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Alexander Dugin

The Fourth
Political
Theory
Eurasian Movement
2012
This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard
specifcation in order to ensure its continuing availability
Dugin, Alexander
The Fourth Political Theory - Moscow, Eurasian
Movement, 2012. 246 p.
ISBN 978-5-903459-19-3
Redaction
Mark Sleboda
Translations
Nina Kurpianova, Maria Tokmakova, Olga Schief,
Vaan Maas, Valentin Cherednikov, Zhirayr Ananyan,
Fedor Smirnov, Cyrill Lazareff, Ivan Fedorov
Copyright A.Dugin, 2012
Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction: To Be or Not to Be? ..................... 5
Chapter 2. Concept Inception The End of the 20th Century:
the End of Modernity ............................................................ 9
Chapter 3. Dasein as an Actor Stages and Problems in
the Development of the Fourth Political Theory ............... 25
Chapter 4. The Critique of Monotonic Processes ............. 50
Chapter 5. The Reversibility of Time ................................. 64
Chapter 6. The Ontology of the Future ............................... 68
Chapter 7. Global Transition and its Enemies .................... 83
Chapter 8. The New Political Anthropology:
The political man and his mutations ................................... 95
Chapter 9. Fourth Political Practice ................................. 103
Chapter 10. Gender in the Fourth Political Theory .......... 111
Chapter 11. Conservatism and Post-Modernity ................ 120
Chapter 12. Civilization as a Concept ............................. 139
Chapter 13. The Transformation of the Left in the 21st
Century ............................................................................. 160
Chapter 14. Liberalism and Its Metamorphoses ............... 177
Chapter 15. The Possibility of Revolution
in Post-Modernity ............................................................. 194
Chapter 16. Against the Post-Modern World .................... 202
Appendixes
Appendix I.
Political Post-Anthropology ............................................. 211
Appendix II. Gender in the Three Political Theories of
Modernity ......................................................................... 217
Appendix IV. The metaphysics of Chaos ......................... 232
Appendix V. The Greater Europe Project ......................... 280
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION:
TO BE OR NOT TO BE?
In todays world, politics appears to be over, at least as we used
to know it. Liberalism persistently fought against its political en-
emies which had offered alternative systems; that is, conservatism,
monarchism, traditionalism, fascism, socialism, and communism,
and fnally by the end of the twentieth century had defeated them
all. It would be logical to assume that politics would become liberal,
while all of its marginalized opponents surviving in the peripheral
fringes of global society would reconsider their strategies and for-
mulate a new united front according to Alain de Benoists periphery
against the centre. But, instead, at the beginning of the twenty-frst
century, everything followed a different script.
Liberalism, which had always insisted on the minimalisation of
the political, made the decision to abolish politics completely af-
ter its triumph. Maybe this was to prevent the formation of politi-
cal alternatives and make its rule eternal, or because the political
agenda had simply expired with the absence of ideological rivals,
the presence of which Carl Schmidt had considered indispensable
for the proper construction of a political position. Regardless of the
rationale, liberalism did everything possible to ensure the collapse
of politics. At the same time, liberalism itself has changed, passing
from the level of ideas, political programs and declarations to the
level of things, penetrating the very fesh of social reality, which
became liberal. This was presented not as a political process, but as
a natural and organic one. As a consequence of such a turn of his-
tory, all other political ideologies, passionately feuding against each
other during the last century, lost their currency. Conservatism, fas-
cism and communism, together with their secondary variations lost
6 Alexander DUGIN
the battle and triumphant liberalism mutated into a lifestyle: con-
sumerism, individualism, and a postmodern iteration of fragmented
and sub-political being. Politics became biopolitical, moving to the
individual and sub-individual level. It turns out that it was not only
the defeated political ideologies that left the stage, but politics, as
such, including liberalism, also exited. It is for that reason that the
formation of an alternative became so diffcult. Those who do not
agree with liberalism fnd themselves in a diffcult situation the
triumphant enemy has dissolved and disappeared; they are strug-
gling against the air. How can one then engage in politics, if there is
no politics?
There is only one way out to reject the classical political theo-
ries, both winners and losers, strain the imagination, seize the reality
of new global world, correctly decipher the challenges of Postmo-
dernity, and to and create something new something beyond the
political battles of the 19
th
and 20
th
centuries. Such an approach is
an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory be-
yond communism, fascism and liberalism.
To move forward towards the development of this Fourth Politi-
cal Theory, it is necessary to:
Reconsider the political history of the last centuries from new
positions beyond the frameworks and clichs of the old ideologies;
Realize and become aware of the profound structure of the global
society emerging before our eyes;
Correctly decipher the paradigm of Postmodernity
Learn to oppose not the political idea, program or strategy, but
the objective status quo, the most social aspect of the apolitical,
fractured (post-) society;
Finally, construct an autonomous political model which offers a
way and a project in the world of deadlocks, blind alleys, the end-
less recycling of the same old things (post-history, according to
Baudrillard).
This book is dedicated to this very problem as the beginning of
the development of a Fourth Political Theory, through an overview
7
Fourth Political Theory
and re-examination of the frst three political theories, and to the
closely-related ideologies of National Bolshevism and Eurasianism
that came very close indeed to the Fourth Political Theory. This is
not dogma, not a complete system, nor a fnished project. This is an
invitation to political creativity, a statement of intuitions and conjec-
tures, an analysis of new conditions, and an attempt at reconsidera-
tion of the past.
The Fourth Political Theory doesnt appear to us as the work of a
single author, but as a trend of a wide spectrum of ideas, researches,
analysis, prognoses, and projects. Anyone thinking in this vein can
contribute some of his own ideas. Notwithstanding, more and more
intellectuals, philosophers, historians, scientists, scholars, and think-
ers will respond to this call.
It is signifcant, that the book, Against Liberalism, by the suc-
cessful French intellectual Alain de Benoist, which is also published
in Russian by the publisher Amphora, has a subtitle Towards the
Fourth Political Theory. Undoubtedly, many things can be said on
this theme by representatives of both the old Left and the Old Right
and, probably, even by liberals themselves, who are conceptualizing
qualitative changes of their own political platform, where politics is
disappearing from.
For my own country, Russia, the Fourth Political Theory, among
other things, has an immense practical signifcance. The majority of
Russian people suffer their integration into global society as a loss
of their own identity. The Russian population had almost entirely
rejected Liberal ideology in the 1990s. But it is also apparent that a
return to the illiberal political ideologies of the 20
th
century, such as
communism or fascism, is unlikely, as these ideologies have already
failed and historically proven themselves to be incapable of oppos-
ing liberalism, to say nothing of the moral costs of totalitarianism.
Therefore, in order to fll this political and ideological vacuum,
Russia needs a new political idea. For Russia, Liberalism does not
ft, but communism and fascism are equally unacceptable. Conse-
quently, we need a Fourth Political Theory. And if for someone this
8 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
is a question of freedom of choice, the realization of political will,
which always can be directed both to an assertion and its negation,
then for Russia this is a matter of life and death, Hamlets eternal
question.
If Russia chooses to be, then it automatically signifes the crea-
tion of a Fourth Political Theory. Otherwise, for Russia there re-
mains only the choice not to be, then quietly to leave the historical
and world stage, and dissolve into the global world, neither created
nor governed by us.
CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT INCEPTION
THE END OF THE 20
TH
CENTURY THE END OF
MODERNITY
The 20
th
century has ended, but it is only now that we are truly
beginning to realize and to understand this fact. The 20
th
century was
the century of ideology. If in the previous centuries, religion, dynas-
ties, estates, classes, and nation-states played an enormous role in
the lives of peoples and societies, then, in the 20
th
century, politics
had shifted into a purely ideological realm, having redrawn the map
of the world, ethnicities, and civilizations in a new way. On the one
hand, political ideologies represented early and deeply rooted civi-
lizational tendencies. On the other hand, they were completely in-
novative.
All political ideologies, having reached the peak of their distribu-
tion and infuence in the 20
th
century were the product of the new,
Modern Era, embodying the spirit of modernity, albeit in different
ways and even through different symbols. Today, we are rapidly
leaving this Era. Thus everyone speaks, more and more often of the
crisis of ideology or even the end of ideology in this fashion, the
existence of a state ideology is explicitly denied in the Constitution
of the Russian Federation. It is past time to address this issue more
closely.
The Three Main Ideologies and their Fate in the 20
th
Century
The three main ideologies of the 20
th
century were:
liberalism
communism
fascism.
10 Alexander DUGIN
They fought among themselves to the death, forming, in essence,
the entire dramatic and bloody political history of the 20
th
century.
It is logical to number these ideologies (political theories) both
based on their signifcance, and in the order of their occurrence, as
was done above.
The frst political theory is liberalism. It arose frst, as early as
the 18
th
century, and turned out to be the most stable and successful
ideology, having ultimately prevailed over its rivals in this historic
battle. As a result of this victory, it proved, among other factors, the
justifcation of its claim to the entire legacy of the Enlightenment.
Today, it is obvious that it was liberalism that was the best ft for
modernity. However, this legacy was disputed earlier, dramatically,
actively, and, at times, convincingly, by another political theory
communism.
It is reasonable to call communism, much like socialism in all its
varieties, the second political theory. It appeared later than liberal-
ism as a critical response to the emergence of the bourgeois-cap-
italist system, which was the ideological expression of liberalism.
And, fnally, fascism is the third political theory. As a contender
for its own understanding of modernitys spirit many researchers,
Hannah Arendt, in particular, reasonably consider totalitarianism
one of the political forms of modernity. Fascism, however, turned
toward the ideas and symbols of traditional society. In some cases,
this gave rise to eclecticism, in others to the desire of conserva-
tives to lead a revolution instead of resisting it and leading their
society in the opposite direction i.e. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck,
Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, etc.
Fascism emerged later than the other major political theories and
vanished before them. The alliance of the frst political theory with
the second political theory, as well as Hitlers suicidal geopolitical
miscalculations, knocked it down mid-fight. The third political the-
ory was a victim of homicide or perhaps suicide not living long
enough to see old age and natural decay, in contrast to the USSR.
Therefore, this bloody vampiric ghost tinged with an aura of global
11
Fourth Political Theory
evil is attractive to the decadent tastes of postmodernity, still fright-
ening humanity to a great extent.
With its disappearance, fascism cleared space for the battle be-
tween the frst and second political theories. This battle took on the
form of the Cold War and gave birth to the strategic geometry of the
bipolar world which lasted for nearly half a century. By 1991, the
frst political theory, liberalism, had defeated the second political
theory, socialism. This marked the global decline of communism.
As a result, by the end of the 20
th
century, liberal theory is the
only remaining one of the three political theories of Modernity that
is capable of mobilizing the vast masses throughout the entire world.
Yet, now that it is left on its own, everyone speaks in unison about
the end of ideology. Why?
The End of Liberalism and the Arrival of Postliberalism
It turns out that the triumph of liberalism, the frst political theo-
ry, coincided with its end. This only seems to be a paradox.
Liberalism had been an ideology from the start. It was not as
dogmatic as Marxism, but was no less philosophical, graceful, and
refned. It ideologically opposed Marxism and Fascism, not only
undertaking a technological war for survival, but also defending its
right to monopolize its own image of the future. While the other
competing ideologies were alive, liberalism continued on and grew
stronger precisely as an ideology, i.e. a set of ideas, views, and pro-
jects that are typical for a historical subject. Each of the three politi-
cal theories had its own subject.
The subject of communism was class. Fascisms subject was the
state in Italian Fascism under Mussolini, or race in Hitlers National
Socialism. In liberalism, the subject was represented by the individ-
ual, freed from all forms of collective identity and any membership
(lappartenance).
While the ideological struggle had formal opponents, entire na-
tions and societies, at least theoretically, were able to select their
subject of choice that of class, racism/statism, or individiualism.
12 Alexander DUGIN
The victory of liberalism resolved this question: the individual be-
came the normative subject within the framework of all mankind.
It is at this point that the phenomenon of globalization arises, the
model of a postindustrial society makes itself known, and the post-
modern era begins. From now on, the individual subject is no longer
the result of choice, but is a kind of a mandatory given. Man is freed
from his membership and collective identities, and the ideology of
human rights becomes widely accepted, at least in theory, and is
practically compulsory.
A humanity under liberalism, comprised of individuals, is natu-
rally drawn toward universality and seeks to become global and uni-
fed. Thus, the projects of the world state, global governance, and
the world government or globalism are born.
A new level of technological development makes it possible to
achieve independence from the class structuralization of industrial
societies i.e. post-industrialism.
The values of rationalism, scientism, and positivism are recog-
nized as veiled forms of repressive, totalitarian policies, or the
grand narrative, and are criticized. At the same time, this is accom-
panied by parallel glorifcation of complete freedom and independ-
ence of the individual from any kind of limiting factors, including
reason, morality, identity (social, ethnic, and even gendered), disci-
plines, etc. This is the condition of Postmodernity.
At this stage, liberalism ceases to be the frst political theory and
becomes the only postpolitical practice. Fukuyamas end of his-
tory arrives, economics in the form of the global capitalist market,
replaces politics, and states and nations are dissolved in the melting
pot of world globalization.
Having triumphed, liberalism disappears and turns into a differ-
ent entity into post-liberalism. It no longer has political dimen-
sions; it does not represent free choice, but instead becomes a kind
of historically deterministic destiny. This is the source of the thesis
about the post-industrial society: economics as destiny.
Thus, the beginning of the 21
st
century coincides with the end of
ideology that is, all three of them. Each met a different end: the
13
Fourth Political Theory
third political theory was destroyed in its youth, the second died of
decrepit old age, and the frst was reborn as something else - as post-
liberalism and the global market society. In any case, the form
which all three political theories took on in the 20
th
century is no
longer useful, effective, or relevant. They lack explanatory explain
power, the ability to help us understand current events, and the ca-
pability to respond to global challenges.
The need for the Fourth Political Theory stems from this assess-
ment.
The Fourth Political Theory as Resistance to the Status Quo
The Fourth Political Theory will not be just handed to us without
any effort. It may or may not emerge. The prerequisite for its appear-
ance is dissent. That is, dissent against postliberalism as a universal
practice, against globalization, against postmodernity, against the
end of history, against the status quo, against the inertial develop-
ment of major civilizational processes at the dawn of the 21
st
century.
The status quo and this inertia do not presuppose any political
theories whatsoever. A global world can only be ruled by the laws of
economics and the universal morality of human rights. All political
decisions are replaced by technical ones. Machinery and technol-
ogy substitute for all else. The French philosopher, Alain de Benoist,
terms this la gouvernance, or micromanagement. Managers and
technocrats take the place of the politician who makes historical de-
cisions, optimizing the logistics of management. Masses of people
are equated to the single mass of individual objects. For this reason,
post-liberal reality, or, rather, virtuality increasingly displacing real-
ity from itself, leads straight to the complete abolition of politics.
Some may argue that the liberals lie to us when they speak of the
end of ideology (this was my debate with philosopher Aleksandr
Zinoviev); in reality, they remain believers in their ideology and
simply deny all others the right to exist. This is not exactly true.
When liberalism transforms from being an ideological arrangement
to the only content of extant social and technological existence, then
14 Alexander DUGIN
it is no longer an ideology, but an existential fact, an objective
order of things, the challenge of which is not only diffcult, but also
foolish. In the postmodern era, liberalism moves from the sphere of
the subject to the sphere of the object. This will potentially lead to
the complete replacement of reality by virtuality.
The Fourth Political Theory is conceived as an alternative to
postliberalism, but not as one ideological arrangement in relation to
another. Instead, it is as an incorporeal idea opposed to corporeal
matter; as a possibility entering into confict with the actuality, as
that which is yet to come into being attacking that which is already
in existence.
At the same time, the Fourth Political Theory cannot be the con-
tinuation of either the second political theory or the third. The end
of fascism, much like the end of communism, was not just an acci-
dental misunderstanding, but the expression of rather lucid histori-
cal logic. They challenged the spirit of modernity (fascism did so
almost openly, communism more covertly: see the review of the
Soviet period as a special eschatological version of the traditional
society by Mikhail S. Agurskii or Sergei Kara-Murza) and lost
1
.
