THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118691. April 17, 1997]

ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique and ALBERTO MAGDATO, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our Decision in this case promulgated on 5 July 1996, we ordered Judge Deogracias K. Del Rosario of
the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnogon-Bugasong-Valderrama, Antique, and Atty. Marcelo
C. Josue to show cause, within ten days from receipt of a copy of the said decision, why they should not
be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law and violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respectively.
The following findings in the decision compelled the issuance of this show-cause order on Judge Del
Rosario:
It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15
November 1991, the MCTC Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15
December 1992 order. While it may be true that this did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are
expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars adopted by this Court which
affect the conduct of cases before them.
Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil
Case No. 262 since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian
relationship between him and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of
MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over
the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG and MAGDATO, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in
MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se, did not automatically divest
the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the
MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or
not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue,
the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.
The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a
strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section which bars the
MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its
predecessor, does not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged
from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to
file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have
even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which
reads:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. -- The following pleadings, motions, or petition shall not be
allowed in the case covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
. . .
Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO "to remove his house ... before
judgment becomes final and executory," and the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy
[MAGDATO'S] house on the ... land of [BAYOG] in case [MAGDATO] should fail to remove the same
... before judgment against him becomes final and executory. This was clearly in violation of Section 8,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such orders of
"removal" and "demolition" before the judgment becomes final and executory were obviously intended
to render futile any appeal which MAGDATO could interpose therefrom pursuant to Section 21 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC, in its Order of Execution of 16
December 1993, directed the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's [MAGDATO's]
home standing in the above-described parcel of land in case defendant should fail to remove the same
therefrom before judgment against him becomes final and executory." And, in strict obedience to this
said order, Sheriff IV Amando S. Lapos, acting for the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff, accompanied by Edgar
Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro Pojo, members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts, and BAYOG himself, served on MAGDATO the order of
execution on 24 January 1994 and forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question
and demolished and destroyed MAGDATO's house.
This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the law. No demolition of
MAGDATO's house could have been validly effected on the day of service of the order of
execution. MAGDATO should have been afforded a reasonable period of time to remove his house, and
only after he failed to comply within the given period could a demolition order have been issued by the
court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In his Comment filed on 12 August 1996, Judge Del Rosario explains that in his honest understanding
and interpretation of Section 5 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in relation to Sections 6 and
19(e) of the said rules and Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129, and defendant-respondents answer which was
filed few days late was deemed never filed, and, therefore, the court,motu proprio or on motion of the
plaintiff, should render judgment as would be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. But,
despite plaintiffs-petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 10 February 1993 he rendered
judgment only after more than seven months, or on 20 September 1993. This indicates that the said
order was not issued with haste.
He also calls the attention of this Court to the following allegation in plaintiffs-petitioners Answer to
Counterclaim with the the MCTC:
4. That, since 1975 until August 31, 1987 defendant used to be a lessee of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog's on
another parcel of land. ...
According to him Magdatos failure to deny the said allegation amounted to an admission that he has
nothing at all to do with the parcel of land described in ... the complaint in Civil Case No. 262. Thus, the
claim of tenancy is false and a sham.
The respondent Judge admits his misgivings in his Order of 20 September 1993, especially with
reference to the phrase before judgment become final and executory. He avers that the said phrase
was never meant to be; as a matter of fact, the Order of Execution was issued only on 16 December
1993, long after the Order of 20 September 1993 had indeed become final and executory. IT IS JUST
MOST UNFORTUNATE that the sheriff executed literally the said Order. At any rate, his Order of 20
September 1993 is the product of what he honestly believed to be right and just under the
circumstances.
We find unsatisfactory the above explanation of Judge Del Rosario. The fact remains that, in his orders
dated 15 December 1992 and 20 September 1993, he applied the previous Rule on Summary procedure
despite the effectivity of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991 yet.
That he never meant his order of 20 September 1993 to be executed before the judgment became final
and executory is a lame excuse, which no rational mind can accept. He explicitly ordered Magdato to
remove his house standing on Bayogs lot before judgment became final and executory. To carry out
that order, he also directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy Magdatos house in case
Magdato should fail to remove the same before judgment against him becomes final and
executory. He reiterated this command in no uncertain terms in his Order of Execution of 16 December
1993 when he directed the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy Magdatos house Magdato failed
to remove the same before judgment against him becomes final and executory. He cannot then be
allowed to make the sheriff who enforced his order as a scapegoat. He knew, or ought to know, that his
order could not be executed before the finality of the judgment and that the removal or destruction of
Magdatos house could only be done after Magdato has failed to remove it within a reasonable period
of time.
We have time and again stated that judges are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. We have reminded them that under Canons 4 and 18
of he Canons of Judicial Ethics, they are required to be studious of the principles of law and to
administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that
they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. (Estoya v. Abraham-
Singson, 237 SCRA 1, 21 [1994]).
Judges of trial courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should never forget that they are in the
forefront in the sacred task of administering justice. Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting
in oppression or failure of justice would have a negative effect in the Judiciary itself. Judges must not
allow this to happen. Judge Del Rosario must then be held responsible for what he did in this case.
As to Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, it appears that he has not complied with the order of this Court for him to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He must then be also required to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt in failing to comply with the said order.
WHEREFORE, for ignorance of procedural laws resulting in abuse of authority and oppression, Judge
Deogracias K. del Rosario of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderrama,
Antique, is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) and WARNED that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
For his failure to comply with the 5 July 1996 Decision of this Court requiring him to explain his apparent
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue is hereby further
DIRECTED to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court and to SUBMIT his
compliance with the decision of 5 July 1996, both within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be immediately served on Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario and Atty.
Marcelo C. Josue.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.









SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000]
GLORIA LUCAS, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a verified complaint
[1]
dated May 20, 1997, complainant Gloria Lucas charged respondent, Judge
Amelia A. Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 9, Manila, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Discretion relative to Civil Case No. 151248 entitled "Editha F. Gacad, represented by
Elenita F. Castelo vs. Gloria Lucas, for Ejectment". Jksm
Complainant, who was the defendant in the aforecited case, alleged that Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued
an Order
[2]
dated February 26, 1997 granting the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the
Order
[3]
dated January 13, 1997, which dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to
appear at the Preliminary Conference.
Complainant averred that it is elementary, under Section 19 (c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure, that
a motion for reconsideration is prohibited, but respondent judge, in violation of the rule, granted the
motion for reconsideration. She added that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had
pointed out in open court that the case is governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure,
[4]
the judge
ordered the revival of the case out of malice, partiality and with intent to cause an injury to
complainant.
Further, complainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in blatant disregard of the
established rules on procedure, and it is an instance where the doctrine of IPSA LOQUITOR may once
again may be applied by the Court to discipline judges.
On June 18, 1997, respondent judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint. In her
Comment
[5]
dated September 16, 1997, she admitted that she granted the motion for reconsideration
even if the same is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She explained, however, that it was
granted in the interest of justice.
In her Comment, respondent stated:
"The Order subject of this complaint is the Order dated January 13, 1997 dismissing the complaint for
ejectment for failure of the plaintiff to appear for preliminary conference and more importantly her
lawyer, Atty. Jose Suing, who was duly empowered to appear for preliminary conference by virtue of a
Special Power of Attorney. Chief
Immediately upon learning the said order of dismissal and awarding of attorneys fees, Atty. Suing filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on January 17, 1997 (Annex "A") stating that he failed to appear due to a
sudden excruciating stomach pain. He further stated that his Secretary called the Court but to no avail
until finally the call came through and she was informed that the case was dismissed. Over the objection
of the defendant that the Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading which this Presiding
Judge is fully aware of under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the Motion for Reconsideration was
nonetheless granted in the interest of justice. The question is poised. Are the actuations of judges to be
governed strictly by the Rule on Summary Procedure despite their belief in good faith that in special
cases, its observance would result in a miscarriage of justice? This Presiding Judge does not think so.
Judges are supposed to responsible Public Officials and should be able to perceive and discern
circumstances which might lead to miscarriage of justice, thus, negating the very purpose and essence
of the Rule on Summary Procedure. The Rule on Summary Procedure is not a straight jacket and it is
believed it was never meant to be that. This is the reason why we have in the Rules of Court Section 5
(g) of Rule 135 which is one of the inherent powers of the Court, that is, to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. Ignorance of the law, to the
mind of the undersigned, is the act of a judge in taking legal steps or adopting procedure unknowingly
aware that they are contrary to established Rules which should be known to the judge. This Presiding
Judge in this particular case was fully aware of the Rule on Summary Procedure. She fully knew that the
Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading but she still considered it because to deny it
would result in a miscarriage of justice. It was not a capricious, whimsical and despotic act when viewed
in the light of this circumstance.
With respect to the allegation that the charge of ignorance of the law was compounded by the failure to
issue a writ of execution, it bears stressing that the Order dated January 13, 1997 never gained finality
because the plaintiff was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration within the fifteen (15) day period,
that is, on January 17, 1997. But even if it is argued validly that the Motion for Reconsideration being a
prohibited pleading did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal, still the said Order did not gain
finality as far as defendant Gloria Lucas is concerned because as the record shows, it was she who
received the Order, not her lawyer, Atty. Sulit." Esm
The complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation after the case was docketed as an administrative matter. On August 25,
1997, OCA in a Memorandum, submitted the following findings:
"After a careful perusal of the records of the case, we find that respondent Judge Fabros abused her
discretion in granting the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent Judge Fabros maintained that she could not be guilty of gross ignorance of the law as she
knows that a motion for reconsideration of judgment is a prohibited motion in an ejectment case. She
explained that although there is already a judgment dismissing the case, she granted the plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration in the interest of justice since the reasons stated in the motion for
reconsideration are meritorious.
Respondent failed to realize that the first duty of the court is to apply the law and that when the law is
clear and unambiguous, there is no room for interpretation. Although her intention was good, this could
not free her from liability.
Respondent should have denied the motion since the plaintiff had other judicial remedies like appeal."
[6]

