !hich is a large
and efficient fortress> at the same time their lac" of mobilit
is a dra!bac"2 %he !or"er !ill learn first to bloc" the streets
!ith barricades of an available vehicle, furniture, or utensil>
to use ever bloc" as a fortress !ith communications
formed b holes made in interior !alls> to use that terrible
arm of defense, the "Molotov coc"tail"> and to coordinate his
fire from the innumerable loo-3holes -rovided b the houses
of a modern cit2
(rom the !or"er masses assisted b the national -olice and
those armed forces charged !ith the defense of the cit, a
-o!erful bloc" of the arm !ill be formed> but it must e4-ect
to suffer great losses2 %he struggle in the cities in these
conditions cannot achieve the facilit and fle4ibilit of the
struggle in the countrside& man !ill fall, including man
leaders, in this -o-ular struggle2 %he enem !ill use tan"s
that !ill be destroed ra-idl as soon as the -eo-le learn
their !ea"nesses and not to fear them> but before that the
tan"s !ill leave their balance of victims2
%here !ill also be other organi#ations related to those of
!or"ers and -easants& first, the student militias, !hich !ill
contain the flo!er of the student outh, directed and
coordinated b the 5ebel .rm> organi#ations of outh in
general, !ho !ill -artici-ate in the same !a> and
organi#ations of !omen, !ho !ill -rovide an enormous
encouragement b their -resence and !ho !ill do such
au4iliar tas"s for their com-anions in the struggle as
coo"ing, ta"ing care of the !ounded, giving final comfort to
those !ho are ding, doing laundr, in a !ord, sho!ing their
com-anions3in3arms that the !ill never be absent in the
difficult moments of the 5evolution2 .ll this is achieved b
!ide3scale organi#ation of the masses su--lemented !ith
-atient and careful education, an education that begins and
is confirmed in "no!ledge ac@uired from their o!n
e4-erience> it should concentrate on reasoned and true
e4-lanations of the facts of the 5evolution2
%he revolutionar la!s should be discussed, e4-lained,
studied in ever meeting, in ever assembl, !herever the
leaders of the 5evolution are -resent for an -ur-ose2 .lso,
the s-eeches of the leaders, and in our case -articularl of
the undis-uted leader, should constantl be read,
commented u-on, and discussed2 =eo-le should come
together in the countr to listen b radio, and !here there
are more advanced facilities, to !atch b television these
magnificent -o-ular lessons that our =rime Minister gives2
%he -artici-ation of the -eo-le in -olitics, that is to sa, in
the e4-ression of their o!n desires made into la!s,
decrees, and resolutions, should be constant2 'igilance
against an manifestations o--osed to the 5evolution
should also be constant> and vigilance over morale !ithin
the revolutionar masses should be stricter, if this is
-ossible, than vigilance against the non3revolutionar or the
disaffected2 8t can never be -ermitted, lest the 5evolution
ta"e the dangerous -ath of o--ortunism, that a revolutionar
of an categor should be e4cused for grave offenses
against decorum or moralit sim-l because he is a
revolutionar2 %he record of his former services ma -rovide
e4tenuating circumstances and the can al!as be
considered in deciding u-on the -unishment, but the act
itself must al!as be -unished2
5es-ect for !or", above all for collective !or" and !or" for
collective ends, ought to be cultivated2 'olunteer brigades to
construct roads, bridges, doc"s or dams, and school cities
should receive a strong im-ulse> these serve to forge a unit
among -ersons sho!ing their love for the 5evolution !ith
!or"s2
.n arm that is lin"ed in such !as !ith the -eo-le, that
feels this intimac !ith the -easants and the !or"ers from
!hich it emerged, that "no!s besides all the s-ecial
techni@ues of its !arfare and is -schologicall -re-ared for
the !orst contingencies, is invincible> and it !ill be even
more invincible as it ma"es the ?ust -hrase of our immortal
Camilo a -art of the flesh of the arm and the citi#enr& "%he
arm is the -eo-le in uniform2" %herefore, for all these
reasons, des-ite the necessit that mono-ol su--ress the
"bad e4am-le" of Cuba, our future is brighter than ever2
6/0 7( GU6558LL. W.5(.56