This means that the struggle with postmodern metamorphosis of
liberalism in the form of postmodernity and globalization should
be qualitatively different; it must be based on new principles and
propose new strategies.
Nevertheless, the starting point of this ideology is precisely the
rejection of the very essence of postmodernity. This starting point
is possible but neither guaranteed, nor fatal, nor predetermined
because it arises from mans free will, from his spirit, rather than an
impersonal historic process.
1
Translators note: English speakers may have an easier time accessing
somewhat related works on the USSR, modernity, and traditionalism, e.g.
David Hoffmans Stalinist Values: the Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity,
1917-1941 (2003) and David Brandenbergers National Bolshevism: Stalin-
ist Mass Culture and the Formation of the Modern Russian National Identity,
1931-1956 (2002)
15
Fourth Political Theory
However, this essence (much like the detection of the rationale
behind modernity itself imperceptible earlier which realized its
essence so fully that it exhausted its internal resources and switched
to the mode of ironic recycling of its earlier stages) is something
completely new, previously unknown, and only surmised intuitively
and fragmentarily during the earlier stages of ideological history and
the ideological struggle.
The Fourth Political Theory is a Crusade against:
If the third political theory criticized capitalism from the Right
and the second from the Left, then the new stage no longer features
this political topography: it is impossible to determine where the
Right and the Left are located in relation to postliberalism. There are
only two positions: compliance (the center) and dissent (the periph-
ery). Both positions are global.
The Fourth Political Theory is the amalgamation of a common
project and in an common impulse to everything that was discarded,
toppled, and humiliated during the course of constructing the soci-
ety of the spectacle (constructing post-modernity). The stone that
the builders rejected has become the cornerstone (Mark 12:10). The
philosopher Aleksandr Sekatskii rightly pointed out the signifcance
of marginalia in the formation of a new philosophical eon, sug-
gesting the term metaphysics of debris as a metaphor.
The Battle for Postmodernity
The Fourth Political Theory deals with the new reincarnation of
an old enemy. It challenges liberalism, much like the second and
third political theories of the past, but it does so under new condi-
tions. The principal novelty of these conditions lies in the fact that
of all the three great political ideologies only liberalism secured the
right to own the legacy behind the spirit of modernity and obtained
the right to create the end of history based on its own premises.
Theoretically, the end of history could have been different: a
planetary Reich, if the Nazis had won, or global communism,
had the communists been right. However, the end of history has
16 Alexander DUGIN
turned out to be precisely liberal. The philosopher Alexandre Ko-
jve was one of the frst to predict this; his ideas were later repro-
duced by Francis Fukuyama. But since this is the case, then any
appeals to modernity and its assumptions, to which the representa-
tives of the second (to a greater extent) and third political theories
appealed in varying degrees, lose their relevance. They lost the bat-
tle for modernity as the liberals triumphed. For this reason, the issue
of modernity, and, incidentally of modernization, may be removed
from the agenda. Now the battle for post-modernity begins.
And, it is here that new prospects open up for the Fourth Political
Theory. That kind of post-modernity which is currently being real-
ized in practice, post-liberal Post-modernity, cancels out the strict
logic of modernity itself after the goal had been achieved, the steps
toward reaching it lose their meaning. The pressure of the ideologi-
cal shell becomes less rigid. The dictatorship of ideas is replaced
by the dictatorship of things, login passwords, and bar codes. New
holes are appearing in the fabric of postmodern reality.
As the third and second political theories, conceived as an escha-
tological version of traditionalism, once tried to saddle modernity
in their struggle with liberalism, the frst political theory, today there
is a chance of accomplishing something analogous with postmoder-
nity, using these new holes, in particular.
Liberalism developed fawlessly operating weapons aimed at its
straightforward alternatives, which was the basis for its victory. But
it is this very victory that holds the greatest risk to liberalism. We
must only ascertain the location of these new vulnerable spots in
the global system and decipher its login passwords in order to hack
into that system. At the very least, we must try to do so. The events
of 9/11 in New York demonstrated that this is possible even tech-
nologically. The Internet society can be useful even to its staunch
opponents. In any case, frst and foremost, we must understand post-
modernity and the new situation no less profoundly than Marx un-
derstood the structure of industrial capitalism.
The Fourth Political Theory must draw its dark inspiration from
postmodernity, from the liquidation of the Enlightenment program,
17
Fourth Political Theory
and the arrival of the society of simulacra, interpreting this as an
incentive for battle rather than a fatal given.
Rethinking the Past and Those Who Lost
The second and third political theories are unacceptable as start-
ing points for resisting liberalism, particularly because of the way
in which they understood themselves, what they appealed to, and
how they operated. They positioned themselves as contenders for
the expression of the soul of modernity and failed in that endeavour.
Yet, nothing stops us from rethinking the very fact of their failure
as something positive, their vices recast as virtues. Since the logic
of the history of the New Era brought us to post-modernity, then it
also contained the secret essence of the New Era which was only
revealed to us in the end.
The second and third political theories recognized themselves as
contenders for the expression of modernitys spirit. And these claims
came crashing down. Everything related to these unfulflled inten-
tions in the previous ideologies is of least interest for the creators of
the Fourth Political Theory. However, we should attribute the very
fact that they lost to one of their advantages rather than their disad-
vantages. By losing, they proved that they did not belong to the spir-
it of modernity, which, in turn, led to the postliberal matrix. Herein
lie their advantages. Moreover, this means that the representatives
of the second and third political theories either consciously or un-
consciously stood on the side of Tradition, however, without draw-
ing the necessary conclusions from this or not recognizing it at all.
The second and third political theories must be reconsidered, se-
lecting in them that which must be discarded and that which has
value in itself. As complete ideologies, trying to get their own way
literally, they are entirely useless either theoretically or practi-
cally. However, certain marginal elements that were generally not
implemented and remained on the periphery or in the shadows (let
us recall the metaphysics of debris once again) may unexpectedly
18 Alexander DUGIN
turn out to be extremely valuable and saturated with meaning and
intuition.
Yet, in any case, it is necessary to rethink the second and third
political theories in a new way, from a new perspective, and only af-
ter we reject our trust in those ideological structures on which their
orthodoxy rested. Their orthodoxy is their most uninteresting and
worthless aspect. Cross-reading them would be far more produc-
tive: Marx through a positive view of the Right or Evola through
a positive view of the Left. This fascinating National Bolshevik
undertaking, in the spirit of Nikolai V. Ustrialov or Ernst Niekisch,
is not suffcient by itself. After all, a mechanical addition of the sec-
ond political theory to the third will not, by itself, lead us anywhere.
Only in retrospect can we delineate their common regions, which
were staunchly opposed to liberalism. This methodological exercise
is useful as a warm-up before commencing a full-fedged elabora-
tion on the Fourth Political Theory.
A truly signifcant and decisive reading of the second and third
political theories is only possible on the basis of an already estab-
lished Fourth Political Theory. Postmodernity and its conditions (the
globalist world, gouvernance or micromanagement, the market so-
ciety, the universalism of human rights, the real domination of capi-
tal, etc.) represent the main object in the Fourth Political Theory.
However, they are radically negated as a value.
The Return of Tradition and Theology
Tradition (religion, hierarchy, family) and its values were over-
thrown at the dawn of modernity. Actually, all three political theo-
ries were conceived as artifcial ideological constructions by people
who comprehended, in various ways, the death of God (Friedrich
Nietzsche), the disenchantment of the world (Max Weber), and the
end of the sacred. This was the core of the New Era of Moder-
nity: man came to replace God, philosophy and science replaced
religion, and the rational, forceful, and technological constructs took
the place of Revelation.
19
Fourth Political Theory
However, if modernism is exhausted in postmodernity, then at
the same time, the period of direct theomachy comes to an end
along with it. Postmodern people are not inimical towards religion,
but rather, indifferent. Moreover, certain aspects of religion, as a
rule, pertaining to the regions of hell, the demonic texture of post-
modernist philosophers are quite appealing. In any case, the era of
persecuting Tradition is over, although, following the logic of post-
liberalism, this will likely lead to the creation of a new global pseu-
do-religion, based on the scraps of disparate syncretic cults, rampant
chaotic ecumenism, and tolerance. While this turn of events is, in
some ways, even more terrifying than direct and uncomplicated dog-
matic atheism and materialism, the weakening in the persecution of
Faith may be that chance, if the representatives of the Fourth Politi-
cal Theory act consistently and uncompromisingly in defending the
ideals and the values of Tradition.
Now it is safe to institute as a political program that which was
outlawed by modernity. And, this no longer looks as foolish and
doomed for failure as before at least because everything in post-
modernity looks foolish and doomed for failure, including its most
glamorous aspects. It is not by chance that the heroes of post-
modernity are freaks and monsters ,transvestites and degener-
ates this is the law of style. Against the backdrop of the worlds
clowns nothing and no one could look too archaic, even the people
of Tradition who ignore the imperatives of modern life. The fairness
of this assertion is not only proven by the signifcant achievements
of Islamic fundamentalism, but also by the revival of the infuence
exerted by vastly archaic Protestant sects (Dispensationalists, Mor-
mons, etc.) on U.S. foreign policy. George W. Bush went to war in
Iraq because, in his own words, God told me to invade Iraq! This is
quite in keeping with his Protestant Methodist teachers.
Thus, the Fourth Political Theory may easily turn toward every-
thing that preceded modernity in order to draw its inspiration from
there. The acknowledgement of Gods death ceases to be the man-
datory imperative for those who want to stay relevant. The people
of post-modernity are already so resigned to this event that they can
20 Alexander DUGIN
no longer understand it Who died exactly? But, in the same way,
the developers of the Fourth Political Theory can forget about this
event, We believe in God, but ignore those who teach about His
death, much like we ignore the words of madmen.
This marks the return of theology and becomes an essential ele-
ment of the Fourth Political Theory. When it returns, postmodernity
(globalization, postliberalism, and the postindustrial society) is eas-
ily recognized as the kingdom of the Antichrist (or its counterparts
in other religions Dajjal for Muslims, Erev Rav for the Jews,
and Kali Yuga for Hindus, etc.). Now this is not simply a metaphor
capable of mobilizing the masses, but a religious fact the fact of
the Apocalypse.
Myths and Archaism in the Fourth Political Theory
If atheism of the New Era ceases to be something mandatory for
the Fourth Political Theory, then the theology of monotheistic reli-
gions, which at one time displaced other sacred cultures, will not be
the ultimate truth either (or rather, may or may not be). Theoretical-
ly, nothing limits the depth of addressing the ancient archaic values,
which can take a specifc place in the new ideological construction,
upon being adequately recognized and understood. Eliminating the
need to adjust theology to rationalism of modernity, the carriers of
the Fourth Political Theory are free to ignore those theological and
dogmatic elements, which were affected by rationalism in mono-
theistic societies, especially at the later stages. The latter led to the
appearance of deism on the ruins of Christian European culture, fol-
lowed by atheism and materialism, during a phased development of
the programs of the modern age.
Not only the highest supramental symbols of faith can be taken
on board once again as a new shield, but so can those irrational
aspects of cults, rites, and legends that have perplexed theologians
at the previous stages. If we reject the idea of progress inherent to
modernity (which as we have seen, has ended), then all that is an-
21
Fourth Political Theory
cient gains value and credibility for us simply because it is ancient.
Ancient means good, and the more ancient the better.
Of all creations, paradise is the most ancient one. The carriers of
the Fourth Political Theory must strive toward discovering it anew
in the near future.
Heidegger and the Event (Ereignis)
And fnally, we can identify the most profound ontological!
foundation for the Fourth Political Theory. Here, we should pay
attention not only to theologies and mythologies, but also to the re-
fective philosophical experience of one particular thinker who had
made a unique attempt of constructing a fundamental ontology the
most summarizing, paradoxical, profound, and penetrating study of
Being. I am talking about Martin Heidegger.
A brief description of Heideggers concept is as follows. At the
dawn of philosophical thought, people (more specifcally, Europe-
ans, even more specifcally, the Greeks), raised the question of Be-
ing as the focal point of their thinking. But, by thematizing it, they
risked getting confused by the nuances of the complicated relation-
ship between Being and thought, between pure Being (Seyn) and its
expression in existence a being (Seiende), between human Being
in the world (Dasein being-there) and Being-in-itself (Sein). This
failure already occurred in the teaching of Heraclitus about the phu-
sis and the logos. Next, it is obvious in Parmenides work, and, fnal-
ly, in Plato, who placed ideas between man and existence and who
defned truth as the correspondence thereof, the referential theory
of knowledge, this failure reached its culmination. This gave birth
to alienation that eventually led to calculating thinking (das rech-
nende Denken) and then to the development of technology. Little by
little, man lost sight of pure Being and pursued the path of nihilism.
The essence of technology (based on the technical relationship with
the world) expresses this continually accumulating nihilism. In the
New Era, this tendency reaches its pinnacle technical development
(Gestell) ultimately displaces Being and crowns Nothingness. Hei-
22 Alexander DUGIN
degger bitterly hated liberalism, considering it an expression of the
calculation source which lies at the heart of Western nihilism.
Postmodernity, which Heidegger did not live to see, is, in every
sense, the ultimate oblivion of Being, it is that midnight, when
Nothingness (nihilism) begins to seep from all the cracks. Yet his
philosophy was not hopelessly pessimistic. He believed that Noth-
ingness itself is the fip side of pure Being, which in such a para-
doxical way! reminds mankind of its existence. If we correctly
decipher the logic behind the unfurling of Being, then thinking man-
kind can save itself with lightning speed at the very moment of the
greatest risk. Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for
salvation, Heidegger quotes Friedrich Hlderlins poetry.
Heidegger used a special term, Ereignis the Event, to de-
scribe this sudden return of Being. It takes place exactly at midnight
of the worlds night at the darkest moment in history. Heidegger
himself constantly vacillated as to whether this point had been
reached or not quite yet. The eternal not yet
Heideggers philosophy may prove to be that central axis thread-
ing everything around it ranging from the reconceived second and
third political theories to the return of theology and mythology.
Thus, at the heart of the Fourth Political Theory, as its magnetic
center, lies the trajectory of approaching Ereignis (the Event),
which will embody the triumphant return of Being at the exact mo-
ment when mankind forgets about it once and for all to the point that
the last traces of it disappear.
The Fourth Political Theory and Russia
Today many people intuitively understand that Russia has no
place in the brave new world of globalization, post-modernity, and
post-liberalism. First, the world state and the world government are
gradually abolishing all nation-states in general. More important is
the fact that the entirety of Russian history is a dialectical argument
with the West and against Western culture, the struggle for uphold-
ing our own (often only intuitively grasped) Russian truth, our own
23
Fourth Political Theory
messianic idea, and our own version of the end of history, no
matter how it is expressed through Muscovite Orthodoxy, Peters
secular empire, or the world communist revolution. The brightest
Russian minds clearly saw that the West was moving towards the
abyss. Now, looking at where neoliberal economics and postmodern
culture has led the world, we can be certain that this intuition, push-
ing generations of Russian people to search for alternatives, was
completely justifed.
The current global economic crisis is just the beginning. The
worst is yet to come. The inertia of post-liberal processes is such
that a change of course is impossible: to save the West, unrestrained
emancipated technology (Oswald Spengler) will search for more
effcient, but a purely technical, technological means. This is the
new phase in the onset of Gestell spreading the nihilistic stain of the
global market over the entire planet. Moving from crisis to crisis and
from one bubble to the next (thousands of Americans held a dem-
onstration at the time of crisis with the following slogan, Give us a
new bubble! Can they be any more blunt?), globalist economy and
the structures of the postindustrial society make mankinds night
more and more black. It is so black, in fact, that we gradually forget
that this is night time. What is light? people ask themselves having
never seen it.
It is clear that Russia needs to follow a different path. Its own.
Yet herein lies the question and paradox. Evading the logic of post-
modernity in one single country will not be that simple. The Soviet
model tried and collapsed. After that point, the ideological situation
changed irreversibly as did the strategic balance of power. In order
for Russia to save herself and others, creating some sort of a techno-
logical miracle or a deceptive move is insuffcient. World history has
its own logic. And the end of ideology is not a random failure, but
the beginning of a new stage, apparently, the last one.
