EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004.]

LA BUGAL-B'LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Represented by its Chairman F'LONG MIGUEL M.
LUMAYONG; WIGBERTO E. TAADA; PONCIANO
BENNAGEN; JAIME TADEO; RENATO R. CONSTANTINO
JR.; F'LONG AGUSTIN M. DABIE; ROBERTO P. AMLOY;
RAQIM L. DABIE; SIMEON H. DOLOJO; IMELDA M.
GANDON; LENY B. GUSANAN; MARCELO L. GUSANAN;
QUINTOL A. LABUAYAN; LOMINGGES D. LAWAY;
BENITA P. TACUAYAN; Minors JOLY L. BUGOY,
Represented by His Father UNDERO D. BUGOY and
ROGER M. DADING; Represented by His Father
ANTONIO L. DADING; ROMY M. LAGARO,
Represented by His Father TOTING A. LAGARO;
MIKENY JONG B. LUMAYONG, Represented by His
Father MIGUEL M. LUMAYONG; RENE T. MIGUEL,
Represented by His Mother EDITHA T. MIGUEL;
ALDEMAR L. SAL, Represented by His Father DANNY
M. SAL; DAISY RECARSE, Represented by Her Mother
LYDIA S. SANTOS; EDWARD M. EMUY; ALAN P.
MAMPARAIR; MARIO L. MANGCAL; ALDEN S. TUSAN;
AMPARO S. YAP; VIRGILIO CULAR; MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN; JULIA REGINA CULAR, GIAN CARLO CULAR,
VIRGILIO CULAR JR., Represented by Their Father
VIRGILIO CULAR; PAUL ANTONIO P. VILLAMOR,
Represented by His Parents JOSE VILLAMOR and
ELIZABETH PUA-VILLAMOR; ANA GININA R. TALJA,
Represented by Her Father MARIO JOSE B. TALJA;
SHARMAINE R. CUNANAN, Represented by Her Father
ALFREDO M. CUNANAN; ANTONIO JOSE A. VITUG III,
Represented by His Mother ANNALIZA A. VITUG,
LEAN D. NARVADEZ, Represented by His Father
MANUEL E. NARVADEZ JR.; ROSERIO MARALAG
LINGATING, Represented by Her Father RIO OLIMPIO
A. LINGATING; MARIO JOSE B. TALJA; DAVID E. DE
VERA; MARIA MILAGROS L. SAN JOSE; Sr. SUSAN O.
BOLANIO, OND; LOLITA G. DEMONTEVERDE; BENJIE L.
NEQUINTO; 1 ROSE LILIA S. ROMANO; ROBERTO S.
VERZOLA; EDUARDO AURELIO C. REYES; LEAN LOUEL A.
PERIA, Represented by His Father ELPIDIO V.
PERIA; 2 GREEN FORUM PHILIPPINES; GREEN FORUM
WESTERN VISAYAS (GF-WV); ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE CENTER (ELAC); KAISAHAN TUNGO SA
KAUNLARAN NG KANAYUNAN AT REPORMANG
PANSAKAHAN (KAISAHAN); 3PARTNERSHIP FOR
AGRARIAN REFORM and RURAL DEVELOPMENT
SERVICES, INC. (PARRDS); PHILIPPINE PARTNERSHIP
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN
THE RURAL AREAS, INC. (PHILDHRRA); WOMEN'S
LEGAL BUREAU (WLB); CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, INC. (CADI); UPLAND
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (UDI); KINAIYAHAN
FOUNDATION, INC.; SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG
LINGAP PANLIGAL (SALIGAN); and LEGAL RIGHTS AND
NATURAL RESOURCES CENTER, INC.
(LRC), petitioners, vs. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR); HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES),
INC., 4 respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J p:
All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development
and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision
of the State. More specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and
technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure the help of
foreign companies in all relevant matters especially financial and technical
assistance provided that, at all times, the State maintains its right of full
control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence, it may be given reasonable
management, operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect
its investments and to enable the business to succeed.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor,
provided that the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set
aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full
control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation: the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing
and other functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given to
contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the business.
Who or what organ of government actually exercises this power of control on
behalf of the State? The Constitution is crystal clear: the President. Indeed, the
Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to "enter into
agreements with foreign owned corporations." On the other hand, Congress
may review the action of the President once it is notified of "every contract
entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days
from its execution." In contrast to this express mandate of the President and
Congress in the EDU of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent
on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress
gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may in a proper case
exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary
should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of
control over the EDU of our natural resources.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be
used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests.
Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient
discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments
and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the
blessings of prosperity and peace.
On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality of
the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations insofar as
they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). 5
Background
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act No. [RA] 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of
1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order
No. [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the FTAA dated March 30, 1995, 6 executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). 7
On January 27, 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision 8 granting the
Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942,
DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government
and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by
the 1987 Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts, 9 which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, 10 were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty
over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the
exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized
service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign
contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including
operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of
production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the
disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership
of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of
our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution
(Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts.
Subsequently, respondents filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. In a
Resolution dated March 9, 2004, the Court required petitioners to comment
thereon. In the Resolution of June 8, 2004, it set the case for Oral Argument on
June 29, 2004.
After hearing the opposing sides, the Court required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda in amplification of their arguments. In a Resolution
issued later the same day, June 29, 2004, the Court noted, inter alia, the
Manifestation and Motion (in lieu of comment) filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of public respondents. The OSG said that it
was not interposing any objection to the Motion for Intervention filed by the
Chamber of Mines of the Philippines, Inc. (CMP) and was in fact joining and
adopting the latter's Motion for Reconsideration.
Memoranda were accordingly filed by the intervenor as well as by petitioners,
public respondents, and private respondent, dwelling at length on the three
issues discussed below. Later, WMCP submitted its Reply Memorandum, while
the OSG in obedience to an Order of this Court filed a Compliance
submitting copies of more FTAAs entered into by the government.
Three Issues Identified by the Court
During the Oral Argument, the Court identified the three issues to be resolved
in the present controversy, as follows:
1.Has the case been rendered moot by the sale of WMC shares in WMCP to
Sagittarius (60 percent of Sagittarius' equity is owned by Filipinos and/or
Filipino-owned corporations while 40 percent is owned by Indophil Resources
NL, an Australian company) and by the subsequent transfer and registration of
the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius?
2.Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, would it still be proper to
resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO
96-40 and the WMCP FTAA?
3.What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article
XII of the Constitution?
Should the Motion for Reconsideration Be Granted?
Respondents' and intervenor's Motions for Reconsideration should be granted,
for the reasons discussed below. The foregoing three issues identified by the
Court shall now be taken up seriatim.
First Issue:
Mootness
In declaring unconstitutional certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the
WMCP FTAA, the majority Decision agreed with petitioners' contention that the
subject FTAA had been executed in violation of Section 2 of Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. According to petitioners, the FTAAs entered into by the
government with foreign-owned corporations are limited by the fourth
paragraph of the said provision to agreements involving only technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Furthermore, the foreign contractor
is allegedly permitted by the FTAA in question to fully manage and control the
mining operations and, therefore, to acquire "beneficial ownership" of our
mineral resources.

The Decision merely shrugged off the Manifestation by WMPC informing the
Court (1) that on January 23, 2001, WMC had sold all its shares in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., 60 percent of whose equity was held by Filipinos; and (2)
that the assailed FTAA had likewise been transferred from WMCP to
Sagittarius. 11 Theponencia declared that the instant case had not been
rendered moot by the transfer and registration of the FTAA to a Filipino-owned
corporation, and that the validity of the said transfer remained in dispute and
awaited final judicial determination. 12 Patently therefore, the Decision is
anchored on the assumption that WMCP had remained a foreign corporation.
The crux of this issue of mootness is the fact that WMCP, at the time it entered
into the FTAA, happened to be wholly owned by WMC Resources International
Pty., Ltd. (WMC), which in turn was a wholly owned subsidiary of Western
Mining Corporation Holdings Ltd., a publicly listed major Australian mining and
exploration company.
The nullity of the FTAA was obviously premised upon the contractor being
a foreign corporation. Had the FTAA been originally issued to a Filipino-owned
corporation, there would have been no constitutionality issue to speak of. Upon
the other hand, the conveyance of the WMCP FTAA to a Filipino corporation
can be likened to the sale of land to a foreigner who subsequently acquires
Filipino citizenship, or who later resells the same land to a Filipino citizen. The
conveyance would be validated, as the property in question would no longer be
owned by a disqualified vendee.
And, inasmuch as the FTAA is to be implemented now by a Filipino corporation,
it is no longer possible for the Court to declare it unconstitutional. The case
pending in the Court of Appeals is a dispute between two Filipino companies
(Sagittarius and Lepanto), both claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares
in WMCP. So, regardless of which side eventually wins, the FTAA would still be
in the hands of a qualified Filipino company. Considering that there is no longer
any justiciable controversy, the plea to nullify the Mining Law has become a
virtual petition for declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original
jurisdiction. DCcTHa
In their Final Memorandum, however, petitioners argue that the case has not
become moot, considering the invalidity of the alleged sale of the shares in
WMCP from WMC to Sagittarius, and of the transfer of the FTAA from WMCP to
Sagittarius, resulting in the change of contractor in the FTAA in question. And
even assuming that the said transfers were valid, there still exists an actual case
predicated on the invalidity of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (DAO 96-40). Presently, we shall discuss petitioners' objections to
the transfer of both the shares and the FTAA. We shall take up the alleged
invalidity of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 later on in the discussion of the third issue.
No Transgression of the Constitution
by the Transfer of the WMCP Shares
Petitioners claim, first, that the alleged invalidity of the transfer of the WMCP
shares to Sagittarius violates the fourth paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution; second, that it is contrary to the provisions of the WMCP FTAA
itself; and third, that the sale of the shares is suspect and should therefore be
the subject of a case in which its validity may properly be litigated.
On the first ground, petitioners assert that paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII
permits the government to enter into FTAAs only with foreign-owned
corporations. Petitioners insist that the first paragraph of this constitutional
provision limits the participation of Filipino corporations in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources to only three species of
contracts production sharing, co-production and joint venture to the
exclusion of all other arrangements or variations thereof, and the WMCP FTAA
may therefore not be validly assumed and implemented by Sagittarius. In short,
petitioners claim that a Filipino corporation is not allowed by the Constitution to
enter into an FTAA with the government.
However, a textual analysis of the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII does
not support petitioners' argument. The pertinent part of the said provision
states: "Sec. 2. . . . The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. . . ." Nowhere in the provision is there any express limitation or
restriction insofar as arrangements other than the three aforementioned
contractual schemes are concerned.
Neither can one reasonably discern any implied stricture to that effect. Besides,
there is no basis to believe that the framers of the Constitution, a majority of
whom were obviously concerned with furthering the development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, could have wanted to restrict
Filipino participation in that area. This point is clear, especially in the light of the
overarching constitutional principle of giving preference and priority to Filipinos
and Filipino corporations in the development of our natural resources.
Besides, even assuming (purely for argument's sake) that a constitutional
limitation barring Filipino corporations from holding and implementing an FTAA
actually exists, nevertheless, such provision would apply only to the transfer of
the FTAA to Sagittarius, but definitely not to the sale of WMC's equity stake in
WMCP to Sagittarius. Otherwise, an unreasonable curtailment of property
rights without due process of law would ensue. Petitioners' argument must
therefore fail.
FTAA Not Intended
Solely for Foreign Corporation
Equally barren of merit is the second ground cited by petitioners that the
FTAA was intended to apply solely to a foreign corporation, as can allegedly be
seen from the provisions therein. They manage to cite only one WMCP FTAA
provision that can be regarded as clearly intended to apply only to a foreign
contractor: Section 12, which provides for international commercial arbitration
under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce, after local
remedies are exhausted. This provision, however, does not necessarily imply
that the WMCP FTAA cannot be transferred to and assumed by a Filipino
corporation like Sagittarius, in which event the said provision should simply be
disregarded as a superfluity.
No Need for a Separate
Litigation of the Sale of Shares
Petitioners claim as third ground the "suspicious" sale of shares from WMC to
Sagittarius; hence, the need to litigate it in a separate case. Section 40 of RA
7942 (the Mining Law) allegedly requires the President's prior approval of a
transfer.
A re-reading of the said provision, however, leads to a different conclusion.
"Sec. 40. Assignment/Transfer A financial or technical assistance agreement
may be assigned or transferred, in whole or in part, to a qualified person subject
to the prior approval of the President: Provided, That the President shall notify
Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement assigned or
converted in accordance with this provision within thirty (30) days from the date
of the approval thereof."
Section 40 expressly applies to the assignment or transfer of the FTAA, not to
the sale and transfer of shares of stock in WMCP. Moreover, when the
transferee of an FTAA is another foreign corporation, there is a logical
application of the requirement of prior approval by the President of the
Republic and notification to Congress in the event of assignment or transfer of
an FTAA. In this situation, such approval and notification are appropriate
safeguards, considering that the new contractor is the subject of a foreign
government.
On the other hand, when the transferee of the FTAA happens to be
a Filipino corporation, the need for such safeguard is not critical; hence, the lack
of prior approval and notification may not be deemed fatal as to render the
transfer invalid. Besides, it is not as if approval by the President is entirely
absent in this instance. As pointed out by private respondent in its
Memorandum, 13 the issue of approval is the subject of one of the cases
brought by Lepanto against Sagittarius in GR No. 162331. That case involved the
review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2003 in CA-
GR SP No. 74161, which affirmed the DENR Order dated December 31, 2001
and the Decision of the Office of the President dated July 23, 2002,
both approving the assignment of the WMCP FTAA to Sagittarius.
Petitioners also question the sale price and the financial capacity of the
transferee. According to the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 23, 2001,
executed between WMC and Sagittarius, the price of the WMCP shares was
fixed at US$9,875,000, equivalent to P553 million at an exchange rate of 56:1.
Sagittarius had an authorized capital stock of P250 million and a paid up capital
of P60 million. Therefore, at the time of approval of the sale by the DENR, the
debt-to-equity ratio of the transferee was over 9:1 hardly ideal for an FTAA
contractor, according to petitioners.
However, private respondents counter that the Deed of Sale specifically
provides that the payment of the purchase price would take place only after
Sagittarius' commencement of commercial production from mining operations,
if at all. Consequently, under the circumstances, we believe it would not be
reasonable to conclude, as petitioners did, that the transferee's high debt-to-
equity ratio per se necessarily carried negative implications for the enterprise;
and it would certainly be improper to invalidate the sale on that basis, as
petitioners propose.

FTAA Not Void,
Thus Transferrable
To bolster further their claim that the case is not moot, petitioners insist that
the FTAA is void and, hence cannot be transferred; and that its transfer does
not operate to cure the constitutional infirmity that is inherent in it; neither will
a change in the circumstances of one of the parties serve to ratify the void
contract.
While the discussion in their Final Memorandum was skimpy, petitioners in
their Comment (on the MR) did ratiocinate that this Court had declared the
FTAA to be void because, at the time it was executed with WMCP, the latter
was a fully foreign-owned corporation, in which the former vested full control
and management with respect to the exploration, development and utilization
of mineral resources, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution. And since the FTAA was per se void, no valid right
could be transferred; neither could it be ratified, so petitioners conclude.
Petitioners have assumed as fact that which has yet to be established. First and
foremost, the Decision of this Court declaring the FTAA void has not yet become
final. That was precisely the reason the Court still heard Oral Argument in this
case. Second, the FTAA does not vest in the foreign corporation full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources, to the exclusion of the government. This point will be dealt with in
greater detail below; but for now, suffice it to say that a perusal of the FTAA
provisions will prove that the government has effective overall direction and
control of the mining operations, including marketing and product pricing, and
that the contractor's work programs and budgets are subject to its review and
approval or disapproval.
As will be detailed later on, the government does not have to micro-manage the
mining operations and dip its hands into the day-to-day management of the
enterprise in order to be considered as having overall control and direction.
Besides, for practical and pragmatic reasons, there is a need for government
agencies to delegate certain aspects of the management work to the
contractor. Thus the basis for declaring the FTAA void still has to be revisited,
reexamined and reconsidered.
Petitioners sniff at the citation of Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, 14 and Halili v. CA, 15 claiming that the doctrines in these cases are
wholly inapplicable to the instant case.
Chavez clearly teaches: "Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a
Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the
invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a
citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires
Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the
constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In
short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold
land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer
himself becomes a qualified party." 16
In their Comment, petitioners contend that in Chavez and Halili, the object of
the transfer (the land) was not what was assailed for alleged
unconstitutionality. Rather, it was the transaction that was assailed; hence
subsequent compliance with constitutional provisions would cure its infirmity.
In contrast, in the instant case it is the FTAA itself, the object of the transfer,
that is being assailed as invalid and unconstitutional. So, petitioners claim that
the subsequent transfer of a void FTAA to a Filipino corporation would not cure
the defect. DAETcC
Petitioners are confusing themselves. The present Petition has been filed,
precisely because the grantee of the FTAA was a wholly owned subsidiary of a
foreign corporation. It cannot be gainsaid that anyone would have asserted that
the same FTAA was void if it had at the outset been issued to a Filipino
corporation. The FTAA, therefore, is not per se defective or unconstitutional. It
was questioned only because it had been issued to an allegedly non-qualified,
foreign-owned corporation.
We believe that this case is clearly analogous to Halili, in which the land
acquired by a non-Filipino was re-conveyed to a qualified vendee and the
original transaction was thereby cured. Paraphrasing Halili, the same rationale
applies to the instant case: assuming arguendo the invalidity of its prior grant to
a foreign corporation, the disputed FTAA being now held by a Filipino
corporation can no longer be assailed; the objective of the constitutional
provision to keep the exploration, development and utilization of our natural
resources in Filipino hands has been served.
More accurately speaking, the present situation is one degree better than that
obtaining in Halili, in which the original sale to a non-Filipino was clearly and
indisputably violative of the constitutional prohibition and thus void ab initio. In
the present case, the issuance/grant of the subject FTAA to the then foreign-
owned WMCP was not illegal, void or unconstitutional at the time. The matter
had to be brought to court, precisely for adjudication as to whether the FTAA
and the Mining Law had indeed violated the Constitution. Since, up to this
point, the decision of this Court declaring the FTAA void has yet to become
final, to all intents and purposes, the FTAA must be deemed valid and
constitutional. 17
At bottom, we find completely outlandish petitioners' contention that an FTAA
could be entered into by the government only with a foreign corporation, never
with a Filipino enterprise. Indeed, the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution
are all anchored on the protection of Filipino interests. How petitioners can
now argue that foreigners have the exclusive right to FTAAs totally overturns
the entire basis of the Petition preference for the Filipino in the exploration,
development and utilization of our natural resources. It does not take deep
knowledge of law and logic to understand that what the Constitution grants to
foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.
Second Issue:
Whether the Court Can Still Decide the Case,
Even Assuming It Is Moot
All the protagonists are in agreement that the Court has jurisdiction to decide
this controversy, even assuming it to be moot.
Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case becomes moot and
academic when "there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits," 18 what is at issue in
the instant case is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA, but also the
constitutionality of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Second, the acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure the
law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its jurisdiction to
decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court the duty to
declare invalid any law that offends the Constitution.
Petitioners also argue that no amendatory laws have been passed to make the
Mining Act of 1995 conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that, at
present, it does not); that public respondents will continue to implement and
enforce the statute until this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law
continues to be the source of legal authority in accepting, processing and
approving numerous applications for mining rights.
Indeed, it appears that as of June 30, 2002, some 43 FTAA applications had
been filed with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), with an aggregate
area of 2,064,908.65 hectares spread over Luzon, the Visayas and
Mindanao 19 applied for. It may be a bit far-fetched to assert, as petitioners
do, that each and every FTAA that was entered into under the provisions of the
Mining Act "invites potential litigation" for as long as the constitutional issues
are not resolved with finality. Nevertheless, we must concede that there exists
the distinct possibility that one or more of the future FTAAs will be the subject of
yet another suit grounded on constitutional issues.
But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over
the mining industry, which is even now scaring away foreign investments.
Attesting to this climate of anxiety is the fact that the Chamber of Mines of the
Philippines saw the urgent need to intervene in the case and to present its
position during the Oral Argument; and that Secretary General Romulo Neri of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) requested this Court to
allow him to speak, during that Oral Argument, on the economic consequences
of the Decision of January 27, 2004. 20
We are convinced. We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as
the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining
industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the
constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future
FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections, 21 it is evident that strong reasons of public policy
demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now. 22
In further support of the immediate resolution of the constitutionality issue,
public respondents cite Acop v. Guingona, 23 to the effect that the courts will
decide question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." 24 Public respondents ask the Court to avoid a
situation in which the constitutionality issue may again arise with respect to
another FTAA, the resolution of which may not be achieved until after it has
become too late for our mining industry to grow out of its infancy. They also
recall Salonga v. Cruz-Pao 25 in which this Court declared that "(t)he Court also
has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. . . ."

The mootness of the case in relation to the WMCP FTAA led the
undersigned ponente to state in his dissent to the Decision that there was no
more justiciable controversy and the plea to nullify the Mining Law has become
a virtual petition for declaratory relief. 26 The entry of the Chamber of Mines of
the Philippines, Inc., however, has put into focus the seriousness of the
allegations of unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 which converts the
case to one for prohibition 27 in the enforcement of the said law and
regulations.
Indeed, this CMP entry brings to fore that the real issue in this case is whether
paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA
7942 and DAO 96-40, not whether it was violated by specific acts implementing
RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. "[W]hen an act of the legislative department is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy
becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law
or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into
a judicial controversy even without any other overt act." 28 This ruling can be
traced from Taada v.Angara, 29 in which the Court said:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy.Where an action of the legislative branch
is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon
its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or
department of the government." 30
Additionally, the entry of CMP into this case has also effectively forestalled any
possible objections arising from the standing or legal interest of the original
parties.
For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Court should proceed to a
resolution of the constitutional issues in this case.
Third Issue:
The Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase
"Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance"
The constitutional provision at the nucleus of the controversy is paragraph 4 of
Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In order to appreciate its
context,Section 2 is reproduced in full:
"Sec. 2.All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in
its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes,
bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. IAEcCa
"The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution." 31
No Restriction of Meaning by
a Verba Legis Interpretation
To interpret the foregoing provision, petitioners adamantly assert that the
language of the Constitution should prevail; that the primary method of
interpreting it is to seek the ordinary meaning of the words used in its
provisions. They rely on rulings of this Court, such as the following:
"The fundamental principle in constitutional
construction however is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is
the language of the provision itself. The presumption is
that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. In other words, verba legis prevails. Only
when the meaning of the words used is unclear and
equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true
intent or purpose of the provision being construed." 32
Very recently, in Francisco v. The House of Representatives, 33 this Court indeed
had the occasion to reiterate the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction:
"First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the
words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est
anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole." 34
For ease of reference and in consonance with verba legis, we reconstruct and
stratify the aforequoted Section 2 as follows:
1.All natural resources are owned by the State. Except
for agricultural lands, natural resources cannot be
alienated by the State.
2.The exploration, development and utilization (EDU)
of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
3.The State may undertake these EDU activities
through either of the following:
(a)By itself directly and solely
(b)By (i) co-production; (ii) joint venture; or
(iii) production sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens
or corporations, at least 60
percent of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens
4.Small-scale utilization of natural resources may be
allowed by law in favor of Filipino citizens.
5.For large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, the President may enter into
"agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law. . . ."
Note that in all the three foregoing mining activities exploration,
development and utilization the State may undertake such EDU activities by
itself or in tandemwith Filipinos or Filipino corporations, except in two
instances: first, in small-scale utilization of natural resources, which Filipinos
may be allowed by law to undertake; and second, in large-scale EDU of
minerals, petroleum and mineral oils, which may be undertaken by the State via
"agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance" as provided by law.
Petitioners claim that the phrase "agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance" simply means technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements, nothing more and nothing else. They insist that there is no
ambiguity in the phrase, and that a plain reading of paragraph 4 quoted above
leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a foreign-owned corporation may
enter into with the government is merely an agreement
for either financial or technical assistanceonly, for the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils; such
a limitation, they argue, excludes foreign management and operation of a
mining enterprise. 35
This restrictive interpretation, petitioners believe, is in line with the general
policy enunciated by the Constitution reserving to Filipino citizens and
corporations the use and enjoyment of the country's natural resources. They
maintain that this Court's Decision 36 of January 27, 2004 correctly declared the
WMCP FTAA, along with pertinent provisions of RA 7942, void for allowing a
foreign contractor to have direct and exclusive management of a mining
enterprise. Allowing such a privilege not only runs counter to the "full control
and supervision" that the State is constitutionally mandated to exercise over
the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources;
doing so also vests in the foreign company "beneficial ownership" of our
mineral resources. It will be recalled that the Decision of January 27, 2004
zeroed in on "management or other forms of assistance" or other activities
associated with the "service contracts" of the martial law regime, since "the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is
the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters
of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate."

On the other hand, the intervenor 37 and public respondents argue that the
FTAA allowed by paragraph 4 is not merely an agreement for supplying limited
and specific financial or technical services to the State. Rather, such FTAA is a
comprehensive agreement for the foreign-owned
corporation's integrated exploration, development and utilization of mineral,
petroleum or other mineral oils on a large-scale basis. The agreement,
therefore, authorizes the foreign contractor's rendition of a whole range of
integrated and comprehensive services, ranging from the discovery to the
development, utilization and production of minerals or petroleum products.
We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of
paragraph 4 could inexorably lead to the conclusions arrived at in
the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words their use of the
phrase agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance does
not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted
to use involving when they could have simply said agreements for financial or
technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case, the
limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.
In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the
inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise
related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance. The word
"involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be
differentiated thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or
"affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring," "implying" or "necessitating";
and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." 38
Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover,
the word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as
in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there
are activities other than those that are being included. In other words, if an
agreement includestechnical or financial assistance, there is apart from such
assistance something else already in and covered or may be covered, by the
said agreement.
In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly
mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the
conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements
with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose
"agreements for technical or financial assistance" against
"agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is
unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.
Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations
to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would
have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no
doubt in anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have
used the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from
involvement in the management or operation of mining or similar ventures or
words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields negative
results. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious
and deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an
intent not to use the expression "agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance" in an exclusionary and limiting manner.
Deletion of "Service Contracts" to
Avoid Pitfalls of Previous Constitutions,
Not to Ban Service Contracts Per Se
Third, we do not see how a verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that
"the management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which
is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate." Nowhere in the above-
quoted Section can be discerned the objective to keep out of foreign hands the
management or operation of mining activities or the plan to eradicate service
contracts as these were understood in the 1973 Constitution. Still, petitioners
maintain that the deletion or omission from the 1987 Constitution of the term
"service contracts" found in the 1973 Constitution sufficiently proves the
drafters' intent to exclude foreigners from the management of the affected
enterprises.
To our mind, however, such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively
established from the mere failure to carry the same expression or term over to
the new Constitution, absent a more specific, explicit and unequivocal
statement to that effect. What petitioners seek (a complete ban on foreign
participation in the management of mining operations, as previously allowed by
the earlier Constitutions) is nothing short of bringing about a momentous sea
change in the economic and developmental policies; and the fundamentally
capitalist, free-enterprise philosophy of our government. We cannot imagine
such a radical shift being undertaken by our government, to the great prejudice
of the mining sector in particular and our economy in general, merely on the
basis of the omission of the terms service contract from or the failure to carry
them over to the new Constitution. There has to be a much more definite and
even unarguable basis for such a drastic reversal of policies.
Fourth, a literal and restrictive interpretation of paragraph 4, such as that
proposed by petitioners, suffers from certain internal logical inconsistencies
that generate ambiguities in the understanding of the provision. As the
intervenor pointed out, there has never been any constitutional or statutory
provision that reserved to Filipino citizens or corporations, at least 60 percent
of which is Filipino-owned, the rendition of financial or technical assistance to
companies engaged in mining or the development of any other natural
resource. The taking out of foreign-currency or peso-denominated loans or any
other kind of financial assistance, as well as the rendition of technical assistance
whether to the State or to any other entity in the Philippines has never
been restricted in favor of Filipino citizens or corporations having a certain
minimum percentage of Filipino equity. Such a restriction would certainly be
preposterous and unnecessary. As a matter of fact, financial, and even technical
assistance, regardless of the nationality of its source, would be welcomed in the
mining industry anytime with open arms, on account of the dearth of local
capital and the need to continually update technological know-how and
improve technical skills.
There was therefore no need for a constitutional provision specifically allowing
foreign-owned corporations to render financial or technical assistance, whether
in respect of mining or some other resource development or commercial
activity in the Philippines. The last point needs to be emphasized: if merely
financial or technical assistance agreements are allowed, there would be no
need to limit them to large-scale mining operations, as there would be far
greater need for them in the smaller-scale mining activities (and even in non-
mining areas). Obviously, the provision in question was intended to refer to
agreements other than those for mere financial or technical assistance.
In like manner, there would be no need to require the President of the Republic
to report to Congress, if only financial or technical assistance agreements are
involved. Such agreements are in the nature of foreign loans that pursuant
to Section 20 of Article VII 39 of the 1987 Constitution the President may
contract or guarantee, merely with the prior concurrence of the Monetary
Board. In turn, the Board is required to report to Congress within thirty days
from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, not thirty days after the
agreement is entered into.
And if paragraph 4 permits only agreements for loans and other forms of
financial, or technical assistance, what is the point of requiring that they
be based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country? For instance, how is one to measure and assess the "real
contributions" to the "economic growth" and "general welfare" of the country
that may ensue from a foreign-currency loan agreement or a technical-
assistance agreement for, say, the refurbishing of an existing power generating
plant for a mining operation somewhere in Mindanao? Such a criterion would
make more sense when applied to a major business investment in a principal
sector of the industry.
The conclusion is clear and inescapable a verba legis construction shows that
paragraph 4 is not to be understood as one limited only to foreign loans (or
other forms of financial support) and to technical assistance. There is definitely
more to it than that. These are provisions permitting participation by foreign
companies;requiring the President's report to Congress; and using, as yardstick,
contributions based on economic growth and general welfare. These were
neither accidentally inserted into the Constitution nor carelessly cobbled
together by the drafters in lip service to shallow nationalism. The provisions
patently have significance and usefulness in a context that allows agreements
with foreign companies to include more than mere financial or technical
assistance.
Fifth, it is argued that Section 2 of Article XII authorizes nothing more than a
rendition of specific and limited financial service or technical assistance by a
foreign company. This argument begs the question "To whom or for whom
would it be rendered"? or Who is being assisted? If the answer is "The State,"
then it necessarily implies that the State itself is the
one directly and solely undertaking the large-scale exploration, development
and utilization of a mineral resource, so it follows that the State must itself bear
the liability and cost of repaying the financing sourced from the foreign lender
and/or of paying compensation to the foreign entity rendering technical
assistance.

However, it is of common knowledge, and of judicial notice as well, that the
government is and has for many many years been financially strapped, to the
point that even the most essential services have suffered serious curtailments
education and health care, for instance, not to mention judicial services
have had to make do with inadequate budgetary allocations. Thus, government
has had to resort to build-operate-transfer and similar arrangements with the
private sector, in order to get vital infrastructure projects built without any
governmental outlay. TCaADS
The very recent brouhaha over the gargantuan "fiscal crisis" or "budget deficit"
merely confirms what the ordinary citizen has suspected all along. After the
reality check, one will have to admit the implausibility of a direct undertaking
by the State itself of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Such an undertaking entails not
only humongous capital requirements, but also the attendant risk of never
finding and developing economically viable quantities of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils. 40
It is equally difficult to imagine that such a provision restricting foreign
companies to the rendition of only financial or technical assistance to the
government was deliberately crafted by the drafters of the Constitution, who
were all well aware of the capital-intensive and technology-oriented nature of
large-scale mineral or petroleum extraction and the country's deficiency in
precisely those areas. 41 To say so would be tantamount to asserting that the
provision was purposely designed to ladle the large-scale development and
utilization of mineral, petroleum and related resources with impossible
conditions, and to remain forever and permanently "reserved" for future
generations of Filipinos.
A More Reasonable Look
at the Charter's Plain Language
Sixth, we shall now look closer at the plain language of the Charter and
examining the logical inferences. The drafters chose to emphasize and
highlight agreements .. . involving either technical or financial assistance in
relation to foreign corporations' participation in large-scale EDU. The inclusion
of this clause on "technical or financial assistance" recognizes the fact that
foreign business entities and multinational corporations are the ones with the
resources and know-how to provide technical and/or financial assistance of the
magnitude and type required for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of these resources.
The drafters whose ranks included many academicians, economists,
businessmen, lawyers, politicians and government officials were not
unfamiliar with the practices of foreign corporations and multinationals.
Neither were they so naive as to believe that these entities would provide
"assistance" without conditionalities or some quid pro quo. Definitely, as
business persons well know and as a matter of judicial notice, this matter is not
just a question of signing a promissory note or executing a technology transfer
agreement. Foreign corporations usually require that they be given a say in the
management, for instance, of day-to-day operations of the joint venture. They
would demand the appointment of their own men as, for example, operations
managers, technical experts, quality control heads, internal auditors or
comptrollers. Furthermore, they would probably require seats on the Board of
Directors all these to ensure the success of the enterprise and the repayment
of the loans and other financial assistance and to make certain that the funding
and the technology they supply would not go to waste. Ultimately, they would
also want to protect their business reputation and bottom lines. 42
In short, the drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism and
savvy to know that these foreign entities will not enter into such "agreements
involving assistance" without requiring arrangements for the protection of their
investments, gains and benefits.
Thus, by specifying such "agreements involving assistance," the drafters
necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these agreements necessarily
entailed; or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable
and effective, including management authority with respect to the day-to-day
operations of the enterprise and measures for the protection of the interests of
the foreign corporation, PROVIDED THAT Philippine sovereignty over natural
resources and full control over the enterprise undertaking the EDU activities
remain firmly in the State.
Petitioners' Theory Deflated by the
Absence of Closing-Out Rules or Guidelines
Seventh and final point regarding the plain-language approach, one of the
practical difficulties that results from it is the fact that there is nothing by way
of transitory provisions that would serve to confirm the theory that the
omission of the term "service contract" from the 1987 Constitution signaled the
demise of service contracts.
The framers knew at the time they were deliberating that there were various
service contracts extant and in force and effect, including those in the
petroleum industry. Many of these service contracts were long-term (25 years)
and had several more years to run. If they had meant to ban service contracts
altogether, they would have had to provide for the termination or
pretermination of the existing contracts. Accordingly, they would have supplied
the specifics and the when and howof effecting the extinguishment of these
existing contracts (or at least the mechanics for determining them); and of
putting in place the means to address the just claims of the contractors for
compensation for their investments, lost opportunities, and so on, if not for the
recovery thereof .
If the framers had intended to put an end to service contracts, they would have
at least left specific instructions to Congress to deal with these closing-out
issues, perhaps by way of general guidelines and a timeline within which to
carry them out. The following are some extant examples of such transitory
guidelines set forth inArticle XVIII of our Constitution:
"Section 23.Advertising entities affected by paragraph
(2), Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution shall
have five years from its ratification to comply on a
graduated and proportionate basis with the minimum
Filipino ownership requirement therein.
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 25.After the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning military
bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall
not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
"Section 26.The authority to issue sequestration or
freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
shall remain operative for not more than eighteen
months after the ratification of this Constitution.
However, in the national interest, as certified by the
President, the Congress may extend such period.
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only
upon showing of a prima facie case. The order and the
list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall
forthwith be registered with the proper court. For
orders issued before the ratification of this
Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or
proceeding shall be filed within six months from its
ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the
judicial action or proceeding shall be commenced
within six months from the issuance thereof.
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed
automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding
is commenced as herein provided." 43
It is inconceivable that the drafters of the Constitution would leave such an
important matter an expression of sovereignty as it were indefinitely
hanging in the air in a formless and ineffective state. Indeed, the complete
absence of even a general framework only serves to further deflate petitioners'
theory, like a child's balloon losing its air.
Under the circumstances, the logical inconsistencies resulting from petitioners'
literal and purely verba legis approach to paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII
compel a resort to other aids to interpretation.
Petitioners' Posture Also Negated
by Ratio Legis Et Anima
Thus, in order to resolve the inconsistencies, incongruities and ambiguities
encountered and to supply the deficiencies of the plain-language approach,
there is a need for recourse to the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission. There is a need for ratio legis et anima.
Service Contracts Not
"Deconstitutionalized"
Pertinent portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) conclusively show that they discussed agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance in the same breadth as service
contracts and used the terms interchangeably. The following exchange between
Commissioner Jamir (sponsor of the provision) and Commissioner Suarez
irrefutably proves that the "agreements involving technical or financial
assistance" were none other than service contracts.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Jamir is recognized. We
are still on Section 3.
MR. JAMIR.Yes, Madam President. With respect to the
second paragraph of Section 3, my
amendment by substitution reads: THE
PRESIDENT MAY ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS
WITH FOREIGN-OWNED CORPORATIONS
INVOLVING EITHER TECHNICAL OR
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE-SCALE
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT AND
UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
ACCORDING TO THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS PROVIDED BY LAW.
MR. VILLEGAS.The Committee accepts the
amendment. Commissioner Suarez will give
the background.

MR. JAMIR.Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you, Madam President.
Will Commissioner Jamir answer a few clarificatory
questions?
MR. JAMIR.Yes, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ.This particular portion of the section has
reference to what was popularly known
before as service contracts, among other
things, is that correct?
MR. JAMIR.Yes, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ.As it is formulated, the President may
enter into service contracts but subject to
the guidelines that may be promulgated by
Congress?
MR. JAMIR.That is correct.
MR. SUAREZ.Therefore, that aspect of negotiation and
consummation will fall on the President,
not upon Congress?
MR. JAMIR.That is also correct, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ.Except that all of these contracts, service
or otherwise, must be made strictly in
accordance with guidelines prescribed by
Congress?
MR. JAMIR.That is also correct.
MR. SUAREZ.And the Gentleman is thinking in terms of
a law that uniformly covers situations of the
same nature?
MR. JAMIR.That is 100 percent correct.
MR. SUAREZ.I thank the Commissioner.
MR. JAMIR.Thank you very much. 44
The following exchange leaves no doubt that the commissioners knew exactly
what they were dealing with: service contracts.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Gascon is recognized.
MR. GASCON.Commissioner Jamir had proposed an
amendment with regard to special service
contracts which was accepted by the
Committee. Since the Committee has
accepted it, I would like to ask some
questions.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Gascon may proceed.
MR. GASCON.As it is proposed now, such service
contracts will be entered into by the
President with the guidelines of a general
law on service contract to be enacted by
Congress. Is that correct?
MR. VILLEGAS.The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
MR. GASCON.According to the original proposal, if the
President were to enter into a particular
agreement, he would need the concurrence
of Congress. Now that it has been changed
by the proposal of Commissioner Jamir in
that Congress will set the general law to
which the President shall comply, the
President will, therefore, not need the
concurrence of Congress every time he
enters into service contracts. Is that
correct?
MR. VILLEGAS.That is right.
MR. GASCON.The proposed amendment of
Commissioner Jamir is in indirect contrast
to my proposed amendment, so I would like
to object and present my proposed
amendment to the body.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GASCON.Yes, it will be up to the body.
I feel that the general law to be set by Congress as
regard service contract agreements which
the President will enter into might be too
general or since we do not know the
content yet of such a law, it might be that
certain agreements will be detrimental to
the interest of the Filipinos. This is in direct
contrast to my proposal which provides
that there be effective constraints in the
implementation of service contracts.
So instead of a general law to be passed by Congress to
serve as a guideline to the President when
entering into service contract agreements, I
propose that every service contract entered
into by the President would need the
concurrence of Congress, so as to assure
the Filipinos of their interests with regard to
the issue in Section 3 on all lands of the
public domain. My alternative amendment,
which we will discuss later, reads: THAT THE
PRESIDENT SHALL ENTER INTO SUCH
AGREEMENTS ONLY WITH THE
CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SITTING
SEPARATELY.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON.The reason we made that shift is that
we realized the original proposal could
breed corruption. By the way, this is not
just confined toservice contracts but also
to financial assistance. If we are going to
make every single contract subject to the
concurrence of Congress which,
according to the Commissioner's
amendment is the concurrence of two-
thirds of Congress voting separately then
(1) there is a very great chance that each
contract will be different from another; and
(2) there is a great temptation that it would
breed corruption because of the great
lobbying that is going to happen. And we do
not want to subject our legislature to that.
Now, to answer the Commissioner's apprehension, by
"general law," we do not mean statements
of motherhood. Congress can build all the
restrictions that it wishes into that general
law so that every contract entered into by
the President under that specific area will
have to be uniform. The President has no
choice but to follow all the guidelines that
will be provided by law.
MR. GASCON.But my basic problem is that we do not
know as of yet the contents of such a
general law as to how much constraints
there will be in it. And to my mind, although
the Committee's contention that the
regular concurrence from Congress would
subject Congress to extensive lobbying, I
think that is a risk we will have to take since
Congress is a body of representatives of the
people whose membership will be changing
regularly as there will be changing
circumstances every time certain
agreements are made. It would be best
then to keep in tab and attuned to the
interest of the Filipino people, whenever
the President enters into any agreement
with regard to such an important matter
as technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources or service
contracts, the people's elected
representatives should be on top of it.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.Madam President, we do not need to
suspend the session. If Commissioner
Gascon needs a few minutes, I can fill up
the remaining time while he completes his
proposed amendment. I just wanted to ask
Commissioner Jamir whether he would
entertain a minor amendment to his
amendment, and it reads as follows: THE
PRESIDENT SHALL SUBSEQUENTLY NOTIFY
CONGRESS OF EVERY SERVICE
CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE GENERAL LAW. I think the reason
is, if I may state it briefly, as Commissioner
Bengzon said, Congress can always change
the general law later on to conform to new
perceptions of standards that should be
built into service contracts. But the only
way Congress can do this is if there were a
notification requirement from the Office of
the President that such service
contracts had been entered into, subject
then to the scrutiny of the Members of
Congress. This pertains to a situation where
the service contracts are already entered
into, and all that this amendment seeks is
the reporting requirement from the Office
of the President. Will Commissioner Jamir
entertain that?
MR. JAMIR.I will gladly do so, if it is still within my
power.
MR. VILLEGAS.Yes, the Committee accepts the
amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN.Madam President, may I ask a question?
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN.Am I correct in thinking that the only
difference between these future service
contracts and the past service
contracts under Mr. Marcos is the general
law to be enacted by the legislature and the
notification of Congress by the President?
That is the only difference, is it not?
MR. VILLEGAS.That is right.
SR. TAN.So those are the safeguards.
MR. VILLEGAS.Yes. There was no law at all
governing service contracts before. TAECSD
SR. TAN.Thank you, Madam President. 45
More Than Mere Financial
and Technical Assistance
Entailed by the Agreements
The clear words of Commissioner Jose N. Nolledo quoted below explicitly and
eloquently demonstrate that the drafters knew that the agreements with
foreign corporations were going to entail not mere technical or financial
assistance but, rather, foreign investment in and management of an enterprise
involved in large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO.Madam President, I have the permission
of the Acting Floor Leader to speak for only
two minutes in favor of the amendment of
Commissioner Gascon.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Nolledo may proceed.
MR. NOLLEDO.With due respect to the members of the
Committee and Commissioner Jamir, I am in
favor of the objection of Commissioner
Gascon.
Madam President, I was one of those who refused to
sign the 1973 Constitution, and one of the
reasons is that there were many provisions
in the Transitory Provisions therein that
favored aliens. I was shocked when I read a
provision authorizing service
contracts while we, in this Constitutional
Commission, provided for Filipino control of
the economy. We are, therefore, providing
for exceptional instances where aliens may
circumvent Filipino control of our economy.
And one way of circumventing the rule in
favor of Filipino control of the economy is
to recognize service contracts.
As far as I am concerned, if I should have my own way,
I am for the complete deletion of this
provision. However, we are presenting a
compromise in the sense that we are
requiring a two-thirds vote of all the
Members of Congress as a safeguard. I think
we should not mistrust the future Members
of Congress by saying that the purpose of
this provision is to avoid corruption. We
cannot claim that they are less patriotic
than we are. I think the Members of this
Commission should know that entering
into service contracts is an exception to the
rule on protection of natural resources for
the interest of the nation, and therefore,
being an exception it should be subject,
whenever possible, to stringent rules. It
seems to me that we are liberalizing the
rules in favor of aliens.
I say these things with a heavy heart, Madam
President. I do not claim to be a nationalist,
but I love my country. Although we need
investments, we must adopt
safeguards that are truly reflective of the
sentiments of the people and not mere
cosmetic safeguards as they now appear in
the Jamir amendment. (Applause)

Thank you, Madam President. 46
Another excerpt, featuring then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide Jr., indicates the limitations of the scope of such service contracts
they are valid only in regard to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, not
to all natural resources.
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.Thank you, Madam President. This is an
amendment to the Jamir amendment and
also to the Ople amendment. I propose to
delete "NATURAL RESOURCES" and
substitute it with the following: MINERALS,
PETROLEUM AND OTHER MINERAL OILS. On
the Ople amendment, I propose to add: THE
NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS SHALL BE
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE
EXECUTION OF THE SERVICE CONTRACT.
THE PRESIDENT.What does the Committee say with
respect to the first amendment in lieu of
"NATURAL RESOURCES"?
MR. VILLEGAS.Could Commissioner Davide explain
that?
MR. DAVIDE.Madam President, with the use of
"NATURAL RESOURCES" here, it would
necessarily include all lands of the public
domain, our marine resources, forests,
parks and so on. So we would like to limit
the scope of these service contracts to
those areas really where these may be
needed, the exploitation, development and
exploration of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. And so, we believe that
we should really, if we want to grantservice
contracts at all, limit the same to only those
particular areas where Filipino capital may
not be sufficient, and not to all natural
resources.
MR. SUAREZ.Just a point of clarification again, Madam
President. When the Commissioner made
those enumerations and specifications, I
suppose he deliberately did not include
"agricultural land"?
MR. DAVIDE.That is precisely the reason we have to
enumerate what these resources are into
which service contracts may enter. So,
beyond the reach of any service
contract will be lands of the public domain,
timberlands, forests, marine
resources, fauna and flora, wildlife and
national parks. 47
After the Jamir amendment was voted upon and approved by a vote of 21 to 10
with 2 abstentions, Commissioner Davide made the following statement, which
is very relevant to our quest:
THE PRESIDENT.Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE.I am very glad that Commissioner Padilla
emphasized minerals, petroleum and
mineral oils. The Commission has just
approved the possible foreign entry into the
development, exploration and utilization of
these minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils by virtue of the Jamir
amendment. I voted in favor of the Jamir
amendment because it will eventually give
way to vesting in exclusively Filipino citizens
and corporations wholly owned by Filipino
citizens the right to utilize the other natural
resources. This means that as a matter of
policy, natural resources should be utilized
and exploited only by Filipino citizens or
corporations wholly owned by such citizens.
But by virtue of the Jamir amendment,
since we feel that Filipino capital may not
be enough for the development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President can enter
into service contracts with foreign
corporations precisely for the development
and utilization of such resources. And so,
there is nothing to fear that we will
stagnate in the development of minerals,
petroleum and mineral oils because we now
allow service contracts. . .? 48
The foregoing are mere fragments of the framers' lengthy discussions of the
provision dealing with agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance, which ultimately became paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of
the Constitution. Beyond any doubt, the members of the ConCom were actually
debating about the martial-law-era service contracts for which they were
crafting appropriate safeguards.
In the voting that led to the approval of Article XII by the ConCom, the
explanations given by Commissioners Gascon, Garcia and Tadeo indicated that
they had voted to reject this provision on account of their objections to the
"constitutionalization" of the "service contract" concept.
Mr. Gascon said, "I felt that if we would constitutionalize any provision on
service contracts, this should always be with the concurrence of Congress and
not guided only by a general law to be promulgated by Congress." 49 Mr. Garcia
explained, "Service contracts are given constitutional legitimization in Sec. 3,
even when they have been proven to be inimical to the interests of the nation,
providing, as they do, the legal loophole for the exploitation of our natural
resources for the benefit of foreign interests." 50 Likewise, Mr. Tadeo cited inter
alia the fact that service contracts continued to subsist, enabling foreign
interests to benefit from our natural resources. 51 It was hardly likely that these
gentlemen would have objected so strenuously, had the provision called for
mere technical or financial assistance and nothing more.
The deliberations of the ConCom and some commissioners' explanation of their
votes leave no room for doubt that the service contract concept precisely
underpinned the commissioners' understanding of the "agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance."
Summation of the
Concom Deliberations
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of
the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
In their deliberations on what was to become
paragraph 4, the framers used the
term service contracts in referring
to agreements . . . involving either technical
or financial assistance.
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was
understood in the 1973 Constitution.
It was obvious from their discussions that they were
not about to ban or eradicate service
contracts.
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in
place safeguards that would eliminate or
minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime. In brief, they were
going to permit service contracts with
foreign corporations as contractors, but
with safety measures to prevent abuses, as
an exception to the general norm
established in the first paragraph of Section
2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or
limits to Filipino citizens and
corporations at least 60 percent of which is
owned by such citizens the exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources.
This provision was prompted by the perceived
insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt
need for foreign investments in the EDU of
minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort
of safeguards that would be considered
adequate and reasonable. But some of
them, having more "radical" leanings,
wanted to ban service contracts altogether;
for them, the provision would permit aliens
to exploit and benefit from the nation's
natural resources, which they felt should be
reserved only for Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual
commissioners were heard by the entire
body. They sounded off their individual
opinions, openly enunciated their
philosophies, and supported or attacked
the provisions with fervor. Everyone's
viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National
Economy and Patrimony including
paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with
foreign corporations as an exception to the
general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
the same article was resoundingly
approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2
abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical
or Financial Assistance Are
Service Contracts With Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are
in factservice contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are
between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on
the other, the government as principal or "owner" of the works. In the new
service contracts, the foreign contractors provide capital, technology and
technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of
large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government, through its
agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the
entire operation.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1)The service contract shall be crafted in accordance
with a general law that will set standard or uniform
terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the
possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.
(2)The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have
been vetted several times over at different levels to
ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand
public scrutiny.
(3)Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the
President shall report it to Congress to give that
branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.
Use of the Record of the
ConCom to Ascertain Intent
At this juncture, we shall address, rather than gloss over, the use of the
"framers' intent" approach, and the criticism hurled by petitioners who quote a
ruling of this Court:
"While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention 'are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less the mass
of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof ." 52

The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of those members who
spoke out and not the views of the majority who remained silent should be
clarified. We must never forget that those who spoke out were heard by those
who remained silent and did not react. If the latter were silent because they
happened not to be present at the time, they are presumed to have read the
minutes and kept abreast of the deliberations. By remaining silent, they are
deemed to have signified their assent to and/or conformity with at least some
of the views propounded or their lack of objections thereto. It was incumbent
upon them, as representatives of the entire Filipino people, to follow the
deliberations closely and to speak their minds on the matter if they did not see
eye to eye with the proponents of the draft provisions.
In any event, each and every one of the commissioners had the opportunity to
speak out and to vote on the matter. Moreover, the individual explanations of
votes are on record, and they show where each delegate stood on the issues. In
sum, we cannot completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the record of
the ConCom, simply because certain members chose not to speak out.
It is contented that the deliberations therein did not necessarily reflect the
thinking of the voting population that participated in the referendum and
ratified the Constitution. Verily, whether we like it or not, it is a bit too much to
assume that every one of those who voted to ratify the proposed Charter did so
only after carefully reading and mulling over it, provision by provision.
Likewise, it appears rather extravagant to assume that every one of those who
did in fact bother to read the draft Charter actually understood the import of its
provisions, much less analyzed it vis--vis the previous Constitutions. We
believe that in reality, a good percentage of those who voted in favor of it did
so more out of faith and trust. For them, it was the product of the hard work
and careful deliberation of a group of intelligent, dedicated and trustworthy
men and women of integrity and conviction, whose love of country and fidelity
to duty could not be questioned.
In short, a large proportion of the voters voted "yes" because the drafters, or a
majority of them, endorsed the proposed Constitution. What this fact translates
to is the inescapable conclusion that many of the voters in the referendum did
not form their own isolated judgment about the draft Charter, much less about
particular provisions therein. They only relied or fell back and acted upon the
favorable endorsement or recommendation of the framers as a group. In other
words, by votingyes, they may be deemed to have signified their voluntary
adoption of the understanding and interpretation of the delegates with respect
to the proposed Charter and its particular provisions. "If it's good enough for
them, it's good enough for me;" or, in many instances, "If it's good enough for
President Cory Aquino, it's good enough for me."
And even for those who voted based on their own individual assessment of the
proposed Charter, there is no evidence available to indicate that their
assessment or understanding of its provisions was in fact different from that of
the drafters. This unwritten assumption seems to be petitioners' as well. For all
we know, this segment of voters must have read and understood the provisions
of the Constitution in the same way the framers had, an assumption that would
account for the favorable votes.
Fundamentally speaking, in the process of rewriting the Charter, the members
of the ConCom as a group were supposed to represent the entire Filipino
people. Thus, we cannot but regard their views as being very much indicative of
the thinking of the people with respect to the matters deliberated upon and to
the Charter as a whole.
It is therefore reasonable and unavoidable to make the following conclusion,
based on the above arguments. As written by the framers and ratified and
adopted by the people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is
clear: to develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a
large scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we should reverse the Decision of January
27, 2004, and in fact now hold a view different from that of the Decision, which
had these findings: (a) paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII limits foreign
involvement in the local mining industry to agreements strictly for either
financial or technical assistance only; (b) the same paragraph precludes
agreements that grant to foreign corporations the management of local mining
operations, as such agreements are purportedly in the nature of service
contracts as these were understood under the 1973 Constitution; (c) these
service contracts were supposedly "de-constitutionalized" and proscribed by
the omission of the term service contracts from the 1987 Constitution; (d) since
the WMCP FTAA contains provisions permitting the foreign contractor to
manage the concern, the said FTAA is invalid for being a prohibited service
contract; and (e) provisions of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, which likewise grant
managerial authority to the foreign contractor, are also invalid and
unconstitutional.
Ultimate Test: State's "Control"
Determinative of Constitutionality
But we are not yet at the end of our quest. Far from it. It seems that we are
confronted with a possible collision of constitutional provisions. On the one
hand, paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Article XII explicitly mandates the State to
exercise "full control and supervision" over the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. On the other hand, paragraph 4 permits
safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors. Normally, pursuant
thereto, the contractors exercise management prerogatives over the mining
operations and the enterprise as a whole. There is thus a legitimate ground to
be concerned that either the State's full control and supervision may rule out
any exercise of management authority by the foreign contractor; or, the other
way around, allowing the foreign contractor full management prerogatives may
ultimately negate the State's full control and supervision.
Ut Magis Valeat
Quam Pereat
Under the third principle of constitutional construction laid down in Francisco
ut magis valeat quam pereat every part of the Constitution is to be given
effect, and the Constitution is to be read and understood as a harmonious
whole. Thus, "full control and supervision" by the State must be understood as
one that does not preclude the legitimate exercise of management prerogatives
by the foreign contractor. Before any further discussion, we must stress the
primacy and supremacy of the principle of sovereignty and State control and
supervision over all aspects of exploration, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, as mandated in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XII.
But in the next breadth we have to point out that "full control and supervision"
cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and
supervises everything involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all
decisions required in the mining operations. This strained concept of control
and supervision over the mining enterprise would render impossible the
legitimate exercise by the contractors of a reasonable degree of management
prerogative and authority necessary and indispensable to their proper
functioning.
For one thing, such an interpretation would discourage foreign entry into large-
scale exploration, development and utilization activities; and result in the
unmitigated stagnation of this sector, to the detriment of our nation's
development. This scenario renders paragraph 4 inoperative and useless. And
as respondents have correctly pointed out, the government does not have to
micro-manage the mining operations and dip its hands into the day-to-day
affairs of the enterprise in order for it to be considered as having full control
and supervision.
The concept of control 53 adopted in Section 2 of Article XII must be taken to
mean less than dictatorial, all-encompassing control; but nevertheless sufficient
to give the State the power to direct, restrain, regulate and govern the affairs of
the extractive enterprises. Control by the State may be on a macro level,
through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable the government to control
the conduct of affairs in various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not
desirable or beneficial.
The end in view is ensuring that these enterprises contribute to the economic
development and general welfare of the country, conserve the environment,
and uplift the well-being of the affected local communities. Such a concept of
control would be compatible with permitting the foreign contractor sufficient
and reasonable management authority over the enterprise it invested in, in
order to ensure that it is operating efficiently and profitably, to protect its
investments and to enable it to succeed. TCHEDA
The question to be answered, then, is whether RA 7942 and its Implementing
Rules enable the government to exercise that degree of control sufficient to
direct and regulate the conduct of affairs of individual enterprises and restrain
undesirable activities.
On the resolution of these questions will depend the validity and
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DAO 96-40), as well as the
WMCP FTAA.
Indeed, petitioners charge 54 that RA 7942, as well as its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, makes it possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control and
management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign-owned corporations,
with the result that the State is allegedly reduced to a passive regulator
dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak review and audit powers.
The State does not supposedly act as the owner of the natural resources for and
on behalf of the Filipino people; it practically has little effective say in the
decisions made by the enterprise. Petitioners then conclude that the law, the
implementing regulations, and the WMCP FTAA cede "beneficial ownership" of
the mineral resources to the foreign contractor.

A careful scrutiny of the provisions of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules
belies petitioners' claims. Paraphrasing the Constitution, Section 4 of the
statute clearly affirms the State's control thus:
"Sec. 4.Ownership of Mineral Resources. Mineral
resources are owned by the State and the exploration,
development, utilization and processing thereof shall
be under its full control and supervision. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
mineral agreements with contractors.
"The State shall recognize and protect the rights of the
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands as provided for by the Constitution."
The aforequoted provision is substantively reiterated in Section 2 of DAO 96-40
as follows:
"Sec. 2.Declaration of Policy. All mineral resources
in public and private lands within the territory and
exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the
Philippines are owned by the State. It shall be the
responsibility of the State to promote their rational
exploration, development, utilization and conservation
through the combined efforts of the Government and
private sector in order to enhance national growth in a
way that effectively safeguards the environment and
protects the rights of affected communities."
Sufficient Control Over Mining
Operations Vested in the State
by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
RA 7942 provides for the State's control and supervision over mining
operations. The following provisions thereof establish the mechanism of
inspection and visitorial rights over mining operations and institute reportorial
requirements in this manner:
1.Sec. 8 which provides for the DENR's power of over-
all supervision and periodic review for "the
conservation, management, development
and proper use of the State's mineral
resources";
2.Sec. 9 which authorizes the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) under the DENR to exercise
"direct charge in the administration and
disposition of mineral resources", and
empowers the MGB to "monitor the
compliance by the contractor of the terms
and conditions of the mineral agreements",
"confiscate surety and performance bonds",
and deputize whenever necessary any
member or unit of the Phil. National Police,
barangay, duly registered non-
governmental organization (NGO) or any
qualified person to police mining activities;
3.Sec. 66 which vests in the Regional Director
"exclusive jurisdiction over safety
inspections of all installations, whether
surface or underground", utilized in mining
operations.
4.Sec. 35, which incorporates into all FTAAs the
following terms, conditions and warranties:
"(g)Mining operations shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions
of the Act and its IRR.
"(h)Work programs and minimum
expenditures commitments.
xxx xxx xxx
"(k)Requiring proponent to effectively use
appropriate anti-pollution
technology and facilities to
protect the environment and
restore or rehabilitate mined-
out areas.
"(l)The contractors shall furnish the
Government records of geologic,
accounting and other relevant
data for its mining operation,
and that books of accounts and
records shall be open for
inspection by the government. . .
.
"(m)Requiring the proponent to dispose of
the minerals at the highest price
and more advantageous terms
and conditions.
"(n) . . .
"(o)Such other terms and conditions
consistent with the Constitution
and with this Act as the
Secretary may deem to be for
the best interest of the State and
the welfare of the Filipino
people."
The foregoing provisions of Section 35 of RA 7942 are also reflected and
implemented in Section 56 (g), (h), (l), (m) and (n) of the Implementing Rules,
DAO 96-40.
Moreover, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 also provide various stipulations confirming
the government's control over mining enterprises:
The contractor is to relinquish to the government
those portions of the contract area not
needed for mining operations and not
covered by any declaration of mining
feasibility (Section 35-e, RA 7942; Section
60, DAO 96-40).
The contractor must comply with the provisions
pertaining to mine safety, health and
environmental protection (Chapter XI, RA
7942; Chapters XV and XVI, DAO 96-40).
For violation of any of its terms and conditions,
government may cancel an FTAA. (Chapter
XVII, RA 7942; Chapter XXIV, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor is obliged to open its books of
accounts and records for inspection by the
government (Section 56-m, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor has to dispose of the minerals
and by-products at the highest market price
and register with the MGB a copy of the
sales agreement (Section 56-n, DAO 96-40).
MGB is mandated to monitor the contractor's
compliance with the terms and conditions
of the FTAA; and to deputize, when
necessary, any member or unit of the
Philippine National Police, the barangay or
a DENR-accredited non-governmental
organization to police mining activities
(Section 7-d and -f, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA cannot be transferred or assigned without
prior approval by the President (Section 40,
RA 7942; Section 66, DAO 96-40).
A mining project under an FTAA cannot proceed to
the construction/development/utilization
stage, unless its Declaration of Mining
Project Feasibility has been approved by
government (Section 24, RA 7942).
The Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility filed by
the contractor cannot be approved without
submission of the following documents:
1.Approved mining project feasibility study
(Section 53-d, DAO 96-40)
2.Approved three-year work program
(Section 53-a-4, DAO 96-40)
3.Environmental compliance certificate
(Section 70, RA 7942)
4.Approved environmental protection and
enhancement program (Section
69, RA 7942)
5.Approval by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Bayan/Barangay
(Section 70, RA 7942; Section 27,
RA 7160)
6.Free and prior informed consent by the
indigenous peoples concerned,
including payment of royalties
through a Memorandum of
Agreement (Section 16, RA 7942;
Section 59, RA 8371)
The FTAA contractor is obliged to assist in the
development of its mining community,
promotion of the general welfare of its
inhabitants, and development of science
and mining technology (Section 57, RA
7942).
The FTAA contractor is obliged to submit reports (on
quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis as
the case may be; per Section 270, DAO 96-
40), pertaining to the following:
1.Exploration
2.Drilling
3.Mineral resources and reserves
4.Energy consumption
5.Production
6.Sales and marketing
7.Employment
8.Payment of taxes, royalties, fees and
other Government Shares
9.Mine safety, health and environment
10.Land use
11.Social development
12.Explosives consumption
An FTAA pertaining to areas within government
reservations cannot be granted without a
written clearance from the government
agencies concerned (Section 19, RA 7942;
Section 54, DAO 96-40).
An FTAA contractor is required to post a financial
guarantee bond in favor of the government
in an amount equivalent to its expenditures
obligations for any particular year. This
requirement is apart from the
representations and warranties of the
contractor that it has access to all the
financing, managerial and technical
expertise and technology necessary to carry
out the objectives of the FTAA (Section 35-
b, -e, and -f, RA 7942).
Other reports to be submitted by the contractor, as
required under DAO 96-40, are as follows:
an environmental report on the
rehabilitation of the mined-out area and/or
mine waste/tailing covered area, and anti-
pollution measures undertaken (Section 35-
a-2); annual reports of the mining
operations and records of geologic
accounting (Section 56-m); annual progress
reports and final report of exploration
activities (Section 56-2).
Other programs required to be submitted by the
contractor, pursuant to DAO 96-40, are the
following: a safety and health program
(Section 144); an environmental work
program (Section 168); an annual
environmental protection and
enhancement program (Section 171).
The foregoing gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations
imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations easily
overturn petitioners' contention. The setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
hardly relegates the State to the role of a "passive regulator" dependent on
submitted plans and reports. On the contrary, the government agencies
concerned are empowered to approve or disapprove hence, to influence,
direct and change the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development
and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
Once these plans and reports are approved, the contractor is bound to comply
with its commitments therein. Figures for mineral production and sales are
regularly monitored and subjected to government review, in order to ensure
that the products and by-products are disposed of at the best prices possible;
even copies of sales agreements have to be submitted to and registered with
MGB. And the contractor is mandated to open its books of accounts and
records for scrutiny, so as to enable the State to determine if the government
share has been fully paid.
The State may likewise compel the contractor's compliance with mandatory
requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection, and the use
of anti-pollution technology and facilities. Moreover, the contractor is also
obligated to assist in the development of the mining community and to pay
royalties to the indigenous peoples concerned.
Cancellation of the FTAA may be the penalty for violation of any of its terms and
conditions and/or noncompliance with statutes or regulations. This general, all-
around, multipurpose sanction is no trifling matter, especially to a contractor
who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars sunk
into a mining project.
Overall, considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just
discussed, we believe that the State definitely possesses the means by which it
can have the ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions
and objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions,
should the occasion therefor arise.

In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it pleases and get
away with it; on the contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it
wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in
the government more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over
the conduct of mining operations.
Section 3(aq) of RA 7942
Not Unconstitutional
An objection has been expressed that Section 3(aq) 55 of RA 7942 which
allows a foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit is
unconstitutional. The reasoning is that Section 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution does not allow foreign-owned corporations to undertake mining
operations directly. They may act only as contractors of the State under an
FTAA; and the State, as the party directly undertaking exploitation of its natural
resources, must hold through the government all exploration permits and
similar authorizations. Hence, Section 3(aq), in permitting foreign-owned
corporations to hold exploration permits, is unconstitutional. ESCacI
The objection, however, is not well-founded. While the Constitution mandates
the State to exercise full control and supervision over the exploitation of
mineral resources, nowhere does it require the government to hold all
exploration permits and similar authorizations. In fact, there is no prohibition at
all against foreign or local corporations or contractors holding exploration
permits. The reason is not hard to see.
Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7942, an exploration permit merely grants to a
qualified person the right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified
areas. Such a permit does not amount to an authorization to extract and carry
off the mineral resources that may be discovered. This phase involves nothing
but expenditures for exploring the contract area and locating the mineral
bodies. As no extraction is involved, there are no revenues or incomes to speak
of. In short, the exploration permit is an authorization for the grantee to spend
its own funds on exploration programs that are pre-approved by the
government, without any right to recover anything should no minerals in
commercial quantities be discovered. The State risks nothing and loses nothing
by granting these permits to local or foreign firms; in fact, it stands to gain in
the form of data generated by the exploration activities.
Pursuant to Section 24 of RA 7942, an exploration permit grantee who
determines the commercial viability of a mining area may, within the term of
the permit, file with the MGB a declaration of mining project feasibility
accompanied by a work program for development. The approval of the mining
project feasibility and compliance with other requirements of RA 7942 vests in
the grantee the exclusive right to an MPSA or an other mineral agreement, or to
an FTAA.
Thus, the permit grantee may apply for an MPSA, a joint venture agreement, a
co-production agreement, or an FTAA over the permit area, and the application
shall be approved if the permit grantee meets the necessary qualifications and
the terms and conditions of any such agreement. Therefore, the contractor will
be in a position to extract minerals and earn revenues only when the MPSA or
another mineral agreement, or an FTAA, is granted. At that point, the
contractor's rights and obligations will be covered by an FTAA or a mineral
agreement.
But prior to the issuance of such FTAA or mineral agreement, the exploration
permit grantee (or prospective contractor) cannot yet be deemed to have
entered into any contract or agreement with the State, and the grantee would
definitely need to have some document or instrument as evidence of its right to
conduct exploration works within the specified area. This need is met by the
exploration permit issued pursuant to Sections 3(aq), 20 and 23 of RA 7942.
In brief, the exploration permit serves a practical and legitimate purpose in that
it protects the interests and preserves the rights of the exploration permit
grantee (the would-be contractor) foreign or local during the period of
time that it is spending heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to
earn revenues to recoup any of its investments and expenditures. Minus this
permit and the protection it affords, the exploration works and expenditures
may end up benefiting only claim-jumpers. Such a possibility tends to
discourage investors and contractors. Thus, Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 may not
be deemed unconstitutional.
The Terms of the WMCP FTAA
A Deference to State Control
A perusal of the WMCP FTAA also reveals a slew of stipulations providing for
State control and supervision:
1.The contractor is obligated to account for the value
of production and sale of minerals (Clause
1.4).
2.The contractor's work program, activities and
budgets must be approved by/on behalf of
the State (Clause 2.1).
3.The DENR secretary has the power to extend the
exploration period (Clause 3.2-a).
4.Approval by the State is necessary for incorporating
lands into the FTAA contract area (Clause
4.3-c).
5.The Bureau of Forest Development is vested with
discretion in regard to approving the
inclusion of forest reserves as part of the
FTAA contract area (Clause 4.5).
6.The contractor is obliged to relinquish periodically
parts of the contract area not needed for
exploration and development (Clause 4.6).
7.A Declaration of Mining Feasibility must be
submitted for approval by the State (Clause
4.6-b).
8.The contractor is obligated to report to the State its
exploration activities (Clause 4.9).
9.The contractor is required to obtain State approval of
its work programs for the succeeding two-
year periods, containing the proposed work
activities and expenditures budget related
to exploration (Clause 5.1).
10.The contractor is required to obtain State approval
for its proposed expenditures for
exploration activities (Clause 5.2).
11.The contractor is required to submit an annual
report on geological, geophysical,
geochemical and other information relating
to its explorations within the FTAA area
(Clause 5.3-a).
12,The contractor is to submit within six months after
expiration of exploration period a final
report on all its findings in the contract area
(Clause 5.3-b).
13.The contractor, after conducting feasibility studies,
shall submit a declaration of mining
feasibility, along with a description of the
area to be developed and mined, a
description of the proposed mining
operations and the technology to be
employed, and a proposed work program
for the development phase, for approval by
the DENR secretary (Clause 5.4).
14.The contractor is obliged to complete the
development of the mine, including
construction of the production facilities,
within the period stated in the approved
work program (Clause 6.1).
15.The contractor is obligated to submit for approval
of the DENR secretary a work program
covering each period of three fiscal years
(Clause 6.2).
16.The contractor is to submit reports to the DENR
secretary on the production, ore reserves,
work accomplished and work in progress,
profile of its work force and management
staff, and other technical information
(Clause 6.3).
17.Any expansions, modifications, improvements and
replacements of mining facilities shall be
subject to the approval of the secretary
(Clause 6.4).
18.The State has control with respect to the amount of
funds that the contractor may borrow
within the Philippines (Clause 7.2).
19.The State has supervisory power with respect to
technical, financial and marketing issues
(Clause 10.1-a).
20.The contractor is required to ensure 60 percent
Filipino equity in the contractor, within ten
years of recovering specified expenditures,
unless not so required by subsequent
legislation (Clause 10.1).
21.The State has the right to terminate the FTAA for
the contractor's unremedied substantial
breach thereof (Clause 13.2);
22.The State's approval is needed for any assignment
of the FTAA by the contractor to an entity
other than an affiliate (Clause 14.1).
We should elaborate a little on the work programs and budgets, and what they
mean with respect to the State's ability to exercise full control and effective
supervision over the enterprise. For instance, throughout the initial five-
year exploration and feasibility phase of the project, the contractor is mandated
by Clause 5.1 of the WMCP FTAA to submit a series of work programs (copy
furnished the director of MGB) to the DENR secretary for approval. The
programs will detail the contractor's proposed exploration activities and
budget covering each subsequent period of two fiscal years.
In other words, the concerned government officials will be informed
beforehand of the proposed exploration activities and expenditures of the
contractor for each succeeding two-year period, with the right to
approve/disapprove them or require changes or adjustments therein if deemed
necessary.
Likewise, under Clause 5.2(a), the amount that the contractor was supposed to
spend for exploration activities during the first contract year of the exploration
period was fixed at not less than P24 million; and then for the succeeding years,
the amount shall be as agreed between the DENR secretary and the contractor
prior to the commencement of each subsequent fiscal year. If no such
agreement is arrived upon, the previous year's expenditure commitment shall
apply.
This provision alone grants the government through the DENR secretary a very
big say in the exploration phase of the project. This fact is not something to be
taken lightly, considering that the government has absolutely no contribution to
the exploration expenditures or work activities and yet is given veto power over
such a critical aspect of the project. We cannot but construe as very significant
such a degree of control over the project and, resultantly, over the mining
enterprise itself.
Following its exploration activities or feasibility studies, if the contractor
believes that any part of the contract area is likely to contain an economic
mineral resource, it shall submit to the DENR secretary a declaration of mining
feasibility (per Clause 5.4 of the FTAA), together with a technical description of
the area delineated for development and production, a description of the
proposed mining operations including the technology to be used, a work
program for development, an environmental impact statement, and a
description of the contributions to the economic and general welfare of the
country to be generated by the mining operations (pursuant to Clause 5.5).

The work program for development is subject to the approval of the DENR
secretary. Upon its approval, the contractor must comply with it and complete
the development of the mine, including the construction of production facilities
and installation of machinery and equipment, within the period provided in the
approved work program for development (per Clause 6.1).
Thus, notably, the development phase of the project is likewise subject to the
control and supervision of the government. It cannot be emphasized enough
that the proper and timely construction and deployment of the production
facilities and the development of the mine are of pivotal significance to the
success of the mining venture. Any missteps here will potentially be very costly
to remedy. Hence, the submission of the work program for development to the
DENR secretary for approval is particularly noteworthy, considering that so
many millions of dollars worth of investments courtesy of the contractor
are made to depend on the State's consideration and action.
Throughout the operating period, the contractor is required to submit to the
DENR secretary for approval, copy furnished the director of MGB, work
programs covering each period of three fiscal years (per Clause 6.2). During the
same period (per Clause 6.3), the contractor is mandated to submit various
quarterly and annual reports to the DENR secretary, copy furnished the director
of MGB, on the tonnages of production in terms of ores and concentrates, with
corresponding grades, values and destinations; reports of sales; total ore
reserves, total tonnage of ores, work accomplished and work in progress
(installations and facilities related to mining operations), investments made or
committed, and so on and so forth.
Under Section VIII, during the period of mining operations, the contractor is also
required to submit to the DENR secretary (copy furnished the director of MGB)
the work program and corresponding budget for the contract area, describing
the mining operations that are proposed to be carried out during the period
covered. The secretary is, of course, entitled to grant or deny approval of any
work program or budget and/or propose revisions thereto. Once the
program/budget has been approved, the contractor shall comply therewith.
In sum, the above provisions of the WMCP FTAA taken together, far from
constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial ownership of
mineral resources to the contractor in question, bestow upon the State more
than adequate control and supervision over the activities of the contractor and
the enterprise.
No Surrender of Control
Under the WMCP FTAA
Petitioners, however, take aim at Clause 8.2, 8.3, and 8.5 of the WMCP FTAA
which, they say, amount to a relinquishment of control by the State, since it
"cannot truly impose its own discretion" in respect of the submitted work
programs.
"8.2.The Secretary shall be deemed to have approved
any Work Programme or Budget or
variation thereof submitted by the
Contractor unless within sixty (60) days
after submission by the Contractor the
Secretary gives notice declining such
approval or proposing a revision of certain
features and specifying its reasons therefor
('the Rejection Notice').
8.3.If the Secretary gives a Rejection Notice, the
Parties shall promptly meet and endeavor
to agree on amendments to the Work
Programme or Budget. If the Secretary and
the Contractor fail to agree on the
proposed revision within 30 days from
delivery of the Rejection Notice then
the Work Programme or Budget or
variation thereof proposed by the
Contractor shall be deemed approved, so as
not to unnecessarily delay the performance
of the Agreement.
8.4. . . .
8.5.So far as is practicable, the Contractor shall comply
with any approved Work Programme and
Budget. It is recognized by the Secretary
and the Contractor that the details of any
Work Programmes or Budgets may require
changes in the light of changing
circumstances. The Contractor may make
such changes without approval of the
Secretary provided they do not change the
general objective of any Work Programme,
nor entail a downward variance of more
than twenty per centum (20 percent) of the
relevant Budget. All other variations to an
approved Work Programme or Budget shall
be submitted for approval of the
Secretary." AcSEHT
From the provisions quoted above, petitioners generalize by asserting that the
government does not participate in making critical decisions regarding the
operations of the mining firm. Furthermore, while the State can require the
submission of work programs and budgets, the decision of the contractor will
still prevail, if the parties have a difference of opinion with regard to matters
affecting operations and management.
We hold, however, that the foregoing provisions do not manifest a
relinquishment of control. For instance, Clause 8.2 merely provides a
mechanism for preventing the business or mining operations from grinding to a
complete halt as a result of possibly over-long and unjustified delays in the
government's handling, processing and approval of submitted work programs
and budgets. Anyway, the provision does give the DENR secretary more than
sufficient time (60 days) to react to submitted work programs and budgets. It
cannot be supposed that proper grounds for objecting thereto, if any exist,
cannot be discovered within a period of two months.
On the other hand, Clause 8.3 seeks to provide a temporary, stop-gap solution
in the event a disagreement over the submitted work program or budget arises
between the State and the contractor and results in a stalemate or impasse, in
order that there will be no unreasonably long delays in the performance of the
works.
These temporary or stop-gap solutions are not necessarily evil or wrong.
Neither does it follow that the government will inexorably be aggrieved if and
when these temporary remedies come into play. First, avoidance of long delays
in these situations will undoubtedly redound to the benefit of the State as well
as the contractor.Second, who is to say that the work program or budget
proposed by the contractor and deemed approved under Clause 8.3 would not
be the better or more reasonable or more effective alternative? The contractor,
being the "insider," as it were, may be said to be in a better position than the
State an outsider looking in to determine what work program or budget
would be appropriate, more effective, or more suitable under the
circumstances.
All things considered, we take exception to the characterization of the DENR
secretary as a subservient nonentity whom the contractor can overrule at will,
on account of Clause 8.3. And neither is it true that under the same clause, the
DENR secretary has no authority whatsoever to disapprove the work program.
As Respondent WMCP reasoned in its Reply-Memorandum, the State despite
Clause 8.3 still has control over the contract area and it may, as sovereign
authority, prohibit work thereon until the dispute is resolved. And ultimately,
the State may terminate the agreement, pursuant to Clause 13.2 of the same
FTAA, citing substantial breach thereof. Hence, it clearly retains full and
effective control of the exploitation of the mineral resources.
On the other hand, Clause 8.5 is merely an acknowledgment of the parties'
need for flexibility, given that no one can accurately forecast under all
circumstances, or predict how situations may change. Hence, while approved
work programs and budgets are to be followed and complied with as far as
practicable, there may be instances in which changes will have to be effected,
and effected rapidly, since events may take shape and unfold with suddenness
and urgency. Thus, Clause 8.5 allows the contractor to move ahead and make
changes without the express or implicit approval of the DENR secretary. Such
changes are, however, subject to certain conditions that will serve to limit or
restrict the variance and prevent the contractor from straying very far from
what has been approved.
Clause 8.5 provides the contractor a certain amount of flexibility to meet
unexpected situations, while still guaranteeing that the approved work
programs and budgets are not abandoned altogether. Clause 8.5 does not
constitute proof that the State has relinquished control. And ultimately, should
there be disagreement with the actions taken by the contractor in this instance
as well as under Clause 8.3 discussed above, the DENR secretary may resort to
cancellation/termination of the FTAA as the ultimate sanction.
Discretion to Select Contract
Area Not an Abdication of Control
Next, petitioners complain that the contractor has full discretion to select
and the government has no say whatsoever as to the parts of the contract
area to be relinquished pursuant to Clause 4.6 of the WMCP FTAA. 56 This
clause, however, does not constitute abdication of control. Rather, it is a mere
acknowledgment of the fact that the contractor will have determined, after
appropriate exploration works, which portions of the contract area do not
contain minerals in commercial quantities sufficient to justify developing the
same and ought therefore to be relinquished. The State cannot just substitute
its judgment for that of the contractor and dictate upon the latter which areas
to give up.
Moreover, we can be certain that the contractor's self-interest will propel
proper and efficient relinquishment. According to private respondent, 57 a
mining company tries to relinquish as much non-mineral areas as soon as
possible, because the annual occupation fees paid to the government are based
on the total hectarage of the contract area, net of the areas relinquished. Thus,
the larger the remaining area, the heftier the amount of occupation fees to be
paid by the contractor. Accordingly, relinquishment is not an issue, given that
the contractor will not want to pay the annual occupation fees on the non-
mineral parts of its contract area. Neither will it want to relinquish promising
sites, which other contractors may subsequently pick up.

