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- 1/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Petitioner

v.
RENO J USTICE COURT, HONORABLE
PETER SFERRAZZA, SECOND J UDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT HONORABLE PATRICK
FLANAGAN AND HONORABLE LIDIA
STIGLICH

Respondent
---------------------------------------------------------/
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN

Petitioner

v.

MATT MERLISS, MERLISS LIVING TRUST,

Real Party in Interest

)
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Supreme Court No:

MOTION TO PROCEED INFORMA PAUPERIS AND FILE THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE , FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ., and hereby swears under penalty of
perjury that the following is true and based upon his first hand knowledge: Coughlin is indigent. He is
collecting food stamps. His rent is $150.00 per month. His car has not been working for about a month
now (needs a starter), and the seat to his bicycle and the front tire recently broke on the very same day.
Regardless, his only vehicle is a 1996 Honda Accord LX (2.2L, 4 cyl) with 120k miles worth about,
maybe, $500 in its current condition. Coughlin owns no stocks, bonds, real property, or anything other
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- 2/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
than ordinary household furnishings, and he has no money whatsoever to his name at the present hour,
and no income to speak of, though he has been given a generous helping of baseless, vindictive
prosecutions by both the WCDA and Reno City Attorneys Office to toil away his hours defending
against incident to the numerous brazen violations of the 1/4/08 Indigent Defense Order in ADKT 0411
that the majority of the judiciary in Washoe County seem to refer to as That J oke That We Regularly
Ignore. Such embarrassing displays of prosecutorial discretion include prosecuting Coughlin for
allegedly violating a Workplace Harassment Protection Order the Clerk of Court of the State Bar of
Nevada obtained against Coughlin purporting to bar him from the constitutionally protected activity of
filing a document in the very State Bar Court that the SBNs Clerk of Court Laura Peters is the Clerk of
Court of. Another involves an allegation that a justice court bailiff in a county of less than 700,000 is
somehow a public officer sufficient to support a NRS 199.280 resisting a public officer SCR 111(6)
leveraging prosecution incident to an allegation that Coughlin was sitting on a bench near a caf inside
the Mills Lane J ustice Center reading some documents in his possession and failed to leave the building.
Coughlin as told to leave just because. Upon alleging not leaving the building, Coughlin was then
thrown over a bench by this public officer justice court bailiff, whom is neither elected, nor
appointed, and clearly not a public officer under NRS 169.164, nor NRS 281.005, and where NRS
193.109s mixing of officer and public officer amongst those words or phrases such statutory
section purports to define has led to legion of instances of anyone remotely connected to law
enforcement in any way whatsoever threatening to, and in fact arresting individuals for obstruction
and resisting a public officer for, often, doing nothing much more than making direct eye contact
with such public officers so inured to the largesse of statutory interpretation. FACTS
1. Coughlin pled that his was, at least in part, a commercial
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- 3/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
tenancy precluding the use of the summary procedures of NRS 40.253 where the landlord sought to
evict Coughlin from his former home law office for no cause under NRS 40.254(2).
2. On 10/19/13 Coughlin filed a Notice of Appeal to the district court of the J ustice courts 10/13/11
Order, which found that Coughlin had established a legal defense under NRS 40.253(6), only to then
rule that Coughlin must, inexplicably, deposit some $2,275 in rent escrow under some inscrutable
application of NRS 118A.355(5) in a no cause summary eviction brought under NRS 40.254(2).
Nonetheless, the justice court insisted on proceeding headlong into a 10/25/11 Trial that was violative
of both NRS 40.253(6), NRS 40.254, and J CRCP 109, as well as NRS 40.300, etc., etc. Davidsohn,
Volpert, Aikins, etc., etc.
3. The landlord failed to rebut in any way Coughlins pleading that his was a commercial tenancy
at page 6 of Coughlins 10/17/11 filing in the justice court case in Rev2011-001708 (and Coughlins
original Tenants Answer of 10/6/11 and his filing of 10/10/11, etc. (see 61383, please incorporate by
reference herein the extensive Meta-ROA Coughlin put together and filed therein), and 10/13/11 etc. all
referenced the rental as Coughlins home law office. Coughlins 10/17/11 filing spelled out in bold and
underlining on page 6 thereof the jurisdictional bar to the use of such summary eviction procedures
against a commercial tenant where such was not based on the non-payment of rent, all of which went
unrebutted in any way, other than Richard G. Hill, Esq. and his associate Casey D. Baker thereafter lying
during the appeal and Coughlins subsequent criminal trespass trial incident to the arrest at his former
home law office (see 61901) and Coughlins formal disciplinary hearing (see 62337) in alleging that
Coughlin had failed to raise such jurisdictional bar to summarily evicting a commercial tenant where no
alleging non-payment of rent in the trial courtwhich is plainly false from a review of the ROA filed by
the RJ C in CV11-03628.