In this situation, Russias future directly relies on our efforts to
develop the Fourth Political Theory. We will not go far, and will
only extend our time, by locally sorting those options that globali-
zation offers to us and by correcting the status quo in a superfcial
24 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
manner. Postmodernitys challenge is tremendously signifcant: it is
rooted in the logic of Beings oblivion and in mankinds departure
from its existential (ontological) and spiritual (theological) roots.
Responding to it with hat-tossing innovation or public-relations sur-
rogates is impossible. Therefore, we must refer to the philosophical
foundations of history and make a metaphysical effort in order to
solve the current problems the global economic crisis, countering
the unipolar world, as well as the preservation and strengthening of
sovereignty, etc.
It is diffcult to say how the process of developing this theory
will turn out. One thing is clear: it cannot be an individual effort
or one that is restricted to a small group of people. The effort must
be shared and collective. In this matter, the representatives of other
cultures and people (both in Europe and Asia) can truly help us,
since they sense the eschatological tension of the present moment in
an equally acute way and are just as desperately looking for the way
out from the global dead end.
However, it is possible to state in advance that the Russian ver-
sion of the Fourth Political Theory, based on the rejection of the
status quo in its practical and theoretical dimensions, will focus on
the Russian Ereignis. This will be that very Event, unique and
extraordinary, for which many generations of Russian people lived
and waited, from the birth of our nation to the coming arrival of the
End of Days.
CHAPTER 3. DASEIN AS AN ACTOR
STAGES AND PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH POLITICAL THEORY
Being a supporter of cyclical development and an opponent of
Francis Bacon and his idea of data collection, I would still like to
suggest that we develop and modify approaches to specifc topics
and areas of thought in an ongoing manner. We have repeatedly clar-
ifed the notion of conservatism. We conducted a series of confer-
ences and scientifc symposia on the Fourth Political Theory. Let
us believe that these efforts, the results of which are published in
magazines
1
, scientifc collections, individual monographs, and web-
sites
2
were not carried out in vain, and that the readers are more or
less familiar with them. Therefore, I propose to move on.
I will demonstrate with concrete examples of what has been done
to promote the discussion of the Fourth Political Theory and, con-
sequently, the observable results of the activities conducted by the
Center of Conservative Research at the Faculty of Sociology of the
Moscow State University
3
and the St. Petersburg Conservative Club
1
Issue #1 of the journal Russkoe Vremia (Russian Time), 2009, completely
dedicated to the subject of conservatism. See also A.G. Dugin, The Fourth
Political Theory, Profle, #48 (603), 22.12.2008.
2
Here are some links: http://evrazia.org/print.php?id=779; http://www.
evrazia.org/article/755; http://konservatizm.org/news/activity/020409175427.
xhtml; http://rossia3.ru/ideolog/friends/hezbali1; http://rossia3.ru/ideolog/
friends/hezbali2; http://www.evrazia.org/article/751;http://konservatizm.org/
konservatizm/theory/160309164752.xhtml; http://konservatizm.org/konserva-
tizm/theory/140309014819.xhtml; http://www.geopolitica.ru/Articles/434/;
http://www.sorokinfond.ru/index.php?id=552; http://neokons.ru/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=88&Itemid=78
3
http://konservatizm.org
26 Alexander DUGIN
at the Faculty of Philosophy of the St. Petersburg State University
1
.
These results include two books that were recently published in St.
Petersburg, in the wonderful St. Petersburg publishing house Am-
phora: Alain de Benoists Against Liberalism: Toward the Fourth
Political Theory
2
and Aleksandr Dugins The Fourth Political The-
ory
3
. The book by the philosopher Alain de Benoist, who spoke at
the St. Petersburg State University during the Philosophy Days in St.
Petersburg, is a compendium of his views in philosophy and political
science on major issues of our time: globalization, the economic and
social crisis, the process of European integration, the new political
and social trends, the relationship between Europe and Russia, hu-
manism, etc. All these problems are addressed from the standpoint
of criticizing the liberal ideology dominating the world (the frst and
the most stable political theory). Having remained without compe-
tition after the collapse of communism, it has become the priority
target for criticism by those who are acutely aware of the negative
aspects of the status quo in politics, the social sphere, economy, cul-
ture, ideology, etc. and who are searching for an alternative. The old
alternatives to liberalism communism and fascism have been his-
torically overcome and discarded: each in its own way, yet they have
demonstrated their ineffectiveness and incompetence. Therefore, the
search for an alternative to liberalism must be held somewhere else.
The search area is designated as the domain of the Fourth Politi-
cal Theory. Such an approach corresponds exactly to the stated
theme: Conservatism: the Future or an Alternative? If we think
about an alternative and correlate it with the blueprint for the future,
then we should clearly realize what that alternative is going to re-
place. The answer is simple: liberalism as the dominant global dis-
1
http://konservatizm.org/regions/leningrad/region.xhtml
2
Benoist, Alain de. Protiv liberalizma. K chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii, St.
Petersburg, Amfora, 2009. [Against Liberalism. Toward the Fourth Political
Theory]
3
Dugin, A.G. Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, St. Petersburg, Am-
phora, 2009 (on the web: http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/amfo-
ra/031209153016.xhtml) [The Fourth Political Theory]
27
Fourth Political Theory
course. Therefore, the only signifcant alternative should logically
be directed against liberalism, hence the title of Alain de Benoists
book. Nevertheless, the question remains: does conservatism ft this
role? In part, we heard the answer in de Benoists speech, in which
he criticized the liberal theory of progress. This philosophical ap-
proach proposes that conservatism is the most logical candidate for
an alternative to liberalism either as a relativizing worldview or as
one rejecting progress altogether. What remains, then, is to specify
the kind of conservatism in question: it is obvious that liberal con-
servatism cannot be considered an alternative to liberalism, being
its variant. Thus, through the process of elimination, we can specify
a proposition: we must look for an alternative to liberalism in non-
liberal versions of conservatism. All this is logical, since de Benoist
himself is known as a philosopher with conservative views (some-
times he is referred to as one of the pioneers of the European New
Right), but the particular kind of conservative views he has in mind
is obvious from his newly published book.
There is another aspect worth mentioning in regards to the title
of de Benoists book. Many readers will remember another ideologi-
cal manifesto directed against liberalism called After Liberalism
1
by
Immanuel Wallerstein. Despite the similarity of titles and the object
of criticism, there is a signifcant difference. Wallerstein criticized
liberalism from the point of view of the Left from the neo-Marxist
position. And, like any Marxist, he saw liberalism (bourgeois de-
mocracy, capitalism) as a phase of historical development, which
is progressive in comparison with the preceding phases of develop-
ment (such as feudalism or slavery), but is inferior to what must
come after it socialism, communism, etc. We are talking about the
criticism from the Left and, in some ways, from the standpoint of
the future (which is expressed in Wallerstein's book title After Lib-
eralism). This is a typical feature of Marxism. For de Benoist, nei-
ther the superiority of liberalism over the previous historical types
of society, nor the advantages of a communist future are obvious.
1
Wallerstein, Immanuel. Posle liberalizma. Moscow, 2003. [After Liberalism]
28 Alexander DUGIN
Therefore, despite the similarity of titles, there is a fundamental dif-
ference between the authors initial positions: with Wallerstein, we
have to deal with criticism from the Left; with de Benoist, with
criticism from the Right. Another difference involves the relation-
ship to liberalism. According to Wallerstein, the end of liberalism is
a foregone conclusion by the very logic of socio-political and socio-
economic history, and so he easily spoke of an after. For de Be-
noist, the question remains: one must fght against liberalism, yet in
this morally and historically justifed struggle, there are no guaran-
teed results. It is important to fght against liberalism here and now;
it is important to identify its vulnerabilities; it is important to forge
an alternative worldview but the future is in our hands, and it is
open rather than predetermined. Wallerstein, in varying degrees, is
a mechanicist, like any Marxist, whereas de Benoist is an organicist
and holist, like any (real) conservative.
The last item that I would like to draw attention to in regards to the
ideas of Alain de Benoist and their relevance is the comprehension
of Carl Schmitts concept of the Fourth Nomos of the Earth
1
that
is, the relationship between political science and political theology
with geopolitics and the new model of the political organization of
space.
On my part, in the book The Fourth Political Theory
2
, I had done
a review of the three main political theories of the past liberalism,
Marxism (socialism) and fascism (National Socialism), summed up
their overall balance, and attempted to identify the horizons for the
development of the Fourth Political Theory beyond all three ide-
ologies. This, of course, is extremely far from any dogmatism or a
proposal of a complete answer to the stated problem. But, neverthe-
less, these are rather specifc steps toward the preparation of closely
tackling this issue. Without repeating what was said in my book and
the book by Alain de Benoist, I will try to make a number of remarks
about the development of this subject.
1
Schmitt, Carl, Nomos zemli, St. Petersburg, 2008. [The Nomos of the Earth]
2
Dugin, A. G. Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, ibid. [The Fourth Political
Theory]
29
Fourth Political Theory
What the Fourth Political Theory is in terms of negation is
now clear. It is neither fascism, nor communism, nor liberalism. In
principle, this kind of negation is rather signifcant. It embodies our
determination to go beyond the usual ideological and political para-
digms and to make an effort in order to overcome the inertia of the
clichs within political thinking. This alone is a highly stimulating
invitation for a free spirit and a critical mind. I do not really under-
stand why certain people, when confronted with the concept of the
Fourth Political Theory, do not immediately rush to open a bottle
of Champagne, and do not start dancing and rejoicing, celebrating
the revelation of a new horizon. After all, this is a kind of a philo-
sophical New Year an exciting leap into the unknown. The Old
Year witnessed the struggle of the three political ideologies one
that was bloody and that claimed millions of lives. All the criticism
of liberalism was either fascist or communist. This criticism was
left in the past, but the oldest of these ideologies liberalism is
still here. Liberalism is the remnant of the Old Year; it is residuo,
an uncertain past that was not properly sent into the oblivion. It has
already passed, but does not want to leave permanently in any way.
In short, it is a chimera, the dragon that swallowed the sun, or the
diabolical spirits that kidnapped the Snow Maiden before the New
Year. In a sense, liberalism embodies everything that was in the past.
The Fourth Political Theory is the name for a breakthrough, for a
new beginning.
Underscoring the relevance of criticism and especially highlight-
ing the fact that this is a radical rejection of all three political theories
(liberalism, communism, and fascism) and their variants, I suggest
we contemplate about the positive content of the Fourth Political
Theory. The fact that we have identifed the negative content is
in itself remarkable and requires a thorough understanding. The
very idea to put an end to fascism, communism, and liberalism is an
extremely stimulating thing. The negative program of the Fourth
Political Theory sounds as follows, Say no to fascism, no to
communism, and no to liberalism! Liberalism will not work! It
will not pass! (No pasara!), much like fascism once failed (no ha
30 Alexander DUGIN
pasado). The Berlin Wall, too, collapsed; only dust remains from the
only visible manifestation of communism, separating the commu-
nists from the capitalists (liberals). The communists did not pass
either. Now, what remains is for liberals to not pass and they
will not pass! (No pasaran!). But in order for them to not pass,
the fragments of the Berlin Wall are insuffcient for us, as the Wall
itself was insuffcient. The Wall existed, but they still passed. Even
less helpful are the dark shadows of the Third Reich, its independ-
ent corpses, inspiring only the brutal punk youth and the disturbing,
perverted dreams of S&M devotees
1
.
Consequently, we suggest moving on in order to advance from
the nihilistic phase of the Fourth Political Theory toward positiv-
ity. Discarding the three political theories as a systematized whole,
we can try to look at them from a different perspective. They are be-
ing rejected precisely as complete ideological systems each on the
basis of separate arguments. But they like any system consist of
elements that do not belong to them. The three political ideologies
own their unique philosophical systems, groups, explanatory meth-
odologies, their whole a structure of their hermeneutic circle,
their fundamental epistemes. They are what they are as a whole.
Dismembered into components, they lose their signifcance and be-
come de-semanticized. A particular component of a liberal, Marx-
ist (socialist, communist), or a fascist (National Socialist) ideology
is not liberalism, Marxism, or fascism. It is not that they are com-
pletely neutral, but outside of the strict ideological context, they can
fnd or discover a different new meaning. The positive aspects
in the development of the Fourth Political Theory are based on
this principle. A revision of the three political ideologies and their
unconventional analysis can give certain clues to the substantive
content of this theory.
1Translators
note: independent corpses. The author uses the word nezalezh-
nye in reference to the so-called orange revolution in the Ukraine and the
Nazi sympathies among certain Western Ukrainians.

31
Fourth Political Theory
In each of the three ideologies there is a clearly defned histori-
cal subject.
In liberal ideology, the historical subject is the individual. The
individual is conceived as a unit that is rational and endowed with
a will (morality). The individual is both a given and the goal of lib-
eralism. It is a given, but one that is often unaware of its identity
as an individual. All forms of collective identity ethnic, nation-
al, state-based, religious, caste-based, etc. impede an individuals
awareness of his individuality. Liberalism encourages the individual
to become himself, that is, to be free of all those social identities
and dependencies that constrain and defne the individual externally.
This is the meaning of liberalism (Eng.: liberty, Lat.: libertas): the
call to become liberated (Lat.: liber) of all things external. Moreo-
ver, liberal theorists (in particular, John Stuart Mill) underscored the
fact that we are talking about a freedom from
1
, about the release
from ties, identifcations, and restrictions that are negative in their
content. As to what the purpose of this freedom is liberals remain
silent to assert some kind of a normative goal is, in their eyes, to
restrict the individual and his freedom. Therefore, they strictly sepa-
rate a freedom from, which they regard as a moral imperative of
social development, from the freedom for (Eng.: freedom) the
normativization of how, why, and for what purpose this freedom
should be used. The latter remains at the discretion of the historical
subject (the individual).
The historical subject of the second political theory is class. The
class structure of society and the contradiction between the exploiter
class and the exploited class are the core of the communists dramat-
ic vision of history. History is class struggle. Politics is its expres-
sion. The proletariat is a dialectic historical subject, which is called
to set itself free from the domination of the bourgeoisie and to build
a society on new foundations. A single individual is conceived here
as a part of a class-based whole and acquires social existence only in
the process of raising class consciousness.
1
Mill, John Stuart, O svobode, Nauka i zhizn, 1993, #11, pp. 1015, # 12.
pp. 2126. [On Liberty]
32 Alexander DUGIN
And, fnally, the subject of the third political theory is either the
State (as in Italian Fascism) or race (as in German National Social-
ism). In fascism, everything is based upon the Right-wing version
of Hegelianism, since Hegel himself considered the Prussian state to
be the peak of historical development in which the subjective spirit
was perfected. Giovanni Gentile, a proponent of Hegelianism, ap-
plied this concept to Fascist Italy
1
. In German National Socialism,
the historical subject is the Aryan race
2
, which, according to rac-
ists, carries out the eternal struggle against the subhuman races.
The appalling consequences of this ideology are too well known to
dwell upon them. However, it was this original defnition of a his-
torical subject that was at the heart of the Nazis criminal practices.
The defnition of a historical subject is the fundamental basis for
political ideology in general, and it defnes its structure. Therefore,
in this matter, the Fourth Political Theory may act in the most
radical way by rejecting all of these constructions as candidates for
a historical subject. The historical subject is neither an individual,
nor class, nor the state, nor race. This is the anthropological and the
historical axiom of the Fourth Political Theory.
We assumed that it is clear to us who (or what) cannot be the
historical subject. But then who (or what) can?
We cleared a space and correctly posed the question. We carried
out our theme: we specifed the problem of clarifying the historical
subject in the Fourth Political Theory. Now there is a gaping void.
This gaping void is extremely interesting and signifcant.
Heading into the depths of this void, we propose four hypoth-
eses, which are not mutually exclusive, and which can be examined
both collectively and individually.
The frst hypothesis suggests abandoning all versions of contend-
ers for the role of a historical subject from classical political theory,
assuming that the subject of the Fourth Political Theory is some
1
Gregor A. James, Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism, Transaction
Publishers, 2001.
2
Rosenberg, Alfred, Mif XX veka. Tallinn, 1998. [The Myth of the Twentieth
Century]
33
Fourth Political Theory
kind of a compound not the individual, class, state (race, nation)
on their own, but instead a certain combination thereof. This is a
hypothesis of a compound subject.
