CIR v.

Cebu Portland Cement Company

Doctrine: The payment of taxes cannot be postponed by simply questioning
their validity. The machinery of the state would grind to a halt and all
government functions would be paralyzed if this were so. Tax is the
lifeblood of the government.
Facts:
This case stems from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals which
ordered the CIR to refund the amount of overpayments of ad
valorem taxes on cement produced and sold by the Cebu
Portland Cement Company after October 1957.
Cebu Portland moed for the issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce said !ud"ment of the Court of Tax Appeals. #oweer$ the C%&
opposed said motion on the "round that Cebu Portland had an
outstanding sales tax liability to which the judgment debt
was already credited. In fact there was still a balance
owing on the sales taxes with surcharges.
The CTA "ranted the motion of Cebu Portland holdin" that since the
tax liability was still bein" 'uestioned$ it could not be set off a"ainst
the refund.
!rguments:
Cebu Portland claims that their tax liability was still bein"
'uestioned since accordin" to them$ cement is not a manufactured
product$ but a mineral product. %t should hae been exempt from
taxes under (ection 1)) of the Tax Code. *oreoer$ the alle"ed sales
tax deficiency could not be enforced a"ainst them since it has already
prescribed$ not hain" been made within the 5 year re"lementary
period from the filin" of the tax returns.
Issue:
+hether or not cement is a manufactured product and therefore not
exempt from sales taxes.
+hether or not the collection of the ,ational %nternal &eenue tax
can be en!oined.
+hether or not the sales tax assessments hae already prescribed.
Ratio:
Cement is considered as a manufactured product and was
never considered otherwise within the meaning of "ection
#$% of the &ax Code notwithstanding at least '() of its
components are minerals for the simple reason that cement is a
product of the manufacturin" process and is no lon"er the mineral
product contemplated in the Tax Code.
(uch position of Cebu Portland was apparently encoura"ed by a
preious !urisprudence. (uch reliance is misplaced and said decision
is no authority for the proposition that after the enactment of &A
1-99$ cement became a mineral product as distin"uished from a
manufactured product$ and therefore ceased to be sub!ect to sales
tax. (uch decision was overruled insofar as it is in conflict with
the instant decision.
&he action has not yet prescribed. The period of prescription
be"ins to run from the time the sales return re'uired in (ection 1).
of the Tax Code is filed$ not the ad valorem tax returns under
"ection #$* or the income tax return. The commissioner does
not consider such returns as compliance with the re'uirement for the
filin" of tax returns so as to start the runnin" of the 5 year
prescriptie period.
There bein" no sales tax returns filed$ the assessment made by the
Commissioner is not barred by the 5 year prescriptie period. Absent
a return$ or where a return is false or fraudulent$ the applicable
period is 1/ days from the discoery of the fraud$ falsity or omission.
&he payment of taxes cannot be postponed by simply
+uestioning their validity. &he machinery of the state
would grind to a halt and all government functions would
be paraly,ed if this were so. This is proided by (ection -91 of
the Code which states that no court shall hae authority to "rant an
in!unction to restrain the collection of any national internal reenue
tax$ fee or char"e imposed by this code.
%n sum$ the Court of Tax Appeals erred in orderin" the refund.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. !lgue
Doctrine: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. But such collection should be
made in accordance with the law as any arbitrariness will negate the very
reason for government itself.
Taxation should be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. If not then the taxpayer has a right to complain to
the courts. The tax collector may be stopped in his trac!s if the taxpayer can
demonstrate that the law has not been observed.
Facts:
Al"ue herein was a domestic corporation en"a"ed in en"ineerin"$
construction and other allied actiities. %t receied a letter from the
C%& showin" the total amount as delin'uency income taxes for the
years 195) and 1959. Al"ue 0as representatie of the corporation1
filed a letter of protest or re+uest for reconsideration
which was stamped and received on the same day in the
office of the CIR.
Thereafter$ despite the letter of protest$ a warrant of distraint
and levy was presented to !lgue through its counsel but they
refused to receie it on the "round that they filed a letter of protest.
The letter of protest was apparently lost in the office. #ence$ a
Photostat copy of the letter of protest was a"ain "ien to the 2%& but
thereafter$ !lgue was informed that the -IR was not ta.ing
any action on the protest and it was only then that he
accepted the warrant of distraint and levy served.
13 days later$ Al"ue filed a petition for reiew of the decision of the
C%& with the Court of Tax Appeals 0which appears to fall within the
./ day period re'uired after the receipt of the decision or rulin"1.
%t should be noted that the letter of protest filed by Al"ue contained a
protest on the disallowance of the deduction of expenses in its
income tax returns. %t claims that the expenses were ordinary
reasonable or necessary business expense$ not promotional fees.
#ence$ should be deducted from the amount to be paid.
Issue:
+hether or not the appeal was made on time and in accordance with
the law.
+hether or not the C%& correctly disallowed the P75/// deduction
claimed by Al"ue as le"itimate business expenses in its income tax
returns.
Ratio:
&he appeal was made on time and in accordance with the
law. There is a special circumstance in this case and such
circumstance prevents the application of the accepted
doctrine that a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the
finality of the assessment.
%n this case$ after Al"ue4s receipt of the notice of assessment$ it
immediately filed a notice of protest which thereafter$ could not be
located in the office of the C%&. %t was only after a Photostat was
submitted$ that it was considered by the tax authorities. &hus
during the intervening period the warrant was premature
and could not therefore be served.
&he claimed deduction by !lgue was permitted under the
Internal Revenue Code. &hus it could not be disallowed by
the petitioner. The 75$/// deduction in this case stems from the
authority of Alberto 5ueara and others to sell the land$ factories$
and oil manufacturin" process of the Philippine (u"ar 6state
7eelopment Company. Alberto 5ueara et al wor8ed for the
formation of the 9e"etable Oil %nestment Corporation$ inducin"
others to inest in it. :or the sale of properties$ Al"ue receied as an
a"ent a commission of 1-3$/// and it was from this commission that
the 75//// promotional fees were paid to the aforementioned
indiiduals.
%t should be noted that the payments were made periodically and not
in lump sum. Also$ this was a family corporation where strict
business procedures were not applied and immediate issuance of
receipts was not re'uired.