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- 4/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
4. Coughlin move pursuant to NRS 40.385 for a stay in the justice court (as to the residential
portion of his tenancy) as well as in the district court (as to both the residential and commercial portions
of his tenancy, in addition to therafter complying with NRAP 8 in moving for a stay with the NSCT in
compliance with NRS 40.385s 2011 amendments).
5. The District Court refused to rule on Coughlins 12/30/11 NRS 40.385 Motion for Stay.
6. The District Courts 3/30/12 Order denied Coughlins appeal in refusing to conduct a de novo
review whilst also violating NRAP 32 in limiting Coughlins brief to 5 pages.
7. Coughlin filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Order Affirming Summary Eviction Order on 4/7/12,
and a Request to Submit such Motion thereafter that is now more than 60 days old, where no action has
been taken theron.
8. The landlord was awarded, pursuant to NRS 69.050 a prevailing party attorney fee award in a
6/25/12 Order despite the district courts 6/28/12 Order making clear such 6/25/12 Order was not a
sanction, and therefore void in light of NRS 40.400s dictate that NRAP 38 controls as the only basis for
an attorney fee award, particularly where NRS 69.050 only applies to appeals of judgments from
civil actions in the justice courts, not appeals of summary removal orders from summary eviction
proceedings
Coughlin has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. He appealed the justice courts order, then the
district court refused to exercise its jurisdiction, in addition to exceeding its jurisdiction, in a display of
versatility.
Coughlin will suffer damage as a result of thd summary eviction order and judges Sferrazza,
Flanagan, and Stiglichs arbitrary and capricious decision to let stand an order that lacked subject matter
jurisdiction whilst also refusing to adjudicate matters to which they had a duty to.
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- 5/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND RELIEF SOUGHT Was J udge Sferrazza's holding
the trial on 10/25/11 in excess of his jurisdiction, or arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law? Was
J udge Flanagans refusal to adjudicate Coughlins 12/30/11 NRS 40.385 Motion for Stay of the
Summary Eviction Order so as well (especially the decision to grant or deny such is arguably merely
ministerial and not discretionary where the statute plainly provides that if one plunks down the $250
they get there stay during the pendency of the appeal, subject to the proviso that they will be eligible for
another summary eviction being filed if they fail to pay rent during such appeals pendency. Similarly, is
J udge Stiglich now refusing to embrace her jurisdiction in failing to address both Coughlins 4/7/12
Motion to Alter or Amend the 3/30/12 Order Denying His appeal in addition to refusing to rule on
various NRCP 60(b) and or functional equivalents of NRAP 40 Petitions for Rehearing that Coughlin
has filed in connection to both the 3/30/12 Order denying his appeal and the reprehensible 6/25/12 Order
awarding a grotesque $42,065.00 in attorneys fees to the landlord for the appeal alone of a summary
eviction (not to mention the 5/22/12 Order awarding some $5K of so in costs)
III. STATEMENT OF REASON WHY WRITS SHOULD ISSUE Coughlin .Has No Plain,
Speedy, Or Adequate Remedy At Law And No Appeal. Article 6, Section 4, of the Nevada Constitution
provides: "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases arising in district
court. . .. The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus and also all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of appellate
jurisdiction."
NRS 34.020(2) Allows this Court to issue a writ of certiorari "when an inferior tribunal, board or
oft1cer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer and
there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy." Further,
NRS 34.160 And 34.170 Allow this Court to issue a writ of mandamus "to compel the performance of an
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- 6/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
act which the la 4 it.' Especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station ... [And]
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Coughlin has no right to appeal J udge Flanagans denial of his appeal and the august panel of
this Court in 61383 in a 5/28/13 Order Dismissed Coughlins appeal to it, indicating as much (though
Coughlin had filed a Petition for En Banc Reconsideration in that matter recently. Article 6, Section 6 of
the Nevada Constitution vests district courts with "final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in J ustices
Courts and such other inferior tribunals as may be established by law." As J udge Flanagan and now
J udge Stiglich have/had final appellate jurisdiction over the instant case, Coughlin has no right to
appeal.