The second hypothesis is to approach the problem from the
standpoint of phenomenology. Let us place all that we know about
the historical subject outside the framework of classical ideologies,
carry out the Husserlian method of epoch, and try to empirically
defne that lifeworld, which will open up before us the life-
world of the political, one free from metaphysics or theology
1
.
Is it possible to consider political history without a subject? History
as such? After all, theoretically, there were historical periods when
politics existed, but when there was no subject in the philosophi-
cal Cartesian sense. Of course, in hindsight, even this pre-subject
in political history was reinterpreted in accordance with various
ideologies. But, if we no longer trust ideologies (the three political
theories), then their historic reconstruction is not an axiom for us.
If we consider political history in the style of the Annales school
(Fernand Braudels method), then we have the chance to discover a
rather polyphonic picture, expanding our understanding of the sub-
ject. In the spirit of Peter Berger
2
, we can open up the prospect of
desecularization (throughout history, religious organizations fre-
quently acted as political subjects) or together with Carl Schmitt
3
,
we can rethink the infuence of Tradition on making a political deci-
sion (in the spirit of Schmitts doctrine about decisionism). Dis-
carding the dogma of progress will reveal a wide range of political
actors, operating up until and beyond the New Age, which fts into
the conservative approach. But we are free to continue our liberated
search of what may come in place of the historical subject in the
future in the area of exotic hypotheses by Deleuze and Guattari
about the rhizome, a body without organs, micropolitics, etc. or
on the horizon of proto-history with Baudrillard and Derrida (text,
1
Schmitt, Carl, Politicheskaia teologia, Moscow, 2000. [Political Theology]
2
Berger Peter L. (ed.), The Desecularization of the World: A Global Over-
view, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1999.
3
Schmitt, Carl, Diktatura, St. Petersburg, 2005. [Dictatorship]
34 Alexander DUGIN
deconstruction, diffrance, etc.). They offer us new (this time, en-
tirely not conservative) capabilities. Therefore, it is not worthwhile
to reject them in advance, simply on the basis of their authors sym-
pathies toward Marxism and their Leftist affliation.
The third hypothesis is about forcing the phenomenological
method and rushing several steps ahead: we may propose to con-
sider Heidegger's Dasein
1
as the subject of the Fourth Political
Theory. Dasein is described in Heideggers philosophy at length
via its existential structure, which makes it possible to build a com-
plex holistic model on its basis, the development of which will lead
to, for instance, a new understanding of politics. Many researchers
have lost sight of the fact that Heidegger (especially, in the middle
period 1936-1945) developed a complete history of philosophy
centered around Dasein, which can form the basis of a full-fedged
and a well-developed political philosophy in retrospect.
Thus, accepting the Dasein hypothesis immediately gives us a
broad coordinate system in order to navigate the construction of his-
tory necessary for political theory. If the subject is Dasein, then the
Fourth Political Theory would constitute a fundamental ontologi-
cal structure that is developed on the basis of existential anthropolo-
gy. We can map out the direction to specify this type of an approach:
Dasein and the State;
Dasein and social stratifcation;
Dasein and power (the will to power);
Dasein and power;
Being and politics;
The horizons of political temporality;
Existential spatiality and the phenomenology of boundaries;
The Prince and nothing;
Parliament, the choice, and Being-towards-death;
Citizenship and the role of the guardians of Being;
Referendum and intentionality;
The authentic and the inauthentic in jurisprudence;
1
Heidegger, Martin, Sein und Zeit (1927), Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tubingen,
2006.
35
Fourth Political Theory
Existential philosophy of jurisprudence;Revolution and the
fight of the gods;
Urbanization and the house of Being.
Naturally, this merely is a cursory outline of the areas of interest
in the new political science.
The fourth hypothesis appeals to the concept of the imagina-
tion (limaginaire). This topic is covered in detail in the works of
Gilbert Durand
1
, the basic ideas of which I discuss in my new work
Sociology of the Imagination
2
. Imagination as a structure precedes
the individual, the collective, class, culture, and race (if race exists
as a sociological phenomenon, which is uncertain), as well as the
state. According to Durand, who developed the ideas of Carl Gustav
Jung and Gaston Bachelard, the imagination (limaginaire) forms
the content of human existence based on the internal, original, and
independent structures that are embedded in it. The interpretation of
political processes in history a posteriori is of no diffculty for the
sociology of the imagination, and it produces impressive results.
If we interpret the imagination (limaginaire) as an autonomous ac-
tor in the political sphere, including the projective component and
a sort of a legal status, then we end up with an extraordinarily
fascinating and a totally undeveloped trajectory. Even though the
students of 1968 demanded the freedom of imagination, in that
moment they were unlikely to recognize the imagination as a con-
tender for special political subjectivity. They remained trapped in
the individual (as part of liberalism, even if that of the Left) and
class (i.e., Marxism, although strictly reconsidered on the basis of
psychoanalysis).
In search of the subject of the Fourth Political Theory, we must
boldly head into a new hermeneutic circle. The Fourth Political
Theory is the whole, which, naturally, is still insuffciently described
1
Durand, Gilbert, Les Structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire, Paris,
1960.
2
Dugin, A. G., Sotsiologiia voobrazheniia. Vvedenie v strukturnuiu
sotsiologiiu, Moscow, 2010. [Sociology of the Imagination. Introduction to
Structural Sociology]
36 Alexander DUGIN
and defned. Its parts are the subject, which is also established as a
preliminary suggestion. But, moving constantly between the uncer-
tainty of the whole and the uncertainty of its parts and back again,
we gradually begin to clarify the more precise contours of what is
at stake. This process, starting from the base of negative credibility
(the rejection of the old hermeneutic circles: liberalism with the in-
dividual, Marxism with class, fascism/Nazism with the state/race),
will lead to the clarifcation of a rather positive structure sooner or
later. This structure will be further clarifed when hermeneutics hits
the boundaries of explicitly absurd contradictions (which cannot be
resolved) or stops matching empirical data. That is, starting from a
certain point, the development of the Fourth Political Theory will
gain rather scientifc and rational characteristics, which, for the time
being, are barely discernable behind the energy of groundbreaking
intuitions and the revolutionary super-task of destroying the old ide-
ologies.
The entire hermeneutic circle of the Fourth Political Theory
should be included in the Fourth Nomos of the Earth. This inclu-
sion will specify its content in even more detail and, in particular,
will reveal a colossal epistemological potential of geopolitics. The
latter, in addition to its purely practical and applied objectives, can
be viewed as a broad invitation to think spatially in a postmodern
scenario, when historic thinking, which dominated the modern era,
is becoming irrelevant. On numerous occasions, I have written about
the philosophical and the sociological potential of geopolitics in my
works.
1
Spatiality is one of the most important existential compo-
nents of Dasein, so the appeal to the Fourth Nomos of the Earth
can be tied to the third subject hypothesis of the Fourth Political
Theory.
1
Dugin, A. G., Myslit prostranstvom. Osnovy geopolitiki. Moscow, 2000
[Thinking Spatially. The Origins of Geopolitics.] New edition: Sotsiologiia
prostranstva. Sotsiologiia voobrazheniia. Vvedenie v strukturnuiu sotsiologi-
iu, Moscow, 2010. [Sociology of Space. Sociology of the Imagination. Intro-
duction to Structural Sociology]
37
Fourth Political Theory
Now we can approach the problem of content formation in the
Fourth Political Theory from another direction and examine the
contenders for inclusion in this theory from the three classical mod-
els.
However, prior to determining the aspects of the three old ideolo-
gies that can be borrowed from them having neutralized them and
taken them out of context, ripping them out of their own herme-
neutic circle, it is important to briefy mention what aspects must
be frmly discarded.
If we begin with fascism and National Socialism, then here we
must defnitively reject all forms of racism. Racism is what caused
the collapse of National Socialism in the historical, the geopolitical,
and the theoretical sense. This was not only a historic, but also a
philosophical collapse. Racism is based on the belief in the innate
objective superiority of one human race over another. It was racism,
not some other aspect of National Socialism that brought about the
consequences, which led to immeasurable suffering, as well as the
collapse of Germany and the Axis Powers, and the destruction of
the entire ideological construction of the third way. The crimi-
nal practice of wiping out entire ethnic groups (Jews, Gypsies, and
Slavs) based on race was rooted precisely in the racial theory this
is what angers and shocks us about Nazism to this day. In addi-
tion, Hitlers anti-Semitism and the doctrine that Slavs are subhu-
man and must be colonized, is what led Germany to enter into war
against the USSR (for which we have paid with millions of lives),
as well as to the fact that Germans themselves have lost their politi-
cal freedom and the right to participate in political history for a long
time (if not forever) (they are now left only with the economy and,
in the best case scenario, with ecology). The supporters of the third
way were left in the position of ideological outcasts and marginals.
It was racism in theory and in practice that criminalized all other
aspects of National Socialism and fascism, making these political
world views the object of curses and vilifcation.
Hitlers racism, however, is only one form of racism this type of
racism is the most obvious, straightforward, biological, and therefore
38 Alexander DUGIN
the most repulsive. There are other forms of racism cultural racism
(asserting that there are high and low cultures), civilizational (divid-
ing people into those civilized and those insuffciently civilized),
technological (viewing technological development as the main cri-
terion of societal value), social (stating, in the spirit of the Protestant
doctrine of predestination, that the rich are the best and the greatest
as compared to the poor), economic racism (based on which all hu-
manity is ranked according to regions of material well-being), and
evolutionary racism (for which it is axiomatic that human society is
the result of biological development, in which the basic processes
of evolution of the species survival of the fttest, natural selec-
tion, etc. continue today). The European and American society is
fundamentally afficted with this type of racism, unable to eradicate
it from itself despite all the effort. Fully aware of how revolting this
phenomenon is, people in the West tend to make racism a taboo.
However, all this turns into a witch hunt new pariahs accused of
fascism are its victims, often for no apparent reason. Thus, this
very political correctness and its norms are transformed into a totali-
tarian discipline of political, purely racist exclusions. In this manner,
the institutionalized French Left-liberal anti-racism itself gradually
becomes the distribution center of racial hatred. Even Africans
suffer from being accused of fascism. Such was the case of the
unrestrained defamatory campaign against a well-known black co-
median Dieudonn Mbala Mbala, who dared to mock certain hid-
eous features of the contemporary French establishment in his rou-
tines, including anti-racism (Ras-le-Front, SOS-Racisme, etc.). And
then what?! African comedian Mbala Mbala was admitted into the
brown category, that is, accused of fascism and racism.
The newest types of racism are glamour, fashion, and following
the latest informational trends. The norms are set by models, design-
ers, party socialites, and the owners of the latest version of mobile
phones or laptop computers. Conformity or nonconformity with the
glamour code is located at the very base of the mass strategies for
social segregation and cultural apartheid. Today, this is not asso-
ciated directly with the economic factor, but is gradually gaining
39
Fourth Political Theory
independent sociological features: this is the ghost of the glamour
dictatorship the new generation of racism.
The very ideology of progress is racist in its structure. The as-
sertion that the present is better and more fulflling than the past
and the assurance that the future will be even better than the pres-
ent represent the discrimination of the past and the present, the
humiliation of those who lived in the past, an insult to the honour
and dignity of the previous generations, and a certain kind of viola-
tion of the rights of the dead. In many cultures, the dead play an
important sociological role. They are considered to remain living
in a certain sense, present in this world, and participating in its ex-
istence. Such are all ancient cultures and civilizations. Billions of
inhabitants on this earth believe in this concept to this day. In the
Chinese civilization, built upon the cult of the dead and upon the
reverence toward them alongside the living, being dead is regarded
as a high social status, in some ways superior to the status of the
living. The ideology of progress represents a moral genocide of the
past generations in other words, real racism. Equally question-
able is the idea of modernization, when it is taken as a self-value.
It is easy to detect the obvious signs of racism in it.
Undoubtedly racist is the idea of unipolar globalization. It is
based on the fact that Western, especially American, society equates
its history and its values to universal law and artifcially tries to con-
struct a global society based on these local and historically specifc
values democracy, the market, parliamentarianism, capitalism,
individualism, human rights, and unlimited technological develop-
ment. These values are local, and globalization is trying to impose
them onto all of humanity as something that is universal and taken
for granted. This attempt implicitly argues that the values of all other
peoples and cultures are imperfect, underdeveloped, and are subject
to modernization and standardization based on the Western model.
Globalization is thus nothing more than a globally deployed
model of Western European, or, rather, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism,
which is the purest manifestation of racist ideology.
40 Alexander DUGIN
As one of its essential features, the Fourth Political Theory
rejects all forms and varieties of racism and all forms of norma-
tive hierarchization of societies based on the ethnic, religious, so-
cial, technological, economic, or cultural grounds. Societies can be
compared, but we cannot state that one of them is objectively better
than the others. Such an assessment is always subjective, and any
attempt to raise a subjective assessment to the status of a theory is
racism. This type of an attempt is unscientifc and anti-humane. The
difference between societies in any sense can, in no shape or form,
imply the superiority of one over the other. This is a central axiom of
the Fourth Political Theory. Furthermore, if anti-racism directly
strikes the ideology of National Socialism (i.e., the third political
theory), then it also indirectly reaches communism, with its class
hatred, and liberalism, with its progressivism as well as its inherent
forms of economic, technological, and cultural racism. Instead of a
unipolar world, the Fourth Political Theory insists upon a multi-
polar world, and instead of universalism on pluriversalism, which
Alain de Benoist brilliantly pointed out in his book
1
.
Clearly highlighting the main trajectory for the rejection of all
forms and varieties of racism, including the biological forms inher-
ent in National Socialism, we can identify what the Fourth Political
Theory may borrow from it. Rejecting strongly any suggestion of
racism, we, in fact, destroy the hermeneutic circle of the National
Socialist ideology and neutralize its content, undermining its integ-
rity and key foundations. Without racism, National Socialism is no
longer National Socialism either theoretically or practically it is
neutralized and decontaminated. We can now proceed without fear
to objectively analyze it in search of those ideas that could be inte-
grated into the Fourth Political Theory.
We note a positive attitude toward the ethnos, ethnocentrism, to-
ward that type of existence, which is formed within the structure of
the ethnos and remains intact throughout a variety of stages, includ-
ing highly differentiated social formations. This topic has found deep
1
Benoist, Alain de, Protiv liberalizma, ibid. [Against Liberalism]
41
Fourth Political Theory
resonance in certain philosophical directions of the Conservative
Revolution (for instance, Carl Schmitt and his theory of peoples
rights, in Adam Mller, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, etc.) or the
German school of ethnic sociology (Wilhelm Mhlmann, Richard
Thurnwald, etc.). Ethnos is the greatest value of the Fourth Politi-
cal Theory as a cultural phenomenon; as a community of language,
religious belief, daily life, and of sharing resources and efforts; as
an organic entity written into an accommodating landscape (Lev
Gumilev); as a refned system of constructing models for marital
unions; as an always-unique means of establishing a relationship
with the outside world; as the matrix of the lifeworld (Edmund
Husserl); and as the source of all the language-games (Ludwig
Wittgenstein). Of course, ethnicity was not the focal point either in
National Socialism, or in fascism. Yet, liberalism as an ideology,
calling for the liberation from all forms of collective identity in gen-
eral, is entirely incompatible with the ethnos and ethnocentrism, and
is an expression of systemic theoretical and technological ethnocide.
Marxist ideology did not pay much attention to the ethnos ei-
ther, believing that the ethnos is overcome in a class-based society,
and that no trace of it remains in a bourgeois and, even more so, a
proletarian society. Based on the latter, the principle of proletar-
ian internationalism becomes absolute. The only place where the
ethnos received any kind of attention is in dissident, third way
currents, rather marginal in the general political mainstream, even
though the Nazi orthodoxy blocked the organic development of the
ethno-sociological subject area with its racist dogma.
Whatever the case may be, the ethnos and ethnocentrism (Wil-
helm Mhlmann) have every reason to be considered as candidates
for the status of the subject in the Fourth Political Theory. At the
same time, again and again we must pay attention to the fact that we
view the ethnos in the plural, without trying to establish any kind of
a hierarchical system: ethnicities are different, but each of them is
in itself universal; ethnicities live and develop, but this life and this
development do not ft into one specifc paradigm; they are open and
always distinct; ethnicities mix and separate, but neither one, nor
42 Alexander DUGIN
the other is good or evil per se ethnicities themselves generate the
evaluation criteria, each time in a different way. We can draw many
conclusions based on this point. In particular, we can relativize the
very notion of politics, which comes from the normativity of the
city, the polis, and, consequently, of the urban model of self-orga-
nization within the community (or the society). As a general para-
digm, we can review what Richard Thurnwald called Dorfstaat a
village-state
1
. The village-state is an alternative view of politics
from the perspective of the ethnos naturally living in balance with
the environment. This view does not refect the perspective of the
city (projecting its structure onto the rest of the country), but is that
of the village, the province. It comes from the standpoint of those
regions that have been peripheral in classical politics, but become
the center of the Fourth Political Theory. However, this is only
one example of all those possibilities that open up in case we accept
the ethnos as the historical subject. Yet, even this shows the serious
nature of transforming the most basic political concepts, and how
drastic the revision of an established dogma can be.
Now let us discuss what could be taken from communism the
second political theory. First, however, let us decide on what should
be discarded in order to demolish its hermeneutic circle. First and
foremost, communist ideas of historical materialism and the notion
of unidirectional progress are inapplicable to our purposes. We have
previously talked about the racist element, which is embedded in
the idea of progress. It looks particularly revolting within histori-
cal materialism, which not only puts the future ahead of the past,
brutally violating the rights of the ancestors, but also equates the
living human society (Richard Thurnwald) with a mechanical sys-
tem operating independent of man and humanity, according to laws
that are monotonic and uniform for all. Materialist reductionism and
economic determinism comprise the most repulsive aspect of Marx-
ism. In practice, it was expressed through the destruction of the spir-
itual and religious heritage of those countries and societies in which
1
Thurnwald, Richard, Die Menschliche Gesellschaft, 1 Band, Berlin und
Leipzig, 1931.
43
Fourth Political Theory
Marxism had historically won. An arrogant contempt for the past, a
vulgar materialist interpretation of spiritual culture, economic cen-
trism, a positive attitude toward the process of raising the social dif-
ferential in societal systems, and the idea of class as the only histori-
cal subject the Fourth Political Theory rejects all these aspects
of Marxism. However, without these components, Marxism (and,
more generally, socialism) ceases to be itself, and, consequently, it is
rendered harmless as a full-fedged ideology, breaking into separate
components that do not represent a single whole.
Marxism is relevant in terms of its description of liberalism, in
identifying the contradictions of capitalism, in its criticism of the
bourgeois system, and in revealing the truth behind the bourgeois-
democratic policies of exploitation and enslavement presented as
development and liberation. Marxisms critical potential is
highly useful and applicable. It may well be included into the ar-
senal of the Fourth Political Theory. But, in this case, Marxism
does not appear as an ideology that provides answers to a full range
of emerging issues answers that are rational and axiomatic in their
foundation but as an expressive myth or a witty sociological meth-
od. Marxism, which we can accept, is mythic sociological Marxism.
As a myth, Marxism tells us the story about the original state of
paradise (primitive communism), which was gradually lost (the
initial division of labor and the stratifcation of the primitive soci-
ety). Then the contradictions grew, moving toward the point when,
at the end of the world, they were reincarnated in the most paradig-
matically pure form of the confrontation between Labor and Capital.
Capital the bourgeoisie and liberal democracy personifed global
evil, exploitation, alienation, lies, and violence. Labor embodied a
great dream and an ancient memory of the common good, the ac-
quisition of which (the surplus value) by an evil minority gave
birth to all the problems in life. Labor (the proletariat) must recog-
nize the paradoxes of this state of affairs and rise up against their
masters in order to build a new society a paradise on earth com-
munism. Only this will not be the naturally occurring initial com-
munism, but an artifcial, scientifc kind, in which the differential,
44 Alexander DUGIN
accumulated over centuries and millennia of alienation, will serve
the commune, the community. The dream will become a reality.
This myth completely fts into the structure of eschatological
consciousness, which occupies a signifcant place in mythologies of
all kinds of tribes and peoples, not to mention the highly differenti-
ated religions. That alone speaks in its favour in order for us to treat
it with the outmost consideration.
On the other hand, as sociology, Marxism is tremendously useful
in revealing those mechanisms of alienation and mystifcation that
liberalism uses to justify its dominion and as proof of its correct-
ness. Being a myth itself, in its polemical activist form, Marxism
serves as an excellent tool to expose the bourgeois great stories
in order to overthrow the credibility of liberal pathos. And in this
capacity against liberalism it can be effectively used under the
new conditions: after all, we continue to exist under capitalism, and
hence, the Marxist criticism thereof and the struggle with it remain
on the agenda, even if the old forms of this struggle have become
irrelevant.
Marxism is often correct when it describes its enemy, especially
the bourgeoisie. However, its own attempts to understand itself lead
to failure. The frst and the most prominent contradiction is Marxs
unfulflled prediction about the type of societies that are the most
prone to socialist revolutions. He was confdent that this would
take place in industrialized European countries with the high level
of manufacturing and a large percentage of urban proletariat. Such
revolutions were excluded from occurring in agrarian countries and
countries with the Asiatic mode of production due to their back-
wardness. In the 20
th
century, everything occurred exactly to the
contrary. Socialist revolutions and socialist societies developed in
agrarian countries with an archaic rural population, while nothing
like that occurred in highly developed Europe and America. How-
ever, even in those countries where socialism had won, the Marx-
ist dogma did not allow to rethink its basic logical assumptions, to
consider the role of preindustrial factors, and to truly evaluate the
real power of myth. In its Western and Soviet versions, Marxisms
45
Fourth Political Theory
self-refection turned out to be questionable and inaccurate. Justif-
ably criticizing liberalism, Marxism was seriously mistaken about
itself, which, at some point, affected its own fate. It eventually col-
lapsed even in those places where it had triumphed. And, in terms of
where it was supposed to win, capitalism prevailed; the proletariat
dissolved in the middle class, and disappeared inside the consumer
society contrary to the expectations and the projections. In the end,
European revolutionary communists turned into petty-bourgeois
clowns entertaining the bored and the jaded democratic public.
If Marxism itself was unable to look at itself from the proper
standpoint, then nothing prevents us to do so in the context of the
Fourth Political Theory. Alain de Benoist has a classic book called
Vu de Droite
1
(A View from the Right), in which he suggested to re-
read various political writers (both the Right and the Left) from
the point of view of the New Right. This book led to the inception
of the New Right movement in Europe. It contains not only the
critique of those ideas which were almost dogmatic for the Old
Right, but also a revolutionary and a well-meant reading of such
authors as the communist Antonio Gramsci examined from the point
of view of the Right. It is precisely this reading of Marx from the
Right, from the standpoint of myths, and of archaic and holistic
sociology that would be particularly ftting at present.
Finally, what can we take from liberalism? And here, as always,
we must begin with those aspects that must not be borrowed. Per-
haps, in this case, everything is described clearly and in a fairly de-
tailed manner in Alain de Benoists work Against Liberalism: To-
ward the Fourth Political Theory
2
, to which I keep constantly and
consciously referring in my explanation. Liberalism is the main en-
emy of the Fourth Political Theory, which is constructed specif-
cally based on the opposition with it. Yet, even here, as was the case
with the other political theories, there is something important and
1
Benoist, Alain de, Vu de droite. Anthologie critique des ides contempo-
raines, Paris, Copernic, 1977.
2
Benoist, Alain de, Protiv liberalizma. K chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii, ibid.
[Against Liberalism. Toward the Fourth Political Theory]
46 Alexander DUGIN
something secondary. Liberalism as a whole rests on the individual
as its parts. It is these parts that are taken as the whole. It is, perhaps,
for this reason that the hermeneutic circle of liberalism turned out
to be the most durable: it has the smallest orbit and rotates around
its subject the individual. In order to shatter this circle, we must
strike the individual, abolish him, and cast him into the periphery
of political considerations. Liberalism is well aware of this danger,
and therefore undertakes consecutive battles with all ideologies and
theories social, philosophical, and political that encroach on the
individual, inscribing his identity into a more general context. The
neurosis and the fears located at the pathogenic core of liberal phi-
losophy are clearly seen in The Open Society and its Enemies
1
, a
work by the classic of neo-liberalism, Karl Popper. He compared
fascism and communism precisely based on the fact that both ide-
ologies integrate the individual into a supra-individual community,
into a whole, into a totality, which Popper immediately qualifed as
totalitarianism. Having undermined the individual as the constitu-
tive fgure of the entire political and social system, we can put an
end to liberalism. Of course, this is not that easy to achieve. Nev-
ertheless, it is now obvious that the weakest (and the strongest) as-
pect of the frst political theory comes from the direct appeal to the
individual pleading that he remain himself, by himself in his own
autonomous individuality, uniqueness, particularity, and partiality.
In any case, the Fourth Political Theory can interpret Poppers
phobias (which led him and his followers to anecdotal conclusions
quite telling are his feeble-minded criticism of Hegel in the spirit
of negative PR and the accusations of fascism directed toward Plato
and Aristotle!) in its favour. Understanding what the enemy fears the
most, we propose the theory that every human identity is acceptable
and justifed except for that of the individual. Man is anything but
an individual. We must look carefully at a liberal, when he reads
or hears an axiom of this kind. I think this will be an impressive
spectacle all his tolerance will instantly evaporate, while hu-
1
Popper, Karl, Otkrytoe obschestvo i ego vragi, Moscow, 1992. [The Open
Society and Its Enemies]
47
Fourth Political Theory
man rights will be distributed to anyone, just not the one who dares
to utter something along these lines. This, however, I described in
more detail in my essay Maximal Humanism
1
as well as in my book,
The Philosophy of Politics.
2
Liberalism must be defeated and destroyed, and the individual
must be thrown off the pedestal. Yet, is there anything that we could
take away from liberalism from liberalism that was hypothetically
defeated and has lost its axis?
Yes, there is. It is the idea of freedom. And not just the idea of
freedom for that same substantive freedom rejected by Mill in
his liberal program concentrating on the freedom from. We must
say yes to freedom in all its meanings and in all its perspectives.
The Fourth Political Theory should be a theory of absolute free-
dom, but not as in Marxism, in which it coincides with absolute ne-
cessity (this correlation denies freedom its very core). No, freedom
can be of any kind, free of any correlation or lack thereof, facing any
direction and any goal. Freedom is the greatest value of the Fourth
Political Theory, which coincides with its center, with its dynamic,
energetic core.
But, this freedom is conceived as human freedom, not freedom
of an individual as the freedom of ethnocentrism and the freedom
of Dasein, the freedom of culture and the freedom of society, the
freedom for any form of subjectivity except for that of an individual.
Moving in the opposite direction, European thought had come to
a different conclusion: man (as an individual) is a prison without
walls
3
(Jean-Paul Sartre); that is to say, the freedom of an individual
is a prison. In order to attain true freedom, we must go beyond the
limits of the individual. In this sense, the Fourth Political Theory
is a theory of liberation, of going beyond the prison walls into the
outside world, which begins where the jurisdiction of individual
identity ends.
1
Dugin, A.G., Maksimalnyi gumanizm, Russkaia vesch, Moscow, 2001.
[Maximal Humanism]
2
Dugin, A.G., Filosofia politiki, Moscow, 2004. [The Philosophy of Politics]
3
Sartre J. P., L'age de raison, Paris, Gallimard, 1945.
48 Alexander DUGIN
Freedom is always fraught with chaos, and is open for opportuni-
ties. Placed into the narrow framework of individuality, the amount
of freedom becomes microscopic, and, ultimately, fctitious. An in-
dividual can be given freedom because he cannot handle it properly
it will remain contained within the system of his individuality and
its order. This is the fip side of liberalism: at its core, it is totalitar-
ian and intolerant of differences and the implementation of a great
will. It is only prepared to tolerate small people; it protects not so
much the rights of man, but, rather, the rights of a small man.
This small man can be allowed to do anything, but he, despite all
his desire, will be able to do nothing. Yet, beyond the small man,
on the other side of minimal humanism
1
everything just begins
revealing the frst horizon of freedom. However, it is also there that
the great risk and serious dangers are born. Having left the limits of
individuality, man can be crushed by the elements of life, by dan-
gerous chaos. He may want to establish order. And this is entirely
within his right the right of a great man (homo maximus) a real
man of Being and Time (Martin Heidegger). And, like any order,
this possible order, the coming order may be embodied in individual
forms. Nonetheless, this is not individuality, but individuation; not
empty rotations around that which is given and which is meaning-
less, but the execution of tasks as well as the taming of the restless
and the exciting horizons of the will.
The bearer of freedom in this case will be Dasein. The previous
ideologies each in its own way alienated Dasein from its mean-
ing, made it restricted, imprisoned it in one way or another, made
it inauthentic. Each of these ideologies put a cheerless doll das
Man
2
in the place of Dasein. The freedom of Dasein lies in imple-
menting the opportunity to be authentic: that is, in the realization of
Sein more so than of da. There-Being consists of there and
of Being. In order to understand where this there is located, we
should point it out and make a basic, foundational gesture. Yet, in
order for Being to fow into there like a fountain, we must place
1
Dugin, A.G., Maksimalnyi gumanizm, ibid. [Maximal Humanism]
2
Heidegger, Martin, Sein und Zeit, ibid.
49
Fourth Political Theory
all of this together place this entire hermeneutic circle into the
domain of complete freedom. Therefore, the Fourth Political The-
ory is, at the same time, a fundamental ontological theory which
contains the awareness of the truth of Being at its core.
Without freedom, we cannot force anyone to exist. Even if we
build the optimal society, and even if we force everyone to act ap-
propriately and to operate within the framework of the correct para-
digm, we could never guarantee the latter outcome. The latter result
is a mans freedom to choose Being. Of course, most often, man
leans toward the inauthentic existence of Dasein, trying to dodge
the issue, to succumb to gossip (Gerede) and to self-mockery. Lib-
erated Dasein may not choose the path to Being, may hide in shel-
ter, may, once again, clutter the world with its hallucinations and
fears, its concerns and intentions. Choosing Dasein may corrupt the
Fourth Political Theory itself, turning it into a self-parody. This is
a risk, but Being is a risk, too. The only question is who risks what
(whom). You risk everything, or everything (everyone) risks you.
Yet, only the multiplier of freedom will make the choice of authentic
Being a reality only then will the stakes be truly great, when the
danger is infnite.
Unlike other political theories, the Fourth Political Theory
does not want to lie, soothe, or seduce. It summons us to live danger-
ously, to think riskily, to liberate and to release all those things that
cannot be driven back inside. The Fourth Political Theory trusts
the fate of Being and entrusts fate to Being.
Any strictly constructed ideology is always a simulacrum and
always inauthentic, that is to say, it always is the lack of freedom.
Therefore, the Fourth Political Theory should not hurry in order
to become a set of basic axioms. Perhaps, it is more important to
leave some things unsaid, found in expectations and insinuations, in
allegations and premonitions. The Fourth Political Theory should
be completely open.
CHAPTER 4. THE CRITIQUE OF
MONOTONIC PROCESSES
The idea of modernization is based on the idea of progress. When
we use the term modernization, we certainly mean progress, linear
accumulation, and a certain continuous process. When we speak of
modernization, we presuppose development, growth, and evolu-
tion. This is the same semantic system. Thus, when we speak of the
unconditional positive achievements of modernization, we agree
with a very important basic paradigm - we agree with the idea that
human society is developing, progressing, evolving, growing, and
getting better and better. That is to say, we share a particular vision
of historical optimism.
This historical optimism pertains to the three classical political
ideologies (liberalism, communism, and fascism). It is rooted in the
scientifc, societal, political, and social worldview in the humanities
and the natural sciences of the 18
th
-19
th
centuries, when the idea
of progress, development, and growth was taken as an axiom that
was not subjected to doubt. In other words, the entire set of axioms,
the whole historiography, and predictive analytics of the 19
th
cen-
tury in the humanities and the natural sciences were built on the idea
of progress. We can easily trace the development of this subject the
idea of progress in the three political ideologies.