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
P2,000.00 for grave abuse of discretion. The Court, however, finds this recommendation without factual
and legal basis.
As a rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus,
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases covered by this Rule.
xxx
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
xxx"
This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered on the
merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective November 15, 1991: "The motion
prohibited by this Section is that which seeks reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the
court after trial on the merits of the case."
[7]
Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due
to failure of a party to appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the
merits after trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohibited
pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary Procedure. Thus,
respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the law, in
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present complaint. Esmsc
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint filed against respondent Judge Amelia A. Fabros is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.





THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997]
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners, vs. HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding
Judge, Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Iloilo City; and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE
GUEVARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an answer filed
out of time due to alleged oversight?
This is the main legal question raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24,
[1]
which dismissed a special civil action for certiorariand injunction
filed by herein petitioners. The dispositive portion of the assailed RTC Decision reads:
[2]

WHEREFORE premises considered, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
denied and, with respect to the merits, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed.
Double costs against petitioners.
Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted as
correct by the parties. A complaint for forcible entry
[3]
was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara
against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial
Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25,
1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara
was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993,
petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer.
[4]
On
September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
[5]
On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of
the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their
answer,
[6]
which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the
admission of an amended answer. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and
considered the case submitted for resolution.
[7]
On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC
[9]
issued a
decision
[10]
resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
[11]
Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the
amended answer and to conduct further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed for, a
temporary restraining order was issued by the RTC.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed Decision
[12]
dismissing the petition. Respondent Judge Norberto
E. Devera, Jr., ratiocinated:
[13]

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
provides, among others, as follows:
Sec. 36 - Summary Procedures in Special Cases x x x The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or
procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditions (sic) and inexpensive
determination thereof without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing
pleadings shall be non-extendible.
Pursuant to the aforequoted legislative mandate, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on Summary
Procedure, the pertinent provisions of which, as related to the issues raised in this case, are hereunder
set forth -
II - Civil Cases
Section 3 - Pleadings
A. (P)leadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints, compulsory counter-
claims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5 Answer - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to
the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of Failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not
be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing should underscore quite clearly the reality that the ten-day-period to file an answer
reckoned from the date of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and no reason of any kind is
acceptable to operate as an excuse. The rule is explicit. It is addressed more, being one of procedure,
to counsels than to litigants. Counsels, therefore cannot assert the validity of their clients cause to
evade the mandate of the law.
Accordingly, the Court cannot fault the respondent judge [referring to Judge Jose R. Astorga] in acting
the way he did in Civil Case No. 130 (93) taking into account the admitted facts and circumstances.
Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit for resolution the following questions of law:
[14]

I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied
STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Petitioners argue that the technical rules of procedure must yield to the higher interest of
justice. Petitioners explain that they filed the motion for extension of time to file an answer, a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, because of oversight. That was why
immediately upon receipt of the denial of that motion, petitioners filed their motion to admit answer
which was later verified and had to be amended. All these (actions) were done in a period of five (5)
days from the lapse of the reglementary period to file an answer.
[15]
Furthermore, petitioners contend
that no prejudice to private respondent has been claimed or alleged by reason of the delay in filing an
answer.
[16]
Petitioners also argue that their defense in the action for forcible entry is based on
substantial grounds, because they were in prior physical possession of the premises subject of the
action and that their houses have long been standing on the land in question because the land on which
said houses are standing are (sic) the common properties of the parties.
Citing Section 2, Rule 1
[17]
of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray that the provisions in the Rule on
Summary Procedure regarding prohibited pleadings and the period for filing an answer be given liberal
interpretation. Petitioners concede that said provisions appear to be couched in mandatory
language. They contend, however, that other similarly worded provisions in the Rules of Court have
nonetheless been liberally applied by this Court to promote substantial justice.
[18]