J udge's Sferrazza, Flanagan, and Stiglichs Decisions Were In Excess of their J urisdiction and or
refused to Embrace Their J ursidiction in other Instances
I. This Court may grant a Writ of Certiorari where the tribunal below exceeds it jurisdiction by
failing to follow a proceeding or remedy created by a statute. A writ of certiorari may be granted where
(1) the inferior tribunal has exceeded jurisdiction, (2) no means of appeal exist, and (3) there is no plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy at law. Nev. Pub. Land Access Coalition, Inc. V. Humboldt County Bd. Of
County Comm'rs, III Nev. 749, 751, 895 P.2D 640, 641 (1995).
As seen above, Coughlin clearly has no means to appeal the decision and no plain, speedy or
adequate remedy at law and a collateral consequence of the dumpster fire these case are is Coughlins
currently facing permanent disbarment in 62337 incident to the criminal trespass conviction at issue in
61901, and the 6/25/12 Order awarding $42K in attorneys fees which Asst. Bar Counsel Patrick O. King
knows full well was not a sanction, as King emailed the 8/28/12 Order by J udge Flanagain in CV11-
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- 7/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
03628 that proves as much to Coughlin on 8/30/12. Nevertheless, King and Hill both continued to
attempt to perpetuate that fraud at Coughlins 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing (see 62337).
Thus, this Court. May issue a writ of certiorari if the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.
In Sellers v. Fourth J udicial District Court, 119 Nev. 256, 71 P.3D 495 (2003), J ustice Court awarded
attorney's fees to a prevailing self-represcnted party, pursuant to NRS 69.030. Id., 119 Nev. At 257, 71
P.3D at 496. Because no atttorney's fees were incurred, the losing party (Sellers) appealed and district
court affirmed the justice courts decision. Id. Sellers then filed a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court.
Id. This Court
Granted a writ of certiorari, voided the award of attorney's fees, and directed the district court to
remand the void order back to J ustice Court for modfication. Id., 119 Nev. A 260, 71 P.3D at 498. This
Court found that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing an award of attorney's fees to the
self represented prevailing party in justice court. Ld . By not complying with the statutory prerequisite
for an award of attorney's fees, the justice court and district court lacked jurisdiction to let stand an
award attorney's lees. Id., 119 Nev. A[258, 71 P.3D at 497. When statutes create a proceeding or remedy,
the failure to follow those statutes divests a court of subject matter jurisdiction. Ex. Rel. Wolf v. J ustice
of thc Pcace, Nev. 359, 364, 223 P. 821, 822 (1924). In Nevada, unlawful detainer actions are statutory
creations. NRS 40.2515-40.425.
In a summary eviction, and all other unlawful detainer actions, the Nevada Supreme Court has
held that the mode of acquiring jurisdiction "should be strictly pursued. . .. Where a statute prescribes
the mode of acquiring jurisdiction, that mode must be complied with or the proceedings are a nullity."
Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev. 70 (1865); See also C.H.A Venture v. G.C. Wallace Eng., 106 Nev. 381, 794
P.2d 708 (1990) (reh'g denied) (where this Court adheres to the same rule in all cases). The unlawful
detainer proceeding was unknown at common law and "purely a statutory proceeding and remedy .... "
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- 8/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Gibby's v. Aylett, 96 Nev. 678, 680681,615 P.2D 949, 951(1980). "As such, the statute must be strictly
construed and is presumably exclusive and complete as to the procedure to be followed pursuant to it."
Here, J udge Sferrazza and J udges Flanagan and Stiglich exceeded the court's jurisdiction by failing to
follow the statutorily prescribed procedure and dismiss the eviction where landlord Merliss did not have
a right to judgment as a matter of law and Coughlin raised a legal defense by showing that, genuine
issue of material fact existed as well as demonstrating that the jurisdictional prerequisites to the
maintenance of a summary eviction brought under NRS 40.254(2) were missing (no subject matter
jurisdiction against a commercial tenant were the non-payment of rent was not the basis for such
summary action, but rather an alleged right to a no cause eviction (and even that did not exist).