!ccording to the Code all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year shall be
deductibles. /oreover the Revenue Regulations provide
for the inclusion of a reasonable amount of compensation
for personal services as deductibles. &he test of
deductibility in this case is whether they are reasonable
and are in fact payments purely for service. %n this case$
Al"ue has proed that the payment of the fees was necessary and
reasonable in the li"ht of the efforts exerted by the a"ents in inducin"
inestors and prominent businessmen to enture in an experimental
enterprise and inole themseles in a new business re'uirin"
millions of pesos.
C.0. 1odges v. /unicipal -oard of the City of Iloilo
Doctrine: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government. It is imperative that
the power to impose them to be clothed with the implied authority to devise
ways and means to accomplish their collection in the most effective manner.
"unicipal corporations may exercise all powers in the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the
powers expressly granted and in doing so they are given the choice of the
means adapted to the ends and are not confined to any one mode of
operation.
Facts:
Pursuant to the proisions of the ;ocal Autonomy Act$ the *unicipal
2oard of %loilo enacted Ordinance ,o. .. which re+uired any
person firm association or corporation to pay a sales tax
of 2 of 3) of the selling price of any motor vehicle and
prohibiting registration of the sale of the motor vehicle in
the /otor 4ehicles 5ffice unless the tax has been paid.
C, #od"es belieed the same to be inalid for hain" been passed in
excess of authority of the municipal board. #ence$ he filed a petition
for declaratory !ud"ment with the court and prayed that he be
refunded the amount he was re'uired to pay under the ordinance.
The court a 'uo rendered a decision holdin" that the sales tax
re'uirement was alid$ but the portion of the ordinance which
re'uires the payment as a condition precedent for the re"istration of
the sale is inalid for bein" repu"nant to &A --3< 0which proides
for the power of the municipal corporation to tax1.
Issue:
+hether or not Ordinance ,o. .. is alid.
Ratio:
6es. It can be inferred from the provisions of the 7ocal
!utonomy !ct that the City of Iloilo has the authority to
approve the ordinance in +uestion for it merely imposes a
percentage tax on the sale of a second hand motor vehicle
that may be carried out within the city by any person. It
comes within the category of a just tax. The ;ocal Autonomy
Act only prohibits imposition of percenta"e taxes on municipalities$
municipal districts. It does not comprehend chartered cities
such as the City of Iloilo.
The payment as a condition precedent to re"istration is also alid. It
is merely a coercive measure to ma.e the enforcement of
the contemplated sales tax more effective. It is not a tax
imposed on the registration of a motored vehicle.
!ssociation of Customs -ro.ers Inc. v. /unicipal -oard of the City
of /anila
Doctrine: If a tax is in its nature an excise or license tax it does not become
a property tax because it is proportioned in amount to the value of the
property used in connection with the occupation privilege or act which is
taxed. #very excise necessarily must finally fall upon and be paid by
property and so may be indirectly a tax upon property$ but if it is really
imposed upon the performance of an act en%oyment of a privilege or the
engaging in an occupation it will be considered an excise.
Facts:
The City of *anila issued Ordinance ,o ..79$ pursuant to &A </9
0which "ae it the power to tax motor and other ehicles operatin"
within the City of *anila1. (uch ordinance levies a so8called
property tax on motor vehicles operating within the City. It
provides that the tax shall be 3) ad valorem per annum and
the proceeds of which shall accrue to the streets and
bridges funds of the city and shall be expended exclusively
for the repair maintenance and improvement of its streets
and bridges.
Petitioners herein contends that such tax imposed is actually a
license tax which is beyond the power of the city to impose. They
further contend that it constitutes double taxation and is in iolation
of the rule of uniformity in taxation.
Issue:
+hether or not the ordinance is alid.
Ratio:
Invalid. &he character of the tax 9property or license: shall
be determined by its incidents and not by its nomenclature.
The tax herein is actually a license tax. %t is imposed primarily for the
purpose of raisin" funds to be expended exclusiely for the repair$
maintenance and improement of the streets and brid"es in the city.
This is precisely what the *otor 9ehicle ;aw intends to preent
when it prohibited exaction of fees for the operation of a motor
ehicle except property tax. &he ordinance in +uestion merely
imposes a license fee under the cloa. of an ad valorem tax
to circumvent the prohibition imposed by said law.
*oreoer$ the ordinance infrin"es the rule on the uniformity of
taxation since it does not distinguish between a motor vehicle
for hire and one which is purely for private use. 0either
does it distinguish between a vehicle registered in the city
of manila and in another place but occasionally comes to
/anila.
;sso "tandard ;astern Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Doctrine: &laims for deductions are a matter of legislative grace and do not
turn on mere equitable considerations. The tax payer in every instance has
the burden of %ustifying the allowance of any deduction claimed.
To be deductible as a business expense the expense must be '( ordinary and
necessary$ )( paid or incurred within the taxable year$ *( paid or incurred
in carrying on a trade or business.
+n expense is ordinary when it connotes a payment which is normal in
relation to the business of the taxpayer and the surrounding circumstances.
It does not require the payment to be habitual or normal in the sense that
the same will have to ma!e them often the payment may be unique or non,
recurring to the particular taxpayer affected.
It is necessary when the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in the
development of the taxpayer-s business.
Facts:
6((O deducted from its "ross income an amount which it claims to
be ordinary and necessary business expense 0for the drillin" and
exploration of petroleum concessions1. (uch claim was disallowed by
the C%& on the "round that the expenses should be capitali=ed and
mi"ht be written off as a loss only when a dry hole should result.
6((O filed an amended return wherein it as8ed for the refund of
P.-.$ -79 by reason of its abandonment as dry holes of seeral of its
oil wells. It also claimed as ordinary and necessary expenses
an amount of P<$('##.($ representing margin fees it paid
to Central -an. on its profit remittances to its 0ew 6or.
head office.
The C%& disallowed the deductions claimed for the mar"in fees paid
for it cannot be considered as deductible business expenses within
the meanin" of the law.
Issue:
+hether or not &A -//9 is a police measure or a reenue measure 0if
a reenue measure$ the mar"in fees paid by the petitioner should be
deductible from 6((O4s "ross income1.
+hether or not the mar"in fees are considered ordinary and
necessary business expenses.
Ratio:
It is a police measure. ! margin fee is not a tax but an
exaction designed to curb the excessive demands upon our
international reserve. %t is a form of exchan"e or control or
restriction desi"ned to discoura"e imports and encoura"e exports
and ultimately$ curtail any excessive demand upon the
international reserve in order to stabili,e the currency.
A tax is leied to proide reenue for "oernment operations while
the proceeds of the margin fee are applied to strengthen the
international reserve. &hus the margin fee was imposed in
the exercise of the "tate=s police power and not the power
of taxation.
It is also not to be deducted since it is considered as
ordinary and necessary business expense. +hen a taxpayer
claims deduction$ he must be able to point to a specific proision in
law to proe that he is entitled to the deduction.
To be deductible as a business expense$ the expense must be 3:
ordinary and necessary> #: paid or incurred within the
taxable year> <: paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or
business.
An expense is ordinary when it connotes a payment which is
normal in relation to the business of the taxpayer and the
surroundin" circumstances. %t does not re'uire the payment to be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same will hae to ma8e them
often$ the payment may be uni'ue or non>recurrin" to the particular
taxpayer affected.
%t is necessary when the expenditure is appropriate and helpful in
the deelopment of the taxpayer4s business.
In this case the margin fees in +uestion were incurred for
the remittance of funds to the petitioner=s head office in
0ew 6or. which is a separate and distinct income taxpayer
from the branch in the Philippines for its disposal abroad.
%t can neer be said that the mar"in fees were appropriate and
helpful in the deelopment of the business. %f at all$ the mar"in fees
were incurred for the purpose of conductin" the corporate affairs in
,ew ?or8$ not in the Philippines.
6((O merely presumed that all corporate expenses are necessary and
appropriate.
Progressive ?evelopment Corporation v. @ue,on City
Doctrine: .ocal governments are given a broad taxing authority extending
to almost everything except those which are mentioned in /+ ))01
provided that the tax levied is for public purposes %ust and uniform.
To be considered as a license fee the imposition must relate to an
occupation or activity that engages in public interest as to require
regulation for the protection and promotion of such public interest it must
bear reasonable relation to the probable expenses of regulation ta!ing into
account not only the cost of direct regulation but also the incidentals. 2hen
supervision of public officers is reasonable necessary for the safeguarding
of public interests cost of inspection or supervision shall be paid in the form
of a license fee.
Facts:
The City Council of @ue=on City adopted Ordinances 7997 amended
by Ordinance 9-.3 which imposes a *) tax on gross receipts on
rentals or lease of space in privately owned public mar.ets
in @C and a 3() stall rental to the City as supervision fee.
:armers *ar8et thus filed a petition for preliminary in!unction
a"ainst said city on the "round that the superision or license tax is
in reality a tax on income which accordin" to them$ the city may not
impose bein" expressly prohibited by the ;ocal Autonomy Act.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissin" the petition statin"
that said imposition is in reality a priile"e tax or license fee which
local "oernments$ li8e the @C$ are empowered to impose and
collect.
Issue:
+hether or not the tax imposed by respondent is properly
characteri=ed as a license fee and not an income tax.
Ratio:
&he tax imposed is a license fee. :irst and foremost$ the charter
of the city empowers the council to fix the license fee and to tax.
*oreoer$ the ;ocal Autonomy Act also proides that all chartered
cities hae authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon
persons en"a"ed in any occupation or business in said cities. &he
city charter and the 7ocal !utonomy !ct therefore clearly
show that the respondent city is authori,ed to fix the
license fee collectible from and regulate the business of
petitioner as operator of a privately owned public mar.et.
A license fee is a le"al concept distin"uishable from tax. The former
is imposed in the exercise of police power while the latter is imposed
primarily for the purpose of raisin" reenues. Thus if the "eneratin"
of reenue is the primary purpose and re"ulation is merely
incidental$ the imposition is a taxA but if the re"ulation if the primary
purpose and incidentally reenue is also obtained$ it does not ma8e
such imposition a tax.
To be considered as a license fee$ the imposition must relate to an
occupation or actiity that en"a"es in public interest as to re'uire
re"ulation for the protection and promotion of such public interest it
must bear reasonable relation to the probable expenses of re"ulation$
ta8in" into account not only the cost of direct re"ulation but also the
incidentals. +hen superision of public officers is reasonable
necessary for the safe"uardin" of public interests$ cost of inspection
or superision shall be paid in the form of a license fee.
%n this case$ :armers *ar8et and (hoppin" Center is established and
operated as a mar8et with a permit to sell foodstuffs. -eing a
public mar.et in the sense that it is made open to the
general public the operation thereof re+uired a license
issued by the city done principally in the exercise of its
police power. It re+uires close supervision and control by
the city for the protection and health by the public.
The 5B tax imposed by the amendin" ordinance was also held to be
alid in the absence of any eidence that it is unreasonably lar"e and
excessie and so "rossly proportionate to the costs of the re"ulatory
serice bein" performed by the city to compel the court to
characteri=e the imposition as a reenue measure exclusiely.
P!7 v. ;?A
Doctrine: "otor vehicle registration fees are veritable taxes and not merely
fees. This can be inferred from the provision of the law which imposes them
and applies to the funds for the construction and maintenance of public
roads streets and bridges. The fees collected herein are not for regulatory
purposes for their express ob%ect is to provide for the revenue with which
the government is to discharge one of its principal functions 3 construction
and maintenance of highways.
Facts:
PA; is a corporation existin" and operatin" under the laws of the
Philippines. Cnder its franchise$ it is exempted from the payment of
taxes except a -B 0of the "ross reenue1 tax imposed deried from its
operations under the franchise. 2ein" exempted from the payment of
taxes$ it has not been payin" motor ehicle re"istration fees for it is
under the impression that such fees are taxes.
C%& issued a re"ulation re'uirin" all the exempted tax entities$
includin" PA; to pay for the ehicle re"istration fees citin" &epublic
. Philippine &abbit 2us ;ines which held that the re"istration fees
are re"ulatory.
Citin" Calalan" . ;oren=o which held that the re"istration fees are
actually taxes$ PA; throu"h its counsel demanded a refund of the
amount it paid to the 2%&.
Issue:
+hether motor ehicle re"istration fees are taxes or merely
re"ulatory fees.
Ratio:
&hey are veritable taxes not mere fees. Today$ the matter of
motor ehicle re"istration fees is "oerned by the ;and
Transportation Code which proides that the money collected shall
accrue to the road and brid"e funds of the different proinces and
chartered cities in proportion to the centum shall durin" the next
preious year and the remainin" )/B shall be deposited in the
Treasury to create a special fund for the construction and
maintenance of national and proincial roads and brid"es. #ence$ it
is clear that the legislative intent of such re+uirement to pay
registration fees is mainly to raise funds for the
construction and maintenance of the highways and to pay
for operating expenses of the administering agency.
:ees may be properly re"arded as taxes een thou"h they also sere
as an instrument of re"ulation. %t is possible for an exaction to be
both tax arose$ re"ulation. 7icense fees are loo.ed to as a
source of revenue as well as a means of regulation. Indeed
even tax may be made the implement of the state=s police
power.
%f the purpose of primarily reenue$ or if reenue is$ at least one of
the real substantial purposes$ then the exaction is properly called a
tax. (uch is the case for motor ehicle re"istration fees.
4ehicle registration fees were originally intended for
regulation in the exercise of the "tate=s police power.
1owever over the years as vehicular traffic exploded and
vehicles became necessities the state found registration a
very convenient way of raising revenues. Bithout changing
the nature of registration as fees their nature has become
that of taxes.
#oweer$ the refund that PA; is claimin" cannot be completely
refunded since between Dune -7$ 193) and April 9$ 1979$ the tax
exemption in the franchise of PA; was repealed.
4illegas v. 1iu Chiong &sai Pao 1o
Facts:
The *unicipal 2oard of *anila adopted Ordinance ,o 35.7 which
ma8es it unlawful for any alien to be employed or to en"a"e or
participate in any position$ occupation or business whether
permanent$ temporary or causal without first securing an
employment permit from the /ayor of manila and paying
the permit of P*(.
#iu Chion" was one of the persons affected by this ordinance. #ence
he filed an action prayin" for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
in!unction and restrainin" order to stop the enforcement of the
ordinance on the "round that it is discriminatory and violative
of the rule on uniformity in taxation it is an illegal
delegation of legislative powers and is arbitrary
oppressive and unreasonable.
Issue:
+hether or not the ordinance is alid.
Ratio:
&he ordinance is void because it does not contain or
suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the
exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the
ordinance it violates the due process of law e+ual
protection rule of the constitution and the uniformity in
taxation.
The ordinance herein is a reenue measure. #ence$ the rule on
uniformity must apply to it The re'uirement that a permit be secured
is re"ulatory in character but the payment of P5/ clearly ma8es it an
ordinance to raise money under the "uise of re"ulation. It violates
the uniformity in taxation rule since it fails to ma.e
distinctions and consider valid substantial differences
among individual aliens who are re+uired to pay it
9whether he is a causal or permanent part time or full time
or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive:.
%t is also an undue dele"ation of le"islatie power since it "rants the
mayor the power to exercise his own discretion on approin" permit
without conditions imposed for its "rant or refusal.
%t is a iolation of the due process and e'ual protection clauses since
it denies the person the basic ri"ht to en"a"e in a means of lielihood
when the City *ayor withholds the issuance of the permit.
Compania Ceneral ?e &abacos ?e Filipinas v. City of /anila
Doctrine: Tax applies to all !inds of exactions which become public funds. It
includes levies for revenue as well as levies for regulatory purposes. Thus
license fees are commonly called taxes. 4owever a license fee is a legal
concept quite distinct from tax. The former is imposed in the exercise of
police power for the purpose of regulation while the latter is imposed under
the taxing power for the purpose of raising revenues.
Facts:
Tabacalera is a duly licensed first class wholesale and retail li'uor
dealer. %t paid the City of *anila the fixed license fees and the
sales taxes as a wholesale and retail dealer of general
merchandise. &abacalera included its li+uor sales when it
paid for the wholesale retail and grocery sales of general
merchandise allegedly by mista.e. Thus$ Tabacalera filed an
action for refund based on the theory that in connection with the
li'uor sales$ it should pay license fees and since it already paid the
license fees aforesaid$ the sales taxes paid by it was an
overpayment made by mista.e and therefore refundable.
The City refused to ma8e the refund since the payment was made
without protest and was by reason of a ne"lect of duty. *oreoer$ the
amount was already expended by the city.
%n this case$ there are < ordinances. As a li'uor dealer$ Tabacalera
paid annually the wholesale and retail li'uor license fees under
Ordinance ..5). #oweer$ when the succeedin" ordinances were
passed$ the city treasurer issued a re"ulation which states that the
term "eneral merchandise mentioned in said ordinances includes
all the articles referred to in the 0IRC 9which includes
li+uor among taxable articles:. 1ence &abacalera again
paid for the amount which included the sales of li+uor in its
sworn +uarterly declaration 0the amount sou"ht to be
recoered1.
Issue:
+hether or not there is double taxation.
Ratio:
&he double taxation herein is more apparent than real.
Ordinance ..5) herein is a license fee for the priile"e of sellin"
li'uors$ which not anyone or anybody can freely en"a"e considerin"
that this may endan"er public health and morals. On the other hand$
the other ordinances$ imposed a tax for reenue purposes based on
the sales made of the same article or merchandise.
%t is settled that both a license fee and a tax may be imposed
on the same business or occupation or for selling the same
article not being in violation of the rule against double
taxation.
!merican /ail 7ine et. al v. City of -asilan
Facts:
This case inoles an ordinance issued by the City of 2asilan entitled
the Port !rea 5rdinance which provides that any foreign
vessel engaged in coastwide trade which may anchor within
the territorial waters of the City of -asila for the purpose of
loading or unloading logs shall pay an anchorage fee of 2
centavo per registered gross ton of the vessel for the first
#$ hours or part thereof and for the succeeding hours or
par thereof. Proided it shall not exceed 75 pesos per day.
Appellees herein are forei"n shippin" companies licensed to do
business in the country and were as8ed to pay the anchora"e fees
prescribed in the ordinance. As such$ they filed an action for
declaratory relief to have the court determine its validity
on the ground that the City of -asilan had no authority to
collect said anchorage fees.
Issue:
+hether or not the City of 2asilan had authority to collect the
anchora"e fees.
Ratio:
&he City of -asilan had no authority to collect said
anchorage fees since the charter provided that they only
had the authority to levy and collect taxes for general and
special purposes in accordance with or as provided by law.
Otherwise stated$ they were not "ranted the blan8et power of
taxation. There is a le"islatie intent to limit their taxin" power.
The proision which states that they had the power to fix the char"es
to be paid by all watercraft landin" at or usin" their public whares
does not include such power of taxation.
%t cannot be said that this was done as an exercise of police power
cannot be sustained since it has already been held that the
power to regulate as an exercise of police power does not
include the power to impose fees for revenue purposes.
:ees for purely regulatory purposes may only be of sufficient
amount to include the expenses of issuing the license and
the cost of the necessary inspection or police surveillance
ta.ing into account not only the expense of the direct
regulation but also the incidental expenses.
The re"ulatory fee must be more than sufficient to coer the actual
cost of inspection or examination. %n this case$ the fees have no
proper reasonable relation to the cost of the issuing of the
permits and the cost of inspection or surveillance. &he fee
imposed exceeds even the harbor fee imposed by the
0ational Covernment which is only *( pesos for foreign
vessels. All such circumstances point to the conclusion that the fees
were intended for reenue purposes.
5smena v. 5rbos
Facts:
The OP(: was created by President *arcos to reimburse oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate
adjustments and from increases in the world mar.et prices
of crude oil. (uch OP(: was reclassified into trust liability accounts
and was ordered released to the *inistry of 6ner"y. %t also
authori=ed the inestment of the fund in "oernment securities with
the earnin"s from such placements accruin" to the fund.
The petition at present alle"ed that the OP(: showed a terminal fund
balance deficit and that to abate the worsenin" deficit$ the 6ner"y
&e"ulatory 2oard issued an order approin" the increase in pump
prices of petroleum products and at the rate of recoupment$ the
OP(: deficit should hae been fully coered in a span of 3 months.
The petition also aers that the creation of the trust fund
violates the constitution particularly the provision which
states that all money collected and paid out for a special
purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for
such purposes only. If such purpose be fulfilled or
abandoned the balance shall be transferred to the general
funds of the government. The petitioner claims that the OP(:
should be treated as a special fund and not a trust account since a
special fund consists of monies collected throu"h the taxin" power of
the state$ such amounts belon" to the state althou"h the use is
limited to the special purpose or ob!ectie for which it was created.
Petitioners further aer that there is an undue dele"ation of authority
to the 6&2 inasmuch as it was "ien the authority to impose
additional amounts on petroleum products to au"ment the resources
of the :und.
Issue:
+hether or not the OP(: is a special fund.
+hether or not there is undue dele"ation of le"islatie power.
Ratio:
The OP(: is a buffer mechanism throu"h which the domestic
consumer prices of oil and petroleum products are stabili=ed$ instead
of fluctuatin" eery so often$ and oil companies are allowed to
recoer those portions of their costs which they would not otherwise
recoer "ien the leel of domestic prices existin" at any "ien time.
&he 5P"F is a device through which the domestic prices of
petroleum products are subsidi,ed in part. As such$ it is an
exercise of the police power of the state and not taxation.
(uch circumstance is similar to the stabili=ation fees collected in
relation to the su"ar stabili=ation fund which is within the power of
the (tate to impose for the promotion of the su"ar industry. &he tax
collected herein is nit a pure exercise of taxing power. It is
levied with a regulatory purpose to provide a means for
the stabili,ation of the industry. &he levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power of the state.
The OP(: is se"re"ated from the "eneral fund and while it is placed
in what the law refers to as trust liability account$ the fund
nonetheless remains sub!ect to the scrutiny of the COA. The court is
satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional
description of a special fund 0hain" been leied for a special
purpose$ once the purpose is fulfilled or abandoned$ the balance is to
be transferred to the "eneral funds of the "oernment1.
On the issue of undue dele"ation$ the court is convinced that
there was no undue delegation of legislative power since
what is involved here first and foremost is the police
power. #ence$ it cannot be oerloo8ed that the oerridin"
consideration is to enable the dele"ate to act with expediency in
carryin" out the ob!ecties of the law which are embraced by the
police power of the state. Constant fluctuation of oil prices do not
coneniently permit the settin" of fixed or ri"id parameters in the
law. To do so would render the 6&2 unable to respond to the
undesirable conse'uences of the fluidity.
Republic of the Philippines v. -acolod /urcia8/illing
Facts:
Philsu"in is a semi public corporation created by &epublic Act ,o.
3.- 0its charter1 for the purpose of conductin" research 0primarily0$
either a"ricultural or industrial for the purpose of introducin"
processes that will reduce cost production in the su"ar industry of
the Philippines. %t is or"ani=ed and was "ien seeral powers to fulfill
such purpose amon" others$ the power to ley amounts for the
annual su"ar production of su"ar.
It imposed a 3( centavo per picul of sugar to be collected
for a period of * years borne by the sugar cane planters and
the sugar centrals in proportion to their milling share. &he
funds collected shall constitute a special fund to be .nown
as the "ugar Research and "tabili,ation Fund which shall be
aailable for the exclusie use of the said corporation.
2acolod *urcia *illin" and other millin" companies left unpaid
balances correspondin" to their supposed payments to the
(tabili=ation :und. ?uring which time the "tabili,ation Fund
suffered tremendous losses allegedly by reason of the
purchase of Philsugin of the Insular "ugar Refinery.
The millin" companies with unpaid balances are now 'uestionin" the
authority of the public corporation to purchase the %nsular (u"ar
&efinery. 2ein" alle"edly unauthori=ed to ma8e the purchase$ such
millin" companies refused to satisfy their unpaid balances to the
stabili=ation fund. &hey contend that they are to contribute
only to the fund insofar as they are benefited by it since it is
a special assessments fund and is not a revenue measure.
Issue:
+hether or not the collection of the stabili=ation fund constitutes as
a special fund and not an ordinary tax measure for reenue 0since if it
is a special assessments fund$ the millin" companies can ri"htly
refuse to ma8e paymentsA if it is an ordinary tax$ the taxpayer cannot
refuse1.
Ratio:
The court extensiely cited the case of ;ut= . Araneta in decidin" the
issue in this case. %t stated that the fund in the Araneta case is ery
much similar to the stabili=ation fund mentioned in the instant case.
In the case of !raneta if was found that the stabili,ation
fund collected therein was actually an exercise of police
power of the state not of taxation since the tax was levied
for the purpose of rehabilitating and stabili,ing the sugar
industry of the Philippines. (u"ar is one of the leadin" export
products in the country. As such$ its promotion$ protection and
adancement "reatly redounds to the "eneral welfare of the society.
The protection of a lar"e industry constitutin" one of the "reat source
of the state4s wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affectin" the
welfare of so "reat a portion of the population of the (tate is affected
to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power
of the soerei"n. &here is no reason is seen why the state may
not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and
attainment. &axation may be made the implement of the
state=s police power.
Following the abovementioned case the stabili,ation fund
in this case is not so much an ordinary tax nor is it a special
assessments fund. It is actually an exercise of police power
of the state for the general welfare to which the milling
companies herein cannot resist.
4ictorias /illing Co v. /unicipality of 4ictorias Province of
0egros 5ccidental
Facts:
Two municipal ordinances are 'uestioned in this case imposing
license taxes on operators of sugar centrals and sugar
refineries. &he license taxes were increased with respect to
sugar centrals> and as to sugar refineries the rates of
license taxes as well as the range of the graduated schedule
of annual output capacity was also increased. As such$
9ictoria *illin"s$ in both its su"ar central and its su"ar refinery
located in the *unicipality of 9ictorias come within such terms. %t
see8s to hae the ordinances declared null and oid on the "round
that it is discriminatory$ constitutes double taxation and that it
exceeds the amounts re'uired for a re"ulatory measure.
The trial court rendered a decision inalidatin" the ordinances in
'uestion.
Issue:
+hether or not the ordinances are a re"ulatory or a reenue
measure.
+hether or not there is double taxation.
+hether or not the ordinances are discriminatory.
Ratio:
&he ordinances are a revenue measure not a regulatory
one. The taxin" power of the *unicipality emanates from
Commonwealth Act ,o. <7- which authori=es it to impose . 8inds of
licensesE 11 license for re"ulation of useful occupations or
enterprisesA -1 license for restriction or re"ulation of non>useful
onesA <: license for revenue 9for revenue purposes> not a
license fee and rests on taxing power hence the taxing
power must be conferred by statute upon the municipality
which is so granted by the Commonwealth !ct:.
The court loo8ed into the purpose of the municipality for passin" the
ordinance in the whereas clauses and found that the imposition was
because of the implementation of the *inimum +a"e ;aw which is
"reatly drainin" the treasury as well as for the improements of the
roads and feeder roads of the said municipality. %t found that the
price of su"ar per picul is increasin" and hence$ found it a stable
source of fundin" for the deficit created by the minimum wa"e law in
their funds. For this reason it is a revenue raising exaction
on privileges or activities. ?espite the fact that it is
commonly called a tax a license fee is a tax for revenue
raising if found to be so in contract to the other .ind which
is imposed in the exercise of police power for purposes of
regulation.
+hen no police inspection$ superision or re"ulation is proided and
a license on the payment of the sum will issue$ to do business$ under
no "uardian eye$ but accordin" to the unrestrained !ud"ment or fancy
of the applicant and the licensee$ the presumption is stron" that the
power of taxation$ not police power is bein" exercised 0as in this
case1.
&he ordinance is not discriminatory. %t does not sin"le out the
millin" company. %t is of no moment that 9ictorias *illin" is the only
su"ar millin" company in the municipality since if there are other
millin" companies that will$ in the future$ be established and
operated$ the same will be brou"ht under the operation of the said
ordinance.
&here is also no double taxation in this case. 7ouble taxation
is described as direct duplication of taxation. %n order for it to exist$
the same property must be taxed twice when it should be taxed only
once. %n this case$ the two taxes coer two different ob!ects$ the first
one taxes a person operating sugar centrals or engaged in
the manufacturing of sugar while the other is imposed on
the occupation or the business. -oth taxes are not on sugar.
7ut, v. !raneta
Facts:
The (u"ar Ad!ustment Act was promul"ated due to the threat to our
industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon su"ar as
proided in the Tydin"s *c7uffie Act. %t see8s to obtain a
read!ustment of the benefits deried from the su"ar industry by the
component elements thereof and to stabili,e the sugar industry
so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
preferential position in the A" mar.et and the imposition
of the export taxes.
%n section - of the said law$ an increase of the existin" tax on the
manufacture of su"ar on a "raduated basis on each picul of su"ar
manufactures was imposed and in section .leies on owners or
persons in control of lands deoted to the cultiation of su"ar cane
and ceded to others for a consideration.
All collections made under the said act shall accrue to a special
fund in the &reasury to be .nown as the "ugar !djustment
and "tabili,ation Fund and shall be paid out only for
purposes enumerated under the law:
1. Place the su"ar industry in a position to maintain itself
-. To read!ust the benefits deried from the su"ar industry by
all of the component elements thereof.
.. To limit the production of su"ar to areas more economically
suited to the production thereof
<. To afford labor employed in the industry a liin" wa"e and to
improe their liin" and wor8in" conditions.
+alter ;ut=$ as !udicial administrator assails the alidity of said tax
measure on the "round that it is unconstitutional and oid$ bein"
leied for the aid and support of the su"ar industry exclusiely which
accordin" to ;ut=$ was not for a public purpose for which a tax
may be constitutionally levied.
Issue:
+hether or not the tax proided for in the law is unconstitutional.
Ratio:
(u"ar$ bein" one of the "reat industries of our nation$ su"ar
occupyin" a leadin" position amon" its export products$ is piotal in
the plans of the re"ime committed to a policy of currency stability.
#ence$ it was competent for the legislature to find that the
general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should
be stabili,ed in turn and in the wide field of its police
power the lawma.ing body could provide that the
distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the
increase in taxes that it had to sustain.
The protection of a lar"e industry constitutin" one of the "reat
sources of the state4s wealth and therefore directly or indirectly
affectin" the welfare of so "reat a portion of the population of the
(tate is affected to such an extent by public interest as to be within
the police power of the soerei"n.
&he protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a
matter of public concern. It follows that the legislature may
determine what is necessary for its protection and
promotion. &he discretion of the legislature herein comes
into play subject to the test of reasonableness and it is not
contended that the means in the law bear no relation to the
objective pursues or are oppressive in character.
Also$ the mere fact that the tax money is bein" deoted to the su"ar
industry promotion and stabili=ation is not a "round and does not
constitute expenditure of tax for priate purposes.
PCCC v. Cojuangco
Facts:
COCO:67$ 2allares$ CO!uan"co et. al were ac8nowled"ed to be
re"istered stoc8holders of the CCP2 and are authori=ed to exercise
their ri"hts to ote their shares of stoc8 and themseles to be oted
upon in the CCP2 at a scheduled stoc8holders4 meetin".
Prior to this said meetin" it should be understood that the PC55 was
created by an executie order issued by the president for the recoery
of ill "otten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the
Philippines or abroad. PC55 was also empowered to file and
prosecute cases inesti"ated under the ordinances.
Pursuant to this authority$ the PC55 issued and implemented
numerous se'uestrations$ free=e orders and proisional ta8eoers of
alle"ed ill "otten wealth. Amon" such corporations$ were the shares
of stoc8 in the CCP2 re"istered in the names of 1 million coconut
farmers$ or more popularly called$ the coconut industry
investment fund companies. &he se+uestered shares were
purchased with coconut levy funds which allows PCCC to
vote for said se+uestered shares.
3 years later$ the board of directors of the CCP2 called for a
stoc8holders4 meetin" for the purpose of electin" the board of
directors. :or this reason$ Co!uan"co et al filed an action omnibus
motion to en!oin PC55 from otin" the CCP2 shares of stoc8
re"istered in the names of the 1 million nameless farmers and to
further en!oin them from otin" the (*C shares re"istered in the
names of the C%%: holdin" companies includin" those re"istered in
the name of PC55.
Issue:
+hether or not the PC55 may ote the se'uestered chares of stoc8.
Ratio:
"e+uestered shares as a general rule are to be voted by the
registered owner. 1owever such rule cannot apply when
the se+uestered stoc.s are ac+uired with funds that are
prima facie public in character or at least affected with
public interest. %n this case$ the se'uestered shares of stoc8s of the
CCP2 were ac'uired with the coco ley funds which are public in
character. Thus$ the right to vote shall be exercised by the
PCCC.
%n this case$ the public character test$ not the two>tiered test applies
since the coco ley funds$ which were used to ac'uire the se'uestered
stoc8s$ are imbued with public interest.
&he public character test grants the government the
authority to vote shares when the government shares are
ta.en over by private persons whoDwhich registered them
in their own names and where the capitali,ation or shares
that were ac+uired with public funds somehow landed in
private hands. Public property re"istered in the names of non>
owners is affected with trust relations and that the prima facie
beneficial owner should be "ien the priile"e of en!oyin" the ri"hts
flowin" from the prima facie fact of ownership.
The coconut ley funds$ bein" clearly affected with public interest$
follows that the corporations formed and or"ani=ed from those
funds$ and all assets ac'uired therefrom should also be re"arded as
clearly affected with public interest.
It is affected by public interest since it cannot be denied
that the coconut industry is one of the major industries of
the economy. It is the state=s concern to ma.e it a strong
and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant
segment of the population but also of export earnings the
sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of the
economy.
Public funds are those belon"in" to any state of to any political
subdiision$ more specifically$ taxes$ customs duties and moneys
raised by operation of law for the support of the "oernment or for
the dischar"e of its obli"ations. Coconut ley funds satisfy such
definition since they were raised with the use of police and
taxing powers of the "tate and are imposed by the state for
the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers.
! tax has < elements 0which is satisfied by the coconut ley
funds1E 11 it is an enforced proportional contribution from persons
and propertiesA -1 imposed by the state by irtue of its soerei"ntyA .1
leied for the support of the "oernment.
The coconut ley of P15.// per 8ilo"ram of copra was imposed and
the proceeds of such ley shall be deposited with the P,2 as a
separate trust fund which shall not form part of the "eneral fund of
the "oernment. They were not oluntary payments or donations.
They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions.
They were imposed for a public purpose since it will proide for the
rehabilitation and stabili=ation of a threatened industry which is so
affected with public interest. %t is the state4s concern to ma8e it s
stron" and secure source not only of the lielihood of a si"nificant
se"ment of the population$ but also export earnin"s the sustained
"rowth of which is one of the imperaties of the economy.
%n sum$ the courts applied the public character test$ instead of the
Ftwo>tiered testF since the shares of stoc8 in the CCP2 were ac'uired
usin" the coconut ley funds$ which$ as established$ is a special fund
created by the "oernment in the exercise of its police power for the
rehabilitation and stabili=ation of the coconut industry in the
country. As such$ the coconut ley funds were clearly affected by
public interest. Thus$ it is the PC55$ not the re"istered owners of the
shares of stoc8s in the CCP2 which are "ien the ri"ht to ote the
shares.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. P7?&
Facts:
P;7T$ a telecommunications company in the Philippines$ paid the
2%& compensatin" taxes$ adance sales taxes$ other internal reenue
taxes and alue added taxes. After some time$ P;7T addressed a
letter to the 2%& see8in" a confirmatory rulin" on its tax exemption
priile"e under &A 7/)- which proides that the grantee shall be
exempted from all taxes including the 3() 4!& prescribed.
:or this reason$ P;7T was exempted from the 9AT on its
importation of e'uipment$ machineries and spare parts needed for
its franchise operations. P;7T filed a claim for refund but the 2%&
did not act upon such claim.
Issue:
+hether or not P;7T is exempt from the payment of 9AT$
compensatin" taxes$ adance sales taxes and other 2%& taxes on its
importations by irtue of the proision in its franchise that the .B
franchise tax on its "ross receipts shall be in lieu of all taxes on its
franchise or earnin"s.
Ratio:
P7?& is not exempted from the payment of compensating
tax advance sales tax 4!& and other internal revenue
taxes on its importation of various e+uipment machinery
and pare parts for the use of its telecommunications
system.
?irect taxes are those that are exacted from the ery person who it
is intended or desired$ should pay them. They are impositions for
which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business he is
en"a"ed.
Indirect taxes are those that are demanded in the first instance$
from$ one person in the expectation and intention that he can shift
the burden to someone else such as when the tax is imposed upon
"oods before reachin" the consumer who ultimately pays for it. #e
shifts the burden$ not the liability to pay it to the purchaser.
The 4!& is an indirect tax. %t is not a tax on the franchise or a
business enterprise or on its earnin"s. %t is imposed on all taxpayers
who import "oods whether the "oods will be sold.
!dvance "ales &ax also has the attributes of an indirect tax
because the tax>payin" importer of "oods for sale or of raw material
to be processed into merchandise can shift the tax or to lay the
economic burden of the tax on the purchaser.
Compensating tax also parta.es the nature of an excise tax
payable by all persons who import articles$ whether in the course of
business or not.
The liability to pay indirect taxes lies only with the seller of
the goods not in the buyer. #ence$ it is important to determine
if the tax exemption "ranted includes indirect tax which is shifted to
him as part of the purchase price otherwise$ it is presumed that the
tax exemption embraces only those for which the buyer is directly
liable. ;xemptions must be construed against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
%n this case$ the exemption was limited by the followin" phrase Fon
this franchise or earnin"s thereofF suggesting that the
exemption is limited to taxes imposed directly on P7?&
since taxes pertaining to P7?& are its direct liability.
In this case the alleged exemption from the payment of the
tax is not clear or express. Anless it appears clearly and
manifestly that an exemption is intended the provision is
to be construed strictly against the party claiming the
exemption.
Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation
Facts:
President *arcos$ in the exercise of his le"islatie powers$ issued ;O%
1<35 which proided the imposition of a capital recovery
component 9CRC: on the domestic sale of all grades of
fertili,ers in the Philippines. ! capital contribution shall be
collected until ade+uate capital is raised to ma.e PPI
viable.
Pursuant to the ;O%$ :ertiphil paid P1/ for eery ba" of fertili=er it
sold in the domestic mar8et to the :ertili=er and Pesticide Authority.
#oweer$ after the 67(A reolution$ :PA oluntarily stopped the
imposition of the P1/ ley with the return of democracy. #ence$
:ertiphil demanded the refund of the amounts it paid but PP%
refused to accede to the demand. Fertiphil +uestioned the
constitutionality of the 75I on the ground that it is unjust
unreasonable oppressive invalid and an unlawful
imposition that amounted to a denial of due process.
The &TC ruled that such was an inalid exercise of state4s power of
taxation as it iolated the inherent constitutional prescription that
taxes are to be leied for a public purpose. %n this case$ the collected
money was remitted to the depositary ban8 of PP% and was used to
adance its priate interest. CA affirmed said decision.
Issue:
+hether or not the ;O% is a alid le"islation pursuant to the exercise
of taxation and police power for public purposes.
Ratio:
&he imposition of the levy was an exercise by the "tate of its
taxation powers however the levy under the 75I is to
excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose since it was o
be imposed until there is ade+uate capital raised to ma.e
the PPI viable. The primary purpose of the ley is reenue
"eneration. %f primarily reenue "eneration$ the exaction is properly
called a tax.
The ley therefore is unconstitutional because it is not for a public
purpose and was imposed to give undue benefit to PPI.
Taxes cannot be used for purely priate purposes or for the exclusie
benefit of priate persons. Public purpose is not confined to those
purposes which are traditionally iewed as "oernmental functions.
%t can also include those purposes desi"ned to promote social !ustice.
Another proof that this was imposed for the benefit of the PP% was
the fact that the collected funds were deposited by :PA to the
depositary ban8 of PP%. *oreoer$ the funds were made to pay
corporate debts of the PP%. It is not for the purpose of ensuring
the stability of the fertili,er industry in the country.
&he amounts collected should be refunded to Fertiphil.
;xxonmobil Petroleum and Chemical 1oldings Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
6xxon is en"a"ed in the business of sellin" petroleum products to
domestic and international carriers. %t purchased from Caltex and
Petron a Det A>1 fuel and other petroleum products the excise taxes
of which were paid for and remitted by both Caltex and
Petron. "aid taxes were passed on to ;xxon which
ultimately shouldered the excise taxes and petroleum
products.
On arious dates$ 6xxon filed administratie claims for refund with
the 2%& amountin" to the exemptions which should hae been
"ranted. Claims hain" been unheeded$ 6xxon filed a petition for
reiew with the CTA claimin" a refund or tax credit
representing the amount of excise tax paid on the Eet and
other petroleum products it sold to international carriers
from 0ov. #((3 to Eune #((#.
C&! issued a resolution ruling that only the taxpayer or the
manufacturer of the petroleum products sold has the legal
personality to claim the refund of excise taxes paid on
petroleum products sold to international carriers. #ence$
6xxon does not hae the le"al personality to claim the refund.
Issues:
+hether or not 6xxon has the le"al personality to claim the tax
exemption.
Ratio:
0o. Accordin" to the law$ Petroleum products sold to international
carriers are exempt entities or a"encies and are exempt fro excise
taxes proided that the products sold to such international carriers
shall be stored in a bonded stora"e tan8 and may be disposed of only
in accordance with the rules and re"ulations to be prescribed by the
(ecretary of :inance. ;xcise taxes are in the nature of indirect
taxes the liability for the payment of which may fall on a
person other than he who actually bears the burden of the
tax. Bhen the seller passes on the tax to his buyer he in
effect shifts the tax burden not the liability to pay it to the
purchaser as part of the goods sold services rendered.
!s such ;xxon is not a statutory taxpayer. The proper party to
'uestion or to see8 a refund of$ an indirect tax$ is the statutory
taxpayer$ or the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who
paid the same$ een if he shifts the burden thereof to another. It
does not matter that an additional amount is billed as tax to
the purchaser. &he effect is still the same namely that the
purchaser ?5;" 05& pay the tax. 1e merely pays the seller
more for the goods because of the seller=s obligation but
that is all and the amount added because of the tax is paid
to get the foods and for nothing else. %t is CaltexGPetron$ not its
consumers who may as8 for a refund of whateer amount it is
entitled.