Let us turn to the classical liberalism of the sociologist Herbert
Spencer. He claimed that the development of human society is the
next stage that fts into the evolution of the animal species, that there
is a connection a continuity between the animal world and social
development.
1
And, therefore, all the laws of the animal world lead-
1
Spencer, Herbert, Opyty nauchnye, politicheskie i flosovskie, Seriia:
51
Fourth Political Theory
ing to development, improvement, and the evolution in the animal
world within Darwins framework can be projected onto soci-
ety. This is the basis of the famous method, Social Darwinism, of
which Spencer was a classic representative. If, according to Darwin,
the driving force behind the evolution of the animal kingdom is the
struggle for survival and natural selection, then the same process
takes place in society, argued Spencer. And, the more perfect this
struggle is for survival (inter-species, intra-species, the struggle of
the strong against the weak, the competition for resources, pleasure)
the more perfect our society becomes. The question is about im-
proving the struggle for survival. According to Spencer, this is the
central theme of the liberal model, and this is the meaning of social
progress. Therefore, if we are liberals, then in one way or the other,
we inherited this zoological approach to social development based
on the struggle and the destruction of the weak by the strong.
However, Spencers theory contains one important point. He ar-
gued that there are two phases of social development. The frst phase
occurs when the struggle for survival is conducted crudely by force;
this is characteristic of the ancient world. The second occurs when the
struggle is carried out more subtly by using economic means. At the
moment when the bourgeois revolution takes place, the struggle for
survival does not stop. According to Spencer, it acquires new, more
advanced, and more effcient forms; it relocates into the sphere of the
market. Here, the strongest survive, that is, the richest. Instead of the
most powerful feudal lord, a hero, a strong person, a leader, who sim-
ply seizes all that is up for grabs around them, takes away all that
belongs to the other nations and races, and shares it with the ruling
ethnicity or the ruling caste, now comes the capitalist, who brings the
same aggressive animal principle to the level of the market, the corpo-
ration, and the trading company. The transition from the order of pow-
er to the order of money, according to Spencer, does not mean the hu-
manization of the process, but only underscores greater effectiveness.
Klassicheskaia flosovskaia mysl, tr. N.A.Rubakin, Minsk, Sovremennyi liter-
ator, 1999. [Essays: Scientifc, Political and Speculative
52 Alexander DUGIN
That is to say, the struggle in the market sphere between the strong
(= rich) and the weak (= poor) becomes more effcient and leads to
the higher level of development until the super-rich, super-strong,
and super-developed countries appear. Progress, according to Spen-
cer, and, more broadly speaking, according to liberalism, is always
the growth of the economic power, since it continues to refne the
struggle for survival of the animal species and the warfare methods
of the strong nations and castes within the framework of pre-capital-
ist states. Thus, the concept of animal aggression is embedded in the
liberal idea of progress, which is regarded as the main trajectory of
social development. With more economic freedom, there is greater
power for takeovers, attacks, as well as mergers and acquisitions.
The liberal discourse the analysis of the liberal ideologist is a
totally animal discourse. In this case, the more advanced law or
the more advanced, more modernized methods of production do
not mean that they are more humane; what it means is that they give
more opportunities for the strong to realize their power, to become
more effective, while the weak can only admit defeat, or, if there
is any strength left, to fght on. In this manner, the modern idea of
economic growth, as we see it with liberals Alan Greenspan and Ben
Bernanke, has its foundation and origins in the idea of the struggle
between the species, that is, the feral destruction of the weak by the
strong, or the validation of the strong at the expense of the weak.
Only instead of the idea of predators and herbivores, we have the
golden billion, and in that gold billion their own kings of beasts
(the New York Stock Exchange and the World Bank bankers, who
devour all that is up for grabs and, at the same time, develop a so-
cietal infrastructure of the world forest).
Therefore, when we speak of modernization in the liberal vein,
we necessarily mean the enhancement of the social, political, cul-
tural, spiritual, and informational scenario within which the total
aggression of the strong against the weak can be implemented.
53
Fourth Political Theory
American liberal Ayn Rand (Greenspan was one of her great-
est admirers) has created an entire philosophy (Objectivism)
1

based on the following blunt idea: if one is rich, then he is good. She
reached the limits of Webers idea about the origin of capitalism in
the Protestant ethic and said that the rich is always and necessar-
ily the good almost a saint, while the poor is evil, lazy, bad,
and corrupt a sinner. Being poor, according to Ayn Rand, is to
be a sinful villain, whereas to be rich is to be a saint. She proposed
to establish the conspiracy of the rich (= the strong, bright, sacred,
and powerful capitalists) against any kind of labor movements, the
peasants, against all those who stand for social justice, or those who
are simply poor. Such a crusade of the rich against the poor is the
basis of the Objectivist ideology. People like Greenspan and the
current head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Bernanke, are Objectiv-
ists that is, those who interpret modernization, progress, econom-
ic growth, and development in the liberal vein.
If we understand modernization like liberal democrats, then that
means that we are invited to join in this terrible struggle for survival
at its highest peak, that is to become just like them and to snatch
a place at the globalization feeder. Globalization, in this case, is
the new avenue in the struggle for survival, the struggle of the rich
against the poor.
Naturally, the ideologically philosophic and moral premise of
this version of modernization is entirely alien to the Russian people
in terms of our history and our culture. We reject this type of mod-
ernization unconditionally, and those who might try to impose it
upon us will pay dearly for doing so.
In communism, the idea of unidirectional progress is also pre-
sent. Marx argued that the change of formations, which leads to
the improvement and the development of societies and economies,
sooner or later, will result in the communist proletarian revolution,
redistributing the products accumulated as the result of develop-
ing alienating technologies. The expropriation of the expropriators
1
Rand, Ayn,,Apologiia kapitalizma, Moscow, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie,
2003. [Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal]
54 Alexander DUGIN
will occur. Nevertheless, while this has not happened, Marxists say,
let everything be as it may in the development of capitalism. Marx
also saw history positively as development he viewed history
as growth and improvement, from the minus to the plus, from the
simple to the complex.
It is telling that the lion's share of The Communist Manifesto
1

by Marx and Engels is devoted to criticizing specifcally those anti-
bourgeois political philosophies that differed from Marxism, frst
and foremost, those that are feudal, reactionary, and nationalistic.
By doing so, Marx and Engels strove to emphasize that their com-
munism was directed against the bourgeoisie in a manner differ-
ent from the criticism by the Right-wing anti-capitalists. In reality,
compared to all the other reactionary and conservative projects,
Marxists stand on the side of the bourgeoisie and seek to bring its
victory closer, since it translates into historic progress and the logic
of modernization. For this reason, Marxism rejects conservatism
in all of its forms. The contradictions between the communists and
the capitalists acquire a particularly acute character as the triumph
of capitalism becomes irreversible and complete. It is here that the
communists enter history as the vanguard of the proletariat and push
historic progress further along toward socialism and communism.
Once again, we see Darwinism in Marxism, including the full
acceptance of the evolutionary ideas and the belief in the miraculous
power of scientifc progress and technological improvement.
We lived through this kind of modernization in the 20
th
cen-
tury, paid for it more than in full; the people clearly do not have the
slightest desire to repeat such experiments. Therefore, this version
of modernization will not work moreover, no one is voicing it.
Oddly enough, fascism, too, is an evolutionary movement. We
may remember Friedrich Nietzsche, who spoke of the blond beast
and of the will to power that drives history. Nietzsche was an evo-
1
Marx, Karl, Engels, Friedrich, Manifest Kommunisticheskoi partii, in Marx,
Karl, Engels, Friedrich, Works, 2nd edition, vol. 4, Moscow, Gosudarstven-
noe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1955, pp. 419-459. [The Communist
Manifesto]
55
Fourth Political Theory
lutionist and believed that, based on the logic of species develop-
ment, man will be replaced by the Superman, much like man frst
came to replace the ape. He wrote,
What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame.
And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock,
a thing of shame.
1
The National Socialists added a racial point to
this idea: that the white race is more developed than the black,
yellow, or some other kind, and on this basis has the right to rule
the world. Here, we encounter the same progressivist outlook along
with the idea of development and improvement, which lead to the
assumption of racial superiority on the grounds that the white na-
tions own sophisticated instruments of machine production, while
other ethnic groups do not.
Today, we reject and criticize fascism for its racial component,
but we forget that this ideology is also built on the ideas of progress
and evolution just like the other two political theories of modernity.
If we were to visualize the essence of the Nazi ideology and the role
of progress and evolution in it, then the connection between racism
and evolution would become obvious to us. This connection in a
concealed form can be seen in liberalism and even in communism.
Even if not biological, we see cultural, technological, and economic
racism in the ideology of the free market and in the dictatorship
of the proletariat.
In one way or another, all three ideologies originate from the
same trend the idea of growth, development, progress, evolution,
and of the constant, cumulative societal improvement. They all view
the world, the entire historical process as linear growth. They differ
in their interpretation of this process; they attribute different mean-
ings to it, but they all accept the irreversibility of history and its
progressive character.
Thus, modernization is a concept that directly sends us back to
the three classical political ideologies. Furthermore, we can see the
common ground that unites the three ideologies in the idea of pro-
1
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Tak govoril Zaratustra, in Nietzsche, Friedrich, Col-
lected Works, vol. 2, Mysl, Moscow, 1990. [Thus Spake Zarathustra]
56 Alexander DUGIN
gress and in the positive evaluation of the modernization concept
itself. Nowadays, all three of these ideologies are being gradually
discarded. This is evident with regard to fascism and communism,
and is somewhat less obvious with regard to liberalism, but even lib-
eralism gradually ceases to satisfy the majority of the world's popu-
lation and, simultaneously, turns into something other than what it
was during the classical era of modernity. Consequently, it is about
time that we pose the question of searching for the Fourth Politi-
cal Theory
1
beyond the frst three. And, the radical rejection of the
three classical theories refects our attitude toward what is common
to them all that is, our attitude toward modernization, progress,
evolution, development, and growth.
American scientist Gregory Bateson, a theorist of ethno-sociol-
ogy, cybernetics, and ecology, a psychoanalyst and a linguist, de-
scribed the monotonic process in his book Mind and Nature
2
. The
monotonic process is the idea of constant growth, constant accumu-
lation, development, steady progress, and the increase of one par-
ticular indicator. In mathematics, this is associated with the notion
of the monotonic value, i.e. the ever-increasing value, hence, the
monotonic functions. Monotonic processes are the type of processes
that always occur in one direction: for example, all their indica-
tors consistently increase without cyclical fuctuations and oscilla-
tions. Studying the monotonic process at three levels at the level
of biology (life), at the level of mechanics (steam engines, internal
combustion engines), and at the level of social phenomena, Bateson
concluded that when this process occurs in nature, it immediately
destroys the species; if we are talking about an artifcial device it
falls apart (explodes, collapses); if we mean a society the society
deteriorates, degenerates, and disappears. The monotonic process
1
Dugin, A. G., Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, St. Petersburg, Amfora,
2009. [The Fourth Political Theory]; Benoist, Alain de, Protiv liberalizma. K
chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii, St. Petersburg, Amfora, 2009. [Against Liberal-
ism. Toward the Fourth Political Theory]
2
Bateson, Gregory, Razum i priroda, Moscow, KomKniga, 2007. [Mind and
Nature]
57
Fourth Political Theory
(in biology) is incompatible with life it is an anti-biological phe-
nomenon. Monotonic processes are completely absent from nature.
All the processes of accumulating something in particular, one par-
ticular trait, result in the death of the others. Monotonic processes do
not exist in any biological species, from cells to the most complex
organisms. As soon as this kind of a monotonic process initiates,
deviants, giants or dwarfs, and freaks of nature appear they are
incapacitated, not compatible with life, cannot produce offspring,
and life itself casts them out.
Solving the problem of monotonic processes was the main goal
which arose in the development of steam engines. It turns out that
the most important subtlety in steam engines is the relay feedback.
When the process reaches cruising speed, it is necessary to reset the
fuel supply, otherwise the monotonic process initiates, everything
begins to resonate, and the speed of the engine increases causing
it to explode. It was precisely this solution of avoiding the monot-
onic process in mechanics that was the principal theoretical, math-
ematical, physical, and engineering problem during the early stage
of industrialization. It turns out that the monotonic process is not
only incompatible with life, but also with the proper mechanical
functioning of a device. The task of designing a functioning device
is one of avoiding the monotonic process, that is, the prevention of
one-dimensional progress, evolution, development, and the place-
ment of growth into a closed cycle.
By analyzing sociology, Bateson showed that there are no mo-
notonic processes in real societies. Monotonic processes, such as
population growth, in normal cases led to wars, as a rule, which
cut the growing population in half. In our society today we see an
unprecedented level of automated technological progress along with
unbelievable moral degradation.
If we look at all this evidence without the evolutionary bias,
then we will realize that monotonic processes exist only in people's
minds, i.e. they are purely ideological models. Bateson demonstrat-
ed that they do not exist in biological, mechanical, and social reality.
58 Alexander DUGIN
Marcel Mauss, a well-known French sociologist, criticized the
monotonic process as well. In his book, Sacrifce: Its Nature and
Functions
1
and especially in his essay, The Gift
2
, he showed that the
traditional society paid great attention to the ritual destruction of
the surplus. The surplus was seen as excessive, likho, usury. Likho
personifes evil, usury is the interest charged on borrowed capital,
and excess is that which is obtained beyond ones need, beyond ne-
cessity. For instance, surplus crops were seen as disastrous in tradi-
tional society. The ancient worldview was based on the belief that an
increase in one area translates into a decrease in another. Therefore,
the surplus had to be destroyed as soon as possible. For this purpose,
the community organized an orgy, a feast, a sacrifce, consumed all
the additional food, choking, or gave it to the gods, handed it out,
or destroyed it. This is the origin of a special ritual the potlatch,
which constitutes the deliberate damage of personal property. It pre-
supposes the destruction of the surplus
3
.
Marcel Mauss proved that the belief in the destructiveness of mo-
notonic processes lies at the foundations of human sociality. The
society remains strong only through the rejection of the monotonic
process and by turning growth into a cycle.
Emile Durkheim, Pitirim Sorokin, and Georges Gurvitch, the
greatest sociologists of the 20
th
century, the classicists of sociologi-
cal thought, argued that social progress does not exist, in contrast
to the 19
th
-century sociologists, such as Auguste Comte or Herbert
1
Mauss, Marcel, Sotsialnye funktsii sviaschennogo, in Selected Works, tr.,
ed. I. V Utehin, St. Petersburg, Evraziia, 2000. [Sacrifce: Its Nature and Func-
tions]
2
Mauss, Marcel, Ocherk o dare. Obschestva. Obmen. Lichnost: Trudy po
sotsialnoi antropologii, tr. A. B. Gofman, Moscow, Vostochnaia literatura,
RAN, 1996. [The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societ-
ies]
3
Translators note: likho is the personifcation of calamities and misfortune in
eastern Slavic mythology. This archaic word is the equivalent of evil, and is
etymologically related to lishnii, that is, excessive. The author also uses the
original meaning of the term likhva, an archaic word which signifes usury,
and is also linked to likho.
59
Fourth Political Theory
Spencer. Progress is not an objective social phenomenon, but rather,
an artifcial concept, a kind of a scientifcally formulated myth.
When we study societies, we can only speak of the different types
thereof. There is no general criterion to determine which is more de-
veloped, and which is less so. Lucien Lvy-Brhl attempted to prove
that savages think pre-logically, while modern humans logically
1
.
However, Claude Levi-Strauss demonstrated
2
that savages think in
the same way as we do; only their taxonomy is built differently, so
they do not have less logic than we do maybe even more so and
they think in a more refned manner.
As for the phases of social development, the greatest U.S. cul-
tural anthropologist Franz Boas and his followers as well as Claude
Levi-Strauss and his school proved that we cannot look at modern
humans as ones evolved from the archaic and primitive hordes with-
in the framework of anthropology. Primitives and primitive societies
are simply different people and different societies. Modern humans
are one group, the archaic humans another. But, they are people, too,
no worse than we are. They are not an underdeveloped version of
us. They have different children, who do not know myths and fairy
tales (they are not introduced to them), in contrast to our children.