Coughlin has yet to receive a ruling from the district court on his 4/7/12 Motion to Alter, Amend,
etc. in CV11-03628, despite his 7/10/13 Request to Submit such 4/7/12 Motion in CV11-03628 now
being more than 60 days old. Additionally, the 2J DC has continued to refuse to adjudicate Coughlins
12/30/11 NRS 40.385 Motion to Stay the 10/27/11 FOFCOL and Order for Summary Eviction, instead,
choosing to only countenance such as a Motion for a TRO as to the 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Coughlins 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien.
Coughlin's Request to Submit his 4/7/12 Motion to Alter, Amend, etc. J udge Flanagan's 3/30/12
Order in CV11-03628 is now more than 60 days old. J udge Stiglich's 7/25/12 Order in CV11-03628 (a
6/11/13 Order by 2J DC Chief J udge Hardy essentially move nearly all cases in which Coughlin is a
party, criminal or civil, to J udge Stiglichs Department 8) admits to having not adjudicated such in light
of her view that "all outstanding motions" by Coughlin were moot (sort of a scorched earth approach
to Coughlin's filings reminiscent of that applied to his Petitions for Writ from J une and J uly of 2013
(both those the 2J DC actually permitted Coughlin to file and those it violated the law in refusing to file
or otherwise recognize).
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- 9/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Such 7/25/13 Order in CV11-03628 by J udge Stiglich admits: "Because this matter has been
fully adjudicated, all of Coughlin's outstanding motions pending in this case are DENIED as moot,
including his Emergency Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. This case is closed.". However, it
would certainly appear that the matter could not be "fully adjudicated" until Coughlin's 4/7/12 Motion to
Alter, Amend, etc. has been disposed of.
Until such time as that 4/7/12 Motion is disposed of, Coughlin is unable to file the NRAP 40
Petition for Rehearing (or some functional equivalent of an NRCP 60(b) motion given the vagaries of
the extent to which such 3/30/12 Order is an exercise of the district court's original or final appellate
jurisdiction vis a vis NRS 40.400's proviso:
NRS 40.400 Rules of practice. The provisions of NRS, Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure
and Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials, so far as they
are not inconsistent with the provisions of NRS 40.220 to 40.420, inclusive, apply to the proceedings
mentioned in those sections.
For, without a decision on such tolling motion renders this a matter lacking a "final
judgment". Depending upon whether J udge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order was made in an exercise of his
original or appellate jurisdiction (likely, I imagine, it was in an exercise of his NV Const. Art. 6 Sec. 6
final appellate jurisdiction, as opposed to his 1/11/12 order seemingly done in an exercise of his the
original jurisdiction accorded him by virtue of the then newly amended NRS 40.385 speaking to a
commercial tenant's (such as in the case of Coughlin, with his former home law office on River Rock)
need to, in the first instance, apply for a stay with the district court thereunder.
With respect to the finality of judgment in 03628 vis a vis the 3/30/12 Order denying Coughlin's
appeal (premised upon), there remains Coughlins outstanding 4/7/12 Motion to Alter or Amend Order
Affirming Summary Eviction Order. Note: regardless of the fact that Hill and his associate have lied in
their assertion that Coughlin failed to raise the issue of the jurisdictional bar to the use of the summary
eviction procedures under NRS 40.253 presented by NRS 40.254 where Coughlin's pleading a
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- 10/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
commercial tenancy went unrebutted, and where Hill's landlord client Merliss admits to pursuing a no
cause summary eviction under NRS 40.254(2) (under Nevada law, a commercial tenant can only be
summarily evicted for non-payment of rent), even assuming Coughlin had failed to make such argument
in the trial court (the justice court) such goes to that court's jurisdiction anyways. Accordingly: Court
gives de novo review to a district court's decision to grant summary judgment, Wood, 121 Nev. At 729,
121 P.3D at 1029, a de novo standard of review does not trump the general rule that "[a] point not urged
in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will
not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. V. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2D 981, 983 (1981).