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that the provisions in question have to be strictly
construed in order to avoid delay, considering that the Rule on Summary Procedure is aimed at
inexpensive, expeditious and summary determination of cases.
[19]
Private respondent adds that the
petition can also be dismissed on the ground of violation of Revised Circular 28-91 on forum shopping,
because three (3) months after the rendition of the assailed Decision, a petition for quieting of title and
partition, and damages, involving the same parcel of residential land (Cadastral Lot No. 709 x x x ), was
filed xxx docketed as Civil Case No. 21618, by (Petitioner) Victoria Guevara-Gachon (x x x), Patricio
Guevara (father of Petitioner Alex Guevara), Lilia Guevara-Doreza and Fe Guevara-Burgos against herein
private respondent. Private respondent contends that the subsequent case is the appropriate forum
where ownership of the property in question may be threshed out.
[20]

As observed at the outset, the issue to be resolved is whether, under the undisputed facts of this case,
the Rule on Summary Procedure may be liberally construed in order to allow the admission of
petitioners answer which unquestionably was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Preliminary Matter
It bears noting that petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for review assailing the RTC
Decision. This remedy is allowed under paragraph 2 of Circular 2-90
[21]
which provides:
Section 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. -- Except in criminal cases where
the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
[22]
this being the
clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be
taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This is a pure
question of law that may be properly raised in this petition for review.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Interpretation of the Period
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer
to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not
be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x x x x x
(Underscoring supplied.)
The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a
statute.
[23]
This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word
ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the
consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other.
[24]

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.
[25]

The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.
[26]
For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays
and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is
Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the
failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure shall be non-extendible.
[27]

Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,
[28]
and this rule
should equally apply with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the
start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure
underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of
expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put
premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light,
petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
Other than a plea for the liberal interpretation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, petitioners do not
provide an adequate justification for the admission of their late answer. Oversight, which they
candidly cite as the reason for their filing a motion for extension of time to file an answer, is not a
justification. Oversight, at best, implies negligence; at worst, ignorance. The negligence displayed by
petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so basic a rule, on the other hand, can never be
condoned. In either case, the directory application of the questioned provision is not warranted.
Petitioners also cite Rosales vs. Court of Appeals
[29]
and Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,
[30]
but these cases do not support their position.
In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals,
[31]
this Court applied the Rule on Summary Procedure liberally when the
defendant, instead of filing an answer, filed within the reglementary period a pleading labeled as a
motion to dismiss. In treating the motion to dismiss as an answer, the Court ruled:
[32]

Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding its being labeled as a
motion to dismiss, said pleading should have been considered as his answer pursuant to the liberal
interpretation accorded the rules and inasmuch as the grounds involved therein also qualify as defenses
proper in an answer. In this instance the Court agrees. Indeed, the rule on summary procedure was
conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases such as the present one. Well-settled is
the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving disturbance of
social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override
substantial justice. With this premise in mind and having insisted, however erroneously, on its
jurisdiction over the case, it certainly would have been more prudent for the lower court to have treated
the motion to dismiss as the answer of petitioner and examined the case on its merits. As will be shown
shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place would have been avoided.
Furthermore, the said case did not involve the question of extension in the period for filing pleadings
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[33]
this Court allowed the notice to vacate, served upon
the tenant, by registered mail instead of personal service as required by the Rules of Court. We thus
ruled:
[34]

At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature because they involve a disturbance a social order which must be abated as promptly as possible
without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate
analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has
personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a
messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila Times
Publishing Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new
owner of the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising
him to leave the premises but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January
12, 1981 elicited the same reaction; that a final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to
petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on the supposition that there was no
personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioners blatant attempts at
evasion which compelled the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance
an unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted
delay resulting from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid
demand.
In both cases, there was substantial compliance with the law, something that cannot be said of herein
petitioners.
Second Issue: Forum-Shopping
Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present
ejectment suit, notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the same
property and parties. We are unable to find basis for this charge.
For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and
circumstances; and the actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and
issues.
[35]
Suffice it to say that an action for quieting of title and partition has a different cause of action
than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself contended, ownership of a certain portion
of the property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily mean that the successful
litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the
character of a partys possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to
stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
[36]
It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate action for
quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of
ejectment.
[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in
toto. Double costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.