Government Not
a Subcontractor
Petitioners further maintain that the contractor can compel the government to
exercise its power of eminent domain to acquire surface areas within the
contract area for the contractor's use. Clause 10.2 (e) of the WMCP FTAA
provides that the government agrees that the contractor shall "(e) have the
right to require the Government at the Contractor's own cost, to purchase or
acquire surface areas for and on behalf of the Contractor at such price and
terms as may be acceptable to the contractor. At the termination of this
Agreement such areas shall be sold by public auction or tender and the
Contractor shall be entitled to reimbursement of the costs of acquisition and
maintenance, adjusted for inflation, from the proceeds of sale." HETDAC
According to petitioners, "government becomes a subcontractor to the
contractor" and may, on account of this provision, be compelled "to make use
of its power of eminent domain, not for public purposes but on behalf of a
private party, i.e., the contractor." Moreover, the power of the courts to
determine the amount corresponding to the constitutional requirement of just
compensation has allegedly also been contracted away by the government, on
account of the latter's commitment that the acquisition shall be at such terms
as may be acceptable to the contractor.
However, private respondent has proffered a logical explanation for the
provision. 58 Section 10.2(e) contemplates a situation applicable to foreign-
owned corporations. WMCP, at the time of the execution of the FTAA, was a
foreign-owned corporation and therefore not qualified to own land. As
contractor, it has at some future date to construct the infrastructure the
mine processing plant, the camp site, the tailings dam, and other infrastructure
needed for the large-scale mining operations. It will then have to identify and
pinpoint, within the FTAA contract area, the particular surface areas with
favorable topography deemed ideal for such infrastructure and will need to
acquire the surface rights. The State owns the mineral deposits in the earth,
and is also qualified to own land.
Section 10.2(e) sets forth the mechanism whereby the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific
surface areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine
infrastructure. The government then acquires ownership of the surface land
areas on behalf of the contractor, in order to enable the latter to proceed to
fully implement the FTAA.
The contractor, of course, shoulders the purchase price of the land. Hence, the
provision allows it, after termination of the FTAA, to be reimbursed from
proceeds of the sale of the surface areas, which the government will dispose of
through public bidding. It should be noted that this provision will not be
applicable to Sagittarius as the present FTAA contractor, since it is a Filipino
corporation qualified to own and hold land. As such, it may therefore freely
negotiate with the surface rights owners and acquire the surface property in its
own right.
Clearly, petitioners have needlessly jumped to unwarranted conclusions,
without being aware of the rationale for the said provision. That provision does
not call for the exercise of the power of eminent domain and determination
of just compensation is not an issue as much as it calls for a qualified party to
acquire the surface rights on behalf of a foreign-owned contractor.
Rather than having the foreign contractor act through a dummy corporation,
having the State do the purchasing is a better alternative. This will at least cause
the government to be aware of such transaction/s and foster transparency in
the contractor's dealings with the local property owners. The government,
then, will not act as a subcontractor of the contractor; rather, it will facilitate
the transaction and enable the parties to avoid a technical violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law.
Absence of Provision
Requiring Sale at Posted
Prices Not Problematic
The supposed absence of any provision in the WMCP FTAA directly and
explicitly requiring the contractor to sell the mineral products at posted or
market prices is not a problem. Apart from Clause 1.4 of the FTAA obligating the
contractor to account for the total value of mineral production and the sale of
minerals, we can also look to Section 35 of RA 7942, which incorporates into all
FTAAs certain terms, conditions and warranties, including the following:
"(l)The contractors shall furnish the Government
records of geologic, accounting and other
relevant data for its mining operation, and
that books of accounts and records shall be
open for inspection by the government. . . .
(m)Requiring the proponent to dispose of the minerals
at the highest price and more advantageous
terms and conditions."
For that matter, Section 56(n) of DAO 99-56 specifically obligates an FTAA
contractor to dispose of the minerals and by-products at the highest market
price and to register with the MGB a copy of the sales agreement. After all, the
provisions of prevailing statutes as well as rules and regulations are deemed
written into contracts.
Contractor's Right to Mortgage
Not Objectionable Per Se
Petitioners also question the absolute right of the contractor under Clause 10.2
(l) to mortgage and encumber not only its rights and interests in the FTAA and
the infrastructure and improvements introduced, but also the mineral products
extracted. Private respondents do not touch on this matter, but we believe that
this provision may have to do with the conditions imposed by the creditor-
banks of the then foreign contractor WMCP to secure the lendings made or to
be made to the latter. Ordinarily, banks lend not only on the security of
mortgages on fixed assets, but also on encumbrances of goods produced that
can easily be sold and converted into cash that can be applied to the repayment
of loans. Banks even lend on the security of accounts receivable that are
collectible within 90 days. 59
It is not uncommon to find that a debtor corporation has executed deeds of
assignment "by way of security" over the production for the next twelve
months and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof or the corresponding
accounts receivable, if sold on terms in favor of its creditor-banks. Such
deeds may include authorizing the creditors to sell the products themselves and
to collect the sales proceeds and/or the accounts receivable.
Seen in this context, Clause 10.2(l) is not something out of the ordinary or
objectionable. In any case, as will be explained below, even if it is allowed
to mortgage or encumber the mineral end-products themselves, the contractor
is not freed of its obligation to pay the government its basic and additional
shares in the net mining revenue, which is the essential thing to consider.
In brief, the alarumraised over the contractor's right to mortgage the minerals
is simply unwarranted. Just the same, the contractor must account for the value
of mineral production and the sales proceeds therefrom. Likewise, under the
WMCP FTAA, the government remains entitled to its sixty percent share in the
net mining revenues of the contractor. The latter's right to mortgage the
minerals does not negate the State's right to receive its share of net mining
revenues.
Shareholders Free
to Sell Their Stocks
Petitioners likewise criticize Clause 10.2(k), which gives the contractor authority
"to change its equity structure at any time." This provision may seem somewhat
unusual, but considering that WMCP then was 100 percent foreign-owned, any
change would mean that such percentage would either stay unaltered or be
decreased in favor of Filipino ownership. Moreover, the foreign-held shares
may change hands freely. Such eventuality is as it should be.
We believe it is not necessary for government to attempt to limit or restrict the
freedom of the shareholders in the contractor to freely transfer, dispose of or
encumber their shareholdings, consonant with the unfettered exercise of their
business judgment and discretion. Rather, what is critical is that, regardless of
the identity, nationality and percentage ownership of the various shareholders
of the contractor and regardless of whether these shareholders decide to
take the company public, float bonds and other fixed-income instruments, or
allow the creditor-banks to take an equity position in the company the
foreign-owned contractor is always in a position to render the services required
under the FTAA, under the direction and control of the government.
Contractor's Right to Ask
For Amendment Not Absolute
With respect to Clauses 10.4(e) and (i), petitioners complain that these
provisions bind government to allow amendments to the FTAA if required by
banks and other financial institutions as part of the conditions for new lendings.
However, we do not find anything wrong with Clause 10.4(e), which only states
that "if the Contractor seeks to obtain financing contemplated herein from
banks or other financial institutions, (the Government shall) cooperate with the
Contractor in such efforts provided that such financing arrangements will in no
event reduce the Contractor's obligations or the Government's rights
hereunder." The colatilla obviously safeguards the State's interests; if breached,
it will give the government cause to object to the proposed amendments.
On the other hand, Clause 10.4(i) provides that "the Government shall
favourably consider any request from [the] Contractor for amendments of this
Agreement which are necessary in order for the Contractor to successfully
obtain the financing." Petitioners see in this provision a complete renunciation
of control. We disagree.
The proviso does not say that the government shall grant any request for
amendment. Clause 10.4(i) only obliges the State to favorably consider any such
request, which is not at all unreasonable, as it is not equivalent to saying that
the government must automatically consent to it. This provision should be read
together with the rest of the FTAA provisions instituting government control
and supervision over the mining enterprise. The clause should not be given an
interpretation that enables the contractor to wiggle out of the restrictions
imposed upon it by merely suggesting that certain amendments are requested
by the lenders.

Rather, it is up to the contractor to prove to the government that the requested
changes to the FTAA are indispensable, as they enable the contractor to obtain
the needed financing; that without such contract changes, the funders would
absolutely refuse to extend the loan; that there are no other sources of
financing available to the contractor (a very unlikely scenario); and that without
the needed financing, the execution of the work programs will not proceed. But
the bottom line is, in the exercise of its power of control, the government has
the final say on whether to approve or disapprove such requested amendments
to the FTAA. In short, approval thereof is not mandatory on the part of the
government.
In fine, the foregoing evaluation and analysis of the aforementioned FTAA
provisions sufficiently overturns petitioners' litany of objections to and criticisms
of the State's alleged lack of control.
Financial Benefits Not
Surrendered to the Contractor
One of the main reasons certain provisions of RA 7942 were struck down was
the finding mentioned in the Decision that beneficial ownership of the mineral
resources had been conveyed to the contractor. This finding was based on the
underlying assumption, common to the said provisions, that the foreign
contractor manages the mineral resources in the same way that foreign
contractors in service contracts used to. "By allowing foreign contractors to
manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the above-cited
provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over
the nation's mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto." 60 As the WMCP FTAA contained similar
provisions deemed by the ponente to be abhorrent to the Constitution, the
Decision struck down the Contract as well. TSDHCc
Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and
capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial
owner. 61 Black's Law Dictionary indicates that the term is used in two
senses: first, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also
called "equitable ownership"); andsecond, to refer to the power of a corporate
shareholder to buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered
in the corporation's books as the owner.62 Usually, beneficial ownership is
distinguished from naked ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits
and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the bare title to property.
An assiduous examination of the WMCP FTAA uncovers no indication that it
confers upon WMCP ownership, beneficial or otherwise, of the mining property
it is to develop, the minerals to be produced, or the proceeds of their sale,
which can be legally asserted and enforced as against the State.
As public respondents correctly point out, any interest the contractor may have
in the proceeds of the mining operation is merely the equivalent of the
consideration the government has undertaken to pay for its services. All lawful
contracts require such mutual prestations, and the WMCP FTAA is no different.
The contractor commits to perform certain services for the government in
respect of the mining operation, and in turn it is to be compensated out of the
net mining revenues generated from the sale of mineral products. What would
be objectionable is a contractual provision that unduly benefits the contractor
far in excess of the service rendered or value delivered, if any, in exchange
therefor.
A careful perusal of the statute itself and its implementing rules reveals that
neither RA 7942 nor DAO 99-56 can be said to convey beneficial ownership of
any mineral resource or product to any foreign FTAA contractor.
Equitable Sharing
of Financial Benefits
On the contrary, DAO 99-56, entitled "Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime
of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements" aims to ensure an equitable
sharing of the benefits derived from mineral resources. These benefits are to be
equitably shared among the government (national and local), the FTAA
contractor, and the affected communities. The purpose is to ensure sustainable
mineral resources development; and a fair, equitable, competitive and stable
investment regime for the large-scale exploration, development and
commercial utilization of minerals. The general framework or concept followed
in crafting the fiscal regime of the FTAA is based on the principle that the
government expects real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country, while the contractor expects a reasonable return on its
investments in the project. 63
Specifically, under the fiscal regime, the government's expectation is, inter alia,
the receipt of its share from the taxes and fees normally paid by a mining
enterprise. On the other hand, the FTAA contractor is granted by the
government certain fiscal and non-fiscal incentives 64 to help support the
former's cash flow during the most critical phase (cost recovery) and to make
the Philippines competitive with other mineral-producing countries. After the
contractor has recovered its initial investment, it will pay all the normal taxes
and fees comprising the basic share of the government, plus an additional share
for the government based on the options and formulae set forth in DAO 99-56.
The said DAO spells out the financial benefits the government will receive from
an FTAA, referred to as "the Government Share," composed of a basic
government share and an additional government share.
The basic government share is comprised of all direct taxes, fees and royalties,
as well as other payments made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA.
These are amounts paid directly to (i) the national government (through the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Mines & Geosciences Bureau
and other national government agencies imposing taxes or fees), (ii) the local
government units where the mining activity is conducted, and (iii) persons and
communities directly affected by the mining project. The major taxes and other
payments constituting the basic government share are enumerated below: 65
Payments to the National Government:
Excise tax on minerals 2 percent of the gross
output of mining operations
Contractor' income tax maximum of 32 percent of
taxable income for corporations
Customs duties and fees on imported capital
equipment the rate is set by the Tariff
and Customs Code (37 percent for
chemicals; 310 percent for explosives; 3
15 percent for mechanical and electrical
equipment; and 310 percent for vehicles,
aircraft and vessels
VAT on imported equipment, goods and services
10 percent of value
Royalties due the government on minerals extracted
from mineral reservations, if applicable 5
percent of the actual market value of the
minerals produced
Documentary stamp tax the rate depends on the
type of transaction
Capital gains tax on traded stocks 5 to 10 percent
of the value of the shares
Withholding tax on interest payments on foreign
loans 15 percent of the amount of
interest
Withholding tax on dividend payments to foreign
stockholders 15 percent of the dividend
Wharfage and port fees
Licensing fees (for example, radio permit, firearms
permit, professional fees)
Other national taxes and fees.
Payments to Local Governments:
Local business tax a maximum of 2 percent of gross
sales or receipts (the rate varies among
local government units)
Real property tax 2 percent of the fair market
value of the property, based on an
assessment level set by the local
government
Special education levy 1 percent of the basis used
for the real property tax
Occupation fees PhP50 per hectare per year;
PhP100 per hectare per year if located in a
mineral reservation
Community tax maximum of PhP10,500 per year
All other local government taxes, fees and imposts as
of the effective date of the FTAA the rate
and the type depend on the local
government
Other Payments:
Royalty to indigenous cultural communities, if any
1 percent of gross output from mining
operations
Special allowance payment to claim owners and
surface rights holders
Apart from the basic share, an additional government share is also collected
from the FTAA contractor in accordance with the second paragraph of Section
81 of RA 7942, which provides that the government share shall be comprised
of, among other things, certain taxes, duties and fees. The subject proviso
reads:
"The Government share in a financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national, and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The government, through the DENR and the MGB, has interpreted the insertion
of the phrase among other things as signifying that the government is entitled
to an "additional government share" to be paid by the contractor apart from
the "basic share," in order to attain a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from
mining.
The additional government share is computed by using one of three options or
schemes presented in DAO 99-56: (1) a fifty-fifty sharing in the cumulative
present value of cash flows; (2) the share based on excess profits; and (3) the
sharing based on the cumulative net mining revenue. The particular formula to
be applied will be selected by the contractor, with a written notice to the
government prior to the commencement of the development and construction
phase of the mining project.66
Proceeds from the government shares arising from an FTAA contract are
distributed to and received by the different levels of government in the
following proportions:

National Government50 percent
Provincial Government10 percent
Municipal Government20 percent
Affected Barangays20 percent
The portion of revenues remaining after the deduction of the basic and
additional government shares is what goes to the contractor.
Government's Share in an
FTAA Not Consisting Solely
of Taxes, Duties and Fees
In connection with the foregoing discussion on the basic and additional
government shares, it is pertinent at this juncture to mention the criticism
leveled at the second paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942, quoted earlier. The
said proviso has been denounced, because, allegedly, the State's share in FTAAs
with foreign contractors has been limited to taxes, fees and duties only; in
effect, the State has been deprived of a share in the after-tax income of the
enterprise. In the face of this allegation, one has to consider that the law does
not define the term among other things; and the Office of the Solicitor General,
in its Motion for Reconsideration appears to have erroneously claimed that the
phrase refers to indirect taxes.
The law provides no definition of the term among other things, for the reason
that Congress deliberately avoided setting unnecessary limitations as to what
may constitute compensation to the State for the exploitation and use of
mineral resources. But the inclusion of that phrase clearly and unmistakably
reveals thelegislative intent to have the State collect more than just the usual
taxes, duties and fees. Certainly, there is nothing in that phrase or in the
second paragraph of Section 81 that would suggest that such phrase should
be interpreted as referring only to taxes, duties, fees and the like.
Precisely for that reason, to fulfill the legislative intent behind the inclusion of
the phrase among other things in the second paragraph of Section 81, 67 the
DENR structured and formulated in DAO 99-56 the said additional government
share. Such a share was to consist not of taxes, but of a share in the earnings or
cash flows of the mining enterprise. The additional government share was to be
paid by the contractor on top of the basic share, so as to achieve a fifty-fifty
sharing between the government and the contractor of net benefits from
mining. In the Ramos-DeVera paper, the explanation of the three options or
formulas 68 presented in DAO 99-56 for the computation of the additional
government share serves to debunk the claim that the government's take
from an FTAA consists solely of taxes, fees and duties.
Unfortunately, the Office of the Solicitor General although in possession of
the relevant data failed to fully replicate or echo the pertinent elucidation in
the Ramos-DeVera paper regarding the three schemes or options for computing
the additional government share presented in DAO 99-56. Had due case been
taken by the OSG, the Court would have been duly apprised of the real nature
and particulars of the additional share. aCHcIE
But, perhaps, on account of the esoteric discussion in the Ramos-DeVera paper,
and the even more abstruse mathematical jargon employed in DAO 99-56, the
OSG omitted any mention of the three options. Instead, the OSG skipped to a
side discussion of the effect of indirect taxes, which had nothing at all to do
with the additional government share, to begin with. Unfortunately, this move
created the wrong impression, pointed out in Justice Antonio T. Carpio's
Opinion, that the OSG had taken the position that the additional government
share consisted of indirect taxes.
In any event, what is quite evident is the fact that the additional government
share, as formulated, has nothing to do with taxes direct or indirect or
with duties, fees or charges. To repeat, it is over and above the basic
government share composed of taxes and duties. Simply put, the additional
share may be (a) an amount that will result in a 50-50 sharing of the cumulative
present value of the cash flows 69 of the enterprise; (b) an amount equivalent
to 25 percent of the additional or excess profits of the enterprise, reckoned
against a benchmark return on investments; or (c) an amount that will result in
a fifty-fifty sharing of the cumulative net mining revenue from the end of the
recovery period up to the taxable year in question. The contractor is required to
select one of the three options or formulae for computing the additional share,
an option it will apply to all of its mining operations.
As used above, "net mining revenue" is defined as the gross output from mining
operations for a calendar year, less deductible expenses (inclusive of taxes,
duties and fees). Such revenue would roughly be equivalent to "taxable
income" or income before income tax. Definitely, as compared with, say,
calculating the additional government share on the basis of net income
(after income tax), the net mining revenue is a better and much more
reasonable basis for such computation, as it gives a truer picture of the
profitability of the company.
To demonstrate that the three options or formulations will operate as intended,
Messrs. Ramos and de Vera also performed some quantifications of the
government share via a financial modeling of each of the three options
discussed above. They found that the government would get the highest share
from the option that is based on the net mining revenue, as compared with the
other two options, considering only the basic and the additional shares; and
that, even though production rate decreases, the government share will
actually increase when the net mining revenue and the additional profit-based
options are used.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the three options or formulae do not yet
take into account the indirect taxes 70 and other financial contributions 71 of
mining projects. These indirect taxes and other contributions are real and actual
benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people and/or government. Now, if some of the
quantifiable items are taken into account in the computations, the financial
modeling would show that the total government share increases to 60
percent or higher in one instance, as much as 77 percent and even 89
percent of the net present value of total benefits from the project. As noted
in the Ramos-DeVera paper, these results are not at all shabby, considering that
the contractor puts in all the capital requirements and assumes all the risks,
without the government having to contribute or risk anything. TSADaI
Despite the foregoing explanation, Justice Carpio still insisted during the Court's
deliberations that the phrase among other things refers only to taxes, duties
and fees. We are bewildered by his position. On the one hand, he condemns
the Mining Law for allegedly limiting the government's benefits only to taxes,
duties and fees; and on the other, he refuses to allow the State to benefit from
the correct and proper interpretation of the DENR/MGB. To remove all doubts
then, we hold that the State's share is not limited to taxes, duties and fees only
and that the DENR/MGB interpretation of the phrase among other things is
correct. Definitely, this DENR/MGB interpretation is not only legally sound, but
also greatly advantageous to the government.
One last point on the subject. The legislature acted judiciously in not defining
the terms among other things and, instead, leaving it to the agencies concerned
to devise and develop the various modes of arriving at a reasonable and fair
amount for the additional government share. As can be seen from DAO 99-56,
the agencies concerned did an admirable job of conceiving and developing not
just one formula, but three different formulae for arriving at the additional
government share. Each of these options is quite fair and reasonable; and, as
Messrs. Ramos and De Vera stated, other alternatives or schemes for a possible
improvement of the fiscal regime for FTAAs are also being studied by the
government.
Besides, not locking into a fixed definition of the term among other things will
ultimately be more beneficial to the government, as it will have that innate
flexibility to adjust to and cope with rapidly changing circumstances, particularly
those in the international markets. Such flexibility is especially significant for the
government in terms of helping our mining enterprises remain competitive in
world markets despite challenging and shifting economic scenarios.
In conclusion, we stress that we do not share the view that in FTAAs with foreign
contractors under RA 7942, the government's share is limited to taxes, fees and
duties. Consequently, we find the attacks on the second paragraph of Section 81
of RA 7942 totally unwarranted.
Collections Not Made Uncertain
by the Third Paragraph of Section 81
The third or last paragraph of Section 81 72 provides that the government share
in FTAAs shall be collected when the contractor shall have recovered its pre-
operating expenses and exploration and development expenditures. The
objection has been advanced that, on account of the proviso, the collection of
the State's share is not even certain, as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this
grace period or recovery period.
We believe that Congress did not set any time limit for the grace period,
preferring to leave it to the concerned agencies, which are, on account of their
technical expertise and training, in a better position to determine the
appropriate durations for such recovery periods. After all, these recovery
periods are determined, to a great extent, by technical and technological
factors peculiar to the mining industry. Besides, with developments and
advances in technology and in the geosciences, we cannot discount the
possibility of shorter recovery periods. At any rate, the concerned agencies
have not been remiss in this area. The 1995 and 1996 Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 7942 specify that the period of recovery, reckoned from the
date of commercial operation, shall be for a period not exceeding five years, or
until the date of actual recovery, whichever comes earlier.

Approval of Pre-Operating
Expenses Required by RA 7942
Still, RA 7942 is criticized for allegedly not requiring government approval of
pre-operating, exploration and development expenses of the foreign
contractors, who are in effect given unfettered discretion to determine the
amounts of such expenses. Supposedly, nothing prevents the contractors from
recording such expenses in amounts equal to the mining revenues anticipated
for the first 10 or 15 years of commercial production, with the result that the
share of the State will be zero for the first 10 or 15 years. Moreover, under the
circumstances, the government would be unable to say when it would start to
receive its share under the FTAA.
We believe that the argument is based on incorrect information as well as
speculation. Obviously, certain crucial provisions in the Mining Law were
overlooked. Section 23, dealing with the rights and obligations of the
exploration permit grantee, states: "The permittee shall undertake exploration
work on the area as specified by its permit based on an approved work
program." The next proviso reads: "Any expenditure in excess of the yearly
budget of the approved work program may be carried forward and credited to
the succeeding years covering the duration of the permit. . . ." (emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, even at the stage of application for an exploration permit, the applicant
is required to submit for approval by the government a proposed work
program for exploration, containing a yearly budget of proposed expenditures.
The State has the opportunity to pass upon (and approve or reject) such
proposed expenditures, with the foreknowledge that if approved these
will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating expenses that the contractor
will have to recoup over the grace period. That is not all.
Under Section 24, an exploration permit holder who determines the
commercial viability of a project covering a mining area may, within the term of
the permit, file with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau a declaration of mining
project feasibility. This declaration is to be accompanied by a work program for
development for the Bureau's approval, the necessary prelude for entering into
an FTAA, a mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA), or some other
mineral agreement. At this stage, too, the government obviously has the
opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work program and budgeted
expenditures for development works on the project. Such expenditures will
ultimately become the pre-operating and development costs that will have to
be recovered by the contractor.
Naturally, with the submission of approved work programs and budgets for the
exploration and the development/construction phases, the government will be
able to scrutinize and approve or reject such expenditures. It will be well-
informed as to the amounts of pre-operating and other expenses that the
contractor may legitimately recover and the approximate period of time
needed to effect such a recovery. There is therefore no way the contractor can
just randomly post any amount of pre-operating expenses and expect to
recover the same.
The aforecited provisions on approved work programs and budgets have
counterparts in Section 35, which deals with the terms and conditions
exclusively applicable to FTAAs. The said provision requires certain terms and
conditions to be incorporated into FTAAs; among them, "a firm
commitment . . . of an amount corresponding to the expenditure obligation that
will be invested in the contract area" and "representations and warranties . . . to
timely deploy these [financing, managerial and technical expertise and
technological] resources under its supervision pursuant to the periodic work
programs and related budgets . . .," as well as "work programs and minimum
expenditures commitments." (emphasis supplied)
Unarguably, given the provisions of Section 35, the State has every opportunity
to pass upon the proposed expenditures under an FTAA and approve or reject
them. It has access to all the information it may need in order to determine in
advance the amounts of pre-operating and developmental expenses that will
have to be recovered by the contractor and the amount of time needed for
such recovery.
In summary, we cannot agree that the third or last paragraph of Section 81 of
RA 7942 is in any manner unconstitutional.
No Deprivation of
Beneficial Rights
It is also claimed that aside from the second and the third paragraphs of Section
81 (discussed above), Sections 80, 84 and 112 of RA 7942 also operate to
deprive the State of beneficial rights of ownership over mineral resources; and
give them away for free to private business enterprises (including foreign
owned corporations). Likewise, the said provisions have been construed as
constituting, together with Section 81, an ingenious attempt to resurrect the
old and discredited system of "license, concession or lease."
Specifically, Section 80 is condemned for limiting the State's share in a mineral
production-sharing agreement (MPSA) to just the excise tax on the mineral
product. Under Section 151(A) of the Tax Code, such tax is only 2 percent of the
market value of the gross output of the minerals. The colatilla in Section 84, the
portion considered offensive to the Constitution, reiterates the same limitation
made in Section 80. 73
It should be pointed out that Section 80 and the colatilla in Section 84 pertain
only to MPSAs and have no application to FTAAs. These particular statutory
provisions do not come within the issues that were defined and delineated by
this Court during the Oral Argument particularly the third issue, which
pertained exclusively to FTAAs. Neither did the parties argue upon them in their
pleadings. Hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement in this
case regarding the constitutionality of Sections 80 and 84 without violating the
fundamental rules of due process. Indeed, the two provisos will have to await
another case specifically placing them in issue.
On the other hand, Section 112 74 is disparaged for allegedly reverting FTAAs
and all mineral agreements to the old and discredited "license, concession or
lease" system. This Section states in relevant part that "the provisions of
Chapter XIV [which includes Sections 80 to 82] on government share in mineral
production-sharing agreement . . . shall immediately govern and apply to a
mining lessee or contractor." (emphasis supplied) This provision is construed as
signifying that the 2 percent excise tax which, pursuant to Section 80, comprises
the government share in MPSAs shall now also constitute the government share
in FTAAs as well as in co-production agreements and joint venture
agreements to the exclusion of revenues of any other nature or from any
other source.
Apart from the fact that Section 112 likewise does not come within the issues
delineated by this Court during the Oral Argument, and was never touched
upon by the parties in their pleadings, it must also be noted that the criticism
hurled against this Section is rooted in unwarranted conclusions made without
considering other relevant provisions in the statute. Whether Section 112 may
properly apply to co-production or joint venture agreements, the fact of the
matter is that it cannot be made to apply to FTAAs.
First, Section 112 does not specifically mention or refer to FTAAs; the only
reason it is being applied to them at all is the fact that it happens to use the
word "contractor." Hence, it is a bit of a stretch to insist that it covers FTAAs as
well. Second, mineral agreements, of which there are three types MPSAs, co-
production agreements, and joint venture agreements are covered by
Chapter V of RA 7942. On the other hand, FTAAs are covered by and in fact are
the subject of Chapter VI, an entirely different chapter altogether. The law
obviously intends to treat them as a breed apart from mineral agreements,
since Section 35 (found in Chapter VI) creates a long list of specific terms,
conditions, commitments, representations and warranties which have not
been made applicable to mineral agreements to be incorporated into FTAAs.
Third, under Section 39, the FTAA contractor is given the option to "downgrade"
to convert the FTAA into a mineral agreement at any time during the term if
the economic viability of the contract area is inadequate to sustain large-scale
mining operations. Thus, there is no reason to think that the law through
Section 112 intends to exact from FTAA contractors merely the same
government share (a 2 percent excise tax) that it apparently demands from
contractors under the three forms of mineral agreements. In brief, Section 112
does not apply to FTAAs. EAHcCT
Notwithstanding the foregoing explanation, Justices Carpio and Morales
maintain that the Court must rule now on the constitutionality of Sections 80,
84 and 112, allegedly because the WMCP FTAA contains a provision which
grants the contractor unbridled and "automatic" authority to convert the FTAA
into an MPSA; and should such conversion happen, the State would be
prejudiced since its share would be limited to the 2 percent excise tax. Justice
Carpio adds that there are five MPSAs already signed just awaiting the
judgment of this Court on respondents' and intervenor's Motions for
Reconsideration. We hold however that, at this point, this argument is based on
pure speculation. The Court cannot rule on mere surmises and hypothetical
assumptions, without firm factual anchor. We repeat: basic due process
requires that we hear the parties who have a real legal interest in the MPSAs
(i.e. the parties who executed them) before these MPSAs can be reviewed, or
worse, struck down by the Court. Anything less than that requirement would be
arbitrary and capricious.
In any event, the conversion of the present FTAA into an MPSA is
problematic. First, the contractor must comply with the law, particularly Section
39 of RA 7942;inter alia, it must convincingly show that the "economic viability
of the contract is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale mining
operations;" second, it must contend with the President's exercise of the power
of State control over the EDU of natural resources; and third, it will have to risk
a possible declaration of the unconstitutionality (in a proper case) of Sections
80, 84 and 112.

The first requirement is not as simple as it looks. Section 39 contemplates a
situation in which an FTAA has already been executed and entered into, and is
presumably being implemented, when the contractor "discovers" that the
mineral ore reserves in the contract area are not sufficient to justify large-scale
mining, and thus the contractor requests the conversion of the FTAA into an
MPSA. The contractor in effect needs to explain why, despite its exploration
activities, including the conduct of various geologic and other scientific tests
and procedures in the contract area, it was unable to determine correctly the
mineral ore reserves and the economic viability of the area. The contractor
must explain why, after conducting such exploration activities, it decided to file
a declaration of mining feasibility, and to apply for an FTAA, thereby leading the
State to believe that the area could sustain large-scale mining. The contractor
must justify fully why its earlier findings, based on scientific procedures, tests
and data, turned out to be wrong, or were way off . It must likewise prove that
its new findings, also based on scientific tests and procedures, are correct. Right
away, this puts the contractor's technical capabilities and expertise into serious
doubt. We wonder if anyone would relish being in this situation. The State
could even question and challenge the contractor's qualification and
competence to continue the activity under an MPSA.
All in all, while there may be cogent grounds to assail the aforecited Sections,
this Court on considerations of due process cannot rule upon them
here. Anyway, if later on these Sections are declared unconstitutional, such
declaration will not affect the other portions since they are clearly separable
from the rest.
Our Mineral Resources Not
Given Away for Free by RA 7942
Nevertheless, if only to disabuse our minds, we should address the contention
that our mineral resources are effectively given away for free by the law (RA
7942) in general and by Sections 80, 81, 84 and 112 in particular.
Foreign contractors do not just waltz into town one day and leave the next,
taking away mineral resources without paying anything. In order to get at the
minerals, they have to invest huge sums of money (tens or hundreds of millions
of dollars) in exploration works first. If the exploration proves unsuccessful, all
the cash spent thereon will not be returned to the foreign investors; rather,
those funds will have been infused into the local economy, to remain there
permanently. The benefits therefrom cannot be simply ignored. And assuming
that the foreign contractors are successful in finding ore bodies that are viable
for commercial exploitation, they do not just pluck out the minerals and cart
them off. They have first to build camp sites and roadways; dig mine shafts and
connecting tunnels; prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots;
install their machinery and equipment, generator sets, pumps, water tanks and
sewer systems, and so on.
In short, they need to expend a great deal more of their funds for facilities,
equipment and supplies, fuel, salaries of local labor and technical staff, and
other operating expenses. In the meantime, they also have to pay
taxes, 75 duties, fees, and royalties. All told, the exploration, pre-feasibility,
feasibility, development and construction phases together add up to as many as
eleven years. 76 The contractors have to continually shell out funds for the
duration of over a decade, before they can commence commercial production
from which they would eventually derive revenues. All that money translates
into a lot of "pump-priming" for the local economy.
Granted that the contractors are allowed subsequently to recover their pre-
operating expenses, still, that eventuality will happen only after they shall
have first put out the cash and fueled the economy. Moreover, in the process of
recouping their investments and costs, the foreign contractors do not actually
pull out the money from the economy. Rather, they recover or recoup their
investments out of actual commercial production by not paying a portion of the
basic government share corresponding to national taxes, along with the
additional government share, for a period of not more than five
years 77 counted from the commencement of commercial production.
It must be noted that there can be no recovery without commencing actual
commercial production. In the meantime that the contractors are recouping
costs, they need to continue operating; in order to do so, they have to disburse
money to meet their various needs. In short, money is continually infused into
the economy.
The foregoing discussion should serve to rid us of the mistaken belief that, since
the foreign contractors are allowed to recover their investments and costs, the
end result is that they practically get the minerals for free, which leaves the
Filipino people none the better for it.
All Businesses Entitled
to Cost Recovery
Let it be put on record that not only foreign contractors, but all businessmen and
all business entities in general, have to recoup their investments and costs. That
is one of the first things a student learns in business school. Regardless of its
nationality, and whether or not a business entity has a five-years cost recovery
period, it will must have to recoup its investments, one way or another.
This is just common business sense. Recovery of investments is absolutely
indispensable for business survival; and business survival ensures soundness of
the economy, which is critical and contributory to the general welfare of the
people. Even government corporations must recoup their investments in order
to survive and continue in operation. And, as the preceding discussion has
shown, there is no business that gets ahead or earns profits without any cost to
it.
It must also be stressed that, though the State owns vast mineral wealth, such
wealth is not readily accessible or transformable into usable and negotiable
currency without the intervention of the credible mining companies. Those
untapped mineral resources, hidden beneath tons of earth and rock, may as
well not be there for all the good they do us right now. They have first to be
extracted and converted into marketable form, and the country needs the
foreign contractor's funds, technology and know-how for that.
After about eleven years of pre-operation and another five years for cost
recovery, the foreign contractors will have just broken even. Is it likely that they
would at that point stop their operations and leave? Certainly not. They have
yet to make profits. Thus, for the remainder of the contract term, they must
strive to maintain profitability. During this period, they pay the whole of
the basic government share and the additional government share which, taken
together with indirect taxes and other contributions, amount to approximately
60 percent or more of the entire financial benefits generated by the mining
venture.
In sum, we can hardly talk about foreign contractors taking our mineral
resources for free. It takes a lot of hard cash to even begin to do what they
do. And what they do in this country ultimately benefits the local economy,
grows businesses, generates employment, and creates infrastructure, as
discussed above. Hence, we definitely disagree with the sweeping claim that no
FTAA under Section 81 will ever make any real contribution to the growth of the
economy or to the general welfare of the country. This is not a plea for foreign
contractors. Rather, this is a question of focusing the judicial spotlight squarely
on all the pertinent facts as they bear upon the issue at hand, in order to avoid
leaping precipitately to ill-conceived conclusions not solidly grounded upon fact.
Repatriation of
After-Tax Income
Another objection points to the alleged failure of the Mining Law to ensure real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country, as
mandated by Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution. Pursuant to Section 81
of the law, the entire after-tax income arising from the exploitation of mineral
resources owned by the State supposedly belongs to the foreign contractors,
which will naturally repatriate the said after-tax income to their home
countries, thereby resulting in no real contribution to the economic growth of
this country. Clearly, this contention is premised on erroneous assumptions.
First, as already discussed in detail hereinabove, the concerned agencies have
correctly interpreted the second paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 to mean
that the government is entitled to an additional share, to be computed based
on any one of the following factors: net mining revenues, the present value of
the cash flows, or excess profits reckoned against a benchmark rate of return
on investments. So it is not correct to say that all of the after-tax income will
accrue to the foreign FTAA contractor, as the government effectively receives a
significant portion thereof .
Second, the foreign contractors can hardly "repatriate the entire after-tax
income to their home countries." Even a bit of knowledge of corporate finance
will show that it will be impossible to maintain a business as a "going concern" if
the entire "net profit" earned in any particular year will be taken out and
repatriated. The "net income" figure reflected in the bottom line is a mere
accounting figure not necessarily corresponding to cash in the bank, or other
quick assets. In order to produce and set aside cash in an amount equivalent to
the bottom line figure, one may need to sell off assets or immediately collect
receivables or liquidate short-term investments; but doing so may very likely
disrupt normal business operations.
In terms of cash flows, the funds corresponding to the net income as of a
particular point in time are actually in use in the normal course of business
operations. Pulling out such net income disrupts the cash flows and cash
position of the enterprise and, depending on the amount being taken out, could
seriously cripple or endanger the normal operations and financial health of the
business enterprise. In short, no sane business person, concerned with
maintaining the mining enterprise as a going concern and keeping a foothold in
its market, can afford to repatriate the entire after-tax income to the home
country.

The State's Receipt of Sixty
Percent of an FTAA Contractor's
After-Tax Income Not Mandatory
We now come to the next objection which runs this way: In FTAAs with a
foreign contractor, the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax
income from the exploitation of its mineral resources. This share is the
equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the
capital, and hence 60 percent of the income, of mining companies should
remain in Filipino hands.
First, we fail to see how we can properly conclude that the Constitution
mandates the State to extract at least 60 percent of the after-tax income from a
mining company run by a foreign contractor. The argument is that the Charter
requires the State's partner in a co-production agreement, joint venture
agreement or MPSA to be a Filipino corporation (at least 60 percent owned by
Filipino citizens).
We question the logic of this reasoning, premised on a supposedly parallel or
analogous situation. We are, after all, dealing with an essentially different
equation, one that involves different elements. The Charter did not intend to fix
an iron-clad rule on the 60 percent share, applicable to all situations at all times
and in all circumstances. If ever such was the intention of the framers, they
would have spelt it out in black and white. Verba legis will serve to dispel
unwarranted and untenable conclusions. DHSACT
Second, if we would bother to do the math, we might better appreciate the
impact (and reasonableness) of what we are demanding of the foreign
contractor. Let us use a simplified illustration. Let us base it on gross revenues
of, say, P500. After deducting operating expenses, but prior to income tax,
suppose a mining firm makes a taxable income of P100. A corporate income tax
of 32 percent results in P32 of taxable income going to the government, leaving
the mining firm with P68. Government then takes 60 percent
thereof, equivalent to P40.80, leaving only P27.20 for the mining firm.
At this point the government has pocketed P32.00 plus P40.80, or a total of
P72.80 for every P100 of taxable income, leaving the mining firm with only
P27.20. But that is not all. The government has also taken 2 percent excise tax
"off the top," equivalent to another P10. Under the minimum 60 percent
proposal, the government nets around P82.80 (not counting other taxes, duties,
fees and charges) from a taxable income of P100 (assuming gross revenues of
P500, for purposes of illustration). On the other hand, the foreign
contractor, which provided all the capital, equipment and labor, and took all the
entrepreneurial risks receives P27.20. One cannot but wonder whether such
a distribution is even remotely equitable and reasonable, considering
the nature of the mining business. The amount of P82.80 out of P100.00 is really
a lot it does not matter that we call part of it excise tax or income tax, and
another portion thereof income from exploitation of mineral resources. Some
might think it wonderful to be able to take the lion's share of the benefits. But
we have to ask ourselves if we are really serious in attracting the investments
that are the indispensable and key element in generating the monetary benefits
of which we wish to take the lion's share. Fairness is a credo not only in law, but
also in business.
Third, the 60 percent rule in the petroleum industry cannot be insisted upon at
all times in the mining business. The reason happens to be the fact that in
petroleum operations, the bulk of expenditures is in exploration, but once the
contractor has found and tapped into the deposit, subsequent investments and
expenditures are relatively minimal. The crude (or gas) keeps gushing out, and
the work entailed is just a matter of piping, transporting and storing. Not so in
mineral mining. The ore body does not pop out on its own. Even after it has
been located, the contractor must continually invest in machineries and expend
funds to dig and build tunnels in order to access and extract the minerals from
underneath hundreds of tons of earth and rock.
As already stated, the numerous intrinsic differences involved in their
respective operations and requirements, cost structures and investment needs
render it highly inappropriate to use petroleum operations FTAAs as
benchmarks for mining FTAAs. Verily, we cannot just ignore the realities of
the distinctly different situations and stubbornly insist on the "minimum 60
percent."
The Mining and the Oil Industries
Different From Each Other
To stress, there is no independent showing that the taking of at least a 60
percent share in the after-tax income of a mining company operated by a
foreign contractor is fair and reasonable under most if not all circumstances.
The fact that some petroleum companies like Shell acceded to such percentage
of sharing does not ipso facto mean that it is per se reasonable and applicable
to non-petroleum situations (that is, mining companies) as well. We can take
judicial notice of the fact that there are, after all, numerous intrinsic differences
involved in their respective operations and equipment or technological
requirements, costs structures and capital investment needs, and product
pricing and markets.
There is no showing, for instance, that mining companies can readily cope with
a 60 percent government share in the same way petroleum companies
apparently can. What we have is a suggestion to enforce the 60 percent quota
on the basis of a disjointed analogy. The only factor common to the two
disparate situations is the extraction of natural resources.
Indeed, we should take note of the fact that Congress made a distinction
between mining firms and petroleum companies. In Republic Act No. 7729
"An Act Reducing the Excise Tax Rates on Metallic and Non-Metallic Minerals
and Quarry Resources, Amending for the Purpose Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended" the lawmakers fixed the excise tax rate
on metallic and non-metallic minerals at two percent of the actual market value
of the annual gross output at the time of removal. However, in the case of
petroleum, the lawmakers set the excise tax rate for the first taxable sale
at fifteen percent of the fair international market price thereof.
There must have been a very sound reason that impelled Congress to impose
two very dissimilar excise tax rate. We cannot assume, without proof, that our
honorable legislators acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically in this
instance. We cannot just ignore the reality of two distinctly different situations
and stubbornly insist on going "minimum 60 percent."
To repeat, the mere fact that gas and oil exploration contracts grant the State
60 percent of the net revenues does not necessarily imply that mining contracts
should likewise yield a minimum of 60 percent for the State. Jumping to that
erroneous conclusion is like comparing apples with oranges. The exploration,
development and utilization of gas and oil are simply different from those of
mineral resources.
To stress again, the main risk in gas and oil is in the exploration. But once oil in
commercial quantities is struck and the wells are put in place, the risk is
relatively over and black gold simply flows out continuously
with comparatively less need for fresh investments and technology.
On the other hand, even if minerals are found in viable quantities, there is still
need for continuous fresh capital and expertise to dig the mineral ores from the
mines. Just because deposits of mineral ores are found in one area is no
guarantee that an equal amount can be found in the adjacent areas. There are
simply continuing risks and need for more capital, expertise and industry all the
time.
Note, however, that the indirect benefits apart from the cash revenues
are much more in the mineral industry. As mines are explored and extracted,
vast employment is created, roads and other infrastructure are built, and other
multiplier effects arise. On the other hand, once oil wells start producing, there
is less need for employment. Roads and other public works need not be
constructed continuously. In fine, there is no basis for saying that government
revenues from the oil industry and from the mineral industries are to be
identical all the time.
Fourth, to our mind, the proffered "minimum 60 percent" suggestion tends
to limit the flexibility and tie the hands of government, ultimately hampering
the country's competitiveness in the international market, to the detriment of
the Filipino people. This "you-have-to-give-us-60-percent-of-after-tax-income-
or-we- don't-do-business-with-you" approach is quite perilous. True, this
situation may not seem too unpalatable to the foreign contractor during good
years, when international market prices are up and the mining firm manages to
keep its costs in check. However, under unfavorable economic and business
conditions, with costs spiraling skywards and minerals prices plummeting, a
mining firm may consider itself lucky to make just minimal profits.
The inflexible, carved-in-granite demand for a 60 percent government share
may spell the end of the mining venture, scare away potential investors, and
thereby further worsen the already dismal economic scenario. Moreover, such
an unbending or unyielding policy prevents the government from responding
appropriately to changing economic conditions and shifting market forces. This
inflexibility further renders our country less attractive as an investment option
compared with other countries.
And fifth, for this Court to decree imperiously that the government's share
should be not less than 60 percent of the after-tax income of FTAA contractors
at all times is nothing short of dictating upon the government. The result,
ironically, is that the State ends up losing control. To avoid compromising the
State's full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources,
this Court must back off from insisting upon a "minimum 60 percent" rule. It is
sufficient that the State has the power and means, should it so decide, to get a
60 percent share (or more) in the contractor's net mining revenues or after-tax
income, or whatever other basis the government may decide to use in
reckoning its share. It is not necessary for it to do so in every case, regardless of
circumstances.

In fact, the government must be trusted, must be accorded the liberty and the
utmost flexibility to deal, negotiate and transact with contractors and third
parties as it sees fit; and upon terms that it ascertains to be most favorable or
most acceptable under the circumstances, even if it means agreeing to less than
60 percent. Nothing must prevent the State from agreeing to a share less than
that, should it be deemed fit; otherwise the State will be deprived of full control
over mineral exploitation that the Charter has vested in it.
To stress again, there is simply no constitutional or legal provision fixing the
minimum share of the government in an FTAA at 60 percent of the net profit.
For this Court to decree such minimum is to wade into judicial legislation, and
thereby inordinately impinge on the control power of the State. Let it be clear:
the Court is not against the grant of more benefits to the State; in fact, the
more the better. If during the FTAA negotiations, the President can secure 60
percent, 78 or even 90 percent, then all the better for our people. But, if under
the peculiar circumstances of a specific contract, the President could secure
only 50 percent or 55 percent, so be it. Needless to say, the President will have
to report (and be responsible for) the specific FTAA to Congress, and eventually
to the people.
Finally, if it should later be found that the share agreed to is grossly
disadvantageous to the government, the officials responsible for entering into
such a contract on its behalf will have to answer to the courts for their
malfeasance. And the contract provision voided. But this Court would abuse its
own authority should it force the government's hand to adopt the 60 percent
demand of some of our esteemed colleagues.
Capital and Expertise Provided,
Yet All Risks Assumed by Contractor
Here, we will repeat what has not been emphasized and appreciated
enough: the fact that the contractor in an FTAA provides all the needed capital,
technical and managerial expertise, and technology required to undertake the
project.
In regard to the WMCP FTAA, the then foreign-owned WMCP as contractor
committed, at the very outset, to make capital investments of up to US$50
million in that single mining project. WMCP claims to have already poured in
well over P800 million into the country as of February 1998, with more in the
pipeline. These resources, valued in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars,
are invested in a mining project that provides no assurance whatsoever that any
part of the investment will be ultimately recouped.
At the same time, the contractor must comply with legally imposed
environmental standards and the social obligations, for which it also commits to
make significant expenditures of funds. Throughout, the contractor assumes all
the risks 79 of the business; as mentioned earlier. These risks are indeed very
high, considering that the rate of success in exploration is extremely low. The
probability of finding any mineral or petroleum in commercially viable
quantities is estimated to be about 1:1,000 only. On that slim chance rides the
contractor's hope of recouping investments and generating profits. And when
the contractor has recouped its initial investments in the project, the
government share increases to sixty percent of net benefits without the
State ever being in peril of incurring costs, expenses and losses.
And even in the worst possible scenario an absence of commercial quantities
of minerals to justify development the contractor would already have spent
several million pesos for exploration works, before arriving at the point in which
it can make that determination and decide to cut its losses. In fact, during
the first year alone of the exploration period, the contractor was already
committed to spend not less than P24 million. The FTAA therefore clearly
ensures benefits for the local economy, courtesy of the contractor.
All in all, this setup cannot be regarded as disadvantageous to the State or the
Filipino people; it certainly cannot be said to convey beneficial ownership of our
mineral resources to foreign contractors.
Deductions Allowed by the
WMCP FTAA Reasonable
Petitioners question whether the State's weak control might render the sharing
arrangements ineffective. They cite the so-called
"suspicious" deductions allowed by the WMCP FTAA in arriving at the net
mining revenue, which is the basis for computing the government share. The
WMCP FTAA, for instance, allows expenditures for "development within
and outside the Contract Area relating to the Mining
Operations," 80 "consulting fees incurred both inside and outside the
Philippines for work related directly to the Mining Operations," 81 and "the
establishment and administration of field offices including administrative
overheads incurred within and outside the Philippines which are properly
allocatable to the Mining Operations and reasonably related to the
performance of the Contractor's obligations and exercise of its rights under this
Agreement." 82
It is quite well known, however, that mining companies do perform some
marketing activities abroad in respect of selling their mineral products and by-
products. Hence, it would not be improper to allow the deduction
of reasonable consulting fees incurred abroad, as well as administrative
expenses and overheads related to marketing offices also located abroad
provided that these deductions are directly related or properly allocatable to
the mining operations and reasonably related to the performance of the
contractor's obligations and exercise of its rights. In any event, more facts are
needed. Until we see how these provisions actually operate, mere "suspicions"
will not suffice to propel this Court into taking action. AaSHED
Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA
Invalid and Disadvantageous
Having defended the WMCP FTAA, we shall now turn to two defective provisos.
Let us start with Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA. While Section 7.7 gives the
government a 60 percent share in the net mining revenues of WMCP from the
commencement of commercial production, Section 7.9 deprives the
government of part or all of the said 60 percent. Under the latter provision,
should WMCP's foreign shareholders who originally owned 100 percent of
the equity sell 60 percent or more of its outstanding capital stock to a Filipino
citizen or corporation, the State loses its right to receive its 60 percent share in
net mining revenues under Section 7.7.
Section 7.9 provides:
The percentage of Net Mining Revenues payable to the
Government pursuant to Clause 7.7 shall be reduced
by 1 percent of Net Mining Revenues for every 1
percent ownership interest in the Contractor (i.e.,
WMCP) held by a Qualified Entity. 83
Evidently, what Section 7.7 grants to the State is taken away in the next breadth
by Section 7.9 without any offsetting compensation to the State. Thus, in reality,
the State has no vested right to receive any income from the FTAA for the
exploitation of its mineral resources. Worse, it would seem that what is given to
the State in Section 7.7 is by mere tolerance of WMCP's foreign stockholders,
who can at any time cut off the government's entire 60 percent share. They can
do so by simply selling 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding capital stock to a
Philippine citizen or corporation. Moreover, the proceeds of such sale will of
course accrue to the foreign stockholders of WMCP, not to the State.
The sale of 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding equity to a corporation that is 60
percent Filipino-owned and 40 percent foreign-owned will still trigger the
operation of Section 7.9. Effectively, the State will lose its right to receive all 60
percent of the net mining revenues of WMCP; and foreign stockholders will own
beneficially up to 64 percent of WMCP, consisting of the remaining 40 percent
foreign equity therein, plus the 24 percent pro-rata share in the buyer-
corporation. 84
In fact, the January 23, 2001 sale by WMCP's foreign stockholder of the entire
outstanding equity in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. a domestic
corporation at least 60 percent Filipino owned may be deemed to have
automatically triggered the operation of Section 7.9, without need of further
action by any party, and removed the State's right to receive the 60 percent
share in net mining revenues.
At bottom, Section 7.9 has the effect of depriving the State of its 60 percent
share in the net mining revenues of WMCP without any offset or compensation
whatsoever. It is possible that the inclusion of the offending provision was
initially prompted by the desire to provide some form of incentive for the
principal foreign stockholder in WMCP to eventually reduce its equity position
and ultimately divest in favor of Filipino citizens and corporations. However, as
finally structured, Section 7.9 has the deleterious effect of depriving
government of the entire 60 percent share in WMCP's net mining revenues,
without any form of compensation whatsoever. Such an outcome is completely
unacceptable.
The whole point of developing the nation's natural resources is to benefit the
Filipino people, future generations included. And the State as sovereign and
custodian of the nation's natural wealth is mandated to protect, conserve,
preserve and develop that part of the national patrimony for their benefit.
Hence, the Charter lays great emphasis on "real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country" 85 as essential guiding principles to
be kept in mind when negotiating the terms and conditions of FTAAs.
Earlier, we held (1) that the State must be accorded the liberty and the utmost
flexibility to deal, negotiate and transact with contractors and third parties as it
sees fit, and upon terms that it ascertains to be most favorable or most
acceptable under the circumstances, even if that should mean agreeing to less
than 60 percent; (2) that it is not necessary for the State to extract a 60 percent
share in every case and regardless of circumstances; and (3) that should the
State be prevented from agreeing to a share less than 60 percent as it deems
fit, it will be deprived of the full control over mineral exploitation that the
Charter has vested in it.

That full control is obviously not an end in itself; it exists and subsists precisely
because of the need to serve and protect the national interest. In this instance,
national interest finds particular application in the protection of the national
patrimony and the development and exploitation of the country's mineral
resources for the benefit of the Filipino people and the enhancement of
economic growth and the general welfare of the country. Undoubtedly, such full
control can be misused and abused, as we now witness.
Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA effectively gives away the State's share of net
mining revenues (provided for in Section 7.7) without anything in exchange.
Moreover, this outcome constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the local
and foreign stockholders of WMCP. By their mere divestment of up to 60
percent equity in WMCP in favor of Filipino citizens and/or corporations, the
local and foreign stockholders get a windfall. Their share in the net mining
revenues of WMCP is automatically increased, without their having to pay the
government anything for it. In short, the provision in question is without a
doubt grossly disadvantageous to the government, detrimental to the interests
of the Filipino people, and violative of public policy.
Moreover, it has been reiterated in numerous decisions 86 that the parties to a
contract may establish any agreements, terms and conditions that they deem
convenient; but these should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. 87 Being precisely violative of anti-graft provisions
and contrary to public policy, Section 7.9 must therefore be stricken off as
invalid.
Whether the government officials concerned acceded to that provision by sheer
mistake or with full awareness of the ill consequences, is of no moment. It is
hornbook doctrine that the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
government for the act of its agents, 88 and that it is never estopped by any
mistake or error on their part. 89 It is therefore possible and proper to rectify
the situation at this time. Moreover, we may also say that the FTAA in question
does not involve mere contractual rights; being impressed as it is with public
interest, the contractual provisions and stipulations must yield to the common
good and the national interest.
Since the offending provision is very much separable 90 from Section 7.7 and
the rest of the FTAA, the deletion of Section 7.9 can be done without affecting
or requiring the invalidation of the WMCP FTAA itself. Such a deletion will
preserve for the government its due share of the benefits. This way, the
mandates of the Constitution are complied with and the interests of the
government fully protected, while the business operations of the contractor are
not needlessly disrupted.
Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA
Also Invalid and Disadvantageous
Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA is likewise invalid. It provides thus:
"7.8The Government Share shall be deemed to include
all of the following sums:
"(a)all Government taxes, fees, levies, costs,
imposts, duties and royalties
including excise tax, corporate
income tax, customs duty, sales
tax, value added tax, occupation
and regulatory fees,
Government controlled price
stabilization schemes, any other
form of Government backed
schemes, any tax on dividend
payments by the Contractor or
its Affiliates in respect of
revenues from the Mining
Operations and any tax on
interest on domestic and foreign
loans or other financial
arrangements or
accommodations, including
loans extended to the
Contractor by its stockholders;
"(b)any payments to local and regional
government, including taxes,
fees, levies, costs, imposts,
duties, royalties, occupation and
regulatory fees and
infrastructure contributions;
"(c)any payments to landowners, surface
rights holders, occupiers,
indigenous people or Claim-
owners;
"(d)costs and expenses of fulfilling the
Contractor's obligations to
contribute to national
development in accordance with
Clause 10.1(i) (1) and 10.1(i) (2);
"(e)an amount equivalent to whatever
benefits that may be extended in
the future by the Government to
the Contractor or to financial or
technical assistance agreement
contractors in general;
"(f)all of the foregoing items which have not
previously been offset against
the Government Share in an
earlier Fiscal Year, adjusted for
inflation." (emphasis supplied)
Section 7.8(e) is out of place in the FTAA. It makes no sense why, for instance,
money spent by the government for the benefit of the contractor in building
roads leading to the mine site should still be deductible from the State's share
in net mining revenues. Allowing this deduction results in benefiting the
contractor twice over. It constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the
contractor at the expense of the government, since the latter is effectively being
made to pay twice for the same item. 91 For being grossly disadvantageous and
prejudicial to the government and contrary to public policy, Section 7.8(e) is
undoubtedly invalid and must be declared to be without effect. Fortunately,
this provision can also easily be stricken off without affecting the rest of the
FTAA.
Nothing Left Over
After Deductions?
In connection with Section 7.8, an objection has been raised:
Specified in Section 7.8 are numerous items of deduction from the State's 60
percent share. After taking these into account, will the State ever receive
anything for its ownership of the mineral resources?
We are confident that under normal circumstances, the answer will be yes. If
we examine the various items of "deduction" listed in Section 7.8 of the WMCP
FTAA, we will find that they correspond closely to the components or elements
of the basic government share established in DAO 99-56, as discussed in the
earlier part of this Opinion.
Likewise, the balance of the government's 60 percent share after netting out
the items of deduction listed in Section 7.8 corresponds closely to
the additional government share provided for in DAO 99-56 which, we once
again stress, has nothing at all to do with indirect taxes. The Ramos-DeVera
paper 92 concisely presents the fiscal contribution of an FTAA under DAO 99-56
in this equation:
Receipts from an FTAA = basic gov't share + add'l gov't share
Transposed into a similar equation, the fiscal payments system from the WMCP
FTAA assumes the following formulation:
Government's 60 percent share in net mining revenues
of WMCP = items listed in Sec. 7.8 of the FTAA +
balance of Gov't share, payable 4 months from the end
of the fiscal year
It should become apparent that the fiscal arrangement under the WMCP FTAA
is very similar to that under DAO 99-56, with the "balance of government share
payable 4 months from end of fiscal year" being the equivalent of the additional
government share computed in accordance with the "net-mining-revenue-
based option" under DAO 99-56, as discussed above. As we have emphasized
earlier, we find each of the three options for computing the additional
government share as presented in DAO 99-56 to be sound and reasonable.
We therefore conclude that there is nothing inherently wrong in the fiscal
regime of the WMCP FTAA, and certainly nothing to warrant the invalidation of
the FTAA in its entirety.
Section 3.3 of the WMCP
FTAA Constitutional
Section 3.3 of the WMCP FTAA is assailed for violating supposed constitutional
restrictions on the term of FTAAs. The provision in question reads:
"3.3This Agreement shall be renewed by the
Government for a further period of twenty-
five (25) years under the same terms and
conditions provided that the Contractor
lodges a request for renewal with the
Government not less than sixty (60) days
prior to the expiry of the initial term of this
Agreement and provided that the
Contractor is not in breach of any of the
requirements of this Agreement." cCAaHD
Allegedly, the above provision runs afoul of Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
"Sec. 2.All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in
its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes,
bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.

"The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution." 93
We hold that the term limitation of twenty five years does not apply to FTAAs.
The reason is that the above provision is found within paragraph 1 of Section 2
of Article XII, which refers to mineral agreements co-production agreements,
joint venture agreements and mineral production-sharing agreements which
the government may enter into with Filipino citizens and corporations, at least
60 percent owned by Filipino citizens. The word "such" clearly refers to these
three mineral agreements CPAs, JVAs and MPSAs, not to FTAAs.
Specifically, FTAAs are covered by paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 2 of Article XII
of the Constitution. It will be noted that there are no term limitations provided
for in the said paragraphs dealing with FTAAs. This shows that FTAAs are sui
generis, in a class of their own. This omission was obviously a deliberate move
on the part of the framers. They probably realized that FTAAs would be
different in many ways from MPSAs, JVAs and CPAs. The reason the framers did
not fix term limitations applicable to FTAAs is that they preferred to leave the
matter to the discretion of the legislature and/or the agencies involved in
implementing the laws pertaining to FTAAs, in order to give the latter enough
flexibility and elbow room to meet changing circumstances.
Note also that, as previously stated, the exploratory phrases of an FTAA lasts up
to eleven years. Thereafter, a few more years would be gobbled up in start-up
operations. It may take fifteen years before an FTAA contractor can start
earning profits. And thus, the period of 25 years may really be short for an
FTAA. Consider too that in this kind of agreement, the contractor assumes all
entrepreneurial risks. If no commercial quantities of minerals are found, the
contractor bears all financial losses. To compensate for this long gestation
period and extra business risks, it would not be totally unreasonable to allow it
to continue EDU activities for another twenty five years.
In any event, the complaint is that, in essence, Section 3.3 gives the contractor
the power to compel the government to renew the WMCP FTAA for another 25
years and deprives the State of any say on whether to renew the contract.
While we agree that Section 3.3 could have been worded so as to prevent it
from favoring the contractor, this provision does not violate any constitutional
limits, since the said term limitation does not apply at all to FTAAs. Neither can
the provision be deemed in any manner to be illegal, as no law is being violated
thereby. It is certainly not illegal for the government to waive its option to
refuse the renewal of a commercial contract.
Verily, the government did not have to agree to Section 3.3. It could have said
"No" to the stipulation, but it did not. It appears that, in the process of
negotiations, the other contracting party was able to convince the government
to agree to the renewal terms. Under the circumstances, it does not seem
proper for this Court to intervene and step in to undo what might have perhaps
been a possible miscalculation on the part of the State. If government believes
that it is or will be aggrieved by the effects of Section 3.3, the remedy is the
renegotiation of the provision in order to provide the State the option to not
renew the FTAA.
Financial Benefits for Foreigners
Not Forbidden by the Constitution
Before leaving this subject matter, we find it necessary for us to rid ourselves of
the false belief that the Constitution somehow forbids foreign-owned
corporations from deriving financial benefits from the development of our
natural or mineral resources.
The Constitution has never prohibited foreign corporations from acquiring and
enjoying "beneficial interest" in the development of Philippine natural
resources. The State itself need not directly undertake exploration,
development, and utilization activities. Alternatively, the Constitution
authorizes the government to enter into joint venture agreements (JVAs), co-
production agreements (CPAs) and mineral production sharing agreements
(MPSAs) with contractors who are Filipino citizens or corporations that are at
least 60 percent Filipino-owned. They may do the actual "dirty work," the
mining operations.
In the case of a 60 percent Filipino-owned corporation, the 40 percent
individual and/or corporate non-Filipino stakeholders obviously participate in
the beneficial interest derived from the development and utilization of our
natural resources. They may receive by way of dividends, up to 40 percent of
the contractor's earnings from the mining project. Likewise, they may have a
say in the decisions of the board of directors, since they are entitled to
representation therein to the extent of their equity participation, which the
Constitution permits to be up to 40 percent of the contractor's equity. Hence,
the non-Filipino stakeholders may in that manner also participate in the
management of the contractor's natural resource development work. All of this
is permitted by our Constitution, for any natural resource, and without
limitation even in regard to the magnitude of the mining project or operations
(see paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Article XII).
It is clear, then, that there is nothing inherently wrong with or constitutionally
objectionable about the idea of foreign individuals and entities having or
enjoying "beneficial interest" in and participating in the management of
operations relative to the exploration, development and utilization of our
natural resources.
FTAA More Advantageous
Than Other Schemes
Like CPA, JVA and MPSA
A final point on the subject of beneficial interest. We believe the FTAA is a more
advantageous proposition for the government as compared with other
agreements permitted by the Constitution. In a CPA that the government enters
into with one or more contractors, the government shall provide inputs to the
mining operations other than the mineral resource itself . 94
In a JVA, a JV company is organized by the government and the contractor, with
both parties having equity shares (investments); and the contractor is granted
the exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract minerals found
in the area. 95 On the other hand, in an MPSA, the government grants the
contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within the contract
area and shares in the gross output; and the contractor provides the necessary
financing, technology, management and manpower.
The point being made here is that, in two of the three types of agreements
under consideration, the government has to ante up some risk capital for the
enterprise. In other words, government funds (public moneys) are withdrawn
from other possible uses, put to work in the venture and placed at risk in case
the venture fails. This notwithstanding, management and control of the
operations of the enterprise are in all three arrangements in the hands of
the contractor, with the government being mainly a silent partner. The three
types of agreement mentioned above apply to any natural resource, without
limitation and regardless of the size or magnitude of the project or operations.
In contrast to the foregoing arrangements, and pursuant to paragraph 4 of
Section 2 of Article XII, the FTAA is limited to large-scale projects and only for
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils. Here, the Constitution removes the
40 percent cap on foreign ownership and allows the foreign corporation to own
up to 100 percent of the equity. Filipino capital may not be sufficient on
account of the size of the project, so the foreign entity may have to ante up all
the risk capital.
Correlatively, the foreign stakeholder bears up to 100 percent of the risk of loss
if the project fails. In respect of the particular FTAA granted to it, WMCP (then
100 percent foreign owned) was responsible, as contractor, for providing the
entire equity, including all the inputs for the project. It was to bear 100 percent
of the risk of loss if the project failed, but its maximum potential "beneficial
interest" consisted only of 40 percent of the net beneficial interest, because the
other 60 percent is the share of the government, which will never be exposed
to any risk of loss whatsoever.
In consonance with the degree of risk assumed, the FTAA vested in WMCP
the day-to-day management of the mining operations. Still such management is
subject to the overall control and supervision of the State in terms of regular
reporting, approvals of work programs and budgets, and so on.
So, one needs to consider in relative terms, the costs of inputs for, degree of
risk attendant to, and benefits derived or to be derived from a CPA, a JVA or an
MPSA vis--vis those pertaining to an FTAA. It may not be realistically asserted
that the foreign grantee of an FTAA is being unduly favored or benefited as
compared with a foreign stakeholder in a corporation holding a CPA, a JVA or an
MPSA. Seen the other way around, the government is definitely better off with
an FTAA than a CPA, a JVA or an MPSA.
Developmental Policy
on the Mining Industry
During the Oral Argument and in their Final Memorandum, petitioners
repeatedly urged the Court to consider whether mining as an industry and
economic activity deserved to be accorded priority, preference and government
support as against, say, agriculture and other activities in which Filipinos and
the Philippines may have an "economic advantage." For instance, a recent US
study 96 reportedly examined the economic performance of all local US
counties that were dependent on mining and 20 percent of whose labor
earnings between 1970 and 2000 came from mining enterprises. AaDSEC
The study covering 100 US counties in 25 states dependent on mining
showed that per capita income grew about 30 percent less in mining-dependent
communities in the 1980s and 25 percent less for the entire period 1980 to
2000; the level of per capita income was also lower. Therefore, given the slower
rate of growth, the gap between these and other local counties increased.

Petitioners invite attention to the OXFAM America Report's warning to
developing nations that mining brings with it serious economic problems,
including increased regional inequality, unemployment and poverty. They also
cite the final report 97 of the Extractive Industries Review project
commissioned by the World Bank (the WB-EIR Report), which warns of
environmental degradation, social disruption, conflict, and uneven sharing of
benefits with local communities that bear the negative social and
environmental impact. The Report suggests that countries need to decide on
the best way to exploit their natural resources, in order to maximize the value
added from the development of their resources and ensure that they are on the
path to sustainable development once the resources run out.
Whatever priority or preference may be given to mining vis--vis other
economic or non-economic activities is a question of policy that the President
and Congress will have to address; it is not for this Court to decide. This Court
declares what the Constitution and the laws say, interprets only when
necessary, and refrains from delving into matters of policy.
Suffice it to say that the State control accorded by the Constitution over mining
activities assures a proper balancing of interests. More pointedly, such control
will enable the President to demand the best mining practices and the use of
the best available technologies to protect the environment and to rehabilitate
mined-out areas. Indeed, under the Mining Law, the government can ensure
the protection of the environment during and after mining. It can likewise
provide for the mechanisms to protect the rights of indigenous communities,
and thereby mold a more socially-responsive, culturally-sensitive and
sustainable mining industry.
Early on during the launching of the Presidential Mineral Industry
Environmental Awards on February 6, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos
captured the essence of balanced and sustainable mining in these words:
"Long term, high profit mining translates into higher
revenues for government, more decent jobs for the
population, more raw materials to feed the engines of
downstream and allied industries, and improved
chances of human resource and countryside
development by creating self-reliant communities
away from urban centers.
xxx xxx xxx
"Against a fragile and finite environment, it is
sustainability that holds the key. In sustainable mining,
we take a middle ground where both production and
protection goals are balanced, and where parties-in-
interest come to terms."
Neither has the present leadership been remiss in addressing the concerns of
sustainable mining operations. Recently, on January 16, 2004 and April 20,
2004, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Orders Nos. 270 and
270-A, respectively, "to promote responsible mineral resources exploration,
development and utilization, in order to enhance economic growth, in a manner
that adheres to the principles of sustainable development and with due regard
for justice and equity, sensitivity to the culture of the Filipino people and
respect for Philippine sovereignty." 98
Refutation Of Dissents
The Court will now take up a number of other specific points raised in the
dissents of Justices Carpio and Morales.
1.Justice Morales introduced us to Hugh Morgan, former president and chief
executive officer of Western Mining Corporation (WMC) and former president
of the Australian Mining Industry Council, who spearheaded the vociferous
opposition to the filing by aboriginal peoples of native title claims against
mining companies in Australia in the aftermath of the landmark Mabo decision
by the Australian High Court. According to sources quoted by our esteemed
colleague, Morgan was also aracist and a bigot. In the course of
protesting Mabo, Morgan allegedly uttered derogatory remarks belittling the
aboriginal culture and race.
An unwritten caveat of this introduction is that this Court should be careful not
to permit the entry of the likes of Hugh Morgan and his hordes of alleged racist-
bigots at WMC. With all due respect, such scare tactics should have no place in
the discussion of this case. We are deliberating on the constitutionality of RA
7942, DAO 96-40 and the FTAA originally granted to WMCP, which had been
transferred to Sagittarius Mining, a Filipino corporation. We are not discussing
the apparition of white Anglo-Saxon racists/bigots massing at our gates.
2.On the proper interpretation of the phrase agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance, Justice Morales points out that at times we
"conveniently omitted" the use of the disjunctive either . . . or, which according
to her denotes restriction; hence the phrase must be deemed to connote
restriction and limitation.
But, as Justice Carpio himself pointed out during the Oral Argument, the
disjunctive phrase either technical or financial assistance would, strictly
speaking, literally mean that a foreign contractor may provide only one or the
other, but not both. And if both technical and financial assistance were required
for a project, the State would have to deal with at least two different foreign
contractors one for financial and the other for technical assistance. And
following on that, a foreign contractor, though very much qualified to
provide both kinds of assistance, would nevertheless be prohibited from
providing one kind as soon as it shall have agreed to provide the other.
But if the Court should follow this restrictive and literal construction, can we
really find two (or more) contractors who are willing to participate in one single
project one to provide the "financial assistance" only and the other the
"technical assistance" exclusively; it would be excellent if these two or more
contractors happen to be willing and are able to cooperate and work closely
together on the same project (even if they are otherwise competitors). And it
would be superb if no conflicts would arise between or among them in the
entire course of the contract. But what are the chances things will turn out this
way in the real world? To think that the framers deliberately imposed this kind
of restriction is to say that they were either exceedingly optimistic, or incredibly
naive. This begs the question What laudable objective or purpose could
possibly be served by such strict and restrictive literal interpretation?
3.Citing Oposa v. Factoran Jr., Justice Morales claims that a service contract
is not a contract or property right which merits protection by the due process
clause of the Constitution, but merely a license or privilege which may be validly
revoked, rescinded or withdrawn by executive action whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare.
Oposa cites Tan v. Director of Forestry and Ysmael v. Deputy Executive
Secretary as authority. The latter cases dealt specifically with timber licenses
only. Oposaallegedly reiterated that a license is merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation. Thus this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Should Oposa be deemed applicable to the case at bar, on the argument that
natural resources are also involved in this situation? We do not think so. A
grantee of a timber license, permit or license agreement gets to cut the timber
already growing on the surface; it need not dig up tons of earth to get at the
logs. In a logging concession, the investment of the licensee is not as substantial
as the investment of a large-scale mining contractor. If a timber license were
revoked, the licensee packs up its gear and moves to a new area applied for,
and starts over; what it leaves behind are mainly the trails leading to the logging
site.
In contrast, the mining contractor will have sunk a great deal of money (tens of
millions of dollars) into the ground, so to speak, for exploration activities, for
development of the mine site and infrastructure, and for the actual excavation
and extraction of minerals, including the extensive tunneling work to reach the
ore body. The cancellation of the mining contract will utterly deprive the
contractor of its investments (i.e., prevent recovery of investments), most of
which cannot be pulled out.
To say that an FTAA is just like a mere timber license or permit and does not
involve contract or property rights which merit protection by the due process
clause of the Constitution, and may therefore be revoked or cancelled in the
blink of an eye, is to adopt a well-nigh confiscatory stance; at the very least, it is
downright dismissive of the property rights of businesspersons and corporate
entities that have investments in the mining industry, whose investments,
operations and expenditures do contribute to the general welfare of the
people, the coffers of government, and the strength of the economy. Such a
pronouncement will surely discourage investments (local and foreign) which are
critically needed to fuel the engine of economic growth and move this country
out of the rut of poverty. In sum,Oposa is not applicable.
4.Justice Morales adverts to the supposedly "clear intention" of the framers of
the Constitution to reserve our natural resources exclusively for the Filipino
people. She then quoted from the records of the ConCom deliberations a
passage in which then Commissioner Davide explained his vote, arguing in the
process that aliens ought not be allowed to participate in the enjoyment of our
natural resources. One passage does not suffice to capture the tenor or
substance of the entire extensive deliberations of the commissioners, or to
reveal the clear intention of the framers as a group. A re-reading of the entire
deliberations (quoted here earlier) is necessary if we are to understand the true
intent of the framers.

