USON v.

DEL ROSARIO
GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530
FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the petitioner. The
latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land occupied by defendant Maria
del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a defense, defendant presented a
deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson containing among others an statement
giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance
from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new
Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they
shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?
HELD:
No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil
Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of
inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in view of
her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon
his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for the simple reason
that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given retroactive
effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time
shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired
right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and
this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the
new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law of the
Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to
respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such
condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of
having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the
laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Is the condition as set by the testator valid?
HELD:
No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said condition
then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.










Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However,
the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without
the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance
with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged.
Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is
substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary
public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD:
NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot
serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in
front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one
will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such
situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a
function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own
act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which
is to minimize fraud.


Arts. 820 - 827

Unson vs. Abella

A will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses do not
remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has
been executed and signed in the manner prescribed by law. As a general rule, the attesting witnesses
must be produced when there is opposition to the probate. But there are exceptions to this rule, for
instance, when the witness is dead, cannot be served with process of the court, or his reputation for the
truth has been questioned, or he appears hostile to the


Unson v. Abella, et. al.
FACTS
Pedro Unson, executor of Dona Josefa Zalameas last will, filed a petition for the probate of the will of
the latter. Attached on the said will is an inventory of all the properties of Dona Josefa.
Opposition was made thereto by Antonio, Ignacia and Avivencia Abella and Santiago Vito on the ff.
grounds:-will is not paged correlatively in letters rather it is in Arabic numerals- There is no attestation
clause in the inventory attached to the will-Will was not signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the
presence of each other.Note: only the two witnesses namely Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea
testified as to the authenticity of the will. The third witness, Pedro de Jesus, was not presented because
he was hostile with Unson and has been meeting with the oppositors since the filing of the petition for
the probate of the will of Josefa.
ISSUE:
WON the will is valid?
HELD: YES!
1.As to the paging of the will, the SC cited the case of Aldaba v. Roque
Thus:
It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law,
inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent
the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be said that the object of
thelaw in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should
be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the
witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the
more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not makefor the
easiness to forge the signatures.
2.The inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it so the inventory need not have an
additional attestation clause at the end.
3. The actuation of the proponents in NOT bringing to court Pedro de Jesus doesnot render the will
invalid. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, the generalrule is that, where opposition is made to the
probate of a will, theattesting witnesses must be produced.
Exceptions:
a.when a witness is dead, or
b.cannot be served with process of the court, or
c.his reputation for truth has been questioned or
d. He appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.
In the aforementioned cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of said
witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly
executed. But supposing that de Jesus, when cited, had testified adversely to the application, this would
not by itself have change the result reached by the court a quo , for section 632 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that one or more witnesses
do not remember having attested it, provided the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the
will has been executed and signed


ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762
FACTS:
Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her neices and
nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra Nuez (sister of
defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the
harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuez, who thereafter
refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce. The defendant turn
sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it
belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior judicial declaration, however, that the
plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?
HELD:
Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now
deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died
without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas,
plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of
a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such,
provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.





Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987

FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle,
Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers
and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia
Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively,
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC
granted Fernandez and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for
probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

RULING:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either
because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing
cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all
was written.





LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547
FACTS:
Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana
Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as
compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and
because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted
and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such
court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in
favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the
sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights
of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.
ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?
HELD:
No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are
not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving
any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother,
this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by
his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of
inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The
herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are
not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.








LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE
GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776
FACTS:
Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of public convenience
to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent despite his demise,
contending that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the
estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?
HELD:
Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him
that right... The aforesaid right of respondent to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one
which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his
estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied his application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in
view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.










LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757
FACTS:
Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of P4,039.
Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in
the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not
yet been properly probated.
ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's deceased
parent?
HELD:
No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the
creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which
pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and
when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased
must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor
of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in
connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are
perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin
Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before
the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.










DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ
GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265
FACTS:
A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat; the latter then
assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino transferred 1/2 of his rights to
the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the consideratioin paid by her to the
mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as heirs. Honoria also died, with the
plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement and distribution of the estate
of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in question which was adjudicated, after proper
proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the
lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.
ISSUE: May the petition prosper?
HELD:
No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in their favor after
all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of the deceased
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the estate of the deceased;
so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the defendants are presumed to be
free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up in the complaint should have been
interposed during the pendency and progress of Special Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done
so, she cannot now bring this action against the defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of
contract between plaintiff and defendants upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the
present defendants.









IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721
FACTS:
Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some
minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to
the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor
children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as
heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.
ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?
HELD:
The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different language, this article is
incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold
the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal
or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null
and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court
was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If
registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to
no other cause than his own opposition.









OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531
FACTS:
Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of one Francisco
Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession of the status of natural
son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his family; that the defendant
Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y Reyes, be ordered to recognize the
plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is entitled to share in his father's estate; and,
furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the
court might deem proper to fix. The evidence offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to
Osorio Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y
Garcia to be properly established.
ISSUE:
Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights appertaining to his
deceased father's estate?
HELD:
Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in continuous possession of
his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the certificate in which his name
and that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors, and by his father's statement to
various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his father's always having attended to the care,
education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and the law on
the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the father of both
of them, recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled
to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's estate, all of which is in possession of
the defendant spouses.






RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918
FACTS:
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in this case. Upon
demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate
proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs
of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio
Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of
the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The
foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was
confirmed by the court. Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging
among others the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended
that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?
HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from
the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or recognition to such
successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special circumstances, protected
these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs.
Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of
testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or
refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."









DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133
FACTS:
Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge Mencias, denying their
petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money judgment in a civil case
rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja. Petitioners levied aganst the
rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents Josefa
Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special Proceedings Nos.
F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in the
testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to
attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against the said
heir
ISSUE:
May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?
HELD:
The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that the sale shall be
only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final
settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the
public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates and in the manner
provided by the legal provision mentioned above.








RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418
FACTS:
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan
a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition before
the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The
petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's
estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUE:
Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
HELD:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of
the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place
for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section
3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.










CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990
FACTS:
Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6 children, while
possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their share to private
respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with
the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the
siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel
which was denied by the trail court but which later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On
appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier
transfers.
ISSUE:
Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede that of the
partition inter-vivos?
HELD:
Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a
will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of
Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent
thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she
herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a
simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the
property she had received in the partition inter vivos.







NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185
FACTS:
This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first
marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator
with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a
land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it
turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were
indebted to their father.
ISSUE:
Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there disinheritance in this
case?
HELD:
Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator
left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly
disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them
already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage.
Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in
so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the
institution of heirs.









BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987
FACTS:
Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs, the herein
respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels of land and
caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had also sought the
reconveyance which did not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of the decedent, now sought
the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question the petitioners legal standing,
them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?
HELD:
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to
commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial
declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding
for the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the
petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties,
not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law.
Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the
name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In
fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented,
the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.









BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47
FACTS:
On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of the late
Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the deceased, the trial
court decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property belonging to the legitime and further
declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents. Petitioners come now
questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to the spurious
children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby questioning the competence and
jurisdiction of the trial court,
ISSUE:
Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint? Could the
provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its effectivity?
HELD:
1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the broad challenge
the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the distribution of the property,
they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the
illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that under the old Civil Code illegitimate children
other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. They do not contest the delivery of the estate to the
deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the court
notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A decision, no matter how erroneous,
becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.







CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249
FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-
appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the
deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the
deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the
decedent's natural children.
ISSUE:
May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural
filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the
deceased natural father.
HELD:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while
the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed
parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against
the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the
minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of
the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the
latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be
transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.








REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105
FACTS:
Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at Palma de
Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a purported will
of her husband. The purported will was submitted to be admitted to probate by respondent Consul
General Palmaroli. The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in view of her absence, deprived
her of her right to contest the original application.
ISSUE:
Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?
HELD:
Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property after his
death. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution and proof of wills has
been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provision that after death of the testator
his will may be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a will, while conclusive as to its due
execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of
the estate of the decedent, it should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law
applicable to his case, the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by law
must prevail.










MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA
FACTS:
Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession of personal
property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither
party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi
Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people. The court
argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving the State all his property.
ISSUE:
Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?
HELD:
No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a
disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered a will. Rizal's
Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It may be considered a will in a
grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks the requirements of a
holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day of its execution and his signature.













MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142
FACTS:
Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting her
husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to probate but
were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A
and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a day before Exhibit A,
thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a supposed
last will, be probated?
HELD:
Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before Exhibit A
could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or
modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the
language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a
testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of
Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the
new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes
within this definition.








CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426
FACTS:
Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that although the
attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses
who also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the testator.
ISSUE:
Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?
HELD:
No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator
sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express
direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact,
therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no
consequence.













MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states that the law of the
Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and that legatees have to
respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be annulled. By virtue of such
condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus excluded because, by his action of
having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the will. Andre sued contending that the
conditions are void being contrary to law which provides that the will shall be probated according to the
laws of the nationality of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Is the condition as set by the testator valid?
HELD:
No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Said condition
then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.