They have different adults their adults do know the myths, where-
as ours do not believe in them. Our adults, our sober and practical
society, are similar to their children. The adults in primitive tribes
are capable of telling mythical stories, sincerely believe in them,
and embody the feats of their ancestors and spirits in their life,
making no distinction. In contrast, the children of primitive socie-
ties are characterized by cynicism, pragmatism, scepticism, and the
desire to attribute everything to material causes. This does not mean
that modern societies had grown from the state of primitivism and
superseded it; it is just that we confgured our society differently (no
better or worse), built it upon other foundations and on other values.
1
Lvy-Brhl , Lucien, Pervobytnoe myshlenie. Psikhologiia myshleniia.
Moscow, MGU, 1980. [Primitive Mentality]
2
Lvi-Strauss, Claude, Pervobytnoe myshlenie issledovanie osobennosti
myshleniia, Moscow, Respublika, 1994. [The Savage Mind]
60 Alexander DUGIN
With regard to cultural studies and philosophy, Nikolai Danilevs-
kii, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jnger, Martin Heidegger,
and Arnold Toynbee showed that all the processes in the history of
philosophy and the history of culture are a cyclical phenomenon.
The Russian historian Lev Gumilev suggested in his version of cy-
clical history that he explained in his famous theory of passionarity.
They all acknowledge that there is development, but that there also
is decline. Those, who place bets only on growth and development,
act against all norms of history, against all sociological laws, and
against the logic of life. Such unidirectional modernization, such
growth, such development, and such progress do not exist. Piotr Sz-
tompka, a contemporary Polish sociologist, stated
1
that, in terms or
progress, the following change occurred in the humanities in the
19
th
century, everyone believed that it exists, and that was the prin-
cipal axiom and a scientifc criterion. But, if we examine the para-
digms of the 20
th
century in the humanities and the natural sciences,
then we will see that almost everyone rejected this paradigm; no one
is guided by it any longer. Nowadays, the paradigm of progress is
considered almost antiscientifc; it is incompatible with contem-
porary scientifc criteria, as it is incompatible with the criteria of
humanism and tolerance. Any idea of progress is in itself a veiled or
direct racism, asserting that our culture, for instance, the white
culture or American culture is of higher value than your culture,
than, for instance, the culture of Africans, Muslims, Iraqis, or Af-
ghans. As soon as we say that the American or the Russian culture
is better than that of the Chukchi or the inhabitants of the Northern
Caucasus, we act like racists. And, this is incompatible with either
science or with respect toward different ethnicities.20
th
-century sci-
ence uses cyclicality as a scientifc criterion, or, according to Sz-
tompka, we have moved from the paradigm of evolution, moderni-
zation, and development to the paradigm of crisis, the paradigm of
catastrophes. This means that all processes in nature, society, and
1
Sztompka, Piotr, Sotsiologiia sotsialnykh izmenenii, Moscow, Aspekt Press,
1996. [The Sociology of Social Change]
61
Fourth Political Theory
technology must be conceived as relative, reversible, and cyclical.
This is the most important point.
In terms of its methodological base, the Fourth Political The-
ory must be rooted in the fundamental rejection of the monotonic
process. That is to say, the Fourth Political Theory must assert
that the monotonic process is unscientifc, inadequate, amoral, and
untrue as its future axiom (without specifying how the monotonic
process must be rejected). And, everything that appeals to the mo-
notonic process and it variations, such as development, evolution,
and modernization, should, in the very least, be placed into the cy-
clical mode. Instead of the idea of the monotonic process, progress,
and modernization, we must endorse other slogans directed toward
life, repetition, the preservation of that which is worth preserving
and changing that which should be changed.
Instead of modernization and growth, we need the direction of
balance, adaptability, and harmony. Instead of moving upward and
forward, we must adapt to that which exists, to understand where we
are, and to harmonize socio-political processes.
And, most important, instead of growth, progress, and develop-
ment, there is life. After all, one is yet to prove that life is linked to
growth. This was the myth of the 19
th
century. Life, in contrast, is
connected to eternal return. In the end, even Nietzsche incorporated
his idea of the will to power into the concept of eternal return. The
very logic of life to which Nietzsche was dedicated told him that if
there is growth in life, the Apollonian movement toward the logos,
then the balance of the nocturnal Dionysian world exists as well.
And, Apollo is not just opposed to Dionysus, they complement each
other. Half of the cycle constitutes modernization, the other half
decline; when one half faces up, the other half faces down. There
is no life without death. Being-towards-death, careful attention to
death, to the fip side of the sphere of Being, as Heidegger wrote, is
not a struggle with life, but, rather, its glorifcation and its founda-
tion.
We must put an end to the antiquated political ideologies and
theories. If we have truly rejected Marxism and fascism, then what
62 Alexander DUGIN
remains is to reject liberalism. Liberalism is an equally outdated,
cruel, misanthropic ideology like the two previous ones. The term
liberalism should be equated with the terms fascism and com-
munism. Liberalism is responsible for no fewer historic crimes
than fascism (Auschwitz) and communism (the GULAG): it is re-
sponsible for slavery, the destruction of the Native Americans in the
U.S., for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the aggression in Serbia, Iraq,
and Afghanistan, for the devastation and the economic exploitation
of millions of people on the planet, and for the ignoble and cynical
lies which whitewash this history.
But, most important, we must reject the base upon which these
three ideologies stand: the monotonic process in all its forms, that
is, evolution, growth, modernization, progress, development, and all
that which seemed scientifc in the 19
th
century but was exposed as
unscientifc in the 20
th
century.
We must also abandon the philosophy of development and pro-
pose the following slogan: life is more important than growth. In-
stead of the ideology of development, we must place our bets on the
ideology of conservatism and conservation. However, we not only
require conservatism in our daily lives, but also philosophical con-
servatism. We need the philosophy of conservatism. Looking toward
the future of the Russian political system; if it is going to be based
on monotonic processes, then it is doomed to failure. No stability
will ever come from a new round of unidirectional growth (from the
energy prices, real estate, stocks, etc.) or from the growth of global
economy as a whole. If this illusion persists, then it may become
fatal for our country.
Today, we fnd ourselves in a transitional state. We roughly know
what we are moving away from, but do not know what we are mov-
ing toward. If we head toward that which directly or indirectly im-
plies the presence of the monotonic process, then we will reach a
dead end.
The Fourth Political Theory must take a step toward the for-
mulation of a coherent critique of the monotonic process; it must
develop an alternative model of a conservative future, a conserva-
63
Fourth Political Theory
tive tomorrow, based on the principles of vitality, roots, constants,
and eternity.
After all, as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck once said, Eternity
is on the side of the conservative.
CHAPTER 5. THE REVERSIBILITY OF TIME
Three political theories have been produced from the ideology
of Modernity. They were all based on the topography of Progress.
Progress implicates the irreversibility of time, a forward-moving
and predetermined evolutionary process. Progress is both an ortho-
genetic and a monotonous process. Inevitably, all three are based on
Hegels philosophy. After Hegel, the meaning of history has become
the fact that Absolute Spirit has become estranged from itself, em-
phasizing itself into the substance, which has externalized itself into
history, dialectically, until it turns into Enlightened society, enlight-
ened Monarchy.
Marx has accepted this topography, and after Kozhev and Fuku-
yama, liberal thinkers have accepted it as well. In the framework of
National Socialism, Hegelianism was externalized in the concept of
a Final Reich, with the Third Reich as the Third kingdom of Joachim
de Flore, and in the concept of Social Darwinism, where natural se-
lection theory has been adapted to apply to society and races. Social
Darwinism is also inherent in Spensers liberalism. Each of these
three ideologies of Modernity utilizes the ideas of the irreversibility
of time and of unidirectional history. They implicitly acknowledge
the totalizing imperative of Modernization. Modernization can be
liberal, communist, or fascist. An example of the effectiveness of
fascist Modernization would be the success, however brutal, of Hit-
lers industrial modernization of Germany in the 1930s.
The 4th political theory is a non-modern theory. As Bruno Latour
has said, We have never been contemporary. Theoretical axioms of
Modernity are harmless because they are not in reality executable. In
practice they are permanently and very spectacular self-abnegated.
4
th
political theory completely discards the idea of the irreversibility
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Fourth Political Theory
of history. Theoretically this idea was interesting, as substantiated
by Georges Dumzil, with his anti-euhemerism, and Gilbert Durand.
I have written previously about sociology and the morphology of
time in my books Postphilosophy, Sociology of the Imagination,
and Sociology of Russian society. Time is a social phenomenon; its
structures dont depend upon object characters but upon the domina-
tion of social paradigms, because the object is assigned by society it-
self. In Modern society, time is seen as irreversible, progressive and
unidirectional. But this is not necessarily true inside societies that
do not accept Modernity. In some societies without a strict Modern
conception of time, cyclic and even regressive conceptions of time
exist. Therefore, political history is considered in the topography of
plural conceptions of time for the 4
th
political theory. There are as
many conceptions of time, as there are societies.
4
th
political theory does not just discard progress and moderniza-
tion, however. This theory contemplates progress and modernization
relative to and intimately connected with current historical, social
and political semantic occasions, as in Occasionalist theory. Prog-
ress and modernization are real, but relative, not absolute. We are
talking here about specifed stages, but not about the absolute trend
of history. Thats why 4
th
political theory suggests alternative ver-
sion of political history based on systematized Occasionalism. Karl
Schmitt was very close to this in his work. Fernand Braudel and
cole des Annales have also been inspired by this in their writ-
ing. In discussion of the political transformation of society we place
them in their specifc semantic context: history, religion, philosophy,
economics, and culture, with its ethnic and ethnic-sociological spe-
cifcs considered. This demands a new classifcation of social and
political transformation. We acknowledge these transformations, but
we do not place them into a broad-based scale that could be the com-
mon destiny for all societies. This gives us political pluralism.
4
th
political theory uses a societally-dependent conception of re-
versible time. In the context of Modernity, turning back from some
point in history to a previous one is impossible. But it is possible in
the context of 4
th
political theory. Berdyaevs idea of the New Me-
66 Alexander DUGIN
dieval is quite applicable. Societies can be variously built and trans-
formed. The experience of the 90s is quite demonstrative of this:
people in the USSR were sure that socialism would proceed from
capitalism, not vice versa. But in the 1990s they saw the opposite;
capitalism following socialism. It is quite possible that Russia could
yet see feudalism, a slave-owning society, as well as communism or
primordial society emerge after that. Those who laugh at this are the
captives of the Modern and its hypnosis. Having acknowledged the
reversibility of political and historical time, weve arrived at a new
pluralist point of view of political science and we have reached the
advanced perspective necessary for ideological construction.
4
th
political theory constructs, and reconstructs, society behind
Modern axioms. Thats why the elements of the different political
forms can be used in 4
th
political theory without any connection to
the time scale. There are no stages and epochs - but only pre-con-
cepts and concepts. In this context, theological constructions, an-
tiquity, caste and other aspects of traditional society are only one of
the possible variants; along with socialism, Keynesian theory, free
markets, parliamentary democracy, or nationalism. They are just
forms, but they wouldnt be related an implied topography of ob-
jective historical time. Theres no such thing! If time is historical
it is cannot objective. Dasein says the same. Dasein is the subject
of 4
th
political theory. Dasein can be recovered by the refnement of
the existential truth from the ontological superstructure. Dasein is
something that institutionalizes time. Durand institutionalizes time
by Traiectum in his topography. Traiectum/Dasein is not a function
of time, but time is a function of Traiectum/Dasein. Thats why time
is something that is institutionalized by politics in the context of 4
th

political theory. Time is a political category. Political time is a pre-
concept of a political form.
4
th
political theory has opened a unique perspective: if we com-
prehend the principle of the reversibility of time, we are not only be
able to compose the project of a future society, but we would also
able to compose a whole range of projects of different future societ-
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Fourth Political Theory
ies thus we would be able to suggest some non-linear strategies for
a new institutionalization of the world.
4
th
political theory is not an invitation to traditional society
again; ie., it is not conservatism. There are many characteristics of
our chronological past which are pleasant, and many which are not.
Forms of traditional society are also different from each other. Fi-
nally, ethnic and sociological matrixes and contexts of different con-
temporary societies are different too. 4
th
political theory shouldnt
impose anything on anyone. Adherents of 4
th
political theory should
act step by step: if we simply argue the reversibility of time and
Dasein as the subjects of 4
th
political theory, it would be the frst
and main step. We would thus free space for the pre-concepts. We
can defne several pre-concepts with regards to the reversibility of
time and Dasein/Traiectum, therefore we can defne several political
concepts of time and each of them can be plugged into the current
political project, according to the principles of 4
th
political theory.
CHAPTER 6. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE FUTURE
Is there a future? The question is legitimate because it provokes
thinking about the ontology of time. What is or is now, and precisely
because of being now, it is considered as being proper according to
the multitude of direct empirical perceptions, or it was, and the fact
of past existence is certifed by the reliable documents. But in both
cases forgery is possible. The being of that which is only to be is
highly questionable.
Martin Heidegger spoke about three ecstasies of time: The past,
the present and the future. Apparently there are three ontological
arguments relatively to those three: ecstasies - immediacy (there is/
there is not) is related to the present; Documentary (there was/ here
was not) is related to the past; Probabilistic (there will be/ there will
be not) is related to the future. It seems that we could create a hierar-
chy, based on the evidence: there is, there was, there will be. There
is is most evident. There will be is most doubtful. There was is
in middle of them. The future is most hesitating among the three ec-
stasies of time. The future is in a lesser scale comparing with there
is or there was. There was was, or they think that there was
at least. Concerning the future you never know for certain. It could
happen, but probably will not. The future lacks being compared
with the other ecstasies of time.
From this point we could proceed in several different directions.
For example we could put in question the solidity of ontological ar-
guments concerning the most evident moment the present. Recall-
ing Kant and his doubts about the inner being of the object. The fact
of perception of something is not enough for the declaration of its
being (the Ding-an-sich problem). Nor pure reason but only practi-
cal reason gives the being to the object, based on moral imperative.
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Fourth Political Theory
The object should have being. It would be good when it has it. It
has to have it.
If the present as most evident of all moments of time, it can be
questioned rather deeply, we are arriving at an interesting point: all
three moments of time are ontologically improvable and unverif-
able and concern only the gnoseologic level. It is pessimistic con-
cerning the present whose reality we habitually take for granted,
but rather optimistic concerning the two other moments, the past
and future. The future and past acquire equal consideration with the
present. The present, past and future for pure reason have equal phe-
nomenological value. The future in this case is the phenomenon, and
hence it phenomenologically is. Being the phenomenon it is and it
is real. It is actual.
Kant, analyzing the a priori forms of sensibility, puts time nearer
to the subject, and space nearer to the object. It indicates that time
belongs to the closest orbit of the subject. Time is hence subjective.
It is the transcendental subject that installs time in the perception of
the object.
Now let change the perspective and consider the time in a phe-
nomenological way. Husserl proposed to study time with the ex-
ample of music. The consciousness of hearing the music piece is
not based on the strict identifcation of notes sounding in a concrete
discrete moment. Hearing music is something different that hearing
a note that sounds now, in the present. The consciousness of music,
is accessed by recalling the past note as well that are dissolving little
by little in to nothingness, but their resonance, the echo continues in
the consciousness and gives the musical phrase the esthetical sense.
Husserl calls it the continuous instance. The past is present in the
present. The present thus becomes continuous and includes the past
as a vanishing presence.
This is the methodological key for the understanding of history.
History is awareness of the presence of the past in the present. The
vanishing events continue to sound in the recalling of them. Clio
and Polyhymnia are sisters. This recalling is necessary to give the
present the sense. The anamnesis of Plato has the same function. The
70 Alexander DUGIN
soul should recall the hidden past of its past existence in order to
reconstruct the wholeness of the melody of destiny. Only thus could
it be played harmoniously.