5.Since 1935, the Filipino people, through their Constitution, have decided that
the retardation or delay in the exploration, development or utilization of the
nation's natural resources is merely secondary to the protection and
preservation of their ownership of the natural resources, so says Justice
Morales, citing Aruego. If it is true that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did
not care much about alleviating the retardation or delay in the development and
utilization of our natural resources, why did they bother to write paragraph 4 at
all? Were they merely paying lip service to large-scale exploration,
development and utilization? They could have just completely ignored the
subject matter and left it to be dealt with through a future constitutional
amendment. But we have to harmonize every part of the Constitution and to
interpret each provision in a manner that would give life and meaning to it and
to the rest of the provisions. It is obvious that a literal interpretation of
paragraph 4 will render it utterly inutile and inoperative.
6.According to Justice Morales, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission do not support our contention that the framers, by specifying such
agreements involving financial or technical assistance, necessarily gave implied
assent to everything that these agreements implicitly entailed, or that could
reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective, including
management authority in the day-to-day operations. As proof thereof, she
quotes one single passage from the ConCom deliberations, consisting of an
exchange among Commissioners Tingson, Garcia and Monsod.
However, the quoted exchange does not serve to contradict our argument; it
even bolsters it. Comm. Christian Monsod was quoted as saying: ". . . I think we
have to make a distinction that it is not really realistic to say that we will borrow
on our own terms. Maybe we can say that we inherited unjust loans, and we
would like to repay these on terms that are not prejudicial to our own
growth. But the general statement that we should only borrow on our own
terms is a bit unrealistic." Comm. Monsod is one who knew whereof he spoke.
7.Justice Morales also declares that the optimal time for the conversion of an
FTAA into an MPSA is after completion of the exploration phase and just before
undertaking the development and construction phase, on account of the fact
that the requirement for a minimum investment of $50 million is applicable
only during the development, construction and utilization phase, but not during
the exploration phase, when the foreign contractor need merely comply with
minimum ground expenditures. Thus by converting, the foreign contractor
maximizes its profits by avoiding its obligation to make the minimum
investment of $50 million.
This argument forgets that the foreign contractor is in the game precisely to
make money. In order to come anywhere near profitability, the contractor must
first extract and sell the mineral ore. In order to do that, it must also develop
and construct the mining facilities, set up its machineries and equipment and
dig the tunnels to get to the deposit. The contractor is thus compelled to
expend funds in order to make profits. If it decides to cut back on investments
and expenditures, it will necessarily sacrifice the pace of development and
utilization; it will necessarily sacrifice the amount of profits it can make from the
mining operations. In fact, at certain less-than-optimal levels of operation, the
stream of revenues generated may not even be enough to cover variable
expenses, let alone overhead expenses; this is a dismal situation anyone would
want to avoid. In order to make money, one has to spend money. This truism
applies to the mining industry as well.
8.Mortgaging the minerals to secure a foreign FTAA contractor's obligations is
anomalous, according to Justice Morales since the contractor was from the
beginning obliged to provide all financing needed for the mining operations.
However, the mortgaging of minerals by the contractor does not necessarily
signify that the contractor is unable to provide all financing required for the
project, or that it does not have the financial capability to undertake large-scale
operations. Mortgaging of mineral products, just like the assignment (by way of
security) of manufactured goods and goods in inventory, and the assignment of
receivables, is an ordinary requirement of banks, even in the case of clients with
more than sufficient financial resources. And nowadays, even the richest and
best managed corporations make use of bank credit facilities it does not
necessarily signify that they do not have the financial resources or are unable to
provide the financing on their own; it is just a manner of maximizing the use of
their funds.
9.Does the contractor in reality acquire the surface rights "for free," by virtue of
the fact that it is entitled to reimbursement for the costs of acquisition and
maintenance, adjusted for inflation? We think not. The "reimbursement" is
possible only at the end of the term of the contract, when the surface rights will
no longer be needed, and the land previously acquired will have to be disposed
of, in which case the contractor gets reimbursement from the sales proceeds.
The contractor has to pay out the acquisition price for the land. That money will
belong to the seller of the land. Only if and when the land is finally sold off will
the contractor get any reimbursement. In other words, the contractor will have
been cash-out for the entire duration of the term of the contract 25 or 50
years, depending. If we calculate the cost of money at say 12 percent per
annum, that is the cost or opportunity loss to the contractor, in addition to the
amount of the acquisition price. 12 percent per annum for 50 years is 600
percent; this, without any compounding yet. The cost of money is therefore at
least 600 percent of the original acquisition cost; it is in addition to the
acquisition cost. "For free?" Not by a long shot. CAcEaS
10.The contractor will acquire and hold up to 5,000 hectares? We doubt it. The
acquisition by the State of land for the contractor is just to enable the
contractor to establish its mine site, build its facilities, establish a tailings pond,
set up its machinery and equipment, and dig mine shafts and tunnels, etc. It is
impossible that the surface requirement will aggregate 5,000 hectares. Much of
the operations will consist of the tunneling and digging underground, which will
not require possessing or using any land surface. 5,000 hectares is way too
much for the needs of a mining operator. It simply will not spend its cash to
acquire property that it will not need; the cash may be better employed for the
actual mining operations, to yield a profit.
11.Justice Carpio claims that the phrase among other things (found in the
second paragraph of Section 81 of the Mining Act) is being incorrectly treated
as a delegation of legislative power to the DENR secretary to issue DAO 99-56
and prescribe the formulae therein on the State's share from mining
operations. He adds that the phrase among other things was not intended as a
delegation of legislative power to the DENR secretary, much less could it be
deemed a valid delegation of legislative power, since there is nothing in the
second paragraph of Section 81 which can be said to grant any delegated
legislative power to the DENR secretary. And even if there were, such
delegation would be void, for lack of any standards by which the delegated
power shall be exercised.
While there is nothing in the second paragraph of Section 81 which can directly
be construed as a delegation of legislative power to the DENR secretary, it does
not mean that DAO 99-56 is invalid per se, or that the secretary acted without
any authority or jurisdiction in issuing DAO 99-56. As we stated earlier in our
Prologue, "Who or what organ of government actually exercises this power of
control on behalf of the State? The Constitution is crystal clear: the
President. Indeed, the Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to
'enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.' On the other hand,
Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of 'every
contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within
thirty days from its execution.'" It is the President who is constitutionally
mandated to enter into FTAAs with foreign corporations, and in doing so, it is
within the President's prerogative to specify certain terms and conditions of the
FTAAs, for example, the fiscal regime of FTAAs i.e., the sharing of the net
mining revenues between the contractor and the State.
Being the President's alter ego with respect to the control and supervision of
the mining industry, the DENR secretary, acting for the President, is necessarily
clothed with the requisite authority and power to draw up guidelines
delineating certain terms and conditions, and specifying therein the terms of
sharing of benefits from mining, to be applicable to FTAAs in general. It is
important to remember that DAO 99-56 has been in existence for almost six
years, and has not been amended or revoked by the President.
The issuance of DAO 99-56 did not involve the exercise of delegated legislative
power. The legislature did not delegate the power to determine the nature,
extent and composition of the items that would come under the phrase among
other things. The legislature's power pertains to the imposition of taxes, duties
and fees. This power was not delegated to the DENR secretary. But the power
to negotiate and enter into FTAAs was withheld from Congress, and reserved
for the President. In determining the sharing of mining benefits, i.e., in
specifying what the phrase among other things include, the President (through
the secretary acting in his/her behalf) was not determining the amount or rate
of taxes, duties and fees, but rather the amount of INCOME to be derived from
minerals to be extracted and sold, income which belongs to the State as owner
of the mineral resources. We may say that, in the second paragraph of Section
81, the legislature in a sense intruded partially into the President's sphere of
authority when the former provided that

"The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws."
(Italics supplied)
But it did not usurp the President's authority since the provision merely
included the enumerated items as part of the government share, without
foreclosing or in any way preventing (as in fact Congress could not validly
prevent) the President from determining what constitutes the State's
compensation derived from FTAAs. In this case, the President in effect directed
the inclusion or addition of "other things," viz., INCOME for the owner of the
resources, in the government's share, while adopting the items enumerated by
Congress as part of the government share also.
12.Justice Carpio's insistence on applying the ejusdem generis rule of statutory
construction to the phrase among other things is therefore useless, and must
fall by the wayside. There is no point trying to construe that phrase in relation
to the enumeration of taxes, duties and fees found in paragraph 2 of Section 81,
precisely because "the constitutional power to prescribe the sharing of mining
income between the State and mining companies," to quote Justice Carpio
pursuant to an FTAA is constitutionally lodged with the President, not with
Congress. It thus makes no sense to persist in giving the phrase among other
things a restricted meaning referring only to taxes, duties and fees.
13.Strangely, Justice Carpio claims that the DENR secretary can change the
formulae in DAO 99-56 any time even without the approval of the President,
and the secretary is the sole authority to determine the amount of
consideration that the State shall receive in an FTAA, because Section 5 of the
DAO states that ". . . any amendment of an FTAA other than the provision on
fiscal regime shall require the negotiation with the Negotiation Panel and the
recommendation of the Secretary for approval of the President . . .". Allegedly,
because of that provision, if an amendment in the FTAA involves non-fiscal
matters, the amendment requires approval of the President, but if the
amendment involves a change in the fiscal regime, the DENR secretary has the
final authority, and approval of the President may be dispensed with; hence the
secretary is more powerful than the President.
We believe there is some distortion resulting from the quoted provision being
taken out of context. Section 5 of DAO 99-56 reads as follows:
"Section 5.Status of Existing FTAAs. All FTAAs
approved prior to the effectivity of this Administrative
Order shall remain valid and be recognized by the
Government: Provided, That should a Contractor
desire to amend its FTAA, it shall do so by filing a
Letter of Intent (LOI) to the Secretary thru the Director.
Provided, further, That if the Contractor desires to
amend the fiscal regime of its FTAA, it may do so by
seeking for the amendment of its FTAA's whole fiscal
regime by adopting the fiscal regime provided hereof :
Provided, finally, That any amendment of an FTAA
other than the provision on fiscal regime shall require
the negotiation with the Negotiating Panel and the
recommendation of the Secretary for approval of the
President of the Republic of the Philippines." (emphasis
supplied)
It looks like another case of misapprehension. The proviso being objected to by
Justice Carpio is actually preceded by a phrase that requires a contractor
desiring to amend the fiscal regime of its FTAA, to amend the same by adopting
the fiscal regime prescribed in DAO 99-56 i.e., solely in that manner, and in
no other.Obviously, since DAO 99-56 was issued by the secretary under the
authority and with the presumed approval of the President, the amendment of
an FTAA by merely adopting the fiscal regime prescribed in said DAO 99-56 (and
nothing more) need not have the express clearance of the President anymore. It
is as if the same had been pre-approved. We cannot fathom the complaint that
that makes the secretary more powerful than the President, or that the former
is trying to hide things from the President or Congress.
14.Based on the first sentence of Section 5 of DAO 99-56, which states "[A]ll
FTAAs approved prior to the effectivity of this Administrative Order shall remain
valid and be recognized by the Government", Justice Carpio concludes that said
Administrative Order allegedly exempts FTAAs approved prior to its effectivity
like the WMCP FTAA from having to pay the State any share from their
mining income, apart from taxes, duties and fees.
We disagree. What we see in black and white is the statement that the FTAAs
approved before the DAO came into effect are to continue to be valid and will be
recognized by the State. Nothing is said about their fiscal regimes. Certainly,
there is no basis to claim that the contractors under said FTAAs were being
exempted from paying the government a share in their mining incomes.
For the record, the WMCP FTAA is NOT and has never been exempt from paying
the government share. The WMCP FTAA has its own fiscal regime Section 7.7
which gives the government a 60 percent share in the net mining revenues of
WMCP from the commencement of commercial production.
For that very reason, we have never said that DAO 99-56 is the basis for
claiming that the WMCP FTAA has a consideration. Hence, we find quite out of
place Justice Carpio's statement that ironically, DAO 99-56, the very authority
cited to support the claim that the WMCP FTAA has a consideration, does not
apply to the WMCP FTAA. By its own express terms, DAO 99-56 does not apply
to FTAAs executed before the issuance of DAO 99-56, like the WMCP FTAA. The
majority's position has allegedly no leg to stand on since even DAO 99-56,
assuming it is valid, cannot save the WMCP FTAA from want of consideration.
Even assuming arguendo that DAO 99-56 does not apply to the WMCP FTAA,
nevertheless, the WMCP FTAA has its own fiscal regime, found in Section 7.7
thereof. Hence, there is no such thing as "want of consideration" here.
Still more startling is this claim: The majority supposedly agrees that the
provisions of the WMCP FTAA, which grant a sham consideration to the State,
are void.Since the majority agrees that the WMCP FTAA has a sham
consideration, the WMCP FTAA thus lacks the third element of a valid
contract. The Decision should declare the WMCP FTAA void for want of
consideration unless it treats the contract as an MPSA under Section 80. Indeed
the only recourse of WMCP to save the validity of its contract is to convert it into
an MPSA.
To clarify, we said that Sections 7.9 and 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA are provisions
grossly disadvantageous to government and detrimental to the interests of the
Filipino people, as well as violative of public policy, and must therefore be
stricken off as invalid. Since the offending provisions are very much separable
from Section 7.7 and the rest of the FTAA, the deletion of Sections 7.9 and
7.8(e) can be done without affecting or requiring the invalidation of the WMCP
FTAA itself, and such deletion will preserve for government its due share of the
60 percent benefits. Therefore, the WMCP FTAA is NOT bereft of a valid
consideration (assuming for the nonce that indeed this is the "consideration" of
the FTAA).
Summation
To conclude, a summary of the key points discussed above is now in order.
The Meaning of "Agreements Involving
Either Technical or Financial Assistance"
Applying familiar principles of constitutional construction to the
phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance, the
framers' choice of words does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of
assistance, but rather implies that there are other things being included or
possibly being made part of the agreement, apart from financial or technical
assistance. The drafters avoided the use of restrictive and stringent
phraseology; a verba legis scrutiny of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution
discloses not even a hint of a desire to prohibit foreign involvement in the
management or operation of mining activities, or to eradicateservice contracts.
Such moves would necessarily imply an underlying drastic shift in fundamental
economic and developmental policies of the State. That change requires a much
more definite and irrefutable basis than mere omission of the words "service
contract" from the new Constitution.
Furthermore, a literal and restrictive interpretation of this paragraph leads to
logical inconsistencies. A constitutional provision specifically allowing foreign-
owned corporations to render financial or technical assistance in respect of
mining or any other commercial activity was clearly unnecessary; the provision
was meant to refer to more than mere financial or technical assistance.
Also, if paragraph 4 permits only agreements for financial or technical
assistance, there would be no point in requiring that they be "based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country." And
considering that there were various long-term service contracts still in force and
effect at the time the new Charter was being drafted, the absence of any
transitory provisions to govern the termination and closing-out of the then
existing service contracts strongly militates against the theory that the mere
omission of "service contracts" signaled their prohibition by the new
Constitution.
Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is therefore
unavoidable, and a careful scrutiny thereof conclusively shows that the ConCom
members discussed agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance in the same sense as service contracts, and used the terms
interchangeably. The drafters in fact knew that the agreements with foreign
corporations were going to entail not mere technical or financial assistance, but
rather, foreign investment in and management of an enterprise for large-
scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals.

The framers spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in
the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their discussions that they did not
intend to ban or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on
crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize
the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief, they were going to
permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with
safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm
established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII which reserves or
limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60 percent owned by such
citizens the exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum
resources. This was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital
and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral resources.
Despite strong opposition from some ConCom members during the final voting,
the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony including paragraph 4
allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to the
general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same Article was
resoundingly and overwhelmingly approved.
The drafters, many of whom were economists, academicians, lawyers,
businesspersons and politicians knew that foreign entities will not enter into
agreements involving assistance without requiring measures of protection to
ensure the success of the venture and repayment of their investments, loans
and other financial assistance, and ultimately to protect the business reputation
of the foreign corporations. The drafters, by specifying such agreements
involving assistance, necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these
agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make
them tenable and effective including management authority with respect to
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise, and measures for the protection of
the interests of the foreign corporation, at least to the extent that they are
consistent with Philippine sovereignty over natural resources, the constitutional
requirement of State control, and beneficial ownership of natural resources
remaining vested in the State.
From the foregoing, it is clear that agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance referred to in paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but
such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand, and on the other hand government as principal or
"owner" (of the works), whereby the foreign contractor provides the capital,
technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation
and operation of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise, and government
through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full control and supervision
over the entire enterprise.
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant of such service contracts is subject
to several safeguards, among them: (1) that the service contract be crafted in
accordance with a general law setting standard or uniform terms, conditions
and requirements; (2) the President be the signatory for the government; and
(3) the President report the executed agreement to Congress within thirty days.
Ultimate Test:
Full State Control
To repeat, the primacy of the principle of the State's sovereign ownership of all
mineral resources, and its full control and supervision over all aspects of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be upheld.
But "full control and supervision" cannot be taken literally to mean that the
State controls and supervises everything down to the minutest details and
makes all required actions, as this would render impossible the legitimate
exercise by the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative
and authority, indispensable to the proper functioning of the mining enterprise.
Also, government need not micro-manage mining operations and day-to-day
affairs of the enterprise in order to be considered as exercising full control and
supervision.
Control, as utilized in Section 2 of Article XII, must be taken to mean a degree of
control sufficient to enable the State to direct, restrain, regulate and govern the
affairs of the extractive enterprises. Control by the State may be on a macro
level, through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry
standards and similar measures that would enable government to regulate the
conduct of affairs in various enterprises, and restrain activities deemed not
desirable or beneficial, with the end in view of ensuring that these enterprises
contribute to the economic development and general welfare of the country,
conserve the environment, and uplift the well-being of the local affected
communities. Such a degree of control would be compatible with permitting
the foreign contractor sufficient and reasonable management authority over
the enterprise it has invested in, to ensure efficient and profitable
operation. ITCHSa
Government Granted Full Control
by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40
Baseless are petitioners' sweeping claims that RA 7942 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations make it possible for FTAA contracts to cede full control
and management of mining enterprises over to fully foreign owned
corporations. Equally wobbly is the assertion that the State is reduced to a
passive regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports, with weak review
and audit powers and little say in the decision-making of the enterprise, for
which reasons "beneficial ownership" of the mineral resources is allegedly
ceded to the foreign contractor.
As discussed hereinabove, the State's full control and supervision over mining
operations are ensured through the following provisions in RA 7942: Sections 8,
9, 16, 19, 24, 35[(b), (e), (f), (g), (h), (k), (l), (m) and (o)], 40, 57, 66, 69, 70, and
Chapters XI and XVII, as well as the following provisions of the DAO 96-40:
Sections 7[(d) and (f)], 35(a-2), 53[(a-4) and (d)], 54, 56[(g), (h), (l), (m) and (n)],
56(2), 60, 66, 144, 168, 171 and 270, and also Chapters XV, XVI and XXIV.
Through the foregoing provisions, the government agencies concerned are
empowered to approve or disapprove hence in a position to influence,
direct, and change the various work programs and the corresponding
minimum expenditures commitments for each of the exploration, development
and utilization phases of the enterprise. Once they have been approved, the
contractor's compliance with its commitments therein will be monitored.
Figures for mineral production and sales are regularly monitored and subjected
to government review, to ensure that the products and by-products are
disposed of at the best prices; copies of sales agreements have to be submitted
to and registered with MGB.
The contractor is mandated to open its books of accounts and records for
scrutiny, to enable the State to determine that the government share has been
fully paid. The State may likewise compel compliance by the contractor with
mandatory requirements on mine safety, health and environmental protection,
and the use of anti-pollution technology and facilities. The contractor is also
obligated to assist the development of the mining community, and pay royalties
to the indigenous peoples concerned. And violation of any of the FTAA's terms
and conditions, and/or non-compliance with statutes or regulations, may be
penalized by cancellation of the FTAA. Such sanction is significant to a
contractor who may have yet to recover the tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars sunk into a mining project.
Overall, the State definitely has a pivotal say in the operation of the individual
enterprises, and can set directions and objectives, detect deviations and non-
compliances by the contractor, and enforce compliance and impose sanctions
should the occasion arise. Hence, RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in government
more than a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of
mining operations.
Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 was objected to as being unconstitutional for allowing
a foreign contractor to apply for and hold an exploration permit. During the
exploration phase, the permit grantee (and prospective contractor) is spending
and investing heavily in exploration activities without yet being able to extract
minerals and generate revenues. The exploration permit issued under Sections
3(aq), 20 and 23 of RA 7942, which allows exploration but not extraction, serves
to protect the interests and rights of the exploration permit grantee (and
would-be contractor), foreign or local. Otherwise, the exploration works already
conducted, and expenditures already made, may end up only benefiting claim-
jumpers. Thus, Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 is not unconstitutional.
WMCP FTAA Likewise Gives the
State Full Control and Supervision
The WMCP FTAA obligates the contractor to account for the value of production
and sale of minerals (Clause 1.4); requires that the contractor's work program,
activities and budgets be approved by the State (Clause 2.1); gives the DENR
secretary power to extend the exploration period (Clause 3.2-a); requires
approval by the State for incorporation of lands into the contract area (Clause
4.3-c); requires Bureau of Forest Development approval for inclusion of forest
reserves as part of the FTAA contract area (Clause 4.5); obligates the contractor
to periodically relinquish parts of the contract area not needed for exploration
and development (Clause 4.6); requires submission of a declaration of mining
feasibility for approval by the State (Clause 4.6-b); obligates the contractor to
report to the State the results of its exploration activities (Clause 4.9); requires
the contractor to obtain State approval for its work programs for the
succeeding two year periods, containing the proposed work activities and
expenditures budget related to exploration (Clause 5.1); requires the contractor
to obtain State approval for its proposed expenditures for exploration activities
(Clause 5.2); requires the contractor to submit an annual report on geological,
geophysical, geochemical and other information relating to its explorations
within the FTAA area (Clause 5.3-a); requires the contractor to submit within six
months after expiration of exploration period a final report on all its findings in
the contract area (Clause 5.3-b); requires the contractor after conducting
feasibility studies to submit a declaration of mining feasibility, along with a
description of the area to be developed and mined, a description of the
proposed mining operations and the technology to be employed, and the
proposed work program for the development phase, for approval by the DENR
secretary (Clause 5.4); obligates the contractor to complete the development of
the mine, including construction of the production facilities, within the period
stated in the approved work program (Clause 6.1); requires the contractor to
submit for approval a work program covering each period of three fiscal years
(Clause 6.2); requires the contractor to submit reports to the secretary on the
production, ore reserves, work accomplished and work in progress, profile of its
work force and management staff, and other technical information (Clause 6.3);
subjects any expansions, modifications, improvements and replacements of
mining facilities to the approval of the secretary (Clause 6.4); subjects to State
control the amount of funds that the contractor may borrow within the
Philippines (Clause 7.2); subjects to State supervisory power any technical,
financial and marketing issues (Clause 10.1-a); obligates the contractor to
ensure 60 percent Filipino equity in the contractor within ten years of
recovering specified expenditures unless not so required by subsequent
legislation (Clause 10.1); gives the State the right to terminate the FTAA for
unremedied substantial breach thereof by the contractor (Clause 13.2); requires
State approval for any assignment of the FTAA by the contractor to an entity
other than an affiliate (Clause 14.1).

In short, the aforementioned provisions of the WMCP FTAA, far from
constituting a surrender of control and a grant of beneficial ownership of
mineral resources to the contractor in question, vest the State with control and
supervision over practically all aspects of the operations of the FTAA
contractor, including the charging of pre-operating and operating expenses,
and the disposition of mineral products.
There is likewise no relinquishment of control on account of specific provisions
of the WMCP FTAA. Clause 8.2 provides a mechanism to prevent the mining
operations from grinding to a complete halt as a result of possible delays of
more than 60 days in the government's processing and approval of submitted
work programs and budgets. Clause 8.3 seeks to provide a temporary, stop-gap
solution in case a disagreement between the State and the contractor (over the
proposed work program or budget submitted by the contractor) should result in
a deadlock or impasse, to avoid unreasonably long delays in the performance of
the works.
The State, despite Clause 8.3, still has control over the contract area, and it
may, as sovereign authority, prohibit work thereon until the dispute is resolved,
or it may terminate the FTAA, citing substantial breach thereof. Hence, the
State clearly retains full and effective control.
Clause 8.5, which allows the contractor to make changes to approved work
programs and budgets without the prior approval of the DENR secretary,
subject to certain limitations with respect to the variance/s, merely provides
the contractor a certain amount of flexibility to meet unexpected situations,
while still guaranteeing that the approved work programs and budgets are not
abandoned altogether. And if the secretary disagrees with the actions taken by
the contractor in this instance, he may also resort to cancellation/termination
of the FTAA as the ultimate sanction.
Clause 4.6 of the WMCP FTAA gives the contractor discretion to select parts of
the contract area to be relinquished. The State is not in a position to substitute
its judgment for that of the contractor, who knows exactly which portions of
the contract area do not contain minerals in commercial quantities and should
be relinquished. Also, since the annual occupation fees paid to government are
based on the total hectarage of the contract area, net of the areas relinquished,
the contractor's self-interest will assure proper and efficient relinquishment.
Clause 10.2(e) of the WMCP FTAA does not mean that the contractor can
compel government to use its power of eminent domain. It contemplates a
situation in which the contractor is a foreign-owned corporation, hence, not
qualified to own land. The contractor identifies the surface areas needed for it
to construct the infrastructure for mining operations, and the State then
acquires the surface rights on behalf of the former. The provision does not call
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain (or determination of just
compensation); it seeks to avoid a violation of the anti-dummy law.
Clause 10.2(l) of the WMCP FTAA giving the contractor the right to mortgage
and encumber the mineral products extracted may have been a result of
conditions imposed by creditor-banks to secure the loan obligations of WMCP.
Banks lend also upon the security of encumbrances on goods produced, which
can be easily sold and converted into cash and applied to the repayment of
loans. Thus, Clause 10.2(l) is not something out of the ordinary. Neither is it
objectionable, because even though the contractor is allowed to mortgage or
encumber the mineral end-products themselves, the contractor is not thereby
relieved of its obligation to pay the government its basic and additional shares
in the net mining revenue. The contractor's ability to mortgage the minerals
does not negate the State's right to receive its share of net mining revenues.
Clause 10.2(k) which gives the contractor authority "to change its equity
structure at any time," means that WMCP, which was then 100 percent foreign
owned, could permit Filipino equity ownership. Moreover, what is important is
that the contractor, regardless of its ownership, is always in a position to render
the services required under the FTAA, under the direction and control of the
government.
Clauses 10.4(e) and (i) bind government to allow amendments to the FTAA if
required by banks and other financial institutions as part of the conditions of
new lendings. There is nothing objectionable here, since Clause 10.4(e) also
provides that such financing arrangements should in no event reduce the
contractor's obligations or the government's rights under the FTAA. Clause
10.4(i) provides that government shall "favourably consider" any request for
amendments of this agreement necessary for the contractor to successfully
obtain financing. There is no renunciation of control, as the proviso does not
say that government shall automatically grant any such request. Also, it is up to
the contractor to prove the need for the requested changes. The government
always has the final say on whether to approve or disapprove such requests.
In fine, the FTAA provisions do not reduce or abdicate State control.
No Surrender of
Financial Benefits
The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 has been denounced for
allegedly limiting the State's share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to just
taxes, fees and duties, and depriving the State of a share in the after-tax
income of the enterprise. However, the inclusion of the phrase "among other
things" in the second paragraph of Section 81 clearly and unmistakably reveals
the legislative intent to have the State collect more than just the usual taxes,
duties and fees.
Thus, DAO 99-56, the "Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements," spells out the financial benefits government
will receive from an FTAA, as consisting of not only a basic government share,
comprised of all direct taxes, fees and royalties, as well as other payments
made by the contractor during the term of the FTAA, but also an additional
government share, being a share in the earnings or cash flows of the mining
enterprise, so as to achieve a fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits from
mining between the government and the contractor.
The additional government share is computed using one of three (3) options or
schemes detailed in DAO 99-56, viz., (1) the fifty-fifty sharing of cumulative
present value of cash flows; (2) the excess profit-related additional government
share; and (3) the additional sharing based on the cumulative net mining
revenue. Whichever option or computation is used, the additional government
share has nothing to do with taxes, duties, fees or charges. The portion of
revenues remaining after the deduction of the basic and additional government
shares is what goes to the contractor.
The basic government share and the additional government share do not yet
take into account the indirect taxes and other financial contributions of mining
projects, which are real and actual benefits enjoyed by the Filipino people; if
these are taken into account, total government share increases to 60 percent or
higher (as much as 77 percent, and 89 percent in one instance) of the net
present value of total benefits from the project.
The third or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 is slammed for deferring
the payment of the government share in FTAAs until after the contractor shall
have recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration and development
expenditures. Allegedly, the collection of the State's share is rendered
uncertain, as there is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period or recovery
period. But although RA 7942 did not limit the grace period, the concerned
agencies (DENR and MGB) in formulating the 1995 and 1996 Implementing
Rules and Regulations provided that the period of recovery, reckoned from the
date of commercial operation, shall be for a period not exceeding five years, or
until the date of actual recovery, whichever comes earlier.
And since RA 7942 allegedly does not require government approval for the pre-
operating, exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractors, it
is feared that such expenses could be bloated to wipe out mining revenues
anticipated for 10 years, with the result that the State's share is zero for the
first 10 years. However, the argument is based on incorrect information.
Under Section 23 of RA 7942, the applicant for exploration permit is required to
submit a proposed work program for exploration, containing a yearly budget of
proposed expenditures, which the State passes upon and either approves or
rejects; if approved, the same will subsequently be recorded as pre-operating
expenses that the contractor will have to recoup over the grace period.
Under Section 24, when an exploration permittee files with the MGB a
declaration of mining project feasibility, it must submit a work program for
development, with corresponding budget, for approval by the Bureau, before
government may grant an FTAA or MPSA or other mineral agreements; again,
government has the opportunity to approve or reject the proposed work
program and budgeted expenditures for development works, which will become
the pre-operating and development costs that will have to be recovered.
Government is able to know ahead of time the amounts of pre-operating and
other expenses to be recovered, and the approximate period of time needed
therefor. The aforecited provisions have counterparts in Section 35, which deals
with the terms and conditions exclusively applicable to FTAAs. In sum, the third
or last paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 cannot be deemed defective.
Section 80 of RA 7942 allegedly limits the State's share in a mineral production-
sharing agreement (MPSA) to just the excise tax on the mineral product, i.e.,
only 2 percent of market value of the minerals. The colatilla in Section 84
reiterates the same limitation in Section 80. However, these two provisions
pertain only to MPSAs, and have no application to FTAAs. These particular
provisions do not come within the issues defined by this Court. Hence, on due
process grounds, no pronouncement can be made in this case in respect of the
constitutionality of Sections 80 and 84.

Section 112 is disparaged for reverting FTAAs and all mineral agreements to the
old "license, concession or lease" system, because it allegedly effectively
reduces the government share in FTAAs to just the 2 percent excise tax which
pursuant to Section 80 comprises the government share in MPSAs. However,
Section 112 likewise does not come within the issues delineated by this Court,
and was never touched upon by the parties in their pleadings. Moreover,
Section 112 may not properly apply to FTAAs. The mining law obviously meant
to treat FTAAs as a breed apart from mineral agreements. There is absolutely
no basis to believe that the law intends to exact from FTAA contractors merely
the same government share (i.e., the 2 percent excise tax) that it apparently
demands from contractors under the three forms of mineral agreements.
While there is ground to believe that Sections 80, 84 and 112 are indeed
unconstitutional, they cannot be ruled upon here. In any event, they are
separable; thus, a later finding of nullity will not affect the rest of RA
7942. TDSICH
In fine, the challenged provisions of RA 7942 cannot be said to surrender
financial benefits from an FTAA to the foreign contractors.
Moreover, there is no concrete basis for the view that, in FTAAs with a foreign
contractor, the State must receive at least 60 percent of the after-tax income
from the exploitation of its mineral resources, and that such share is the
equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60 percent of the
capital, and hence 60 percent of the income, of mining companies should
remain in Filipino hands. Even if the State is entitled to a 60 percent share from
other mineral agreements (CPA, JVA and MPSA), that would not create a
parallel or analogous situation for FTAAs. We are dealing with an essentially
different equation. Here we have the old apples and oranges syndrome.
The Charter did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60 percent share,
applicable to all situations, regardless of circumstances. There is no indication
of such an intention on the part of the framers. Moreover, the terms and
conditions of petroleum FTAAs cannot serve as standards for mineral mining
FTAAs, because thetechnical and operational requirements, cost structures and
investment needs of off-shore petroleum exploration and drilling companies do
not have the remotest resemblance to those of on-shore mining companies.
To take the position that government's share must be not less than 60 percent
of after-tax income of FTAA contractors is nothing short of this Court dictating
upon the government. The State resultantly ends up losing control. To avoid
compromising the State's full control and supervision over the exploitation of
mineral resources, there must be no attempt to impose a "minimum 60
percent" rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and means, should it
so decide, to get a 60 percent share (or greater); and it is not necessary that the
State does so in every case.
Invalid Provisions of
the WMCP FTAA
Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA clearly renders illusory the State's 60 percent
share of WMCP's revenues. Under Section 7.9, should WMCP's foreign
stockholders (who originally owned 100 percent of the equity) sell 60 percent
or more of their equity to a Filipino citizen or corporation, the State loses its
right to receive its share in net mining revenues under Section 7.7, without any
offsetting compensation to the State. And what is given to the State in Section
7.7 is by mere tolerance of WMCP's foreign stockholders, who can at any time
cut off the government's entire share by simply selling 60 percent of WMCP's
equity to a Philippine citizen or corporation.
In fact, the sale by WMCP's foreign stockholder on January 23, 2001 of the
entire outstanding equity in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., a domestic
corporation at least 60 percent Filipino owned, can be deemed to have
automatically triggered the operation of Section 7.9 and removed the State's
right to receive its 60 percent share. Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA
has effectively given away the State's share without anything in exchange.
Moreover, it constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the local and foreign
stockholders in WMCP, because by the mere act of divestment, the local and
foreign stockholders get a windfall, as their share in the net mining revenues of
WMCP is automatically increased, without having to pay anything for it.
Being grossly disadvantageous to government and detrimental to the Filipino
people, as well as violative of public policy, Section 7.9 must therefore be
stricken off as invalid. The FTAA in question does not involve mere contractual
rights, but, being impressed as it is with public interest, the contractual
provisions and stipulations must yield to the common good and the national
interest. Since the offending provision is very much separable from the rest of
the FTAA, the deletion of Section 7.9 can be done without affecting or requiring
the invalidation of the entire WMCP FTAA itself.
Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA likewise is invalid, since by allowing the sums
spent by government for the benefit of the contractor to be deductible from
the State's share in net mining revenues, it results in benefiting the contractor
twice over. This constitutes unjust enrichment on the part of the contractor, at
the expense of government. For being grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial
to government and contrary to public policy, Section 7.8(e) must also be
declared without effect. It may likewise be stricken off without affecting the
rest of the FTAA.
Epilogue
AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE, it is clear that there is unanimous agreement in
the Court upon the key principle that the State must exercise full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources.
The crux of the controversy is the amount of discretion to be accorded the
Executive Department, particularly the President of the Republic, in respect of
negotiations over the terms of FTAAs, particularly when it comes to the
government share of financial benefits from FTAAs. The Court believes that it is
not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive,
given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts
of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the
complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade,
coupled with the State's need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to
preserve and enhance our country's competitiveness in world markets.
We are all, in one way or another, sorely affected by the recently reported
scandals involving corruption in high places, duplicity in the negotiation of
multi-billion peso government contracts, huge payoffs to government officials,
and other malfeasances; and perhaps, there is the desire to see some measures
put in place to prevent further abuse. However, dictating upon the President
what minimum share to get from an FTAA is not the solution. It sets a bad
precedent since such a moveinstitutionalizes the very reduction if not
deprivation of the State's control. The remedy may be worse than the problem
it was meant to address. In any event, provisions in such future agreements
which may be suspected to be grossly disadvantageous or detrimental to
government may be challenged in court, and the culprits haled before the bar
of justice.
Verily, under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal
and coordinate branches of government, this Court must restrain itself from
intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress
maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the
assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and
answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country.
"The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of
government of their official functions." 99 As aptly spelled out seven decades
ago by Justice George Malcolm, "Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department
of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act." 100 Let
the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political
branches of government. And let not this Court interfere inordinately and
unnecessarily.
The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the
repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people. We fully
sympathize with the plight of Petitioner La Bugal B'laan and other tribal groups,
and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, we cannot
justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its
implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA
contract.
We must never forget that it is not only our less privileged brethren in tribal and
cultural communities who deserve the attention of this Court; rather, all parties
concerned including the State itself, the contractor (whether Filipino or
foreign), and the vast majority of our citizens equally deserve the protection
of the law and of this Court. To stress, the benefits to be derived by the State
from mining activities must ultimately serve the great majority of our fellow
citizens. They have as much right and interest in the proper and well-ordered
development and utilization of the country's mineral resources as the
petitioners.
Whether we consider the near term or take the longer view, we cannot
overemphasize the need for an appropriate balancing of interests and needs
the need to develop our stagnating mining industry and extract what NEDA
Secretary Romulo Neri estimates is some US$840 billion (approx. PhP47.04
trillion) worth of mineral wealth lying hidden in the ground, in order to
jumpstart our floundering economy on the one hand, and on the other, the
need to enhance our nationalistic aspirations, protect our indigenous
communities, and prevent irreversible ecological damage.

This Court cannot but be mindful that any decision rendered in this case will
ultimately impact not only the cultural communities which lodged the instant
Petition, and not only the larger community of the Filipino people now
struggling to survive amidst a fiscal/budgetary deficit, ever increasing prices of
fuel, food, and essential commodities and services, the shrinking value of the
local currency, and a government hamstrung in its delivery of basic services by a
severe lack of resources, but also countless future generations of Filipinos.
For this latter group of Filipinos yet to be born, their eventual access to
education, health care and basic services, their overall level of well-being, the
very shape of their lives are even now being determined and affected partly by
the policies and directions being adopted and implemented by government
today. And in part by this Resolution rendered by this Court today.
Verily, the mineral wealth and natural resources of this country are meant to
benefit not merely a select group of people living in the areas locally affected by
mining activities, but the entire Filipino nation, present and future, to whom the
mineral wealth really belong. This Court has therefore weighed carefully the
rights and interests of all concerned, and decided for the greater good of the
greatest number. JUSTICE FOR ALL, not just for some; JUSTICE FOR THE
PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, not just for the here and now.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents' and the
intervenors' Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Court's January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this
new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the
Philippine Mining Law), (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640 insofar as they relate to financial
and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and
Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except Sections 7.8 and
7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to
public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ .,
concur.
Puno, J ., consurs in the result and vote to invalidate sections 3.3; 7.8 and 7.9 of
the WMC FTAA.
Quisumbing, J ., concurs in the result.
Carpio, J ., see dissenting opinion.
Corona, J ., Davide, Jr., C.J. certifies that Justice Corona voted affirmatively with
the majority and he was allowed to do so although he is on leave.
Carpio Morales, J ., please see my dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J ., concurs with dissenting opinion of J. Carpio.
Azcuna, J ., took no part same reason.
Tinga, J ., concurs with a separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J ., concurs. Pls. see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I dissent and vote to deny respondents' motions for reconsideration. I find that
Section 3(aq), Section 39, Section 80, the second paragraph of Section 81, the
proviso in Section 84, and the first proviso in Section 112 of Republic Act No.
7942 1 ("RA 7942") violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and are
therefore unconstitutional.
In essence, these provisions of RA 7942 waive the State's ownership rights
under the Constitution over mineral resources. These provisions also abdicate
the State's constitutional duty to control and supervise fully the exploitation of
mineral resources.
A.The Threshold Issue for Resolution
Petitioners claim that respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Secretary Victor O. Ramos, in issuing the rules to implement RA
7942, gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assert that RA 7942 is unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1.RA 7942 "allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral
resources in a manner contrary to Section
2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the
Constitution";
2.RA 7942 "allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as
well as fully foreign owned corporations of
the nation's marine wealth contrary to
Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution";
3.RA 7942 "violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution";
4.RA 7942 "allows priority to foreign and fully foreign
owned corporations in the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral
resources contrary to Article XII of the
Constitution";
5.RA 7942 "allows the inequitable sharing of wealth
contrary to Section 1, paragraph 1, and
Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the
Constitution."2 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also assail the validity of the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement between the Philippine Government and WMCP (Philippines),
Inc. dated 2 March 1995 3 ("WMCP FTAA") for violation of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The issues that petitioners raise boil down to whether RA 7942 and the WMCP
FTAA violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
B.The Constitutional Declaration and Mandate
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution 4 provides as follows:
All . . . minerals, . . . petroleum, and other mineral oils,
. . . and other natural resources are owned by the
State. . . . The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Two basic principles flow from this constitutional provision. First, the
Constitution vests in the State ownership of all mineral resources. Second,
the Constitution mandates the State to exercise full control and
supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources.
The first principle reiterates the Regalian doctrine, which established State
ownership of natural resources since the arrival of the Spaniards in the
Philippines in the 16th century. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
incorporate the Regalian doctrine. 5 The State, as owner of the nation's natural
resources, exercises the attributes of ownership over its natural resources. 6 An
important attribute of ownership is the right to receive the income from any
commercial exploitation of the natural resources. 7
The second principle insures that the benefits of State ownership of natural
resources accrue to the Filipino people. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
introduced the second principle to avoid the adverse effects of the "license,
concession or lease" 8 system of exploitation under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. 9 The "license, concession or lease" system enriched the private
concessionaires who controlled the exploitation of natural resources. However,
the "license, concession or lease" system left the Filipino people impoverished,
starkly exemplified by the nation's denuded forests whose exploitation did not
benefit the Filipino people.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended to abandon the "license,
concession or lease" system prevailing under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
This exchange in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveals this
clear intent:
MR. DAVIDE:Thank you, Mr. Vice-President. I would
like to seek some clarifications.
MR. VILLEGAS:Yes. cHSIDa
MR. DAVIDE:Under the proposal, I notice that except
for the lands of the public domain, all the
other natural resources cannot be alienated
and in respect to lands of the public
domain, private corporations with the
required ownership by Filipino citizens can
only lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as
other natural resources are concerned, it
would only be the State which can exploit,
develop, explore and utilize the same.
However, the State may enter into a joint
venture, co-production or production-
sharing. Is that not correct?
MR. VILLEGAS:Yes.
MR. DAVIDE:Consequently, henceforth upon the
approval of this Constitution, no timber or
forest concessions, permits or authorization
can be exclusively granted to any citizen of
the Philippines nor to any corporation
qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain?
MR. VILLEGAS:Would Commissioner Monsod like to
comment on that? I think his answer is
"yes."
MR. DAVIDE:So, what will happen now to licenses or
concessions earlier granted by the
Philippine government to private
corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would
they be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS:This is not applied retroactively. They
will be respected. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
To carry out this intent, the 1987 Constitution uses a different phraseology from
that used in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The previous Constitutions used
the phrase "license, concession or lease" in referring to exploitation of natural
resources. The 1987 Constitution uses the phrase "co-production, joint venture
or production-sharing agreements," with "full control and supervision" by the
State. The change in language was a clear rejection of the old system of
"license, concession or lease."
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions also used the words "belong to" in stating the
Regalian doctrine, thus declaring that natural resources "belong to the State."
The 1987 Constitution uses the word "owned," thus prescribing that natural
resources are "owned" by the State. In using the word "owned," the 1987
Constitution emphasizes the attributes of ownership, among which is the right
to the income of the property owned. 11
The State as owner of the natural resources must receive income from the
exploitation of its natural resources. The payment of taxes, fees and charges,
derived from the taxing or police power of the State, is not a substitute. The
State is duty bound to secure for the Filipino people a fair share of the income
from any exploitation of the nation's precious and exhaustible natural
resources. As explained succinctly by a textbook writer:

Under the former licensing, concession, or lease
schemes, the government benefited from such
activities only through fees, charges and taxes. Such
benefits were very minimal compared with the
enormous profits reaped by the licensees,
concessionaires or lessees who had control over the
particular resources over which they had been given
exclusive right to exploit. Moreover, some of them
disregarded the conservation of natural resources.
With the new role, the State will be able to obtain a
greater share in the profits. It can also actively
husband our natural resources and engage in
development programs that will be beneficial to the
nation. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the 1987 Constitution commands the State to exercise full control and
supervision over the exploitation of natural resources to insure that the State
receives its fair share of the income. In Miners Association of the Philippines v.
Hon. Factoran, Jr., et al., 13 the Court ruled that "the old system of exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources through 'license, concession or
lease' . . . has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution."
The Court explained:
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987, the State assumed a more dynamic
role in the exploration, development and utilization of
the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section
2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of
the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to theeconomic growth and general
welfare of the country. (Emphasis supplied)
The old system of "license, concession or lease" which merely gave the State a
pittance in the form of taxes, fees and charges is now buried in history. Any
attempt to resurrect it is unconstitutional and deserves outright rejection by
this Court.
The Constitution prohibits the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands. 14 The Constitution, however, allows the State to exploit
commercially its natural resources and sell the marketable products from such
exploitation. This the State may do through a co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing arrangement with companies at least 60% Filipino owned.
The necessary implication is that the State, as owner of the natural resources,
must receive a fair share of the income from such commercial operation. The
State may receive its share of the net income in cash or in kind.
The State may also directly exploit its natural resources in either of two ways.
The State may set up its own company to engage in the exploitation of natural
resources. Alternatively, the State may enter into a financial or technical
assistance agreement ("FTAA") with private companies who act as contractors
of the State. The State may seek from such contractors either financial or
technical assistance, or both, depending on the State's own needs. Under an
FTAA, the contractor, foreign or local, manages the contracted work or
operations to the extent of its financial or technical contribution, subject to the
State's control and supervision.
Except in large-scale exploitation of certain minerals, the State's contractors
must be 60% Filipino owned companies. The State pays such contractors, for
their technical services or financial assistance, a share of the income from the
exploitation of the natural resources. The State retains the remainder of the
income after paying the Filipino owned contractor.
In large-scale exploitation of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
Constitution allows the State to contract with "foreign-owned
corporations" under an FTAA. This is still a direct exploitation by the State but
using a foreign instead of a local contractor. However, the Constitution requires
that the participation of foreign contractors must make a real contribution to
the national economy and the general welfare. The State pays the foreign
contractor, for its technical services or financial assistance, a share of the
income from the exploitation of the minerals, petroleum or other mineral oils.
The State retains the rest of the income after paying the foreign contractor.
Whether the FTAA contractor is local or foreign, the State must retain its fair
share of the income from the exploitation of the natural resources that it owns.
To insure it retains its fair share of the income, the State must exercise full
control and supervision over the exploitation of its natural resources. And
whether the FTAA contractor is local or foreign, the State is directly
undertaking the exploitation of its natural resources, with the FTAA contractor
providing technical services or financing to the State. Since the State is directly
undertaking the exploitation, all exploration permits and similar authorizations
are in the name of the Philippine Government, which then authorizes the
contractor to act on its behalf.
The State exercises full control and supervision over the mining operations in
the Philippines of the foreign contractor. However, the State does not exercise
control and supervision over the foreign contractor itself or its board of
directors. The State does not also exercise any control or supervision over the
foreign contractor's mining operations in other countries, or even its non-
mining operations in the Philippines. There is no conflict of power between the
State and the foreign contractor's board of directors. By entering into an FTAA,
the foreign contractor, through its board of directors, agrees to manage the
contracted work or operations to the extent of its financial or technical
contribution subject to the State's control and supervision.
No government should contract with a corporation, local or foreign, to exploit
commercially the nation's natural resources without the State receiving any
income as owner of the natural resources. Natural resources are non-renewable
and exhaustible assets of the State. Certainly, no government in its right mind
should give away for free its natural resources to private business enterprises,
local or foreign, amidst widespread poverty among its people.
In sum, two basic constitutional principles govern the exploitation of natural
resources in the country. First, the State owns the country's natural resources
and must benefit as owner from any exploitation of its natural resources.
Second, to insure that it receives its fair share as owner of the natural
resources, the State must exercise full control and supervision over the
exploitation of its natural resources.
We shall subject RA 7942 to constitutional scrutiny based on these two basic
principles.
C.Waiver of Beneficial Rights from Ownership of Mineral Resources
RA 7942 contains five provisions which waive the State's right to receive income
from the exploitation of its mineral resources. These provisions are Sections 39,
80, 81, 84 and 112:
Section 39.Option to Convert into a Mineral
Agreement. The contractor has the option to convert
the financial or technical assistance agreement to a
mineral agreement at any time during the term of the
agreement, if the economic viability of the contract
area is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale
mining operations, after proper notice to the Secretary
as provided for under the implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, That the mineral agreement
shall only be for the remaining period of the original
agreement. AEHCDa
In the case of a foreign contractor, it shall reduce its
equity to forty percent (40%) in the corporation,
partnership, association, or cooperative. Upon
compliance with this requirement by the contractor,
the Secretary shall approve the conversion and execute
the mineral production-sharing agreement.
Section 80.Government Share in Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement. The total government share in a
mineral production sharing agreement shall be the
excise tax on mineral products as provided in Republic
Act No. 7729, amending Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Section 81.Government Share in Other Mineral
Agreements. The share of the Government in co-
production and joint-venture agreements shall be
negotiated by the Government and the contractor
taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of
the project, (b) risks involved, (c) contribution of the
project to the economy, and (d) other factors that will
provide for a fair and equitable sharing between the
Government and the contractor. The Government shall
also be entitled to compensation for its other
contributions which shall be agreed upon by the
parties, and shall consist, among other things, the
contractor's income tax, excise tax, special allowance,
withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign
stockholders arising from dividend or interest
payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a
foreign national, and all such other taxes, duties and
fees as provided for under existing laws.
The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.
The collection of Government share in financial or
technical assistance agreement shall commence after
the financial or technical assistance agreement
contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating
expenses, exploration, and development expenditures,
inclusive.

Section 84.Excise Tax on Mineral Products. The
contractor shall be liable to pay the excise tax on
mineral products as provided for under Section 151 of
the National Internal Revenue Code: Provided,
however, That with respect to a mineral production
sharing agreement, the excise tax on mineral products
shall be the government share under said agreement.
Section 112.Non-impairment of Existing
Mining/Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing
mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases
pending renewal, mineral production sharing
agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid . .
.Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV 15 on
government share in mineral production-sharing
agreement . . . shall immediately govern and apply to a
mining lessee or contractor unless the mining lessee or
contractor indicates his intention to the Secretary, in
writing, not to avail of said provisions: . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 80 of RA 7942 limits to the excise tax the State's share in a mineral
production-sharing agreement ("MPSA"). Section 80 expressly states that the
excise tax on mineral products shall constitute the "total government share in a
mineral production sharing agreement." Under Section 151(A) of the Tax Code,
this excise tax on metallic and non-metallic minerals is only 2% of the market
value, as follows:
Section 151.Mineral Products.
(A)Rates of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and
collected on minerals, mineral products and quarry
resources, excise tax as follows:
(1)On coal and coke, a tax of Ten pesos (P10.00) per
metric ton;
(2)On all nonmetallic minerals and quarry resources, a
tax of two percent (2%) based on the actual market
value of the gross output thereof at the time of
removal, in the case of those locally extracted or
produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs
in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise
tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation.
xxx xxx xxx
(3)On all metallic minerals, a tax based on the actual
market value of the gross output thereof at the time of
removal, in the case of those locally extracted or
produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs
in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise
tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation, in
accordance with the following schedule:
(a)Copper and other metallic minerals:
(i)On the first three (3) years upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No.
7729, one percent (1%);
(ii)On the fourth and the fifth years, one
and a half percent (1 1/2%); and
(iii)On the sixth year and thereafter, two
percent (2%).
(b)Gold and chromite, two percent (2%).
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 80 of RA 7942 does not allow the State to receive any income as owner
of the mineral resources. The proviso in Section 84 of RA 7942 reiterates this
when it states that "the excise tax on mineral products shall be the government
share under said agreement." 16 The State receives only an excise tax flowing
from its taxing power, not from its ownership of the mineral resources. The
excise tax is imposed not only on mineral products, but also on alcohol, tobacco
and automobiles 17produced by companies that do not exploit natural
resources owned by the State. The excise tax is not payment for the
exploitation of the State's natural resources, but payment for the "privilege of
engaging in business." 18 Clearly, under Section 80 of RA 7942, the State does
not receive as owner of the mineral resources any income from the exploitation
of its mineral resources.
The second paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 also limits the State's share in
FTAAs with foreign contractors to taxes, duties and fees. Section 81 of RA 7942
provides that the State's share in FTAAs with foreign contractors
shall consist of, among other things, the contractor's
corporate income tax, excise tax, special allowance,
withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign
stockholders arising from dividend or interest
payments to the said foreign stockholder in case of a
foreign national and all such other taxes, duties and
fees as provided for under existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied)
RA 7942 does not explain the phrase "among other things." The Solicitor
General states correctly that the phrase refers to taxes. 19 The phrase is
an ejusdem generis phrase, and means "among other taxes, duties and
fees" since the items specifically enumerated are all taxes, duties and fees.
The last phrase "all such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under
existing laws" at the end of the sentence clarifies further that the phrase
"among other things" refers to taxes, duties and fees.
The second paragraph of Section 81 does not require the Government and the
foreign FTAA contractor to negotiate the State's share. In contrast, the first
paragraph of Section 81 expressly provides that the "share of the Government
in co-production and joint-venture agreements shall be negotiated by the
Government and the contractor" which is 60% Filipino owned.
In a co-production or joint venture agreement, the Government contributes
other inputs or equity in addition to its mineral resources. 20 Thus, the first
paragraph of Section 81 requires the Government and the 60% Filipino owned
company to negotiate the State's share. However, in an FTAA with a foreign
contractor under the second paragraph of Section 81, the Government's
contribution is only the mineral resources. Section 81 does not require the
Government and the foreign contractor to negotiate the State's share from the
net proceeds because there is no share for the State. Section 81 does not
recognize the State's contribution of mineral resources as worthy of any share of
the net proceeds from the mining operations.
Thus, in FTAAs with foreign contractors under RA 7942, the State's share is
limited to taxes, fees and duties. The taxes include "withholding tax due from
the contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend or interest
payments." All these taxes, fees and duties are imposed pursuant to the State's
taxing power. The tax on income, including dividend and interest income, is
imposed on all taxpayers whether or not they are stockholders of mining
companies. These taxes, fees and duties are not contractual payments to the
State as owner of the mineral resources but are mandatory exactions based on
the taxing power of the State.
Section 112 of RA 7942 is another provision that violates Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 112 "immediately" reverts all mineral
agreements to the old and discredited "license, concession or lease" system
outlawed by the 1987 Constitution. Section 112 states that "the provisions of
Chapter XIV 21 on government share in mineral production-sharing agreement .
. . shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor." The
contractor, local or foreign, will now pay only the "government share in a
mineral production-sharing agreement" under RA 7942. Section 80 of RA 7942,
which specifically governs MPSAs, limits the "government share" solely to the
excise tax on mineral products 2% on metallic and non-metallic minerals and
3% on indigenous petroleum.
In allowing the payment of the excise tax as the only share of the government
in any mineral agreement, whether co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing, Section 112 of RA 7942 reinstates the old "license, concession or lease"
system where the State receives only minimal taxes, duties and fees. This
clearly violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and is therefore
unconstitutional. Section 112 of RA 7942 is a sweeping negation of the clear
letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution that the exploitation of the State's
natural resources must benefit primarily the Filipino people.
Of course, Section 112 gives contractors the option not to avail of the benefit of
Section 112. This is in the guise that the enactment of RA 7942 shall not impair
pre-existing mining rights, as the heading of Section 112 states. It is doubtful,
however, if any contractor of sound mind would refuse to receive 100% rather
than only 40% of the net proceeds from the exploitation of minerals under the
FTAA.
Another provision that violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution is
Section 39 of RA 7942. Section 39 grants the foreign contractor the option to
convert the FTAA into a "mineral production-sharing agreement" if the foreign
contractor finds that the mineral deposits do not justify large-scale mining
operations. Section 39 of RA 7942 operates to deprive the State of income from
the mining operations and limits the State to the excise tax on mineral
products.
Section 39 grants the foreign contractor the option to revert to the "license,
concession or lease" system which the 1987 Constitution has banned. The only
requirement for the exercise of the option is for the foreign contractor to divest
60% of its equity to a Philippine citizen or to a corporation 60% Filipino owned.
Section 39 states, "Upon compliance with this requirement by the contractor,
the Secretary shall approve the conversion and execute the mineral production-
sharing agreement." The foreign contractor only needs to give "proper notice to
the Secretary as provided for under the implementing rules and regulations" if
the contractor finds the contract area not viable for large-scale mining. Thus,
Section 39 of RA 7942 is unconstitutional.
Sections 39, 80, 81, 84 and 112 of RA 7942 operate to deprive the State of the
beneficial rights arising from its ownership of mineral resources. What Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution vests in absolute ownership to the State,
Sections 80, 81, 84 and 112 of RA 7942 take away and give for free to private
business enterprises, including foreign-owned companies.
The legislature has discretion whether to tax a business or product. If the
legislature chooses to tax a business or product, it is free to determine the rate
or amount of the tax, provided it is not confiscatory. 22 The legislature has the
discretion to impose merely a 2% excise tax on mineral products. Courts cannot
inquire into the wisdom of the amount of such tax, no matter how meager it
may be. This discretion of the legislature emanates from the State's taxing
power, a power vested solely in the legislature.

However, the legislature has no power to waive for free the benefits accruing to
the State from its ownership of mineral resources. Absent considerations of
social justice, the legislature has no power to give away for free what forms part
of the national patrimony of the State. Any surrender by the legislature of the
nation's mineral resources, especially to foreign private enterprises, is
repugnant to the concept of national patrimony. Mineral resources form part of
the national patrimony under Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Under the last paragraph of Section 81, the collection of the State's so-called
"share" (consisting of taxes) in FTAAs with foreign contractors is not even
certain. This paragraph provides that the State's "share . . . shall commence
after the financial or technical assistance agreement contractor has fully
recovered its pre-operating expenses, exploration, and development
expenditures." There is no time limit in RA 7942 for this grace period when the
collection of the State's "share" does not run.23
RA 7942 itself does not require government approval for the pre-operating,
exploration and development expenses of the foreign contractor. The
determination of the amount of pre-operating, exploration and development
expenses is left solely to the discretion of the foreign contractor. Nothing
prevents the foreign contractor from recording pre-operating, exploration and
development expenses equal to the mining revenues it anticipates for the first
10 years. If that happens, the State's share is ZERO for the first 10 years.
The Government cannot tell the Filipino people when the State will start to
receive its "share" (consisting of taxes) in mining revenues under the FTAA. The
Executive Department cannot correct these deficiencies in RA 7942 through
remedial implementing rules. The correction involves substantive legislation,
not merely filling in the implementing details of the law. ESTAIH
Taxes, fees and duties cannot constitute payment for the State's share as owner
of the mineral resources. This was the mode of payment used under the old
system of "license, concession or lease" which the 1987 Constitution
abrogated. Obviously, Sections 80, 81, 84 and 112 of RA 7942 constitute an
ingenious attempt to resurrect the old and discredited system, which the 1987
Constitution has now outlawed. Under the 1987 Constitution, the State must
receive its fair share as owner of the mineral resources, separate from taxes,
fees and duties paid by taxpayers. The legislature may waive taxes, fees and
duties, but it cannot waive the States share in mining operations.
Any law waiving for free the State's right to the benefits arising from its
ownership of mineral resources is unconstitutional. Such law negates Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution vesting ownership of mineral resources in
the State. Such law will not contribute to "economic growth and the general
welfare of the country" as required in the fourth paragraph of Section 2. Thus,
in waiving the State's income from the exploitation of mineral resources,
Section 80, the second paragraph of Section 81, the proviso in Section 84, and
Section 112 of RA 7942 violate the Constitution and are therefore void.
D.Abdication of the State's Duty to Control and Supervise Fully the
Exploitation of Mineral Resources
The 1987 Constitution commands the State to exercise "full control and
supervision" over the exploitation of natural resources. The purpose of this
mandatory directive is to insure that the State receives its fair share in the
exploitation of natural resources. The framers of the Constitution were
determined to avoid the disastrous mistakes of the past. Under the old system
of "license, concession or lease," the State gave full control to the
concessionaires who enriched themselves while paying the State minimal taxes,
fees and charges.
Under the 1987 Constitution, for a co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreement to be valid, the State must exercise full control and
supervision over the mining operations. This means that the State should
approve all capital and operating expenses in the exploitation of the natural
resources. Approval of capital expenses determines how much capital is
recoverable by the mining contractor. Approval of operating expenses
determines the reasonable amounts deductible from the annual income from
mining operations. Such approvals are essential because the net income from
mining operations, which is the basis of the State's share, depends on the
allowable amount of capital and operating expenses. There is approval of
capital and operating expenses when the State approves them, or if the State
disapproves them and a dispute arises, when their final allowance is subject to
arbitration.
The provisions of RA 7942 on MPSAs and FTAAs do not give the State any
control and supervision over mining operations. The reason is obvious. The
State's so-called "share" in a mineral production-sharing agreement under
Section 80 is limited solely to the excise tax on mineral products. This excise tax
is based on the market value of the mineral product determined without
reference to the capital or operating expenses of the mining contractor.
Likewise, the State's "share" in an FTAA under Section 81 has no relation to the
capital or operating expenses of the foreign contractor. The State's "share"
constitutes the same excise tax on mineral products, in addition to other direct
and indirect taxes. The basis of the excise tax is the selling price of the mineral
product. Hence, there is no reason for the State to approve or disapprove the
capital or operating expenses of the mining contractor. Consequently, RA 7942
does not give the State any control and supervision over mining operations
contrary to the express command of the Constitution. This makes Section 80,
the second paragraph of Section 81, the proviso in Section 84, and Section 112
of RA 7942 unconstitutional. cdasia
E.RA 7942 Will Not Contribute to Economic Growth or General Welfare of
the Country
The fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires
that FTAAs with foreign contractors must make "real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country." Under Section 81 of RA
7942, all the net proceeds arising from the exploitation of mineral resources
accrue to the foreign contractor even if the State owns the mineral resources.
The foreign contractor will naturally repatriate the entire after-tax net proceeds
to its home country. Sections 94(a) and 94(b) of RA 7942 guarantee the foreign
contractor the right to repatriate its after-tax net proceeds, as well as its entire
capital investment, after the termination of its mining operations in the
country. 24
Clearly, no FTAA under Section 81 will ever make any real contribution to the
growth of the economy or to the general welfare of the country. The foreign
contractor, after it ceases to operate in the country, can even remit to its home
country the scrap value of its capital equipment. Thus, the second paragraph of
Section 81 of RA 7942 is unconstitutional for failure to meet the constitutional
requirement that the FTAA with a foreign contractor should make a real
contribution to the national economy and general welfare.
F.Example of FTAA that Complies with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution
The Solicitor General warns that declaring unconstitutional RA 7942 or its
provisions will endanger the Philippine Government's contract with the foreign
contractor extracting petroleum in Malampaya, Palawan. 25 On the contrary,
the FTAA with the foreign petroleum contractor meets the essential
constitutional requirements since the State receives a fair share of the income
from the petroleum operations. The State also exercises control and supervision
over the exploitation of the petroleum. The petroleum FTAA provides enough
safeguards to insure that the petroleum operations will make a real
contribution to the national economy and general welfare.
The Service Contract dated 11 December 1990 between the Philippine
Government as the first party, and Occidental Philippines, Inc. and Shell
Exploration B.V. as the second party 26 ("Occidental-Shell FTAA"), covering
offshore exploitation of petroleum in Northwest Palawan, contains the
following provisions:
a.There is express recognition that the "conduct of
Petroleum Operations shall be under the full
control and supervision of the Office of
Energy Affairs," 27now Department of
Energy ("DOE"), and that the "CONTRACTOR
shall undertake and execute the Petroleum
Operations contemplated hereunder under
the full control and supervision of the
OFFICE OF ENERGY AFFAIRS;" 28
b.The State receives 60% of the net proceeds from the
petroleum operations, while the foreign
contractor receives the remaining 40%; 29
c.The DOE has a right to inspect and audit every year
the foreign contractor's books and accounts
relating to the petroleum operations, and
object in writing to any expense (operating
and capital expenses) 30 within 60 days
from completion of the audit, and if there is
no amicable settlement, the dispute goes to
arbitration; 31
d.The operating expenses in any year cannot exceed
70% of the gross proceeds from the sale of
petroleum in the same year, and any excess
may be carried over in succeeding years; 32
e.The Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") can inspect
and examine all the accounts, books and
records of the foreign contractor relating to
the petroleum operations upon 24 hours
written notice; 33
f.The petroleum output is sold at posted or market
prices; 34
g.The foreign contractor pays the 32% Philippine
corporate income tax on its 40% share of
the net proceeds, including withholding tax
on dividends or remittances of
profits. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
The Occidental-Shell FTAA gives the State its fair share of the income from the
petroleum operations of the foreign contractor. There is no question that the
State receives its rightful share, amounting to 60% of the net proceeds, in
recognition of its ownership of the petroleum resources. In addition,
Occidental-Shell's 40% share in the net proceeds is subject to the 32%
Philippine income tax. The Occidental-Shell FTAA also gives the State, through
the DOE and BIR, full control and supervision over the petroleum operations of
the foreign contractor. The foreign contractor can recover only the capital and
operating expenses approved by the DOE or by the arbitral panel. 36 The
Occidental-Shell FTAA also contains other safeguards to protect the interest of
the State as owner of the petroleum resources. While the foreign contractor
manages the contracted work or operations to the extent of its financial or
technical contribution, there are sufficient safeguards in the FTAA to insure
compliance with the constitutional requirements. The terms of the Occidental-
Shell FTAA are fair to the State and to Occidental-Shell.

In FTAAs with a foreign contractor, the State must receive at least 60% percent
of the net proceeds from the exploitation of its mineral resources. This share is
the equivalent of the constitutional requirement that at least 60% of the
capital, and hence 60% of the income, of mining companies should remain in
Filipino hands.Intervenor CMP and even respondent WMCP agree that the State
has a 60% interest in the mining operations under an FTAA with a foreign
contractor. Intervenor CMP asserts that the Philippine Government "stands in
the place of the 60% Filipino-owned company." 37 Intervenor CMP also states
that "the contractor will get 40% of the financial benefits," 38 admitting that the
State, which is the owner of the mineral resources, will retain the remaining
60% of the net proceeds.
Respondent WMCP likewise admits that the 60%40% "sharing ratio between
the Philippine Government and the Contractor is also in accordance with the
60%40% equity requirement for Filipino-owned corporations." 39 Respondent
WMCP even adds that the 60%40% sharing ratio is "in line with the intent
behind Section 2 of Article XII that the Filipino people, as represented by the
State, benefit primarily from the exploration, development, and utilization of the
Philippines' natural resources." 40 If the State has a 60% interest in the mining
operations under an FTAA, then it must retain at least 60% of the net proceeds.
Otherwise, there is no sense exploiting the State's natural resources if all or a
major part of the profits are remitted abroad, precluding any real contribution
to the national economy or the general welfare. The constitutional requirement
of full control and supervision necessarily means that the State must receive the
income that corresponds to the party exercising full control, and this logically
means a majority of the income.
The Occidental-Shell FTAA satisfies these constitutional requirements because
the State receives 60% of the net proceeds and exercises full control and
supervision of the petroleum operations. The State's right to receive 60% of the
net proceeds and its exercise of full control and supervision are the essential
constitutional requirements for the validity of any FTAA. The name given to the
contract is immaterial whether a "Service Contract" or any other name
provided these two essential constitutional requirements are present. Thus, the
designation of the Occidental-Shell FTAA as a "Service Contract" is
inconsequential since the two essential constitutional requirements for the
validity of the contract as an FTAA are present.
With the State's right to receive 60% of the net proceeds, coupled with its
control and supervision, the petroleum operations in the Occidental-Shell FTAA
are legally and in fact 60% owned and controlled by Filipinos. Indeed, the State
is directly undertaking the petroleum exploitation with Occidental-Shell as the
foreign contractor. The Occidental-Shell FTAA does not provide for the issuance
of exploration permits to Occidental-Shell precisely because the State itself is
directly undertaking the petroleum exploitation.
Section 3(aq) of RA 7942 allows the foreign contractor to hold the exploration
permit under the FTAA. However, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
does not allow foreign owned corporations to undertake directly mining
operations. Foreign owned corporations can only act as contractors of the State
under the FTAA, which is one method for the State to undertake directly the
exploitation of its natural resources. The State, as the party directly undertaking
the exploitation of its natural resources, must hold through the Government all
exploration permits and similar authorizations. Section 3(aq) of RA 7942, in
allowing foreign owned corporations to hold exploration permits, is
unconstitutional.
The Occidental-Shell FTAA, involving a far riskier offshore venture than land-
based mining operations, is a model for emulation if foreign contractors want to
comply with the constitutional requirements. Section 112 of RA 7942, however,
negates the benefits of the State from the Occidental-Shell FTAA.
Occidental-Shell can invoke Section 112 of RA 7942 and deny the State its 60%
share of the net proceeds from the exploitation of petroleum. Section 112
allows the foreign contractor to pay only the "government share in a mineral
production-sharing agreement" under RA 7942. Section 80 of RA 7942 on
MPSAs limits the "government share" solely to the excise tax 2% on metallic
and non-metallic mineral products and 3% on petroleum. Section 112 of RA
7942 is unconstitutional since it is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
G.The WMCP FTAA Violates Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
The WMCP FTAA 41 ostensibly gives the State 60% share of the net mining
revenue. In reality, this 60% share is illusory. Section 7.7 of the WMCP FTAA
provides that:
From the Commencement of Commercial Production,
the Contractor shall pay a government share of sixty
per centum (60%) of Net Mining Revenues, calculated
in accordance with the following provisions (the
Government Share). The Contractor shall be entitled to
retain the balance of all revenues from the Mining
Operations. (Emphasis supplied)
However, under Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA, if WMCP's foreign stockholders
sell 60% of their equity to a Philippine citizen or corporation, the State loses its
right to receive its 60% share of the net mining revenues under Section 7.7.
Thus, Section 7.9 provides:
The percentage of Net Mining Revenues payable to the
Government pursuant to Clause 7.7 shall be reduced by
1% of Net Mining Revenues for every 1% ownership
interest in the Contractor held by a Qualified Entity.
(Emphasis supplied)
What Section 7.7 gives to the State, Section 7.9 takes away without any
offsetting compensation to the State. In reality, the State has no vested
right to receive any income from the exploitation of its mineral
resources. What the WMCP FTAA gives to the State in Section 7.7 is merely
by tolerance of WMCP's foreign stockholders, who can at anytime cut off
the State's entire 60% share by selling 60% of WMCP's equity to a
Philippine citizen or corporation. 42 The proceeds of such sale do not
accrue to the State but belong entirely to the foreign stockholders of
WMCP.
Section 2.1 of the WMCP FTAA defines a "Qualified Entity" to include a
corporation 60% Filipino owned and 40% foreign owned. 43 WMCP's foreign
stockholders can sell 60% of WMCP's equity to such corporation and the sale
will still trigger the operation of Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA. Thus, the State
will receive ZERO percent of the income but the foreign stockholders will own
beneficially 64% of WMCP, consisting of their remaining 40% equity and 24%
pro-rata share in the buyer-corporation. WMCP will then invoke Section 39 of
RA 7942 allowing it to convert the FTAA into an MPSA, thus subjecting WMCP
to pay only 2% excise tax on mineral products in lieu of sharing its mining
income with the State. This violates Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution requiring that only corporations "at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens" can enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements with the State.
The State, as owner of the mineral resources, must receive a fair share of the
income from any commercial exploitation of its mineral resources. Mineral
resources form part of the national patrimony, and so are the net proceeds
from such resources. The Legislature or Executive Department cannot waive the
State's right to receive a fair share of the income from such mineral resources.
The intervenor Chamber of Mines of the Philippines ("CMP") admits that under
an FTAA with a foreign contractor, the Philippine Government "stands in the
place of the 60% Filipino owned company" and hence must retain 60% of the
net proceeds. Thus, intervenor CMP concedes that:
. . . In other words, in the FTAA situation, the
Government stands in the place of the 60% Filipino-
owned company, and the 100% foreign-owned
contractor company takes all the risks of failure to find
a commercially viable large-scale ore body or oil
deposit, for which the contractor will get 40% of the
financial benefits. 44 (Emphasis supplied)
For this reason, intervenor CMP asserts that the "contractor's stipulated share
under the WMCP FTAA is limited to a maximum of 40% of the net
production." 45Intervenor CMP further insists that "60% of its (contractor's) net
returns from mining, if any, will go to the Government under the WMCP
FTAA." 46 Intervenor CMP, however, fails to consider that the Government's
60% share is illusory because under Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA, the foreign
stockholders of WMCP can reduce at any time to ZERO percent the
Government's share.
If WMCP's foreign stockholders do not immediately sell 60% of WMCP's equity
to a Philippine citizen or corporation, the State in the meantime receives its
60% share. However, under Section 7.10 of the WMCP FTAA, the State shall
receive its share "after the offsetting of the items referred to in Clauses 7.8 and
7.9," namely:
7.8.The Government Share shall be deemed to include
all of the following sums:
(a)all Government taxes, fees, levies, costs, imposts,
duties and royalties including excise tax,
corporate income tax, customs duty, sales
tax, value added tax, occupation and
regulatory fees, Government controlled
price stabilization schemes, any other form
of Government backed schemes, any tax on
dividend payments by the Contractor or its
Affiliates in respect of revenues from the
Mining Operations and any tax on interest
on domestic and foreign loans or other
financial arrangements or accommodation,
including loans extended to the Contractor
by its stockholders;
(b)any payments to local and regional government,
including taxes, fees, levies, costs, imposts,
duties, royalties, occupation and regulatory
fees and infrastructure contributions;

(c)any payments to landowners, surface rights holders,
occupiers, indigenous people or Claim-
owners;
(d)costs and expenses of fulfilling the Contractor's
obligations to contribute to national
development in accordance with Clause
10.1(i)(1) and 10.1(i)(2);
(e)an amount equivalent to whatever benefits that
may be extended in the future by the
Government to the Contractor or to
financial or technical assistance agreement
contractors in general; CSTDIE
(f)all of the foregoing items which have not previously
been offset against the Government Share
in an earlier Fiscal year, adjusted for
inflation.
7.9.The percentage of Net Mining Revenues payable to
the Government pursuant to Clause 7.7
shall be reduced by 1% of Net Mining
Revenues for every 1% ownership interest
in the Contractor held by a Qualified Entity.
It makes no sense why under Section 7.8(e) money spent by the Government
for the benefit of the contractor, like building roads leading to the mine site, is
deductible from the State's 60% share of the Net Mining Revenues. Unless of
course the purpose is solely to reduce further the State's share regardless of
any reason. In any event, the numerous deductions from the State's 60% share
make one wonder if the State will ever receive anything for its ownership of the
mineral resources. Even assuming the State will receive something, the foreign
stockholders of WMCP can at anytime take it away by selling 60% of WMCP's
equity to a Philippine citizen or corporation.
In short, the State does not have any right to any share in the net income from
the mining operations under the WMCP FTAA. The stipulated 60% share of the
Government is illusory. The State is left to collect only the 2% excise tax as its
sole share from the mining operations.
Indeed, on 23 January 2001, WMCP's foreign stockholders sold 100% of
WMCP's equity to Sagittarius Mines, Inc., a domestic corporation 60% Filipino
owned and 40% foreign owned. 47 This sale automatically triggered the
operation of Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA reducing the State's share in the Net
Mining Revenues to ZERO percent without any offsetting compensation to the
State. Thus, as of now, the State has no right under the WMCP FTAA to receive
any share in the mining revenues of the contractor, even though the State owns
the mineral resources being exploited under the WMCP FTAA.
Intervenor CMP anchors its arguments on the erroneous interpretation that the
WMCP FTAA gives the State 60% of the net income of the foreign contractor.
Thus, intervenor CMP states that "60% of its (WMCP's) net returns from mining,
if any, will go to the Government under the WMCP FTAA." 48 This basic error in
interpretation leads intervenor CMP to erroneous conclusions of law and fact.
Like intervenor CMP, respondent WMCP also maintains that under the WMCP
FTAA, the State is "guaranteed" a 60% share of the foreign contractor's Net
Mining Revenues. Respondent WMCP contends, after quoting Section 7.7 of the
WMCP FTAA, that:
In other words, the State is guaranteed a sixty per
centum (60%) share of the Mining Revenues, or 60% of
the actual fruits of the endeavor. This is in line with the
intent behind Section 2 of Article XII that the Filipino
people, as represented by the State, benefit primarily
from the exploration, development, and utilization of
the Philippines' natural resources.
Incidentally, this sharing ratio between the Philippine
Government and the Contractor is also in accordance
with the 60%-40% equity requirement for Filipino-
owned corporations in Paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
Article XII. 49 (Italics and emphasis in the original)
This so-called "guarantee" is a sham. Respondent WMCP gravely misleads this
Court. Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA provides that the State's share "shall be
reduced by 1% of Net Mining Revenues for every 1% ownership interest in the
Contractor held by a Qualified Entity." This reduction is without any offsetting
compensation to the State and constitutes a waiver of the State's share to
WMCP's foreign stockholders. The Executive Department cannot give away for
free, especially to foreigners, what forms part of the national patrimony. This
negates the constitutionally mandated State ownership of mineral resources for
the benefit of the Filipino people.
WMCP's stockholders may also invoke Section 112 of RA 7942 allowing a mining
contractor to pay the State's share in accordance with Section 80 of RA 7942.
WMCP will end up paying only the 2% excise tax to the Philippine Government
for the exploitation of the mineral resources the State owns. In short, the old
and discredited system of "license, concession or lease" will govern the WMCP
FTAA.
The WMCP FTAA is also emphatic in stating that WMCP shall have exclusive
right to exploit, utilize, process and dispose of all mineral products produced
under the WMCP FTAA. Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA provides:
The Contractor shall have the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilise, process and dispose of all
Mineral products and by-products thereof that may be
derived or produced from the Contract Area but shall
not, by virtue only of this Agreement, acquire any title
to lands encompassed within the Contract Area.
Under the WMCP FTAA, the contractor has exclusive right to exploit,
utilize and process the mineral resources to the exclusion of third
parties and even the Philippine Government. Since WMCP's right is
exclusive, the Government has no participation in approving the operating
expenses of the foreign contractor relating to the exploitation, utilization,
and processing of mineral resources. The Government will have to accept
whatever operating expenses the contractor decides to incur in exploiting,
utilizing and processing mineral resources.
Under the WMCP FTAA, the contractor has exclusive right to dispose of the
minerals recovered in the mining operations. This means that the contractor
can sell the minerals to any buyer, local or foreign, at the price and terms the
contractor chooses without any intervention from the State. There is no
requirement in the WMCP FTAA that the contractor must sell the minerals at
posted or market prices. The contractor has the sole right to "mortgage, charge
or encumber" the "Minerals produced from the Mining Operations." 50
Section 8.3 of the WMCP FTAA also makes a sham of the DENR Secretary's
authority to approve the foreign contractor's Work Program. Section 8.3
provides:
If the Secretary gives a Rejection Notice the Parties
shall promptly meet and endeavour to agree on
amendments to the Work Program or budget. If the
Secretary and the Contractor fail to agree on the
proposed revision within 30 days from delivery of the
Rejection Notice then the Work Programme or Budget
or variation thereof proposed by the Contractor shall
be deemed approved, so as not to unnecessarily delay
the performance of the Agreement. (Emphasis
supplied)
The DENR Secretary is the representative of the State which owns the
mineral resources. The DENR Secretary implements the mining laws,
including RA 7942. Section 8.3, however, treats the DENR Secretary like a
subservient non-entity whom the contractor can overrule at will. Under
Section 8.3 of the WMCP FTAA, the DENR Secretary has no authority
whatsoever to disapprove the Work Program. This is not what the
Constitution means by full control and supervision by the State of mining
operations.
Section 10.4(i) of the WMCP FTAA compels the Philippine Government to agree
to any request by the foreign contractor to amend the WMCP FTAA to satisfy
the conditions of creditors of the contractor. Thus, Section 10.4(i) states:
(i)the Government shall favourably consider any
request, from Contractor for amendments
of this Agreement which are necessary in
order for the Contractor to successfully
obtain the financing;
xxx xxx xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
This provision requires the Government to favorably consider any request
from the contractor which means that the Government must render a
response favorable to the contractor. In effect, the contractor has the right
to amend the WMCP FTAA even against the will of the Philippine
Government just so the contractor can borrow money from banks.
True, the preceding Section 10.4(e) of the WMCP FTAA provides that "such
financing arrangements will in no event reduce the Contractor's obligations or
the Government's rights." However, Section 10.4(i) binds the Government to
agree to any future amendment requested by the foreign contractor even if the
Government does not agree with the wisdom of the amendment. This provision
is contrary to the State's full control and supervision in the exploitation of
mineral resources.
Clearly, under the WMCP FTAA the State has no full control and supervision
over the mining operations of the contractor. Provisions in the WMCP FTAA
that grant the State full control and supervision are negated by other provisions
that take away such control and supervision.
The WMCP FTAA also violates the constitutional limits on the term of an FTAA.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution limits the term of a mineral
agreement to "a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law." The original term cannot exceed 25 years, and at the end of
such term, either the Government or the contracting party may decide not to
renew the mineral agreement. However, both the Government and the
contracting party may also decide to renew the agreement, in which case the
renewal cannot exceed another 25 years. What is essential is that either party
has the option to renew or not to renew the mineral agreement at the end of
the original term.
However, Section 3.3 of the WMCP FTAA binds the Philippine Government to an
ironclad 50-year term. Section 3.3 compels the Government to renew the FTAA
for another 25 years after the original 25-year term expires. Thus, Section 3.3
states:

This Agreement shall be renewed by the Government
for a further period of twenty-five (25) years under the
same terms and conditions provided that the
Contractor lodges a request for a renewal with the
Government not less than sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry of the initial term of this Agreement and
provided that the Contractor is not in breach of any of
the requirements of this Agreement. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 3.3, the contractor has the option to renew or not to renew the
agreement. The Government has no such option and must renew the
agreement once the contractor makes a request for renewal. Section 3.3
violates the constitutional limits because it binds the Government to a 50-year
FTAA at the sole option of the contractor.
H.Arguments of the Solicitor General and the NEDA Secretary
The Solicitor General states that the "basic share" of the State in FTAAs
involving large-scale exploitation of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils

. . . consists of all direct taxes, fees and royalties, as
well as other payments made by the Contractor during
the term of the FTAA. The amounts are paid to the (i)
national government, (ii) local governments, and (iii)
persons directly affected by the mining project. Some
of the major taxes paid are as follows Section 3(g) of
DAO-99-56:
A.Payments to National Government
Excise tax on minerals 2% of gross
output of mining operations
Contractor's income tax 32% of taxable
income for corporation
Customs duties and fees rate is set by
Tariff and Customs Code
VAT on imported equipment, goods and
services 10% of value
Royalty on minerals extracted from
mineral reservations, if
applicable 5% of the actual
market value of the minerals
produced
Documentary stamp tax rate depends
on the type of transaction
Capital gains tax on traded stocks 5 to
10% of the value
Tax on interest payments on foreign loans
15% of the interest
Tax on foreign stockholders dividends
15% of the dividend
Wharfage and port fees
Licensing fees (e.g., radio permit, firearms
permit, professional fees)
B.Payments to Local Governments
Local business tax maximum of 2% of
gross sale or receipt
Real property tax 2% of the fair market
value of property based on an
assessment level set by the local
government
Local business tax maximum of 2% of
gross sale or receipt
Special education levy 1% of the basis
used in real property tax
Occupation tax 50 pesos per hectare
per year; 100 pesos per hectare
per year if located in a mineral
concession
Community tax 10,500 pesos maximum
per year
Other local taxes and fees rate and type
depends on the local
government
C.Other Payments
Royalty to indigenous cultural
communities, if any not less
than 1% of the gross output
from mining operations
Special allowance payment to claim
owners or surface right owners
The Solicitor General argues that the phrase "among other things" in the second
paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942 means that the State "is entitled to
an additional government share to be paid by the Contractor." The Solicitor
General explains:
An additional government share is collected from an
FTAA contractor to fulfill the intent of Section 81 of RA
No. 7942, to wit:
Sec. 81.The Government share in an FTAA
shall consist of, among other things, the
Contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due
from the Contractor's foreign stockholders
arising from dividends or interest payments
to the said foreign stockholders in case of a
foreign-owned corporation and all such
other taxes, duties and fees as provided for
in existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "among other things" indicates that the
Government is entitled to an additional share to be
paid by the Contractor, aside from the basic share in
order to achieve the fifty-fifty sharing of net benefits
from mining.
By including indirect taxes and other financial
contributions in the form of fuel tax; employees' payroll
and fringe benefits; various withholding taxes on
royalties to land owners and claim owners, and
employees' income; value added tax on local goods,
equipment, supplies and services; and expenditures for
social infrastructures in the mine site (hospitals,
schools, etc.) and development of host and neighboring
communities, geosciences and mining technology, the
government share will be in the range of 60% or more
of the total financial benefits. (Emphasis and italics in
the original)
The Solicitor General enumerates this "additional government share" as
"indirect taxes and other financial contributions in the form of fuel tax;
employees' payroll and fringe benefits; various withholding taxes on royalties to
land owners and claim owners, and employees' income; value added tax on local
goods, equipment, supplies and services; . . ." The Solicitor General's argument
merely confirms that under Section 81 of RA 7942 the State only receives taxes,
duties and fees under the FTAA. The State does not receive, as owner of the
mineral resources, any income from the mining operations of the contractor.
In short, the "basic share" of the State consists of direct taxes by the national
and local governments. The "additional share" of the State consists of indirect
taxes including even fringe benefits to employees and compensation to private
surface right owners. Direct and indirect taxes, however, are impositions by the
taxing authority, a burden borne by all taxpayers whether or not they exploit
the State's mineral resources. Fringe benefits of employees are compensation
for services rendered under an employer-employee relationship. Compensation
to surface right owners is payment for the damage suffered by private
landowners arising from the mining operations. All these direct and indirect
taxes, as well as other expenses of the contractor, do not constitute payment for
the share of the State as owner of the mineral resources.
Clearly, the so-called "share" of the State consists only of direct and indirect
taxes, as well as other operating expenses not even payable to the State. The
Solicitor General in effect concedes that under the second paragraph of Section
81, the State does not receive any share of the net proceeds from the mining
operations of the FTAA contractor. Despite this, the Solicitor General insists that
the State remains the owner of the mineral resources and exercises full control
over the mining operations of the FTAA contractor. The Solicitor General has
redefined the civil law concept of ownership, 51 by giving the owner full control
in the exploitation of the property he owns but denying him the fruits or
income from such exploitation. The only satisfaction of the owner is that the
FTAA contractor pays taxes to the Government.
However, even this psychological satisfaction is dubious. Under the third
paragraph of Section 81 of RA 7942, the "collection of Government share in
financial and technical assistance agreement shall commence after the financial
and technical assistance agreement contractor has fully recovered its pre-
operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive."
This provision does not defer the collection of the State's "share," but prevents
the accrual of the State's "share" until the contractor has fully recovered all its
pre-operating, exploration and development expenditures. This provision
exempts for an undefined period the contractor from all existing taxes that are
part of the Government's so-called "share" under Section 81. 52 The Solicitor
General has interpreted these taxes to include "other national taxes and fees"
as well as "other local taxes and fees." aDcEIH
Secretary Romulo L. Neri of the National Economic and Development Authority
("NEDA") has warned this Court of the supposed dire repercussions to the
nation's long-term economic growth if this Court declares the assailed
provisions of RA 7942 unconstitutional. 53 Under the Constitution, the NEDA is
the "independent (economic) planning agency of the
government." 54 However, in this case the NEDA Secretary has joined the
chorus of the foreign chambers of commerce to uphold the validity of RA 7942
as essential to entice foreign investors to exploit the nation's mineral resources.
We cannot fault the foreign chambers of commerce for driving a hard bargain
to maximize the profits of foreign investors. We are, however, saddened that
the NEDA Secretary is willing to give away for free to foreign investors the
State's share of the income from its ownership of mineral resources. If the
NEDA Secretary owns the mineral resources instead of the State, will he allow
the foreign contractor to exploit his mineral resources for free, the only
obligation of the foreign contractor being to pay taxes to the Government?
Secretary Neri claims that the potential tax collection from the mining industry
alone is P57 billion as against the present collection of P2 billion. Secretary Neri
adds that the potential tax collection from incremental activities linked to
mining is another P100 billion, thus putting the total potential tax collection
from mining and related industries at P157 billion. 55 Secretary Neri also
estimates the "potential mining wealth in the Philippines" at P47 trillion or
US$840 billion, 15 times our total foreign debt of US$56 billion. 56
If all that the State will receive from its P47 trillion potential mineral wealth is
the P157 billion in direct and indirect taxes, then the State will truly receive only
a pittance. The P157 billion in taxes constitute a mere .33% or a third of 1% of
the total mineral wealth of P47 trillion. Even if the P157 billion is collected
annually over 25 years, the original term of an FTAA, the total tax collection will
amount to only P3.92 trillion, or a mere 8.35% of the total mineral wealth. The
rest of the country's mineral wealth will flow out of the country if foreign
contractors exploit our mineral resources under FTAAs pursuant to RA 7942.

