ANGEL T.

LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948 EN BANC
HILADO, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of
public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the PSC erred in granting the application for CPC
2. Whether the estate of Fragante is a person.
3. Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered as a citizen.

HELD:
1. NO. The right of Fragante to prosecute the application to its final conclusion was one
which by its nature did not lapse through his death.
It constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such a right was property
despite the possibility that in the end the PSC might have denied the application.
Rule 88, Sec. 2 provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend
actions for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. It is
true that a proceeding upon an application for a CPC before the PSC is not an "action.
But the provisions of the law go to prove that the decedents rights which by their nature
are not extinguished by death, go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for
the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any and the heirs of the decedent.

2. YES. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, under the Bill of
Rights, it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of
cases relate to natural persons, the term person must be deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less
than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature.

Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,
the Court held that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of
Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of
the settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
which survived after his death.
3. YES. The fiction of such extension of Fragantes citizenship is made necessary to
avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his
death, to the loss of the investment which he had already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserves to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certificate of
public convenience to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in
accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which provides
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor
such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. No franchise granted to any individual, firm or
corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by Congress when the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfills the
citizenship requirement. To our mind, the question can be restated by asking
whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante fulfill the citizenship requirement of the
law.
The estate is an abstract entity. As such, its legal value depends on what it represents. It
is a device by which the law gives a kind of personality and unity to undetermined
tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the very moment of
his death. As there are procedural requisites for their identification and determination
that need time for their compliance, a legal fiction has been devised to represent them.
That legal fiction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of solidification.
The estate, therefore, has only a representative value. What the law calls estate is,
a matter of fact, intended to designate the heirs of the deceased. The question,
therefore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusively the citizenship of the heirs of
Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the action taken by the Public Service
Commission should be affirmed. If they are not, it should be reversed.

LORENZO vs. POSADAS JR.
G.R. No. L-43082
June 18, 1937

FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal
properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his
estate were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to
administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten
years after the two executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee
until he resigned and the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
(Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for
deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the
same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its
recovery. Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff
went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas counterclaim. Both parties
appealed to this court.
ISSUE:

(e) Has there been delinquency in the payment of the inheritance tax?

HELD: The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff
in both instances
YES
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before
the delivery of the decedents property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant
contends that delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in
this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the
Revised Administrative Code. This contention is well taken and is sustained. A trustee is but an
instrument or agent for the cestui que trust

The appointment of Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in conformity with the
wishes of the testator as expressed in his will. It is true that the word trust is not mentioned
or used in the will but the intention to create one is clear. No particular or technical words are
required to create a testamentary trust. The words trust and trustee, though apt for the
purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive on the
question that a trust is created. To constitute a valid testamentary trust there must be a
concurrence of three circumstances:

(1) Sufficient words to raise a trust;
(2) a definite subject;
(3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so
providing.

There is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that
certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated
purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointmening a trustee to
carry into effect the provisions of the will

As the existence of the trust was already proven, it results that the estate which plaintiff
represents has been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the
payment of interest and surcharge provided by law in such cases.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore became
trustee. On that date trust estate vested in him. The interest due should be computed from
that date.
NOTES: Other issues:

(a) When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied?
The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same.
Acording to article 657 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death. In other words, said Arellano, C. J., . . . the
heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession
takes place in any event at the moment of the decedents death. The time when the heirs
legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive
such inheritance. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued
as of the date.
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the
obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on inheritance tax is
clearly fixed by section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3031,
in relation to section 1543 of the same Code. The two sections follow:
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. The following shall not be
taxed:
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.
(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or legatee to
the trustees.
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in favor of another beneficiary, in
accordance with the desire of the predecessor. xx
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. The tax fixed in this article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section, before entrance into
possession of the property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if
judicial testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said
period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator before delivering to each
beneficiary his share.
The instant case does[not] fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of section 1544
above-quoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the
subsection, the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to
Moore as trustee.
(b) Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time
of the testators death, or on its value ten years later?

If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance
taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the
right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the
estate as it stood at the time of the decedents death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value

(c) In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
compensation due to trustees?

A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services. But from this it
does not follow that the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net
value of the estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires
trustees commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to
inheritance tax

(d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the
tax-payer be given retroactive effect?

A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enacts, amends, or
repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute clearly demands or expresses
that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . . Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions
indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect can be given the statute
by this court.
Nera v. Rimando
G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911
Ponente: Carson, J.:

'Test of Presence'

Facts:
1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway
where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses
were attaching their signatures to the instrument.

2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of
vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo
that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room while the
signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.

3. The CA deemed the will valid.

Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in
the act of affixing their signatures.

HELD: YES
The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when
the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will
since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the
witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was
blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching
the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign
but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical,
mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of the
signature.
Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964


Facts:
1. Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12,
1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in
duplicates, an original and a carbon copy.

2. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of
the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he
signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses
in his presence.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a
page is sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the
duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the
original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be
defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be
probated.

The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the
law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or
deliberate deviation existed.

Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by
the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.
Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed
without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in
accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements,
a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment,
which is to minimize fraud.
Gan v. Yap
104 P 509
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and
in Manila.
Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with
apetition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, supposedly
took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who knew of
her intentionto make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to
the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had
made known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to
probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts.
For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her
relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in
her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There
was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositors
evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic
will.
ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.
HELD:
1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-
814. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be
subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;
such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant
requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule
77). If there is, the three must testify, if available. From the testimony of
suchwitnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion
as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its
due execution.
With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are
demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they
are entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
In the probate of a holographic will says the New Civil Code, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of
the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three
such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar
with decedents handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to.
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they
must be familiar with the decedents handwriting. Obviously, when the will itself
is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not
available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the testators handwriting
has disappeared.
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost
or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of
the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic
wills which could not then be validly made here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by
analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the
holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen an implied admission that such
loss or theft renders it useless.
As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution
or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting
such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but whether in the face of
the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they cant do
unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,
admittedlythe basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the
matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens
of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the
deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his
handwriting and signature.
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why,
unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence
when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first,
the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the
testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now).
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the
ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four
with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and
exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that
they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc. And if
they wereintimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end
themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they
can not receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only
one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable
imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let
three honest and credible witnesses see and read the forgery; and the latter,
having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith
affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost the forger
may have purposely destroyed it in an accident the oppositors have no way to
expose the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And
considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages, and only
one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be
the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable
feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this
kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-
known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law.
One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing
witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the
testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the
witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they
allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly
contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that
clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that
clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that
the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the
original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be
determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.
Azaola v. Singson

FACTS:

Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City onSeptember 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for
probate herholographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir asagainst the nephew,
who is the defendant. Only one witness,FrancisocoAzaola, was presented to testify on the
handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more orless, before the
death of the testatrix, as it was given to him andhis wife; and that it was in the testatrixs
handwriting. He presentedthe mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the generalpower
of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit toreinforce his statement. Two residence
certificates showing thetestatrixs signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.The
probate was opposed on the ground that (1) theexecution of the will was procured by undue and
improper pressureand influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) thatthe testatrix
did not seriously intend the instrument to be her lastwill, and that the same wasactually written
either on the 5th or 6thday of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears onthe will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article811 of the Civil Code, the proponent
must present three witnesseswho could declare that the will and the signature are in the writingof
the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lonewitness presented "did not prove
sufficiently that the body of thewill was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."Petitioner
appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound toproduce more than one witness because the will's
authenticity wasnot questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorilyrequire the
production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even
if itsauthenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:

W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:

Article 8111 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Sincethe authenticity of the will was not
contested, petitioner was notrequired to produce more than one witness; but even if
thegenuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to
require the compulsory presentation of threewitnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penaltyof having the probate denied. Since no witness may have beenpresent at the
execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that theexistence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is amatter beyond the
control of the proponent. For it is not merely aquestion of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of thetestator" and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the lawdoes not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in thehandwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness ofthe testator's
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may beunwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule ofparagraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811allows the court to resort to expert
evidence. The law foresees thepossibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amountsto the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing totestify to the authenticity of
the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.What the law deems
essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed
numberof witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary tocall for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competentwitness is available, or none of those produced isconvincing, theCourt may still, and in
fact it should, resort to handwriting experts.The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all
available lines ofinquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent thatthe true intention
of the testator be carried into effect.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June
1939. The latter will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the
will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife,
herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and
nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for
the probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set
aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918
will this time. Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been
revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of
the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the
revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that
a subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory
clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the
testator deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of
the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will
can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the
old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario.
Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he
adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the
acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a
large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in
favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent
the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito.
In his will, Florentino bequeathed his share in the conjugal estate to his
second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his
share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Teclas son
by her first marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other
properties were bequeathed to his protg Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was
registered by Florentinos brother, nephews and nieces.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge
admitted the will to probate.
The testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the
order of partition and distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro
alleging that they had been in continuous possession of those lands and praying
that they be declared owners thereof.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground
of res judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of
the will, the legal heirs filed a case for annulment of the will alleging fraud and
deceit.
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after
the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of
Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that
will to the petitioners.
HELD:
NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
setting aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the
firstcivil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second civil
case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of
the will. That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undueinfluence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding,
not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its
execution cannot be raised anymore.
The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding
in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil
case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the merits. Thus.
It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the
recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC
(the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.
The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for annulment of a will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole
world.After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set
aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law
or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In
the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the
discovery of fraud. The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence
of a contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and testaments.
Austria v. Reyes


Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the
respondents, alll have been declared by the former as her legally adopted
children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was
opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was
dismissed and the will was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging
that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in
fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were
strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the
institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary
capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or
undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the
testamentary institution does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution.
An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain
factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art.
850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will,
2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side
especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
AZNAR v. DUNCAN (1966)

Doctrine: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without
referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons,
the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be
completed.

Facts: Edward Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will. CFI
admitted the will to probate, and declared that Helen Garcia was his natural child. The declaration was
appealed to this Court; affirmed.

Meanwhile, CFI approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the
will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia appealed from the order
of approval, and this Court reversed the same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will
should be governed by Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as provided by said law.

CFI approved the project of partition submitted by the executor, wherein the properties of the estate were
divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his
natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death.
- Basis: Since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was
annulled. Hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only
the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower
court and distributed to the legatees.

Hence this appeal.

The CFI ruled, and appellee maintains, that there has been preterition of Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir
in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.

Appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition. Considering the provisions of the will whereby
the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but left to her a legacy nevertheless
although less than the amount of her legitime, she was in effect defectively disinherited. Based on Articles
906 and 918 of the Civil Code, Helen Garcia is entitled only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate
equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the succession were intestate.

Issue: WON the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be divided in equal shares, OR the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced

Held/Ratio: Lucy's inheritance should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover Helen's
legitime, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate.

Edward Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her share to
a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no
reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards
her would have undergone any change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy
Duncan, who alone was expressly recognized by him.

When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could
not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.


CFI's order is set aside; case remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew.