American Jurisprudence, Second Edition

Database updated February 2014

Constitutional Law
George Blum, J.D., James Buchwalter, J.D., Paul M. Coltoff, J.D., Jefferson James Davis, J.D., Laura Hunter Dietz,
J.D., Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Tracy Farrell, J.D., J.S., Richard Link, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Thomas Muskas,
J.D., Jeffrey J. Shampo, J.D., Eric C. Surette, J.D., Susan L. Thomas, and Eleanor L. Grossman, J.D., Glenda K.
Harnad, and Anne E. Melley, J.D., LL.M. of the staff of the National Legal Research Group, Inc.

XIII. Equal Protection of the Laws; Class Legislation
A. Guarantee of Equal Protection, in General
1. 14th Amendment
d. Who is Protected

Topic Summary Correlation Table References

848. Class of one

West's Key Number Digest

West's Key Number Digest, Constitutional Law 3042

A.L.R. Library

Class-of-One Equal Protection Claims Based upon Law Enforcement Actions, 86 A.L.R.6th 173

Class-of-One Equal Protection Claims Based upon Law Enforcement Actions, 86 A.L.R.6th 173

Application of Class-of-One Theory of Equal Protection to Public Employment, 32 A.L.R.6th 457

Trial Strategy

Proof of Qualified Immunity Defense in 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 or Bivens Actions Against Law Enforcement
Officers, 59 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 291

Governmental Entity's Liability for Failure to Prevent Crime, 30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 429

The Equal Protection Clause may support a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff does
not allege membership in a more numerous class or group.[1] A class, for purposes of equal protection analysis, can
consist of a single member. A class, for purposes of equal protection analysis, can also be defined by reference to the
discrimination itself. While the principal target of the Equal Protection Clause is discrimination against members of
vulnerable groups, the clause also protects "class-of-one" plaintiffs victimized by wholly arbitrary acts.[2] A
plaintiff need not be a member of a traditionally protected class in order to allege an equal protection violation, but
rather a "class of one" may maintain an equal protection claim as long as the plaintiff alleges that he or she was
treated differently from similarly situated persons and that the different treatment was intentional and had no rational
basis.[3] After a plaintiff shows differential treatment, he or she must then prove that it flows from an illegitimate
animus, not from inadvertence or some kind of permissible governmental classification.[4] Although a person can be
a member of a class with only one member, he or she must be singled out because of his or her membership in the
class and not be just the random victim of governmental incompetence; the state's act of singling out an individual
for differential treatment does not itself create the class.[5]

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

Class-of-one theory of equal protection presupposes that like individuals should be treated alike, and that to
treat them differently is to classify them in a way that must survive at least rationality review. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. Reget v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691 (7th Cir. 2010).
Allegation that police officers repeatedly arrested plaintiff solely for reasons of personal animus stated a claim
for an equal protection violation under a class-of-one theory. Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2009).
To be "similarly situated" for purposes of class of one equal protection claim, comparators must be prima facie
identical in all relevant respects. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240 (11th
Cir. 2010).
A class of one equal protection claim may be brought where there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment or the cause of the differential treatment is a totally illegitimate animus toward the plaintiff by the
defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Curtis v. Wilks, 704 F. Supp. 2d 771, 82 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 109 (N.D. Ill.
2010).
Failing proof of selective treatment based on impermissible considerations, plaintiffs must plead "class of one"
equal protection claim. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. MacPherson v. Town of Southampton, 738 F. Supp. 2d 353
(E.D. N.Y. 2010).
Under any applicable test, the class-of-one plaintiff claiming deprivation of equal protection must allege facts
showing that he is similarly situated to other persons with respect to the specific incident or incidents that are alleged
to be examples of differential treatment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Missere v. Gross, 2011 WL 6030665 (S.D.
N.Y. 2011).
Under class-of-one theory for equal protection claims, a plaintiff must prove defendants' actions lacked rational
basis, that is, were so unrelated to achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that district court can only
conclude defendants' actions were irrational; plaintiff may overcome her burden by negating every conceivable basis
which might support defendants' action, or by showing challenged actions were motivated by animus or ill-will.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Golembiewski v. Logie, 852 F. Supp. 2d 908 (N.D. Ohio 2012).

[END OF SUPPLEMENT]




[FN1] Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000).

[FN2] Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of School Com'rs of the City of Indianapolis, 101 F.3d 1179,
114 Ed. Law Rep. 766 (7th Cir. 1996).

[FN3] Warren v. City of Athens, Ohio, 411 F.3d 697, 2005 FED App. 0261P (6th Cir. 2005); Leib v.
Hillsborough County Public Transp. Com'n, 558 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2009); Tuskowski v. Griffin, 359 F.
Supp. 2d 225 (D. Conn. 2005).

A "class of one" plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation may demonstrate that government action
lacks a rational basis either by negativing every conceivable basis which might support the government
action or by showing that the challenged action was motivated by animus or ill will. TriHealth, Inc. v.
Board of Com'rs, Hamilton County, Ohio, 430 F.3d 783, 2005 FED App. 0470P (6th Cir. 2005).

[FN4] Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 199 Ed. Law Rep. 615 (7th Cir. 2005).

[FN5] Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1992), judgment aff'd, 510 U.S. 266, 114 S. Ct. 807, 127
L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994).