Regardless, of course, law clerk newly hired by Coughlin's party opponents as the WCDA in
several matters, Zelalem Bogale (now J udge Stiglich's law clerk and brother the the boyfriend of the
very ADKT 0411 violating directly appointed by J udges Clifton and Pearson conflict counsel R. Bruce
Lindsay whom on 3/14/13 threatened to murder Coughlin and otherwise presented a rather tepid
arrangement in lieu of actual advocacy (with Bogale's brother, Sutafe smugly opinion to Coughlin "you
got what you paid for" in reference to indigent Coughlin utilizing the public defender and or court
appointed counsel, including the unauthorized practice of law by his fiance, Diana Simms, on behalf of
R. Bruce Lindsay, Esq.) and J udge Flanagan applied a "clearly erroneous" standard of review where the
very Anvui their Order cites to makes quite clear a "de novo review" by the district court is
mandated. Such entails no deference to the justice court's FOFCOL and Order for Summary Eviction
whatsoever, but rather, an application by the district court of the same NRS 40.253(6) standard applied
by the justice court. That is, the district court must apply the same substantive test on review that the
justice courtt earlier applied. This occurs, for example, when both the justice court and the district court
ask whether a genuine dispute over material facts precludes summary judgment. Each court reviews the
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- 11/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
preliminary record and determines whether the test of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
met. Celotex Corp. V. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986).
Per Anvui, the Nevada Supreme Court's standard of review is actually de novo, however, because
it arrives at its substantive decision irrespective of the trial courts decision. See Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3D 967, 975, 34 U.S.P.Q.2D 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (En banc) (On appeal,
we review de novo the correctness of the district courts grant of J MOL by reapplying the J MOL
standard.), Affd 517 U.S. 470 (1996).
Of course, that's not what J udge Flangan's 3/30/12 Order did, where it reads: "Whether on appeal
at the Nevada Supreme Court from a district court, or on appeal at a district court from a justice court, a
lower court's findings "will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and are
not based on substantial evidence." Gibellini v Kilindt 110 Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2D 540, 542
(1994)."
J udge Flanagan and Bogale can throw Richard G. Hill and his associate Casey D. Baker under
the bus somewhat where Hill and Baker fraudulently cited to the very Gibellini decision that they know
full well has nothing to do with the appeal of an order granting summary judgment, much less the appeal
of a summary removal order in a summary eviction under NRS 40.253(6). Luckily, it is just that sort of
fraud, combined with the more egregious fraud attendant to Hill's firm and and his client lying in open
court and in filings about the length of the lease and in attesting that it had automatically "expired" after
the expiration of 12 months from its commencement where the lease quite clearly provides that it shall
be for "not less than 12 months",etc., etc., that makes Hill's firm, Hill, and Baker appropriate defendants
under the Mayes v. UVI decision (see also, Iorio, Russell v. Kalian, and their progeny).
Another troubling issue relates to the fact that the 2J DC's clerks stamped and signed a Certificate
of Clerk indicating that it was in fact receiving that in the 1/4/12 Supplemental filed in CV11-03628 by
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- 12/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
the RJ C that which is listed in the Appeal Receipt on page 2 thereof. Of course, the 4/1/13 refiling of
such by the RJ C is an admission that such was never actually transmitted in the 1/4/13
Supplemental. Such obviously had an enormously prejudicial effect on the appeal in 03628, including
the following from page 5, footnote 5 of J udge Flangan's 3/30/12 Order (especially where a timely
Notice of Appeal was in fact filed by Coughlin in the RJ C to just that to which J udge Flanagan's
footnote 5 alleges Coughlin was deficient with respect to, especially where such 12/26/12 Notice of
Appeal was among those items listed in the 1/4/12 Supplemental's "Appeal Receipt" that were not
actually received by the 2J DC, despite Clerk Baragan stamped and signing a Certificate of Clerk
indicating that such had, in fact, been received. Filing Officer Manager Michelle Purdy has since
admitted to Coughlin that such was clear error by the Clerk, and a change in policy has been put in place
in the 2J DC specifically in response to just such occurrence, upon Coughlin's bringing it to light (ie, no
more robo signing by the clerks, or no more certificate of clerk robo stamping). Such footnote 5 on page
5 of J udge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order in 03628 reads: "In addition, because Coughlin failed to timely file
hi notice of appeal regarding the personal property lien, see NRS 40.253(8), And because Coughlin's
notice of appea fails to identify an error regarding the court's procedure in setting a hearing on this issue,
this Court will no consider this issue."
Of course, J udge Flanagan's 3/30/12 Order admits that the required "de novo review" was not
performed, but rather something slightly more involved than a rubber stamping of the justice court's
summary removal order. Such does not satisfy J udge Flanagan's duty, where his 3/30/12 Order admits:
"Legal Analysis This Court has reviewed all of the parties' pleadings and the exhibits
attached thereto This Court also has considered all of the parties' relevant arguments. After this review
an consideration, this Court will not disturb J udge Sferrazza's October 27, 2011 Order granting summary
eviction. This Court finds that Order was based on substantial evidence and it was no clearly
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- 13/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
erroneous. Thus, this Court concludes Merliss has met his initial burden of proving there is no genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly Consequently, the
burden shifts to Coughlin to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Although Coughlin
raises several claims and makes numerous allegations in his Brief, Coughlin fails to present
additional facts related to his defenses raised in RJC that undermine or legitimately call into question
the substantial evidence upon which Judge Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction. This
Court gives substantial deference to the lower court's factual findings in this regard, particularly in
light of the numerous hearings held before Judge Sferrazza and Coughlin's related opportunities to
present evidence supporting his various defenses. Therefore, this Court finds no genuine issue of
material fact exists regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly in the lower court. As a
result, Coughlin's appeal is DENIED."
There is far more to a "de novo review" than merely reviewing "the parties pleadings and exhibits
attached thereto. The term "pleadings" only encompasses the Tenant's Answer/Affidavit and the
Landlord's Affidavit, and any amendments thereto, at best. Whether or not the district court found the
justice court's summary removal order to be clearly erroneous or based upon substantial evidence is of
no moment in conducting a de novo review ("This Court finds that Order was based on substantial
evidence and it was no clearly erroneous" reveals the patent extent to which Judge Flanagan failed to
embrace his jurisdiction, sufficient to warrant a Writ of Mandamus so now requiring Judge Stiglich
to do so.). Judge Flanagan is not permitted excise his duty to conduct a "de novo review" of the
entire record by merely conducting a review of the pleadings and the justice court's order, only to
thereafter conclude "Merliss has met his initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Coughlin was summarily evicted properly".
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- 14/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Similarly, J udge Flanagan fails to embrace his jursidiction where he then again fails to conduct a
"de novo review" of the justice court record but merely indicates that "Although Coughlin raises
several claims and makes numerous allegations in his Brief, Coughlin fails to present additional facts
related to his defenses raised in RJC that undermine or legitimately call into question the substantial
evidence upon which Judge Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction."
Coughlin was not required to present "additional facts related to his defenses", and, in fact, a "de
novo review" would prevent putting new "additional facts" into the record being reviewed. As such, it is
completely irrelevant whether J udge Flanagan feels there was substantial evidence upon which Judge
Sferrazza relied when he granted summary eviction". Further, it is beyond irrelevant whether the
district court gives "substantial deference to the lower court's factual findings in this regard,
particularly in light of the numerous hearings held before Judge Sferrazza and Coughlin's related
opportunities to present evidence supporting his various defenses" particularly where, had J udge
Flanagan conducted the "de novo review" he was required to (see NRS 281.340 as to his failure to abide
by such a duty) it would have been abundantly clear that there were no such "numerous hearings held"
and "related opportunities" for Coughlin to "present evidence supporting his various defense", especially
given the egregious application of NRS 118A.355(5) by the justice court in a no cause summary
eviction, and where J udge Sferrazza insisted on forcing Coughlin to spend an inordinate amount of time
proving his "habitability defense" when, in reality, Coughlin defenses were that the lease had not
"expired", and therefore the purported "notice of termination" was deficient where it fraudulently
asserted the lease had expired, (particularly where there was no right to no cause terminate either a
commercial or residential lease (especially where both were expressly permitted by the lease) inuring to
the landlord under the lease, and that the landlord had violated Nevada law in evicting Coughlin in
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- 15/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
retaliation for Coughlin's engaging in a variety of protected activities (including making valid
habitability complaints, asserting his rights under the lease, complaints of discrimination, etc., etc.).