Secretary Neri also warns that foreign investors who have acquired local
cement factories in the last ten years will find their investments illegal if the
Court declares unconstitutional the assailed provisions of RA 7942. 57 Such
specious arguments deserve scant consideration. Cement manufacturing is not
a nationalized activity. Hence, foreigners can own 100% of cement companies in
this country. When the foreign investors acquired the local cement factories,
they spun off the quarry operations into separate companies 60% owned by
Filipino citizens. The foreign investors knew the constitutional requirements of
holding quarry permits.
Besides, the quarrying requirement of cement companies is just a simple
surface mining of limestone. Such activity does not constitute large-scale
exploitation of mineral resources. It definitely cannot qualify for FTAAs with
foreign contractors under the fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. Obviously, only a company at least 60% Filipino owned can engage
in such mining activity.
The offshore Occidental-Shell FTAA shows that even in riskier ventures involving
far more capital investments, the State can negotiate and secure at least 60% of
the net proceeds from the exploitation of mineral resources. Foreign
contractors like Occidental-Shell are willing to pay the State 60% of the net
proceeds from petroleum operations, in addition to paying the Government the
32% corporate income tax on its 40% share of the net proceeds. Even intervenor
CMP and respondent WMCP agree that the State has a 60% interest in mining
operations under an FTAA. We simply cannot fathom why the NEDA Secretary is
willing to accept a ZERO percent share in the income from the exploitation of
inland mineral resources.
FTAAs like the WMCP FTAA, which gives the State an illusory 60% share of the
net proceeds from mining revenues, will only impoverish further the Filipino
people. The nation's potential mineral wealth of P47 trillion will contribute to
economic development only if the bulk of the wealth remains in the country,
not if remitted abroad by foreign contractors.
I.Refutation of Arguments of Majority Opinion
The majority opinion advances the following arguments:
1.DENR Department Administrative Order No. 56-99
("DAO 56-99") is the basis for determining
the State's share in the mining income of
the foreign FTAA contractor. The DENR
Secretary issued DAO 56-99 pursuant to the
phrase "among other things" in Section 81
of RA 7942. The majority opinion claims
that the phrase "among other things"
"clearly and unmistakably reveals the
legislative intent to have the State collect
more than just the usual taxes, duties and
fees." The majority opinion anchors on the
phrase "among other things" its argument
that RA 7942 allows the State to collect a
share in the mining income of the foreign
FTAA contractor, in addition to taxes, duties
and fees. Thus, on the phrase "among other
things" depends whether the State and the
Filipino people are entitled under RA 7942
to share in the vast mineral wealth of the
nation, estimated by NEDA at P47 trillion or
US$840 billion.
2.FTAAs, like the WMCP FTAA, are not subject to the
term limit in Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. In short, while co-
production, joint venture and production-
sharing agreements cannot exceed 25
years, renewable for another 25 years, as
provided in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, the WMCP FTAA is not
governed by the constitutional limitation.
The majority opinion states that the
"constitutional term limitations do not
apply to FTAAs." Thus, the majority opinion
upholds the validity of Section 3.3 of the
WMCP FTAA providing for a 50-year term at
the sole option of WMCP.
3.Section 112 of RA 7942, placing "all valid and
existing" mining agreements under the
fiscal regime prescribed in Section 80 of RA
7942, does not apply to FTAAs. Thus, the
majority opinion states, "[W]hether Section
112 may properly apply to co-production or
joint venture agreements, the fact of the
matter is that it cannot be made to apply to
FTAAs."
4.Foreign FTAA contractors and even foreign
corporations can hold exploration permits,
despite Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution reserving to Philippine citizens
and to corporations 60% Filipino owned the
"exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources." Thus, the majority
opinion states that "there is no prohibition
at all against foreign or local corporations
or contractors holding exploration permits."
5.The Constitution does not require that the State's
share in FTAAs or other mineral agreements
should be at least 60% of the net mining
revenues. Thus, the majority opinion states
that "the Charter did not intend to fix an
iron-clad rule on the 60 percent share,
applicable to all situations at all times and
in all circumstances."
I respond to the arguments of the majority opinion.
1.DAO 99-56 as Basis for Government's Share in FTAAs
The main thrust of my dissenting opinion is that mineral agreements under RA
7942, whether FTAAs under Section 81 or MPSAs under Section 80, do not allow
the State to receive any share from the income of mining companies. The State
can collect only taxes, duties and fees from mining companies.
The majority opinion, however, points to the phrase "among other things" in
the second paragraph of Section 81 as the authority of the State to collect in
FTAAs a share in the mining income separate from taxes, duties and fees. The
majority opinion can point to no other provision in RA 7942 allowing the State
to collect any share. The majority opinion admits that limiting the State's share
in any mineral agreement to taxes, duties and fees is unconstitutional. Thus, the
majority opinion's case rises or falls on whether the phrase "among other
things" allows the State to collect from FTAA contractors any income in addition
to taxes, duties and fees.
In the case of MPSAs, the majority opinion cannot point to any provision in RA
7942 allowing the State to collect any share in MPSAs separate from taxes,
duties and fees. The language of Section 80 is so crystal clear "the total
government share in a mineral production sharing agreement shall be the excise
tax on mineral products" that there is no dispute whatsoever about it. The
majority opinion merely states that the constitutionality of Section 80 is not in
issue in the present case. Section 81, the constitutionality of which the majority
opinion admits is in issue here, is intertwined with Sections 39, 80, 84 and 112.
Resolving the constitutionality of Section 81 necessarily involves a
determination of the constitutionality of Sections 39, 80, 84 and 112.
The WMCP FTAA, the constitutionality of which is certainly in issue, is governed
not only by Section 81 but also by Sections 39, 80 and 112. The reason is that
the WMCP FTAA is a reversible contract that gives WMCP the absolute option at
anytime to convert the FTAA into an MPSA. In short, the WMCP FTAA is like a
single coin with two sides one an FTAA and the other an MPSA.
a.The Integrated Intent, Plan and Structure of RA 7942
The clear intent of RA 7942 is to limit the State's share from mining operations
to taxes, duties and fees, unless the State contributes equity in addition to the
mineral resources. RA 7942 does not recognize the mere contribution of
mineral resources as entitling the State to receive a share in the net mining
revenues separate from taxes, duties and fees. Thus, Section 80 expressly states
that the "total government share in a mineral production sharing agreement
shall be the excise tax on mineral products." Section 84 reiterates this by stating
that "with respect to mineral production sharing agreement, the excise tax on
mineral products shall be the government share under said agreement." The
only share of the State in an MPSA is the excise tax. Ironically, Sections 80 and
84 disallow the State from sharing in the production or income, even as the
contract itself is called a mineral production sharing agreement.
In co-production and joint venture agreements, where the State contributes
equity in addition to the mineral resources, the first paragraph of Section 81
expressly requires that "the share of the government . . . shall be negotiated by
the Government and the contractor." However, in FTAAs where the State
contributes only its mineral resources, the second paragraph of Section 81
states
The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.
All the items enumerated in the second paragraph of Section 81 as
comprising the "Government share" refer to taxes, duties and fees. The
phrase "all such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing
laws" makes this clear.
Section 112 places "all valid and existing mining" agreements "at the date of
effectivity" of RA 7942 under the fiscal regime prescribed in Section 80. Section
112 expressly states that the "government share in mineral production sharing
agreement . . . shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or
contractor." Section 112 provides:
Section 112.Non-impairment of Existing
Mining/Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing
mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases
pending renewal, mineral production-sharing
agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid,
shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized by the
Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter
XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing
agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee
or contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor
indicates his intention to the secretary, in writing, not
to avail of said provisions: Provided, further, That no
renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made after
the expiration of its term: Provided, finally, That such
leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or
technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 112 requires "all" FTAAs and MPSAs, as of the date of
effectivity of RA 7942, to pay only the excise tax 2% on metallic and
non-metallic minerals and 3% on petroleum 58 instead of the
stipulated mining income sharing, if any, in their respective FTAAs or
MPSAs.
This means that Section 112 applies even to the Occidental-Shell FTAA, which
was executed before the enactment of RA 7942. This reduces the State's share in
the Malampaya gas extraction from 60% of net proceeds to 3% of the market
price of the gas as provided in Section 80 of RA 7942 in relation to Section 151 of
the National Internal Revenue Code. This is disastrous to the national economy
because Malampaya under the original Occidental-Shell FTAA generates
annually some US$0.5 billion to the National Treasury.
Section 112 applies to all agreements executed "under Executive Order No.
279." The WMCP FTAA expressly states in its Section 1.1, "This Agreement is a
Financial & Technical Assistance Agreement entered into pursuant to Executive
Order No. 279." Thus, Section 112 applies to the WMCP FTAA.
Section 39 of RA 7942 grants the FTAA contractor the "option to convert" the
FTAA into an MPSA "at any time during the term" of the FTAA if the contract
areas are not economically viable for large-scale mining. Once the contractor
reduces its foreign equity to not more than 40%, the Secretary "shall approve
the conversion and execute the mineral production sharing agreement. Thus,
Section 39 provides:
Section 39.Option to Convert into a Mineral
Agreement. The contractor has the option to
convert the financial or technical assistance agreement
to a mineral agreement at any time during the term of
the agreement, if the economic viability of the contract
area is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale
mining operations, after proper notice to the Secretary
as provided for under the implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, That the mineral agreement
shall only be for the remaining period of the original
agreement.
In the case of a foreign contractor, it shall reduce its
equity to forty percent (40%) in the corporation,
partnership, association, or cooperative. Upon
compliance with this requirement by the contractor,
the Secretary shall approve the conversion and execute
the mineral production-sharing agreement. (Emphasis
supplied) CAaSHI
The only requirement in the second paragraph of Section 39 is that the FTAA
contractor shall reduce its foreign equity to 40%. The second paragraph states,
"Upon compliance with this requirement, the Secretary shall approve the
conversion and execute the mineral production sharing agreement." The
determination of the economic viability of the contract area for large-scale
mining, which is left to the foreign contractor with "proper notice" only to the
DENR Secretary, is not even made a condition for the conversion.
Under Section 3(aq) of RA 7942, the foreign contractor holds the exploration
permit and conducts the physical exploration. The foreign
contractor controls the release of the technical data on the mineral resources.
The foreign contractor can easily justify the non-viability of the contract area for
large-scale mining. The Philippine Government will have to depend on the
foreign contractor for technical data on whether the contract area is viable for
large-scale mining. Obviously, such a situation gives the foreign contractor
actual control in determining whether the contract area is viable for large-scale
mining.
The conversion from an FTAA into an MPSA is solely at the will of the foreign
contractor because the contractor can choose at any time to sell 60% of its
equity to a Philippine citizen. The price or consideration for the sale of the
contractor's 60% equity does not go to the State but to the foreign stockholders
of the contractor. Under Section 80 of RA 7942, once the FTAA is converted into
an MPSA the only share of the State is the 2% excise tax on mineral
products. Thus, under RA 7942 the FTAA contractor has the absolute option to
pay the State only the 2% excise tax, despite any other stipulated consideration
in the FTAA.
Clearly, Sections 3(aq), 39, 80, 81, 84 and 112 are tightly integrated under a
single intent, plan and structure: unless the State contributes equity in addition
to the mineral resources, the State shall receive only taxes, duties and fees. The
State's contribution of mineral resources is not sufficient to entitle the State to
receive any income from the mining operations separate from taxes, duties and
fees.
b.The Meaning of the Phrase "Among Other Things"
As far as the State and the Filipino people are concerned, the most important
part of an FTAA is the consideration: how much will the State receive from the
exploitation of its non-renewable and exhaustible mineral resources?
Section 81 of RA 7942 does not require the foreign FTAA contractor to pay the
State any share from the mining income apart from taxes, duties and fees. The
second paragraph of Section 81, just like Section 80, only allows the State to
collect taxes, duties and fees as the State's share from the mining operations.
The intent of RA 7942 is that the State cannot share in the income from mining
operations, separate from taxes, duties and fees, based only on the mineral
resources that the State contributes to the mining operations.
This is also the position of the Solicitor General that the State's share under
Section 81 refers only to direct and indirect taxes. Thus, the Solicitor General
agrees that Section 81 does not allow the State to collect any share from the
mining income separate from taxes, duties and fees. The majority opinion
agrees that Section 81 is unconstitutional if it does not require the foreign FTAA
contractor to pay the State any share of the net mining income apart from
taxes, duties and fees.
However, the majority opinion says that the phrase "among other things" in
Section 81 is the authority to require the FTAA contractor to pay a
consideration separate from taxes, duties and fees. The majority opinion cites
the phrase "among other things" as the source of power of the DENR Secretary
to adopt DAO 56-99 59prescribing the formulae on the State's share from
mining operations separate from taxes, duties and fees.
In short, the majority opinion says that the phrase "among other things" is a
delegation of legislative power to the DENR Secretary to adopt the formulae on
the share of the State from mining operations. The issue now is whether the
phrase "among other things" in the second paragraph of Section 81 is intended
as a delegation of legislative power to the DENR Secretary. If so, the issue turns
on whether it is a valid delegation of legislative power. We reproduce again the
second paragraph of Section 81 for easy reference:
The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 81 of RA 7942 does not delegate any legislative power to the DENR
Secretary to adopt the formulae in determining the share of the State. There is
absolutely no language in the second paragraph of Section 81 granting the
DENR Secretary any delegated legislative power. Thus, the DENR Secretary
acted without authority or jurisdiction in issuing DAO 56-99 based on a
supposed delegated power in the second paragraph of Section 81. This makes
DAO 56-99 void.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is language in Section 81
delegating legislative power to the DENR Secretary to adopt the formulae in
DAO 56-99, such delegation is void. Section 81 has no standards by which the
delegated power shall be exercised. There is no specification on the minimum
or maximum share that the State must receive from mining operations under
FTAAs. No parameters on the extent of the delegated power to the DENR
Secretary are found in Section 81. Neither were such parameters ever discussed
even remotely by Congress when it enacted RA 7942.
In sharp contrast, the first paragraph of the same Section 81, in prescribing the
State's share in co-production and joint venture agreements, expressly specifies
the standards in determining the State's share as follows: "(a) capital
investment of the project, (b) risks involved, (c) contribution of the project to
the economy, and (d) other factors that will provide for a fair and equitable
sharing between the Government and the contractor." The reason for the
absence of similar standards in the succeeding paragraph of Section 81 in
determining the State's share in FTAAs is obvious the State's share in FTAAs
is limited solely to taxes, duties and fees. Thus, such standards are inapplicable
and irrelevant.
The majority opinion now makes the formulae in DAO 56-99 the heart and soul
of RA 7942 because the formulae supposedly determine the consideration of
the FTAA. The consideration is the most important part of the FTAA as far as the
State and Filipino people are concerned. The formulae in DAO 56-99 derive life
solely from the phrase "among other things." DAO 56-99 itself states that it is
issued "[P]ursuant to Section 81 and other pertinent provisions of Republic Act
No. 7942." Without the phrase "among other things," the majority opinion
could not point to any other provision in RA 7942 to support the existence of
the formulae in DAO 56-99.
Thus, the phrase "among other things" determines whether the FTAA has the
third element of a valid contract the commercial value or consideration that
the State will receive. The majority opinion in effect says that Congress made
the wealth and even the future prosperity of the nation to depend on the
phrase "among other things."

The DENR Secretary can change the formulae in DAO 56-99 any time even
without the approval of the President or Congress. The DENR Secretary is the
sole authority to determine the amount of consideration that the State shall
receive in an FTAA. Section 5 of DAO 56-99 states:
. . . any amendment of an FTAA other than the
provision on fiscal regime shall require the negotiation
with the Negotiation Panel and the recommendation
of the Secretary for approval of the President of the
Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 5, if the amendment in the FTAA involves non-fiscal
matters, the amendment requires the approval of the President. However,
if the amendment involves a change in the fiscal regime referring to the
consideration of the FTAA the DENR Secretary has the final authority
and approval of the President is not required. This makes the DENR
Secretary more powerful than the President.
Section 5 of DAO 56-99 violates paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution mandating that the President shall approve all FTAAs and
send copies of all approved FTAAs to Congress. The consideration of the FTAA is
the most important part of the FTAA as far as the State and the Filipino people
are concerned. The DENR Secretary, in issuing DAO 56-99, has arrogated to
himself the power to approve FTAAs, a power vested by the Constitution solely
in the President. By not even informing the President of changes in the fiscal
regime and thus preventing such changes from reaching Congress, DAO 56-99
even seeks to hide changes in the fiscal regime from Congress. By its provisions
alone, DAO 56-99 is clearly unconstitutional and void.
Section 5 of DAO 56-99 also states that "[A]ll FTAAs approved prior to the
effectivity of this Administrative Order shall remain valid and be recognized by
the Government." This means that the fiscal regime of an FTAA executed prior
to the effectivity of DAO 56-99 "shall remain valid and be recognized." If the
earlier FTAA provides for a fiscal regime different from DAO 56-99, then the
fiscal regime in the earlier FTAA shall prevail. In effect, DAO 56-99 exempts an
FTAA approved prior to its effectivity from paying the State the share
prescribed in the formulae under DAO 56-99 if the earlier FTAA provides for a
different fiscal regime. Such is the case of the WMCP FTAA.
Based on the majority opinion's position that the 1987 Constitution requires
payment in addition to taxes, duties and fees, this makes DAO 56-99
unconstitutional and void. DAO 56-99 does not require prior FTAAs to pay the
State the share prescribed in the formulae under DAO 56-99 even if the
consideration in the prior FTAAs is limited only to taxes, duties and fees. DAO
56-99 recognizes such payment of taxes, duties and fees as a "valid"
consideration. Certainly, the DENR Secretary has no authority to exempt foreign
FTAA contractors from a constitutional requirement. Not even Congress or the
President can do so.
Ironically, DAO 56-99, the very authority the majority opinion cites to support
its claim that the WMCP FTAA has a consideration, does not apply to the WMCP
FTAA.By its own express terms, DAO 56-99 does not apply to FTAAs executed
before the issuance of DAO 56-99, like the WMCP FTAA. The majority opinion's
position has no leg to stand on since even DAO 56-99, assuming it is valid,
cannot save the WMCP FTAA from want of consideration. DAaIHT
The formulae prescribed in DAO 56-99 are totally alien to the phrase "among
other things." There is no relationship whatsoever between the phrase "among
other things" and the highly esoteric formulae prescribed in DAO 56-99. No one
in this Court can assure the Filipino people that the formulae in DAO 56-99 will
guarantee the State 60%, or 30% or even 10% of the net proceeds from the
mining operations. And yet the majority opinion trumpets DAO 56-99 as the
savior of Section 81 from certain constitutional infirmity.
The majority opinion gives the stamp of approval and legitimacy on DAO 56-99.
This assumes that the majority understand fully the formulae in DAO 56-99. Can
the majority tell the Court and the Filipino people the minimum share that the
State will receive under the formulae in DAO 56-99? The formulae in DAO 56-99
are fuzzy since they do not guarantee the minimum share of the State, unlike
the clear and specific income sharing provisions in the Occidental-Shell FTAA or
in the case ofConsolidated Mines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals. 60
The Solicitor General asserts that the phrase "among other things" refers to
indirect taxes, an interpretation that contradicts the DENR Secretary's
interpretation under DAO 56-99. The Solicitor General is correct. The ejusdem
generis rule of statutory interpretation applies squarely to the phrase "among
other things."
In Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 61 the Court held:
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where a description
of things of a particular class or kind is 'accompanied
by words of a generic character, the generic words will
usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with
those particularly enumerated . . . .'
In Grapilon v. Municipal Council of Cigara, 62 the Court construed the general
word "absence" in the phrase "absence, suspension or other temporary
disability of the mayor" in Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code as
"on the same level as 'suspension' and 'other forms of temporary disability'."
The Court quoted with approval the following Opinion of the Secretary of
Interior:
The phrase 'other temporary disability' found in
section 2195 of the Code, follows the words 'absence'
and 'suspension' and is used as a modifier of the two
preceding words, under the principle of statutory
construction known as ejusdem generis.
In City of Manila v. Entote, 63 the Court ruled that broad expressions such as
"and all others" or "any others" or "other matters," when accompanied by an
enumeration of items of the same kind or class, "are usually to be restricted to
persons or things of the same kind or class with those specifically named" in the
enumeration. Thus, the Court held:
In our jurisdiction, this Court in Ollada vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, et al. applied the rule of "ejusdem generis" to
construe the purview of a general phrase "other
matters" appearing after an enumeration of specific
cases decided by the Collector of Internal Revenue and
appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals found in
section 7, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 1125, and it
held that in order that a matter may come under said
general clause, it is necessary that it belongs to the
same kind or class of cases therein specifically
enumerated. (Emphasis supplied)
The four requisites of the ejusdem generis rule 64 are present in the phrase
"among other things" as appearing in Section 81 of RA 7942. First, the general
phrase "among other things" is accompanied by an enumeration of specific
items, namely, "the contractor's corporate income tax, excise tax, special
allowance, withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign stockholders
arising from dividend or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes, duties and fees as provided
for under existing laws." Second, all the items enumerated are of the same kind
or class they are all taxes, duties and fees. Third, the enumeration of the
specific items is not exhaustive because "all such other taxes, duties and fees"
are included. Thus, the enumeration of specific items is merely
illustrative. Fourth, there is no indication of legislative intent to give the general
phrase "among other things" a broader meaning. On the contrary, the
legislative intent of RA 7942 is to limit the State's share from mining operations
to taxes, duties and fees.
In short, the phrase "among other things" refers to taxes, duties and fees. The
phrase "among other things" is even followed at the end of the sentence by the
phrase "and all such other taxes, duties, and fees," reinforcing even more the
restriction of the phrase "among other things" to taxes, duties and fees. The
function of the phrase "and such other taxes, duties and fees" is to clarify that
the taxes enumerated are not exhaustive but merely illustrative.
c.Formulae in DAO 56-99 a Mere Creation of DENR
The majority opinion praises the DENR for "conceiving and developing" the
formulae in DAO 56-99. Thus, the majority opinion states:
As can be seen from DAO 56-99, the agencies
concerned did an admirable job of conceiving and
developing not just one formula, but three different
formulasfor arriving at the additional government
share. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, we credit the DENR for conceiving and developing on their own
the formulae in DAO 56-99. The formulae are the creation of DENR, not of
Congress.
The DENR conceived and developed the formulae to save Section 81 not only
from constitutional infirmity, but also from blatantly depriving the State and
Filipino people from any share in the income of mining companies. However,
the DENR's admittedly "admirable job" cannot amend Section 81 of RA 7942.
The DENR has no legislative power to correct constitutional infirmities in RA
7942. The DENR does not also possess the constitutional power to prescribe the
sharing of mining income between the State and mining companies, the act the
DENR attempts to do in adopting DAO 56-99.
d.DAO 56-99 is an Exercise in Futility
Even assuming arguendo the majority opinion is correct that the phrase
"among other things" constitutes sufficient legal basis to issue DAO 56-99, the
FTAA contractor can still prevent the State from collecting any share of the
mining income. By invoking Section 39 of RA 7942 giving the foreign FTAA
contractor the option to convert the FTAA into an MPSA, the FTAA contractor
can easily place itself outside the scope of DAO 56-99 which expressly applies
only to FTAAs.
Also, by invoking Section 112, the foreign contractor need not even convert its
FTAA into a mineral production agreement to place its contract under Section
80 and outside of Section 81. Section 112 automatically and immediately places
all FTAAs under the fiscal regime applicable to MPSAs, forcing the State to
collect only the 2% excise tax. Thus, DAO 56-99 is an exercise in futility. This
now compels the Court to resolve the constitutionality of Sections 39 and 112
of RA 7942 in the present case.

e.Congress Prescribes the Terms and Conditions of FTAAs.
In a last-ditch attempt to justify the constitutionality of DAO 56-99, the majority
opinion now claims that the President has the prerogative to prescribe the terms
and conditions of FTAAs, including the fiscal regime of FTAAs. The majority
opinion states:
. . . It is the President who is constitutionally
mandated to enter into FTAAs with foreign
corporations, and in doing so, it is within the
President's prerogative to specify certain terms and
conditions of the FTAAs, for example, the fiscal regime
of FTAAs i.e., the sharing of the net revenues
between the contractor and the State. (Emphasis in the
original; italics supplied)
The majority opinion is re-writing the 1987 Constitution and even RA 7942.
Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, . . .. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the 1987 Constitution mandates that the President may enter into
FTAAs only "according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law." There is no doubt whatsoever that it is Congress that prescribes the
terms and conditions of FTAAs, not the President as the majority opinion
claims. The 1987 Constitution mandates the President to comply with the
terms and conditions prescribed by Congress for FTAAs.
Indeed, RA 7942 stipulates the terms and conditions for FTAAs. Section 35 of RA
7942 provides that the "following terms, conditions, and warranties shall be
incorporated in the financial or technical assistance agreement to wit: . . .."
Section 38 of RA 7942 expressly limits an FTAA to a "term not exceeding twenty-
five (25) years," which is one of the issues in the present case.
The majority opinion claims that the President has the power to prescribe "the
fiscal regime of FTAAs i.e., the sharing of the net mining revenues between
the contractor and the State." This claim of the majority opinion renders the
entire Chapter XIV of RA 7942 an act of usurpation by Congress of Presidential
power.Chapter XIV entitled "Government Share" prescribes the fiscal
regimes of MPSAs and FTAAs. The constitutionality of Sections 80 and 81 of
Chapter XIV whether the fiscal regimes prescribed in these sections of RA
7942 comply with the 1987 Constitution is the threshold issue in this case.
The majority opinion seeks to uphold the constitutionality of Section 81 of RA
7942, an act of Congress prescribing the fiscal regime of FTAAs. If it is the
President who has the constitutional authority to prescribe the fiscal regime of
FTAAs, then Section 81 is unconstitutional for being a usurpation by Congress of
a Presidential power. The majority opinion not only re-writes the 1987
Constitution, it also contradicts itself.
That is not all. By claiming that the President has the prerogative to prescribe
the fiscal regime of FTAAs, the majority opinion contradicts its basic theory that
DAO 56-99 draws life from the phrase "among other things" in Section 81 of RA
7942. Apparently, the majority opinion is no longer confident of its position that
DAO 56-99 draws life from the phrase "among other things." The majority
opinion now invokes a non-existent Presidential power that directly collides
with the express constitutional power of Congress to prescribe the "general
terms and conditions" of FTAAs.
f.Sections 80 and 84 of RA 7942 are Void on their Face
Definitely, Section 80 of RA 7942 is constitutionally infirm even based on the
reasoning of the majority opinion. The majority opinion agrees that the 1987
Constitution requires the mining contractor to pay the State "more than just the
usual taxes, duties and fees." Under Section 80, the excise tax 2% for metallic
and non-metallic minerals and 3% for petroleum is the only and total
share of the State from mining operations. Section 80 provides:
Section 80.Government Share in Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement. The total government share in a
mineral production sharing agreement shall be the
excise tax on mineral products as provided in Republic
Act No. 7729, amending Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 80 has no ifs or buts. Section 84 even reiterates Section 80 that "with
respect to a mineral production sharing agreement, the excise tax on mineral
products shall be the government share under said agreement." There is
no ejusdem generis phrase like "among other things" in Section 80 that the
majority opinion can cling on to save it from constitutional infirmity. DAO 56-99,
the magic wand of the majority opinion, expressly applies only to FTAAs and not
to MPSAs. By any legal yardstick, even by the arguments of the majority
opinion, Sections 80 and 84 are void and unconstitutional.
g.Necessity of Resolving Constitutionality of Sections 39, 80 and 84
The majority opinion states that the constitutionality of Sections 80 and 84 of
RA 7942 is not in issue in the present case. The majority opinion forgets that
petitioners have assailed the constitutionality of RA 7942 and the WMCP FTAA
for violation of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
specifically assails the "inequitable sharing of wealth" in the WMCP FTAA, which
petitioners assert is "contrary to Section 1, paragraph 1, and Section 2,
paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution."
Section 9.1 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP the absolute option, by mere
notice to the DENR Secretary, to convert the FTAA into an MPSA under Section
80. The "sharing of wealth" in Section 80 is "inequitable" and "contrary to . . .
Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the Constitution" because the State will
only collect the 2% excise tax in an MPSA. Such a pittance of a sharing will not
make any "real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country" as required in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Section 39 of RA 7942 also grants foreign FTAA contractors the option, by mere
notice to the DENR Secretary, to convert their FTAAs into MPSAs under Section
80. Necessarily, the constitutionality of the WMCP FTAA must be resolved in
conjunction with Section 80 of RA 7942.
The WMCP FTAA is like a coin with two sides, one side is an FTAA, and the other
an MPSA. By mere notice to the DENR Secretary, WMCP can convert the
contract from an FTAA to an MPSA, a copy of which, complete with all terms
and conditions, is annexed to the WMCP FTAA. 65 The DENR Secretary has no
option but to sign the annexed MPSA. There are only two conditions to WMCP's
exercise of this option: the reduction of foreign equity in WMCP to 40%, and
notice to the DENR Secretary. The first condition is already fulfilled since all the
equity of WMCP is now owned by a corporation 60% Filipino owned. The notice
to the DENR Secretary is solely at the will of WMCP.
What this Court is staring at right now is a dual contract an FTAA which, by
mere notice to the DENR Secretary, immediately becomes an MPSA. The
majority opinion agrees that the provisions of the WMCP FTAA, which grant a
sham consideration to the State, are void. Since the majority opinion agrees
that the WMCP FTAA has a sham consideration, the WMCP FTAA thus lacks the
third element of a valid contract. The majority opinion should declare the WMCP
FTAA void for want of consideration unless the majority opinion treats the
contract as an MPSA under Section 80. Indeed, the only recourse of WMCP to
save the validity of its contract is to convert it into an MPSA.
Thus, with the absence of consideration in the WMCP FTAA, what is actually
before this Court is an MPSA. This squarely puts in issue whether an MPSA is
constitutional if the only consideration or payment to the State is the 2% excise
tax as provided in Section 80 of RA 7942.
The basic constitutional infirmity of the WMCP FTAA is the absence of a fair
consideration to the State as owner of the mineral resources. Petitioners call
this the "inequitable sharing of wealth." The constitutionality of the
consideration for the WMCP FTAA cannot be resolved without determining the
validity of both Sections 80 and 81 of RA 7942 because the consideration for the
WMCP FTAA is anchored on both Sections 80 and 81.
The majority opinion refuses to face the issue of whether the WMCP contract
can validly rely on Section 80 for its consideration. If this issue is not resolved
now, then the WMCP FTAA has no consideration. The majority opinion admits
that the consideration in the WMCP FTAA granting the State 60% share in the
mining revenues is a sham and thus void ab initio.
Strangely, the majority opinion claims that the share of the State in the mining
revenues is not the principal consideration of the FTAA. The majority opinion
claims that the principal consideration of the FTAA is the "development" of the
minerals by the foreign contractor. The foreign contractor can bring equipment
to the mine site, tunnel the mines, and construct underground rails to bring the
minerals to the surface in short develop the mines. What will the State and
the Filipino people benefit from such activities unless they receive a share of
the mining proceeds? After the minerals are exhausted, those equipment,
tunnels and rails would be dilapidated and even obsolete. Besides, those
equipment belong to the foreign contractor even after the expiration of the
FTAA.
Plainly, even a businessman with limited experience will not agree that the
principal consideration in an FTAA, as far as the State and Filipino people are
concerned, is the development of the mines. It is obvious why the majority
opinion will not accept that the principal consideration is the share of the State
in the mining proceeds. Otherwise, the majority opinion will have to admit that
the WMCP FTAA lacks the third element of a valid contract the consideration.
This will compel the majority opinion to admit that the WMCP FTAA is void ab
initio.

The only way for the majority opinion to save the WMCP FTAA from nullity is to
treat it as an MPSA and thus apply Section 80 of RA 7942. This puts in issue the
constitutionality of Section 80. The majority opinion, however, refuses to treat
the WMCP FTAA as an MPSA. Thus, the WMCP FTAA still lacks a valid
consideration. However, the majority opinion insists that the WMCP FTAA is
valid.
If the majority opinion puts the constitutionality of Section 80 in issue, the
majority opinion will have to declare Section 80 unconstitutional. The majority
opinion agrees that the 1987 Constitution requires the State to collect "more
than the usual taxes, duties and fees." Section 80 indisputably limits the State
to collect only the excise tax and nothing more.
The equivocal stance of the majority opinion will not put an end to this
litigation. Once WMCP converts its FTAA into an MPSA to avoid paying "more
than the usual taxes, duties and fees," petitioners will immediately question the
validity of WMCP's MPSA as well as the constitutionality of Section 80. The case
will end up again in this Court on the same issue of whether there is a valid
consideration for such MPSA, which necessarily involves a determination of the
constitutionality of Section 80. Clearly, this Court has no recourse but to decide
now the constitutionality of Section 80.
As the Solicitor General reported in his Compliance dated 20 October 2004, the
DENR has signed five MPSAs with different parties. 66 These five MPSAs
uniformly contain the following provision:
Share of the Government The Government Share
shall be the excise tax on mineral products at the time
of removal and at the rate provided for in Republic Act
No. 7729 amending Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, as well as other
taxes, duties, and fees levied by existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
If the constitutionality of Section 80 is not resolved now, these five
MPSAs, including the WMCP FTAA once converted into an MPSA, will
remain in limbo. There will be no implementation of these MPSAs until
the Court finally resolves this constitutional issue.
Even if evaded now, the constitutionality of Section 80 will certainly resurface,
resulting in a repeat of this litigation, most probably even between the same
parties. To avoid unnecessary delay, this Court must rule now on the
constitutionality of Section 80 of RA 7942. SHADcT
2.The Constitutional Term Limit Applies to FTAAs
Section 3.3 of the WMCP FTAA provides a fixed contract term of 50 years at the
option of WMCP. Thus, Section 3.3 provides:
This Agreement shall be renewed by the Government
for a further period of twenty-five (25) years under the
same terms and conditions provided that the
Contractor lodges a request for a renewal with the
Government not less than sixty (60) days prior to the
expiry of the initial term of this Agreement and
provided that the Contractor is not in breach of any of
the requirements of this Agreement. (Emphasis
supplied)
This provision grants WMCP the absolute right to extend the first 25-year
term of the FTAA to another 25-year term upon mere lodging of a request
or notice to the Philippine Government. WMCP has the absolute right to
extend the term of the FTAA to 50 years and all that the Government can
do is to acquiesce to the wish of WMCP.
Section 3.3 of the WMCP FTAA is void because it violates Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, the first paragraph of which provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant. (Emphasis
supplied)
The majority opinion, however, makes the startling assertion that FTAAs
are not covered by the term limit under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. The majority opinion states:
I believe that the constitutional term limits do not
apply to FTAAs. The reason is that the above provision
is found within paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Article XII,
which refers to mineral agreements co-production
agreements, joint venture agreements and mineral
production sharing agreements which the
government may enter into with Filipino citizens and
corporations, at least 60 percent owned by Filipino
citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
If the term limit does not apply to FTAAs because the term limit is found in
the first paragraph of Section 2, then the other limitations in the same
first paragraph of Section 2 do not also apply to FTAAs. These limitations
are three: first, that the State owns the natural resources; second, except
for agricultural lands, natural resources shall not be alienated; third, the
State shall exercise full control and supervision in the exploitation of
natural resources. Under the majority opinion's interpretation, these three
limitations will no longer apply to FTAAs, leading to patently absurd
results. The majority opinion will also contradict its own admission that
even in FTAAs the State must exercise full control and supervision in the
exploitation of natural resources.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a consolidation of Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, which state:
Section 8.All lands of public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With
the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, or resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploration, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of
water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
Section 9.The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital which is owned by
such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the national
interest, may allow such citizens, corporations or
associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts
for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such.
Section 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, a one-paragraph
section, contained the provision reserving the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources to Philippine citizens or corporations 60% Filipino
owned as well as the provision on FTAAs. The provision on the 25-year term
limit was found in the preceding Section 8 of Article XIV. If the 25-year term
limit under the 1973 Constitution did not apply to FTAAs, then it should not also
have applied to non-FTAA mining contracts, an interpretation that is obviously
wrong. Thus, the term limit in Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
necessarily applied to both non-FTAA mining contracts and FTAAs in Section 9.
What the framers of the 1987 Constitution did was to consolidate Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution into one section, the present Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The consolidation necessitated re-
arranging the sentences and paragraphs without any intention of destroying
their unity and coherence. Certainly, the consolidation did not mean that the
FTAAs are no longer subject to the 25-year term limit. If anything, the
consolidation merely strengthened the need, following the rules of statutory
construction, to read and interpret together all the paragraphs, and even the
sentences, of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In his book The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was a leading member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, discussed the limitations on the exploitation of
natural resources. Father Bernas states:
4.Other limitations
Agreements for the exploitation of the natural
resources can have a life of only twenty-five years. This
twenty-five year limit dates back to the 1935
Constitution and is considered to be a "reasonable
time to attract capital, local and foreign, and to enable
them to recover their investment and make a profit.
The twenty-five year limit on the exploitation of
natural resources is not applicable to "water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power." In these
cases, "beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant." But in the case of water rights for
water power, the twenty-five year limit is
applicable." 67 (Emphasis supplied)

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions all limit the exploitation of natural
resources to 25-year terms. They also limit franchises for public utilities,
leases of alienable lands of public domain, and water rights for power
development to 25-year terms. If a different term is intended, the
Constitution expressly says so as in water rights for uses other than power
development. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, there is no
separate term for FTAAs other than the 25-year term for the exploitation
of natural resources.
The WMCP FTAA draws life from Executive Order No. 279 issued on 25 July
1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino when she still exercised legislative
powers. Section 1.1 of the WMCP FTAA expressly states, "This Agreement is a
Financial & Technical Assistance Agreement entered into pursuant to Executive
Order No.279." Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides:
Section 7.All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 463 ("PD 463"), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1385, provides:
Section 40.Issuance of Mining Lease Contracts. . . .
After the mining claim has been verified as to its
mineral contents and its actual location on the ground
as determined through reports submitted to the
Director, the Secretary shall approve and issue the
corresponding mining lease contract, which shall be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years,
renewable upon the expiration thereof for another
period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years under such
terms and conditions as provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, at the time of execution of the WMCP FTAA, statutory law limited
the term of all mining contracts to 25-year terms. PD 463 merely
implemented the mandate of the 1973 Constitution on the 25-year term
limit, which is the same 25-year term limit in the 1987 Constitution. Under
Section 7 of Executive Order No.279, Section 40 of PD 463 limiting mining
contracts to a 25-year term applies to the WMCP FTAA. Therefore, Section
3.3 of the WMCP FTAA providing for a 50-year term is void.
Then President Aquino also issued Executive Order No. 211 on 10 July 1987, a
bare 17 days before issuing Executive Order No. 279. Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 211 states:
Section 3.The processing, evaluation and approval of
all mining applications, declarations of locations,
operating agreements and service contracts as
provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, However, that the privileges
granted as well as the terms and conditions thereof
shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 211 applies to the WMCP FTAA which
was executed on 22 March 1995, more than seven years after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 211. Subsequently, Congress enacted RA
7942 to prescribe new terms and conditions for all mineral agreements.
RA 7942 took effect on 9 April 1995.
RA 7942 governs the WMCP FTAA because Executive Order No. 211 expressly
makes mining agreements like the WMCP FTAA subject to "any and all
modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution." Section 38 of RA 7942 provides for a 25-
year term limit specifically for FTAAs, thus:
Section 38.Term of Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement. A financial or technical assistance
agreement shall have a term not exceeding twenty-five
(25) years to start from the execution thereof,
renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the 25-year term limit specifically for FTAAs in Section 38 of RA 7942
applies to the WMCP FTAA. Again, Section 3.3 of the WMCP FTAA
providing for a 50-year term is void.
What is clear from the foregoing is that the 25-year statutory term limit on
mining contracts is merely an implementation of the 25-year constitutional
term limit, whether under the 1935, 1973 or 1987 Constitutions. The majority
opinion's assertion that the 25-year term in the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitutions does not apply to FTAAs is obviously wrong.
3.Section 112 of RA 7942 Applies to the WMCP FTAA
The majority opinion insists that Section 112 of RA 7942 does not apply to the
WMCP FTAA. Section 112 provides:
Section 112.Non-impairment of Existing
Mining/Quarrying Rights. All valid and existing
mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases
pending renewal, mineral production-sharing
agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid,
shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized by the
Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter
XIV on government share in mineral production-sharing
agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee
or contractor unless the mining lessee or
contractor indicates his intention to the secretary, in
writing, not to avail of said provisions: Provided,
further, That no renewal of mining lease contracts
shall be made after the expiration of its
term: Provided, finally, That such leases, production-
sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance
agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions
of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 112 "immediately" applies the fiscal regime under Section 80 on
"mineral production sharing agreement" to "all valid and existing mining"
contracts, including those "granted under Executive Order No. 279." If
Section 112 applies to the WMCP FTAA, then the WMCP FTAA is subject
only to the 2% excise tax under Section 80 as the "total share" of the
Philippine Government.
The majority opinion states, "Whether Section 112 may properly apply to co-
production or joint venture agreements, the fact of the matter is that it cannot
be made to apply to FTAAs." This position of the majority opinion is
understandable. If Section 112 applies to FTAAs, the majority opinion would
have to rule on the constitutionality of Section 80 of RA 7942. The majority
opinion already agrees that the 1987 Constitution requires the FTAA contractor
to pay the State "more than the usual taxes, duties and fees." If Section 112
applies to FTAAs, the majority opinion would have no choice but declare
unconstitutional Section 80.
Thus, the majority opinion insists that Section 112 "cannot be made to apply to
FTAAs." This insistence of the majority opinion collides with the very clear and
plain language of Section 112 of RA 7942 and Section 1.1 of the WMCP FTAA.
This insistence of the majority opinion will lead to absurd results.
First, Section 112 of RA 7942 speaks of "all valid and existing mining" contracts.
The phrase "all valid and existing mining" contracts means
the entire or total mining contracts in existence "at the date of effectivity" of RA
7942 without exception. The word "all" negates any exception. This certainly
includes the WMCP FTAA, unless the majority opinion concedes that the WMCP
FTAA is not a mining contract, or if it is, that it is not a valid contract.
Second, the last proviso of Section 112 itself expressly states that "financial or
technical assistance agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions of
this Act and its implementing rules and regulations." There is no shadow of
doubt whatsoever that Section 112, by its own plain, clear and indisputable
language, commands that FTAAs shall comply with RA 7942. We truly cannot
fathom how the majority opinion can assert that Section 112 cannot apply to
FTAAs.
Third, Section 112 expressly refers to Chapters XIV and XVI of RA 7942. Chapter
XIV refers to the "Government Share" and covers Sections 80, 81 and 82 of RA
7942.Section 81, as the majority opinion concedes, applies to FTAAs. Chapter
XVI refers to "Incentives" and covers Section 90 to 94 of RA 7942. Section 90
states that the "contractors in mineral agreements, and financial technical and
assistance agreements shall be entitled to the fiscal and non-fiscal incentives as
provided under Executive Order No. 226 . . .." Clearly, Section 112 applies to
FTAAs.
Fourth, Section 1.1 of the WMCP FTAA expressly states, "This Agreement is a
Financial & Technical Assistance Agreement entered into pursuant to Executive
Order No. 279." Section 112 states in unequivocal language that "all valid and
existing" agreements "granted under Executive Order No. 279" are immediately
placed under the fiscal regime of MPSAs. In short, mining agreements granted
under Executive Order No. 279 are expressly among the agreements included in
Section 112 and placed under the fiscal regime prescribed in Section 80. There
is no doubt whatsoever that Section 112 applies to the WMCP FTAA which was
"entered into pursuant to Executive Order No. 279."
Fifth, Section 3 of Executive Order No. 211 expressly subjects all mining
contracts executed by the Executive Department to the terms and conditions of
new mining laws that Congress might enact in the future. Thus, Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 211 states:
Section 3.The processing, evaluation and approval of
all mining applications, declarations of locations,
operating agreements and service contracts as
provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, However, that the privileges
granted as well as the terms and conditions thereof
shall be subject to any and all modifications or
alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied) cEHSTC

There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 211, issued prior to the
execution of the WMCP FTAA, applies to the WMCP FTAA. There is also no
dispute that RA 7942 took effect after the issuance of Executive Order No.
211 and after the execution of the WMCP FTAA. Therefore, Section 112 of
RA 7942 applies specifically to the WMCP FTAA.
Indeed, it is plain to see why Section 112 of RA 7942 applies to FTAAs, like the
WMCP FTAA, that were executed prior to the enactment of RA 7942. Section
112 is found in Chapter XX of RA 7942 on "Transitory and Miscellaneous
Provisions." The title of Section 112 refers to the "[N]on-impairment of Existing
Mining Quarrying Rights." RA 7942 is the general law governing all kinds of
mineral agreements, including FTAAs. In fact, Chapter VI of RA 7942, covering
nine sections, deals exclusively on FTAAs. The fiscal regime in FTAAs executed
prior to the enactment of RA 7942 may differ from the fiscal regime prescribed
in RA 7942. Hence, Section 112 provides the transitory provisions to resolve
differences in the fiscal regimes, ostensibly to avoid impairment of contract
obligations. Clearly, Section 112 applies to FTAAs.
There are no ifs or buts in Section 112. The plain, simple and clear language of
Section 112 makes FTAAs, like the WMCP FTAA, subject to Section 112. We
repeat the express words of Section 112
(1)"All valid and existing mining lease contracts . .
. mineral production-sharing agreements
granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act . . .."
(2)the ". . . government share in mineral production-
sharing agreement . . . shall immediately
govern and apply to a mining lessee or
contractor . . .."
(3)"financial or technical assistance agreements shall
comply with the applicable provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and
regulations."
With such clear and unequivocal language, how can the majority opinion
blithely state that Section 112 "cannot be made to apply to FTAAs"? It defies
common sense, simple logic and plain English to assert that Section 112 does
not apply to FTAAs. It defies the fundamental rule of statutory construction as
repeated again and again in jurisprudence:
Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared
by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation. There is only room for application. 68
For nothing is better settled than that the first and
fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they
find it, not as they like it to be. Fidelity to such a task
precludes construction or interpretation, unless
application is impossible or inadequate without it. 69
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has
no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.70
If Section 112 of RA 7942 does not apply to FTAAs as the majority opinion
asserts, what will govern FTAAs executed before the enactment of RA 7942, like
the WMCP FTAA? Section 112 expressly addresses FTAAs executed before the
enactment of RA 7942, requiring these earlier FTAAs to comply with the
provisions of RA 7942 and its implementing rules. Executive Order No. 211,
issued seven years before the execution of the WMCP FTAA, requires all FTAAs
subsequently executed to comply with the terms and conditions of any future
mining law that Congress may enact. That law is RA 7942 which took effect after
the execution of the WMCP FTAA.
The majority opinion allows the WMCP FTAA to become sui generis, an FTAA
outside the scope of RA 7942 which expressly governs "all" mining agreements,
whether MPSAs or FTAAs. This means that the WMCP FTAA is not even
governed by Section 81 of RA 7942 and its phrase "among other things," which
the majority opinion claims is the authority to subject the WMCP FTAA to the
payment of consideration that is "more than the usual taxes, duties and fees."
This makes the majority opinion's position self-contradictory and inutile. The
majority opinion claims that the WMCP FTAA is subject to the phrase "among
other things" in Section 81. At the same time, the majority opinion asserts that
Section 112, which requires earlier FTAAs to comply with Section 81 and other
provisions of RA 7942, does not apply to the WMCP FTAA. The majority opinion
is caught in a web of self-contradictions.
This exemption by the majority opinion of the WMCP FTAA from Section 112 is
judicial class legislation. Why is the WMCP FTAA so special that the majority
opinion wants it exempted from Section 112 of RA 7942? Why are only "all"
other FTAAs subject to the terms and conditions of RA 7942 and not the WMCP
FTAA?
4.Foreign Corporations and Contractors Cannot Hold Exploration Permits
The majority opinion states that "there is no prohibition at all against foreign or
local corporations or contractors holding exploration permits." This is another
assertion of the majority opinion that directly collides with the plain language of
the 1987 Constitution.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly reserves to Philippine
citizens and corporations 60% Filipino owned the "exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources." The majority opinion rationalizes its
assertion in this manner:
Pursuant to Section 20 of RA 7942, an exploration
permit merely grants to a qualified person the right to
conduct exploration for minerals in specified
areas.Such a permit does not amount to an
authorization to extract and carry off the mineral
resources that may be discovered. . . .. (Italics in
original)
The issue is not whether an exploration permit allows a foreign contractor or
corporation to extract mineral resources, for apparently by its language alone a
mere exploration permit does not. There is no dispute that an exploration
permit merely means authority to explore, not to extract. The issue is whether
the issuance of an exploration permit to a foreign contractor violates the
constitutional limitation that only Philippine citizens or corporations 60%
Filipino owned can engage in the "exploration . . . of natural resources."
The plain language of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution clearly limits
to Philippine citizens or to corporations 60% Filipino owned the right to engage
in the "exploration . . . of natural resources." To engage in "exploration" is
simply to explore, not to develop, utilize or extract. To engage in exploration one
must secure an exploration permit. The mere issuance of the exploration permit
is the authority to engage in the exploration of natural resources.
This activity of exploration, which requires an exploration permit, is a reserved
activity not allowed to foreign contractors or foreign corporations. Foreign
contractors and foreign corporations cannot secure exploration permits
because they cannot engage in the exploration of natural resources. If, as the
majority opinion asserts, foreign contractors or foreign corporations can secure
and hold exploration permits, then they can engage in the "exploration . . . of
natural resources." This violates Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, Section 3(aq) of RA 7942, which provides that "a legally
organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit," is void and unconstitutional.
However, the State may directly undertake to explore, develop and utilize the
natural resources. To do this the State may contract a foreign corporation to
conduct the physical act of exploration in the State's behalf, as in an FTAA. In
such a case, the foreign FTAA contractor is merely an agent of the State which
holds the right to explore. No exploration permit is given to the foreign
contractor because it is the State that is directly undertaking the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources.
The requirement reserving "exploration . . . of natural resources" to Philippine
citizens or to corporations 60% Filipino owned is not a matter of constitutional
whim. The State cannot allow foreign corporations, except as contractual
agents under the full control and supervision of the State, to explore our natural
resources because information derived from such exploration may have
national security implications.
If a Chinese company from the People's Republic of China is allowed to explore
for oil and gas in the Spratlys, the technical information obtained by the
Chinese company may only bolster the resolve of the Chinese Government to
hold on to their occupied reefs in the Spratlys despite these reefs being within
the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines. Certainly, we cannot expect the
Chinese company to disclose to the Philippine Government the important
technical data obtained from such exploration.
In Africa, foreign mining companies who have explored the mineral resources of
certain countries shift their support back and forth between government and
rebel forces depending on who can give them better terms in exploiting the
mineral resources. Technical data obtained from mineral exploration have
triggered or fueled wars and rebellions in many countries. The right to explore
mineral resources is not a trivial matter as the majority opinion would want us
to believe.
Even if the foreign companies come from countries with no territorial dispute
with the Philippines, can we expect them to disclose fully to the Philippine
Government all the technical data they obtain on our mineral resources? These
foreign companies know that the Philippine Government will use the very same
data in negotiating from them a higher share of the mining revenues. Why will
the foreign companies give to the Philippine Government technical data
justifying a higher share for the Philippine Government and a lower share for
the foreign companies? The framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1986 Constitutions
were acutely aware of this problem. That is why the 1987 Constitution not only
reserves the "exploration . . . of natural resources" to Philippine citizens and to
corporations 60% Filipino owned, it also now requires the State to exercise "full
control and supervision" over the "exploration . . . of natural resources."

5.The State is Entitled to 60% Share in the Net Mining Revenues
The majority opinion claims that the Constitution does not require that the
State's share in FTAAs or other mineral agreements should be at least 60% of
the net mining revenues. Thus, the majority opinion states that "the Charter did
not intend to fix an iron-clad rule on the 60 percent share, applicable to all
situations at all times and in all circumstances."
The majority opinion makes this claim despite the express admission by
intervenor CMP and respondent WMCP that the State, as owner of the natural
resources, is entitled to 60% of the net mining revenues. The intervenor CMP
admits that under an FTAA, the Philippine Government "stands in the place of
the 60% Filipino owned company" and hence must retain 60% of the net
income. Thus, intervenor CMP concedes that:
. . . In other words, in the FTAA situation, the
Government stands in the place of the 60% Filipino-
owned company, and the 100% foreign-owned
contractor company takes all the risks of failure to find
a commercially viable large-scale ore body or oil
deposit, for which the contractor will get 40% of the
financial benefits. 71 (Emphasis supplied)
As applied to the WMCP FTAA, intervenor CMP asserts that the "contractor's
stipulated share under the WMCP FTAA is limited to a maximum of 40% of the
net production." 72 Intervenor CMP further insists that "60% of its (contractor's)
net returns from mining, if any, will go to the Government under the WMCP
FTAA." 73
Like intervenor CMP, respondent WMCP also maintains that under an FTAA, the
State is "guaranteed" a 60% share of the foreign contractor's Net Mining
Revenues. Respondent WMCP admits that:
In other words, the State is guaranteed a sixty per
centum (60%) share of the Mining Revenues, or 60% of
the actual fruits of the endeavor. This is in line with the
intent behind Section 2 of Article XII that the Filipino
people, as represented by the State, benefit primarily
from the exploration, development, and utilization of
the Philippines' natural resources.
Incidentally, this sharing ratio between the Philippine
Government and the Contractor is also in accordance
with the 60%-40% equity requirement for Filipino-
owned corporations in Paragraph 1 of Section 2 of
Article XII. 74 (Emphasis supplied)
In short, the entire mining industry, as represented by intervenor CMP, is willing
to pay the State a share equivalent to 60% of the net mining revenues. Even the
foreign contractor WMCP agrees to pay the State 60% of its net mining
revenues, albeit dishonestly.
However, the majority opinion refuses to accept that the State is entitled to
what the entire mining industry is willing to pay the State. Incredibly, the
majority opinion claims that "there is no independent showing that the taking of
at least 60 percent share in the after-tax income of a mining company operated
by a foreign contractor is fair and reasonable under most if not all
circumstances." Despite the willingness of the entire mining industry to pay the
State a 60% share without exception, the majority opinion insists that such
sharing is not fair and reasonable to the mining industry "under most if not all
circumstances." What is the basis of the majority opinion in saying this when
the entire mining industry already admits, concedes and accepts that the State
is entitled, without exception, to 60% of the net mining revenues?
Oddly, the majority opinion cites only the personal experience of the ponente,
who had previously "been engaged in private business for many years." The
majority opinion even states, in insisting that the State should receive less than
60% share, that "[F]airness is a credo not only in law, but also in business." The
majority opinion cannot be more popish than the Pope. The majority
opinion ponente's business judgment cannot supplant the unanimous business
judgment of the entire mining industry, as manifested by intervenor CMP
before this Court. What is obvious is that it is not fair to deprive the Filipino
people, many of whom live in hand to mouth existence, of what is legally their
share of the national patrimony, in light of the willingness of the entire mining
industry to pay the Filipino people their rightful share.
The majority opinion gives a "simplified illustration" to show that the State does
not deserve a 60% share of the net proceeds from mining revenues. The
majority opinion states:
. . . Let us base it on gross revenues of, say, P500. After
deducting operating expenses, but prior to income tax,
suppose a mining makes a taxable income of P100. A
corporate income tax of 32 percent results in P32 of
taxable income going to the government, leaving the
mining firm with P68. Government then takes 60
percent thereof, equivalent to P40.80, leaving only
P27.20 for the mining firm.
The majority opinion's "simplified illustration" is indeed too simplified
because it does not even consider the exploration, development and
capital expenses. The majority opinion's "simplified illustration" deducts
from gross revenues only "operating expenses." This is an egregious error
that makes this "simplified illustration" misleading. Exploration,
development and other capital expenses constitute a huge part of the
deductions from gross revenues. In the early years of commercial
production, the exploration, development and capital expenses, if not
subject to a cap or limitation, can wipe out the gross revenues.
The majority opinion's operating expenses are not even taken from mining
industry rates. One can even zero out the taxable income by simply jacking up
the operating expenses. A "simplified illustration" of an income statement of an
operating mining company, omitting the deduction of amortized capital
expenses, serves no purpose whatsoever. What is important is the return on
the investment of the foreign contractor. The absolute amount that goes to the
contractor may be smaller than what goes to the State. However, the amount
that goes to the contractor may be a hundred times its investment. This can
only be determined if the capital expenditures of the contractor are taken into
account. AaCcST
Under an FTAA, the State is directly undertaking the exploitation of mineral
resources. The net proceeds are not subject to income tax since there is no
separate taxable entity. The State is an entity but not a taxable corporate entity.
The State does not pay income tax to itself, and even if it does, it is just a book
entry since it is the payor and payee at the same time. Only the 40% share of
the FTAA contractor is subject to the 32% corporate income tax. On this score
alone, the majority opinion's "simplified illustration" is wrong.
Intervenor CMP and respondent WMCP are correct in anchoring on Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution their admission that the State is entitled to
60% of the net mining revenues. Their common position is based on the
Constitution, existing laws and industry practice.
First, the State owns the mineral resources. To the owner of the mineral
resources belongs the income from any exploitation of the mineral resources.
The owner may share its income with the contractor as compensation to the
contractor, which is an agent of the owner. The industry practice is the owner
receives an equal or larger share of the income as against the share of the
contractor or agent.
In the Occidental-Shell FTAA covering Malampaya, where the contractor
contributed all the capital and technology, the State receives 60% of the net
proceeds. In addition, Occidental-Shell's 40% share is subject to the 32%
Philippine income tax. Occidental-Shell's US$2 billion investment 75 in
Malampaya is by far the single biggest foreign investment in the Philippines.
The offshore Malampaya gas extraction is also by far more capital intensive and
riskier than land-based mineral extraction. Over the 20-year life of the natural
gas reserves, the State will receive US$8-10 billion 76 from its share in the
Occidental-Shell FTAA.
In Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 77 a case decided under the
1973 Constitution, Consolidated Mines, the concessionaire of the mines, shared
equally the net mining income with Benguet Consolidated Mines, the mining
operator or contractor. Thus, as quoted in Consolidated Mines, the agreement
between the concessionaire and operator stated:
X.After Benguet has been fully reimbursed for its
expenditures, advances and disbursements as
aforesaid the net profits from the operation shall be
divided between Benguet and Consolidated share and
share alike, it being understood however, that the net
profits as the term is used in this agreement shall be
computed by deducting from gross income all
operating expenses and all disbursements of any
nature whatsoever as may be made in order to carry
out the terms of this agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
Incidentally, in Consolidated Mines the State did not receive any share in
the net mining income because of the "license, concession or lease"
system under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The State and the Filipino
people received only taxes, duties and fees.
Second, the State exercises "full control and supervision" over the exploitation
of mineral resources. "Full control" as used in the Constitution means more
than ordinary majority control. In corporate practice, ordinary control of a
corporation means a simple majority control, or at least 50% plus one of the
total voting stock. In contrast, full or total control means two-thirds of the
voting stock, which enables the owner of the two-thirds equity to amend any
provision in the charter of the corporation. However, since foreigners can own
up to 40% of the equity of mining companies, "full control" cannot exceed the
control corresponding to the State's 60% equity. Thus, the State's share in the
net proceeds of mining companies should correspond to its 60% interest and
control in mining companies.
Third, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the FTAA must
make "real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country." As respondent WMCP aptly admits, "the intent behind Section 2 of
Article XII (is) that the Filipino people, as represented by the State, (shall) benefit
primarily from the exploration, development, and utilization of the Philippines'
natural resources." For the Filipino people to benefit primarily from the
exploitation of natural resources, and for FTAAs to make real contributions to
the national economy, the majority of the net proceeds from mining operations
must accrue to the State.

Fourth, the 1987 Constitution ordains the State to "conserve and develop our
patrimony." The nation's mineral resources are part of our national patrimony.
The State can "conserve" our mineral resources only if the majority of the net
proceeds from the exploitation of mineral resources accrue to the State.
In sum, only the majority opinion refuses to accept that the State has a right to
receive at least 60% of the net proceeds from mining operations. The principal
parties involved in this case do not object that the State shall receive such
share. The entire mining industry and respondent WMCP admit that the State is
entitled to a 60% share of the net proceeds. The State, represented by the
Government, will certainly not object to such share.
More than anything else, the intent and language of the 1987 Constitution
require that the State receive the bulk of the income from mining operations.
Only Congress, through a law, may allow a share lesser than 60% if
certain compelling conditions are present. Congress may authorize the
President to make such determination subject to standards and limitations that
Congress shall prescribe.
The majority opinion wants to give the President the absolute discretion to
determine the State's share from mining revenues. The President will be hard
put accepting anything less than 60% of the net proceeds. If the President
accepts less than 60%, the President is open to a charge of entering into a
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract to the Government because
the entire mining industry, including WMCP, has already agreed to pay 60% of
the net proceeds to the State. The only way to avoid this is for Congress to
enact a law providing for the conditions when the State may receive less than
60% of the net proceeds.
Conclusion
Let us assume that one of the Justices of this Court is the owner of mineral
resources say gold reserves. A foreigner offers to extract the gold and pay for
all development, capital and operating expenses. How much will the good
Justice demand as his or her share of the gold extracted by the foreigner? If the
Justice follows the Malampaya precedent, he or she will demand a 60% share of
the net proceeds. If the Justice follows the manifestation of intervenor CMP and
respondent WMCP before this Court, he or she will also demand a 60% share in
the net proceeds. If the Justice follows the Consolidated Mines precedent, he or
she will demand no less than 50% of the net proceeds. In either case, the 2%
excise tax on the gold extracted is part of the operating expenses to be paid by
the foreigner but deducted from the gross proceeds.
Now, under the Regalian doctrine the State, not the Justice, owns the gold
reserves. How much should the State demand from the foreigner as the State's
share of the gold that is extracted? If we follow Sections 39, 80, 81, 84 and 112
of RA 7942, the State will receive only 2% excise tax as its "total share" from the
gold that is extracted.
Is this fair to the State and the Filipino people, many of whom live below the
poverty line? Is this what the 1987 Constitution mandates when it says that (a)
the State must conserve and develop the nation's patrimony, (b) the State owns
all the natural resources, (c) the State must exercise full control and supervision
over the exploitation of its natural resources, and (d) FTAAs must make real
contributions to the national economy and the general welfare?
How this Court decides the present case will determine largely whether our
country will remain poor, or whether we can progress as a nation. Based on
NEDA's estimates, the total mineral wealth of the nation is P47 trillion, or
US$840 billion. This is 15 times more than our US$56 billion foreign debt. Can
this Court in conscience agree that the State will receive only 2% of the P47
trillion mineral wealth of the nation?
In Miners Association, this Court ruled that the 1987 Constitution has
abandoned the old system of "license, concession or lease" and instead
installed full State control and supervision over the exploitation of natural
resources. No amount of dire warnings or media publicity should intimidate this
Court into resurrecting the old and discredited system that has caused the
denudation of almost all of the nation's virgin forests without any visible benefit
to the Filipino people.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution have wisely instituted the new system to
prevent a repeat of the denudation of our forestlands that did not even make
any real contribution to the economic growth of the nation. This Court must do
its solemn duty to uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution and, in the
words of the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution, "conserve and develop our
patrimony" for the benefit of the Filipino people.
This Court cannot trivialize the Filipino people's right to be the primary
beneficiary of the nation's mineral resources by ruling that the phrase "among
other things" is sufficient to insure that FTAAs will "make real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country." This Court cannot tell
the Filipino people that the phrase "among other things" is sufficient
to "preserve and develop the national patrimony." This Court cannot tell the
Filipino people that the phrase "among other things" means that they will
receive the bulk of mining revenues.
This Court cannot tell the Filipino people that Congress deliberately used the
phrase "among other things" to guarantee that the Filipino people will receive
their equitable share from mining revenues of foreign contractors. This Court
cannot tell the Filipino people that with the phrase "among other things," this
Court has protected the national interest as mandated by the 1987
Constitution.
I therefore vote to deny the motions for reconsideration. I vote to declare
unconstitutional Section 3(aq), Section 39, Section 80, the second paragraph of
Section 81, the proviso in Section 84, and the first proviso in Section 112 of RA
7942 for violation of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. In issuing the
rules to implement these void provisions of RA 7942, DENR Secretary Victor O.
Ramos gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
I also vote to declare unconstitutional the present WMCP FTAA for violation of
the same Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. However, WMCP may
negotiate with the Philippine Government for a new mineral agreement
covering the same area consistent with this Decision.
CARPIO MORALES, J ., dissenting.
Regrettably, a majority of the members of this Court has voted to reverse its
January 27, 2004 Decision in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association,
Inc. v. Ramos 1 by which it declared certain provisions 2 of the Mining Act of
1995 3 on Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs), the related
provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative
Order 96-40 (DAO No. 96-40), and the March 22, 1995 Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) executed between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) in violation of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Because I find that: (1) the "agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance" contemplated by the fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution are distinct and dissimilar from the "service
contracts" under the 1973 Constitution; and (2) these certain provisions of the
Mining Act, its implementing rules, and the WMCP FTAA unconstitutionally
convey beneficial ownership and control over Philippine mineral and petroleum
resources to foreign contractors, I most respectfully dissent.
Antecedents
By motion, private respondent WMCP seeks a reconsideration of this Court's
Decision, it arguing essentially that FTAAs are the same as service contracts
which were sanctioned under the 1973 Constitution.
By Resolution of June 22, 2004, this Court, upon motion, 4 impleaded Philippine
Chamber of Mines (PCM), as respondent-in-intervention. Intervenor PCM
argues that the "agreements" referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution were intended to involve or include the "service contracts"
provided for in the 1973 Constitution.
The parties were, on June 29, 2004, heard on oral arguments during which two
major issues were tackled: first, the proper interpretation of the phrase
"agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance" in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, and second, mootness.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda, as required by
Resolution of this Court. However, despite the verbal request of Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban during the oral arguments, 5 intervenor PCM
failed to submit along with its memorandum any documents to establish
international mining practices, particularly in developing countries.
Issues for Resolution
The majority opinion holds that the resolution of the Motions for
Reconsideration in this case should be confined to the issues taken up during
the oral arguments on June 29, 2004. These were: (1) the proper interpretation
of the phrase "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance"
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, and (2) mootness. TAIaHE
It further holds that the issue of whether the Mining Act and the WMCP FTAA
are manifestly disadvantageous to the government could not be passed upon
because the same was supposedly not raised in the original petition.
These rulings, while well intentioned, cannot be accepted.
First, there is no rule of procedure, whether in Rule 52 or elsewhere, which
restricts the resolution of a case to the issues taken up in the oral arguments.
The reason is obvious. The issues for resolution in any given case are
determined by the conflicting arguments of the parties as set forth in their
pleadings. On the other hand, the matters to be taken up in an oral argument
may be limited, by order of the court, to only such points as the court may
deem necessary. Thus, Section 1 of Rule 49 provides:

Section 1.When allowed. At its own instance or
upon motion of a party, the court may hear the parties
in oral argument on the merits of a case, or on any
material incident in connection therewith.
The oral argument shall be limited to such matters as
the court may specify in its order or resolution.
(Emphasis supplied)
A narrow delimitation of matters to be taken up during oral argument is a
matter of practical necessity since often not all the relevant issues can be
thoroughly discussed without unduly imposing on the time of the Court.
However, unlike a pre-trial order, 6 the delimitation does not control or limit
the issues to be resolved. These issues may be subject matter of the parties'
memoranda, as in this case.
Second, as noted in the Decision, 7 the issue of whether the Mining Act and the
WMCP FTAA afford the State a just share in the proceeds of its natural
resources was in fact raised by the petitioners, viz:
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction:
I
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
allows fully foreign owned corporations to
explore, develop, utilize and exploit mineral
resources in a manner contrary to Section
2, paragraph 4, Article XII of the
Constitution;
II
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
allows the taking of private property
without the determination of public use
and for just compensation;
III
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
violates Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution;
IV
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well
as fully foreign owned corporations of the
nation's marine wealth contrary to Section
2, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the
Constitution;
V
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
allows priority to foreign and fully foreign
owned corporations in the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral
resources contrary to Article XII of the
Constitution;
VI
. . . in signing and promulgating DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40
implementing Republic Act No. 7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that it
allows the inequitable sharing of wealth
contrary to Sections [sic] 1, paragraph 1,
and Section 2, paragraph 4[,] [Article XII] of
the Constitution;
VII
. . . in recommending approval of and
implementing the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement between the
President of the Republic of the Philippines
and Western Mining Corporation
Philippines Inc. because the same is illegal
and unconstitutional. 8 (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
Indeed, this Court expressly passed upon this issue in the Decision when it held
that:
With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds
that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act
authorizes service contracts. Although the statute
employs the phrase "financial and technical
agreements" in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, it actually treats these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
law. 9 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Moreover, the issue of whether the State is deprived of its just share in the
proceeds from mining was touched upon by the parties in their memoranda.
Thus, respondent WMCP argues that:
Section 10.2 (a) of the COLUMBIO FTAA does not
prohibit the State from partaking of the fruits of the
exploration. In fact, Section 7.7 of the COLUMBIO FTAA
provides:
"7.7Government Share
From the Commencement of Commercial
Production, the Contractor shall pay a
government share of sixty per centum
(60%) of Net Mining Revenues, calculated in
accordance with the following provisions
(the "Government Share"). The Contractor
shall be entitled to retain the balance of all
revenues from the Mining
Operations." TaSEHD
In other words, the State is guaranteed a sixty per
centum (60%) share of the Net Mining Revenues, or
60% of the actual fruits of the endeavor. This is in line
with the intent behind Section 2 of Article XII that the
Filipino people, as represented by the State, benefit
primarily from the exploration, development, and
utilization of the Philippines' natural
resources. 10 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
while the petitioners, for their part, claim:
For instance, government share is computed on the
basis of net mining revenue. Net mining revenue is
gross mining revenue less, among others, deductible
expenses. Some of the allowable deductions from the
base amount to be used to compute government share
are suspicious. The WMCP FTAA contract, for instance,
allows expenditures for development "outside the
Contract Area," consulting fees for work done "outside
the Philippines," and the "establishment and
administration of field offices including administrative
overheads incurred within and outside the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
One mischief inherent in past service contracts was the
practice of transfer pricing. UNCTAD defines this as the
"pricing of transfers of goods, services and other assets
within a TNC network." If government does not control
the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources, then the intra-transnational corporation
pricing of expenditures may not become
transparent. 11 (Emphasis supplied; footnotes
omitted)
In fine, the majority opinion skirts an issue raised in the original Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus, passed upon in its Decision of January 27, 2004 and
argued by the parties in the present Motion for Reconsideration.
Instead, I find that the myriad arguments raised by the parties may be grouped
according to two broad categories: first, the arguments pertaining to the
constitutionality of FTAA provisions of the Mining Act; and second, those
pertaining to the validity of the WMCP FTAA. Within these categories, the
following issues are submitted for resolution: (1) whether in invalidating certain
provisions of the Mining Act a non-justiciable political question is passed upon;
(2) whether the FTAAs contemplated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution are identical to, or inclusive of, the "service contracts" provided for
in the 1973 Constitution; (3) whether the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of certain provisions of the Mining Act should be reconsidered; (4) whether the
question of validity of the WMCP FTAA was rendered moot before the
promulgation of the Decision; and (5) whether the decision to declare the
WMCP FTAA unconstitutional and void should be reconsidered.
Following the foregoing framework of analysis, I now proceed to resolve the
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration.
I
Constitutionality of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
The issues presented constitute
justiciable questions.
Contrary to the posture of respondent WMCP, this Court did not tread on a
political question in rendering its Decision of January 27, 2004.
The Constitution delineates the parameters of the powers of the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. 12 Whether the first and second great departments
of government exceeded those parameters is the function of the third. 13 Thus,
the Constitution defines judicial power to include "the duty . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 14
Judicial power does not extend to political questions, which are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular
measure. 15 The reason is that, under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state power. 16 In short, the judiciary
does not settle policy issues. 17
The distinction between a truly political question and an ostensible one lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. 18 If there are
constitutionally imposed limits, then the issue is justiciable, and a court is duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within those limits. 19
Respondent WMCP argues that the "exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources are matters of policy, in other words, political matters or
questions," over which this Court has no jurisdiction. IDcTEA
Respondent is mistaken. The questions involved in this case are not political.
The provisions of paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution,
including the phrase "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance," incorporate limitations 20 on the scope of such agreements or
FTAAs. Consequently, they constitute limitations on the powers of the
legislative to determine their terms, as well as the powers of the Executive to
enter into them. In its Decision, this Court found that, by enacting the
objectionable portions of the Mining Act and in entering into the subject FTAA,
the Congress and the President went beyond the constitutionally delimited
scope of such agreements and thereby transgressed the boundaries of their
constitutional powers.
The "agreements" contemplated in
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution are distinct and
dissimilar from the old "service
contracts."