Additionally, the recent hiring of the WCDA's Office of J udge Stiglich's law clerk, Zelalem
Bogale, is necessarily and enormous conflict of interest, on the level of WCDA's Office Chief Deputy
Bruce Hahn at once sitting on the Board of Directors of Washoe Legal Services whilst former WLS
employee Coughlin was and is suing WLS for wrongful termination, etc., all whilst Hahn also failed to
recuse himself from Coughlin's NNDB Screening Panel in April 2012, all whilst the WCDA's Office
necessarily has a role in the burglaries of tenants' (including several committed against Coughlin, see
CR12-1262, RCR2012-000374, RCR2012-001048, RCR2013-067980) dress up as summary eviction
lockouts where the WCSO steadfastly refuses (in contrast to all other counties in Nevada) to accord
tenants the "24 hours" "from receipt" of a summary removal order they are entitled to before the
effectuation of any lockout pursuant thereto. Of course, the very $42,065 attorney fee award that
Richard G. Hill, Esq. has purported to execute upon by levying and apparently purchasing at auction
Coughlin's interest in any award flowing from Coughlin's suit against Washoe Legal Services (incident
to the 6/25/12 Order in CV11-03628 that J udge Flanagan's 8/28/12 Order therein makes quite clear is
not a sanction, and therefore, per NRS 40.400 and NRAP 38, such award must now be set aside by
J udge Stiglich (whom is required (subject to a Writ of Mandamus) to embrace the jurisdiciton accorded
her per either NRAP 40, NRCP 60(b) or some functional equivalent thereof depending upon whether the
6/25/12 $42,065 fee award by J udge Flanagan (whose law clerk at the time was also Zelalem Bogale,
whom, again, now joins WLS's Executive Director Paul Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano, Esq., as among
those in the employ of the WCDA's Office) was made in an exercise of the districts original or appellate
jurisdiction. Regardless, nothing about any order in 61383 changes that or absolves J udge Stiglich of
the duty to embrace her jurisdiction therein (see NRS 281.340). Regardless, NV J CRCP 81, NRS
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- 16/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
40.400, and NRAP 38 operate to make quite clear that the only basis left for J udge Flanagan's 6/25/12
03628 attorney fee award, NRS 69.050's prevailing party attorney fee award in appeals of "civil actions"
to district courts, is completely inapplicable, particularly where such applies only to "judgments" from
"civil actions", and CV11-03628 involves the appeal of a "summary removal order" from a "summary
eviction proceeding".
The fact that the very $42,065.00 attorney fee award Hill now seeks to satisfy out of any future
award Coughlin's receives against WLS in CV11-01896 stems from Hill's associate's 4/19/12 Motion for
Attorney's Fees in the appeal in CV11-03628 of the summary eviction in Rev2011-001708, and that such
Motion was filed on the very day 2J DC J udge Elliott violated the contempt procedures in CR12-0376
(all the more troubling where J udge Elliott failed to divulge, much less recuse himself from Coughlin's
companion suit against WLS and CAAW in CV11-01955 where J udge Elliott sat on CAAW's Executive
Board) for revoking one's bail under NRS 178, along with the competency order stay under NRS
178.405, with the complicity of DDA Z. Young (whose attempt to hold a trial on the day an opposition
to such attorney fee motion was due, in Young's 5/7/12 in RCR2011-063341 (now on appeal before
J udge Stiglich and her WCDA's Office new hire law clerk Zelalem Bogale) conspiring with WCPD
Goodnight to again violate NRS 178.405) is more than troubling.
CONCLUSION
Coughlin respectfull requests that either a writ of certiorari or mandmaus issue from this
Court directing either Judges Sferrazza, Flanagan, or Stiglich to reverse the summary eviction
order, reverse the denial of his appeal, grant his motion for stay of the summary eviction order,
etc., etc. or to show cause why such orders should not be dismissed. RESPECTFULLY
SUBMITTED
DATED this 10/22/13
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- 17/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Petitioner

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- 18/18 -
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP AND SUBMIT THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR, IN
THE ALTERANTIVE FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Proof of Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
to all registered electronic filers
richard g. hill, esq. for Merliss and or mailed a copy to Merliss himself at his Chico address (though Hill
is coyly attempting to characterize such as an RPC 4.2 violation though Hill fails to appear in CV11-
03051, etc, etc., and mailed a copy to Hill if this Court directs Coughlin to, though Coughlin requests
that, if personal service be required, such be ordered at public expense incident to this IFP Motion
Dated this 10/22/13

/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin Petitioner, pro per attorney
suspended in NV