The majority and respondents share a common thesis: that the fourth
paragraph of Sec. 2, Article XII contemplates not only financial or technical
assistance but, just like the service contracts which were allowed under the
1973 Constitution, management assistance as well.
The constitutional provision in dispute reads:
Art. XII
National Economy and Patrimony
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 2.All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization
of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
Its counterpart provision in Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution authorized
"service contracts" as follows:
SEC. 9.The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of which is owned by such citizens. The
Batasang Pambansa, in the national interest, may
allow such citizens, corporations or associations to
enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any
person or entity for the exploration, development,
exploration, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts
for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
Respondent WMCP contends that the fourth paragraph of Section 2 is an
exception to the rule that participation in the country's natural resources is
reserved to Filipinos. 21 It hastens to add, however, that the word "may"
therein is permissive not restrictive; 22 and that consistent with the provision's
permissive nature, the word "involving" therein should be construed to mean
"to include," such that the assistance by foreign corporations should not be
confined to technical or financial, but also to management forms. 23 And it
notes that the Constitution used "involving" instead of such restrictive terms as
"solely," "only," or "limited to." 24
To the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the intent behind the fourth
paragraph is to prevent the practice under the 1973 Constitution of allowing
foreigners to circumvent the capitalization requirement, 25 as well as to
address the absence of a governing law that led to the abuse of service
contracts. 26 The phrase "technical or financial" is merely for emphasis, the
OSG adds, that it is descriptive, not definitive, of the forms of assistance that
the State needs and which foreign corporations may provide in the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of the specified
resources. 27 Furthermore, the OSG contends that the denomination of the
subject FTAA as a "financial and technical assistance agreement" is a misnomer
and should more properly be called "agreements for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils." 28 It argues that the President has broad discretion to enter
into anyagreement, regardless of the scope of assistance, with foreign
corporations. 29 Driving its point, the OSG poses: If the framers of the
Constitution intended to limit the service of foreign corporations to "passive
assistance," such as simple loan agreements, why confine them to large-scale
ventures? 30 Why does the Constitution require that such agreements be based
on real contributions to economic growth and general welfare of the
country? 31 Why the condition in the last paragraph of Section 2 that the
President report to Congress? 32 Finally, the OSG asserts that these
requirements would be superfluous if the assistance to be rendered were
merely technical or financial. 33 And that it would make more sense if the
phrase "agreements . . . involving technical or financial assistance" were
construed to mean the same concept as the service contracts under the 1973
Constitution. TaCIDS
The OSG's contentions are complemented by intervenor PCM which maintains
that the FTAA "is an agreement for [the] rendition of a whole range of services
of an integrated and comprehensive character, ranging from discovery through
development and utilization and production of minerals or petroleum by the
foreign-owned corporation." 34 In fine, intervenor posits that the change in
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution does not relate to the substance of the
agreement, 35 otherwise, the State itself would be compelled to conduct the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, ventures that it is
ill-equipped to undertake. 36
Primary Concepts in Article XII of
the Constitution
Before passing upon the foregoing arguments and for better clarity, it may be
helpful to first examine the concepts of (a) "beneficial ownership," (b) "full
control and supervision," and (c) "real contributions to the economic growth
and general welfare of the country" which are at the heart of Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.
Beneficial Ownership
Beneficial ownership, as the plain meaning of the words implies, refers to the
right to the gains, rewards and advantages generated by the property. 37
The concept is not new, but in fact is well entrenched in the law of
trusts. 38 Thus, while the trustee holds the legal title to or ownership of the
property entrusted to him, he is nevertheless not the beneficial owner. Rather,
he holds and administers the property for the benefit of another, called the
beneficiary or the cestui que trust. Hence, the profits realized from the
administration and management of the property by the trustee, who is the
"naked owner," less any lawful fees due to the latter, accrue to the cestui que
trust, who is the "beneficial" or "equitable" owner. 39
The foregoing concepts are directly applicable to the statement in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State."
The words "owned" and "State" should both be understood on two levels.
"Owned" or "ownership" refers to both the legal title to and the beneficial
ownership of the natural resources. Similarly, "State" should be understood as
denoting both the body politic making up the Republic of the Philippines, i.e.,
the Filipino people, as well as the Government which represents them and acts
on their behalf.
Thus, the phrase "natural resources are owned by the State" simultaneously
vests the legal title to the nation's natural resources in the Government, and
the beneficial ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filipino people,
from whom all governmental authority emanates. 40
On this point, petitioners and respondent WMCP appear to be in rare
agreement. Thus, petitioners, in their Memorandum state:
. . . With respect to exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, the State should not
merely be concerned about passing laws. It is expected
that it holds these natural resources covered in Article
XII, Section 2 in dominium and in trust for the Filipino
people. 41 (Emphasis and italics supplied; italics in the
original)
Respondent WMCP is even more emphatic:
The Regalian Doctrine, as embodied under the
Constitution, is a recognition that sovereignty resides
in the Filipino people, and the prime duty of
government or the State is to serve and protect the
people. Thus, the ownership of natural resources by
the State under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
is actually a beneficial trust in favor of the Filipino
people.
Stated differently, it is the Filipino people who own the
nation's natural resources, and the State is merely the
guardian-in-trust thereof. 42 (Emphasis and italics
supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)

Clearly, in the exploration, development and utilization of the nation's natural
resources, the Government is in a position analogous to a trustee, holding title
to and managing these resources for the benefit of the Filipino people,
including future generations. 43 As the trustee of the sovereign, the
Government has a fiduciary duty to ensure that the gains, rewards and
advantages generated by the Philippines' natural resources accrue to the
benefit of the Filipino people. Corollary to this, the Government cannot,
without violating its sacred trust, enter into any agreement or arrangement
which effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial ownership of
these resources e.g., when it enters into an agreement whereby the vast
majority of the resources, or the profit generated from the resources, is
bargained away in favor of a foreign entity. CTAIHc
Full Control and Supervision
In the context of its role as trustee, the Government's "full control and
supervision" over the exploration, development, and utilization of the nation's
natural resources, in its most basic and fundamental sense, is accomplished by
maintaining a position whereby it can carry out its fiduciary duty to protect the
beneficial interest of its cestui que trust in these resources.
Significantly, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that the
Government may undertake the exploration, development and utilization of
these resources by itself or together with a third party. 44 In the first case,
where no third party is involved, the Government's "full control and
supervision" over the resources is easily achieved. In the second case, where
the third party may naturally be expected to seek participation in the operation
of the venture and ask for compensation in proportion to its contribution(s), the
Government must still maintain a position vis--vis its third party partner
whereby it can adequately protect the interest of the Filipino people, who are
the beneficial owners of the resources.
By way of concrete example, the Government may enter into a joint venture
agreement 45 with a third party to explore, develop or utilize certain natural
resources through a jointly owned corporation, wherein the government has
the controlling interest. Under this arrangement, the Government would clearly
be in a position to protect the interest of the beneficial owners of the natural
resources.
In the alternative, as suggested by the OSG, 46 the Government may be allowed
one or more directors (holding nominal shares) on the governing board and
executive committee(s) of the private corporation contracted to undertake
mining activities in behalf of the government. Depending on the by-laws of the
private corporation, strategic representation of the Government in its
governing board and executive committee(s) may afford sufficient protection to
the interest of the people.
However, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution does not limit the options
available to the Government, when dealing with prospective mining partners, to
joint ventures or representation in the contractor's board of directors. To be
sure, the provision states that the Government may enter into "co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations," or, for large scale exploration, development and
utilization, "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance." But whatever form the agreement entered
into by the Government and its third party partner(s) may take, the same must
contain, as an absolute minimum, provisions that ensure that the Government
can effectively perform its fiduciary duty to safeguard the beneficial interest of
the Filipino people in their natural resources, as mandated by the Constitution.
Real Contributions to the Economy
and the General Welfare of the
Country
Section 2, Article XII likewise requires that "agreements . . . involving financial or
technical assistance" be "based on real contributions to the economic
growth andgeneral welfare of the country." This provision articulates the value
which the Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes their
potential benefits. It likewise acknowledges the fact that the impact of mining
operations is not confined to the economy but, perhaps to a greater extent,
affects Philippine society as a whole as well.
"Minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils," are part of the non-renewable
wealth of the Filipino people. By pursuing large scale exploration, development
and utilization of these resources, the State would be allowing the consumption
or exhaustion of these resources, and thus deprive future Filipino generations
the enjoyment thereof. Mining especially large-scale mining often results
in the displacement of local residents. Its negative effects on the environment
are well-documented. 47
Thus, for benefits from the exploration, development and utilization of these
resources to be real, they must yield profits over and above 1) the capital and
operating costs incurred, 2) the resulting damage to the environment, and 3)
the social costs to the people who are immediately and adversely affected
thereby. EcAISC
Moreover, the State must ensure that the real benefits from the utilization of
these resources are sufficient to offset the corresponding loss of these resources
to future generations. Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the
motherland's natural resources are the birthright not only of the present
generation of Filipinos but of future generations as well. 48
The requirement of real benefit is applicable even when the exploration,
development and utilization are being undertaken directly by the Government
or with the aid of Filipinos or Filipino corporations. But it takes on greater
significance when a foreign entity is involved. In the latter instance, the foreign
entity would naturally expect to be compensated for its assistance. In that
event, it is inescapable that a foreigner would be benefiting from an activity (i.e.
mining) which also results in numerous, serious and long term harmful
consequences to the environment and to Philippine society.
Moreover, as recognized by the 1935 Constitutional Convention, foreign
involvement in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources has serious
implications on national security. As recounted by delegate Jose Aruego:
The nationalization of the natural resources was also
intended as an instrument of national defense. The
Convention felt that to permit foreigners to own or
control the natural resources would be to weaken the
national defense. It would be making possible the
gradual extension of foreign influence into our politics,
thereby increasing the possibility of foreign control. . . .
Not only these. The nationalization of the natural
resources, it was believed, would prevent making the
Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to its internal security and
independence. For unless the natural resources were
nationalized, with the nationals of foreign countries
having the opportunity to own or control them,
conflicts of interest among them might arise inviting
danger to the safety and independence of the
nation. 49(Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, and contrary to the posture of the OSG, it is immaterial whether
the foreign involvement takes the form of "active" participation in the mining
concern or "passive" assistance such as a foreign mining loan or the licensing of
mining technology. Whether the foreign involvement is passive or active, the
fact remains that the foreigner will expect to be compensated and, as a
necessary consequence, a fraction of the gains, rewards and advantages
generated by Philippine natural resources will be diverted to foreign hands even
as the long term pernicious "side effects" of the mining activity will be borne
solely by the Filipino people.
Under such circumstances, the Executive, in determining whether or not to
avail of the assistance of a foreign corporation in the large scale exploration,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources, must carefully
weigh the costs and benefits if it is to faithfully discharge its fiduciary duty to
protect the beneficial interest of the Filipino people in these resources.
These same considerations likewise explain why the last paragraph of Section 2
mandates that the President "notify the Congress of every contract entered into
in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution." The
Constitution requires that the Legislative branch, which is perceived to be more
broadly representative of the people and therefore more immediately sensitive
to their concerns, be given a timely opportunity to scrutinize and evaluate the
Executive's decision.
With these concepts in mind, I now turn to what I believe to be the proper
interpretation of "agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance" in paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Construction of paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution
The suggestion that the avoidance of the term "service contracts" in the fourth
paragraph is to prevent the circumvention, prevalent under the 1973
Constitution, of the 6040 capital requirement does not persuade, it being too
narrow an interpretation of that provision. If that were the only purpose in the
change of phraseology, this Court reiterates, there would have been no need to
replace the term "service contracts" with "agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial assistance."
The loophole in the 1973 Constitution that sanctioned dummyism is easily
plugged by the provision in the present Constitution that the President, not
Congress or the Batasan Pambansa (under the 1973 Constitution), may enter
into either technical or financial agreements with foreign corporations. The
framers then could have easily employed the more traditional term "service
contracts" in designating the agreements contemplated, and thus obviated
confusion, especially since the term was employed by the legal system then
prevailing 50 and had a settled acceptation. STADIH

The other proffered raison d'tre of the fourth paragraph, i.e. to address the
absence of a governing law that led to the abuse of service contracts, is equally
unpersuasive. In truth, there were a host of laws governing service contracts
pertaining to various natural resources, as this Court noted when it traced the
history of Section 2, Article XII in its Decision. 51
Respondent WMCP nevertheless correctly states that the fourth paragraph
establishes an exception to the rule limiting the exploration, development and
utilization of the nation's natural resources to Filipinos. As an exception,
however, it is illogical to deduce that the provision should be interpreted
liberally, not restrictively. It bears repeating that the provision, being an
exception, should be strictly construed against foreign participation.
In any case, the constitutional provision allowing the
President to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation's natural resources is
reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos. As Commissioner Villegas
emphasized, the provision is "very restrictive."
Commissioner Nolledo also remarked that "entering
into service contracts is an exception to the rule on
protection of natural resources for the interest of the
nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should be
subject, whenever possible, to stringent rules." Indeed,
exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provision rather than the
exception. 52 (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations
omitted).
That the fourth paragraph employs the word "may" does not make it non-
restrictive. Indeed, "may" does make the provision permissive, but only as
opposed to mandatory, 53 and operates to confer discretion upon a
party. 54 Thus, as used in the fourth paragraph, "may" provides the President
with the option to enter into FTAAs. It is, however, not incumbent upon the
President to do so for, as owner of the natural resources, the "State [itself] may
directly undertake such activities." 55If the President opts to exercise the
prerogative to enter into FTAAs, the agreement must conform to the
restrictions laid down by Section 2, including the scope of the assistance, which
must be limited to financial or technical forms.
"May" in the fourth paragraph, therefore, should be understood in the same
sense as it is used in the first paragraph, that is, that the State "may enter into .
. . agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or association at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens."
The majority, however, opines that the "agreements involving either technical
or financial assistance" referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution are indeed service contracts. In support of this
conclusion, the majority maintains that the use of the phrase "agreements . . .
involving either technical or financial assistance" does not indicate the intent to
exclude other modes of assistance because the use of the word "involving"
signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or activities.
And it proffers that the word "involving" has three connotations that can be
differentiated as follows: (1) the sense of concerning, having to do with, or
affecting; (2) entailing, requiring, implying or necessitating; (3) including,
containing or comprising. None of these three connotations, it is contended,
convey a sense of exclusivity. Thus, it concludes that had the framers intended
to exclude other forms of assistance, they would have simply said "agreements
for technical or financial assistance" as opposed to "agreements including
technical or financial assistance."
To interpret the term "involving" in the fourth paragraph to mean "including,"
as the majority contends, would run counter to the restrictive spirit of the
provision. Notably, the 1987 Constitution uses "involving" not "including." As
admitted in the majority opinion, the word "involve" may also mean
concerning, having to do with or affecting. Following the majority opinion's own
methodology of substitution, "agreements . . . involving either technical or
financial assistance" means "agreements . . . concerning either technical or
financial assistance." And the word "concerning" according to Webster's Third
New International Dictionary means "regarding", "respecting" or "about." To
reiterate, these terms indicate exclusivity. More tellingly, the 1987 Constitution
not only deleted the term "management" in the 1973 Constitution, but also the
catch-all phrase "or other forms of assistance," 56 thus reinforcing the
exclusivity of "either technical or financial assistance." SITCEA
That the fourth paragraph does not employ the terms "solely," "only," or
"limited to" to qualify "either technical or financial assistance" does not detract
from the provision's restrictive nature. Moreover, the majority opinion's
illustration conveniently omits "either . . . or." As Senior Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno pointed out during the oral arguments, the use of the
disjunctive "either . . . or" denotes restriction. 57
According to the Penguin Dictionary, the word "either" may be used as (1) an
adjective or (2) a pronoun or (3) a conjunction or (4) an adverb. As an adjective,
the word "either" means (1) any one of two; one or the other; or (2) one and
the other; each. As a pronoun, the word "either" means the one or the other. As
a conjunction, the word "either" is used before two or more sentence elements
of the same class or function joined usually by "or" to indicate what immediately
follows is the first of two or more alternatives. Lastly, as an adverb, "either" is
used for emphasis after a negative or implied negation (i.e. for that matter or
likewise). The traditional rule holds that "either" should be used only to refer to
one of two items and that "any" is required when more than two items are
involved. 58 However, modern English usage has relaxed this rule when "either"
is used as a conjunction. 59 Thus, the word "either" may indicate the choice
between two or more possibilities.
"Either" in paragraph 4, section 2, Article XII, is clearly used as a conjunction,
joining two (and only two) concepts financial and technical. The use of the
word "either" clearly limits the President to only two possibilities, financial, and
technical assistance. Other forms of assistance are plainly not allowed,
since only the words "financial and technical" follow the word "either."
In accordance with the intent of the provision, "agreements . . . involving either
technical or financial" is deemed restrictive and not just descriptive. It is a
condition, a limitation, not a mere description.
The OSG's suggestion that the President may enter into "any" agreement, the
scope of which may go beyond technical or financial assistance, with a foreign-
owned corporation, does not impress. The first paragraph of Section 2 limits
contracts with Filipino citizens or corporations to co-production, joint venture
or production-sharing agreements. To subscribe to the OSG's theory would
allow foreign-owned corporations participation in the country's natural
resources equal to, perhaps even greater than, that of Filipino citizens or
corporations.
The OSG cites the Separate Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug, now retired, who
proposed that, on the premise that the State itself may undertake the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, a foreign-owned
corporation may engage in such activities in behalf of the State:
The Constitution has not prohibited the State from
itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the country's
natural resources, and, for this purpose, it may, I
submit, enter into the necessary agreements with
individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible
operation.
The fundamental law is deemed written in every
contract. The FTAA entered into by the government
and WMCP recognizes this vital principle. Thus, two of
the agreement's clauses provide:
"WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines provides in
Article XII, Section 2 that all lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other natural resources are
owned by the State, and that the
exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State; and
"WHEREAS, the Constitution further
provides that the Government may enter
into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of
minerals."
The assailed contract or its provisions must then be
read in conformity with abovementioned
constitutional mandate. Hence, Section 10.2(a) of the
FTAA, for instance, which states that "the Contractor
shall have the exclusive right to explore for, exploit,
utilize, process, market, export and dispose of all
minerals and products and by-products thereof that
may be derived or produced from the Contract Area
and to otherwise conduct Mining Operations in the
Contract Area in accordance with the terms and
conditions hereof," must be taken to mean that the
foregoing rights are to be exercised by WMCP for and
in behalf of the State and that WMCP, as the
Contractor, would be bound to carry out the terms and
conditions of the agreement acting for and in behalf of
the State. In exchange for the financial and technical
assistance, inclusive of its services, the Contractor
enjoys an exclusivity of the contract and a
corresponding compensation therefor. 60 (Emphasis
supplied). aCTHDA
This proposition must be rejected since it sanctions the circumvention, if
not outright violation, of the fourth paragraph by allowing foreign
corporations to render more than technical or financial assistance on the
pretext that it is an agent of the State. Quando aliquid prohibitur ex
directo, prohibitur et per obliquum. What is prohibited directly is
prohibited indirectly. 61 Further, the proposition lends itself
to mischievous consequences. If followed to its logical conclusion, nothing
would stop the State from engaging the services of a foreign corporation
to undertake in its behalf the exploration, development and utilization
of all other natural resources, not just, "minerals, petroleum and mineral
oils, even on a small scale, not just "large-scale."

The present Constitution restricts foreign involvement to large-scale activities
because the idea is to limit the participation of foreign corporations only to
areas where they are needed.
MS. QUESADA. Going back to Section 3, the section
suggests that:
The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources . . . may be directly undertaken by
the State, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing agreement with . . .
corporations or associations at least sixty percent of
whose voting stock or controlling interest is owned by
such citizens.
Lines 25 to 30 on the other hand, suggest that in the
large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources, the President with the concurrence
of Congress may enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations even for technical or financial
assistance.
I wonder if this first part of Section 3 contradicts the
second part. I am raising this point for fear that foreign
investors will use their enormous capital resources to
facilitate the actual exploitation or exploration,
development and effective disposition of our natural
resources to the detriment of Filipino investors. I am
not saying that we should not consider borrowing
money from foreign sources. What I refer to is that
foreign interest should be allowed to participate only
to the extent that they lend us money and give us
technical assistance with the appropriate government
permit. In this way, we can insure the enjoyment of our
natural resources by our people.
MR. VILLEGAS. Actually, the second provision about the
President does not permit foreign investors to
participate. It is only technical or financial assistance
they do not own anything but on conditions that
have to be determined by law with the concurrence of
Congress. So, it is very restrictive.
If the Commissioner will remember, this removes the
possibility for service contracts which we said
yesterday were avenues used in the previous regime to
go around the 60-40 requirement. 62 (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
The intent is to allow Filipinos to benefit from Filipino resources.
MR. DAVIDE. May I be allowed to explain the
proposal?
MR. MAAMBONG. Subject to the three-minute rule,
Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. It will not take me three minutes.
The Commission had just approved the Preamble. In
the Preamble we clearly stated there that the Filipino
people are sovereign and that one of the objectives for
the creation or establishment of a government is to
conserve and develop the national patrimony. The
implication is that the national patrimony or our
natural resources are exclusively reserved for the
Filipino people. No alien must be allowed to enjoy,
exploit and develop our natural resources. As a matter
of fact, that principle proceeds from the fact that our
natural resources are gifts from God to the Filipino
people and it would be a breach of that special blessing
from God if we will allow aliens to exploit our natural
resources.
I voted in favor of the Jamir proposal because it is not
really exploitation that we granted to the alien
corporations but only for them to render financial or
technical assistance. It is not for them to enjoy our
natural resources. Madam President, our natural
resources are depleting; our population is increasing
by leaps and bounds. Fifty years from now, if we will
allow these aliens to exploit our natural resources,
there will be no more natural resources for the next
generations of Filipinos. It may last long if we will begin
now. Since 1935 the aliens have been allowed to enjoy
to a certain extent the exploitation of our natural
resources, and we became victims of foreign
dominance and control. The aliens are interested in
coming to the Philippines because they would like to
enjoy the bounty of nature exclusively intended for the
Filipinos by God. HSDIaC
And so I appeal to all, for the sake of the future
generations, that if we have to pray in the Preamble
"to preserve and develop the national patrimony for
the sovereign Filipino people and for the generations
to come," we must at this time decide once and for all
that our natural resources must be reserved only to
Filipino citizens.
Thank you. 63 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The intent loses all significance if foreign-owned corporations are likewise
allowed to participate even in small or medium-scale ventures.
Thus, in keeping with the clear intent and rationale of the Constitution, financial
or technical assistance by foreign corporations are allowable only where there
is no Filipino or Filipino-owned corporation (including corporations at least 60%
of the capital of which are owned by Filipinos) which can provide the same or
similar assistance.
To reiterate, the over-arching letter and intent of the Constitution is to reserve
the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources to Filipinos.
The justification for foreign involvement in the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources was that Filipino nationals or corporations may
not possess the necessary capital, technical knowledge or technology to mount
a large scale undertaking. In the words of the "Draft of the 1986 U.P. Law
Constitution Project" (U.P. Law Draft) which was taken into consideration
during the deliberation of the CONCOM: 64
Under the proposed provision, only technical
assistance or financial assistance agreements may be
entered into, and only for large-scale activities. These
are contract forms which recognize and assert our
sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since
the foreign entity is just a pure contractor and not a
beneficial owner of our economic resources. The
proposal recognizes the need for capital and
technology to develop our natural resources without
sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such
resources 65 . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Thus, the contention that Section 2, Article XII allows for any agreement for
assistance by a foreign corporation "so long as such assistance requires
specialized knowledge or skills, and are related to the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources" is erroneous. 66
Where a foreign corporation does not offer financial or technological assistance
beyond the capabilities of its Philippine counterparts, an FTAA with such a
corporation would be highly questionable. Similarly, where the scope of the
undertaking does not qualify as "large scale," an FTAA with a foreign
corporation is equally suspect.
"Agreements" in Section 2, Article
XII do not include "service
contracts."
This Court's ruling in the Decision under reconsideration that the agreements
involving either technical or financial assistance contemplated by the 1987
Constitution are different and dissimilar from the service contracts under the
1973 Constitution must thus be affirmed. That there is this difference, as noted
in the Decision, is gathered from the change in phraseology. 67 There was no
need to employ strongly prohibitory language, like that found in the Bill of
Rights. 68 For the framers to expressly prohibit "management and other forms
of assistance" would be redundant inasmuch as the elimination of such phrase
serves the same purpose. The deletion is simply too significant to ignore and
speaks just as profoundly it is an outright rejection.
It bears noting that the fourth paragraph does not employ the same language
adopted in the first paragraph, which specifically denominates the agreements
that the State may enter into with Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. The
fourth paragraph does not state "The President may also enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with foreign-
owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. . . ." On the other hand, the fourth
paragraph cannot be construed as a grant of boundless discretion to the
President to enter into any agreement regardless of the scope of assistance
because it would result in a bias against Filipino citizens and corporations.
On this point, the following observations from the U.P. Law Draft on the odious
and objectionable features of service contracts bear restating:
5.The last paragraph is a modification of the service
contract provision found in Section 9, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution as amended. This 1973 provision
shattered the framework of nationalism in our
fundamental law (see Magallona, "Nationalism and its
Subversion in the Constitution"). Through the service
contract, the 1973 Constitution had legitimized that
which was prohibited under the 1935 constitution
the exploitation of the countrys natural resources by
foreign nationals. Through the service contract, acts
prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law were recognized as
legitimate arrangements. Service contracts lodge
exclusive management and control of the enterprise to
the service contractor, not unlike the old concession
regime where the concessionaire had complete control
over the country's natural resources, having been given
exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource and, in effect, having been assured of
ownership of that resource at the point of
extraction (see Agabin, "Service Contracts: Old Wine in
New Bottles"). Service contracts, hence, are
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our
natural resources, as well as the constitutional
provision on nationalization or Filipinization of the
exploitation of our natural resources. 69 (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, Professor Pacifico A. Agabin, a member of the working group of
the U.P. Law Constitution Project and now counsel for intervenor PCM, stated
in his position paper:
Recognizing the service contract for what it is, we have
to expunge it from the Constitution and reaffirm
ownership over our natural resources. That is the only
way we can exercise effective control over our natural
resources. AIcaDC

This should not mean complete isolation of the
country's natural resources from foreign
investment. Other contract forms which are less
derogatory to our sovereignty and control over natural
resources like technical assistance agreements,
financial assistance [agreements], co-production
agreements, joint ventures, production-sharing
[agreements] could still be utilized and adopted
without violating constitutional provisions. In other
words, we can adopt contract forms which recognize
and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural
resources, and where the entity is just a pure
contractor instead of the beneficial owner of our
economic resources. 70 (Emphasis & italics supplied),
indicating that the proposed financial or technical assistance agreements
are contract forms different from the 1973 Constitution service contracts.
Thus the phrase "agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance" in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution
must be interpreted as restricting foreign involvement in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources to large scale undertakings
requiring foreign financialor technical assistance and not, as alleged by
respondents, inclusive of any possible agreement under the sun.
The majority however argues that the deletion or omission from the 1987
Constitution of the term "service contracts" found in the 1973 Constitution
does not sufficiently prove the drafters' intent to exclude foreigners from
management since such intent cannot be definitively and conclusively
established. This argument overlooks three basic principles of statutory
construction.
First, casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. 71 As recently as 2001
in Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, 72 this
Court held that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. 73 That there is a difference between
technical or financial assistance contemplated by the 1987 Constitution and the
service contracts under the 1973 Constitution is gathered from the omission of
the phrase "management or other forms of assistance."
As earlier noted, the phrase "service contracts" has
been deleted in the 1987 Constitution's Article on
National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM
intended to retain the concept of service contracts
under the 1973 Constitution, it would have simply
adopted the old terminology ("service contracts")
instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms
("agreements . . . involving either technical or financial
assistance.") Such a difference between the language
of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a
similar provision in the preceding constitution is viewed
as indicative of a difference in purpose. If, as
respondents suggest, the concept of "technical or
financial assistance" agreements is identical to that of
"service contracts," the CONCOM would not have
bothered to fit the same dog with a new collar. To
uphold respondents' theory would reduce the first to a
mere euphemism for the second render the change in
phraseology meaningless. 74 (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citation omitted)
Second, expressio unius est exclusion alterius. 75 The express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. 76
Third and lastly, expressium facit cessare tacitum. 77 What is expressed puts an
end to that which is implied. 78 Since the constitutional provision, by its terms,
is expressly limited to financial or technical agreements, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other forms of assistance.
These three principles of statutory construction, derived from the well-settled
principle of verba legis, proceed from the premise that the Constitutional
Commission would not have made specific enumerations in the provision if it
had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned. And this Court may not, in the guise of interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a constitutional provision and include therein situations
not provided nor intended by the framers. To do so would be to do violence to
the very language of the Constitution, the same Constitution which this Court
has sworn to uphold. SAHaTc
The majority counters, however, that service contracts were not de-
constitutionalized since the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission conclusively show that they discussed agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance in the same breath as service contracts and
used the terms interchangeably. This argument merely echoes that of private
respondent WMCP which had already been addressed in this Court's Decision of
January 27, 2004, (the Decision) viz:
While certain commissioners may have mentioned the
term "service contracts" during the CONCOM
deliberations, they may not have been necessarily
referring to the concept of service contracts under the
1973 Constitution. As noted earlier "service contracts"
is a term that assumes different meanings to different
people. The commissioners may have been using the
term loosely, and not in its technical and legal sense, to
refer, in general, to agreements concerning natural
resources entered into by the Government with foreign
corporations. These loose statements do not
necessarily translate to the adoption of the 1973
Constitution provision allowing service contracts.
It is true that, as shown in the earlier quoted portions
of the proceedings in [the] CONCOM, in response to Sr.
Tan's question, Commissioner Villegas commented
that, other than congressional notification, the only
difference between "future" and "past" "service
contracts" is the requirement of a general law as there
were no laws previously authorizing the
same. 79 However, such remark is far outweighed by
his more categorical statement in his exchange with
Commissioner Quesada that the draft article "does not
permit foreign investors to participate" in the nation's
natural resources which was exactly what service
contracts did except to provide "technical or
financial assistance."
In the case of the other commissioners, Commissioner
Nolledo himself clarified in his work that the present
charter prohibits service contracts. Commissioner
Gascon was not totally averse to foreign participation,
but favored stricter restrictions in the form of majority
congressional concurrence. On the other hand,
Commissioners Garcia and Tadeo may have veered to
the extreme side of the spectrum and their objections
may be interpreted as votes against any foreign
participation in our natural resources
whatsoever. 80 (Emphasis and italics supplied;
citations omitted)
In fact, the opinion of Commissioner Nolledo in his textbook which is cited in
this Court's January 27, 2004 Decision should leave no doubt as to the intention
of the framers to eliminate service contracts altogether.
Are service contracts allowed under the new
Constitution? No. Under the new Constitution, foreign
investors (fully alien-owned) can NOT participate in
Filipino enterprises except to provide: (1) Technical
Assistance for highly technical enterprises; and (2)
Financial Assistance for large-scale enterprises.
The intention of this provision, as well as other
provisions on foreign investments, is to prevent the
practice (prevalent in the Marcos government) of
skirting the 60/40 equation using the cover of service
contracts. 81
Next, the majority opinion asserts that if the framers had meant to ban service
contracts altogether, they would have provided for the termination or pre-
termination of the existing service contracts.
There was no need for a constitutional provision to govern the termination or
pre-termination of existing service contracts since the intention of the framers
was to apply the rule banning service contracts prospectively.
MR. DAVIDE. Under the proposal, I notice that except
for the lands of the public domain, all other natural
resources cannot be alienated and in respect to lands
of the public domain, private corporations with the
required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease
the same. Necessarily, insofar as other natural
resources are concerned, it would only be the State
which can exploit, develop; explore and utilize the
same. However, the State may enter into a joint
venture, coproduction (sic) or production-sharing. Is
that not correct?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
MR. DAVIDE. Consequently, henceforth upon the
approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest
concessions, permits or authorization can be
exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor
to any corporation qualified to acquire lands of the
public domain?
MR. VILLEGAS. Would Commissioner Monsod like to
comment on that? I think his answer is "yes." HCATEa
MR. DAVIDE. So, what will happen now to licenses or
concessions earlier granted by the Philippine
government to private corporations or to Filipino
citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS. This is not applied retroactively. They
will be respected.
MR. DAVIDE. In effect, they will be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS. No. 82 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Besides, a service contract is only a license or privilege, not a contract or
property right which merits protection by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus in the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 83 this Court
held:
. . . Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license
or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

'A license is merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and
is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is
it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation'
Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael,
Jr. & Co, Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. And it
can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process clause."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause which reads:
"SEC 10.No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed."
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe
vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system
of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at
the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in
the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia
vs. New York quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit:
"Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest." IcDCaT
In short the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. 84 (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citations omitted)
The majority however argues that Oposa is not applicable since the investment
in a logging concession is not as substantial an investment as that of a large
scale mining contractor. Such a contention is patently absurd. Taken to its
logical conclusion, the majority would have this Court exempt firms in highly
capital intensive industries from the exercise of police power simply to protect
their investment. That would mean that the legislature would, for example, be
powerless to revoke or amend legislative franchises of public utilities, such as
power and telecommunications firms, which no doubt require huge sums of
capital.
The majority opinion then proffers that the framers of the Constitution were
pragmatic enough to know that foreign entities would not enter into such
agreements without requiring arrangements for the protection of their
investments, gains, and benefits or other forms of conditionalities. It goes on to
argue that "by specifying such 'agreements involving assistance,' the framers of
the Constitution necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these
agreements necessarily entailed; or that could reasonably be deemed necessary
to make them tenable and effective, including management authority with
respect to the day-to-day operations of the enterprise and measures for the
protection of the interests of the foreign corporation."
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, however, do not support
the immediately foregoing contentions.
MR. TINGSON. Within the purview of what the
Gentleman is saying, would he welcome friendly
foreigners to lend us their technical expertise in
helping develop our country?
MR. GARCIA. Part 2 of this proposal, Filipino control of
the economy, in fact, says that the entry of foreign
capital, technology and business enterprises into the
national economy shall be effectively regulated to
ensure the protection of the interest of our people.
In other words, we welcome them but on our own
terms. This is very similar to our position on loans. We
welcome loans as long as they are paid on our own
terms, on our ability to pay, not on their terms. For
example, the case of Peru is instructive. They decided
first to develop and grow, and were willing to pay only
10 percent of their foreign exchange earnings. That, I
think, is a very commendable position given the
economic situation of a country such as Peru. The
Philippines is a similar case, especially when we realize
that the foreign debt was made by a government that
was bankrupt in its desire to serve the people.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Vice-President, I think we have to
make a distinction that it is not really realistic to say
that we will borrow on our own terms. Maybe we can
say that we inherited unjust loans, and we would like
to repay these on terms that are not prejudicial to our
own growth. But the general statement that we should
only borrow on our own terms is a bit unrealistic.
MR. GARCIA. Excuse me. The point I am trying to make
is that we do not have to borrow. If we have to borrow,
it must be on our terms. In other words, banks do not
lend out of the goodness of their hearts. Banks lend to
make a profit.
MR. TINGSON. Mr. Vice-President, I think the trouble
in our country is that we have forgotten the scriptural
injunction that the borrower becomes a slave to the
lender. That is the trouble with our country; we have
borrowed and borrowed but we forget that we become
slaves to those who lend us. 85 (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
By public respondent's information, "[t]he potential mining wealth in the
Philippines is estimated at $840 billion or P47 trillion or 10 times our annual
GDP, and 15 times our total foreign debt of $56 billion. Globally, the Philippines
ranks third in gold, fourth in copper, fifth in nickel and sixth in
chromite." 86 With such high concentration of valuable minerals coupled with
the Filipino people's willingness to protect and preserve ownership of their
natural resources at the expense of retarding or postponing the exploration,
development, and utilization of these resources, the Philippines clearly has the
superior bargaining position and should be able to dictate its terms. No foreign
entity should be able to bully the Philippines and intimidate the Government
into conceding to certain conditions incompatible with the Constitution. aCcEHS
Extent of foreign corporation's
participation in the management of
an FTAA
Foreign-owned corporations, however, are not precluded from
a limited participation in the management of the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources.
Some degree of participation by the contractor in management, to assure the
proper application of its investment and/or to facilitate the technical assistance
and transfer of technology may be unavoidable and not necessarily undesirable.
Thus, there is merit in respondent WMCP's contention, to which even
petitioners conceded during the oral arguments, that a foreign-owned
corporation is not prevented from having limited participation in the
management assistance or participation so long as it is incidental to the
financial or technical assistance being rendered:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Alright. Going back to verba legis, you say that the
FTAA's are limited to financial or technical
assistance only.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Either financial or technical assistance, yes your Honor.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Full management, your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Full management is excluded.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
But incidental management to protect the financial or
technical assistance should be allowed.
ATTY. LEONEN:
If a mining company would get the technical expertise
to bring in drilling rig your Honor, and that
is the sole contract, then we cannot imagine
a situation where it is not the technicians
that will do the actual drilling your Honor,
but for the entire contract area your Honor
as it is now in the FTAA then I think that
would be different.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes I agree. In other words, the words financial or
technical may include parts of
management, isn't it? Its reasonable in
other words if I may re state it, it's
reasonable to expect that entities, foreign
entities who don't know anything about this
country, well that is an exaggeration, who
know not too much about this country,
would not just extend money, period. They
would want to have a say a little bit of say
management and sometimes even in
auditing of the company, isn't it reasonable
to expect.
ATTY. LEONEN:
I would qualify my answer your Honor with
management of what your Honor. It means
if it's for development and utilization of the
minerals.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
No.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor, but if it's management of sub-
contracted activity like a symposium then
that would be all right your Honor. Mining
companies do symposiums also.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Management to protect their own investments,
whether it be technical or financial. EAICTS
ATTY. LEONEN:
Their investment, your Honor, which cannot be the
entire mining operation from my
perspective, your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes I agree because there is the Constitutional
provision of control and supervision, full
control and supervision to the State.
ATTY. LEONEN:
And Filipino corporations your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Or even Filipino corporation, the full control and
supervision is still with the State.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Even with Filipino citizens being the contractors, full
control and supervision is still with the
State.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes, your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
In all these contract full control and supervision is with
the State.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor and we can only hope that the State is
responsive to the people we represent.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes, yes. Can it also not be said reading that the
Constitution that the safeguards on
contracts with foreigners was left by the
Constitutional Commission or by
Constitution itself to Congress to craft out.
ATTY. LEONEN:
I can accept your Honor that there was a province of
power that was given to Congress, but it
was delimited by the fact, that they
removed the word management and other
arrangement and put the words either
financial and technical.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes but you just admitted earlier that these two words
would also include some form of
management or other things to protect the
investment or the technology being put by
the foreign company.
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor for so long as it's not the entire.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Yes, yes provided the State does not lose control and
supervision, isn't it?
ATTY. LEONEN:
Yes your Honor. 87 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Thus, the degree of the foreign corporation's participation in the management
of the mining concern is co-extensive with and strictly limited to the degree of
financial or technical assistance extended. The scope of the assistance defines
the limits of the participation in management. IcESDA
However, to whatever extent the foreign corporation's incidental participation
in the management of the mining concern may be, full control and supervision,
sufficient to protect the interest of the Filipino people, over all aspects of mining
operations must be retained by the Government. While this does not necessarily
mean that the Government must assume the role of a back seat driver, actively
second guessing every decision made by the foreign corporation, it does mean
that sufficient safeguards must be incorporated into the FTAA to insure that the
people's beneficial interest in their natural resources are protected at all times.
Moreover, the foreign contractor's limited participation in management, as the
Court held in its Decision, should not effectively grant foreign-owned
corporations beneficial ownership over the natural resources.
The opinion, submitted by the OSG, of Bernardo M. Villegas, who was a
Member of the Constitutional Commission and Chair of its Committee on
National Economy and Patrimony, is not inconsistent with the foregoing
conclusion. Commissioner Villegas opined:
The phrase "service contracts" contained in the 1973
Constitution was deleted in the 1987 Constitution
because there was the general perception among the
Concom members that it was used during the Marcos
regime as an instrument to circumvent the 60-40 limit
in favor of Filipino ownership. There was also the
impression that the inclusion of the word
"management" in the description of the service
contract concept in the 1973 Constitution was
tantamount to ownership by the foreign partner.
The majority of the Concom members, however,
recognized the vital need of the Philippine economy
for foreign capital and technology in the exploitation of
natural resources to benefit Filipinos, especially the
poor in the countryside where the mining sites are
located. For this reason, the majority voted for
"agreements involving financial or technical
assistance" or FTAA.
I maintain that the majority who voted Yes to this
FTAA provision realized that an FTAA involved more
than borrowing money and/or buying technology from
foreigners. If an FTAA involved only a loan and/or
purchase of technology, there would not have been a
need for a constitutional provision because existing
laws in the Philippines more than adequately regulate
these transactions.
It can be deducted from the various comments of both
those who voted Yes and No to the FTAA provision
that an FTAA also involves the participation in
management of the foreign partner. What was then
assumed in 1986 is now even clearer in the way
business organizations have evolved in the last decade
or so under the modern concept of good governance.
There are numerous stakeholders in a business other
than the stockholders or equity owners who
participate actively in the management of a business
enterprise. Not only do creditors and suppliers
demand representation in boards of directors. There
are also other so-called independent directors who
actively participate in management.
In summary, the word "management" was deleted
from the description of the FTAA because some
CONCOM delegates identified management with
beneficial ownership. In order not to prolong the
debate, those in favor of the FTAA provision agreed
not to include the word management. But from what
has been discussed above, it was clear in the minds of
those who voted YES that the FTAA included more than
just a loan and/or purchase of technology from
foreigners but necessarily allowed the active
participation of the foreign partners in the
management of the enterprise engaged in the
exploitation of natural resources. 88 (Emphasis
supplied).
Under no circumstances should the execution of an FTAA be tantamount to the
grant of a roving commission whereby a foreign contractor is given blanket and
unfettered discretion to do whatever it deems necessary denude
watersheds, divert sources of water, drive communities from their homes in
pursuit of its pecuniary goals.
Nor should the scope of an FTAA be broadened to include "managerial
assistance." As discussed extensively in the Decision, 89 "managerial assistance"
a euphemism by which full control and beneficial ownership of natural
resources were vested in foreigners is part and parcel of the martial law era
"service contracts" and the old "concession regime" which the 1987
Constitution has consigned to the dust bin of history.
The elimination of the phrase "service contracts" effectuates another purpose.
Intervenor PCM agrees that the Constitution tries to veer away from the old
concession system, 90 which vested foreign-owned corporations control and
beneficial ownership over Philippine natural resources. Hence, the 1987
Constitution also deleted the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the
exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. 91
Prof. Agabin had no flattering words for the concession system, which he
described in his position paper as follows:
Under the concession system, the concessionaire
makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given
area. Thus, the concession amounts to a complete
control by the concessionaire over the country's natural
resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource and is in effect assured
ownership of that resource at the point of extraction.
In consideration for the right to exploit a natural
resource, the concessionaire either pays rent or royalty
which is a fixed percentage of the gross proceeds. But
looking beyond the legal significance of the concession
regime, we can see that there are functional
implications which give the concessionaire great
economic power arising from its exclusive equity
holding. This includes, first, appropriation of the
returns of the undertaking, subject to a modest
royalty; second, exclusive management of the
project; third, control of production of the natural
resource, such as volume of production, expansion,
research and development; and fourth, exclusive
responsibility for downstream operations, like
processing, marketing, and distribution. In short, even
if nominally, the state is the sovereign and owner of
the natural resource being exploited, it has been shorn
of all elements of control over such natural resource
because of the exclusive nature of the contractual
regime of the concession. The concession system,
investing as it does ownership of natural resources,
constitutes a consistent inconsistency with the
principle embodied in our Constitution that natural
resources belong to the State and shall not be
alienated, not to mention the fact that the concession
was the bedrock of the colonial system in the
exploitation of natural resources. 92 (Emphasis in the
original) IDScTE
Vestiges of the concession system endured in the service contract regime,
including the vesting on the contractor of the management of the enterprise, as
well as the control of production and other matters, such as expansion and
development. 93 Also, while title to the resource discovered was nominally in
the name of the government, the contractor had almost unfettered control
over its disposition and sale. 94
The salutary intent of the 1987 Constitution notwithstanding, these stubborn
features of the concession system persist in the Mining Act of 1995. The statute
allows a foreign-owned corporation to carry out mining operations, 95 which
includes the conduct of exploration, 96 development 97 and utilization 98 of the
resources. 99 The same law grants foreign contractors auxiliary mining rights,
i.e., timber rights, 100 water rights, 101 the right to possess
explosives, 102 easement rights, 103 and entry into private lands and
concession areas. 104 These are the very same rights granted under the old
concession and service contract systems.

The majority opinion proposes two alternative standards of Government
control over FTAA operations. Thus, in the opening paragraphs it states:
Full control is not anathema to day-to-day
management by the contractor, provided that the
State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and
to set aside, reverse, or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that
which is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
However, the majority opinion subsequently substantially reduces the scope of
its definition of "control" in this wise:
The concept of control adopted in Section 2 of Article
XII must be taken to mean less than dictatorial, all-
encompassing control; but nevertheless sufficient to
give the State the power to direct, restrain, regulate
and govern the affairs of the extractive enterprises.
Control by the State may be on a macro level, through
the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations,
industry standards and similar measures that would
enable the government to control the conduct of
affairs in various enterprises and restrain activities
deemed not desirable or beneficial. (Emphasis and
italics supplied; citations omitted; italics in the original)
This second definition is apparently analogous to regulatory control which the
Government is automatically presumed to exercise over all business activities
by virtue of the Police Power. This definition of the "full control and
supervision" mandated by Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution strikes a
discordant and unconvincing chord as it gives no effect to the mandated "full"
character of the State's control but merely places it at par with any other
business activity or industry regulated by the Government.
But even under this second and more limited concept of regulatory control, the
provisions of the Mining Act pertaining to FTAAs do not pass the test of
constitutionality.
To be sure, the majority opinion cites a litany of documents, plans, reports and
records which the foreign FTAA contractor is obliged to submit or make
available under the Mining Act and DAO 96-40. However, the mere fact that the
Act requires the submission of work programs and minimum expenditure
commitments 105does not provide adequate protection. These were also
required under the old concession 106 and service contract 107 systems, but
did not serve to place full control and supervision of the country's natural
resources in the hands of the Government.
Conspicuously absent from the Mining Act are effective means by which the
Government can protect the beneficial interest of the Filipino people in the
exploration, development and utilization of their resources. It appears from the
provisions of the Mining Act that the Government, once it has determined that
a foreign corporation is eligible for an FTAA and enters into such an agreement,
has very little say in the corporation's actual operations.
Thus, when pressed to identify the mechanism by which the Government can
administratively compel compliance with the foregoing requirements as well as
the other terms and conditions of the Mining Act, DAO 96-40 and DAO 99-56,
the majority can only point to the cancellation of the agreement(s) and/or the
incentives concerned under Section 95 to 99 of the Mining Act: 108
CHAPTER XVII
Ground for Cancellation, Revocation, and Termination
SECTION 95.Late or Non-filing of Requirements.
Failure of the permittee or contractor to comply with
any of the requirements provided in this Act or in its
implementing rules and regulations, without a valid
reason, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension of
any permit or agreement provided under this Act.
SECTION 96.Violation of the Terms and Conditions of
Permit or Agreements. Violation of the terms and
conditions of the permits or agreements shall be a
sufficient ground for cancellation of the same.
SECTION 97.Non-payment of Taxes and Fees. Failure
to pay taxes and fees due the Government for two (2)
consecutive years shall cause the cancellation of the
exploration permit, mineral agreement, financial or
technical assistance agreement and other agreements
and the re-opening of the area subject thereof to new
applicants.
SECTION 98.Suspension or Cancellation of Tax
Incentives and Credits. Failure to abide by the terms
and conditions of tax incentives and credits shall cause
the suspension or cancellation of said incentives and
credits.
SECTION 99.Falsehood or Omission of Facts in the
Statement All statements made in the exploration
permit, mining agreement and financial or technical
assistance agreement shall be considered as conditions
and essential parts thereof and any falsehood in said
statements or omission of facts therein which may
alter, change or affect substantially the facts set forth
in said statements may cause the revocation and
termination of the exploration permit, mining
agreement and financial or technical assistance
agreement.
An examination of the foregoing fails to impress. For instance, how does
cancellation of the FTAA under Section 97 for nonpayment of taxes and fees
(comprising the "basic share" of the government) for two consecutive years
facilitate the collection of the unpaid taxes and fees? How does it preserve and
protect the beneficial interest of the Filipino people? For that matter, how does
the DENR administratively compel compliance with the anti-pollution and other
requirements? 109 If minerals are found to have been sold overseas at less than
the most advantageous market prices, how does the DENR obtain satisfaction
from the offending foreign FTAA contractor for the difference?
In sum, the enforcement provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing
Rules are scarcely effective, and, worse, perceptibly less than the analogous
provisions of other Government Regulatory Agencies.
For instance, the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas, the Central Monetary Authority
mandated by the Constitution to exercise supervision (but not full control and
supervision) over banks, 110 is empowered to (1) appoint a conservator with
such powers as shall be deemed necessary to take charge of the assets,
liabilities and management of a bank or quasi-bank; 111 (2) under certain well
defined conditions, summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid a bank
from doing business in the Philippines and appoint the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation as receiver; 112 and (3) impose a number of
administrative sanctions such as (a) fines not to exceed P30,000 per day for
each violation, (b) suspension of a bank's rediscounting privileges, (c)
suspension of lending or foreign exchange operations or authority to accept
new deposits or make new investments, (d) suspension of interbank clearing
privileges, and (e) revocation of quasi-banking license. 113
Similarly, to give effect to the Constitutional mandate to afford full protection
to labor, 114 the Labor Code 115 grants the Secretary of Labor the power to (1)
issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the
Code; 116 and (2) enjoin an intended or impending strike or lockout by
assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry determined to be
indispensable to the national interest. 117
Under the Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the power to
(1) temporarily suspend the business operations of a taxpayer found to have
committed certain specified violations; 118 (2) order the constructive distraint
of the property of a taxpayer; 119 and (3) impose the summary remedies of
distraint of personal property and or levy on real property for nonpayment of
taxes. 120
In comparison, the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules conspicuously fail to
provide the DENR with anything remotely analogous to the foregoing regulatory
and enforcement powers of other government agencies.
In fine, the provisions of the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules give scarcely
more than lip service to the constitutional mandate for the State to exercise full
control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of
Philippine Natural Resources. Evaluated as a whole and in comparison with
other government agencies, the provisions of the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules fail to meet even the reduced standard of effective
regulatory control over mining operations. In effect, they abdicate control over
mining operations in favor of the foreign FTAA contractor. For this reason, the
provisions of the Mining Act, insofar as they pertain to FTAA contracts, must be
declared unconstitutional and void.
The majority opinion vigorously asserts that it is the Chief Executive who
exercises the power of control on behalf of the State.
This only begs the question. How does President effectively enforce the terms
and conditions of an FTAA? What specific powers are subsumed within the
constitutionally mandated "power of control?" On these particular matters the
majority opinion, like the Mining Act, is silent.
Provisions of the Mining Act
pertaining to FTAAs void for
conveying beneficial ownership of
Philippine mineral resources to
foreign contractors
An examination of the Mining Act reveals that the law grants the lion's share of
the proceeds of the mining operation to the foreign corporation. Thus the
second and third paragraphs of Section 81 of the law provide:
SECTION 81.Government Share in Other Mineral
Agreements. . . .
The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of a foreign national and all such other taxes,
duties and fees as provided for under existing laws.

The collection of Government share in financial or
technical assistance agreement shall commence after
the financial or technical assistance agreement
contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating
expenses, exploration, and development expenditures,
inclusive. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing provisions, the Government does not receive a share in the
proceeds of the mining operation. All it receives are taxes and fees from the
foreign corporation, just as in the old concession 121 and service
contract 122 regimes. The collection of taxes and fees cannot be considered a
return on the resources mined corresponding to beneficial ownership of the
Filipino people. Taxes are collected under the State's power to generate funds
to finance the needs of the citizenry and to advance the common
weal. 123 They are not a return on investment or property. Similarly, fees are
imposed under the police power primarily for purposes of
regulation. 124 Again, they do not correspond to a return on investment or
property.
Even more galling is the stipulation in the above-quoted third paragraph that
the Government's share (composed only of taxes and fees) shall not be
collected until after the foreign corporation has "fully recovered its pre-
operating expenses, exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive." In
one breath this provision virtually guarantees the foreigner a return on his
investment while simultaneously leaving the Government's (and People's) share
to chance.
It is, therefore, clearly evident that the foregoing provisions of the Mining Act
effectively transfer the beneficial ownership over the resources covered by the
agreement to a foreigner, in contravention of the letter and spirit of the
Constitution.
Consequently, the assailed Decision inescapably concluded that:
The underlying assumption in all these provisions is
that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources, just like the foreign contractor in a service
contract. 125
The Mining Act gives the foreign-owned corporation virtually complete
control, not mere "incidental" participation in management, over the
entire operations.
The law is thus at its core a retention of the concession system. It still grants
beneficial ownership of the natural resources to the foreign contractor and does
little to affirm the State's ownership over them, and its supervision and control
over their exploration, development and utilization.
While agreeing that the Constitution vests the beneficial ownership of
Philippine minerals with the Filipino people, entitling them to gains, rewards
and advantages generated by these minerals, the majority opinion nevertheless
maintains that the Mining Act, as implemented by DENR Administrative Order
99-56 126 (DAO 99-56), is constitutional as, so it claims, it does not "convey
beneficial ownership of any mineral resource or product to any foreign FTAA
contractor." The majority opinion adds that the State's share, as expounded by
DAO 99-56, amounts to "real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country," at the same time allowing the contractor to recover "a
reasonable return on its investments in the project."
Under DAO 99-56, the "government's share" in an FTAA is divided into (1) a
"basic government share" composed of a number of taxes and fees 127 and (2)
an "additional government share" 128 computed according to one of three
possible methods (a) a 50-50 sharing in the cumulative present value of cash
flows, 129 (b) a profit related additional government share 130 or (c) an
additional share based on the cumulative net mining revenue 131 at the
option of the contractor.
Thus, the majority opinion claims that the total government share, equal to the
sum of the "basic government share" and the "additional government share,"
will achieve "a fifty-fifty sharing between the government and the contractor
of net benefits from mining."
This claim is misleading and meaningless for two reasons:
First, as priorly discussed, the taxes and fees which make up the government's
"basic share" cannot be considered a return on the resources mined
corresponding to the beneficial ownership of the Filipino people. Again, they do
not correspond to a return on investment or property.
Second, and more importantly, the provisions of the Mining Act effectively allow
the foreign contractor TO CIRCUMVENT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF DAO 99-56,
INCLUDING ITS INTENDED "50-50 SHARING" of the net benefits from mining,
AND REDUCE GOVERNMENT'S TOTAL SHARE to as low as TWO PERCENT (2%)
OF THE VALUE OF THE MINERALS MINED.
The foreign contractor can do this because Section 39 of the Mining Act allows
it to convert its FTAA into a Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement (MPSA) by
the simple expedient of reducing its equity in the corporation undertaking the
FTAA to 40%:
SECTION 39.Option to Convert into a Mineral
Agreement. The contractor has the option to convert
the financial or technical assistance agreement to a
mineral agreement at any time during the term of the
agreement, if the economic viability of the contract
area is found to be inadequate to justify large-scale
mining operations, after proper notice to the Secretary
as provided for under the implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, That the mineral agreement
shall only be for the remaining period of the original
agreement.
In the case of a foreign contractor, it shall reduce its
equity to forty percent (40%) in the corporation,
partnership, association, or cooperative. Upon
compliance with this requirement by the
contractor, the Secretary shall approve the conversion
and execute the mineral production-sharing
agreement. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
And under Section 80 of the Mining Act, in connection with Section 151(a) of
the National Internal Revenue Code 132 (Tax Code), the TOTAL GOVERNMENT
SHARE in an MPSA is ONLY TWO PERCENT (2%) OF THE VALUE OF THE
MINERALS. Section 80 of the Mining Act provides:
SECTION 80.Government Share in Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement. The total government share in a
mineral production sharing agreement shall be the
excise tax on mineral products as provided in Republic
Act No. 7729, amending Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 151(a) of the Tax Code reads:
Sec. 151.Mineral Products. (a) Rates of Tax. There
shall be levied, assessed and collected on mineral,
mineral products and quarry resources, excise tax as
follows:
(1)On coal and coke, a tax of ten pesos (P10.00) per
metric ton.
(2)On non-metallic minerals and quarry resources, a
tax of two percent (2%) based on the actual market
value of the annual gross output thereof at the time of
removal, in the case of those locally extracted or
produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs
in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise
tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation.
(3)On all metallic minerals, a tax based on the actual
market value of the gross output thereof at the time of
removal, in the case of those locally extracted or
produced; or the value used by the Bureau of Customs
in determining tariff and customs duties, net of excise
tax and value-added tax, in the case of importation, in
accordance with the following schedule:
(a)Copper and other metallic minerals:
(i)On the first three (3) years
upon the effectivity
of this Act, one
percent (1%);
(ii)On the fourth and fifth year,
one and a half
percent (1 1/2%); and
(iii)On the sixth year and
thereafter, two
percent (2%)
(b)Gold and chromite, two percent (2%)
(4)On indigenous petroleum, a tax of fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair international market price thereof, on
the first taxable sale, such tax to be paid by the buyer
or purchaser within 15 days from the date of actual or
constructive delivery to the said buyer or purchaser.
The phrase 'first taxable sale, barter, exchange or
similar transaction' means the transfer of indigenous
petroleum in its original state to a first taxable
transferee. The fair international market price shall be
determined in consultation with an appropriate
government agency.
For the purpose of this subsection, 'indigenous
petroleum' shall include locally extracted mineral oil,
hydrocarbon gas, bitumen, crude asphalt, mineral gas
and all other similar or naturally associated substances
with the exception of coal, peat, bituminous shale
and/or stratified mineral deposits. (Emphasis supplied)
By taking advantage of the foregoing provisions and selling 60% of its equity to
a Filipino corporation (such as any of the members of respondent-in-
intervention Philippine Chamber of Mines) a foreign contractor can easily
reduce the total government's share (held in trust for the benefit of the Filipino
People) in the minerals mined to a paltry 2% while maintaining a 40% beneficial
interest in the same.
What is more, if the Filipino corporation acquiring the foreign contractor's stake
is itself 60% Filipino-owned and 40% foreign-owned (a "60-40" Filipino
corporation such as Sagittarius Mines, the putative purchaser of WMC's 100%
equity in WMCP), then the total beneficial interest of foreigners in the mineral
output of the mining concern would constitute a majority of 64% 133 while the
beneficial ownership of Filipinos would, at most, 134 amount to 36% 34% for
the Filipino stockholders of the 60-40 Filipino corporation and 2% for the
Government (in trust for the Filipino People).
The foregoing scheme, provided for in the Mining Act itself, is no different and
indeed is VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL to that embodied in SECTION 7.9 OF THE WMCP
FTAA WHICH THE MAJORITY OPINION ITSELF FOUND TO BE "without a doubt
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, DETRIMENTAL TO THE
INTERESTS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, AND VIOLATIVE OF PUBLIC POLICY :"
. . . While Section 7.7 gives the government a 60
percent share in the net mining revenues of WMCP
from the commencement of commercial
production;Section 7.9 deprives the government of
part or all of the said 60 percent. Under the latter
provision, should WMCP's foreign shareholders who
originally owned 100 percent of the equity sell 60
percent or more of its outstanding capital stock to a
Filipino citizen or corporation, the State loses its right
to receive its 60 percent share in net mining revenues
under Section 7.7.

Section 7.9 provides
The percentage of Net Mining Revenues
payable to the Government pursuant to
Clause 7.7 shall be reduced by 1 percent of
Net Mining Revenues for every 1 percent
ownership interest in the Contractor (i.e.,
WMCP) held by a Qualified Entity.
Evidently, what Section 7.7 grants to the State is taken
away in the next breath by Section 7.9 without any
offsetting compensation to the State. Thus, in reality,
the State has no vested right to receive any income
from the FTAA for the exploration of its mineral
resources. Worse, it would seem that what is given to
the State in Section 7.7 is by mere tolerance of WMCP's
foreign stockholders, who can at any time cut off the
government's entire 60 percent share. They can do so
by simply selling 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding
stock to a Philippine citizen or corporation. Moreover,
the proceeds of such sale will of course accrue to the
foreign stockholders of WMCP, not to the State.
The sale of 60 percent of WMCP's outstanding equity
to a corporation that is 60 percent Filipino-owned and
40 percent foreign-owned will still trigger the
operation of Section 7.9. Effectively, the State will lose
its right to receive all 60 percent of the net mining
revenues of WMCP; and foreign stockholders will own
beneficially up to 64 percent of WMCP, consisting of
the remaining 40 percent foreign equity therein, plus
the 24 percent pro-rata share in the buyer-corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
At bottom, Section 7.9 has the effect of depriving the
State of its 60 percent share in the net mining
revenues of WMCP without any offset or
compensation whatsoever. It is possible that the
inclusion of the offending provision was initially
prompted by the desire to provide some form of
incentive for the principal foreign stockholder in WMCP
to eventually reduce its equity position and ultimately
divest itself thereof in favor of Filipino citizens and
corporations. However,as finally structured, Section 7.9
has the deleterious effect of depriving government of
the entire 60 percent share in WMCP's net mining
revenues, without any form of compensation
whatsoever. Such an outcome is completely
unacceptable.
The whole point of developing the nation's natural
resources is to benefit the Filipino people, future
generations included. And the State as sovereign and
custodian of the nation's natural wealth is mandated
to protect, conserve, preserve and develop that part of
the national patrimony for their benefit. Hence, the
Charter lays great emphasis on "real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the
country" [Footnote 75 of the Dissent omitted] as
essential guiding principles to be kept in mind when
negotiating the terms and conditions of FTAAs.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA effectively gives away
the State's share of net mining revenues (provided for
in Section 7.7) without anything in exchange.Moreover,
this outcome constitutes unjust enrichment on the part
of local and foreign stockholders of WMCP. By their
mere divestment of up to 60 percent equity in WMCP
in favor of Filipino citizens and/or corporations, the
local and foreign stockholders get a windfall. Their
share in the net mining revenues of WMCP is
automatically increased, without their having to pay
the government anything for it. In short, the provision
in question is without a doubt grossly disadvantageous
to the government, detrimental to the interests of the
Filipino people, and violative of public policy. (Emphasis
supplied; italics and underscoring in the original;
footnotes omitted)
The foregoing disquisition is directly applicable to the provisions of the Mining
Act. By selling 60% of its outstanding equity to a 60% Filipino-owned and 40%
foreign-owned corporation, the foreign contractor can readily convert its FTAA
into an MPSA. Effectively, the State's share in the net benefits from mining will
be automatically and drastically reduced from the theoretical 50% anticipated
under DAO 99-56 to merely 2%. What is given to the State by Section 81 and
DAO 99-56 is all but eliminated by Sections 39 and 80. At the same time, foreign
stockholders will beneficially own up to 64% of the mining concern, consisting of
the remaining 40% foreign equity therein plus the 24% pro-rata share in the
buyer-corporation.
It is possible that, like Section 7.9 of the WMCP FTAA, Section 39 of the Mining
Act was intended to provide some form of incentive for the foreign FTAA
contractor to eventually reduce its equity position and ultimately divest itself
thereof in favor of Filipino citizens and corporations. However, the net effect is
to allow the Filipino people to be robbed of their just share in Philippine mineral
resources. Such an outcome is completely unacceptable and cannot be
sanctioned by this Court.
By this simple conversion, which may be availed of at any time, the local and
foreign stockholders will obtain a windfall at the expense of the Government,
which is the trustee of the Filipino people. The share of these stockholders in
the net mining revenues from Philippine resources will be automatically
increased without their having to pay the government anything in exchange.
On this basis alone, and despite whatever other differences of opinion might
exist, the majority must concede that the provisions of the Mining Act are
grossly disadvantageous to the government, detrimental to the interests of the
Filipino people, and violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
En passant, it is significant to note that Section 39 of the Mining Act allows an
FTAA holder to covert its agreement to an MPSA "at any time during the term
of the agreement."
As any reasonable person with a modicum of business experience can readily
determine, the optimal time for the foreign contractor to convert its FTAA into
an MPSA is after the completion of the exploration phase and just before
undertaking the development, construction and utilization phase. This is
because under Section 56 (a) of DAO 40-96, the requirement for a minimum
investment of Fifty Million U.S. Dollars (US$50,000,000.00) 135 is only
applicable during the development, construction and utilization phase and NOT
during the exploration phase where the foreign contractor need only comply
with the stipulated minimum ground expenditures:
SECTION 56.Terms and Conditions of an FTAA. The
following terms, conditions and warranties shall be
incorporated in the FTAA, namely:
a.A firm commitment, in the form of a sworn
statement during the existence of the Agreement, that
the Contractor shall comply with minimum ground
expenditures during the exploration and pre-feasibility
periods as follows:
YearUS $/Hectare
12
22
38
48
518
623
and a minimum investment of Fifty Million US Dollars
($50,000,000.00) or its Philippine Peso equivalent in
the case of Filipino Contractor for infrastructure and
development in the contract area. If a
Temporary/Special Exploration Permit has been issued
prior to the approval of an FTAA, the exploration
expenditures incurred shall form part of the
expenditures during the first year of the exploration
period of the FTAA.
In the event that the Contractor exceeds the minimum
expenditure requirement in any one (1) year, the
amount in excess may be carried forward and
deducted from the minimum expenditure required in
the subsequent year. In case the minimum ground
expenditure commitment for a given year is not met
for justifiable reasons as determined by the
Bureau/concerned Regional Office, the unexpended
amount may be spent on the subsequent year(s) of the
exploration period. (Emphasis supplied)
By converting its FTAA to an MPSA just before undertaking development,
construction and utilization activities, a foreign contractor further maximizes its
profits by avoiding its obligation to make a minimum investment of
US$50,000,000.00. Assuming an exploration term of 6 years, it will have paid
out only a little over US$2.4 million 136 in minimum ground expenditures.
Clearly, under the terms and provisions of the Mining Act, even the promised
influx of tens of millions of dollars in direct foreign investments is merely
hypothetical and ultimately illusory.
Grant of Exploration Permits to Foreign
Corporations is Unconstitutional
The majority is also convinced that Section 3(aq) of the Mining Act, defining
foreign corporations as a qualified entity for the purposes of granting
exploration permits, is "not unconstitutional."
The questioned provision reads:
SECTION 3.Definition of Terms. As used in and for
purposes of this Act, the following terms, whether in
singular or plural, shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(aq)"Qualified person" means any citizen of the
Philippines with capacity to contract, or a corporation,
partnership, association, or cooperative organized or
authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with
technical and financial capability to undertake mineral
resources development and duly registered in
accordance with law at least sixty per centum (60%) of
the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines: Provided, That a legally organized foreign-
owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person
for purposes of granting an exploration permit,
financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral
processing permit. (Emphasis supplied)
In support of its contention that the above-quoted provision does not offend
against the Constitution, the majority opinion states that: (1) "there is no
prohibition at all against foreign or local corporations or contractors holding
exploration permits;" and (2) an "exploration permit serves a practical and
legitimate purpose in that it protects the interests and preserves the rights of
the exploration permit grantee . . . during the period of time that it is spending
heavily on exploration works, without yet being able to earn revenues . . .."
The majority opinion also characterizes an exploration permit as "an
authorization for the grantee to spend its funds on exploration programs that
are pre-approved by the government." And it comments that "[t]he State risks
nothing and loses nothing by granting these permits" to foreign firms.

These contentions fail for two obvious reasons.
First, setting aside for the moment all disagreements pertaining to the
construction of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the following, at the
very least, may be said to have been conclusively determined by this Court: (1)
the only constitutionally sanctioned method by which a foreign entity may
participate in the natural resources of the Philippines is by virtue of paragraph 4
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution; (2) said provision requires that
an agreement be entered into (3) between the President and the foreign
corporation (4) for the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils (5)according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, (6) based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country; (7) such agreements
will promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources;
and (8) the President shall notify the Congress of every contractentered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
However, by the majority opinion's express admission, the grant of an
exploration permit does not even contemplate the entry into an
agreement between the State and the applicant foreign corporation since "prior
to the issuance of such FTAA or mineral agreement, the exploration permit
grantee (or prospective contractor) cannot yet be deemed to have entered into
any contract or agreement with the State."
Consequently, the grant of an exploration permit which is not an agreement
cannot possibly be construed as being favorably sanctioned by paragraph 4
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which refers to "agreements . . .
involving either financial or technical assistance." Not falling within the
exception embodied in paragraph 4 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, the grant of such a permit to a foreign corporation is prohibited
and the proviso providing for such grant in Section 3 (aq) of the Mining Act is
void for being unconstitutional.
Second, given the foregoing discussion on the circumvention of the State's
share in an FTAA, it is clearly evident that to allow the grant of exploration
permits to foreign corporations is to allow the whole-sale circumvention of the
entire system of FTAAs mandated by the Constitution.
For Chapter IV of the Mining Act on Exploration Permits grants to the permit
holder, including foreign corporations, the principal rights conferred on an FTAA
contractor during the exploration phase, including (1) the right to enter, occupy
and explore the permit area under Section 23, 137 and (2) the exclusive right to
an MPSA or other mineral agreements or FTAAs upon the filing of a Declaration
of Mining Project Feasibility under Sections 23 and 24; 138 but requires none of
the obligations of an FTAA not even the obligation under Section 56 of DAO
40-96 to pay the minimum ground expenditures during the exploration and
feasibility period. 139
Thus, all that a foreign mining company need do to further maximize its profits
and further reduce the Government's revenue from mining operations is to
apply for an exploration permit and content itself with the "smaller" permit
area of 400 meridional blocks onshore (which itself is not small considering that
it is equivalent to 32,400 hectares or 324,000,000 square meters). 140 It is not
obligated to pay any minimum ground expenditures during the exploration
period.
Should it discover minerals in commercial quantities, it can circumvent the
Fiscal Regime in DAO 99-56 by divesting 60% of its equity in favor of a Philippine
corporation and opting to enter into an MPSA. By doing so it automatically
reduces the Government's TOTAL SHARE to merely 2% of value of the minerals
mined by operation of Section 81.
And if the Philippine corporation to which it divested its 60% foreign equity is
itself a 60-40 Philippine Corporation, then the beneficial interest of foreigners in
the minerals mined would be a minimum of 64%.
In light of the foregoing, Section 3 (aq), in so far as it allows the granting of
exploration permits to foreign corporations, is patently unconstitutional, hence,
null and void.
II
Invalidity of the WMCP FTAA
Sale of foreign interest in WMCP to
a Filipino corporation did not
render the case moot and academic.
Respondent WMCP, now renamed Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation,
submits that the case has been rendered moot since "[e]xcept for the nominal
shares of directors, 100% of TMRC's share are now owned by Sagittarius Mines,
which is a Filipino-owned corporation. More than 60% of the equity of
Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations." 141 This Court
initially reserved judgment on this issue. 142
Petitioner invokes by analogy the rule that where land is invalidly transferred to
an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to one, the
infirmity in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid, citing Halili v. Court of Appeals. 143 The rationale
for this rule is that if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the
nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not
be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
Filipino citizens. 144
Respondent WMCP's analogy is fallacious. Whether the legal title to the
corporate vehicle holding the FTAA has been transferred from a foreigner to a
Filipino is irrelevant. What is relevant is whether a foreigner has improperly and
illegally obtained an FTAA and has therefore benefited from the exploration,
development or utilization of Philippine natural resources in a manner contrary
to the provisions of the Constitution.
As above-stated the doctrine enunciated in Halili is based on the premise that
the purpose of the Constitution in prohibiting alien ownership of agricultural
land is to retain the ownership or legal title of the land in the hands of Filipinos.
This purpose is not identical or even analogous to that in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution. As priorly discussed, the primary purpose of the provisions on
National Patrimony is to preserve to the Filipino people the beneficial
ownership of their natural resources i.e. the right to the gains, rewards and
advantages generated by their natural resources. Except under the terms of
Section 2, Article XII, foreigners are prohibited from involving themselves in the
exploration, development or utilization of these resources, much less from
profiting from them.
Divestment by a foreigner of an illegally acquired right to mine Philippine
resources does not alter the illegal character of the right being divested or sold.
Indeed, such divestment or sale is obviously a method by which the foreigner
may derive pecuniary benefit from his unlawful act since he receives payment
for his illegally acquired interest in the country's natural resources.
To rule otherwise would be to condone, even to invite, foreign entities to
obtain Philippine mining interests in violation of the Constitution with the
assurance that they can escape liability and at the same time make a tidy sum
by later selling these interests to Filipinos. This is nothing less than allowing
foreign speculation in Philippine natural resources. Worse, there is the very real
possibility that these foreign entities may intentionally inflate the value of their
illegally-acquired mineral rights to the detriment of their Filipino purchasers as
the past Bre-X scandal 145 and recent Shell oil reserve controversy 146 vividly
illustrate.
To allow a foreigner to profit from illegally obtained mining rights or FTAAs
subverts and circumvents the letter and intent of Article XII of the Constitution.
It facilitates rather than prevents the rape and plunder of the nation's natural
resources by unscrupulous neo-colonial entities. It thwarts, rather than
achieves, the purpose of the fundamental law.
As applied to the facts of this case, respondent WMCP, in essence, claims that
now that the operation and management of the WMCP FTAA is in the hands of
a Filipino company, no serious question as to the FTAA's validity need arise.
On the contrary, this very fact that WMC has sold its 100% interest in WMCP
to a Filipino company for US$10,000,000.00 directly leads to some very
serious questions concerning the WMCP FTAA and its validity. First, if a Filipino
corporation is capable of undertaking the terms of the FTAA, why was an
agreement with a foreign owned corporation entered into in the first place?
Second, does not the fact that, as alleged by petitioners 147 and admitted by
respondent WMCP, 148Sagittarius, WMCP's putative new owner, is capitalized
at less than half the purchase price 149 of WMC's shares in WMCP, a strong
indication that Sagittarius is merely acting as the dummy of WMC? Third, if
indeed WMCP has, to date, spent US$40,000,000.00 in the implementation of
the FTAA, as it claims, 150 why did WMC sell 100% of its shares in WMCP for
only US$10,000,000.00? Finally, considering that, as emphasized by
WMCP, 151 "payment of the purchase price by Sagittarius to WMC will come
only after the commencement of commercial production," hasn't WMC
effectively acquired a beneficial interest in any minerals mined in the FTAA area
to the extent of US$10,000,000.00? If so, is the acquisition of such a beneficial
interest by a foreign corporation permitted under our Constitution?
Succinctly put, the question remains: What is the validity of the FTAA by which
WMC, a fully foreign owned corporation, has acquired a more than half billion
peso 152interest in Philippine mineral resources located in a contract area
of 99,387 (alleged to have later been reduced to 30,000) 153 hectares of land
spread across the four provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato?

Clearly then, the issues of this case have not been rendered moot by the sale of
WMC's 100% interest in WMCP to a Filipino corporation, whether the latter be
Sagittarius or Lepanto. If the FTAA is held to be valid under the Constitution,
then the sale is valid and, more importantly, WMC's US$10,000,000.00 interest
in Philippine mineral deposit, arising as it did from the sale and its prior 100%
ownership of WMCP, is likewise valid. However, if the FTAA is held to be invalid,
then neither WMC's interest nor the sale which gave rise to said interest is valid
for no foreigner may profit from the natural resources of the Republic of the
Philippines in a manner contrary to the terms of the Philippine Constitution. If
held unconstitutional, the WMCP FTAA is void ab initio for being contrary to the
fundamental law and no rights may arise from it, either in favor of WMC or its
Filipino transferee.
Evidently, the transfer of the shares in WMCP from WMC Resources
International Pty. Ltd. (WMC), a foreign-owned corporation, to a Filipino-owned
one, whether Sagittarius or Lepanto, now presently engaged in a dispute over
said shares, 154 did not "cure" the FTAA nor moot the petition at bar. On the
contrary, it is the Decision in this case that rendered those pending cases moot
for the invalidation of the FTAA leaves Sagittarius and Lepanto with nothing to
dispute.
Terms of the WMCP FTAA are
contrary to the Constitution and
render said FTAA null and void.
The WMCP FTAA is clearly contrary to the agreements provided for in Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. In the Decision under reconsideration, this Court
observed:
Section 1.3 of the WMCP FTAA grants WMCP "the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilise[,] process and
dispose of all Minerals products and by-products
thereof that may be produced from the Contract
Area." The FTAA also imbues WMCP with the following
rights:
(b)to extract and carry away any Mineral samples from
the Contract area for the purpose of conducting tests
and studies in respect thereof;
(c)to determine the mining and treatment processes to
be utilized during the Development/Operating Period
and the project facilities to be constructed during the
Development and Construction Period;
(d)have the right of possession of the Contract. Area,
with full right of ingress and egress and the right to
occupy the same, subject to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 512 (if applicable) and not be
prevented from entry into private lands by surface
owners and/or occupants thereof when prospecting,
exploring and exploiting for minerals therein;
xxx xxx xxx
(f)to construct roadways, mining, drainage, power
generation and transmission facilities and all other
types of works on the Contract Area;
(g)to erect, install or place any type of improvements,
supplies, machinery and other equipment relating to
the Mining Operations and to use, sell or otherwise
dispose of, modify, remove or diminish any and all
parts thereof;
(h)enjoy, subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations and the rights of third Parties, easement
rights and the use of timber, sand, clay, stone, water
and other natural resources in the Contract Area
without cost for the purposes of the Mining
Operations;
xxx xxx xxx
(l)have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all
or part of its interest and obligations under this
Agreement, the plant, equipment and infrastructure
and the Minerals produced from the Mining
Operations;
xxx xxx xxx
All materials, equipment, plant and other installations
erected or placed on the Contract Area remain the
property of WMCP, which has the right to deal with
and remove such items within twelve months from the
termination of the FTAA.
Pursuant to Section 1.2 of the FTAA, WMCP shall
provide "[all] financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations." The
mining company binds itself to "perform all Mining
Operations . . . providing all necessary services,
technology and financing in connection therewith,"
and to "furnish all materials, labour, equipment and
other installations that may be required for carrying on
all Mining Operations." WMCP may make expansions,
improvements and replacements of the mining
facilities and may add such new facilities as it considers
necessary for the mining operations.
These contractual stipulations, taken together, grant
WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources
that properly belong to the State and are intended for
the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are
abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely
the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the
evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck
down. 155 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, save for the fact that the contract covers a larger area, the subject
FTAA is actually a mineral production sharing agreement. Respondent
WMCP admitted as much in its Memorandum. 156 The first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, however, allows this type of
agreement only with Filipino citizens or corporations.
That the subject FTAA is void for having an unlawful cause bears reaffirmation.
In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party,
the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other. 157 On the part of
WMCP, a foreign-owned corporation, the cause was to extend not only
technical or financial assistance but management assistance as well. The
management prerogatives contemplated by the FTAA are not merely incidental
to the two other forms of assistance, but virtually grant WMCP full control over
its mining operations. Thus, in Section 8.3 158 of the FTAA, in case of a dispute
between the DENR and WMCP, it is WMCP's decision which will prevail.
The questioned FTAA also grants beneficial ownership over Philippine natural
resources to WMCP, which is prohibited from entering into such contracts not
only by the fourth paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, but
also by the first paragraph, the FTAA practically being a production-sharing
agreement reserved to Filipinos.
Contracts whose cause is contrary to law or public policy are inexistent and void
from the beginning. 159 They produce no effect whatsoever. 160 They cannot
be ratified, 161 and so cannot the WMCP FTAA.
The terms of the WMCP FTAA effectively give
away the Beneficial Ownership of Philippine
minerals
As previously observed, the majority opinion finds Section 7.9. of the WMCP
FTAA to be "grossly disadvantageous to the government, detrimental to the
interests of the Filipino people, and violative of public policy" since it
"effectively gives away the State's share of net mining revenues (provided for in
Section 7.7) without anything in exchange."
It likewise finds Section 7.8(e) of the WMCP FTAA to be invalid. Said provision
states:
7.8The Government Share shall be deemed to
include all of the following sums:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)an amount equivalent to whatever
benefits that may be extended in
the future by the Government to
the Contractor or to financial or
technical assistance agreement
contractors in general.
(Emphasis supplied)
And in its own estimation:
Section 7.8(e) is out of place in the FTAA. This
provision does not make any sense why, for instance,
money spent by the government for the benefit of the
contractor in building roads leading to the mine site
should still be deductible from the State's share in net
mining revenues. Allowing this deduction results in
benefiting the contractor twice over. To do so would
constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the
contractor at the expense of the government, since the
latter is effectively being made to pay twice for the
same item. For being grossly disadvantageous and
prejudicial to the government and contrary to public
policy, Section 7.8(e) is undoubtedly invalid and must
be declared to be without effect. . . . (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted; italics in the original)
The foregoing estimation notwithstanding, the majority opinion declines to
invalidate the WMCP FTAA on the theory that Section 7.9 and 7.8 are separable
from the rest of the agreement, which may supposedly be given effect without
the offending provisions.
As previously discussed, the same deleterious results are easily achieved by the
foreign contractor's conversion of its FTAA into an MPSA under the provisions
of the Mining Act. Hence, merely striking out Sections 7.9 and 7.8(e) of the
WMCP FTAA will not suffice; the provisions pertaining to FTAAs in the Mining
Act must be stricken out for being unconstitutional as well.
Moreover, Section 7.8 (e) and 7.9 are not the only provisions of the WMCP
FTAA which convey beneficial ownership of mineral resources to a foreign
corporation.
Under Section 10.2(1) of the WMCP FTAA, the foreign FTAA contractor shall
have the right to mortgage and encumber, not only its rights and interests in
the FTAA, but the very minerals themselves:
10.2Rights of Contractor
The Government agrees that the Contractor shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(l)have the right to mortgage, charge or encumber all
or part of its interest and obligations under
this Agreement, the plant, equipment and
infrastructure and the Minerals produced
from the Mining Operations; (Emphasis
supplied)
Although respondents did not proffer their own explanation, the majority
opinion theorizes that the foregoing provision is necessitated by the conditions
that may be imposed by creditor-banks on the FTAA contractor:
. . . I believe that this provision may have to do with
the conditions imposed by the creditor-banks of the
then foreign contractor WMCP to secure the lendings
made to the latter. Ordinarily, banks lend not only on
the security of mortgages on fixed assets, but also on
encumbrances of goods produced that can easily be
sold and converted into cash that can be applied to the
repayment of loans. Banks even lend on the security
of accounts receivable that are collectible within 90
days. (Citations omitted; italics in the original)

It, however, overlooks the provision of Art. 2085 of the Civil Code which
enumerates the essential requisites of a contract of mortgage:
Art. 2085.The following requisites are essential to the
contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1)That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of
a principal obligation;
(2)That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3)That the persons constituting the pledge or
mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and
in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized
for the purpose.
Third persons who are not parties to the principal
obligation may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
From the foregoing provision of law, it is abundantly clear that only the absolute
owner of the minerals has the right to mortgage the same, and under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution the absolute owner of the minerals is none other
than the State. While the foreign FTAA contractor may have an interest in
theproceeds of the minerals, it does not acquire ownership over the minerals
themselves.
Put differently, the act of mortgaging the minerals is an act of ownership,
which, under the Constitution, is reserved solely to the State. In purporting to
grant such power to a foreign FTAA contractor, Section 10.2 (1) of the WMCP
FTAA clearly runs afoul of the Constitution.
Moreover, it bears noting that to encumber natural resources of the State to
secure a foreign FTAA contractor's obligations is anomalous since Section 1.2 of
the WMCP FTAA provides that "[a]ll financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations shall be provided by the
Contractor."
Indeed, even the provisions of the Mining Act, irredeemably flawed though they
may be, require that the FTAA contractor have the financial capability to
undertake the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources in the Philippines; 162 and, specifically, that the contractor warrant
that it has or has access to all the financing required to promptly and effectively
carry out the objectives of the FTAA. 163
Under Section 10.2 (e) of the WMCP FTAA, the foreign FTAA Contractor has the
power to require the Government to acquire surface rights in its behalf at such
price and terms acceptable to it:
10.2Rights of Contractor
The Government agrees that the Contractor shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)have the right to require the Government at the
Contractor's own cost, to purchase or
acquire surface areas for and on behalf of
the Contractor at such price and terms as
may be acceptable to the Contractor. At the
termination of this Agreement such areas
shall be sold by public auction or tender
andthe Contractor shall be entitled to
reimbursement of the costs of acquisition
and maintenance, adjusted for inflation,
from the proceeds of sale; (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners, in their Memorandum, point out that pursuant to the foregoing, the
foreign FTAA contractor may compel the Government to exercise its power of
eminent domain to acquire the title to the land under which the minerals are
located for and in its behalf.
The majority opinion, however, readily accepts the explanation proffered by
respondent WMCP, thus:
Section 10.2 (e) sets forth the mechanism whereby the
foreign-owned contractor, disqualified to own land,
identifies to the government the specific surface areas
within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the
mine infrastructure. The government then acquires
ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the
contractor, in order to enable the latter to proceed to
fully implement the FTAA.
The contractor, of course, shoulders the purchase
price of the land. Hence, the provision allows it, after
the termination of the FTAA to be reimbursed from
proceeds of the sale of the surface areas, which the
government will dispose of through public bidding.
And it concludes that "the provision does not call for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain" and the determination of just compensation.
The foregoing arguments are specious.
First, the provision in question clearly contemplates a situation where the
surface area is not already owned by the Government i.e. when the land over
which the minerals are located is owned by some private person.
Second, the logical solution in that situation is not, as asserted by respondent
WMCP, to have the Government purchase or acquire the land, but for the
foreign FTAA contractor to negotiate a lease over the property with the private
owner.
Third, it is plain that the foreign FTAA contractor would only avail of Section
10.2 (e) if, for some reason or another, it is unable to lease the land in question
at the price it is willing to pay. In that situation, it would have the power under
Section 10.2 (e) to compel the State, as the only entity which can legally compel
the landowner to involuntarily part with his property, to acquire the land at a
price dictated by the foreign FTAA contractor.
Clearly, the State's power of eminent domain is very much related to the
practical workings of Section 10.2 (e) of the WMCP FTAA. It is the very
instrument by which the contractor assures itself that it can obtain the "surface
right" to the property at a price of its own choosing. Moreover, under Section
60 of DAO 40-96, the contractor may, after final relinquishment, hold up to
5,000 hectares of land in this manner.
More. While the foreign FTAA contractor advances the purchase price for the
property, in reality it acquires the "surface right" for free since under the same
provision of the WMCP FTAA it is entitled to reimbursement of the costs of
acquisition and maintenance, adjusted for inflation. And as if the foregoing
were not enough, when read together with Section 3.3, 164 the foreign FTAA
contractor would have the right to hold the "surface area" for a maximum of 50
years, at its option.
In sum, by virtue of Sections 10.2 (e) and 3.3. of the WMCP FTAA, the foreign
FTAA contractor is given the power to hold inalienable mineral land of up to
5,000 hectares, with the assistance of the State's power of eminent domain, free
of charge, for a period of up to 50 years in contravention of Section 3, Article XII
of the Constitution:
Section 3.Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor. (Emphasis
supplied)
Taken together, the foregoing provisions of the WMCP FTAA amount to a
conveyance to a foreign corporation of the beneficial ownership of both the
minerals and the surface rights to the same in contravention of the clear
provisions of the Constitution.
The majority opinion posits that "[t]he acquisition by the State of land for the
contractor is just to enable the contractor to establish its mine site, build its
facilities, establish a tailings pond, set up its machinery and equipment, and dig
mine shafts and tunnels, etc." It thus concludes that "5,000 hectares is way too
much for the needs of a mining operator."
Evidently, the majority opinion does not take into account open pit mining.
Open pit or opencut mining, as differentiated from methods that require
tunneling into the earth, is a method of extracting minerals by their removal
from an open pit or borrow; 165 it is a mine working in which excavation is
performed from the surface. 166It entails a surface mining operation in which
blocks of earth are dug from the surface to extract the ore contained in them.
During the mining process, the surface of the land is excavated forming a
deeper and deeper pit until the end of mining operations. 167 It is used
extensively in mining metal ores, copper, gold, iron, aluminum168 the very
minerals which the Philippines is believed to possess in vast quantities; and is
considered the most cost-effective mining method. 169
Furthermore, considering that FTAAs deal with large scale exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources and that the original contract
area of the WMCP FTAA was 99,387 hectares, an open pit mining operation
covering a total of 5,000 hectares is not outside the realm of possibility.
In any event, regardless of what the majority opinion considers "way too much"
(or too little), it is undisputed that under Section 60 of DAO 40-96, which is
among the enactments under review, the contractor may, after final
relinquishment, hold up to 5,000 hectares of land. And, under Section 3.3. of the
WMCP FTAA, it may do so for a term of 25 years automatically renewable for
another 25 years, at the option of the contractor.
The majority opinion also argues that, although entitled to reimbursement of its
acquisition cost at the end of the contract term, the FTAA contractor does not
acquire its surface rights for free since "the contractor will have been cash-out
for the entire duration of the term of the contract 25 to 50 years,
depending," thereby foregoing any interest income he might have earned. This
is the "opportunity cost" of the contractor's decision to use its money to
acquire the surface rights instead of leaving it in the bank.

The majority opinion does not consider the fact that "opportunity cost" is more
theoretical rather than actual and, for that reason, is not an allowable
deduction from gross income in an income statement. In layman's terms it is
equivalent to "the value of the chickens that might have been hatched if only
the cook had not scrambled the eggs." Neither does it consider the fact that the
contractor's foregone interest income does not find its way to the pockets of
either the previous land owner (in this case, the Bugal B'Laans) or the State.
But even if the contractor does incur some opportunity cost in holding the
surface rights for 35 to 50 years. The fact remains that, under the terms of the
WMCP FTAA, the contractor is given the power to hold inalienable mineral land
of up to 5,000 hectares, with the assistance of the State's power of eminent
domain for a period of up to 50 years in contravention of Section 3, Article XII of
the Constitution.
Clearly, Section 3 and 10.2 (e) of the WMCP FTAA in conjunction with Section 60
of DAO 40-96, amount to a conveyance to a foreign corporation of the
beneficial ownership of both the minerals and the surface rights over the same,
in contravention of the clear provisions of the Constitution.
The terms of the WMCP FTAA abdicate all
control over the mining operation in favor of
the foreign FTAA contractor
The majority opinion's defense of the constitutionality of Section 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 of
the WMCP FTAA is similarly unpersuasive. These Sections provide:
8.1The Secretary shall be deemed to have approved
any Work Programme or Budget or
variation thereof submitted by the
Contractor unless within sixty (60) days
after submission by the Contractor the
Secretary gives notice declining such
approval or proposing a revision of certain
features and specifying its reasons
therefore ("the Rejection Notice").
8.2If the Secretary gives a Rejection Notice the Parties
shall promptly meet and endeavour to
agree on amendments to the Work
Programme or budget. If the Secretary and
the Contractor fail to agree on the proposed
revision within 30 days from delivery of the
Rejection Notice then the Work Programme
or Budget or variation thereof proposed by
the Contractor shall be deemed approved so
as not to unnecessarily delay the
performance of this Agreement.
Even measured against the majority opinion's standards of control i.e.
either (1) the power to set aside, reverse, or modify plans and actions of
the contractor; or (2) regulatory control the foregoing provisions
cannot pass muster. This is because, by virtue of the foregoing provisions,
the foreign FTAA contractor has unfettered discretion to countermand the
orders of its putative regulator, the DENR.
Contrary to the majority's assertions, the foregoing provisions do not provide
merely temporary or stop-gap solutions. The determination of the FTAA
contractor permanently reverses the "Rejection Notice" of the DENR since, by
the majority opinion's own admission, there is no available remedy for the
DENR under the agreement except to seek the cancellation of the same.
Indeed, the justification for the foregoing provisions is revealing:
. . . First, avoidance of long delays in these situations
will undoubtedly redound to the benefit of the State as
well as to the contractor. Second, who is to say that
the work program or budget proposed by the
contractor and deemed approved under Clause 8.3
would not be the better or more reasonable or more
effective alternative? The contractor, being the
"insider," as it were, may be said to be in a better
position than the State an outsider looking in to
determine what work program or budget would be
appropriate, more effective, or more suitable under the
circumstances. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Both reasons tacitly rely on the unstated assumption that the interest of the
foreign FTAA contractor and that of the Government are identical. They are not.
Private businesses, including large foreign-owned corporations brimming with
capital and technical expertise, are primarily concerned with maximizing the
pecuniary returns to their owners or shareholders. To this extent, they can be
relied upon to pursue the most efficient courses of action which maximize their
profits at the lowest possible cost.
The Government, on the other hand, is mandated to concern itself with more
than just narrow self-interest. With respect to the nation's natural wealth, as
the majority opinion points out, the Government is mandated to preserve,
protect and even maximize the beneficial interest of the Filipino people in their
natural resources. Moreover, it is directed to ensure that the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of these resources results in real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the nation. To
achieve these broader goals, the Constitution mandates that the State exercise
full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources.
However, taking the majority opinion's reasoning to its logical conclusion, the
business "insider's opinion" would always be superior to the Government's
administrative or regulatory determination with respect to mining operations.
Consequently, it is the foreign contractor's opinion that should always prevail.
Ultimately, this means that, at least for the majority, foreign private business
interests outweigh those of the State at least with respect to the conduct of
mining operations.
Indeed, in what other industry can the person regulated permanently overrule
the administrative determinations of the regulatory agency?
To any reasonable mind, the absence of an effective means to enforce even
administrative determinations over an FTAA contractor, except to terminate the
contract itself, falls far too short of the concept of "full control and
supervision" as to cause the offending FTAA to fall outside the ambit of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Verily, viewed in its entirety, the WMCP FTAA cannot withstand a rigid
constitutional scrutiny since, by its provisions, it conveys both the beneficial
ownership of Philippine minerals and control over their exploration,
development and utilization to a foreign corporation. Being contrary to both the
letter and intent of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the WMCP FTAA
must be declared void and of no effect whatsoever.
A Final Note
For over 350 years, the natural resources of this nation have been under the
control and domination of foreign powers whether political or corporate.
Philippine mineral wealth, viciously wrenched from the bosom of the
motherland, has enriched foreign shores while the Filipino people, to whom
such wealth justly belongs, have remained impoverished and unrecompensed.
Time and time again the Filipino people have sought an end to this intolerable
situation. From 1935 they have struggled to assert their legal control and
ownership over their patrimony only to have their efforts repeatedly subverted
first, by the parity amendment to the 1935 Constitution and subsequently by
the service contract provision in the 1973 Constitution.
It is not surprising that an industry, overly dependent on foreign support and
now in decline, should implore this Court to reverse itself if only to perpetuate
its otherwise economically unsustainable conduct. It is even understandable,
however regrettable, that a government, strapped for cash and in the midst of a
self-proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind eye to the
consequences of unconstitutional legislation in the hope, however false or
empty, of obtaining fabulous amounts of hard currency.
But these considerations should not outweigh the Constitution.
As always, the one overriding consideration of this Court should be the will of
the sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their Constitution. The
Constitution which gives life to and empowers this Court. The same
Constitution to which the members of this Court have sworn their unshakable
loyalty and their unwavering fidelity.
Now, the unmistakable letter and intent of the 1987 Constitution
notwithstanding, the majority of this Court has chosen to reverse its earlier
Decision which, to me, would once again open the doors to foreign control and
ownership of Philippine natural resources. The task of reclaiming Filipino
control over Philippine natural resources now belongs to another generation.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny respondents' Motions for Reconsideration.
TINGA, J.:
The Constitution was crafted by men and women of divergent backgrounds and
varying ideologies. Understandably, the resultant document is accommodative
of these distinct, at times competing philosophies. Untidy as any mlange
would seem, our fundamental law nevertheless hearkens to the core
democratic ethos over and above the obvious inconveniences it spawns.
However, when the task of judicial construction of the Constitution comes to
fore, clarity is demanded from this Court. In turn, there is a need to balance and
reconcile the diverse views that animate the provisions of the Constitution, so
as to effectuate its true worth as an instrument of national unity and progress.
The variances and consequent challenges are vividly reflected in Article XII of
the Constitution on National Patrimony, in a manner akin to Article II on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Some of the provisions impress as
protectionist, yet there is also an undisguised accommodation of liberal
economic policies. Section 2, Article XII, 1 the provision key to this case, is one
such Janus-faced creature. It seems to close the door on foreign handling of our
natural resources, but at the same time it leaves open a window for alien
participation in some aspects. The central question before us is how wide is the
entry of opportunity created by the provision.
My vote on the motions for reconsideration is hinged on a renewed exegesis of
Section 2 2 of Article XII in conjunction with the proper understanding of the
nature of the power vested on the President under Section 2. It has to be
appreciated in relation to the inherent functions of the executive branch of
government.

The Contract-Making Power of the President
While all government authority emanates from the people, the breadth and
depth of such authority are not brought to bear by direct popular action, but
through representative government in accord with the principles of
republicanism. 3 By investiture of the Constitution, the function of executive
power is parceled solely to the duly elected President. 4 The Constitution
contains several express manifestations of executive power, such as the
provision on control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, 5 as
well as the so-called "Commander-in-Chief" clause. 6
Yet it has likewise been recognized in this jurisdiction that "executive power" is
not limited to such powers as are expressly granted by the Constitution. Marcos
v.Manglapus 7 concedes that the President has powers other than those
expressly stated under the Constitution, 8 and thus implies that these powers
may be exercised without being derivative from constitutional authority. 9 The
precedential value of Marcos v. Manglapusmay be controvertible, 10 but the
cogency of its analysis of the scope of executive power is indisputable. Neither
is the concept of plenary executive power novel, as discussed by Justice Irene
Cortes in herponencia:
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision
of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the
Governor-General of the Philippines and the
Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal
Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the
Governor-General to do so, said:
. . . Here the members of the legislature
who constitute a majority of the "board"
and "committee" respectively, are not
charged with the performance of any
legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of
any such functions by the legislature.
Putting aside for the moment the question
whether the duties devolved upon these
members are vested by the Organic Act in
the Governor-General, it is clear that they
are not legislative in character, and still
more clear that they are not judicial. The
fact that they do not fall within the
authority of either of these two constitutes
logical ground for concluding that they do
fall within that of the remaining one among
which the powers of government are
divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis
supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong
dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a
folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically
mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do
not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are
found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other. . .
.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show
that however we may disguise it by veiling
words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and
executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into
watertight compartments, were it ever so
desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution
requires. [At 210211.] 11
Such general power has not been diminished notwithstanding the avowed
intent of some of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to abuses under President Marcos, for as the Court
noted, "the result was a limitation of the specific powers of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power." 12 The critical perspective
of this case should spring from a recognition of this elemental fact. CcSTHI
Undeniably, the particular power now in question is expressly provided for by
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. Still, it originates from the concept of
executive power that is not explicitly provided for by the Constitution. As a
necessary incident of the functions of the executive office, it can be concluded
that the President has the authority to enter into contracts in behalf of the
State in matters which are not denied him or her or not otherwise assigned to
the other great branches of government, even if such general power is not
categorically recognized in the Constitution. Among these traditional functions
of the executive branch is the power to determine economic policy.
As once noted by Justice Feliciano, the Republic of the Philippines is itself a
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as "legal personality." 13 As
"Chief of State" the President is also regarded as the head of this body
corporate, 14 and thus is capacitated to represent the State when engaging
with other entities. Such executive function, in theory, does not require a
constitutional provision, or even a Constitution, in order to be operative. It is a
power possessed by every duly constituted presidency starting with
Aguinaldo's. This faculty is complementary to the traditional regard of a Head of
State as emblematic of the State he/she represents.
The power to contract in behalf of the State is clearly an executive function, as
opposed to legislative or judicial. This is easily discernible through the process
of exclusion. The other branches of government the legislative and the
judiciary are not similarly capacitated since their core functions pertain to
legislating and adjudicating respectively.
However, I am not making any pretense that such executive power to contract
is unimpeachable or limitless. The Constitution frowns on unchecked executive
power, mandating in broad strokes, the power of judicial review 15 and
legislative oversight. 16 The Constitution itself may expressly restrict the
exercise of any sort of executive function. Section 2 undeniably constrains the
exercise of the executive power to contract in several regards.
Constitutional Limitations under Section 2, Article XII
What are the express limitations under Section 2 on the power of the executive
to contract with foreign corporations regarding the exploration, development
and utilization of our natural resources?
There are two fundamental restrictions, both of which are asserted in the
second paragraph of Section 2. These are that the State retains legal ownership
of all natural resources, 17 and that the State shall have full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources. 18 These key postulates are facially broad and warrant clarification.
They also predicate several specific restrictions laid down in the fourth
paragraph of Section 2 on the power of the President to enter into agreements
with foreign corporations. These specific limitations are as follows:
First, the natural resources that may be subject of the agreement are a limited
class, particularly minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. Among the
natural resources which are excluded from these agreements are lands of the
public domain, waters, coal, fisheries, forests or timbers, wildlife, flora and
fauna. Most notable of the exclusions are forests and timbers which are in all
respects expressly limited to Filipinos.
It is noteworthy that a previous version of the fourth paragraph of Section 2
deliberated upon during the 1987 Constitutional Commission allowed
agreements with foreign-owned corporations with respect to all classes of
natural resources. 19 However, on the initiative of Commissioner (now Chief
Justice) Davide, the provision was amended to limit the scope of such
agreements to minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, which Commissioner
Davide recognized as "those particular areas where Filipino capital may not be
sufficient." 20
The exclusion of timber resources from the scope of financial/technical
assistance agreements marks a significant distinction from the service contracts
of old. This does not come as a surprise, considering well-reported abuses under
the old regime of issuing timber licensing agreements, which numbered in the
thousands prior to the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, no similar
extensive collateral damage has been reported for the petroleum and mining
industry, capital-intensive industries whose potential for government revenues
in billions of pesos has long been sought after by the State. 21 Hence, the
variance in treatment from the timber industry and the rest of the natural
resources.
Second, these agreements with foreign-owned corporations can only be
entered into for only large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
Third, it is only the President who may enter into these agreements. This is
another pronounced change from the 1973 Constitution, which allowed private
persons to enter into service contracts with foreign corporations.
Fourth, these agreements must be in accord with the general terms and
conditions provided by law. This proviso by itself, and more so when taken
together, as it should, with another provision, 22 entails legislative intervention
and affirmance in the exercise of this executive power. While it is the President
who enters into these contracts, he/she must act within such terms and
conditions as may be prescribed by Congress through legislation. The value of
legislative input as a means of influencing policy should not be discounted.
Policy initiatives grounded on particular economic ideologies may find
enactment through legislation when approved by the necessary majorities in
Congress. Legislative work includes consultative processes with persons of
diverse interests, assuring that economic decisions need not be made solely
from an ivory tower. There is also the possible sanction of repudiation by the
voters of legislators who prove insensate to the economic concerns of their
constituents.

Fifth, the President is mandated to base the decision of entering into these
agreements on "real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare
of the country." In terms of real limitations, this condition has admittedly little
effect. The discretion as to whether or not to enter into these agreements is
vested solely by the Constitution in the President, and such exercise of
discretion, pertaining as it does to the political wisdom of a co-equal branch,
generally deserves respect from the courts.
The above conditionalities, particularly the first three, effect the desire of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution to limit foreign participation in natural
resource-oriented enterprises. They provide a vivid contrast to the 1973
Constitution, which permitted private persons to enter into service contracts
for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any
person or entity, including foreigners, and for the exploration or utilization of
any of the natural resources. 23These requisites imposed by the 1987
Constitution, which are significantly more onerous than those laid down in the
1973 Constitution, warrant obeisance by the executive branch and recognition
by this Court.
Not Strictly Technical or Financial Assistance
The Court's previous Decision, now for reconsideration, insisted on another
restriction purportedly imposed by the fourth paragraph of Section 2. It is
argued that foreign-owned corporations are allowed to render only technical or
financial assistance in the large-scale exploration, development and utilization
of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils. This conservative view is premised on
the sentiment that the Constitution limits foreign involvement only to areas
where they are needed, the overpowering intent being to allow Filipinos to
benefit from Filipino resources. 24 Towards that end, the perception arises that
the power of the executive to enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations is an executive privilege, hampered by the limitations that
generally attach to the grant of privileges.
On the fundamental nature of this power, I harbor an entirely different view.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single articles torn from context. 25 The previously
adopted approach is rigidly formalist, and impervious to the traditional
prerogatives of executive power.
As I stated earlier, the executive authority to contract is a right emanating from
traditional executive functions, and is connected with the power of the
executive branch to determine economic policy. Hence, the proper approach in
interpreting Section 2, Article XII is to tilt in favor of asserting the right rather
than view the provision as a limitation on a privilege. To subscribe to the Court's
previous view will necessitate adopting as a fundamental premise that absent
an express grant of power, the executive branch has no capacity to contract
since such capacity arises from a privilege. TDESCa
Had the provision been worded to state that the President may enter into
agreements for technical or financial assistance only, then this unambiguous
limitation should be affirmed. Yet the Constitution does not express such an
intent. The controversial provision is crafted in such a way that allows any type
of agreement, so long as they involve either technical or financial assistance. In
fact, the provision does not restrict the scope of the agreement so as to pertain
exclusively either to technical or financial assistance.
The Constitution, in allowing foreign participation specifically in the large
scale exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, is cognizant
of the sad truth that such activities entail significant outlay of capital and
advanced technological know-how that domestic corporations may not yet
have. 26 The provision expressly adverts to "technical" and "financial"
assistance in recognition of the reality that these two facets are the
indispensable requisites to qualify foreign participants in the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral and petroleum resources.
Had the framers chosen to restrict all aspects of all mining activities to domestic
persons, the real fear would have materialized that our mineral reserves could
remain untapped for a significant period of time, owing to the paucity of
venture capital. There was a real option to heed dogmatic guns who insisted
that the mineral resources remain unutilized until the day when the domestic
mining industry becomes capacitated to undertake the extraction without need
of foreign aid. Obviously, the more pragmatic view won the day.
If indeed the foreign entity is limited only to technical or financial participation,
the implication is that it is up to the State to do all the rest. Considering the lack
of know-how and financial capital, matters which were appreciated by the
framers of the Constitution, this intended effect is preposterous. Even the State
itself would hesitate to undertake such extractive activities owing to the
intensive capital and extensive training such enterprise would entail. By allowing
this expansive set-up under Section 2, the Constitution enables the minimization
of risk on the part of the State should it desire to undertake large-scale mineral
extractive activities. The pay-off though, understandably, is an atypical cession
of several State prerogatives in the development of its mineral and petroleum
resources.
Perhaps there is need to be explicit and incisive about the implications of
Section 2. The word "assistance," shorn of context, implies a charitable grant
offered without any quid pro quo attached. Unconditional foreign aid may be
more prevalent this day and age with the acceptance of the notion that there
are base minimum standards of decent living which all persons are entitled to.
However, such concept is alien to the mining industry. There is no such entity as
an International Benevolent Association for Extraction of Minerals. If
"assistance" is to be restrictively interpreted according to ordinary parlance, no
entity would be interested in undertaking this regulated industry.
Any decision by any enterprise to assist in the exploration, development or
utilization of mineral resources does not arise from a philanthropic impulse. It is
a pure and simple investment, and one that is not engaged in unless there is the
expectation or hope of a reasonable return. I hasten to add that the deliberate
incorporation of the fourth paragraph of Section 2 has created a window of
opportunity for foreign investments in the extractive enterprises involving
petroleum and other mineral oils, subject of course to limitations under the
law. The term may prove discomfiting to the ideologically committed, the
sentimental nationalist or the visceral oppositionist. Still, the notion is not
inconsistent with the general power of the executive to enter into agreements
for the purpose of enticing foreign investments.
Why then the term "assistance?" Apart from its apparent political palatability in
comparison with "investment," as intimated before, the term is useful in
underscoring the essential facets of the foreign investment which is assistance in
the financial or technical areas, as well as the fundamental limitations and
conditionalities of the investment. What is allowed is participation, though
limited, by foreign corporations which in turn are entitled to expect a return on
their investments.
The Court had earlier premised the invalidity of several provisions of the Mining
Act on the argument that those provisions authorized service contracts. But
while the 1987 Constitution does not utilize the term "service contracts," it
actually contemplates a broader expanse of agreements beyond mere contracts
for services rendered. Still, although the provision sanctions a more numerous
class of agreements, these are subjected to more stringent restrictions than
what had been allowed under the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the test should be
whether the law and the contract take away the State's full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of the country's
mineral resources and negate or defeat the State's ownership thereof .
In line with the test, Section 2 should be accorded a liberal interpretation so as
to recognize this fundamental prerogative of the presidency. Such "liberal
interpretation" does not equate to a wholesale concession of mining resources
to foreigners, much less to an atmosphere of complaisance, whether from their
perception or the Filipinos.' The fourth paragraph sets specific limitations on
the exercise by the President of this contract-making power. On the other hand,
the second paragraph of Section 2 lays down the fundamental limitations which
likewise may not be countermanded.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, and as a necessary consequence of my
view that the agreements under Section 2 are not strictly limited to financial or
technical assistance, I would consider the following questioned provisions of
Republic Act No. 7942 as valid Sections 3 (g), 34 to 38, 40 to 41, 56 and 90.
These provisions were struck down on the premise that they allowed the
constitution of "service contracts," an agreement which to my mind is still
within the contemplation of Section 2, Article XII.
State Ownership over Mineral and Petroleum Resources
There is need to clarify the specific meaning of these general limitations arising
from the State's assertion of ownership, full control and supervision.
In respect to the petition, the question of ownership has become material to
the proper share the State should receive from the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources. I perceive that all the members of the
Court agree that such profit may not be limited to only such revenue derived
from the taxation of the mining activities. Since the right of the State to obtain a
share in the net proceeds and not merely through taxes arises as an attribute of
ownership unequivocally reserved by the Constitution for the State, such right
may not be proscribed either by legislative provision or contractual stipulation.

Yet it should be conceded that the State has the right to enter into an
agreement concerning such profits. There are, as probably should be, political
consequences if the President opts to surrender all of the State's profits to a
foreign corporation, yet in bare theory, the right to bargain profits pertains to
the wisdom of a political act not ordinarily justiciable before this Court. Still, the
overriding adherence of the Constitution to the regalian doctrine should be
given due respect, and an interpretation allowing "beneficial ownership" by the
foreign corporation should not be favored.
For purposes of the present judicial review, I would consider it prudent to limit
myself to conceding that the Court had previously erred in invalidating certain
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7942 and the WMC FTAA on the mistaken notion that
the law and the agreement cede beneficial ownership of mineral resources to a
foreign corporation.
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 7942 expressly recognizes State ownership over
mineral resources, though it is silent on the operational terms of such
ownership. Of course, such general submission would not be in itself curative of
whatever contraventions to State ownership are contained in the same law;
hence, the need for deeper inquiry.
The dissenters wish to strike down the second paragraph of Section 81 of Rep.
Act No. 7942 because it purportedly precludes the Government from obtaining
profits under the agreement from sources other than its share in taxation.
However, as the ponencia points out, the phrase "among other things"
sufficiently allows the government from demanding a share in the cash flow or
earnings of the mining enterprise. A contrary view is anchored on a rule of
statutory construction that concludes that "among other things" refers only to
taxes. Yet, there is also a rule of construction that laws should be interpreted
with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. Thus, the ponencia's
formulation, which achieves the result of the minority without need of
statutory invalidation, is highly preferable.
The provisions of Rep. Act No. 7942 which authorize the conversion of a
financial or technical assistance into a mineral production sharing agreement
(MPSA) turned out to be just as controversial. In this regard, the minority
wishes to strike down Section 39, which in conjunction with Sections 80 and 84
of the law would purportedly allow such conversion, in that it would effectively
limit the government share in the profits to only the excise tax on mineral
products under internal revenue law.
These concerns are valid and raise troubling questions. Yet equally troubling is
that the Court is being called upon to rule on a premature question. There is no
such creature yet as an FTAA converted into an MPSA, and so there is no
occasion that calls for the application of Sections 39, 80 and 84. I do not
subscribe to judicial pre-emptive strikes, as they preclude the application of still
undisclosed considerations which may prove illuminating and even crucial to
the proper disposition of the case. By seeking invalidation of these "MPSA
provisions," the Court is also asked to strike down an enactment of a co-equal
branch which has not given rise to an actual case or controversy. After all, such
enactment deserves due respect from this branch of government. Assuming
that the provisions are indeed invalid, the Court will not hesitate, at the proper
time, to strike them down or at least impose a proper interpretation that does
not run afoul of the Constitution. 27 However, in the absence of any actual
attempt to convert an FTAA to an MPSA, the time is not now. HSDCTA
I likewise agree with the ponencia that Section 7.9 deprives the State of its
rightful share as an incident of ownership without offsetting compensation. The
provisions of the FTAA are fair game for judicial review considering their
present applicability. In fact, the invalidation of Section 7.9 becomes even more
proper now under the circumstances since the provision has become effectual
considering the sale of the foreign equity in WMCP to a domestic corporation. It
is within the competence of this Court to invalidate Section 7.9 here and now.
For that matter, Section 7.8(e) of the FTAA may be similarly invalidated as it can
already serve to unduly deprive the Government of its proper share by allowing
double recovery by WMC.
"Full Control and Supervision" of the State
The matter of "full control and supervision" emerges just as controversial. Does
this grant of power mandate that the State exercise management over the
activity, or exclude the exercise of managerial control by the foreign
corporation?
I don't think it proper to construe the word "full" as implying that such control
or supervision may not be at all yielded or delegated, for reasons I shall
elaborate upon. Instead, "full" should be read as pertaining to the
encompassing scope of the concerns of the State relating to the extractive
enterprises on which it may interfere or impose its will.
It must be conceded that whichever party obtains managerial control must be
allowed considerable elbow room in the exercise of management prerogatives.
Management is in the most informed position to make resources productive in
the pursuit of the enterprise's objectives. 28 In this age of specialization,
corporations have benefited with the devolution of operational control to
specialists, rather than generalists. The era of the buccaneer entrepreneur
chartering his industry solely on gut feel is over. The vagaries of international
finance have dictated that prudent capitalists cede to the opinion of their
experts who are hired because they trained within their particular fields to
know better than the persons who employ them. The Constitution does not
prescribe a particular manner of management; thus, we can conclude that the
State is not compelled to adopt outmoded methods that could tend to minimize
profits.
Still, the question as to who should exercise management is best left to the
parties of the agreement, namely the President and the foreign corporations.
They would be in the best position to determine who is best qualified to exert
managerial control. This prerogative of management can be exercised by the
State if it so insists and the co-parties agree, and the wisdom of such arrogation
is ultimately a policy question this Court has little control over. And even if the
State cedes management to a different entity such as the foreign corporation, it
has the duty to safeguard that the actual exercise of managerial power does not
contravene our laws and public policy.
There is barely any support of the view that only the State may exert
managerial control. Even the minority concede that these foreign corporations
are not precluded from participating in the management of the project. I think
it unwise to construe "full supervision and control" to the effect that the State's
assent or opinion is necessary before any day-to-day operational questions may
be resolved. There is neither an express rule to that effect, nor any law of
construction that necessitates such interpretation. Ideally of course, the most
qualified party should be allowed to manage the enterprise, and we should not
allow an interpretation that compels a possibly unsuited entity, such as the
State, to operationalize the business. 29 Such a limited construction would be
inconvenient and absurd, 30 not to mention potentially wasteful.
The Constitution itself concedes that the State may not have the best sense as
to how to undertake large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
mineral and petroleum resources. This is evinced by the allowance of foreign
technical assistance and foreign participation in the extractive enterprise. Had
the Constitution recognized that the State was supremely qualified to
undertake the operational aspects of the activity, then it could have phrased
the provision in such a way that would strictly limit the foreign participation to
monetary investment or a financial grant of assistance.
The absence of an express provision on management permits consideration of
the following sensible critique on yielding too many management prerogatives
to a remote overseer such as the State. An early United Nations report once
noted that while it is theoretically possible to endow a government department
with a high degree of operating flexibility, it is in practice difficult to do so. 31 It
has been proposed that the further away a decision-maker is to the market, the
higher the information cost, or the opportunity cost to the gaining of
information. 32 Remoteness can be achieved through the layering of
bureaucratic structure, and because of the information loss that accompanies
the transmission of information and judgments from lower levels of the
hierarchy to higher levels, the ultimate basis of a decision may be misleading at
best and erroneous at worst. 33
The same conclusion arises from the view that what the provision authorizes is
foreign investment. The foreign player necessarily at least has a reasonable say
in how the mining venture is run. The interest of the investor in seeing that the
investment is not wasted should be recognized not only as a right available to
the investor, but from the broader view that such say would lead to a more
prudent management of the project. It must be noted that mineral and
petroleum resources are non-renewable, thus a paramount interest arises to
ensure against wasteful exploitation.
Next for consideration is the situation, as in this case, if management is ceded
to the foreign corporation, or even to a private domestic corporation for that
matter. What should be the proper dichotomy, if any, between the private
entity's exercise of managerial control, and the State's full control and
supervision?
The President may insist on conditions into the agreement pertaining to the
State's degree of control and supervision in the mining activity. This was
certainly done with the WMC FTAA, which is replete with stipulations
delineating the State's control which are judicially enforceable, imposed
presumably at the President's call. But the FTAA itself is not the only vehicle by
which State control and supervision is exercised. These can similarly be
enforced through statutes, as well as executive or administrative issuances. The
Mining Act itself is an expression of State control and supervision, implemented
in coordination with the executive and legislative branches.

As a general point, I believe that State control and supervision is
unconstitutionally yielded if either of the Mining Act or the FTAA precludes the
application of the laws and regulations of the Philippines, enunciatory as they
are of State policy. Neither the Mining Act nor the WMC FTAA are flawed in that
regard. The agreements under contemplation are not beyond the ambit of our
regular laws, or regulatory enactments pertaining to such areas as
environmental concerns. Violations of these laws uttered in the name of the
FTAA are punishable in this jurisdiction.
Still, the fact that the Constitution requires "full control and supervision"
indicates an expectation of a more activist role on the part of the State in the
operations of the mining enterprise, perhaps to the prejudice of the laissez-
faire capitalist. Most importantly, the State cannot abdicate its traditional
functions by contractual limitations. It could compel the mining operations to
comply with existing environmental regulations, as well as with future
issuances. It may compel the foreign corporation payment of all assessable
levies. It may evict officers of the foreign corporation for violation of
immigration laws. It may preclude mining operations that affect prerogatives
granted by law to indigenous peoples. It could restrict particular mining
operations which are established to be disasters or nuisances to the affected
communities. The power of the State to enforce its police powers needs no
statutory grant and are certainly not limited either by the Mining Act or the
WMC FTAA.
As to "business decisions," I think that the State may exercise control for the
purpose of ensuring profit of the enterprise as a whole. This may involve
visitorial activity, the conduct of periodic audits, and such powers normally
attributed to an overseer of a business. Just as the foreign corporation is
expected to guard against waste of financial capital, the State is expected
likewise to guard against the waste of resource capital.
I might as well add that, in my view, the constitutional objective of maintaining
full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of
the country's mineral resources in the State would be best served by the
creation of a public corporation for the development and utilization of these
resources, accountable to the State for all actions in its behalf. The device of a
corporation properly utilized provides sufficient protection to the State's
interests while affording flexibility and efficiency in the conduct of mining
operations. 34
The creation of a public corporation could remedy a number of potential
problems regarding full State control and supervision of extractive activities
concerning our mineral resources by entities which have the funds and/or
technical know-how but which cannot have a great degree of control and
supervision over such activities. Persons knowledgeable and competent in
mining operations may sit in the corporation's board of directors and craft
policies which implement and further concretize the broad aims of R.A. No.
7942, taking into consideration the nature of the mining industry. The Board
would also be in charge of studying existing contracts for mining activities, and
approving proposed contracts. The Board may also employ corporate officers
and employees to take charge of the day-to-day operations of the mining
activities pursuant to the corporation's contracts with other entities.
Under such a scheme, the perceived abdication by the State of control and
supervision over mining activities in favor of the foreign entities rendering
financial and/or technical assistance would be greatly diminished. It would be
the public corporation which would principally undertake mining activities and
contract with foreign entities for financial and/or technical assistance if
necessary. The foreign contractor in such cases would not have the power to
determine the course of the project or the major policies involved therein
because these functions would belong to the public corporation as the agent of
the State.
A public corporation would also have the additional benefit of compelling the
input of not only the executive branch, but also that of the legislative. Such
executive-legislative coordination is necessary since public corporations may
only be created through statute. ADSTCa
Section 3.3 of WMC FTAA Constitutional
Finally, it is argued that Section 3.3 of the WMC FTAA violates paragraph 1,
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which imposes a limitation on the term
of mineral agreements. I agree with the ponencia that the constitutional
provision does not pertain to FTAAs. It is clear from reading Section 1 that the
agreements limited in term therein are co-production agreements, joint
venture agreements, and mineral production-sharing agreements, which are all
referred to in Section 1, and not the FTAAs mentioned only in Section 4.
Accordingly, Section 3.3 of the WMC FTAA is not infirm.
Epilogue
Behind the legal issues presented by the petition are fundamental policy
questions from which highly opinionated views can develop, even from the
members of this Court. The promise brought about by the large-scale
exploitation of our mineral and petroleum resources may bring in much needed
revenue, but Filipinos should properly inquire at what cost. As a Filipino, I am
distressed whenever the government crosses the line from cooperation to
subservience to foreign partners in development. Popular Western wisdom
aside, what is good for General Motors is not necessarily good for the country.
The propagation of a foreign-influenced mining industry may lead to a whole
slew of social problems 35 which shall be exacerbated if the government is
complicit, either through active participation or benign neglect, to abuses
committed by the mining industry against the Filipino people. Unlike the foreign
corporation, the bottom line which the State should consider is not found
below a ledger, but in the socio-economic dynamic that will confront the
government as a result of the large-scale mining venture. Political capital is
more fickle than financial capital.
Still, the right to vote I exercise today is that as of a member of the Court, and
not that of the general electorate. The limits of judicial power would exasperate
any well-meaning judge who feels duty-bound to affirm a constitutionally valid
law or principle he or she may otherwise disagree with. My views on how the
government should act are segregate from my view on whether the
government has the power to act at all.
My conclusions are borne out of a close textual analysis of Section 2 in light of
my fundamental understanding of the constitutional powers of the executive
branch. This is in line with my perception of the judicial duty as being limited to
charting the scope and boundaries of the law. The philosophy of inclusiveness
that drives my interpretation of Section 2 is bolstered not because it might lead
to benefits to the economy, but because it gives due regard to the discretion of
the Executive to determine what is good for the economy. This judicial attitude
may not always ensure the economic good. But before we carve that judicial
path out of what we believe are good intentions, restraint is imperative out of
due deference to our co-equal branches, since the duty of formulating and
implementing economic policies falls exclusively within their purview.
In view of the foregoing, I concur with the opinion of justice Panganiban.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the well-reasoned ponencia of my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban. I feel obligated, however, to add the following
observations:
I.RE "FULL CONTROL
AND SUPERVISION"
With all due respect, I believe that the issue of unconstitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942, its implementing rules, and the Financial Assistance Agreement
between the Philippine Government and WMPC (Philippines) Inc. (WMPC FTAA)
executed pursuant to Rep. Act No. 7942 hinges, to a large extent, on the
interpretation of the phrase in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
which states:
(T)he exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Construing said phrase vis--vis the entire provision, it appears from the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission that the term "control" does not
have the meaning it ordinarily has in political law which is the power of a
superior to substitute his judgment for that of an inferior. 1 Thus
MR. NOLLEDO:Suppose a judicial entity is given the
power to exploit natural resources and, of
course, there are decisions made by the
governing board of that judicial entity, can
the state change the decisions of the
governing board of that entity based on the
words "full control".
MR. VILLEGAS:If it is within the context of the contract,
I think the State cannot violate the laws of
the land. 2
Moreover, "full control and supervision" does not mean that foreign
stockholders cannot be legally elected as members of the board of a
corporation doing business under, say, a co-production, joint venture or profit-
sharing agreement, 40% of whose capital is foreign owned. Otherwise, and as
Commissioner Romulo declared, it would be unfair to the foreign
stockholder 3 and, per Commissioner Padilla, "refusing them a voice in
management would make a co-production, joint venture and production
sharing illusory." 4
It is apparently for the foregoing reasons that there was a disapproval of the
amendment proposed by Commissioner, now Mr. Chief Justice Davide, that the
governing and managing bodies of such corporations shall be vested exclusively
in citizens of the Philippines 5 so that control of all corporations involved in the
business of utilizing our natural resources would always be in Filipino hands.

The disapproval must be juxtaposed with the fact that a provision substantially
similar to the proposed Davide amendment was approved with regard to
educational institutions, viz:
Section 4 (2).Educational institutions, other than those
established by religious groups and mission boards,
shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Congress may, however, require
increased Filipino equity participation in all educational
institutions.
The control and administration of educational
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it can be clearly inferred that it was NOT the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to deprive governing boards of
domestic corporations with non-Filipino members, the right to control and
administer the corporation that explores, develops and utilizes natural
resources insofar as agreements with the State for co-production, joint
venture and production-sharing are concerned, otherwise the Davide
amendment would have been approved and, like the prohibition in above-
quoted Section 4(2), Article XIV, control and supervision of all business
involved in the exploration and development of mineral resources would
have been left solely in Filipino hands.
Accordingly, to the extent that the corporate board governs and manages the
operations for the exploration and use of natural resources, to that extent the
"full control and supervision" thereof by the State is diminished.
In effect, therefore, when the State enters into such agreements as provided in
the Constitution, it allows itself to surrender part of its sovereign right to full
control and supervision of said activities, the State having the right to partly
surrender the exercise of sovereign powers under the doctrine of auto-
limitation. 6
If foreigners (under joint ventures etc.) have a say in the management of the
business of utilizing natural resources as corporate directors of domestic
corporations, there is no justification for holding that foreign corporations who
put in considerably large amounts of money under agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils are prohibited from
managing such business. ETaHCD
Indeed, to say that the Constitution requires the State to have full and total
control and supervision of the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals when undertaken in a large scale under agreements with foreign
corporations involving huge amounts of money is to divorce oneself from
reality. As Mr. Justice Panganiban said, no firm would invest funds in such
enterprise unless it has a say in the management of the business.
To paraphrase this Court in one of its landmark cases, the fundamental law
does not intend an impossible undertaking. 7 It must therefore be presumed
that the Constitution did not at all intend an interpretation of Section 2, Article
XII which deprives the foreign corporation engaged in large scale mining
activities a measure of control in the management and operation of such
activities, and in said manner, remove from the realm of the possible the
enterprise the Constitution envisions thereunder.
This brings me to the final point raised by my esteemed colleague, Mme. Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales, that it is of no moment that the declaration of Rep.
Act No. 7942 may discourage foreign assistance and/or retard or delay the
exploration, development or utilization of the nation's natural resources as the
Filipino people, as early as the 1935 Constitution, have determined such
matters as secondary to the protection and preservation of their ownership of
these natural resources. With due respect, I find such proposition not legally
justifiable as it looks backward to the justification in the 1935 Constitution
instead of forward under the 1987 Constitution which expressly allows foreign
participation in the exploration, development or utilization of the nation's
marine wealth to allow the State to take advantage of foreign funding or
technical assistance. As long as the means employed by such foreign assistance
result in real contributions to the economic growth of our country and enhance
the general welfare of our people, the development of our mineral resources by
and through foreign corporations, such FTAAs are not unconstitutional.
II.RE: REQUIREMENT THAT
FTAAs MUST BE "BASED ON
REAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
GENERAL WELFARE OF THE
COUNTRY"
The policy behind Rep. Act No. 7942 is to promote the "rational exploration,
development, utilization and conservation" of the State-owned mineral
resources "through the combined efforts of government and the private sector
in order to enhance national growth in a way that effectively safe-guards the
environment and protect the rights of affected communities". 8 This policy,
with reference specifically to FTAAs, is in keeping with the constitutional
precept that FTAAs must be based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. As has been said, "a statute derives
its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted and to construe it in a
manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the
law." 9 In this regard, much has been said about the alleged unconstitutionality
of Section 81 of Rep. Act No. 7942 as it allegedly allows for the waiver of the
State's right to receive income from the exploitation of its mineral resources as
it limits the State's share in FTAAs with foreign contractors to taxes, duties and
fees. For clarity, the provision states
SEC. 81.Government Share in Other Mineral
Agreements. The share of the Government in co-
production and joint-venture agreements shall be
negotiated by the Government and the contractor
taking into consideration the: (a) capital investment of
the project, (b) risks involved, (c) contribution of the
project to the economy, and (d) other factors that will
provide for a fair and equitable sharing between the
Government and the contractor. The Government shall
also be entitled to compensations for its other
contributions which shall be agreed upon by the
parties, and shall consist, among other things, the
contractor's income tax, excise tax, special allowance,
withholding tax due from the contractor's foreign
stockholders, arising from dividend or interest
payments to the said foreign stockholders, in case of a
foreign national, and all such other taxes, duties and
fees as provided for under existing laws.
The Government share in financial or technical
assistance agreement shall consist of, among other
things, the contractor's corporate income tax, excise
tax, special allowance, withholding tax due from the
contractor's foreign stockholders arising from dividend
or interest payments to the said foreign stockholder in
case of foreign national and all such other taxes, duties
and fees as provided for under existing laws.
The collection of Government share in financial or
technical assistance agreement shall commence after
the financial or technical assistance agreement
contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating
expenses, exploration, and development expenditures,
inclusive. (Emphasis supplied)
The controversy revolves around the proper interpretation of "among other
things" stated in the second paragraph of Section 81. Mr. Justice Carpio is of the
opinion that "among other things" could only mean "among other taxes",
referring to the unnamed "other taxes, duties, and fees as provided for under
existing laws" contained in the last clause of Section 81, paragraph 2. If such
were the correct interpretation, then truly, the provision is unconstitutional as a
sharing based only on taxes cannot be considered as contributing to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. I am bothered, however,
by the interpretation that the phrase "among other things" refers to "and all
such other taxes, duties and fees as provided for under existing laws" since it
would render the former phrase superfluous. In other words, there would have
been no need to include the phrase "among other things" if all it means is "all
other taxes" since the latter is already expressly stated in the provision. As it is a
truism that all terms/phrases used in a statute has relevance to the object of
the law, then I find the view of Mr. Justice Panganiban that "all other things"
means "additional government share" in the form of "earnings or cash flow of
the mining enterprise" as interpreted by the DENR more compelling. Besides,
such an interpretation would affirm the constitutionality of the provision which
would then be in keeping with the rudimentary principle that a law shall not be
declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. 10 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. 11
Finally, I wish to stress that it would appear that the constitutional mandate
that large-scale mining activities under FTAAs must be based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country is
both a standard for the statute required to implement subject provision as well
as the vehicle for the exercise of the State's resultant residual control and
supervision of the mining activities.
In all FTAAs, the State is deemed to reserve its right to control the end to be
achieved so that real contributions to the economy can be realized and, in the
final analysis, the business will redound to the general welfare of the country.
However, the question of whether or not the FTAA will, in fact, redound to the
general welfare of the public involves a "judgment call" by our policy makers
who are answerable to our people during the appropriate electoral exercises
and are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse of
discretion. 12

For the foregoing reasons, I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes

1.Spelled as "Nequito" in the caption of the Petition, but "Nequinto" in the
body. Rollo, p. 12.
2.As spelled in the body of the Petition. Id., p. 13. The caption of the Petition
does not include Louel A. Peria as one of the petitioners; only the
name of his father, Elpidio V. Peria, appears therein.
3.Stated as "Kaisahan Tungo sa Kaunlaran at Repormang Pansakahan
(KAISAHAN)" in the caption of the Petition, but "Philippine
Kaisahan Tungo sa Kaunlaran at Repormang Pansakahan
(KAISAHAN)" in the body. Id., p. 14.
4.Erroneously designated in the Petition as "Western Mining Philippines
Corporation." Id., p. 212.
5.This is dependent upon the discussion, infra, of the invalidity of Sections
7.8(e) and 7.9 of the subject FTAA, for violation of the Civil Code
and the Anti-Graft Law these provisions being contrary to
public policy and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
6.The FTAA is for the exploration, development and commercial exploitation
of mineral deposits in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato, covering an area of 99,387 hectares.
7.At the time of execution of the subject FTAA in 1995, WMCP was owned by
WMC Resources International Pty., Ltd. (WMC) "a wholly
owned subsidiary of Western Mining Corporation Holdings
Limited, a publicly listed major Australian mining and exploration
company." See WMCP FTAA, p. 2.
On Jan. 23, 2001, WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
(Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60%
the equity of which is owned by Filipino citizens or Filipino-owned
corporations and 40% by Indophil Resources, NL, an Australian
company. WMCP was then renamed "Tampakan Mineral
Resources Corporation," and now it claims that by virtue of the
sale and transfer of shares, it has ceased to be connected in any
way with WMC. On account of such sale and transfer of shares,
the then DENR Secretary approved by Order dated Dec. 18, 2001
the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to
Sagittarius (Tampakan). Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., which
was interested in acquiring the shares in WMCP, appealed this
Order of the DENR Secretary, but the Office of the President, and
subsequently, the Court of Appeals (CA), upheld said Order.
8.Penned by the esteemed Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Decision was
promulgated on a vote of 8-5-1. Chief Justice Davide and Justices
Puno, Quisumbing, Carpio, Corona, Callejo, and Tinga concurred.
Justices Santiago, Gutierrez, and Martinez joined the Dissent of
Justice Panganiban, while Justice Vitug wrote a separate Dissent.
Justice Azcuna took no part.
9.Promulgated on Dec. 31, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 87 (PD 87,
otherwise known as "The Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972" in 1 thereof) permitted the government to explore for and
produce indigenous petroleum through service contracts.
A service contract has been defined as a contractual arrangement
for engaging in the exploitation and development of petroleum,
mineral, energy, land and other natural resources, whereby a
government or an agency thereof, or a private person granted a
right or privilege by said government, authorizes the other party
the service contractor to engage or participate in the
exercise of such right or the enjoyment of the privilege, by
providing financial or technical resources, undertaking the
exploitation or production of a given resource, or directly
managing the productive enterprise, operations of the
exploration and exploitation of the resources, or the disposition
or marketing of said resources. See Prof. M. Magallona, Service
Contracts in Philippine Natural Resources, 9 World Bulletin 1, 4
(1993).
Under PD 87, the service contractor undertook and managed the petroleum
operations subject to government oversight. The service
contractor was required to be technically competent and
financially capable to undertake the necessary operations, as it
provided all needed services, technology and financing;
performed the exploration work obligations; and assumed all
related risks. It could not recover any of its expenditures, if no
petroleum was produced. In the event petroleum is discovered in
commercial quantity, the contractor operated the field for the
government. Proceeds of sale of the petroleum produced under
the contract were then applied to pay the service fee due the
contractor and reimburse it for its operating expenses incurred.
10.Sec. 9 of Art. XIV (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1973
Constitution allowed Filipino citizens, with the approval of the
Batasang Pambansa, to enter into service contracts with any
person or entity for the exploration and utilization of natural
resources.
"Sec. 9.The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization
of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited
to citizens, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang
Pambansa, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations or associations to enter into service contracts for
financial, technical, management or other forms of assistance
with any person or entity for the exploration or utilization of any
of the natural resources. Existing valid and binding service
contracts for financial, technical, management or other forms of
assistance are hereby recognized as such."
The intention behind the provision, according to a delegate, was to promote
proper development of the natural resources, given the lack of
Filipino capital and technical skills needed therefor. The original
proposal was to authorize government to enter into such service
contracts with foreign entities, but as finally approved, the
provision permitted the Batasang Pambansa to authorize a citizen
or private entity to be party to such contract. Following the
ratification of the 1973 Charter, PD Nos. 151, 463, 704, 705, 1442
were promulgated, authorizing service contracts for exploration,
development, exploitation or utilization of lands of the public
domain; exploration, development, etc. of a lessee's mining
claims and the processing and marketing of the products thereof;
production, storage, marketing and processing of fish and
fishery/aquatic products; exploration, development, and
utilization of forest resources; and exploration, development, and
exploitation of geothermal resources, respectively.
11.Renamed Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation.
12.That is, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the petition for review
docketed as CA-GR No. 74161 and lodged by Lepanto
Consolidated Mining of the decision of the Office of the
President which upheld the order of the DENR Secretary
approving the transfer and registration of the FTAA to Sagittarius
Mines, Inc.
13.At p. 68.
14.433 Phil. 506, July 9, 2002; 403 SCRA 1, May 6, 2003; and 415 SCRA 403,
November 11, 2003.
15.300 Phil. 906, March 12, 1998.
16.Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 403 SCRA, 1, 2829, supra, per
Carpio, J.
17.The pendency of a motion for reconsideration shall stay the final
resolution sought to be reconsidered. 4 of Rule 52, and 4 of
Rule 56B of the Rules of Court.
18.See Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, GR No. 132986, May 19, 2004.
19.Per the "List of Financial/Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA
applications)" as of June 30, 2002 prepared by the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau's (MGB) Mining Tenements Management
Division, cited in petitioners' Final Memorandum.
20.Instead of allowing Sec. Gen. Neri to speak during the Oral Argument, the
Court in its Resolution of June 29, 2004 required him to submit his
Position Paper through the Office of the Solicitor General. Said
paper was made part of the Memorandum of the public
respondents.
21.27 SCRA 853, April 18, 1969.
22.Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 489, April 18, 1969, per Fernando, J.
(later CJ.), citing People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94, November 16,
1937, per Laurel, J.
23.433 Phil. 62, 68, July 2, 2002, citing Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467,
477, July 31, 1997 and Viola v. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184, 191,
August 15, 1997.
24.Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 US 498, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283,
February 20, 1911, per McKenna, J.
25.134 SCRA 438, 463464, February 18, 1985, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
26.1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
"Section 1.Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder."
27.2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
"Section 2.Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require."
28.Pimentel Jr. v. Aguirre, 391 Phil. 84, 107, July 19, 2000, per Panganiban, J.
29.338 Phil. 546, May 2, 1997.
30.Taada v. Angara, pp. 4749, per Panganiban, J. Italics supplied.
31.Emphasis supplied.
32.Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 338339, June 26, 2001,
per Panganiban, J., citing JM Tuason & Co., Inc. v. LTA, 31 SCRA
413, 422423, February 18, 1970, as cited in Agpalo, Statutory
Construction (1990), pp. 311 and 313.

33.GR Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, 160310,
160318, 160342, 160343, 160360, 160365, 160370, 160376,
160392, 160397, 160403, and 160405, November 10, 2003, per
Carpio Morales, J.
34.Francisco v. The House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, 126127,
November 10, 2003, per Carpio Morales, J. Citations omitted.
35.During the Oral Argument, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marvic Leonen
conceded that the foreign contractor may exercise limited
management prerogatives to the extent of the financial or
technical assistance given. TSN, pp. 181186. How such "limited
management" can be operationalized was not explained.
36.In the January 27, 2004 Decision, this Court held that the fourth
paragraph of Section 2 of Art. XII limits foreign involvement in the
local mining industry to agreements strictly for financial and/or
technical assistance only, and precludes agreements which grant
to foreign corporations the management of local mining
operations, since the latter agreements are purportedly in the
nature of service contracts, as this concept was understood under
the 1973 Constitution. Such contracts were supposedly
deconstitutionalized and proscribed by the omission of the phrase
"service contracts" from the 1987 Constitution. Since the WMCP
FTAA contains provisions that permit the contractor's
management of the concern, the Decision struck down the FTAA
for being a prohibited service contract. Provisions of RA 7942
which granted managerial authority to the foreign contractor
were also declared unconstitutional.
37.Intervenor's Memorandum, pp. 7, 11 and 12.
38.www.dictionary.com provides the following meanings for "involving":
1.To contain as a part; include.
2.To have as a necessary feature or consequence; entail: was told that the
job would involve travel.
3.To engage as a participant; embroil: involved the bystanders in his dispute
with the police.
4.
a.To connect closely and often incriminatingly; implicate: evidence that
involved the governor in the scandal.
b.To influence or affect: The matter is serious because it involves your
reputation.
5.To occupy or engage the interest of: a story that completely involved me
for the rest of the evening.
6.To make complex or intricate; complicate.
7.To wrap; envelop: a castle that was involved in mist.
8.Archaic. To wind or coil about.
39.It reads as follows: "Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee
foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall,
within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar
year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decision on
applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the
Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and
containing other matters as may be provided by law."
40.According to estimates by the MGB, the success-to-failure ratio of large-
scale mining or hydrocarbon projects is about 1:1,000. It goes
without saying that such a miniscule success ratio hardly
encourages the investment of tremendous amounts of risk capital
and modern technology required for the discovery, extraction and
treatment of mineral ores, and oil and gas deposits.
41.The Constitutional Commission (ConCom) began its work in 1986, three
short years after the assassination in August 21, 1983 of former
Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. During the early part of this
three-year period, the country underwent a wracking economic
crisis characterized by scarcity of funds, capital flight, stringent
import controls, grave lack of foreign exchange needed to fund
critical importations of raw materials, panic-buying, hoarding of
commodities, and grave lack of foreign exchange needed to fund
critical importations of raw materials. Many businesses were on
the verge of failure and collapse, and many in fact did. The
members of the ConCom were unlikely to forget the critical
condition of the Philippine economy and the penury of its
government.
42.The management of every business has two primary objectives. The first
is to earn profit. The second is to stay solvent, that is, to have on
hand sufficient cash to pay debts as they fall due. Other objectives
may be targeted, but a business cannot hope to accomplish them,
unless it meets these two basic tests of survival operating
profitably and staying solvent. Meigs and Meigs, Accounting: The
Basis for Business Decisions (5th ed., 1982), p. 11.
43.Art. XVIII, "Transitory Provisions," of the 1987 Constitution.
44.III Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 348. Emphasis supplied.
45.Id., pp. 349352. Emphasis supplied.
46.Id., p. 354. Emphasis supplied.
47.Id., pp. 355356. Emphasis supplied.
48.Id., p. 361. Emphasis supplied.
49.V Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 845.
50.Id., p. 841.
51.Id., p. 844.
52.Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 337338,
February 22, 1991, per Fernan, CJ.
53.The transitive verb 'control' has the following meanings to exercise
restraining or directing influence over; to regulate; to have power
over; to rule; to govern. The noun 'control' refers to an act or
instance of controlling; the power or authority to guide or
manage; and the regulation of economic activity especially by
government directive (as in price controls). From Merriam-
Webster Online, Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com.
54.On p. 2 of the Final Memorandum for Petitioners.
55.Sec. 3(aq) of RA 7942 reads as follows: "aq. Qualified person means any
citizen of the Philippines with capacity to contract, or a
corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative organized or
authorized for the purpose of engaging in mining, with technical
and financial capability to undertake mineral resources
development and duly registered in accordance with law at least
sixty per centum (60 percent) of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines:Provided, That a legally organized
foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical
assistance agreement or mineral processing permit." Emphasis
supplied.
56.Per Clause 4.6 of the WMCP FTAA, the contractor is required to relinquish
each year during the exploration period at least ten percent (10%)
of the original contract area, by identifying and dropping from the
FTAA coverage those areas which do not have mineral potentials,
in order that by the time actual mining operations commence, the
FTAA contract area shall have been reduced to only 5,000
hectares.
57.Memorandum (in support of WMCP's Motion and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration), p. 61.
58.Id., pp. 6364.
59.Accounts receivable may be converted to cash in one of three ways: (1)
assignment of receivables, which is a borrowing arrangement with
receivables pledged as security on the loan; (2) factoring
receivables, which is a sale of receivables without recourse for
cash to a third party, usually a bank or other financial institution;
and (3) the transfer of receivables with recourse, which is a hybrid
of the other two forms of receivable financing. Smith and
Skousen, Intermediate Accounting, (1992, 11th ed.), pp. 317321.
Banks usually prefer lending against the security of accounts receivable
backed up by postdated checks. They refer to these facilities as
"bills discounting lines."
60.Decision, p. 83; bold types supplied.
61."Beneficial interest has been defined as the profit, benefit, or advantage
resulting from a contract, or the ownership of an estate as distinct
from the legal ownership or control." Christiansen v. Department
of Social Security, 131 P. 2d 189, 191, 15 Wash. 2d 465, 467,
November 25, 1942, per Driver, J.
Beneficial use, ownership or interest in property means "such a right to its
enjoyment as exists where the legal title is in one person and the
right to such beneficial use or interest is in another . . .." Montana
Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 26 S Ct. 197, 200, 200 U.S.
118, 127128, January 2, 1906, per Peckham, J.
62.See p. 1138 thereof.
63.Ramos and De Vera, "The Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements", p. 2. A photocopy of their paper is
attached as Annex 2 to the Motion for Reconsideration of public
respondents.
64.These incentives consist principally of the waiver of national taxes during
the cost recovery period of the FTAA. During such period, the
contractor pays only part of the basic government's share in taxes
consisting of local government taxes and fees. These are the local
business tax, real property tax, community tax, occupation fees,
regulatory fees, all other local taxes and fees in force, and royalty
payments to indigenous cultural communities, if any.
These national taxes, however, are not to be paid by the contractor: (i) excise
tax on minerals; (ii) contractor's income tax; (iii) customs duties
and fees on imported capital equipment; (iv) value added tax on
purchases of imported equipment, goods and services; (v)
withholding tax on interest payments on foreign loans; (vi)
withholding tax on dividends to foreign stockholders; and (vii)
royalties due the government on mineral reservations.
Other incentives to the contractor include those under the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1997; those for the use of pollution control
devices and facilities; income tax carry-forward of losses (five-year
net loss carry forward); and income tax accelerated depreciation.
65.See 3(g), DAO 99-56. According to the paper by Messrs. Ramos and De
Vera, supra, who are, respectively, the director of the MGB and
chief of the Mineral Economics, Information and Publication
Division of the MGB, majority of the payments listed under Sec.
3(g) are relatively small in value. The most significant payments in
terms of amount are the excise tax, royalties to mineral
reservations and indigenous cultural communities, income tax
and real property tax.

66.Per Messrs. Ramos and De Vera, supra, "(t)he term of a successful FTAA
may be divided into a pre-operating period, a cost recovery period
and a post recovery period. The pre-operating period consists of
the exploration, pre-feasibility, feasibility, development and
construction phases. The aggregate of this period is a maximum of
eleven (11) years. The cost recovery period, on the other hand,
consists of the initial years of commercial operation where the
contractor is allowed to recover its pre-operating expenses. The
end of this period is when the aggregate of the net cash flow from
the mining operation becomes equal to the total pre-operating
expenses or a maximum of five (5) years from commencement of
commercial production, whichever comes first. The post recovery
period is the remaining term of the FTAA immediately following
the cost recovery period. The additional government share from
an FTAA is collected after the cost recovery period."
67.Ramos and De Vera, supra, pp. 34.
68.The discussion on pp. 47 of the Ramos-DeVera report, focusing on the
modes of computation of the additional government share as
spelled out in DAO 99-56, is significant:
The phrase "among other things" demands that Government is entitled to
additional share aside from the normal taxes and fees paid during
operation. Simple as it was formulated, the phrase is another
challenging task to operationalize. In 1997, the Philippine
government conducted several consultative meetings with
various investor groups, national government agencies concerned
with taxation and incentives and other stakeholders of the mining
industry to formulate the possible modes of determining the
additional government share for FTAA. The negotiation took into
consideration the following:
Capital investment in the project;
Risks involved;
Contribution of the project to the economy;
Contribution of the project to community and local government;
Technical complexity of the project; and
Other factors that will provide for a fair and equitable sharing between the
government and the contractor.
During these consultations, some investor groups have repeatedly expressed
their objections to the imposition of an additional government
share. However, since Government is firmly committed to adhere
to its interpretation of Section 81 of the mining law on
government share in an FTAA, it decided to push through with the
collection of this additional government share by formally making
part of the mining regulation through the issuance by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources of
Administrative Order No. 99-56 providing for the guidelines in
establishing the fiscal regime of Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements.
There were three schemes for computing the additional government share
presented in the administrative order.
5.1Net Mining Revenue-Based Option
Net mining revenue means the gross output from mining operations during a
calendar year less deductible expenses. These deductible
expenses consist of expenses incurred by the Contractor directly,
reasonably and necessarily related to mining operations in the
contract area during a calendar year, namely:
Mining, milling, transport and handling expenses together with smelting
and refining costs other than smelting and refining costs paid to
third parties;
General and administrative expenses actually incurred by the Contractor in
the Philippines;
Consulting fees incurred for work related to the project; provided that
those expenses incurred outside of the Philippines are justifiable
and allowable subject to the approval of the Director of Mines
and Geosciences Bureau;
Environmental expenses of the Contractor including such expenses
necessary to fully comply with its environmental obligations;
Expenses for the development of host and neighboring communities and
for the development of geoscience and mining technology
together with training costs and expenses;
Royalty payments to claim owners or surface land owners relating to the
Contract Area during the Operating Phase;
Continuing exploration and mine development expenses within the
Contract Area after the pre-operating period; and
Interest expenses charged on loans or such other financing-related
expenses incurred by the Contractor subject to limitations in
debt/equity ratio as given in the contract and which shall not be
more than the prevailing international rates charged for similar
types of transactions at the time the financing was arranged, and
where such loans are necessary for the operations; and
Government taxes, duties and fees.
The additional government share from this option for any year i is the
difference between 50% of the cumulative annual net mining
revenues CNi and the cumulative total government share
CGi (basic and additional). The intention is to distribute the
cumulative net mining revenue equally between the Government
and the contractor. It can be expressed through the following
formula:
If 50% of CNi CGi
Additional Government Share = 0
Else, if 50% of CNi > CGi
Additional Gov't Share = (50% x CNi) - CGi
5.2Cash Flow-Based Option
Project cash flow before financing and tax (CFi) is calculated as follows:
CFi = GO - DE + I - PE - OC
In this formula, GO is the gross output; DE are the deductible expenses; I is
the interest expense; PE is unrecovered pre-operating expense;
and OC is on-going capital expenditures. This option provides that
Government gets an additional share from the project cash flow if
the cumulative present value of the previous total government
share collected (basic and additional) is less than 50% of the
cumulative present value of the project cash flows. The additional
government share AGS is therefore the difference between 50%
and the percentage of the cumulative present value of total
government shares CGA over the cumulative present value of the
project cash flows CP. The cumulative present value of project
cash flow for any year i is given by the following formula:
CPi = CPi-1 x (1.10) + CFi
The factor 1.10 is a future value factor based on the cost of borrowed money
with allowance for inflation of the US dollar. The cumulative
present value of the total government share before additional
government share CGB for year i is:
CGBi = CGAi-1 x (1 + Cost of Capital) + BGSi
where CGAi is the cumulative present value of total government share
inclusive of the additional government share during the year is
CGAi = CGBi + AGSi.
If CGBi 50% of CPi:
Additional Government Share = 0
Else, if CGBi < 50% of CPi:
Additional Government Share = (50% x CPi) CGBi
5.3Profit-Based Option
This third option provides that Government shall receive an additional share
of twenty-five percent (25%) of the additional or excess profits
during a taxable year when the two-year average ratio of the net
income after tax (NIAT) to gross output (GO) is 0.40 or better. The
trigger level of 0.40 ratio is approximately equivalent to a 20%
return on investment when computed based on the life of the
project. Investors have indicated that their minimum return on
investment before they would invest on a mining project in the
Philippines is 15%. It was agreed upon that a return on
investment below 20% but not lower than 15% is normal profit. If
the project reaches 20% or better, there is then an additional or
excess profits. The computation of the 0.40 trigger shall be based
on a 2-year moving average which is the average of the previous
year's ratio and the current year's ratio. The additional or excess
profit is computed using the following formula:
Additional Profits = [NIAT - (0.40 x GO)] / (1 - ITR)
In the above formula, ITR refers to the prevailing income tax rate applied by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue in computing the income tax of
the contractor during a taxable year.
If the two-year average ratio is less than 0.40:
Additional Government Share = 0
Else, if the two-year average ratio is 0.40 or better:
Additional Government Share = 25% x Excess Profits
The government shares 25% of any marginal profit derived by the contractor
at 20% or higher return on investment.
In all of these three options, the basis of computation are all in US dollars
based on prevailing foreign exchange rate at the time the
expenses were incurred. Alternatives or options aside from these
three schemes are studied by Government for possible
improvement of the current fiscal system. The basic guideline,
however, is that the total government share should not be less
than fifty percent of the sharing.
6.Collection of the Additional Government Share
The term of a successful FTAA may be divided into a pre-operating period, a
cost recovery period and a post recovery period. The pre-
operating period consists of the exploration, pre-feasibility,
feasibility, development and construction phases. The aggregate
of this period is a maximum of eleven (11) years. The cost
recovery period, on the other hand, consists of the initial years of
commercial operation where the contractor is allowed to recover
its pre-operating expenses. The end of this period is when the
aggregate of the net cash flow from the mining operation
becomes equal to the total pre-operating expenses or a maximum
of five (5) years from commencement of commercial production,
whichever comes first. The post recovery period is the remaining
term of the FTAA immediately following the cost recovery period.
The additional government share from an FTAA is collected after
the cost recovery period. (emphasis supplied)
69.The cash flows of a business concern tend to be more accurate and
realistic indicia of the financial capacity of the enterprise, rather
than net income or taxable income, which are arrived at after
netting out non-cash items like depreciation, doubtful accounts
expense for probable losses, and write-offs of bad debts.
Cash flows provide relevant information about the cash effects of an entity's
operations, and its investing and financing transactions. Smith and
Skousen, supra, p. 184.

70.Some of these indirect taxes are: fuel taxes; withholding tax on payrolls,
on royalty payments to claim owners and surface owners and on
royalty payments for technology transfer; value added tax on
local equipment, supplies and services.
71.Other contributions of mining projects include: infrastructure (hospitals,
roads, schools, public markets, churches, and the like) and social
development projects; payroll and fringe benefits (direct and
indirect employment); expenditures by the contractor for
development of host and neighboring communities; expenditures
for the development of geosciences/mining technology;
expenditures for social infrastructures; and the resulting
multiplier effects of mining operations.
72.The third paragraph of 81, RA 7942 states: "The collection of Government
share in financial or technical assistance agreement shall
commence after the financial or technical assistance agreement
contractor has fully recovered its pre-operating expenses,
exploration, and development expenditures, inclusive."
73.80 and 84 of RA 7942 are reproduced below:
Sec. 80.Government Share in Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. The
total government share in a mineral production sharing
agreement shall be the excise tax on mineral products as provided
in Republic Act No. 7729, amending Section 151(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
Sec. 84.Excise Tax on Mineral Products. The contractor shall be liable to
pay the excise tax on mineral products as provided for under
Section 151 of the National Internal Revenue Code: Provided,
however, That with respect to a mineral production sharing
agreement, the excise tax on mineral products shall be the
government share under said agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
74.112 of RA 7942 is reproduced below:
Sec. 112.Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights. All valid
and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases
pending renewal, mineral production-sharing agreements granted
under Exec. Order No. 279, at the date of effectivity of this Act,
shall remain valid, shall not be impaired, and shall be recognized
by the Government: Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV
on government share in mineral production sharing
agreement and of Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act shall
immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or
contractor unless the mining lessee or contractor indicates his
intention to the Secretary, in writing, not to avail of such
provisions: Provided, further, That no renewal of mining lease
contracts shall be made after the expiration of its term: Provided,
finally, That such leases, production-sharing agreements, financial
or technical assistance agreements shall comply with the
applicable provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
75.Even during the cost recovery period, the contractor will still have to pay
a portion of the basic government share consisting of local
government taxes and fees, such as local business taxes, real
property taxes, community taxes, occupation fees, regulatory
fees, and all other local taxes and fees, plus royalty payments to
indigenous cultural communities, if any.
76.Ramos and DeVera, supra, p. 7.
77.Ibid., p. 11. See also 3e of DAO 99-56.
78.Justice Carpio argues thus: The WMCP FTAA grants the State 60 percent
of net profit; CMP likewise agrees to 60 percent; the Malampaya-
Shell FTAA provides for 60 percent also; so the Court should
decree a minimum of 60 percent. Our answer: no law authorizes
this Court to issue such a decree. It is up to the State to negotiate
the most advantageous percentage. This Court cannot be
stampeded into the realm of legislation.
79.Clause 1.2 thereof states: "All financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations shall be provided
by the Contractor in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement. If no Minerals in commercial quantity are developed
and produced, the Contractor acknowledges that it will not be
entitled to reimbursement of its expenses incurred in conducting
the Mining Operations."
80.WMCP FTAA Clause 2.1 (iv), p. 6.
81.Id., Clause 2.1 (v), p. 6.
82.Id., Clause 2.1 (vii), p. 6.
83."Qualified Entity" is defined as "an entity that at the relevant time is
qualified to enter into a mineral production sharing agreement
with the Government under the laws restricting foreign ownership
and equity in natural resource projects." 2 Definitions, WMCP
FTAA, p. 10. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to 26a in relation to 3g and 3aq of RA 7942, a contractor in an
MPSA should be a citizen of the Philippines or a corporation at
least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines.
84.Since we assume that the buyer-corporation, which buys up 60% equity in
WMCP, is 60% Filipino-owned and 40% foreign-owned, therefore,
the foreign stockholders in such buyer-corporation hold 24%
beneficial interest in WMCP.
85.Fourth paragraph of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.
86.See, for instance, Maestrado v. CA, 327 SCRA 678, 692, March 9, 2000
and Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. NLRC, 338 Phil.
1093, 1111, May 23, 1997.
87.Art. 1306 of the Civil Code provides: "The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."
88.Republic v. CA, 354 SCRA 148, March 9, 2001, per Ynares-Santiago, J.
89.Philippine Basketball Association v. CA, 337 SCRA 358, 369, August 8,
2000. Likewise, 11 of Book I of Chapter 3 of Exec. Order No. 292,
otherwise known as "The Administrative Code of 1987," states:
"Sec. 11. The State's Responsibility for Acts of Agents." (1) The
State shall be legally bound and responsible only through the acts
performed in accordance with the Constitution and the laws by its
duly authorized representatives. (2) The State shall not be bound
by the mistakes or errors of its officers or agents in the exercise of
their functions."
90.Art. 1420 of the Civil Code provides: "In case of a divisible contract, if the
illegal terms can be separated from the legal ones, the latter may
be enforced."
91.Sarmiento v. CA, 353 Phil. 834, 853, July 2, 1998.
92.Ramos-DeVera, supra, p. 2.
93.Bold types supplied.
94.3[h] in relation to 26[b] of RA 7942.
95.26[c] of RA 7942.
96.OXFAM America Research Report, September 2002.
97.Dated December 2003.
98.1 of EO 270.
99.Decena v. Malayaon, AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14, 2004, per Tinga, J.
100.Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation, 57 Phil. 600, 605,
November 25, 1932, per Malcolm, J.
CARPIO, J ., dissenting.
1.Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
2.Rollo, pp. 2324.
3.Ibid., pp. 65120. Then Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr. signed
the WMCP FTAA on behalf of then President Fidel V. Ramos upon
recommendation of then DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala.
4.Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in full: "All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution."
5.Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 433 Phil. 506 (2002).
6.The only limitation is that the State cannot alienate its natural resources
except for agricultural lands. However, the State can exploit
commercially its natural resources and sell the marketable
products from such exploitation. See note 12.
7.Article 441, Civil Code.
8.Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution; Section 8, Article XIV of the
1973 Constitution.
9.Miners Association of the Philippines v. Hon. Factoran, Jr., et al., 310 Phil.
113 (1995).
10.Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. III, p. 260.
11.See note 7.
12.Hector de Leon, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Vol. 2, p. 804 (1999
Ed.).
13.See note 9.
14.Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in part: ". . . With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated."

15.Chapter XIV covers Sections 80 to 82 of RA 7942.
16.The five Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (Annexes A to F)
attached to the 20 October 2004 Compliance of the Solicitor
General uniformly contain the following provision:
Share of the Government. The Government Share shall be the excise tax on
mineral products at the time of removal and at the rate provided
for in Republic Act No.7729 amending Section 151(a) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, as well as other
taxes, duties, and fees levied by existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the State's share is limited to taxes, duties and fees just like under
the old system of "license, concession or lease." See the (1)
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement between the Republic of
the Philippines and Ungay-Malobago Mines, Inc. and Rapu-Rapu
Minerals, Inc. dated 12 September 2000; (2) Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
Ungay-Malobago Mines, Inc. and TVI Resource Development
(Phils.), Inc. dated 17 June 1998; (3) Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and Base
Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (BMMRC) dated 20
November 1997; (4) Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc. dated 29 December 1999 (MPSA No. 148-99XIII);
and (5) Mineral Production Sharing Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. dated
29 December 1999 (MPSA No. 149-99-XIII).
17.Sections 144, 145 and 149, National Internal Revenue Code.
18.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 337
(1995).
19.Memorandum dated 13 July 2004, p. 56.
20.Section 26, RA 7942.
21.Chapter XIV covers Sections 80 to 82 of RA 7942.
22.China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 146749 &
147938, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 634; City of Baguio v. De Leon,
134 Phil. 912 (1968).
23.The 1995 Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942 attempt to limit
the period to five years. Thus, Section 236 of the Implementing
Rules states that the "period of recovery which is reckoned from
the date of commercial operation shall be for a period not
exceeding five years or until the date of actual recovery,
whichever comes first." However, the succeeding sentence of
Section 236 also states, "For clarification, the Government's
entitlement to its share shall commence after the FTAA contractor
has fully recovered its pre-operating, exploration and
development stage expenses, inclusive and the contractor's
obligations under Chapter XXVII (on Taxes and Fees) of the rules
and regulations do not arise until this time." What the first
sentence limits the succeeding sentence cancels. The 1996
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942 omit the
clarificatory sentence.
24.Section 94(a) of RA 7942 guarantees the foreign contractor the "right to
repatriate the entire proceeds of the liquidation of the foreign
investment in the currency in which the investment was originally
made and at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of
repatriation." Section 94(b) guarantees the "right to remit
earnings from the investment in the currency in which the foreign
investment was originally made and at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time of remittance."
25.Memorandum dated 13 July 2004, p. 65.
26.Annex 8, Compliance of the Solicitor General dated 20 October 2004.
27.Fifth Whereas Clause, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
28.Section 1.1, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
29.Sections 7.3 and 7.4, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
30.Section 2.19, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
31.Sections 12.1 and 15.2, Occidental-Shell FTAA; Paragraph 4, Annex B on
Accounting Procedures.
32.Section 7.2, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
33.Section 6.1.i, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
34.Sections 2.16 and 2.17, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
35.Sections 2.24, 6.1.j, 6.3 and 8.1, Occidental-Shell FTAA.
36.Under Section 12.1 of the Occidental-Shell FTAA, the three-man arbitral
panel consists of the Philippine Government's nominee,
Occidental-Shell's nominee, and a third member mutually chosen
by the nominees of the Government and Occidental-Shell.
37.Intervenor CMP's Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 July 2004, p. 22.
38.Ibid.
39.Respondent WMCP's Memorandum dated 15 July 2004, p. 42.
40.Ibid.
41.See note 3.
42.The same provision appears in the FTAA between the Republic of the
Philippines and ARIMCO Mining Corporation dated 20 June 1994.
ARIMCO, a domestic corporation owned and controlled by an
Australian mining company, does not need to pay the 60% share
of the Philippine Government in the mining revenues if ARIMCO's
foreign parent company sells 60% of ARIMCO's equity to a
Philippine citizen or to a 60% Filipino owned corporation. In such
event, the share of the Philippine Government in the mining
revenues is ZERO percent. ARIMCO will only pay the Philippine
Government the 2% excise tax due on mineral products under a
mineral production sharing agreement. See Annex 5, Compliance
of Solicitor General dated 20 October 2004.
43.Section 2.1 of the WMCP FTAA defines a "Qualified Entity" as an "entity
that at the relevant time is qualified to enter into a mineral
production sharing agreement with the Government under the
laws restricting foreign ownership and equity in natural resource
projects."
44.Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 July 2004, p. 22.
45.Ibid., p. 20.
46.Ibid., p. 12.
47.Decision dated 27 January 2004.
48.Memorandum dated 14 April 2004, p. 12.
49.Memorandum dated 15 July 2004, p. 42.
50.Section 10.2 (l), WMCP FTAA.
51.Article 441, Civil Code.
52.Section 2.1 of the WMCP FTAA allows WMCP to recover pre-operating
expenses over 10 years from the start of commercial production.
53.Memorandum dated 13 July 2004, p. 65.
54.Section 9, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
55.Memorandum dated 13 July 2004, p. 60.
56.Ibid., p. 59.
57.Ibid., p. 65.
58.Section 151, National Internal Revenue Code.
59.DENR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 5699.
SUBJECT: Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements Pursuant to Section 81 and other
pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (the "Mining Act"), the
following guidelines establishing the fiscal regime of Financial or
Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) are hereby promulgated.
SECTION 1. Scope
This Administrative Order is promulgated to:
a.Establish the fiscal regime for FTAAs which the Government and the FTAA
Contractors shall adopt for the large-scale exploration,
development and commercial utilization of mineral resources in
the country; and
b.Provide for the formulation of a Pro Forma FTAA embodying the fiscal
regime established herein and such other terms and conditions as
provided in the Mining Act and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the Mining Act.
SECTION 2. Objectives
The objectives of this Administrative Order are:
a.To achieve an equitable sharing among the Government, both National and
Local, the FTAA Contractor and the concerned communities of the
benefits derived from mineral resources to ensure sustainable
mineral resources development; and
b.To ensure a fair, equitable, competitive and stable investment regime for
the large scale exploration, development and commercial
utilization of minerals.
SECTION 3. Fiscal Regime of a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement
The Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement which the Government and
the FTAA Contractor shall enter into shall have a Fiscal Regime
embodying the following provisions:
a.General Principles. The Government Share derived from Mining Operations
after the Date of Commencement of Commercial Production shall
be determined in accordance with this Section.
b.Occupation Fees. Prior to or upon registration of the FTAA and on the same
date every year thereafter, the Contractor shall pay to the
concerned Treasurer of the municipality(ies) or city(ies) the
required Occupation Fee over the Contract Area at the rate
provided for by existing laws, rules and regulations.
c.Deductible Expenses. Allowable deductible expenses shall include all the
expenses incurred by the Contractor directly, reasonably and
necessarily related to the Mining Operations in the Contract Area
in a Calendar Year during the Operating Phase. Allowable
deductible expenses shall include the following:
1.Mining, milling, transport and handling expenses together with smelting
and refining costs other than smelting and refining costs paid to
third parties;
2.General and administrative expenses actually incurred by the Contractor in
the Philippines;
3.Consulting fees:
a)incurred within the Philippines for work related to the project
b)incurred outside the Philippines for work related to the project: Provided,
That such fees are justifiable and subject to the approval of the
Director.
4.Environmental expenses of the Contractor including such expenses
necessary to fully comply with its environmental obligations as
stipulated in the environmental protection provision of the FTAA
and in the IRR;
5.Expenses for the development of host and neighboring communities and
for the development of geoscience and mining technology as
stipulated in the FTAA and in the IRR together with the training
costs and expenses referred to in the FTAA;
6.Royalty payments to Claimowners or surface land owners relating to the
Contract Area during the Operating Phase;
7.Continuing exploration and mine development expenses within the
Contract Area after the pre-operating period;
8.Interest expenses charged on loans or such other financing-related
expenses incurred by the Contractor subject to the financing
requirement in the FTAA, which shall not be more than the
prevailing international rates charged for similar types of
transactions at the time the financing was arranged, and where
such loans are necessary for the operations; and

9.Government taxes, duties and fees.
Ongoing Capital Expenditures shall be considered as capital expenses subject
to Depreciation Charges.
"Ongoing Capital Expenditures" shall mean expenses for approved
acquisitions of equipment and approved construction of buildings
necessary for the Mining Operations as provided in its approved
Mining Project Feasibility Study.
"Depreciation Charges" means the annual non-cash deduction from the
Operating Income for the use of fixed assets that are subject to
exhaustion, wear and tear and obsolescence during their
employment in a Mining Operation. Its applicability and
computation are regulated by existing taxation laws, the Mining
Act and the IRR. Incentives relating to depreciation allowance
shall be in accordance to the provisions of the Mining Act and the
IRR.
"Operating Income" means the Gross Output less Deductible Expenses, while
"Gross Output" has the meaning ascribed to it in the National
Internal Revenue Code.
d.Payment of Government Taxes and Fees. The Contractor shall promptly
pay all the taxes and fees required by the Government in carrying
out the activities covered in the FTAA and in such amount, venue,
procedure and time as stipulated by the particular law and
implementing rules and regulations governing such taxes and fees
subject to all rights of objection or review as provided for in
relevant laws, rules and regulations. In case of non-collection as
covered by Clause 3-g-1 of this Section, the Contractor shall follow
the prevailing procedures for availment of such non-collection in
accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Where
prevailing orders, rules and regulations do not fully recognize and
implement the provisions covered by Clause 3-g-1 of this Section,
the Government shall exert its best efforts to ensure that all such
orders, rules and regulations are revised or modified accordingly.
e.Recovery of Pre-Operating Expenses. Considering the high risk, high cost
and long term nature of Mining Operations, the Contractor is
given the opportunity to recover its Pre-Operating Expenses
incurred during the pre-operating period, after which the
Government shall receive its rightful share of the national
patrimony. The Recovery Period, which refers to the period
allowed to the Contractor to recover its Pre-Operating Expenses
as provided in the Mining Act and the IRR, shall be for a maximum
of five (5) years or at a date when the aggregate of the Net Cash
Flows from the Mining Operations is equal to the aggregate of its
Pre-operating Expenses, reckoned from the Date of
Commencement of Commercial Production, whichever comes
first. The basis for determining the Recovery Period shall be the
actual Net Cash Flows from Mining Operations and actual Pre-
Operating Expenses converted into its US dollar equivalent at the
time the expenditure was incurred.
"Net Cash Flow" means the Gross Output less Deductible Expenses, Pre-
Operating Expenses, Ongoing Capital Expenditures and Working
Capital charges.
f.Recoverable Pre-Operating Expenses. Pre-Operating Expenses for recovery
which shall be approved by the Secretary upon recommendation
of the Director shall consist of actual expenses and capital
expenditures relating to the following:
1.Acquisition, maintenance and administration of any mining or exploration
tenements or agreements covered by the FTAA;
2.Exploration, evaluation, feasibility and environmental studies, production,
mining, milling, processing and rehabilitation,
3.Stockpiling, handling, transport services, utilities and marketing of minerals
and mineral products;
4.Development within the Contract Area relating to the Mining Operations;
5.All Government taxes and fees;
6.Payments made to local Governments and infrastructure contributions;
7.Payments to landowners, surface rights holders, Claimowners, including
the Indigenous Cultural Communities, if any;
8.Expenses incurred in fulfilling the Contractor's obligations to contribute to
national development and training of Philippine personnel;
9.Consulting fees incurred inside and outside the Philippines for work related
directly to the Mining Operations;
10.The establishment and administration of field and regional offices
including administrative overheads incurred within the Philippines
which are properly allocatable to the Mining Operations and
directly related to the performance of the Contractor's obligations
and exercise of its rights under the FTAA;
11.Costs incurred in financial development, including interest loans payable
within or outside the Philippines, subject to the financing
requirements required in the FTAA and to a limit on debt-equity
ratio of 5:1 for investments equivalent to 200 Million US Dollars
or less, or for the first 200 Million US Dollars of investments in
excess of 200 Million US Dollars, or 8:1 for that part of the
investment which exceeds 200 Million US Dollars: Provided, That
the interests shall not be more than the prevailing international
rates charged for similar types of transaction at the time the
financing was arranged;
12.All costs of constructing and developing the mine incurred before the
Date of Commencement of Commercial Production, including
capital and property as hereinafter defined irrespective as to their
means of financing, subject to the limitations defined by Clause 3-
f-11 hereof, and inclusive of the principal obligation and the
interests arising from any Contractor's leasing, hiring, purchasing
or similar financing arrangements including all payments made to
Government both National and Local; and
13.General and administrative expenses actually incurred by the Contractor
for the benefit of the Contract Area.
The foregoing recoverable Pre-Operating Expenses shall be subject to
verification of its actual expenditure by an independent audit
recognized by the Government and chargeable against the
Contractor.
g.Government Share.
1.Basic Government Share. The following taxes, fees and other such charges
shall constitute the Basic Government Share:
a)Excise tax on minerals;
b)Contractor's income tax;
c)Customs duties and fees on imported capital equipment;
d)Value added tax on the purchase of imported equipment, goods and
services;
e)Withholding tax on interest payments on foreign loans;
f)Withholding tax on dividends to foreign stockholders;
g)Royalties due the Government on Mineral Reservations;
h)Documentary stamps taxes;
i)Capital gains tax;
j)Local business tax;
k)Real property tax;
l)Community tax;
m)Occupation fees;
n)All other local Government taxes, fees and imposts as of the effective date
of the FTAA;
o)Special Allowance, as defined in the Mining Act; and
p)Royalty payments to any Indigenous People(s)/Indigenous Cultural
Community(ies).
From the Effective Date, the foregoing taxes, fees and other such charges
constituting the Basic Government Share, if applicable, shall be
paid by the Contractor: Provided, That above items (a) to (g) shall
not be collected from the Contractor upon the date of approval of
the Mining Project Feasibility Study up to the end of the Recovery
Period. Any taxes, fees, royalties, allowances or other imposts,
which should not be collected by the Government, but
nevertheless paid by the Contractor and are not refunded by the
Government before the end of the next taxable year, shall be
included in the Government Share in the next taxable year. Any
Value-Added Tax refunded or credited shall not form part of
Government Share.
2.Additional Government Share. Prior to the commencement of
Development and Construction Phase, the Contractor may select
one of the formula for calculating the Additional Government
Share set out below which the Contractor wishes to apply to all of
its Mining Operations and notify the Government in writing of
that selection. Upon the issuance of such notice, the formula so
selected shall thereafter apply to all of the Contractor's Mining
Operations.
a)Fifty-Fifty Sharing of the Cumulative Present Value of Cash Flows. The
Government shall collect an Additional Government Share from
the Contractor equivalent to an amount which when aggregated
with the cumulative present value of Government Share during
the previous Contract Years and the Basic Government Share for
the current Contract Year is equivalent to a minimum of fifty
percent (50%) of the Cumulative Present Value of Project Cash
Flow before financing for the current Contract Year as defined
below.
Computation. The computation of the Additional Government Share shall
commence immediately after the Recovery Period. If the
computation covers a period of less than one year, the Additional
Government Share corresponding to this period shall be
computed pro-rata wherein the Additional Government Share
during the year shall be multiplied by the fraction of the year after
recovery. The Additional Government Share shall be computed as
follows:
Project Cash Flow Before Financing and Tax ("CF") for a taxable year shall be
calculated as follows:
CF = GO - DE +I - PE - OC
Cumulative Present Value of Project Cash Flow ("CP") shall be the sum of the
present value of the cumulative present value of project cash flow
during the previous year (CP i-1 x 1.10) and the Project Cash Flow
Before Financing and Tax for the current year ("CF"), and shall be
calculated as follows:
CP = (CP i-1 x 1.10)
Cumulative Present Value of Total Government Share Before Additional
Government Share ("CGB") shall be the sum of: the present value
of the cumulative present value of the Total Government Share
during the previous year (CGA i-J x 1.10), and the Basic
Government Share for the current year (BGS), and shall be
calculated as follows:
CGB = (CGA i-1 x 1.10) + BGS
The Additional Government Share ("AGS") shall be:
If: CGB > CP x 0.5 then AGS = 0
If CGB < CP x 0.5 then AGS = [CP x 0.5] - CGB
Cumulative Present Value of Total Government Share (CGA):

CGA = CGB + AGS
where:
BGS = Basic Government Share shall have the meaning as described in Clause
3-g-1 hereof;
GO = Gross Output shall have the same meaning as defined in the National
Internal Revenue Code;
DE = Deductible Expenses shall have the meaning as described in Clause 3-c
hereof;
I = Interest payments on loans included in the Deductible Expenses shall be
equivalent to those referred to in Clause 3-c-8 hereof;
PE = unrecovered Pre-Operating Expenses;
OC = On-going Capital Expenditures as defined in Clause 3-c hereof;
CPi-1 = cumulative present value of project cash flow during the previous
year; and
CGA = cumulative present value of total Government Share during the
previous year.
b)Profit Related Additional Government Share. The Government shall collect
an Additional Government Share from the Contractor based on
twenty-five percent (25%) of the additional profits once the
arithmetic average of the ratio of Net Income After Tax To Gross
Output as defined in the National Internal Revenue Code, for the
current and previous taxable years is 0.40 or higher rounded off
to the nearest two decimal places.
Computation. The computation of the Additional Government Share from
additional profit shall commence immediately after the Recovery
Period. If the computation covers a period of less than a year, the
additional profit corresponding to this period shall be computed
pro-rata wherein the total additional profit during the year shall
be multiplied by the fraction of the year after recovery.
The additional profit shall be derived from the following formula.:
If the computed average ratio as derived from above is less than 0.40:
Additional Profit = 0
If the computed average ratio is 0.40 or higher:
[NIAT-(0.40xGO)]
Additional Profit =
(1-ITR)
The Additional Government Share from the additional profit is computed
using the following formula:
Additional Government Share
From Additional Profit = 25% x Additional Profit
where:
NIAT = Net Income After Tax for the particular taxable year under
consideration.
GO = Gross Output from operations during the same taxable year.
ITR = Income Tax Rate applied by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in
computing the income tax of the Contractor during the taxable
year.
c)Additional Share Based from the Cumulative Net Mining Revenue. The
Additional Government Share for a given taxable year shall be
calculated as follows:
(i)Fifty percent (50%) of cumulative Net Mining Revenue from the end of the
Recovery Period to the end of that taxable year;
LESS
(ii)Cumulative Basic Government Share for that period as calculated under
Clause 3-g-1 hereof;
AND LESS (if applicable)
(iii)Cumulative Additional Government Share in respect of the period
commencing at the end of the Recovery Period and expiring at
the end of the taxable year immediately preceding the taxable
year in question.
"Net Mining Revenue" means the Gross Output from Mining Operations
during a Calendar year less Deductible Expenses, plus
Government taxes, duties and fees included as part of Deductible
Expenses.
3.Failure to Notify. If the Contractor does not notify the Government within
the time contemplated by Clause 3-g-2 of the formula for
calculating the Additional Government Share which the
Contractor wishes to apply to all of its Mining Operations, the
Government shall select and inform the Contractor which option
will apply to the latter.
4.Filing and Payment of Additional Government Share. Payment of the
Additional Government Share shall commence after the Recovery
Period. The Additional Government Share shall be computed, filed
and paid to the MGB within fifteen (15) days after the filing and
payment of the final income tax return during the taxable year to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Late filing and payment of the
Additional Government Share shall be subject to the same
penalties applicable to late filing of income tax returns. The
Contractor shall furnish the Director a copy of its income tax
return not later than fifteen (15) days after the date of filing.
A record of all transactions relating to the computation of the Additional
Government Share shall be maintained by the Contractor and
shall be made available to the Secretary or his/her authorized
representative for audit.
h.Sales and Exportation The Contractor shall endeavor to dispose of the
minerals and by-products produced in the Contract Area at the
highest commercially achievable market price and lowest
commercially achievable commissions and related fees in the
circumstances then prevailing and to negotiate for sales terms
and conditions compatible with world market conditions. The
Contractor may enter into long term sales and marketing
contracts or foreign exchange and commodity hedging contracts
which the Government acknowledges to be acceptable
notwithstanding that the sale price of minerals may from time to
time be lower, or that the terms and conditions of sales are less
favorable, than those available elsewhere.
The Government shall be informed by the Contractor when it enters into a
marketing agreement with both foreign and local buyers. The
Contractor shall provide the Government a copy of the final
marketing agreement entered into with buyers subject to the
confidentiality clause of the FTAA.
The Government shall be entitled to check and inspect all sales and
exportation of minerals and/or mineral products including the
terms and conditions of all sales commitments.
Sales commitments with affiliates, if any, shall be made only at prices based
on or equivalent to arm's length sales and in accordance with
such terms and conditions at which such agreement would be
made if the parties had not been affiliated, with due allowance for
normal selling discounts or commissions. Such discounts or
commissions allowed the affiliates must be no greater than the
prevailing rate so that such discounts or commissions will not
reduce the net proceeds of sales to the Contractor below those
which it would have received if the parties had not been affiliated.
The Contractor shall, subject to confidentiality clause of the FTAA,
submit to the Government evidence of the correctness of the
figures used in computing the prices discounts and commissions,
and a copy of the sales contract.
The Contractor undertakes that any mining, processing or treatment of Ore
by the Contractor shall be conducted in accordance with such
generally accepted international standards as are economically
and technically feasible, and in accordance with such standards
the Contractor undertakes to use all reasonable efforts to
optimize the mining recovery of Ore from proven reserves and
metallurgical recovery of minerals from the Ore: Provided, That it
is economically and technically feasible to do so.
For purposes of this Clause 3-h, an affiliate of an affiliated company means:
a)any company in which the Contractor holds fifty percent (50%) or more of
the shares;
b)any company which holds fifty percent (50%) or more of the Contractor's
shares;
c)any company affiliated by the same definition in (a) or (b) to an affiliated
company of the Contractor is itself considered an affiliated
company for purposes of the FTAA;
d)any company which, directly or indirectly, is controlled by or controls, or is
under common control by the Contractor;
e)any shareholder or group of shareholders of the Contractor or of an
affiliated company; or
f)any individual or group of individuals in the employment of the Contractor
or of any affiliated company.
Control means the power exercisable, directly or indirectly, to direct or cause
the direction of the management and policies of a company
exercised by any other company and shall include the right to
exercise control or power to acquire control directly or indirectly,
over the company's affairs and the power to acquire not less than
fifty percent (50%) of the share capital or voting power of the
Contractor. For this purpose, a creditor who lends, directly or
indirectly, to the contractor, unless he has lent money to the
Contractor in the ordinary course of money-lending business, may
be deemed to be a Person with power to acquire not less than
fifty percent (50%) of the share capital or voting power of the
Contractor if the amount of the total of its loan is not less than
fifty percent (50%) of the total loan capital of the company.
If a person ("x") would not be an affiliate of an affiliated company ("y") on
the basis of the above definition but would be an affiliate if each
reference in that definition to "fifty percent (50%)" was read as a
reference to "forty percent (40%)" and the Government has
reasonable grounds for believing that "x" otherwise controls "y"
or "x" is otherwise controlled by "y," then, upon the Contractor
being notified in writing by the Government of that belief and the
grounds therefore, "x" and "y" shall be deemed to be affiliates
unless the Contractor is able to produce reasonable evidence to
the contrary.
i.Price or Cost Transfers. The Contractor commits itself not to engage in
transactions involving price or cost transfers in the sale of
minerals or mineral products and in the purchase of input goods
and services resulting either in the illegitimate loss or reduction of
Government Share or illegitimate increase in Contractor's share. If
the Contractor engages affiliates or an affiliated company in the
sale of its mineral products or in providing goods, services, loans
or other forms of financing hereunder, it shall do so on terms no
less than would be the case with unrelated persons in arms-
length transactions.
SECTION 4. Pro Forma FTAA Contract
The fiscal regime provided herein, and the terms and conditions provided in
the Mining Act and IRR shall be embodied in a Pro Forma FTAA
Contract to be prepared by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. The Pro Forma FTAA Contract shall also
incorporate such other provisions as the DENR may formulate as a
result of consultations or negotiations conducted for that purpose
with concerned entities.

The Pro Forma FTAA Contract shall be used by the DENR, the Negotiating
Panel and the mining applicant for negotiation of the terms and
conditions of the FTAA: Provided, That the terms and conditions
provided in the Pro Forma FTAA Contract shall be incorporated in
each and every FTAA.
SECTION 5. Status of Existing FTAAs
All FTAAs approved prior to the effectivity of this Administrative Order shall
remain valid and be recognized by the Government: Provided,
That should a Contractor desire to amend its FTAA, it shall do so
by filing a Letter of Intent (LOI) to the Secretary thru the
Director. Provided, further, That if the Contractor desires to
amend the fiscal regime of its FTAA, it may do so by seeking for
the amendment of its FTAA's whole fiscal regime by adopting the
fiscal regime provided hereof : Provided, finally, That any
amendment of an FTAA other than the provision on fiscal regime
shall require the negotiation with the Negotiating Panel and the
recommendation of the Secretary for approval of the President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause
All orders and circulars or parts thereof inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Order are hereby repealed, amended or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity
This Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days upon its complete publication in
newspaper of general circulation and fifteen (15) days after
registration with the Office of the National Administrative
Register.
(SGD.) ANTONIO H. CERILLES
Secretary
60.G.R. Nos. L-18843 & 18844, 29 August 1974; See supra, note 77.
61.323 Phil. 297 (1996).
62.112 Phil. 24 (1961).
63.156 Phil. 498 (1974).
64.Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 217 (1998 Ed.),
citing Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
33471, 31 January 1972, 43 SCRA 192; Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337, 30 September
1969, 29 SCRA 617; People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352 (1923).
65.Section IX of the WMCP FTAA, entitled "Option to Convert into MPSA,"
provides:
9.1The Contractor may, at any time, give notice to the Secretary of its
intention to convert this Agreement either in whole or in part into
one or more Mineral Production Sharing Agreements in the form
of the Agreement annexed hereto in Annexure B ("the MPSA")
over such part or parts of the Contract Area as are specified in the
notice.
66.The five Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (Annexes A to F)
attached to the 20 October 2004 Compliance of the Solicitor
General are: (1) Mineral Production Sharing Agreement between
the Republic of the Philippines and Ungay-Malobago Mines, Inc.
and Rapu-Rapu Minerals, Inc. dated 12 September 2000; (2)
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement between the Republic of
the Philippines and Ungay-Malobago Mines, Inc. and TVI Resource
Development (Phils.), Inc. dated 17 June 1998; (3) Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation
(BMMRC) dated 20 November 1997; (4) Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
Philex Gold Philippines, Inc. dated 29 December 1999 (MPSA No.
148-99XIII); and (5) Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc. dated 29 December 1999 (MPSA No. 149-99-XIII).
67.p. 1140, 2003 Edition.
68.Cebu Portland Cement Company v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, et al., 133
Phil. 695 (1968).
69.Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, 134 Phil. 697 (1968).
70.Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, et al., 140 Phil. 509 (1969); Quijano, et
al. v. Development Bank of the Phils., et al., 146 Phil. 283
(1970); Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, No. L-
44717, 28 August 1985, 138 SCRA 273.
71.Motion for Reconsideration dated 14 July 2004, p. 22.
72.Ibid., p. 20.
73.Ibid., p. 12.
74.Memorandum dated 15 July 2004, p. 42.
75.www.malampaya.com
76.Ibid.
77.157 Phil. 608 (1974).
CARPIO MORALES, J ., dissenting.
1.421 SCRA 148 (2004).
2.Section 3 (aq); Section 23; Sections 3341; Section 56; Section 81, pars. 2
3; and Section 90.
3.Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995).
4.In its Motion for Intervention, intervenor PCM alleged that the Court's
January 27, 2004 Decision in this case would adversely affect the
ability of domestic mining companies to contract with their
foreign counterparts with regard to mining operations beyond the
resources of the local companies. (Rollo, at 2096.)
5.Transcript of Stenographic Notes, June 29, 2004 (TSN) at 129.
6.Rules of Court, Rule 18, sec. 7.
7.La Buga-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148 (2004).
8.Id. at 173174.
9.Id. at 234.
10.Memorandum (In support of WMCP's Motion and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration) at 4243.
11.Final Memorandum for the Petitioners at 9.
12.Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156158 (1936).
13.Bengson v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767, 775776
(1991).
14.CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.
15.Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1067 (1957).
16.Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256, 268 (1989).
17.Ibid.
18.Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, 143151 (2003).
19.Ibid.
20.Vide: La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 207208.
21.Memorandum for WMCP at 37.
22.Id. at 38.
23.Id. at 39.
24.Ibid.
25.Memorandum for Public Respondents at 34.
26.Id. at 37.
27.Id. at 21.
28.Id. at 22.
29.Rollo at 13731374.
30.Memorandum for Public Respondents at 24.
31.Ibid.
32.Id. at 25.
33.Id. at 23.
34.Memorandum for Intervenor at 7.
35.Statement for Intervenor at 1.
36.Memorandum for Intervenor at 9.
37.Vide: Black's Law Dictionary 156 (6th ed., 1991).
38.Article 1440 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1440.A person who establishes a trust is called a trustor; one in whom
confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of
another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose
benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the
beneficiary.
Justice Jose C. Vitug (ret.) describes a trust relationship as follows:
A trust is a juridical relationship that exists between one person having the
equitable title or beneficial enjoyment of property, real or
personal, and another having the legal title thereto. The person
who establishes the trust is the trustor (or grantor); one in whom
confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit of
another person is known as the trustee (fiduciary), and the person
for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the
beneficiary (cestui que trust). The Code has adopted the principles
of the general law of trusts, insofar as they are not in conflict with
its provisions, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and
special laws. [III J.C. VITUG CIVIL LAW 175 (2003); citations
omitted]
39.Vide: Black's Law Dictionary 156 (6th ed., 1991).
40.CONST. art. II, sec. 1.
41.Memorandum for Petitioners at 11.
42.Memorandum for WMCP at 59.
43.Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 803 (1993).
44.Vide: Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA
100, 106 (1995).
45.Vide: Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), sec. 26 (c).
46.Memorandum for Public Respondents at 49.
47.For instance an article written by Patricia Thompson describes the 1996
Marcopper environmental disaster:
Between 2.4 and 4 million tons of tailings solids escaped from an open pit
impoundment at Marcopper's copper mine on the island of
Marinduque in the Philippines on March 24, 1996, when a
concrete drainage plug gave way. The sediment-laden water
flowed into the Boac River system at rates of 5 to 10 cubic meters
per second. Although "independent studies by the United Nations
and the Philippine Department of Science and Technology have
concluded that the escaped material is not toxic," the increased
sediment load in the Boac River led to substantial salt and
freshwater kills. An impact assessment estimated that ten years
would elapse before freshwater fish would be viable in the river
again and predicted a seventy percent reduction in the "salt water
fish catch from the mouth of the Boac River," however, there are
some indications that this initial estimate may be too high.
Although the Boac River itself is not a drinking water source, the
release threatened potable water supplies along the banks of the
river and necessitated airdrops of food and medical supplies. [P.
Thompson, II. Mining Criminal Sanctions Sought in Philippine
Mine Tailings Spill, 1996 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L. L. & POL'Y 54
(1996).]
48.Vide: Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra.
49.II J. Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 605606
(1949); vide: La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
supra at 192, note 111.
50.Vide: Pres. Decree No. 87 (Amending Presidential Decree No. 8 issued on
October 2, 1972, and Promulgating an Amended Act to Promote
the Discovery and Production of Indigenous Petroleum and
Appropriate Funds therefor), Pres. Decree No. 151 (Allowing
Citizens of the Philippines or Corporations or Associations at least
Sixty Per Centum of the Capital of which is Owned by such
Citizens to Enter into Service Contracts with Foreign Persons,
Corporations for the Exploration, Development, Exploitation or
Utilization of Lands of the Public Domain, amending for the
purpose certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141), Pres.
Decree No. 463 (Providing for A Modernized System of
Administration and Disposition of Mineral Lands and to Promote
and Encourage the Development and Exploitation thereof), and
Pres. Decree No. 1442 (An Act to Promote the Exploration and
Development of Geothermal Resources).
51.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 199205 & 233,
note 252.
52.Id. at 234.
53.Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 448, 463 (1992).
54.Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 794, 796 (1982).
55.CONST., art. XII, sec. 2, first par.
56.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 208 & 218222.

57.TSN at 3740.
58.http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=either.
59.Ibid.
60.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 252253.
61.Laurel v. Civil Service Commission, 203 SCRA 195, 209 (1991).
62.III Record of the Constitutional Commission 316317.
63.Id. at 358359.
64.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 224.
65.I DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P. LAW CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
ARTICLE XV at 1213.
66.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 217218.
67.Id. at 208 & 218222.
68.Vide: Section 1 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied of the
equal protection of the laws."); Section 4 ("No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances."); Section 5 ("No law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.")
69.I DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P LAW CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
ARTICLE XV AT 1112.
70.P. A. Agabin, Service Contracts: Old Wines in New Bottles?, II DRAFT
PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P. LAW CONSTITUTION PROJECT 16,
cited in La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at
229.
71.A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted. [Black's Law
Dictionary 219 (6th ed., 1991)]
72.371 SCRA 196 (2001).
73.Id. at 205.
74.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 220.
75.The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. [Black's Law
Dictionary 581 (6th ed., 1991)]
76.Vide: Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004; Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop, Inc., 406 SCRA
178, 186 (2003);National Power Corporation v. City of
Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259, 280 (2003); Malinias v. Commission
on Elections, 390 SCRA 480, 491 (2002); Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81, 109 (2000); People v. Mamac,
332 SCRA 547, 556 (2000); Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 320
SCRA 703, 711 (1999);Miranda v. Abaya, 311 SCRA 617, 624
(1999); City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, 305 SCRA
353, 361 (1999); Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197, 203
(1994); Phil. American Life Insurance Company v. Ansaldo, 234
SCRA 509, 515 (1994); Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 224 SCRA 665, 669670 (1993); Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, 211 SCRA 753, 760 (1992); Montoya v. Escayo, 171 SCRA
442, 448 (1989); Singapore Airlines Local Employees Association
v. NLRC, 130 SCRA 472, 479 (1984); Vera v. Fernandez, 89 SCRA
199, 203 (1979); Central Barrio v. City Treasurer of Davao, 23
SCRA 6, 9 (1968); Catuiza v. People, 13 SCRA 538, 542
(1965); Ursal v. Court of Tax Appeals, 101 Phil. 209, 212
(1957); Vega v. Mun. Board of the City of Iloilo, 94 Phil. 949, 953
(1954); Sotto v. Commission on Elections, 76 Phil. 516, 530 (1946).
77.That which is expressed makes that which is implied to cease. [Black's Law
Dictionary 581 (6th ed., 1991)]
78.Vide: Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004; Malinias
v. Commission on Election, 390 SCRA 480, 491 (2002); National
Electrification Administration v. Commission on Audit, 377 SCRA
223, 232 (2002); Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55 SCRA 533, 538 (1974).
79.Comm. Villegas' response that there was no requirement in the 1973
Constitution for a law to govern service contracts and that, in fact,
there were then no such laws is inaccurate. The 1973 Charter
required similar legislative approval, although it did not specify
the form it should take: "The Batasang Pambansa, in the national
interest, may allow such citizens . . . to enter into service
contracts . . ." As previously noted in this Court's Decision of
January 27, 2004, however, laws authorizing service contracts
were actually enacted by presidential decree [i.e. Presidential
Decree No. 87 (Amending Presidential Decree No. 8 issued on
October 2, 1972, and Promulgating an Amended Act to Promote
the Discovery and Production of Indigenous Petroleum and
Appropriate Funds therefore), Pres. Decree No. 151 (Allowing
Citizens of the Philippines or Corporations or Associations at least
Sixty Per Centum of the Capital of which is Owned by such
Citizens to Enter into Service Contracts with Foreign Persons,
Corporations for the Exploration, Development, Exploitation or
Utilization of Lands of the Public Domain, amending for the
purpose certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141), Pres.
Decree No. 463 (Providing for a Modernized System of
Administration and Disposition of Mineral Lands and to Promote
and Encourage the Development and Exploitation thereof), and
Pres. Decree No. 1442 (An Act to Promote the Exploration and
Development of Geothermal Resources)]
80.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 233234.
81.Id. at 224.
82.III Record of the Constitutional Commission 260.
83.224 SCRA 792 (1993).
84.Id. at 811813.
85.III Record of the Constitutional Commission 319.
86.Rollo at 2779.
87.TSN at 181186.
88.Memorandum for Public Respondents, Annex 1.
89.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 227234.
90.Statement for Intervenor, p. 2.
91.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at
206; vide: Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, 240
SCRA 100, 104 (1995).
92.P. A. Agabin, Service Contracts: Old Wines in New Bottles?, II DRAFT
PROPOSAL OF THE 1986 U.P. LAW CONSTITUTION PROJECT 34.
93.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 227228 citing
Agabin, supra, at 1516.
94.Ibid.
95.Rep. Act No. 7942 (1995), secs. 35 (g), sec. 3 (af).
96.Id., sec. 3 (q).
97.Id., sec. 3 (j).
98.Id., sec. 3 (az).
99.Id., sec. 33.
100.Id., sec. 72.
101.Id., sec. 73.
102.Id., sec. 74.
103.Id., sec. 75.
104.Id., sec. 76.
105.Id., sec. 35 (h).
106.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 195.
107.Vide: Pres. Decree No. 87, sec. 8 (c), (e) and (f).
108.The DENR Secretary is also empowered to charge fines for late or non-
submission of reports under Section 111 of the Mining Act, but
the majority opinion either overlooked this provision or
considered it too insubstantial to be able to compel enforcement
of the law and its implementing rules.
109.Section 108 provides a criminal penalty for violation of the terms and
conditions of an environmental compliance certificate, but this
remedy is judicial and not administrative. In any event, what is the
likelihood of a Philippine court acquiring criminal jurisdiction over
the person of the foreign corporate officers of the foreign FTAA
contractor who may be responsible for such violations?
110.CONST., art. XII. sec. 20.
111.Rep. Act. No. 7653 (1993), sec. 29.
112.Id. sec. 30
113.Id. sec. 37.
114.CONST. art. XIII, sec. 3.
115.Pres. Decree No. 442 as amended.
116.Id. art. 128 (b).
117.Id. art. 263 (g).
118.Rep. Act No. 8424 (1997), sec. 115.
119.Id. sec. 206.
120.Id. sec. 207.
121.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 196.
122.Vide: Pres. Decree No. 87, sec. 8 (k) and sec. 9 (e).
123.National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay, 186 SCRA 198, 207
(1990).
124.Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, 172 SCRA 629, 635
(1989).
125.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 236.
126.Guidelines Establishing the Fiscal Regime of financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements.
127.Section 3 (g) (1) of DAO 99-56 provides:
Section 3.Fiscal Regime of a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement
xxx xxx xxx
g.Government Share.
1.Basic Government Share.The following taxes, fees and other such charges
shall constitute the Basic Government Share:
a)Excise tax on minerals;
b)Contractor's income tax;
c)Customs duties and fees on imported capital equipment;
d)Value added tax on the purchase of imported equipment, goods and
services;
e)Withholding tax on interest payments on foreign loans;
f)Withholding tax on dividends to foreign stockholders;
g)Royalties due the Government on Mineral Reservations;
h)Documentary stamps taxes;
i)Capital gains tax;
j)Local business tax;
k)Real property tax;
l)Community tax;
m)Occupation fees;
n)All other local Government taxes, fees and imposts as of the effective date
of the FTAA;
o)Special Allowance, as defined in the Mining Act; and
p)Royalty payments to any Indigenous People(s)/Indigenous Cultural
Community(ies).
From the Effective Date, the foregoing taxes, fees and other such charges
constituting the Basic Government Share, if applicable, shall be
paid by the Contractor: Provided, That above items (a) to (g) shall
not be collected from the Contractor upon the date of approval of
the Mining Project Feasibility Study up to the end of the Recovery
Period. Any taxes, fees, royalties, allowances or other imposts,
which should not be collected by the Government, but
nevertheless paid by the Contractor and are not refunded by the
Government before the end of the next taxable year, shall be
included in the Government Share in the next taxable year. Any
Value-Added Tax refunded or credited shall not form part of
Government Share.
128.Section 3 (g) (2) of DAO 99-56 provides:
2.Additional Government Share. Prior to the commencement of
Development and Construction Phase, the Contractor may select
one of the formula for calculating the Additional Government
Share set out below which the Contractor wishes to apply to all of
its Mining Operations and notify the Government in writing of
that selection. Upon the issuance of such notice, the formula so
selected shall thereafter apply to all of the Contractor's Mining
Operations.

xxx xxx xxx
129.Section 3 (g) (2) (1) of DAO 99-56 provides:
a)Fifty-Fifty Sharing of the Cumulative Present Value of Cash Flows. The
Government shall collect an Additional Government Share from
the Contractor equivalent to an amount which when aggregated
with the cumulative present value of Government Share during
the previous Contract Years and the Basic Government Share for
the current Contract Year is equivalent to a minimum of fifty
percent (50%) of the Cumulative Present Value of Project Cash
Flow before financing for the current Contract Year, as defined
below.
Computation. The computation of the Additional Government Share shall
commence immediately after the Recovery Period. If the
computation covers a period of less than one year, the Additional
Government Share corresponding to this period shall be
computed pro-rata wherein the Additional Government Share
during the year shall be multiplied by the fraction of the year after
recovery. The Additional Government Share shall be computed as
follows:
Project Cash Flow Before Financing and Tax ("CF") for a taxable year shall be
calculated as follows:
CF = GO - DE + I - PE - OC
Cumulative Present Value of Project Cash Flow ("CP") shall be the sum of the
present value of the cumulative present value of project cash flow
during the previous year (CP i-1 x 1.10) and the Project Cash Flow
Before Financing and Tax for the current year ("CF"), and shall be
calculated as follows:
CP = (CP i-1 x 1.10) + CF
Cumulative Present Value of Total Government Share Before Additional
Government Share ("CGB") shall be the sum of: the present value
of the cumulative present value of the Total Government Share
during the previous year (CGAi-1 x 1.10), and the Basic
Government Share for the current year (BGS), and shall be
calculated as follows:
CGB = (CGA i-1 x 1.10) + BGS
The Additional Government Share ("AGS") shall be:
If: CGB > CP [ ] 0.5thenAGS = 0
If: CGB < CP [ ] 0.5 thenAGS = [ CP x 0.5] - CGB
Cumulative Present Value of Total Government Share (CGA):
CGA = CGB + AGS
where:
BGS = Basic Government Share shall have the meaning as described in Clause
3-g-1 hereof,
GO = Gross Output shall have the same meaning as defined in the National
Internal Revenue Code;
DE = Deductible Expenses shall have the meaning as described in Clause 3-c
hereof;
I = Interest payments on loans included in the Deductible Expenses shall be
equivalent to those referred to in Clause 3-c-8 hereof;
PE = unrecovered Pre-Operating Expenses;
OC = On-going Capital Expenditures as defined in Clause 3-c hereof;
CP i-1 = cumulative present value of project cash flow during the previous
year; and
CGAi-1 = cumulative present value of total Government Share during the
previous year.
130.Section 3 (g) (2) (2) of DAO 99-56 provides:
b)Profit Related Additional Government Share. The Government shall collect
an Additional Government Share from the Contractor based on
twenty-five percent (25%) of the additional profits once the
arithmetic average of the ratio of Net Income After Tax To Gross
Output as defined in the National Internal Revenue Code, for the
current and previous taxable years is 0.40 or higher rounded off
to the nearest two decimal places.
Computation. The computation of the Additional Government Share from
additional profit shall commence immediately after the Recovery
Period. If the computation covers a period of less than a year, the
additional profit corresponding to this period shall be
computed pro-rata wherein the total additional profit during the
year shall be multiplied by the fraction of the year after recovery.
The additional profit shall be derived from the following formula:
If the computed average ratio as derived from above is less than 0.40:
Additional Profit = 0
If the computed average ratio is 0.40 or higher:
[NIAT-(0.40 x GO)]
Additional Profit =
(1 - ITR)
The Additional Government Share from the additional profit is computed
using the following formula:
Additional Government Share
From Additional Profit = 25% x Additional Profit
where:
NIAT = Net Income After Tax for the particular taxable year under
consideration.
GO = Gross Output from operations during the same taxable year.
ITR = Income Tax Rate applied by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in
computing the income tax of the Contractor during the taxable
year.
131.Section 3 (g) (2) (3) of DAO 99-56 provides:
c)Additional Share Based from the Cumulative Net Mining Revenue. The
Additional Government Share for a given taxable year shall be
calculated as follows:
(i)Fifty percent (50%) of cumulative Net Mining Revenue from the end of the
Recovery Period to the end of that taxable year;
LESS
(ii)Cumulative Basic Government Share for that period as calculated under
Clause 3-g-1 hereof;
AND LESS (if applicable)
(iii)Cumulative Additional Government Share in respect of the period
commencing at the end of the Recovery Period and expiring at
the end of the taxable year immediately preceding the taxable
year in question.
"Net Mining Revenue" means the Gross Output from Mining Operations
during a Calendar year less Deductible Expenses, plus
Government taxes, duties and fees included as part of Deductible
Expenses.
132.Republic Act No. 8424 as amended.
133.The 40% equity of the foreign stockholders in a 60-40 Filipino
corporation would translate to a 24% (40% x 60%) beneficial
interest in the corporation undertaking the MPSA.
134.Of course, the 60% Filipino equity in a 60-40 Filipino corporation could
also be held by another 60-40 Filipino corporation or
corporations, further diluting actual Filipino beneficial interest
and increasing foreign beneficial interest.
135.As noted in the Decision (La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association,
Inc., supra at 212213), unlike E.O. 279, the Mining Act
does not define "large-scale" in terms of capital expenditure
although this was evidently the way it was understood by the
1986 Constitutional Commission. (vide: III RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 255).
In fact, the Mining Act does not categorically define "large-scale" at all.
However, a comparison of the maximum areas for exploration in
Section 22 for Exploration Permits (400 meridional blocks onshore
for corporations), Section 28 for Mineral Agreements (200
meridional blocks for corporations) and Section 34 for FTAAs
(1,000 meridional blocks for corporations) indicates that "large-
scale" under the Mining Act refers to the size of the contract area.
It is only Section 56 of DAO 40-96 that any reference to the
US$50,000,000.00 minimum capital investment prescribed by E.O.
279 is made.
136.Applying the formula in Section 56 (a) of DAO 40-96 and assuming: (1)
the foreign FTAA contractor began with the maximum contract
area of 1,000 meridional blocks onshore, (2) an exploration period
of 6 years and (3) compliance with Section 60 of DAO 40-96 on
relinquishment of areas covered by FTAA.
The figure for an exploration period of 10 years is US$ 4.8 million. The figure
for a 20-year exploration period is US$ 7.7 million.
One meridional block is equivalent to 81 hectares. (Website of the Philippine
Mines and Geosciences Bureau www.mgb.gov.ph/epprimer.htm)
137.SECTION 23. Rights and Obligations of the Permittee. An exploration
permit shall grant to the permittee, his heirs or successors-in-
interest, the right to enter, occupy and explore the area: Provided,
That if private or other parties are affected, the permittee shall
first discuss with the said parties the extent, necessity, and
manner of his entry, occupation and exploration and in case of
disagreement, a panel of arbitrators shall resolve the conflict or
disagreement.
The permittee shall undertake an exploration work on the area as specified
by its permit based on an approved work program.
Any expenditure in excess of the yearly budget of the approved work
program may be carried forward and credited to the succeeding
years covering the duration of the permit. The Secretary, through
the Director, shall promulgate rules and regulations governing the
terms and conditions of the permit.
The permittee may apply for a mineral production sharing agreement, joint
venture agreement, co-production agreement or financial or
technical assistance agreementover the permit area, which
application shall be granted if the permittee meets the necessary
qualifications and the terms and conditions of any such
agreement: Provided, That the exploration period covered by the
exploration permit shall be included as part of the exploration
period of the mineral agreement or financial or technical
assistance agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
138.SECTION 24. Declaration of Mining Project Feasibility. A holder of an
exploration permit who determines the commercial viability of a
project covering a mining area may, within the term of the
permit, file with the Bureau a declaration of mining project
feasibility accompanied by a work program for development. The
approval of the mining project feasibility and compliance with
other requirements provided in this Act shall entitle the holder to
an exclusive right to a mineral production sharing agreement or
other mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance
agreement. (Emphasis supplied)
139.Sections 17-30 of DAO 40-96 on exploration permits contains absolutely
no minimum requirement for ground expenditures, much less the
minimum required investment of US$50,000,000.00 for
development, infrastructure and utilization.
140.Vide: note 20.
141.Memorandum for WMCP, p. 2.
142.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 176.
143.287 SCRA 465, 474 (1998). The Constitution prohibits non-Filipinos from
acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession.
144.Id. at 475.
145.In 1997 Bre-X, a large Canadian mining firm, was found to have inflated
the prospective amount of gold deposits in its Busang, Indonesia
mining operation by "salting" and tampering with gold samples
taken from the site. After news of the gold salting scam had
broken out, Bre-X's share price fell by almost 90%. [W. Symonds &
M. Shari, 'After Bre-X, Gold's Glow is Gone' Available at
http:// www.businessweek.com/1997/15/b352267.htm]

146.In January, 2004, 20% of Royal Dutch/Shell's reserves of oil and gas were
reclassified from "proven" to merely "probable" or other even
less certain categories. As a result, Shell's share prices fell by 7%
['Shell shock' Available at
http://www.economist.co.uk/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story
_ID=2354469]
147.Memorandum for Petitioners at 14.
148.Memorandum for WMCP at 67.
149.US$4,000,000.00 or approximately P224,000,000.00.
150.Memorandum for WMCP at 16.
151.Id. at 67.
152.At the prevailing rate of exchange, the US$10,000,000.00 selling price of
WMC's shares in WMCP is worth approximately P560,000,000.00.
153.TSN at 155156; Memorandum for WMCP at 6061.
154.La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, supra at 176.
155.Id. at 243245.
156.Memorandum for WMCP at 5.
157.CIVIL CODE, art. 1350.
158.Section 8.3 provides:
If the Secretary gives a Rejection Notice the Parties shall promptly meet and
endeavour to agree on amendments to the Work Programme or
budget. If the Secretary and the Contractor fail to agree on the
proposed revision within 30 days from delivery of the Rejection
Notice then the Work Programme or Budget or variation thereof
proposed by the Contractor shall be deemed approved, so as not
to unnecessarily delay the performance of this Agreement.
(Emphasis supplied; Rollo, p. 9293.)
159.CIVIL CODE, art. 1409 (1).
160Id. art. 1352.
161Id. art. 1409.
162.R.A. No. 7942, sec. 33.
163.Id, sec. 35 (e).
164.3.3. This Agreement shall be renewed by the Government for a further
period of twenty-five (25) years under the same terms and
conditions provided that the Contractor lodges a request for
renewal with the Government not less than sixty (60) days prior
to the expiry of the initial terms of this Agreement and provided
that the Contractor is not in breach of any of the requirements of
this Agreement.
165.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opep-pit_mining htm.
166.Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1579 (1976).
167.http://riot.ieor.berkeley.edu/riot/Applications/OPM/OPMDetails.html.
168.http://www.mine-engineer.com/mining/open_pit.htm;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open-pit_mining htm.
169.http://www.mcq.org/roc/en/exploitation/exploitation_2_1_2.html.
TINGA, J.:
1.SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it
may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its
execution. (Emphasis supplied)
2.Each time Sec. 2 is hereafter mentioned, it is understood to be Sec. 2, Art.
XII of the Constitution.
3."The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. . . ." See Section 1,
Article II, Constitution. "Republicanism, in so far as it implies the
adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily
points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular
sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established
authority." Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204
(1939), See also Badelles v. Cabili, 136 Phil. 383, 395396 (1969).
4.Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution states: "The executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines."
5.See Section 17, Article VII, Constitution, which reads: "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
6.See Section 18, Article VII, Constitution, which begins: "The President shall
be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. . . ."
7.G.R. No. 88211, 27 October 1989, 178 SCRA 760.
8.Id. at 764. Citing the eminent American legal scholar Laurence Tribe, who
notes that US jurisprudence makes clear "that the constitutional
concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without
limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers
granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal
enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of
"executive" power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere
expressly limited." Ibid.
9.Justice Irene Cortes, who penned the Court's decision in Marcos
v. Manglapus, has opined elsewhere on the grant of plenary
executive powers on the President, "[who] personifies the
executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent
from the two other branches of government. The president is not
the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of
the executive branch can be more immediate and direct than the
United States president because he is given by express provision
of the constitution control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." I. Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study
of Executive Power, pp. 6869; cited in Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary et al., G.R. Nos. 159086, 159103, 159185, 159196, 3
February 2004.
10."This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and
who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a
class by itself." Marcos v. Manglapus, supra note 7, at 682.
11.Id. at 692. See also supra note 8. In light of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in the famed Steel Seizure case, Youngstown Sheet
v. Sawyer, supra note 2, and the competing analyses of Justice
Black (whose "formalist" approach led to rigid categorization of
separate legislative, executive and judicial functions), and Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson (who opted for a more flexible, functional
approach), Gunther and Sullivan note that "[m]uch scholarly
commentary on separation of powers has endorsed the functional
approach, and cite this following argument for the "functional"
view: "When the Constitution confers power, it confers power on
the three generalist political heads of authority, not on branches
as such. [Its] silence about the shape of the inevitable, actual
government was a product both of drafting compromises and of
the explicit purpose to leave Congress free to make whatever
arrangements it deemed 'necessary and proper' for the detailed
pursuit of government purposes." G. Gunther and K. Sullivan,
Constitutional Law (14th ed., 2001), at 342; citing Strauss, "Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions
A Foolish Inconsistency," 72 Corn.L.Rev. 488 (1987).
Another analysis is proferred by Chemerinsky, who acknowledges that the
debate on inherent presidential power has existed "from the
earliest days of the country." E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:
Principles and Policies (2nd ed., 2002), at 329. In analyzing the
U.S. Supreme Court's divided opinions in the seminal case of
Youngstown Sheet, supra note 2, he notes that while the majority
opinion of Justice Black seems to deny the existence of any
inherent presidential power, the concurring opinions of Justices
Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson do seem to acknowledge the
existence of such power, albeit subject to proscription by the
legislative branch. Chemerinsky also notes that the view of
inherent presidential authority had been affirmed in the earlier
case of U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304
(1936), which pertained to the presidential power to conduct
foreign policy. Id. at 334.
12.Ibid. See also Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary; supra note 9.
13.Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 648, 658 (1995).
14.Apropos to the nature of the Filipino presidency is the following comment
on the U.S. presidency by an American historian, "As our Chief of
State, and as such the embodiment of the people's elective will,
the President is clad with the prerogative of the office, and
possesses more actual sovereign power than any British king since
George III. In his role as Chief of Foreign Relations, from the
beginning he has been the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. While
the Senate must advise and consent to any treaty, the President
has exclusive initiative in their negotiation." G.F. Milton, The Use
of Presidential Power: 17891943 (1980 ed.), at 3.

15.Section 1, Article VIII, Constitution enables the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
executive, a duty which is made easier if there is a specifically
prescribed constitutional standard which warrants obeisance by
the executive branch.
16.See Secs. 21 and 22, Art. VI, CONST., which read:
Sec. 21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Sec. 22.The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as
the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House or any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
17.See Section 2, Article XII, Constitution, which states in part, "All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State." An offshoot of the long-standing Regalian
doctrine recognized in this jurisdiction.
18."The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State." Id.
19.The so-called "Jamir amendment," proposed by Commissioner Alberto
M.K. Jamir, which read "The President may enter into agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law based on real contributions to the
long-term growth of the economy." 3 Record of the Constitutional
Commission: Proceedings and Debates (1987), at 351.
20.Id. at 356.
21.Indeed, since 1973 when the service contract system for petroleum was
implemented, the government has earned over 1.882 Billion
Pesos and 10.160 Billion Pesos in revenues from oil and natural
gas production, respectively. Based on data provided by the
Department of Energy.
22.Paragraph 5, Sec. 2, Art. XII. It provides: The President shall notify the
Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
23.See Section 9, Article XIV, 1973 Constitution.
24.Resolution, p. 26.
25.Per Jackson, J., concurring, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952).
26.The following exchanges during the debates of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission indicate that the absence of domestic capital for
mineral and petroleum development was duly considered by the
framers.
MR. GASCON. As far as investment is concerned in developing certain priority
areas for our economic development, are there areas where there
is much need for foreign investments?
MR. VILLEGAS. During the public hearings, we heard people from the mining
and oil exploration industries, who presented a very strong case,
that foreign investment is actually indispensable because there is
no risk capital available in the Philippines. If the Gentleman will
remember, the figure cited over the last ten years is that P800
million literally went down the drain in oil exploration and up to
now, no oil has been found, and all that money was foreign
money. These people asked a rhetorical question: Can you
imagine if that money belonged to Filipinos? 3 Record of the
Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates (1987), at
310.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE. I am very glad that Commissioner Padilla emphasized minerals,
petroleum and mineral oils. The Commission has just approved
the possible foreign entry into the development, exploration and
utilization of these minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils by
virtue of the Jamir amendment. I voted in favor of the Jamir
amendment because it will eventually give way to vesting in
exclusively Filipino citizens and corporations wholly owned by
Filipino citizens the right to utilize the other natural resources.
This means that as a matter of policy, natural resources should be
utilized and exploited only by Filipino citizens or corporations
wholly owned by such citizens. But by virtue of the Jamir
amendment, since we feel that Filipino capital may not be enough
for the development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils, the President can enter into service contracts
with foreign corporations precisely for the development and
utilization of such resources. 3 Record of the Constitutional
Commission: Proceedings and Debates (1987), at 361.
27.Invalidity of provisions which do not adequately assert constitutional
rights or prerogatives need not always be the proper remedy,
considering, as Justice Vitug noted in his separate opinion in this
case, that "[t]he fundamental law is deemed written in every
contract." Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004.
28.N. Hamilton, The Iron Range Resources and Rehabilitation Board: An
Unconstitutional and Confused Delegation of Executive Power to
Legislators, 25 William Mitchell Law Rev. 1204, 1235 (1999).
29.The following traditional observation of John Thurston, as cited in a
periodical article, bears noting:
[Thurston] explained that the day-to-day administration of the corporation
should be independent of the executive and the legislature, but
"[I]n matters of general and public policy, the corporation must
necessarily be subject to executive and legislative control." In
addition to having control over "general and public policy," the
executive and legislature also should monitor the efficiency of the
public corporation. However, Thurston perceived a dilemma in
balancing the need "to ensure that the corporation functions
efficiently and without waste," and the problem of "preventing
unnecessary interference with details of administration." . . . Id.,
at 1231.
30.Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est, ut evitur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Cosico
v. NLRC, 338 Phil. 1080, 1089 (1997); citing Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184, 188 (1992).
31.United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, Some Problems in
the Organization and Administration of Public Enterprise in the
Industrial Field 8 (1954), cited in Hamilton, supra note 35, at 1230.
"As long as an enterprise is not clearly differentiated from other
types of governmental activity, strong pressures will be brought
to make it conform to standard government regulations and
procedures." Ibid.
32.Id. at 1228.
33.Ibid.
34.The employment of the corporate entity was suggested by Neil W.
Hamilton, a Professor of Regulatory Policy in the William Mitchell
College of Law, in his article analyzing the effectiveness and
economic efficiency of a government board for the rehabilitation
iron mines in Minnesota, U.S.A. which were being depleted.
Professor Hamilton proffered the view that the executive and the
legislative branches of government would have control over the
general and public policy concerning the operation of iron mines
and should monitor the efficiency of the public corporation
created to take care of the operation of iron mines, but the
corporation, through its board of directors and officers, would
have control over day-to-day operations. ("The Iron Range
Resources and Rehabilitation Board: An Unconstitutional and
Confused Delegation of Executive Power to Legislators," 25
William Mitchell Law Review 1203 [1999]).
35.The following perspective from sectors not affiliated with the business
community deserve contemplation:
"Creating a favorable investment climate for foreign mining companies has
led to new social problems, namely human rights problems and
dislocation of indigenous peoples. The country has experienced
incidents of armed violence from mining guards and military
personnel assigned to assist the mining companies. Indigenous
tribes have been displaced as military operations facilitate the
entry of corporations into mining areas. Mining operations are
severely infringing on communities and their livelihoods. In 1996,
a mining tailings spill from the Marcopper tailing dam in
Marinduque seriously polluted the Boac River and Calancan Bay
on which the local communities depend." See
http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/imf/selling/asia4.html.
"At risk to the peoples of the Philippines is their remaining patrimony and
economic sovereignty. Mining legislation opens up the country to
further foreign domination and control. It perpetuates the semi-
feudal, semi-capitalist neocolonial character of the economy. It is
creating mass displacement, especially of indigenous communities
and upland farmers. Foreign companies have an abominable
history of creating environmental disasters as well, and turning
virgin forests and clean water sources and farming lands into
wastelands and deserts. They also have a terrible reputation for
excessive exploitation of workers and mass unemployment.
Finally, foreign owned mines will bring militarization as the
owners will guard mining areas." B.J. Warden, at
http://www.canadianliberty.bcca/relatedinfo/miningco.html.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring:
1.Mondano v. Silvosa, GR No. L-7708, 30 May 1955, 97 Phil. 143.

2.J. Bernas, S.J. The Intent of the 1987 Constitution Writers, 1995 Ed., p. 812.
3.Id. at 818.
4.Ibid.
5.Id. at 817818.
6.In Reagan v. Commission on Internal Revenue (L-26379, 27 December 1969,
30 SCRA 968,973) the Court discussed the concept of auto-
limitation in this wise: "It is to be admitted that any State may by
its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereignty rights. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal-self determination and self-restriction.' A State
then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence." See also Taada v. Angara,
GR No. 118295, 2 May 1997, 272 SCRA 18.
7.Cf . Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 355 SCRA 318 (2001).
8.Section 2, Rep. Act. No. 7942.
9.Pilipinas Kao, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105014, 18 December
2001, 372 SCRA 548.
10.Aris (Phis.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90501,
05 August 1991, 200 SCRA 246.
11.Ibid.
12.See Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18.
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[G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.]
FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J p:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel
the PublicEstates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner
of Public Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP' for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry
out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, . .
. lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." 1 On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay " 2 under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP . . .
shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i)CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction,
and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed
upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of
works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work
to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation,
retention and other terms and conditions provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing
required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx xxx xxx
(iii). . . CDCP shall give up all its development rights and
hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all
of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in
and to all the areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet
been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by
CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of
approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial
Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and
approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two
Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888)
square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations
above Mean Low Water Level located outside the
Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood
Unit." 3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety
four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands
known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area
of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty
One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. 4 On
April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all
scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees
reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997. 7Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the
reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands
and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title
covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel, 9and the Government Corporate Counsel. 10 The
Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees. 11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports
that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an
order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA
Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer
Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the
JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper
court." 12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section
7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of
the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to
private corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of
billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on
December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a
temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral
argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May
26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the
President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved
the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA 15 and AMARI 16 are as
follows:
I.WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE
PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II.WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR
FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III.WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR
NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV.WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING
THIS SUIT;
V.WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL
AGREEMENT;
VI.WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE
TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS,
RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED,
VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII.WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR
RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS
GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot
and academic because of subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-
going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court
enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new
agreement with AMARI.
"PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA
containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus,
PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now
moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March
30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA
on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the
Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the
Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended
JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime
PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended
JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its
implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes
more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue too insure the government
itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the
national patrimony. Supervening events whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the
Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. 17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural
lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right
to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI
seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged
areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchaseunder PD No. 1084 (charter of
PEA) and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the
Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor
PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by
the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty
years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987. 20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in
this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title
and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA
is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate
share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA
even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project. 21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe
the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. 22 The Court
can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to
disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed
information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule
that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court
granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially
demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had
an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code 24 and Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 638 25 to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from
the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative
statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA.
Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner
here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Code, 26 the disposition of government lands to private parties
requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to
the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated
PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like
the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of
a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make
the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had
the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone, is determinative of this issue, the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is
a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant
case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to
private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit.
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings
to enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA
refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA
also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of
the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands
worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in
violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional
duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to
the public. In Chavez v. PCGG, 28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a
taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of
recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an
issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He
asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate
and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if
the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and
if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and
moral well-being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this
case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which
have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved publicinterest.
xxx xxx xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the
issue concerns a public right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws, he need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In
the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce
their right to be informed on matters of public concern,
a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws
in order to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they sought
to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while
reiterating Taada, further declared that 'when
a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of
a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen
and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which
possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while
expenditure of public funds may not have been involved
under the questioned contract for the development,
management and operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely
involved considering the important role [of the subject
contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the
Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for
upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of
the people to information and access to official records,
documents and papers a right guaranteed under
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner,
a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because
of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition
at bar should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information
on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7.The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or, decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on
matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28.Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Italics supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as
well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively
other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say,
even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to
nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at
all times . . . accountable to the people," 29 for unless citizens have the
proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate
in publicdiscussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the
Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. 30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep
open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to
the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue
can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG, 31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA
maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage.'"
Also AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-
decisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which
should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the
steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is
generic and therefore, it can cover both steps leading to
a contract and already consummated contract, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on
the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you." 32 (Italics supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before
petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal
their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of
decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate
to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is
immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all
kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to
information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of
the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to
the publicmatters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the
size, location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of,
the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the
minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and
disclose them to the publicat the start of the disposition process, long before the
consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code
requires public bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can
demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation,
there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this
moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all
the non-proprietary information leading to such definite proposition.
In Chavez v. PCGG, 33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose
sufficient public informations on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course,
to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier such as
on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information." (Italics supplied)

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency
on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution
could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively
truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an
emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed
"policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters
of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government
research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any
document that is part of the publicrecords in the custody of government
agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers
recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or
explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or
officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or
processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government
policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such
reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information
does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating
to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them.
One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his
expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to
government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the
inspection and copying. 35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers. 36 The right does not
also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have
long recognized as confidential. 37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondence, or discussions during
closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
Congress, 38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial Power. 39 This is
not the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should
not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security
and public order. 40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right
to information in several legislations. 41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted
in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of
thepublic domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of
all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown. 42The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people,
acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he
disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian
doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner
of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the
foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain." 43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of
1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the
Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved
Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On
November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141,
also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale,
of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141
continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all
waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to
the publicdomain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed
the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5.Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence
of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to
the party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued
the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land
to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339.Property of public dominion is
1.That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2.That belonging exclusively to the State which, without
being of general public use, is employed in
some public service, or in the development
of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense
of the territory, and mines, until granted to
private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by
the public. In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to
property used for some specific public service and open only to those
authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use,
but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.
This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national
wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property
of public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341.Property of public dominion, when no longer
devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the
State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the
executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no
longer needed forpublic use or territorial defense before the government
could lease or alienate the property to private parties. 45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No.
1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The
salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1.The control and disposition of the
foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by
the Government without prejudice to vested rights and
without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of
Manila in the Luneta Extension.

Section 2.(a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the
Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be
divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets
and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats
and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with
the Bureau of Lands.
(b)Upon completion of such plats and
plans the Governor-General shall give notice to
the public that such parts of the lands so made or
reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be
leased for commercial and business purposes, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(e)The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to
the highest and best bidder therefore, subject to such
regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General
may by executive order prescribe." (Italics supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and
disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act
No. 1654 mandate public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands.
Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike
other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these
reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the
sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea
by private parties with government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874,
the Public Land Act. 46 The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed
lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6.The Governor-General, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into
(a)Alienable or disposable,
(b)Timber, and
(c)Mineral lands, . . .
Sec. 7.For the purposes of the government and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited or classified. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 55.Any tract of land of the public domain which,
being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition
or concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions
of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56.The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:
(a)Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging,
filling, or other means;
(b)Foreshore;
(c)Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d)Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 58.The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of
section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-
General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that
the same are not necessary for thepublic service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of
the public domain into . . . alienable or disposable" 47 lands. Section 7 of the Act
empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall
be classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as
other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These
provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable
lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such
disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or
marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of
the public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to
private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for
the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to
sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a
policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to
private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56
(d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874,
the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale. 49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the
Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine,
declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1.All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development,
or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant." (Italics
supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources
except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State
could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural
resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for
25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate
foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable
agricultural lands of the publicdomain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the
classification of public agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and
marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural
lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No.
2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory
prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The
1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were
classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
"Section 2.No private corporation or association may
acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands in excess
of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of
one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of
one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by
homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands
adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand
hectares, may be leased to an individual, private
corporation, or association." (Italics supplied)

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not
repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the
contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of
retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on
lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the publicdomain other than timber and mineral lands. 51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of
the public domain into "alienable or disposable" 52 lands of the public domain,
which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the
government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are
"officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as
follows:
"Sec. 6.The President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time classify the lands of the publicdomain into
(a)Alienable or disposable,
(b)Timber and
(c)Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such
lands from one class to another, 53 for the purpose of
their administration and disposition.
"Sec. 7.For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time
declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8.Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved
for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the
Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized
and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. . . . ."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of
the public domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or
concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-
public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:"
"Sec. 58.Any tract of land of the public domain which,
being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be
used for residential purposes or for commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession,
shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter
and not otherwise.
Sec. 59.The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:
(a)Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging,
filling, or other means;
(b)Foreshore;
(c)Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes rivers;
(d)Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60.Any tract of land comprised under this title may
be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person,
corporation, or association authorized to purchase or
lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . .
Sec. 61.The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of
section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition under this chapter. The lands included in
class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act." (Italics supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All
these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands
to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling
under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes
not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands
of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the
1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified
private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of
the public domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141,
the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes
must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a subsequent law
amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended
for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the
government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act
1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the
foreshore and lands under water remained in the
national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing'
of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and
1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands
reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of
to private parties by lease only and not otherwise."
Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land
reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This
requisite must have been met before the land could be
disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands
under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land
was only by lease. The land remained property of the
State."(Italics supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act
No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in
1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional
edict under the 1935 Constitution, Foreshore lands became inalienable as
natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and
classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall
under the classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold
to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private
parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for
the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize
the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other
non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d)
are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the
government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires
congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that the government
previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private
parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. . . . The area so leased or sold shall be such as
shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the
purposes for which such sale or lease is requested, and
shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares:
Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply
to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government
shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress: . . . ." (Italics supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors
the legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands
that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities
should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-
agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be
used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60
of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands. 57

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections
63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63.Whenever it is decided that lands covered by
this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the
Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural
Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon
receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same manner
as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, . . .
Sec. 67.The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding;
and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. . .
. ." (Italics supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all
leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. 58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions
of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land could
become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of
the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property
of public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the
Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420.The following things are property
of public dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2)Those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.
xxx xxx xxx.
Art. 422.Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property
of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or public service, before
the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case
of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration
of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed
by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property
of public dominion those properties of the State which, without being
for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the
national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State,
even if not employed for publicuse or public service, if developed to enhance the
national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted
the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that

"Sec. 8.All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With
the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of thepublic domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
(Italics supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However,
the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution encompassed
industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of
the public domain. 60 If the land ofpublic domain were neither timber nor
mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of
the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited
the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of
the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of
the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private
corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer
allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that
"Sec. 11.The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account
conservation, ecological, and development
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine
by law the size of land of the public domain which may
be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any
qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or
acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of
twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or
association may hold by lease, concession, license or
permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or
forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand
hectares. However, such area may be increased by the
Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority." (Italics
supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of
the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA
with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4.Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the
following purposes:
(a)To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire
reclaimed land;
(b)To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real
property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated
by the government;
(c)To provide for, operate or administer such service as
may be necessary for the efficient, economical and
beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5.Powers and functions of the Authority.
The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for
which it is created, have the following powers and
functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx xxx xxx
(i)To hold lands of the public domain in
excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j)To reclaim lands and to construct work
across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(o)To perform such acts and exercise such
functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives
herein specified." (Italics supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of
the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb
and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water
regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide. 62 Foreshore and submerged areas
indisputably belong to the public domain 63 and are inalienable unless
reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared
no longer needed for publicservice.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and
until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban
applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and
associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of
the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations
by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of
the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell
these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.
141, which states
"Sec. 60. . . . ; but the land so granted, donated or
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; .
. . ." (Italics supplied)

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of
the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit
private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has
adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural
resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2.All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. . . . .
Section 3.Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the publicdomain
may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall
determine, by law, the size of lands of
the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Italics
supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows
private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease
to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of
the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well
understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS:Mr. Vice-President, my questions have
reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
'No private corporation or association may
hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease, not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935
Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations
from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not
been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this
is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it
was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large
landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS:I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS:In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni
Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo
was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter
land where a chapel stood because the Supreme Court
said it would be in violation of this." (Italics supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi, 64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional
ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against purchases of public agricultural lands by private
corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases
like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations
or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of
the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could
have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more
than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing
the land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation,
upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the
next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable
lands of thepublic domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who
already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain
could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An
individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient
vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals
of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-
growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only
to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause,
consists of three properties, namely:
1."[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded
islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in
Paraaque and Las Pias, Metro Manila, with
a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square
meters;"
2."[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters
contiguous to the three islands;" and
3."[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an
additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed
area." 65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the
Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares . . . ," plus
an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares
. . . ." 66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only
157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and
the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila
Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of
P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the
other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will
share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less
30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net
usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI.
Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that
". . . , PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay
the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the
title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the
Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by
AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the
proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share
in the name of AMARI, . . . ; provided, that if more than
seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given
time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only
seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI,
until such time when a corresponding proportionate
area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been
titled." (Italics supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its
name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-
AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim
foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA
states that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights
and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and
Horizontal Development as well as own the
Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture
the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to
undertake the Project in accordance with the Master
Development Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA
dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9,
1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which state that:
"Section 2.All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.. . . Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, . . . ." (Italics
supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, In its
Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as
amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59.The lands disposable under this title
shall be classified as follows:
(a)Lands reclaimed by the government by
dredging, filling, or other means;
xxx xxx xxx.'" (Italics supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force 68 constituted under Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President
Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain." 69 The Legal Task Force concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain.
However, by statutory authority, the rights of
ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have
been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as
owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified
person without violating the Constitution or any
statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private
corporations from holding public land, except by lease
(Sec. 3, Art. XVII, 70 1987 Constitution), does not apply
to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to
PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters . . . and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State."
As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are
classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of
these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a
law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. 71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified." 72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia, 73 the Executive
Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was
acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen
years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of the Civil Code, a
property of public dominion retains such character until formally
declared otherwise. The Court ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a
long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any
such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Italics supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising
the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311
and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing
the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day,
these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD
No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a
declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed
for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial
erosion on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of
Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the
classification of agricultural lands of the publicdomain. Under the 1987
Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a
private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20,
1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands
may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that
reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not
alienate." 75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5.Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence
of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper
permission shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the grant of authority." (Italics supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private
parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim
from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property
of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold
ownership of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from
which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from
the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the
reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it
replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-
honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from
the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
the public domain." 77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141
requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These land must not be
reserved forpublic or quasi-public purposes. 78 Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the
Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A
declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water,
whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the
National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. (Italics supplied)

xxx xxx xxx."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866
because reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only
by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National
Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a
contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or
permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects
of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private
party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment
to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used
as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or
disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed
for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There
is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no
dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state areinalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed
from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters . . .
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as publicagricultural lands, which under the Constitution are
the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed
for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is
tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA
include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds
of land transportation, . . . ; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of
sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or
all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to
impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed
foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed
for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its
charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also
states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
the recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through
a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; . . . ." Thus, under EO
No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No. 1084, PEA became the primary
implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the entity
"to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting publicwelfare and interests." 79 Since large portions of these
reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a
formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed
for public service from those still needed for public service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify
inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domains
would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or
EO No. 525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4.Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1). . .
xxx xxx xxx
(4)Exercise supervision and control over forest
lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control,
impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and
any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;
xxx xxx xxx
(14)Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the
issuance of licenses, permits, concessions, lease
agreements and such other privileges concerning the
development, exploration and utilization of the
country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and
over all aquatic resources of the country and shall
continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural
resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges
upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any
regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in
furtherance of the conservation of natural resources
and supportive of the national interest;
(15)Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management
and disposition of all lands of the public domain and
serve as the sole agency responsible for classification,
sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in
consultation with appropriate agencies." 80 (Italics
supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State,
DENR exercises "supervision and control over alienable and
disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the
management and disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR
decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila
Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from
DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any
part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should
be classified as alienable under Sections 6 81 and 7 82 of CA No. 141. Once DENR
decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to
the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then
DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517
in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA
No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the
other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of
the publicdomain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does
not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed forpublic service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA No. 141
and other applicable laws. 84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with
CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that
reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall
not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: . . . ." 85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia, 86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states that

"Sec. 48.Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: . . . ."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the Government. The Court declared that
"It is not for the President to convey real property of
the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law
enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence." (Italics supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the
legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued
on February 4, 1977, provides that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area
of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the
reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Project between the Republic of the Philippines
and the Construction and Development Corporation of
the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any
other contract or reclamation covering the same area is
hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the
ownership and administration of
the Public EstatesAuthority established pursuant to PD
No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and
interests of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid
contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise
the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic of
the Philippines (Department of PublicHighways) arising
from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and
assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines the
corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an
issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be
deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General
Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute
such contacts or agreements with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be
necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the
Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of
the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the
subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of
such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned
contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land
Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding
certificate of title." (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979,
provides that
"Sec. 3.All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA which shall be responsible for its
administration, development, utilization or disposition
in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive
from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be
used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to
sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of
PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . .
. owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Italics
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free
from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of
PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory
prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of
the publicdomain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could
be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Italics supplied) would
not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed
for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or
leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA
No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from
holding a public auction. 88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the
patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084,
"supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is an
acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by
law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes PEA "to determine the kind
and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely
authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in
installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable
government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445
mandates that
"Section 79.When government property has become
unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it
shall, upon application of the officer accountable
therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his
duly authorized representative in the presence of the
auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or
unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If
found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to
the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper
committee on award or similar body in the presence of
the auditor concerned or other authorized
representative of the Commission,after advertising by
printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than
three consecutive days in any newspaper of general
circulation, or where the value of the property does not
warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted
for a like period in at least three public places in the
locality where the property is to be sold. In the event
that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at
a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same
committee or body concerned and approved by the
Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in
which case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. 90 The
Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing
Code through Circular No. 89-296 91 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only
through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in
case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified
to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the
auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom
Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning
bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to
regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the
additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one,
however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government
Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through
negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure
of the public bidding on December 10, 1991. 93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only
the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it
also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The
original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750
hectares. 94 The failure of publicbidding on December 10, 1991, involving
only 407.84 hectares, 95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of
750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the
failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three
years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic
situation in the country had greatly improved during the intervening
period.

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, . . .
." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and
AMARI as legislative authorityto sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6.Repayment Scheme. For the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-
operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its
variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the
project proponent . . . may likewise be repaid in the
form of a share in the revenue of the project or other
non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to,
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional requirements with
respect to the ownership of the land: . . . ." (Italics
supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation
of a government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of
the publicdomain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by
PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects
to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the
reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302.Financing, Construction, Maintenance,
Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects
by the Private Sector. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of
industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a
proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on
land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned
in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code,
the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with
leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer
is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12
hectares 96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in
ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership
of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of
the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which
maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual
issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain
and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short,
PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517
and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising
the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their
theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1.Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato, 97 where the
Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the
corresponding certificate of title was issued,
the land ceased to be part of
the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction."
2.Lee Hong Hok v. David, 98 where the Court declared

"After the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to
all the safeguards provided therein."
3.Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas, 99 where the Court ruled
"While the Director of Lands has the power
to review homestead patents, he may do so
only so long as the land remains part of
the public domain and continues to be under
his exclusive control; but once the patent is
registered and a certificate of title is issued,
the land ceases to be part of
the publicdomain and becomes private
property over which the Director of Lands
has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4.Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 100 where
the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as
disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in
favor of the private respondents, the said
lots ceased to be part of the public domain
and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost
jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 101 where the Court
stated
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9,
1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health, of the whole lot,
validly sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is
constitutive of a 'fee simple' title or absolute
title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents
involving public lands, provides that
'Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the
Philippines are alienated, granted or
conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act
(Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall
become registered lands."
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under
the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the
Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the
Department of Health. The National Government transferred the 12.8-
hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other
facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The
Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of
Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an
example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land
losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well
as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any
private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or
certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a
private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred
by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not
give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration. 102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the
Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. 103
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer
of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141
as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino,
to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the
Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1084,supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto
the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land
containing a total area of one million nine hundred
fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters; the technical description of which are
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof."
(Italics supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that
are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of
the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104 Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entitles under Section 60 of CA
No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered
unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however,
cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit
from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section
60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of
the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of
the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can
become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or
patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose
of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are
concededly public lands.

Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain.
Thus, EO No. 525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency
Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which
are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in
various parts of the country which need to be evaluated
for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional
support to the Government's declared policy to provide
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation
of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all
reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under
proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf
of the National Government which shall ensure a
coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation
of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates
the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and
ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the
President with continuing authority to reorganize the
national government including the transfer, abolition,
or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1.The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf
of the National Government. All reclamation projects
shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken
by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it
with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation
projects of any national government agency or entity
authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the
President.
xxx xxx xxx."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as
the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of
the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not
private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable
lands does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain.
Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become
private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to
dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are
still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of
the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both
lands of thepublic domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable
lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and
issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically
make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and
still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership
of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80
million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands." This will
open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the
hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations
amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country creating the
very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this
country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands. 105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited
private corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987
Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act
No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to
existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their
character aspublic lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No.
1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122.Whenever public lands in the Philippine
Islands belonging to the . . . Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same
shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
Act and shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103.Certificate of Title to Patents.
Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree."
(Italics supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in
Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes conveyances of public lands
to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided
in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System
pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly
subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have
been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly
authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the
registered land of the public domain from becoming private land that can be
disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of
the public domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48,
Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
Whenever real property of the government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1). . .
(2)For property belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines, but titled in the name of any
political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive
head of the agency or instrumentality."
(Italics supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for
expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the name of a government
corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property
purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may
also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer
the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town
plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the
municipality. 106 All these properties become properties of
the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any
existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its own power of
eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain.
Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to
issue in the name of the National government new certificates of title covering
such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any
registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or
taken by eminent domain, the National Government,
province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for
registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of
the judgment which shall state definitely by an
adequate description, the particular property or
interest expropriated, the number of certificate of title,
and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the
right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate
of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee
simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor
of the National Government, province, city,
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal
expenses incident to the memorandum of registration
or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the
account of the authority taking the land or interest
therein." (Italics supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may
also be registered pursuant to existing laws.

AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the
Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila
Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture
with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the
earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under its
1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint
venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the
issuance and delivery of the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share on
the name of AMARI." 107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of
thepublic domain except by lease." the transfer of title and ownership to AMARI
clearly means that AMARI will "hold' the reclaimed lands other than by
lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed
lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141, 108 the
Government Auditing Code, 109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of
the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands
reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private
parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent
potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of
the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be
distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To insure such
equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or
seek to circumvent the conditional ban on alienation of lands of
the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risks.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows;
1.The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising
the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA,
are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA
may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands
to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2.The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of
the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15
hectares of submerged areas areinalienable
and outside the commerce of man.
3.Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares 110 of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
4.Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares 111 of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim
these submerged areas. Thereafter, the
government can classify the reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable, and further
declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of
thepublic domain to AMARI will be void in
view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution. under Article 1409 112 of the Civil Code, contracts
whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside
the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The
Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and
therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio. EcICDT
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of
whether the Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity
to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last
issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared
NULL and VOID ab initio. HSIaAT
SO ORDERED.






[G.R. Nos. 113250-52. January 14, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
TEOTIMO MAGPANTAY, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff appellee.
PAO for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Teotimo Magpantay was charged for three counts of rape by his 15-year old
daughter Ronalyn Magpantay which happened in May, June and July, 1991. After
trial Teotimo was convicted as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnity the victim the sum of P50,000.00 in each
case. The conviction was based on the testimony of the victim as corroborated
by the testimony of her mother, Estrella Magpantay.
In this appeal Teotimo assails the credibility of his wife Estrella as he insists on
his defense that the accusations hurled against him are mere concoctions of his
wife to get even with him after he caught her committing an act of infidelity in
flagrante delicto.
In affirming the decision of the trial court in toto, the Supreme Court ruled that
there is no indication that the trial court erred in refusing to give credence to the
alleged motive of accused-appellant's wife to concoct such an accusation of rape
against him. The trial court correctly found accused-appellant's claim to be highly
preposterous and unworthy of belief. Testimonial evidence is weighed in
accordance with the standard used.
Further, the dictum which states that "blood is thicker than water" is still very
true in the Filipino culture. It is inconceivable that Ronalyn would falsely point an
accusing finger at her own father for a crime as serious as rape only to please her
mother. This is plainly incredible. DTSaIc
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; CONSTRUED. In law, the
term alibi has a specific technical meaning. It is a plea of having been elsewhere
than at the place of the commission of the crime at the time of its commission.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO BE APPRECIATED. The requisite elements for
alibi to be appreciated are: (a) to prove his presence at another place at the time
of the perpetration of the offense and (b) to demonstrate that it would thus be
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. Dayson,
242 SCRA 124 [1995]).
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSESSMENT OF WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONY BEST LEFT TO
THE TRIAL COURT. Well-settled is the principle that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best left to the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People
vs. Ambrog, G.R. No. 104666, February 12, 1997).
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS NOT EASY TO CONVINCE A YOUNG GIRL TO HAVE HERSELF
PHYSICALLY EXAMINED AND UNDERGO THE ORDEAL OF A PUBLIC TRIAL FOR
RAPE AGAINST HER FATHER IF SHE WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY DESIRE TO SEEK
JUSTICE. It is not easy to convince a young girl such as Ronalyn, then only
fifteen years of age, to have herself physically examined and thereafter undergo
the ordeals of a public trial for rape against her very own father if she was not
motivated by her desire to seek justice. (People vs. Sanchez [250 SCRA 14 1995]).
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ACCORDED
GREAT RESPECT ON APPEAL. The trial court's findings based on the evidence
presented by the accused-appellant for his defense is likewise give great respect
by this Court. There is no indication that the trial court erred in refusing to give
credence to the alleged motive of accused-appellant's wife to concoct such an
accusation of rape against him. The trial court correctly found accused-
appellant's claim in this regard to be highly preposterous and unworthy of belief.
Testimonial evidence is weighed in accordance with the standard used.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J p:
Accused-appellant implores this Court to admit the possibility that his first-born
daughter had simply concocted a false accusation of three counts of rape against
him upon the instigation of the mother, for which crimes he, upon final
conviction, may be made to live behind bars for the rest of his life. This
proposition defies rhyme and reason and is, therefore, rather difficult to accept.
We are not ready to substitute the conviction in this case for an acquittal.
Three separate Informations were filed before the court a quo which charged
three counts of rape against accused-appellant committed against his 15-year-
old daughter Ronalyn Magpantay, in May, June, and July 1991 as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1152-M
That in or about the month of May, 1991 in the
Municipality of Tanay, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with his own daughter Ronalyn Magpantay y Montales
against her will and consent. cdll
(p. 1, Record, Crim. Case No. 1152-M.)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1153-M
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1991 in the
Municipality of Tanay, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
his own daughter Ronalyn Magpantay y Montales
against her will and consent.
(p. 1, Record, Crim. Case No. 1153-M.)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1154-M
That on or about the 3rd day of July, 1991 in the
Municipality of Tanay, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with his own daughter Ronalyn Magpantay y Montales
against her will and consent.
(p. 1, Record, Crim. Case No. 1154-M.)
At the arraignment conducted on September 1, 1992, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty. From the evidence presented during the joint trial of three cases, the
trial court summarized the prosecution's version as follows:
One day in the month of May 1991 while Estrella
Magpantay was at her place of work weeding in a
caingin, accused instructed Ronalyn's younger brother
and sisters to get out of the house and while outside,
accused got a knife, poked it at the neck of Ronalyn and
then directed her to undress. With the knifed poked at
her neck and at the same time threatening to kill her
she removed her T-shirt and short leaving her bra and
panty on. Accused began kissing Ronalyn on the cheek,
lips, breast and her private organ with the knife still
poked on her neck while his left hand was removing the
bra and panty. After removing the panty, accused
inserted his private organ into Ronalyn's vagina and
while being inserted, Ronalyn felt pains. After finishing
the sexual act, he instructed Ronalyn to dress up and
warned her not to tell anybody including the mother or
else they will be killed.
Then on June 28, 1991 Ronalyn was again sexually
abused with the use of a knife, followed on July 3, 1991.
On July 3, 1991, the mother of Ronalyn and one of the
children left their house to wash clothes in a river. Left
in the house were the accused, Ronalyn and the three
small children. At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning,
accused instructed the brother and two sisters of
Ronalyn to bring food to their mother. Accused and
Ronalyn were the ones left in the house. Accused with a
knifed poked at Ronalyn's neck instructed her to
remove her clothes. She tried to refuse but cannot do
anything. She reluctantly removed her clothes and after
removing them, accused took off the bra and panty. He
started touching Ronalyn's private organ and kissed it.
Thereafter, accused inserted his penis into the private
organ of Ronalyn. After finishing the sexual act, he told
Ronalyn to dress up. This time her brother Michael saw
them but left for fear of the accused.
The incident of June 28, 1991 was seen by the mother
of Ronalyn while the July 3, 1991 incident was seen by
Michael. Ronalyn's mother corroborated her testimony.
Dr. Vladimir E. Villaseor of the PNP Laboratory,
Service, Camp Crame, Quezon City, upon examining the
genitalia of Ronalyn shows healed lacerations at 9:00
o'clock, 3:00 o'clock, 5:00 o'clock, and 6:00 o'clock
(Exhibit "C").
(pp. 81-82 Record.)
After due proceedings, a judgment of conviction dated October 22, 1993 was
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region (Branch 79)
stationed at Morong, Rizal, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Teotimo Magpantay is hereby
sentenced:
1.in Criminal Case No. 1152 to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Ronalyn
Magpantay the sum of P50,000.00;
2.in Criminal Case No. 1153 to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Ronalyn
Magpantay the sum of P50,000.00; and
3.in Criminal Case No. 1154 to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify Ronalyn
Magpantay the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 85, Record.)
Upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal dated November 16, 1993, the lower court
ordered the elevation of the record of the case to this Court, but, because the
same could not be completed, some of the transcripts of stenographic notes
having been destroyed when the old court room housing Branch 79 was burned
down, the Court ordered said regional trial court to retake the testimony of the
witnesses who testified during the hearings on the dates of the missing
transcripts. Upon completion of the transcripts on October 16, 1996, accused-
appellant was ordered to file his brief with which he complied on March 14,
1997. The appellee's brief was filed on October 15, 1997. On November 6, 1997,
counsel for accused-appellant manifested that no reply brief is intended to be
filed. The case is now ripe for decision after some delay through no fault of
anybody. prLL
Accused-appellant assigns a single alleged error bearing on his alibi, which
according to him is the only available defense. However, in the four-page
argument portion of his brief, accused-appellant assails the credibility of witness
Estrella Montales Magpantay, the victim's mother, and the expert witness, Dr.
Vladimir Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory Services, without making any
point on the matter of alibi which the trial court allegedly disregarded.

In law, the term alibi has a specific technical meaning. It is a plea of having been
elsewhere than at the place of the commission of the crime at the time of its
commission. The requisite elements for alibi to be appreciated are: (a) to prove
his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and
(b) to demonstrate that it would thus be physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime (People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]).
Accused-appellant apparently used the term alibi in its loose meaning which is as
an excuse offered for the exoneration from an offense. Thus, he strikes at the
credibility of Estrella Magpantay, his wife and the victim's mother. He insists that
the accusations hurled against him are mere concoctions of his wife, Estrella, to
get even with him after he caught her committing an act of infidelity in flagrante
delicto.
We do not subscribe to accused-appellant's arguments. We are inclined to affirm
the judgment of conviction in toto, considering that the basic principles
applicable to the case at bench clearly militate against accused-appellant's
position, which pertains essentially to credibility of witnesses.
Well-settled is the principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimony is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, G.R. No.
104666, February 12, 1997).
Obviously aware of this principle, the trial court became true to its role in
assessing the credibility of witnesses and paid close attention to the demeanor
of the principal witness, the victim herself. Observations such as these cannot be
gleaned from the pages of the transcript of stenographic notes which are all that
are available to this Court upon review. Thus, we find relevance in the trial
court's factual findings, to wit:
Complainant Ronalyn Magpantay was fifteen (15) years
old in May 1991 when sexually abused for the first time
by her own father who is the accused in these cases.
She has not started experiencing her monthly sickness
(tsn. page 13, January 6, 1993). The narration made by
Ronalyn of how she was raped by her own father first in
May, then on June 28, and the third on July 3, all in
1991 appears credible and worthy of belief. The court
noted that while testifying she answers questions asked
of her both in direct and cross-examination in a straight
forward manner, often times with tears on her eyes and
more often than not with a disdain look towards her
father. She appears no longer humiliated and
embarrassed in narrating all that were necessary only to
show that she was raped. She is young, decent, shy and
soft-spoken. She is not the type of a woman who will
admit before the eyes of the public that she has been
criminally ravished if there is no truth to what she was
narrating, for her natural instinct would be to protect
her honor . . .
(pp. 82-83, Record.)
The trial court correctly applied our ruling in the case of People vs. Caballes (199
SCRA 152 [1991]) where we held:
Given complainant's naivete and inexperience in
matters of sexuality, it was improbable that she would
fabricate matters about the rapes committed against
her person and concoct lies against her own father,
knowing fully well the seriousness of such charges, even
granting that she harbored abhorrence for his ways,
and run the risk of subjecting herself to humiliating and
embarrassing scrutiny wrought by a public trial. We
have repeatedly held that when a woman testifies that
she has been raped, she says all that is necessary to
signify that the crime has been committed. For no
young decent Filipina woman would publicly admit that
she had been criminally ravished unless that is the
truth, for her natural instinct is to protect her honor,
and unless motivated by an honest desire to seek
justice.
(p. 164.)
It is not easy to convince a young girl such as Ronalyn, then only fifteen years of
age, to have herself physically examined and thereafter undergo the ordeals of a
public trial for rape against her very own father if she was not motivated by her
desire to seek justice. In People vs. Sanchez (250 SCRA 14 [1995]), the Court
ruled:
. . . no woman especially one who is of tender age
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter permit
herself to be subjected to a public trial, if she is not
motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. Cdpr
(p. 23.)
The trial courts findings based on the evidence presented by the accused-
appellant for his defense is likewise given great respect by this Court. There is no
indication that the trial court erred in refusing to give credence to the alleged
motive of accused-appellant's wife to concoct such an accusation of rape against
him. The trial court correctly found accused-appellant's claim in this regard to be
highly preposterous and unworthy of belief. Testimonial evidence is weighed in
accordance with the standard used. In People vs. Baquiran (20 SCRA 451 [1967]),
where we held:
. . . It is a legal truism that evidence to be believed,
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself. Human
perception can be warped by the impact of events and
testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the
mind. No better test has yet been found to massacre
the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to
the knowledge and common experience of mankind . . .
(p. 454.)
The alibi referred to by the accused-appellant in his brief consists in his having
caught his wife in flagrante delicto having sex with another person inside their
bathroom. This was followed by a heated argument between the spouses which
included physical violence as well. According to accused-appellant, his wife left
the conjugal dwelling that night with a threat that she would do everything in
order to make him pay for what he did. In plain and simple words, accused-
appellant wants to impress upon the Court that his wife made good her threat
by pressing charges for rape. This means convincing her daughter to concoct the
story of rape, to force her to allow the physical examination of her private parts,
and to undergo the trauma of a public trial all this in order to put away
accused-appellant and make him rot in jail for the rest of his life. This is very hard
for this Court to believe. The dictum which states that "blood is thicker than
water" is still very true in the Filipino culture. It is inconceivable that Ronalyn
would falsely point an accusing finger at her own father for a crime as serious as
rape only to please her mother. This is plainly incredible.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the conviction by the trial court for all three
cases are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 152115. January 26, 2005.]
NIMFA USERO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA POLINAR, respondents.
[G.R. No. 155055. January 26, 2005.]
LUTGARDA R. SAMELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPS. HERMINIGILDO & CECILIA
POLINAR, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J p:
Before this Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 152115,
filed by Nimfa Usero, assails the September 19, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 64718. The second petition, docketed as G.R. No.
155055, filed by Lutgarda R. Samela, assails the January 11, 2002 decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP NO. 64181.
The undisputed facts follow.
Petitioners Lutgarda R. Samela and Nimfa Usero are the owners respectively of
lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Golden Acres Subdivision, Barrio Almanza, Las Pias City.
Private respondent spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land
at no. 18 Anahaw St., Pilar Village, Las Pias City, behind the lots of petitioners
Samela and Usero.
Situated between the lots of the parties is a low-level strip of land, with a
stagnant body of water filled with floating water lilies; abutting and
perpendicular to the lot of petitioner Samela, the lot of the Polinars and the low-
level strip of land is the perimeter wall of Pilar Village Subdivision. DCcIaE
Apparently, every time a storm or heavy rains occur, the water in said strip of
land rises and the strong current passing through it causes considerable damage
to the house of respondent Polinars. Frustrated by their predicament, private
respondent spouses, on July 30, 1998, erected a concrete wall on the bank of the
low-level strip of land about three meters from their house and rip-rapped the
soil on that portion of the strip of land.
Claiming ownership of the subject strip of land, petitioners Samela and Usero
demanded that the spouses Apolinar stop their construction but the spouses
paid no heed, believing the strip to be part of a creek. Nevertheless, for the sake
of peace, the Polinars offered to pay for the land being claimed by petitioners
Samela and Usero. However, the parties failed to settle their differences.
On November 9, 1998, petitioners filed separate complaints for forcible entry
against the Polinars at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City. The case
filed by petitioner Samela was docketed as Civil Case No. 5242, while that of
petitioner Usero was docketed as Civil Case No. 5243.
In Civil Case No. 5242, petitioner Samela adduced in evidence a copy of her
Transfer Certificate of Title, plan of consolidation, subdivision survey, the tax
declaration in her name, and affidavits of petitioner Usero and a certain Justino
Gamela whose property was located beside the perimeter wall of Pilar Village.
The spouses Polinar, on the other hand, presented in evidence their own TCT; a
barangay certification as to the existence of the creek; a certification from the
district engineer that the western portion of Pilar Village is bound by a tributary
of Talon Creek throughout its entire length; boundary and index map of Pilar
Village showing that the village is surrounded by a creek and that the Polinar
property is situated at the edge of said creek; and pictures of the subject strip of
land filled with water lilies.
On March 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner
Samela:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment
ordering the defendants to vacate and remove at their
expense the improvements made on the subject lot;
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a
month as reasonable compensation for the use of the
portion encroached from the filing of the complaint
until the same is finally vacated; and to pay plaintiff
P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of
suit. 3
In a parallel development, the Metropolitan Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243,
issued an order on February 29, 2000, directing petitioner Usero and the Polinar
spouses to commission a professional geodetic engineer to conduct a relocation
survey and to submit the report to the trial court.
On April 24, 2000, Mariano Flotilde, a licensed geodetic engineer, conducted a
relocation survey of Usero's property covered by TCT No. T-29545. The result of
the said relocation survey, as stated in his affidavit, was as follows:
1.That I executed a relocation survey of Lot 2, Block 5,
(LRC) PCS-4463 covered by TCT No. T-29545 registered
in the name of Nimfa O. Usero;
2.That according to my survey, I found out that there is
no existing creek on the boundary of the said lot;
3.That based on the relocation plan surveyed by the
undersigned, attached herewith, appearing is the
encroachment on the above-mentioned lot by Spouses
Herminigildo and Cecilia Polinar with an area of FORTY
THREE (43) SQUARE METERS;
4.That this affidavit was made in compliance with Court
Order dated February 23, 2000 of Metropolitan Trial
Court, Las Pias City, Branch LXXIX. 4
On August 25, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of petitioner
Usero:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering them:
a)To vacate and remove at their expense the
improvement made on the subject lot;
b)To pay the plaintiff P1,000.00 a month as reasonable
compensation for the portion encroached from the
time of the filing of the complaint until the same is
finally vacated;
c)To pay plaintiff P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney's
fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Polinar spouses appealed the decisions of the two Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias, Branch 253 which heard the appeals
separately.TEcHCA
On December 20, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, deciding Civil Case No. 5242,
reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint. It confirmed the existence of the creek between the northwestern
portion of the lot of petitioner Samela and the southwestern portion of the lot of
the spouses Polinar:
Finding the existence of a creek between the respective
properties of the parties, plaintiff-appellee cannot
therefore lay claim of lawful ownership of that portion
because the same forms part of public dominion.
Consequently, she cannot legally stop the defendants-
appellants from rip-rapping the bank of the creek to
protect the latter's property from soil erosion thereby
avoiding danger to their lives and damage to property.
Absent a lawful claim by the plaintiff-appellee over the
subject portion of that lot, defendants-appellants are
not duty bound to pay the former compensation for the
use of the same. As a result, they may maintain the said
improvements introduced thereon subject to existing
laws, rules and regulations and/or ordinances
appurtenant thereto.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
rendered by Branch 79 of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Las Pias is REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant
complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 6
On March 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court, in Civil Case No. 5243, also reversed
the finding of the Municipal Trial Court:
From the foregoing, defendants-appellants may
maintain the improvements introduced on the subject
portion of the lot subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations and/or ordinances pertaining thereto.
Consequently, no compensation may be awarded in
favor of the plaintiff-appellee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-
mentioned Decision rendered by Branch 79 of the Las
Pias City Metropolitan Trial Court is REVERSED.
Accordingly, the instant complaint is DISMISSED.
From the adverse decisions of the Regional Trial Court, petitioners filed their
respective petitions for review on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
Samela's case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP 64181 while that of petitioner Usero
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP 64718.
Both petitions failed in the CA. Thus the instant consolidated petitions.
The pivotal issue in the case at bar is whether or not the disputed strip of land,
allegedly encroached upon by the spouses Polinar, is the private property of
petitioners or part of the creek and therefore part of the public domain. Clearly
this an issue which calls for a review of facts already determined by the Court of
Appeals.
The jurisdiction of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. 7 This is
obviously not the case here. aEcDTC
A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the assailed decisions are founded
on sufficient evidence. That the subject strip of land is a creek is evidenced by:
(1) a barangay certification that a creek exists in the disputed strip of land; (2) a
certification from the Second Manila Engineering District, NCR-DPWH, that the
western portion of Pilar Village where the subject strip of land is located is
bounded by a tributary of Talon Creek and (3) photographs showing the
abundance of water lilies in the subject strip of land. The Court of Appeals was
correct: the fact that water lilies thrive in that strip of land can only mean that
there is a permanent stream of water or creek there.
In contrast, petitioners failed to present proof sufficient to support their claim.
Petitioners presented the TCTs of their respective lots to prove that there is no
creek between their properties and that of the Polinars. However, an
examination of said TCTs reveals that the descriptions thereon are incomplete. In
petitioner Samela's TCT No. T-30088, there is no boundary description relative to
the northwest portion of the property pertaining to the site of the creek.
Likewise in TCT No. T-22329-A of the spouses Polinar, the southeast portion
which pertains to the site of the creek has no described boundary. Moreover the
tax declaration presented by petitioner is devoid of any entry on the "west
boundary" vis-a-vis the location of the creek. All the pieces of evidence taken
together, we can only conclude that the adjoining portion of these boundaries is
in fact a creek and belongs to no one but the state.

Property is either of public dominion or of private
ownership. 8 Concomitantly, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 420.The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use, such as
roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
The phrase "others of similar character" includes a creek which is a recess or an
arm of a river. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not
susceptible to private ownership. 9 Being public water, a creek cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. 10 HAIaEc
Accordingly, the Polinar spouses may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek
to prevent the erosion of their property.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby denied. The assailed
decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 64181 and CA-G.R. SP 64718 are
affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.


























[G.R. No. 24950. March 25, 1926.]
VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, defendant-appellee.
Arroyo & Evangelista for appellant.
Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1.MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION.
The property of a municipality, whether real or personal, necessary for
governmental purposes cannot be attached and sold at public auction to
satisfy a judgment against the municipality.
2.ID.; ID.; PROPERTY EXEMPT. Auto trucks used by a
municipality in sprinkling its streets, its police patrol automobile, police
stations, and public markets, together with the land on which they stand,
are exempt from execution.
3.ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS. Where after judgment is entered
again municipality, the latter has no property subject to execution the
creditor's remedy for collecting his judgment is mandamus.
D E C I S I O N
VILLAMOR, J p:
It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued
the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the
purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of
592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square
meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said
street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality
to pay the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said
judgment was on appeal affirmed by this court.
On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable
to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue
against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff
attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used
as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and Mandurriao.
After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a
few days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with
the Court of First Instance praying that the attachment on the said
property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void
as being illegal and violative of the rights of the defendant municipality.
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the fiscal's motion but the court,
by order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied upon the
aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null and void,
thereby dissolving the said attachment.
From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions.
The fundamental question raised by appellant in her four assignments of
error is whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution.
The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code,
provides that:
"Municipalities are political bodies
corporate, and as such are endowed with the faculties
of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and
through their respective municipal government in
conformity with law.
"It shall be competent for them, in their
proper corporate name, to sue and be sued, to contract
and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real and
personal property for municipal purposes, and generally
to exercise the powers hereinafter specified or
otherwise conferred upon them by law."
For the purposes of the matter here in question, the
Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property that a
municipality may acquire. However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the
property of provinces and (municipalities) into property for public use and
patrimonial property. According to article 344 of the Code, provincial roads
and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, drives and
public improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said
towns or provinces, are property for public use.
All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is
patrimonial and shall be subject to the provision of the Civil Code except as
provided by special laws.
Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In
accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we must distinguish,
as to the patrimonial property of the towns, "between that of common
benefit and that which is private property of the town. The first differs
from property for public use in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is
limited to neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and furthermore, such
use, more or less general, is not intrinsic with this kind of property, for by
its very nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property. The
third group, that is, private property, is used in the name of the town or
province by the entities representing it and, like any private property,
giving a source of revenue."
Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance in this
jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying the functions of a
municipality under the American rule. Notwithstanding this, we believe
that the principle governing property of the public domain of the State is
applicable to property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal
property is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public
use of the State is not within the commerce of man and, consequently, is
unalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public
use of the municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it is
used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.
The American Law is more explicit about this matter as
expounded by McQuillin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3, paragraph
1160, where he says that:
"State statutes often provide that court
houses, jails other buildings owned by municipalities
and the lots on which they stand shall be exempt from
attachment and execution. But independent of express
statutory exemption, as a general proposition, property,
real and personal, held by municipal corporations, in
trust for the benefit of their inhabitants, and used for
public purposes, is exempt.
"For example, public buildings, school
houses, streets, squares, parks, wharves, engines and
engine houses, and the like, are not subject to
execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors
carried in a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason
for the exemption is obvious. Municipal corporations
are created for public purposes and for the good of the
citizens in their aggregate or public capacity. That they
may properly discharge such public functions corporate
property and revenues are essential, and to deny them
these means the very purpose of their creation would
be materially impeded, and in some instances
practically destroy it. Respecting this subject the
Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked: 'On the first view
of this question there is something very repugnant to
the moral sense in the idea that a municipal corporation
should contract debts, and that having no resources but
the taxes which are due to it these should not be
subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its
creditors. This consideration, deduced from the
principles of moral equity has only given way to the
more enlarged contemplation of the great and
paramount interests of public order and the principles
of government.'
"It is generally held that property owned by
a municipality, where not used for a public purpose but
for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution on a
judgment against the municipality, and may be sold.
This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a
municipal corporation and the like. But the mere fact
that corporate property held for public uses is being
temporarily used for private purposes does not make it
subject to execution.
"If municipal property exempt from
execution is destroyed, the insurance money stands in
lieu thereof and is also exempt.
"The members or inhabitants of a municipal
corporation proper are not personally liable for the
debts of the municipality, except that in the New
England States the individual liability of the inhabitant is
generally maintained."
In Corpus Juris, vol. 23, page 355, the following is found:
"Where property of a municipal or other
public corporation is sought to be subjected to
execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such
corporation, the question as to whether such property
is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and
purposes for which it is held. The rule is that property
held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets,
squares, parks, promenades, wharves landing places,
fire engines, hose and hose carriages. engine houses,
public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally
everything held for governmental purposes, is not
subject to levy and sale under execution against such
corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the hands
of a public officer. Likewise it has been held that taxes
due to a municipal corporation or county cannot be
seized under execution by a creditor of such
corporation. But where a municipal corporation or
county owns in its proprietary, as distinguished from its
public or governmental capacity, property not useful or
used for a public purpose but for quasi private
purposes, the general rule is that such property may be
seized and sold under execution against the
corporation, precisely as similar property of individuals
is seized and sold. But property held for public purposes
is not subject to execution merely because it is
temporarily used for private purposes, although if the
public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to
execution. Whether or not property held as public
property is necessary for the public use is a political,
rather than a judicial question."
In the case of City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction
Co., Ltd. (140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf for
unloading sugar and molasses, open to the public, was property for the
public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment
for the payment of the debts of the said city.

In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of
land adjacent to the Mississippi River where all shipments of sugar and
molasses taken to New Orleans were unloaded.
That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction
Company, Ltd., in order that it might erect warehouses so that the
merchandise upon discharge might not be spoiled by the elements. The
said company was given the privilege of charging certain fees for storing
merchandise in the said warehouses and the public in general had the right
to unload sugar and molasses there by paying the required fees, 10 per
cent of which was turned over to the city treasury.
The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the
wharf was public property, that it never ceased to be such in order to
become private property of the City; wherefore the company could not
levy execution upon the wharf in order to collect the amount of the
judgment rendered in favor thereof.
In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U S., 149; 25 Law.
ed., 430), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a public wharf
on the banks of the Mississippi River was public property and not subject to
execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said
wharf was located.
In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River,
which formerly was the shore of the river and which later enlarged itself by
accession, was converted into wharf by the city for public use, who charged
a certain fee for its use.
It was held that land was public property as necessary as a
public street and was not subject to execution on account of the debts of
the city. It was further held that the fees collected were also exempt from
execution because they were a part of the income of the city.
In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of
Guinobatan (32 Phil., 654), the question raised was whether for the
payment of a debt to a third person by the concessionaire of a public
market, the said public market could be attached and sold at public
auction. The Supreme Court held that:
"Even though a creditor is unquestionably
entitled to recover out of his debtor's property, yet
when among such property there is included the special
right granted by the Government of usufruct in a
building intended for a public service, and when this
privilege is closely related to a service of a public
character, such right of the creditor to the collection of
a debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said
special privilege of usufruct in a public market is not
absolute and may be exercised only through the action
of a court of justice with respect to the profits or
revenue obtained under the special right of usufruct
enjoyed by debtor.
"The special concession of the right to
usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like any
ordinary right, because that would be to permit a
person who has contracted with the state or with the
administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage
a service of a public character, to be substituted,
without the knowledge and consent of the
administrative authorities, by one who took no part in
the contract, thus giving rise to the possibility of the
regular course of a public service being disturbed by the
more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice
of the state and the public interests.
"The privilege or franchise granted to a
private person to enjoy the usufruct of a public market
cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor of
such person can recover his debt only out of the income
or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment
or usufruct of the said privilege, in the same manner
that the rights of the creditors of a railroad company
can be exercised and their creditors collected only out
of the gross receipts remaining after deduction has
been made therefrom of the operating expenses of the
road. (Law of November 12, 1869, extended to the
overseas provinces by the royal order of August 3,
1886.)"
For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted we
believe that this court would have reached the same conclusion if the
debtor had been the municipality of Guinobatan and the public market had
been levied upon by virtue of the execution.
It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a
municipality, necessary for governmental purposes, may not be attached
and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The
supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which
such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for government service
justifies that the property of public use of the municipality be exempt from
execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private
individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted
authorities, is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page 467,
Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:
"Municipal corporations are instituted by the
supreme authority of a state for the public good. They
exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a portion of
the sovereign power. The main object of their creation
is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to
provide for the police and local government of certain
designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end
they are invested with certain governmental powers
and charged with civil, political, and municipal duties.
To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers
and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the
authority to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and
subordinately by other modes, as by licenses, fines, and
penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the
essential means by which it is enabled to perform its
appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequated
supply of revenue, such a corporation is practically
destroyed, and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based
upon considerations of this character, it is the settled
doctrine of the law that not only the public-property
but also the taxes and public revenues of such
corporations cannot be seized under execution against
them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it.
Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The
doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by
the creditor is maintained, although the corporation is
in debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes
which it is authorized to collect."
Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of
the court a quo that the proper remedy for collecting the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff was by way of mandamus.
While this question is not necessarily included in the one which
is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that the holding of the trial
court, assigned as error by appellant's counsel, is true when, after a
judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has no property subject to
execution. This doctrine is maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations
vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the decisions of several States of the
Union upholding the same principle and which are cited on page 2679 of
the aforesaid work. In this sense this assignment of error, we believe, is
groundless.
By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from
should be and is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns,
Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Footnotes















[G.R. No. L-24440. March 28, 1968.]
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, defendants-appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M .T . Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Solicitor General for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONVERSION INTO AN
ORDINARY ACTION. Assuming that the law had already been violated and that
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, sec. 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the conversion of a petition for declaratory relief into an ordinary
action.
2.MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; EXTENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY. The principle is this: If the property is owned by the
municipal corporation or municipality in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it; if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress
has no absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation.
3.ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO TWO NORMS PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE AND THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. The capacity in which the property is held is
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. There are two norms,
i.e., of the Civil Code and of the law of Municipal Corporations in classifying
whether municipal properties are patrimonial or public.
4.ID.; ID.; UNDER CIVIL CODE, ALL MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES EXCEPT THOSE
ENUMERATED IN ART. 424 ARE PATRIMONIAL. The Civil Code classification is
found in articles 423 and 424 of the same Code. Under Art. 424, property for
public, use, consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public works for public
service paid for by said municipal corporations. All other property possessed by
any of them is patrimonial and is governed by the Code without prejudice to
provisions of special laws. Under this classification, all the properties in question
save two lots used as High School playgrounds are patrimonial properties of
Zamboanga Province; this includes the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium
sites, and the school sites which are patrimonial as they are not for public use.
They fall outside the phrase "public works for public service" because under
the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and for the
indiscriminate use by anyone.
5.ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES UNDER MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW. Under the norm provided for by the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those properties which are devoted to public service are
deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
6.ID.; ID.; BUILDINGS EXISTING ON LOTS PARTAKE OF NATURE OF THE LATTER.
Although the records do not show whether the buildings on the lots in question
were constructed at the expense of the municipal corporation, since said
buildings were constructed even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act 39
in 1936 and the provinces then had no power to authorize construction of
buildings at their own expense, it is presumed that the buildings were erected by
national funds, In this case, Congress could dispose of said buildings in the same
manner as it did with the lots in question. And even assuming that provincial
funds were used in their construction, the buildings are mere accessories to the
lands which are public, and so they follow the nature of the lands, i.e., public.
Moreover, although located in the city, the buildings are not for the exclusive
use and benefit of city residents but also for provincial residents, wherefore the
province is not really deprived of its benefits.
7.ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL PROPERTY HELD AND DEVOTED TO PUBLIC SERVICE IS NOT
IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS ORDINARY PRIVATE PROPERTY. The controversy is
more along the domains of the law of Municipal Corporations
State vs. Province than along that of Civil Law. The Court is not inclined to
hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same
category as ordinary private property. Else, the consequences are dire. As
ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached, they can be
acquired thru adverse possession - to the detriment of the local community.
8.ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION CANNOT CONVERT PUBLIC PROPERTY INTO PRIVATE
PROPERTY. The fact that the lots used for government purposes are registered
is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
9.ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTIES UNDER CIVIL CODE, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO PROVISIONS OF LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. The
classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities
as patrimonial under art. 424 of the Civil Code is without prejudice to provisions
of special laws. For purposes of this article, the law of Municipal Corporations is
considered as "special laws." Hence, the classification of municipal property
devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the
Civil Code classification in this particular case.
10.ID.; NO LACHES UNDER FACTS OF THE CASE. Under Commonwealth Act No.
39, sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct province of Zamboanga
arose only in 1948 when the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in
issue. In 1951, when the Cabinet transferred the properties for free to
Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof was sought on time. In 1952, the old
province was dissolved and as successor-in-interest to over half of the
properties, Zamboanga del Norte obtained a reconsideration of the cabinet
resolution of 1959 and in fact partial payments were later made. It was only after
the enactment of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose
and since plaintiff brought suit in 1962 all these facts negative laches.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used
to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12,
1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that
"Buildings and properties which the province shall
abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General."
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually
by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can
be gleaned from the records 1 said properties were being utilized as follows
No. of LotsUse
1Capitol Site
3School Site
3Hospital Site
3Leprosarium
1Curuan School
1Trade School
2Burleigh School
2High School Playground
9Burleighs
1Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1San Roque
23vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act
286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the
capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and
buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. 3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to
how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between
the two new ones, Sec. 6 of the law provided:
"Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General."
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned
the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as
follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del
Sur, Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54,39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or
P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should
be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by
Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13,
1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for
P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for
the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the
quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year
1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the
province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50
of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that
"All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located within the
City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of
charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga."
(Stressed for emphasis)

Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments
to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of
Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been
returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5,
1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be
declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without
due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's nights and obligations under
said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of 57,373.46 to defendant
City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction
as prayed for. After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On
August 12, 1963, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional in so far as it
deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of titles
(Exhibits 'A' to 'A-49') in the name of the defunct
province of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of
Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P704,220.05, payment thereof to be deducted from its
regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent
to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall
have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of
Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly
internal revenue allotment for defendant City of
Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.00
shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte to execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant
City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under the certificates of tide
(Exhibits 'A' to 'A-49') upon payment by the latter of the
aforesaid sum of P704,220.00 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and
declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory
injunction issued on June 8, 1967, pursuant to the order
of the Court dated June 47 1962. No costs are assessed
against the defendant.
"It is SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff
province fled a motion to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered
instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over
defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff province motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the propriety of declaratory
relief filed in the lower court on the assertion that the law had already been
violated and that plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming the
same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings
to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the more important and principal
question of the validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and
buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of
legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the
municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial
and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation. 6
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to
which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil
Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in
classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide.
"ART. 423.The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities, is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial properly."
"ART. 424.Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." (Stressed
for emphasis)
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2)
lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capitol site, the hospital
and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for
they are not for public use. They would not fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such
public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art. 424. 7 The
playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. This was the norm applied by
the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was without
jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of
Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that
the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification
regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are
not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the
chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2)
lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting
the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question
which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc. 10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) Hinunangan v.
Director of Lands, 11 where it was stated that ". . . where the municipality has
occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court
house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal
building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from
the State in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule
may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes . .
." (2) Viuda de Tantoco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo 12 held that municipal
properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the
auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots
used as markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since
they were not patrimonial properties. (3) Municipality of Batangas v.
Cantos, 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to
school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of
a municipality.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots
used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites
and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were
held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and
therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as
public property are the following:
TCT NumberLot NumberUse
22204-BCapitol Site
2816149School Site
32811224Hospital Site
32821226Hospital Site
32831225Hospital Site
3748434-A-1School Site
5406171School Site
5564168High School
Playground
5567157 & 158Trade School
15583167High School
Playground
6181(O.C.T.)Curuan School
11942926Leprosarium
11943927Leprosarium
11944925Leprosarium
5557170Burleigh School
5562180Burleigh School
5565172-BBurleigh
5570171-ABurleigh
5571172-CBurleigh
5572174Burleigh
5573178Burleigh
5585171-BBurleigh
5586173Burleigh
5587172-ABurleigh
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each
other and in turn are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools
arc built as per records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence. there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute-
the the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools and partake of the
nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above- mentioned, the
records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the
former Province of Zamboanga, Considering however the fact that said buildings
must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was
enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize
construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National
Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of
said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.

But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute
mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the
nature of said lands, i.e., public Moreover, said buildings, those located in the
city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could
be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its
successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its
share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
Said lots are:
TCT NumberLot NumberUse
5577177Mydro, Magay
13198127-DSan Roque
5569169Burleigh 15
5558175Vacant
5559188"
5560183"
5561186"
5563191"
5566176"
5568179"
5574196"
5575181-A"
5576181-B"
5578182"
5579197"
5580195"
5581159-B"
5582194"
5584190"
5588184"
5589187"
5590189"
5591192"
5592193"
5593185"
73794147"
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that
the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more
along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations State v. Province
than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that
municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as
ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired
thru adverse possession all these to the detriment of the local community.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code is ". . . without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purposes of this article, the
principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered
as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification
in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are guilty of
laches is without merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of
action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after the
Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question. While in 1951, the
Cabinet resolved to transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga
City, a reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province
was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties
involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet
Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected subsequently and it
was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present
controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative
laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City
of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are
patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the valuation of
said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the
P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to
defendant was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only on June
17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the
law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a
completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately
returned by defendant City to plaintiff province. The remaining balance, if any, in
the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by
defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
Plaintiff's prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of
the first cause of action recited in the complaint 17 clearly shows that the relief
sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal
revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal
obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since
there has been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in
question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant
Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another
judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1)Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back
from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and
(2)Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of
whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial
properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of
Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by
the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C . J ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ ., concur.

























[G.R. No. L-24440. March 28, 1968.]
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, defendants-appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M .T . Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Solicitor General for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONVERSION INTO AN
ORDINARY ACTION. Assuming that the law had already been violated and that
plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, sec. 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the conversion of a petition for declaratory relief into an ordinary
action.
2.MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; EXTENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY. The principle is this: If the property is owned by the
municipal corporation or municipality in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it; if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress
has no absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation.
3.ID.; ID.; SUBJECT TO TWO NORMS PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE AND THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. The capacity in which the property is held is
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. There are two norms,
i.e., of the Civil Code and of the law of Municipal Corporations in classifying
whether municipal properties are patrimonial or public.
4.ID.; ID.; UNDER CIVIL CODE, ALL MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES EXCEPT THOSE
ENUMERATED IN ART. 424 ARE PATRIMONIAL. The Civil Code classification is
found in articles 423 and 424 of the same Code. Under Art. 424, property for
public, use, consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public works for public
service paid for by said municipal corporations. All other property possessed by
any of them is patrimonial and is governed by the Code without prejudice to
provisions of special laws. Under this classification, all the properties in question
save two lots used as High School playgrounds are patrimonial properties of
Zamboanga Province; this includes the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium
sites, and the school sites which are patrimonial as they are not for public use.
They fall outside the phrase "public works for public service" because under
the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and for the
indiscriminate use by anyone.
5.ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF MUNICIPAL PROPERTIES UNDER MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW. Under the norm provided for by the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those properties which are devoted to public service are
deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
6.ID.; ID.; BUILDINGS EXISTING ON LOTS PARTAKE OF NATURE OF THE LATTER.
Although the records do not show whether the buildings on the lots in question
were constructed at the expense of the municipal corporation, since said
buildings were constructed even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act 39
in 1936 and the provinces then had no power to authorize construction of
buildings at their own expense, it is presumed that the buildings were erected by
national funds, In this case, Congress could dispose of said buildings in the same
manner as it did with the lots in question. And even assuming that provincial
funds were used in their construction, the buildings are mere accessories to the
lands which are public, and so they follow the nature of the lands, i.e., public.
Moreover, although located in the city, the buildings are not for the exclusive
use and benefit of city residents but also for provincial residents, wherefore the
province is not really deprived of its benefits.
7.ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL PROPERTY HELD AND DEVOTED TO PUBLIC SERVICE IS NOT
IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS ORDINARY PRIVATE PROPERTY. The controversy is
more along the domains of the law of Municipal Corporations
State vs. Province than along that of Civil Law. The Court is not inclined to
hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same
category as ordinary private property. Else, the consequences are dire. As
ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached, they can be
acquired thru adverse possession - to the detriment of the local community.
8.ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION CANNOT CONVERT PUBLIC PROPERTY INTO PRIVATE
PROPERTY. The fact that the lots used for government purposes are registered
is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
9.ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTIES UNDER CIVIL CODE, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO PROVISIONS OF LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. The
classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities
as patrimonial under art. 424 of the Civil Code is without prejudice to provisions
of special laws. For purposes of this article, the law of Municipal Corporations is
considered as "special laws." Hence, the classification of municipal property
devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the
Civil Code classification in this particular case.
10.ID.; NO LACHES UNDER FACTS OF THE CASE. Under Commonwealth Act No.
39, sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct province of Zamboanga
arose only in 1948 when the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in
issue. In 1951, when the Cabinet transferred the properties for free to
Zamboanga City, a reconsideration thereof was sought on time. In 1952, the old
province was dissolved and as successor-in-interest to over half of the
properties, Zamboanga del Norte obtained a reconsideration of the cabinet
resolution of 1959 and in fact partial payments were later made. It was only after
the enactment of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy arose
and since plaintiff brought suit in 1962 all these facts negative laches.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used
to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12,
1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that
"Buildings and properties which the province shall
abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another
place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General."
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually
by Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can
be gleaned from the records 1 said properties were being utilized as follows
No. of LotsUse
1Capitol Site
3School Site
3Hospital Site
3Leprosarium
1Curuan School
1Trade School
2Burleigh School
2High School Playground
9Burleighs
1Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1San Roque
23vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act
286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave and making it the
capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and
buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. 3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to
how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between
the two new ones, Sec. 6 of the law provided:
"Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the province of
Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines,
upon the recommendation of the Auditor General."
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned
the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as
follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del
Sur, Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54,39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or
P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should
be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by
Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13,
1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for
P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for
the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the
quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year
1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the
province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50
of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that
"All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the
former province of Zamboanga and located within the
City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of
charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga."
(Stressed for emphasis)

Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments
to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of
Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been
returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5,
1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be
declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without
due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's nights and obligations under
said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and the Internal Revenue
Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of 57,373.46 to defendant
City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction
as prayed for. After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On
August 12, 1963, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional in so far as it
deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of titles
(Exhibits 'A' to 'A-49') in the name of the defunct
province of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of
Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P704,220.05, payment thereof to be deducted from its
regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent
to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall
have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of
Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly
internal revenue allotment for defendant City of
Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.00
shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte to execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant
City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under the certificates of tide
(Exhibits 'A' to 'A-49') upon payment by the latter of the
aforesaid sum of P704,220.00 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and
declaring permanent the preliminary mandatory
injunction issued on June 8, 1967, pursuant to the order
of the Court dated June 47 1962. No costs are assessed
against the defendant.
"It is SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff
province fled a motion to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered
instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over
defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff province motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the propriety of declaratory
relief filed in the lower court on the assertion that the law had already been
violated and that plaintiff sought to give it coercive effect, since assuming the
same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of the proceedings
to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the more important and principal
question of the validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and
buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of
legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a
province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the
municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental
capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial
and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it
without due process and payment of just compensation. 6
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to
which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil
Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in
classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide.
"ART. 423.The property of provinces, cities and
municipalities, is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial properly."
"ART. 424.Property for public use, in the provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works
for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
"All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." (Stressed
for emphasis)
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2)
lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial
properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capitol site, the hospital
and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for
they are not for public use. They would not fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such
public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art. 424. 7 The
playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. This was the norm applied by
the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was without
jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of
Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that
the capitol site and the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the classification
regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are
not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the
chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2)
lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting
the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question
which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain
patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc. 10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) Hinunangan v.
Director of Lands, 11 where it was stated that ". . . where the municipality has
occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court
house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal
building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from
the State in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule
may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes . .
." (2) Viuda de Tantoco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo 12 held that municipal
properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the
auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots
used as markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since
they were not patrimonial properties. (3) Municipality of Batangas v.
Cantos, 13 held squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to
school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of
a municipality.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots
used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites
and the high school playground sites a total of 24 lots since these were
held by the former Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and
therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as
public property are the following:
TCT NumberLot NumberUse
22204-BCapitol Site
2816149School Site
32811224Hospital Site
32821226Hospital Site
32831225Hospital Site
3748434-A-1School Site
5406171School Site
5564168High School
Playground
5567157 & 158Trade School
15583167High School
Playground
6181(O.C.T.)Curuan School
11942926Leprosarium
11943927Leprosarium
11944925Leprosarium
5557170Burleigh School
5562180Burleigh School
5565172-BBurleigh
5570171-ABurleigh
5571172-CBurleigh
5572174Burleigh
5573178Burleigh
5585171-BBurleigh
5586173Burleigh
5587172-ABurleigh
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each
other and in turn are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools
arc built as per records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence. there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute-
the the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools and partake of the
nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above- mentioned, the
records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the
former Province of Zamboanga, Considering however the fact that said buildings
must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was
enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize
construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National
Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of
said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question.

But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute
mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the
nature of said lands, i.e., public Moreover, said buildings, those located in the
city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could
be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its
successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its
share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly governmental purposes.
Said lots are:
TCT NumberLot NumberUse
5577177Mydro, Magay
13198127-DSan Roque
5569169Burleigh 15
5558175Vacant
5559188"
5560183"
5561186"
5563191"
5566176"
5568179"
5574196"
5575181-A"
5576181-B"
5578182"
5579197"
5580195"
5581159-B"
5582194"
5584190"
5588184"
5589187"
5590189"
5591192"
5592193"
5593185"
73794147"
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that
the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16
We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more
along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations State v. Province
than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that
municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as
ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired
thru adverse possession all these to the detriment of the local community.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the
municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code is ". . . without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purposes of this article, the
principles obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered
as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification
in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are guilty of
laches is without merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of
action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga Province arose only in 1949 after the
Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question. While in 1951, the
Cabinet resolved to transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga
City, a reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province
was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties
involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a reconsideration of the Cabinet
Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected subsequently and it
was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present
controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative
laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City
of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are
patrimonial in nature, said share to be computed on the basis of the valuation of
said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the
P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to
defendant was without legal basis. Republic Act 3039 took effect only on June
17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the
law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a
completed act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately
returned by defendant City to plaintiff province. The remaining balance, if any, in
the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be paid by
defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum.
Plaintiff's prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of
the first cause of action recited in the complaint 17 clearly shows that the relief
sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal
revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal
obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since
there has been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in
question. The titles to the registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant
Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another
judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1)Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga
del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030,11 which the former took back
from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter, and
(2)Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of
whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial
properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of
Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by
the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C . J ., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ ., concur.















[G.R. No. L-29788. August 30, 1972.]
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as
Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA,
in his capacity as Register of Deeds of
Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. HILARION U.
JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of
First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY
OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres,
Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Magno B. Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land
Authority for petitioners-appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; POWER OF THE CITY OF MANILA
AS A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY IN PRIVATE
CAPACITY. The City of Manila could validly acquire property in its corporate or
private capacity, following the accepted doctrine on the dual character public
and private of a municipal corporation. And when it acquires property in its
private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts
or making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it
comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes
established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IF THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT LAND WAS ACQUIRED WITH
PRIVATE FUNDS, PRESUMPTION IS THAT STATE IS SOURCE. In the absence of a
title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own, showing that it
was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the presumption is that such
land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality.
3.ID.; ID.; CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY IN ITS POSSESSION. Originally the
municipality owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by
the State not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are
acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity
to which category a municipal corporation pertains.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT OF LEGUA COMUNAL EXPLAINED. Comunal lands or
"legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in
this country under the laws of Spain. The municipalities of the Philippines were
not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public domain for use as
communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the
public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government
for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no right
therein passed to the municipalities, and. in any event, the ultimate title
remained in the Sovereign.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL RULE ON THE NATURE OF THE POSSESSION OF LAND BY
THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. It may be laid down as a general rule that
regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or
corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of
its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds
such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the
same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a
part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the
legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a
different use.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER PROPERTY OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION; POWER OF LEGISLATURE OVER LANDS HELD BY MUNICIPALITY IN
TRUST FOR THE STATE. Legislative control over a municipal corporation is not
absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to public use, for such
control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their
property or rights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the
obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its
own funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an
agency of the National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.
Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE HAS WIDE DISCRETIONARY POWERS IN CLASSIFYING
STATE PROPERTY. The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of
wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered with by the
courts.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPERTY IN CASE AT BAR IS HELD IN TRUST FOR THE STATE.
The property subject of the litigation in the case at bar was shown not to have
been acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned,
but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land
covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government, through the Director
of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, in the cadastral proceedings did
not contest the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its property, does not
detract from its character as State property and in no way divests the legislature
of its power to deal with it as such, the State not being bound by the mistakes
and/or negligence of its officers.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLEGED PATRIMONIAL CHARACTER OF LAND IN INSTANT CASE
DISPROVED BY CITY'S OFFICIAL ACT. The alleged patrimonial character of the
land under the ownership of the City of Manila is totally belied by the City's own
official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it
were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the
President to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can
be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant
recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply
granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes.
10.STATUTES; PRESUMPTION IS ALWAYS IN FAVOR OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
STATUTE. It is now well established that the presumption is always in favor of
the constitutionality of a law. To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy
of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal for even if a law is
aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional
rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what
the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.
11.ID., REPUBLIC ACT 4118 DOES NOT OPERATE AS AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION. Republic Act 4118
which "seeks to convert one parcel of land in the district of Malate, Manila,
which is reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable property of
the State and to provide its subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants or
tenants," was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to
confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government: And this was done at the instance or
upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision of the land and
conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional
authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain
without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article 111 of
the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal
with state property.
12.ID.; ID.; NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN THE ENACTMENT OF THE
STATUTE. It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon
formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally
approved resolution. The certificate of title over the property in the name of the
City of Manila was accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land Tenure
Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City's duplicate certificate of
title by the City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To
implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of
the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to the City Mayor
furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as
prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the
Land Authority to bona fide applicants". On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila
through his Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the
subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority that his Office "will interpose
no objection to the implementation of said law provided that its provisions are
strictly complied with". The foregoing sequence of events clearly indicates a
pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the
property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by
the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land
involved.
D E C I S I O N
ESGUERRA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated September 23, 1968, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court renders
judgment declaring Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived
the City of Manila of its property without due
process and payment of just compensation.
Respondent Executive Secretary and Governor
of the Land Authority are hereby restrained
and enjoined from implementing the
provisions of said law. Respondent Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila is ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he
had issued in the name of the Land Tenure
Administration and reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22547 in the name of
the City of Manila which he cancelled, if that is
feasible, or issue a new certificate of title for
the same parcel of land in the name of the City
of Manila." 1

The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel
of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of
Manila, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to
said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in
favor of the City of Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the
aforementioned parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold
portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Villanueva. As a
consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 was
cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva
for the portions purchased by her. When the last sale to Pura Villanueva was
effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21974 in the name
of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title
(T.C.T.) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block
557, with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of the City
of Manila.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City
property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of 7,450 square
meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. 2
The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was officially
transmitted to the President of the Philippines by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the information that the same resolution
was, on the same date, transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Congress of the Philippines. 3
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill No.
191 was filed in the House of Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome
Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as patrimonial property
of the City of Manila, and for other purposes. The explanatory note of the Bill
gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:
"In the particular case of the
property subject of this bill, the City of Manila
does not seem to have use thereof as a public
communal property. As a matter of fact, a
resolution was adopted by the Municipal Board
of Manila at its regular session held on
September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility
of declaring the city property bounded by
Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for
the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual
occupants thereof. Therefore, it will be to the
best interest of society that the said property
be used in one way or another. Since this
property has been occupied for a long time by
the present occupants thereof and since said
occupants have expressed their willingness to
buy the said property, it is but proper that the
same be sold to them." 4
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives by Congressmen Manuel Cases, Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor
Yiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with the following explanatory note:
"The accompanying bill seeks to
convert one (1) parcel of land in the district of
Malate, which is reserved as communal
property into a disposable or alienable property
of the State and to provide its subdivision and
sale to bona fide occupants or tenants.
"This parcel of land in question was
originally an aggregate part of a piece of land
with an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or
less. . . . On September 21, 1960, the Municipal
Board of Manila in its regular session
unanimously adopted a resolution requesting
the President of the Philippines and Congress
of the Philippines the feasibility of declaring
this property into disposable or alienable
property of the State. There is therefore a
precedent that this parcel of land could be
subdivided and sold to bona fide occupants.
This parcel of land will not serve any useful
public project because it is bounded on all sides
by private properties which were formerly
parts of this lot in question.
"Approval of this bill will implement
the policy of the Administration of land for the
landless and the Fifth Declaration of Principles
of the Constitution, which states that the
promotion of Social Justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all people
should be the concern of the State. We are
ready and willing to enact legislation promoting
the social and economic well-being of the
people whenever an opportunity for enacting
such kind of legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure
fairness and justice to the present bona fide occupants
thereof, approval of this Bill is strongly urged." 5
The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the same was
thereafter sent to the Senate where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced
by the Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of which is as
follows:
"SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.
President, it will be recalled that when the late
Mayor Lacson was still alive, we approved a
similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor
Lacson came here and protested against the
approval, and the approval was reconsidered.
May I know whether the defect in the bill
which we approved, has already been
eliminated in this present bill?
"SENATOR TOLENTINO: I
understand Mr. President, that has already
been eliminated, and that is why the City of
Manila has no more objection to this bill.
"SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr.
President, in view of that manifestation and
considering that Mayor Villegas and
Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of
Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want
to pretend to know more what is good for the
City of Manila.
"SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr.
President, there being no objection, I move
that we approve this bill on second reading.
"PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The bill
is approved on second reading after several
Senators said aye and nobody said nay."
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on June 20, 1964,
and became Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as follows:
Lot 1-B-2-B op Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the
City of Manila, situated in the District of Malate. City of
Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is
hereby converted into disposal or alienable land of the
State, to be placed under the disposal of the Land
Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure Administration
shall subdivide the property into small lots, none of
which shall exceed one hundred and twenty square
meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to
the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and to
individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no
down payment shall be required of tenants or bona
fide occupants who cannot afford to pay such down
payment: Provided, further, That no person can
purchase more than one lot: Provided,
furthermore, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of
any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall
be given a lease from month to month until such time
that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still
further, That in the event of lease the rentals which may
be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum
of the assessed value of the property leased:
And provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot,
which shall not exceed twenty pesos per square meter,
the cost of subdivision and survey shall not be included.
"Sec. 2.Upon approval of this Act no
ejectment proceedings against any tenant
or bona fide occupant of the above lots shall be
instituted and any ejectment proceedings
pending in court against any such tenant
or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant: Provided, That any
demolition order directed against any tenant
or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.
"Sec. 3.Upon approval of this Act, if
the tenant or bona fide occupant is in arrears in
the payment of any rentals, the amount legally
due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in
twenty-four equal monthly installments from
the date of liquidation.
"Sec. 4.No property acquired by
virtue of this Act shall be transferred, sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of within a
period of five years from the date full
ownership thereof has been vested in the
purchaser without the consent of the Land
Tenure Administration.
"Sec. 5.In the event of the death of
the purchaser prior to the complete payment
of the price of the lot purchased by him, his
widow and children shall succeed in all his
rights and obligations with respect to his lot.
"Sec. 6.The Chairman of the Land
Tenure Administration shall implement and
issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act.
"Sec. 7.The sum of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos is appropriated out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
"Sec. 8.All laws or parts of laws
inconsistent with this Act are repealed or
modified accordingly.
"Sec. 9.This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
"Approved, June 20, 1964."
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant to the
request of the occupants of the property involved, then Deputy Governor Jose V.
Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure Administration)
addressed a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas,
furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot as
prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by
the Land Authority to bona fide applicants. 6

On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical
Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the proposed subdivision plan of the property
in question and informed the Land Authority that his office would interpose no
objection to the implementation of said law, provided that its provisions be
strictly complied with. 7
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for the
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the Laud Authority, thru then Deputy
Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru the City
Mayor, for the surrender and delivery to the former of the owner's duplicate of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name
of the Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the knowledge and
consent of the Office of the City Mayor. 8
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had been
yielded as above stated by the City authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer
Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 was issued in
the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118. 9
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a
complete turn-about, for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his
capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized
public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants,
particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of
Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the
declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the partial
stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court and approved by respondent
Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further evidence and submitted
the case for decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the
trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid on the
ground that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process of
law and payment of just compensation. The respondents were ordered to undo
all that had been done to carry out the provisions of said Act and were
restrained from further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the resolution of which the
decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I.Is the property involved private or patrimonial
property of the City of Manila?
II.Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to
the Constitution?
I
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved is a
communal land or "legua comunal" which is a portion of the public domain
owned by the State; that it came into existence as such when the City of Manila,
or any pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was founded under the
laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a pueblo,
the administrative authority was required to allot and set aside portions of the
public domain for a public plaza, a church site, a site for public buildings, lands to
serve as common pastures and for streets and roads; that in assigning these
lands some lots were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and ownership of
these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that
in the case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such immediate
acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land though administered
thereby, did not automatically become its property in the absence of an express
grant from the Central Government, and that the reason for this arrangement is
that this class of land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the
municipality's governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the City
of Manila for any public purpose and had not been officially earmarked as a site
for the erection of some public buildings; that this circumstance confirms the
fact that it was originally "communal" land alloted to the City of Manila by the
Central Government not because it was needed in connection with its
organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its inhabitants;
that the present City of Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila
under the former Spanish sovereign merely enjoys the usufruct over said land,
and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily
convert the land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila nor divest the
State of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a city is a
governmental agent of the State with authority to govern a limited portion of its
territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given political subdivision, and
the extent of its authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred by
the State; that Congress has the exclusive power to create, change or destroy
municipal corporations; that even if We admit that legislative control over
municipal corporations is not absolute and even if it is true that the City of
Manila has a registered title over the property in question, the mere transfer of
such land by an act of the legislature from one class of public land to another,
without compensation, does not invade the vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has treated the land involved
as one reserved for communal use, and this classification is conclusive upon the
courts; that if the City of Manila feels that this is wrong and its interests have
been thereby prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the attention of
Congress for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise of its wide
discretionary powers has seen fit to classify the land in question as communal,
the Courts certainly owe it to coordinate branch of the Government to respect
such determination and should not interfere with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting portions of the
appealed decision of the trial court, which read thus:
"The respondents (petitioners-
appellants herein) contend, among other
defenses, that the property in question is
communal property. This contention is,
however, disproved by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in
favor of the City of Manila after the land in
question was registered in the City's favor. The
Torrens Title expressly states that the City of
Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said
land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration
Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation
and registration in favor of the City of Manila . .
. shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons including the Insular Government and
all the branches there . . . is nothing in the said
certificate of title indicating that the land was
'communal' land as contended by the
respondents. The erroneous assumption by the
Municipal Board of Manila that the land in
question was communal land did not make it
so. The Municipal Board had no authority to do
that.
"The respondents, however,
contend that Congress had the power and
authority to declare that the land in question
was 'communal' land and the courts have no
power or authority to make a contrary finding.
This contention is not entirely correct or
accurate. Congress has the power to classify
'land of the public domain', transfer them from
one classification to another and declare them
disposable or not. Such power does not,
however, extend to properties which are
owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in
their 'patrimonial' capacity.
"Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides
that properties of provinces, cities and
municipalities are divided into properties for
public use and patrimonial property Art. 424 of
the same code provides that properties for
public use consist of provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades and
public works for public service paid for by said
province, cities or municipalities. All other
property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial. Tested by this criterion the Court
finds and holds that the land in question is
patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
"Respondents contend that
Congress has declared the land in question to
be 'communal' and, therefore, such
designation is conclusive upon the courts. The
Courts holds otherwise. When a statute is
assailed as unconstitutional the Courts have
the power and authority to inquire into the
question and pass upon it. This has long ago
been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed.
60, when the United States Supreme Court
speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:
'. . . If an act of the
legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its validity, bind
the courts, and oblige them to give
effect? It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . .
. So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular
case, so that the court must either
decide that case conformable to the
constitution, disregarding the law,
the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the
case. This is of the very essence of
unconstitutional judicial duty.'"
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law unconstitutional
it does not mean that the judicial power is superior to the legislative power. It
simply means that the power of the people is superior to both and that when the
will of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the
Constitution rather than by the statutes.

There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving the
character of the land involved, and it is that the City of Manila, although declared
by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of
evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial
property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its predecessor, the
Ayuntamiento de Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or
private capacity, following the accepted doctrine on the dual character public
and private of a municipal corporation. And when it acquires property in its
private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts
or making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it
comes to acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes
established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the
absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City of Manila as its own,
showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the
presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the
municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality
owned no patrimonial property except those that were granted by the State not
for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the
course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which
category a municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo
was established in this country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI,
Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were
not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public domain for use as
communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the
public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government
for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights
therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title
remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327).
"For the establishment, then, of
new pueblos the administrative authority of
the province, in representation of the Governor
General, designated the territory for their
location and extension and the metes and
bounds of the same; and before alloting the
lands among the new settlers, a special
demarcation was made of the places which
were to serve as the public square of the
pueblo, for the erection of the church, and as
cites for the public buildings, among others,
the municipal building or the case real, as well
as of the lands which were to constitute the
common pastures, and propios of the
municipality and the streets and roads which
were to intersect the new town were laid out, .
. ." (Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director of
Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis supplied)
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or
classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is
held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the
paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes
its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the
municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of
local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State
itself holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 Mc Quilin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15
N.W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute
even when it comes to its property devoted to public use, for such control must
not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their property or lights
without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the obligations of
contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the municipality which it
did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the
legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the
National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so
in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of the people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a Municipal airport to
an Airport Commission created by the legislature, even without compensation to
the city, was not violative of the due process clause of the American Federal
Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota in Monagham vs.
Armatage, supra, said:
". . . The case is controlled by the
further rule that the legislature, having plenary
control of the local municipality, of its creation
and of all its affairs, has the right to authorize
or direct the expenditures of money in its
treasury, though raised, for a particular
purpose, for any legitimate municipal purpose,
or to order and direct a distribution thereof
upon a division of the territory into separate
municipalities . . . The local municipality has no
such vested right in or to its public funds, like
that which the Constitution protects in the
individual as precludes legislative
interferences. People vs. Power, 25 Ill. 187;
State Board (of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss.
518. As remarked by the supreme court of
Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180: 'It
is of the essence of such a corporation, that the
government has the sole right as trustee of the
public interest, at its own good will and
pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control, and
direct the corporation, its funds, and
franchises.'
"We therefore hold that c.500, in
authorizing the transfer of the use and
possession of the municipal airport to the
commission without compensation to the city
or to the park board, does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States."
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use
(terreno comunal). The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of
wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered with by the
courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of Republic Act No.
4118, viewed in the light of Article III, Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of the
Constitution which ordain that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law and that no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation.
II
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for allegedly
depriving the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and
without payment of just compensation. It is now well established that the
presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law (U. S. vs. Ten Yu,
24 Phil, 1; Go Ching, et al. vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To
declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution
must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of
some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike
down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al.,
G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in
this case as the law assailed does not in any manner trench upon the
constitution as will hereafter be shown.
Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the Government program of "Land for the Landless". The
explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118,
reads in part as follows:
"Approval of this bill will implement
the policy of the administration of 'land for the
landless' and the Fifth Declaration of Principles
of the Constitution which states that 'the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all people
should be the concern of the State.' We are
ready and willing to enact legislation promoting
the social and economic well-being of the
people whenever an opportunity for enacting
such kind of legislation arises.'"
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, "by converting the land in
question which is the patrimonial property of the City of Manila into
disposable alienable land of the State and placing it under the disposal of the
Land Tenure Administration violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2)
of the Constitution which ordain that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law". In support thereof reliance
is placed on the ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of
Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that
Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property
without due process of law and without payment of just compensation since it
has no absolute control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is
undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in reality a private or
patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But it would be simply begging
the question to classify the land in question as such. The property, as has been
previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered time is not
questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as
the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted
by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government, through the
Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, in the cadastral
proceedings did not contest the claim of the City of Manila that the land is its
property does not detract from its character as State property and in no way
divests the legislature of its power to deal with it as such, the state not being
bound by the mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.

One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly
recognized the paramount title of the State over said land when by its resolution
of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor
Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the Philippines to
consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San
Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and
25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the
City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof ." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No. 67945, CFI,
Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case) [Emphasis Supplied]
The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of the City of
Manila is totally belied by the City's own official act, which is fatal to its claim
since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial property why
should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make representation to
the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual
occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for
municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use said land for any
recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a
long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of
ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim
that it is its own private or patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs.
Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil.
327; Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 193). The conclusion
of the respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State and
took it away from the City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the
last analysis the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila
merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State
can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved
but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it
available for disposition by the National Government: And this was done at the
instance or upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision of the
land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection
(2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and
power to deal with state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon formal written
petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved
resolution. The certificate of title over the property in the name of the City of
Manila was accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land Tenure
Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City's duplicate certificate of
title by the City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To
implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of
the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to the City Mayor
furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed subdivision plan of the said lot as
prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the
Land Authority to bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila,
through his Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the
subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority that his Office "will interpose
no objection to the implementation of said law provided that its provisions are
strictly complied with." The foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a
pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the
property to the National Government. All such acts were done in recognition by
the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land
involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either
under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of
having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts
possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore,
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and petitioners shall
proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No.
4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio,
JJ., concur.
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., did not take part.
[G.R. No. L-40474. August 29, 1975.]
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO.,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES,
Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and
JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province
of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and
the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
Jose Antonio B. Conde for petitioner.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio
R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney David R. Hilario for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner applied for registration of title over a portion of M. Gorces Street in
Cebu City. Said portion was declared an abandoned road by the City Council of
Cebu the same not being included in the Cebu Development Plan, and later, by
authority of the City Council, was sold by the Acting Mayor to petitioner who was
the highest bidder at a public bidding.
The trial court dismissed petitioner's application on motion of the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended of public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of men.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court set aside the trial court's order the
directed the latter to proceed with the hearing of petition's application for
registration of title.
SYLLABUS
1.MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; STREETS; POWER OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TO
WITHDRAW PORTION OF STREET FROM PUBLIC USE. Where a portion of the
city street is withdrawn from public use by the city council, which under the city
charter is empowered to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue,
park or square, the property thus withdraw from public servitude become
patrimonial property and be used or conveyed for any purpose for which any
real property belonging to the city may be lawfully used or conveyed.
2.PROPERTY; PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE CONVERTED INTO
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY. Under Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public service, shall form part of
the patrimonial property of the State.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, JR., J p:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title over a parcel of land
situated in the City of Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu,
through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the
terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road,
the same not being included in the City Development Plan. 1 Subsequently, on
December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755,
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public
bidding. 2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being
the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting
City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total
consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale,
the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First Instance of Cebu to
have its title to the land registered. 4
On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss
the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and
therefore outside the commerce of man, Consequently, it cannot be subject to
registration by any private individual. 5
After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1914 the trial court issued an order
dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. 6 Hence, the
instant petition for review.
For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:
(1)Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No.
3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of
Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned?
and
(2)Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned,
make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu
which may be the object of a common contract?
(1)The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:
"Section 31.Legislative Powers.Any provision of law and
executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the
City Council shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(34). . . ; to close any city road, street or alley,
boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed."
From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered
to close a city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, 7 where the
power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or
withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:
"5.So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city
council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street
at its dead end from public use and converting the
remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well
within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The
city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain
property is still necessary for public use.
"Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary,
And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or
interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of
abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public
trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private
interests may he served incidentally will not invalidate
the vacation ordinance."
(2)Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for
registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such
withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an
ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear
and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its
subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a
registerable title over the lot in question.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent
court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and
the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
petitioner's application for registration of title.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.
























[G.R. No. L-61744. June 25, 1984.]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL,
BULACAN, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE OSCAR C.
FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge,
Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, The PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
of Bulacan, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IMPERIO,
ADORACION IMPERIO, RODOLFO IMPERIO, CONRADO
IMPERIO, ERNESTO IMPERIO, ALFREDO IMPERIO,
CARLOS IMPERIO, JR., JUAN IMPERIO and SPOUSES
MARCELO PINEDA and LUCILA PONGCO, respondents.
Pascual C. Liatchko for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Marcelo Pineda for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; PUBLIC FUNDS, NOT
SUBJECT TO LEVY AND EXECUTION. In Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo,
49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the
public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations
cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the treasury or when in
transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments
in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so
declared by statute."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. Well settled is the rule that public funds are not
subject to levy and execution. The reason for this was explained in the case of
Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for
the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for
which municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties
and public funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some
instances destroy said purpose."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner
municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well
as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public
funds and as such they are exempt from execution. Besides, there must be,
pursuant to Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree
on Local Fiscal Administration," a corresponding appropriation in the form of an
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the
municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been shown that the
Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, the
procedure outlined by Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court has not
been followed.
D E C I S I O N
RELOVA, J p:
In Civil Case No. 604-B, entitled "Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, et al. vs.
Municipal Government of San Miguel, Bulacan, et al.", the then Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, on April 28, 1978, rendered judgment holding herein
petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Municipal Government of San Miguel,
Bulacan, represented by Mayor Mar Marcelo G. Aure
and its Municipal Treasurer:
"1.ordering the partial revocation of the Deed of
Donation signed by the deceased Carlos Imperio in
favor of the Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan, dated
October 27, 1947 insofar as Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5,
Block 11 of Subdivision Plan Psd-20831 are concerned,
with an aggregate total area of 4,646 square meters,
which lots are among those covered and described
under TCT No. T-1831 of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan in the name of the Municipal Government of
San Miguel, Bulacan; cdasia
"2.ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding
Deed of Reconveyance over the aforementioned five
lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the
undivided one-half (1/2) share in the name of plaintiffs
Margarita D. Vda. de Imperio, Adoracion, Rodolfo,
Conrado, Ernesto, Alfredo, Carlos, Jr. and Juan, all
surnamed Imperio, and the remaining undivided one-
half (1/2) share in favor of plaintiff-spouses Marcelo E.
Pineda and Lucila Pongco;
"3.ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the
plaintiffs on the proportion mentioned in the
immediately preceding paragraph the sum of
P64,440.00 corresponding to the rentals it has collected
from the occupants for their use and occupation of the
premises from 1970 up to and including 1975, plus
interest thereon at the legal rate from January 1970
until fully paid;
"4.ordering the restoration of ownership and
possession over the five lots in question in favor of the
plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned;
"5.ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P3,000.00 for attorney's fees; and to pay the cost of
suit.
"The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered
dismissed for lack of evidence presented to substantiate
the same.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 11-12, Rollo)
The foregoing judgment became final when herein petitioner's appeal was
dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal
was affirmed by the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12118 and by this
Court in G.R. No. 59938. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for
issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment. Respondent
judge, on July 27, 1982, issued an order, to wit:
"Considering that an entry of judgment had already
been made on June 14, 1982 in G.R. No. L-59938 and;
"Considering further that there is no opposition to
plaintiffs' motion for execution dated July 23, 1983;
"Let a writ of execution be so issued, as prayed for in
the aforestated motion." (p. 10, Rollo) prLL
Petitioner, on July 30, 1982, filed a Motion to Quash the writ of execution on the
ground that the municipality's property or funds are all public funds exempt
from execution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated August 23, 1982 and the alias writ of
execution stands in full force and effect.
On September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order which in part, states:
"It is clear and evident from the foregoing that
defendant has more than enough funds to meet its
judgment obligation. Municipal Treasurer Miguel C.
Roura of San Miguel, Bulacan and Provincial Treasurer
of Bulacan Agustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby
ordered to comply with the money judgment rendered
by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao against said municipality.
In like manner, the municipal authorities of San Miguel,
Bulacan are likewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs'
legal possession of the property already returned to
plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of execution.
"Finally, defendants are hereby given an inextendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
order by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
within which to submit their written compliance." (p.
24, Rollo)
When the treasurers (provincial and municipal) failed to comply with the order
of September 13, 1982, respondent judge issued an order for their arrest and
that they will be released only upon compliance thereof. cdll
Hence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the Municipality
of San Miguel, Bulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of
Bulacan and San Miguel, respectively, are public funds which are exempt from
execution for the satisfaction of the money judgment in Civil Case No. 604-B.
Well settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution.
The reason for this was explained in the case of Municipality of Paoay vs.
Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 "that they are held in trust for the people, intended and
used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations
are created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution
would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said
purpose." And, in Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held
that "it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but
also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under
execution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments
rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers
of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute." Thus, it is
clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are
exempt from execution.
Besides, Presidential Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal
Administration", Section 2 (a), provides:
"SECTION 2.Fundamental Principles. Local
government financial affairs, transactions, and
operations shall be governed by the fundamental
principles set forth hereunder:
"(a)No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific
statutory authority.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form
of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before any money
of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at bar, it has not been
shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an ordinance to this effect.
Furthermore, Section 15, Rule 39 of the New Rules of Court, outlines the
procedure for the enforcement of money judgment:
"(a)By levying on all the property of the debtor,
whether real or personal, not otherwise exempt from
execution, or only on such part of the property as is
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing cost, if
he has more than sufficient property for the purpose;
"(b)By selling the property levied upon;
"(c)By paying the judgment-creditor so much of the
proceeds as will satisfy the judgment and accruing
costs; and
"(d)By delivering to the judgment-debtor the excess, if
any, unless otherwise directed by judgment or order of
the court."
The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the order of respondent judge, dated
July 27, 1982, granting issuance of a writ of execution; the alias writ of execution;
dated July 27, 1982; and the order of respondent judge, dated September 13,
1982, directing the Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan and the Municipal Treasurer
of San Miguel, Bulacan to comply with the money judgments, are SET ASIDE; and
respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the writ of
execution. cdasia

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 28379. March 27, 1929.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, applicant-appellant, vs. CONSORCIA
CABANGIS ET AL., claimants-appellees.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Abad Santos, Camus & Delgado for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1.LAND REGISTRATION; LAND DISAPPEARING INTO SEA; PUBLIC
DOMAIN. As the lots in question disappeared by natural erosion due to
the ebb and flow of the tide, and as they remained in that condition until
reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they
belong to the public domain for public use. (Aragon vs. Insular
Government, 19 Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 28 Phil., 505.)
D E C I S I O N
VILLA-REAL, J p:
The Government of the Philippine Islands appeals to this court
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in cadastral
proceeding No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 373, adjudicating the title and decreeing the
registration of lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40, block 3055 of the cadastral survey of
the City of Manila in favor of Consuelo, Consorcia, Elvira and Tomas,
surnamed Cabangis, in equal parts, and dismissing the claims presented by
the Government of the Philippine Islands and the City of Manila.
In support of its appeal, the appellant assigns the following
alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
"1.The lower court erred in not holding that
the lots in question are of the public domain, the same
having been gained from the sea (Manila Bay) by
accession, by fillings made by the Bureau of Public
Works and by the construction of the break-water (built
by the Bureau of Navigation) near the mouth of Vitas
Estero.
"2.The lower court erred in holding that the
lots in question formed part of the big parcel of land
belonging to the spouses Maximo Cabangis and Tita
Andres, and in holding that these spouses and their
successors in interest have been in continuous, public,
peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of said lots up
to the time this case came up.
"3.The lower court erred in holding that said
lots existed before, but that due to the current of the
Pasig River and to the action of the big waves in Manila
Bay during south-west monsoons, the same
disappeared.
"4.The lower court erred in adjudicating the
registration of the lands in question in the name of the
appellees, and in denying the appellant's motion for a
new trial."
A preponderance of the evidence in the record which may
properly be taken into consideration in deciding the case, proves the
following facts:
Lots 36, 39 and 40, block 3035 of cadastral proceeding No. 71 of
the City of Manila, G. L. R. O. Record No. 373, were formerly a part of a
large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor of the herein claimants
and appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due to
the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said
lots became completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and
remained in such a state until 1912 when the Government undertook the
dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation, depositing all the
sand and silt taken from the bed of the estuary on the low lands which
were completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the
Philippine Manufacturing Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming
the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.
Up to the month of February, 1927 nobody had declared lot 39
for the purposes of taxation, and it was only in the year 1926 that Dr. Pedro
Gil, in behalf of the claimants and appellees, declared lot No. 40 for such
purpose.
In view of the facts just stated, as proved by a preponderance of
the evidence, the question arises: Who owns lots 36, 39 and 40 in
question?
The claimants-appellees contend that inasmuch as the said lots
once formed a part of a large parcel of land belonging to their
predecessors, whom they succeeded, and their immediate predecessor in
interest, Tomas Cabangis, having taken possession thereof as soon as they
were reclaimed, giving his permission to some fishermen to dry their
fishing nets and deposit their bancas thereon, said lots belong to them.
Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:
"Art. 339.Property of public ownership is
"1.That devoted to public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of
a similar character."
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
provides as follows:
"Article 1.The following are part of the
national domain open to public use:
xxx xxx xxx
"3.The Shores. By the shore is understood
that space covered and uncovered by the movement of
the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line
reached by the highest equinoctial tides. Where the
tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land
side at the line reached by the sea during ordinary
storms or tempests."
In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil., 223),
with reference to article 339 of the Civil Code just quoted, this court said:
"We should not be understood, by this
decision, to hold that in a case of gradual encroachment
or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private
property may not become 'property of public
ownership,' as defined in article 339 of the code, where
it appears that the owner has to all intents and
purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally
destroyed, so as to become a part of the 'playa' (shore
of the sea), 'rada' (roadstead), or the like. . . ."
In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we
read the following:
"With relative frequency the opposite
phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances and
private properties are permanently invaded by the
waves, and in this case they become part of the shore
or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the
owner thus dispossessed does not retain any right to
the natural products resulting from their new nature; it
is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to
indemnity."
Now then, when said land was reclaimed, did the claimants-
appellees or their predecessors recover it as their original property?
As we have seen, the land belonging to the predecessors of the
herein claimants-appellees began to wear away in 1896, owing to the
gradual erosion caused by the ebb and flow of the tide, until the year 1901,
when the waters of Manila Bay completely submerged a portion of it,
included within lots 36, 39 and 40 here in question, remaining thus under
water until reclaimed as a result of certain work done by the Government
in 1912. According to the above-cited authorities said portion of land, that
is, lots 36, 39 and 40, which was private property, became a part of the
public domain. The predecessors of the herein claimants-appellees could
have protected their land by building a retaining wall, with the consent of
competent authority, in 1896 when the waters of the sea began to wear it
away, in accordance with the provisions of article 29 of the aforecited Law
of Waters of August 3, 1866, and their failure to do so until 1901, when a
portion of the same became completely covered by said waters, remaining
thus submerged until 1912, constitutes abandonment.
Now then: The lots under discussion having been reclaimed
from the sea as a result of certain work done by the Government, to whom
do they belong?
The answer to this question is found in article 5 of the
aforementioned Law of Waters, which is as follows:
"ART. 5.Lands reclaimed from the sea in
consequence of works constructed by the State, or by
the provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with proper
permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by
the terms of the grant of authority."
The fact that from 1912 some fishermen had been drying their
fishing nets and depositing their bancas on lots 36, 39 and 40, by
permission of Tomas Cabangis, does not confer on the latter or his
successors the ownership of said lots, because, as they were converted into
public land, no private person could acquire title thereto except in the form
and manner established by the law.
In the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government and City of Manila
(13 Phil., 324), cited by the claimants-appellees, this court, admitting the
findings and holdings of the lower court, said the following:
"If we heed the parol evidence, we find that
the seashore was formerly about one
hundred brazas distant from the land in question; that,
in the course of time, and by the removal of a
considerable quantity of sand from the shore at the
back of the land for the use of the street car company in
filling in Calle Cervantes, the sea water in ordinary tides
now covers part of the land described in the petition.
"The fact that certain land, not the bed of a
river or of the sea, is covered by sea water during the
period of ordinary high tide, is not a reason established
by any law to cause the loss thereof, especially when, as
in the present case, it becomes covered by water owing
to circumstances entirely independent of the will of the
owner."
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguilar (G. R. No.
22034), 1 also cited by the claimants-appellees, wherein the Government
adduced no evidence in support of its contention, the lower court said in
part:
"The contention of the claimants Cabangis is
to the effect that said lots are a part of the adjoining
land adjudicated to their deceased father, Don Tomas
Cabangis, which, for over fifty years had belonged to
their deceased grandmother, Tita Andres, and that, due
to certain improvements made in Manila Bay, the
waters of the sea covered a large part of the lots herein
claimed.
"The Government of the Philippine Islands
also claims the ownership of said lots, because, at
ordinary high tide, they are covered by the sea.

"Upon petition of the parties, the lower
court made an ocular inspection of said lots on
September 12, 1923, and on said inspection found some
light material houses built thereon, and that on that
occasion the waters of the sea did not reach the
aforesaid lots.
"From the evidence adduced at the trial of
this cause, it may be inferred that Tita Andres, during
her lifetime, was the owner of a rather large parcel of
land which was adjudicated by a decree to her son
Tomas Cabangis; the lots now in question are
contiguous to that land and are covered by the waters
of the sea at extraordinary high tide; some 50 years
before the sea did not reach said strip of land, and on it
were constructed, for the most part, light material
houses, occupied by the tenants of Tita Andres, to
whom they paid rent. Upon her death, her son Tomas
Cabangis succeeded to the possession, and his children
succeeded him, they being the present claimants,
Consuelo, Jesus, Tomas, and Consorcia Cabangis.
"The Government of the Philippine Islands
did not adduce any evidence in support of its
contention, with the exception of registry record No.
8147, to show that the lots here in question were not
excluded from the application presented in said
proceeding."
It will be seen that in the case of Buzon vs. Insular Government
and City of Manila, cited above, the rise of the waters of the sea that
covered the lands there in dispute, was due not to the action of the tide
but to the fact that a large quantity of sand was taken from the sea at the
side of said land in order to fill in Cervantes Street, and this court properly
held that because of this act, entirely independent of the will of the owner
of said land, the latter could not lose the ownership thereof, and the mere
fact that the waters of the sea covered it as a result of said act, is not
sufficient to convert it into public land, especially, as the land was high and
appropriate for building purposes.
In the case of the Director of Lands vs. Aguilar also cited by the
claimants-appellees, the Insular Government did not present any evidence
in support of its contention, thus leaving uncontradicted the evidence
adduced by the claimants Aguilar et al., as to the ownership, possession
and occupation of said lots.
In the instant case the evidence shows that from 1896, the
waves of Manila Bay had been gradually and constantly washing away the
sand that formed the lots here in question, until 1901, when the sea water
completely covered them, and thus they remained until the year 1912. In
the latter year they were reclaimed from the sea by filling in with sand and
silt extracted from the bed of Vitas Estuary when the Government dredged
said estuary in order to facilitate navigation. Neither the herein claimants-
appellees nor their predecessors did anything to prevent their destruction.
In conclusion, then, we hold that the lots in question having
disappeared on account of the gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of
the tide, and having remained in such a state until they were reclaimed
from the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they are public land.
(Aragon vs. Insular Government, 19 Phil., 223; Francisco vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands, 28 Phil., 505.)
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
lots Nos. 36, 39 and 40 of cadastral proceeding No. 373 of the City of
Manila are held to be public land belonging to the Government of the
United States under the administration and control of the Government of
the Philippine Islands. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.