Therefore, the future should be placed in this context. It is con-
tinuous in the present. Not the moment of novum, but the process
of the vanishing of the present, that is now. The future is the tail of
the present, its resonance. We live the future just now, and already
now, when we play the note of the melody of life. The future is the
process of the death of the present, the attention of the dissolution
of melody in the main frame of harmony. The novum appears in
the future only when the harmony is lost, when our attention falls
asleep, and then suddenly we awake and cannot identify the sounds
that we hear. They momentarily simply dont make sense. That is
the novum -- spontaneous incomprehension of what is going on.
It is the nature of discreet discontinued events. The moment of being
without history, hence without sense of awareness.
Husserl is digging much deeper in the phenomenology of time.
He discovers the new instance of consciousness laying under the
level when the musical history of time is perceived. According to
Husserl beneath this level there is another one, ultimate one that is
responsible for our perception of what is now with the force of evi-
dence and the taste of reality much more intensive that in the case
of the recalling the ever dying past. This instance is the conscious-
ness itself , the consciousness as such that precedes the intentional-
ity and the dualist topic of apprehension being necessarily divided
in two parts the perceived and the perceiving. In the present the
consciousness perceives itself and nothing else. That is the ultimate
experience of the last source of reality. According to Husserl the
base of all is the transcendental subjectivity; whence it conceives
itself, it is a kind of short circuit. This experience is autoreferent
one. In it there is the perception of pure being as the presence of the
subjectivity of consciousness.
This short circuit cause all kind of dualities to be born the logi-
cal ones and temporal one. The necessity to stop this trauma is mani-
fest in the creation of time, the articulation of three time moments.
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Fourth Political Theory
The time is necessary to hide the present which is the traumatically
experience of the autoreferency of the pure consciousness. Inten-
tionality and logical judgements all are rooted in this evasion of the
consciousness from the pain of the void present in which the con-
sciousness is presented to itself.
Such an attitude to the levels of consciousness explains the gen-
esis of time as the evasion from the present and unbearable tension
of pure presence to the same. The tension is immediately relieved
by the expansion in all imaginable kinds of the dualities that con-
stitute the textures of the continuous processes. The model of all
this process is the three moments time. The logical and spatial sym-
metries follow the couples yes/no, true/false, high/low, right/left,
here/there and so on. Before/after belongs to the same cadence. The
consciousness constitutes the time running from unbearable meeting
with itself. But this meeting is inevitable, so the present and its high
precision of existential perception is born.
What is most important in this interpretation of morphology
of time? The idea that the time precedes the object, and he root of
time we should seek in inner depth of consciousness not in the outer
things constituted by subjective procedure of traumatically self-ex-
perience. The world around us becomes what it is by the fundamen-
tal action of presencing accomplished by mind. If a mind sleeps the
reality lacks the taste of present existence. It is fully immersed in
the continuous and interrupted dream. The world is created by time,
and the tine in its turn is the manifestation of the self-encountering
subjectivity.
These remarks lead us to the scientifc topic of the study of future
the prognostic, projecting, the futuro-analysis.
Moving from the man to the society (from the anthropology to
the sociology) we could affrm the future as something absolutely
subjective in nature, so in out context as something social. The fu-
ture is social because it is the historical feature and not the immanent
to the object inherent quality. The object has no future. The earth, the
animals, the stones, the machines have no future. Only those who
are included in the human social context can indirectly take part in
72 Alexander DUGIN
the future. Without autoreferent consciousness there can be no time.
The time that is what is inside us, what makes us what who we are.
The time is mans ultimate identity.
This subjectivity of time doesnt mean that any prognostic will
be self-fulflled prophecy (R.Merton), nor that any project is realiz-
able a priori. The future is strictly determined and is not something
voluntary. The time being historical is predefned precisely by its
historical content. The subject is not free from its structure, more
than that it is absolutely enslaved by it. The time needs the future as
the void space for the continuous vanishing of the present and partly
of the past. If the future lacks the subject will not have the space to
evade, to run from the impossible encounter with itself, from the
short circuit mentioned above. The frozen moment of he present
without the future is that of death.
The society needs the future to run from itself further and further.
The chronicle of such a run is the sense of history. To make it effec-
tive we need the rests of the past episodes. The future is predefned
by he structure of the subject. That is why is strictly defned. The
subject cannot not to deploy the chains of reasoning, not to think,
not to constitute the temporal cadences. The future is in the same
measure as the present and past. Where the time is the future is also.
The future makes sense. It has the sense even before it becomes
present. More than that the future make sense even it will never hap-
pen. It is the semantic value of the prophecy or the prognosis: if it
doesnt happen it also is something loaded with the sense and help-
ing to explain what is going on. The prophecies and the prognosis
are working to discern the meaning of the future. When the future
refute the expectations the fact of the refuting gives the sense to
what it really happens because the sense of it partly consists in what
wasnt realized. Unfulflled prophecy has exactly the same impor-
tance as fulflled one.
The future can be analyzed with the same accuracy as the present
and past. The only thing the future will have in its private possession
is the fash of the self-encounter of the deepest consciousness and
the intensive shock of the discovery of the present as what is really
73
Fourth Political Theory
actually is. What is is the note that sounds now. But it is not music
and can be analyzed. The isolated note says nothing. It conveys us
nothing. It acquires the sense only with the other notes. The context
gives it sense. So concerning the content of time it is something
whole that is disposed in the tree moments of time a priori. We live
the time in its wholeness. So the future dimension is already given
with the sense of music. The history is not only the memory of the
past. It is also the explication of the present and the experience of
the future. When we understand well the history and its logic we
could easily guess what will follow, what is going to happen, which
note should go next. Knowing the society we could identify in its
history the harmony, the periods, the refrains, the structure of the
piece. Sure we could encounter surprises but most surprising would
be the possibility of one authentic moment of the experience of the
self-identity of the pure consciousness. It is possibility to be awaken
by the bold of inner light. In this traumatically situation we discover
the identity between most inner and most outer. We live on the crea-
tion of the external world by internal self. But that is not the history
anymore, it is break through it, the intrusion to the centre of time
where the time is being eternally made. From this point it goes out.
There it exists in the undifferentiated unity of all three ecstasies
past, present and future.
The time can be organized in different ways. The past can be in-
trincated with the present and with the future by the different links.
Here is the circular time based on the eternal refrain pattern. In
the centre of circular time there is experience of the consciousness
linked to itself in manner short circuit. The power of the trauma re-
jects the attention and the life world to the periphery, which became
the circle-time with the future becoming past and so on eternally. It
is the eternal return of the same.
The time could be arranged as regress line. The experience of the
short circuit is placed here in the past. The ear tries to capture the
distant sounds of the past and truly reproduce it. It is traditional so-
ciety based on the everlasting effort of platonic anamnesis. The most
important here is to remember and transmit. In this time the future
74 Alexander DUGIN
and the present are constructed by the past. The reality and actuality
are sent to the past and are remembered, recalled.
There is the time taken as the perpetual waiting of something
to come. It is chiliastic messianic time. The shirt circuit experience
is here appointed to the future. The history is going to accomplish
itself in the future where the reality fulfls. This kind of time is cen-
tred on the thing to come. The tomorrow is the focus of the historical
sense. The being is oriented to the future life.
There is another time installed in the object, moved to the ex-
treme periphery of the subject where the objective world is fxed.
This time is presumable material time, the time introduced in the
substance of thing. This is the time of slaughter, of the death of the
subject.
The consciousness could construct different kinds of times and
their combinations. Before create the world flled with forms the
subject creates the time where the world is to be.
The histories of different societies are different. Exactly as differ-
ent are the pieces, musicians, the compositors, the instruments, the
musical genre, and the kinds of notations. That is why the humanity
as whole cannot have a future. It has no future. The future of human-
ity is quite senseless because it lacks for completely the semantic
value, the sense. Every society is separate fact of the consciousness,
expanded in the rational and temporal horizons. All is strictly super-
individual and open. But before hearing the real history of concrete
society we should immerse in the depths of its identity. The fact that
every people, every culture, every society have its own history, turn
time in local phenomenon. Every society possesses its own tempo-
rality. All moments if it are different past, present, future. The soci-
eties can cross, intersect. Their historical senses cannot. The senses
are local. The common sense is possible only on the base of the
seizure of one society over other one and imposing its own history
on the enslaved one.
That means if the society has future it should be its own future.
The future is through the appurtenance to the expanding forces of
the constituent subject. The society can be united through the struc-
75
Fourth Political Theory
tures of their consciousnesses. It means we should unite the seman-
tic ranges of the respective pasts. It means further to prove the har-
monious correspondences of the notes and melodies, the symphonic
nature of concerned societies. The past is extinguishing, yes it is, but
never extinguished. Being extinguished the present looses the sense,
and the future the possibility to happen, to come. Being vanishing
is the form of existence of time. Vanishing is necessary for the mor-
phology of time at the same scale as the fash of the present and the
vagueness of the future.
So the people should ask themselves today about their future. If
they have the history they could have the future. If they have history
and the future they are. If they are the future is here, in the present.
It is being made now.
We can establish on this basis the prognosis and the projects. Ac-
cording to Heidegger the throwness (Geworfenheit) of the subject
(Dasein) is forcing him to project itself. Etymologically it is clear:
the subject is formed by sub-jectum (sub-jacere), the project by
pro-jectum (pro-jacere). In both cases we have the verb to throw.
The analysis of the future is rooted in this: apprehending the future
we are making it. It is a work on the history and the consciousness
of time as such.
It is doubtful that one society is capable to comprehend the other
society at the same level as it is comprehended by its own members.
Such possibility presupposes the existence of the meta-society, the
society-God, which could operate with the ultimate depths of the
consciousness in the same manner as the consciousness operates
with the attention, noesis, intentionality, the logic and the time and
fnally with the world. Obviously the Western society is particularly
marked by such an ethnocentric approach and universalistic preten-
sion rooted in the racist and colonialist past. But in the XX century it
was certainly proved that it is completely unfounded and false. The
structuralists, the sociologists, the cultural anthropologists, the post-
modernists, the phenomenologist, the linguists, the existentialists,
and so on have deployed convincing argumentation demonstrating
the inner nature of such attitude rooted in the will to the power and
76 Alexander DUGIN
paranoid imposition of the its own identity to the other. The illness
called Western racism.
The West is the local and historical phenomenon. It is very acute
civilization, very particular, very arrogant, very smart. But it is one
among many others. The West has history and is because of its his-
tory. The attempt to abdicate this history in favour of pure univer-
salism and in favour of metaculture and meta-language is doomed.
There are two out of it:
or the West will loose its own identity and will turn into the
automaton;
or it will try to impose its own history given as universal own
on all the existing societies destroying them and creating
new kind of planetarian concentration camp for the cultures.
First version implies the struggle of the cyborgs with the men.
The second one the planetarian liberation fghting against new im-
perialism. It is for the West to decide how manage the consequences
of its proper history and its implications. The West can try to close
its history but it is little probable that it will succeed n closing the
history of the other.
So now it is the moment to begin fght for the historical being
of the people. This historical being is the time the sense of which
is constituted subjectively. The sense can reside only in the society
itself. The West cannot intersect with the sense of the other non-
Western societies. The non-Western people cannot understand cor-
rectly the West and its values. There are in permanent error thinking
they can. It is false. They cannot. But the Western people cannot
understand the non-Western societies. The structures of the subjects,
the time, the music are different. The past, the present and the future
of the historical societies can not be exposed by no meta-culture:
they are lying too deep and are defended from the foreign eyes by
the destructive might of the autoreferential moment, by the bold of
the greatest tension. What for the West is, for the other cultures is
not. So we are dealing with different times always and with different
futures.
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Fourth Political Theory
So we have come to the end of the history and the globaliza-
tion. The end of history is the logical fnalizing of the universalism.
The end of the history is the abolition of the future. The history
proceeds and reaches it terminal state. There is no more space to go
on. So with future all structure of time is abolished not only future,
but also the past and the present. How it can be possible? We could
compare it with the simultaneous playing all existing notes, sounds,
melodies that will give us cacophony, clanking and grinding of teeth.
At the same time it will provoke absolute silence, deafness and sour-
ness. Hence there will be no space for the temporalization of inner
tension of transcendental subjectivity; the short circuit would grow
exponentially without possibility of being dissipated. That means
the infammation, the ignition and fre. The same fre goes usually in
pair with the sword.
In order to prevent the ignition and the blow potentiated by the
closing the temporal and logical perspective of the relief the global
world will strive to trap the consciousness in the networks and the
virtuality, where it could run away from the inner pressure of self-
encountering without issue. If it succeed the new world of the ma-
chine kingdom would be created. The global network and digital
cyberspace are suitable only for the existence of post-humans, post-
society, post-culture. Instead of fre we will get the electricity. Some
people believe Fukuyama is already a robot.
The globalization is the same as the end of history. Both go hand
in hand. They are semantically linked. The different societies have
different histories. That means different futures. If we going to make
the tomorrow common to all societies existing on the planet, if
we are going to propose global future we need previously to destroy
the history of these societies, to delete its pasts, to annihilate the
continuous moment of the present virtualizing the reality consisting
from the content of the historical time. The common future means
deleting of particular histories. But that means no histories at all
including their future part will rest. The common future is no future.
The globality cancels the time. He globality cancels the transcen-
78 Alexander DUGIN
dental subjectivity of Husserl or Dasein of Heidegger. There is no
more time, nor being.
So we are to deal with the bifurcation of temporal constructions.
It is time to put this question with all implicit weight. Now being on
the eve of the entrance in the zone of the end of history, into the post-
history, we could make the decision and to give different ontological
responses.
When we want to have the future it shouldnt be global. It couldnt
be one future, we will have to have many futures. The transcenden-
tal subjectivities/cultures/societies can preserve the space for the
scattering of energies born by the self-encountering, the short circuit
in question through its temporalization: that will, grant the existence
of the outer world and the duration of (always and necessarily) local
histories. The time will last and the world as the experience of the
real presencing will be supported by the structure of the deep sub-
jectivity. The history will rest local. The common history consists of
the local histories being made by the unique chronological cadence.
There are the next question: the formalisation in the national
State does refect correctly and exhaustively the structure of tran-
scendent subject as the creator of history? Will be the future histori-
cal time necessarily national (as in the modernity), or it will fnd out
the new ways? Or maybe it will return to the pre-modern forms?
When Huntington evokes civilizations he admits the possibility of
emergent localities and local identities being different than nation
States. The civilizations are cultural and religious communities
not the national ones. We could imagine the step backward in the
pre-national direction (Islamic integration); the step forwards in
the post-national direction (European Union or Eurasian Union); or
we could tolerate the civilization in the form of national State (so
with India, China or Turkey).The historical narratives and political
formalisations of the time could be somewhere changed. It means
there is the lot of work that should be done historically. When some-
one is alive he could change not only the future but also the past. The
gesture or meaningful motion accomplished in the present will add
new sense to the past. Only after resolute death the past of someone
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Fourth Political Theory
become the property of other. Hence the history of peoples, societ-
ies and cultures is open they could make the amazing and dazzling
turn obliging the conceive their past in the new perspective. So the
history is music and the work of Muse.
Are the civilizations destined to shock with each other? It is not
sure: the history has not linear rules. Difference doesnt mean auto-
matically the shock and struggle. The history knows the war. The
history knows the peace as well. The war and peace were always.
The war and peace will always be. They serve torelive the tension,
the stress of present. They liberate and subjugate the horror and the
death.
The pure war and pure peace are equally murderous.
The continuation of the history of local societies will lead to the
preservation of the being and hence to the possibility of the future
to happen.
The second option is globalization. It cancels the future. It re-
quires the arrival of post-human. It constructs post-world consist-
ing of simulacra and virtual structures. In place of transcendental
subject, Dasein, society becomes a huge computer center, a matrix,
a supercomputer. Instead of time its doubles make appearance. The
doubles of the past, present and future. Counterpart of the past is
a false memory, the product of artifcial infuence on the histori-
cal recalling. Blockade of the transcendental subject allows you to
change the past as alternate video disc in player. An alternate version
of society could be loaded as prequel. It is technically possible - the
substitution of the past. Suffcient control over the present allows it
to be produced easily.
Substitution of the future follows this manipulation. Two dispa-
rate tracks mixed one with another produce the cacophonic reper-
cussions in the future. Future is stoned, the semantic of time blurs,
forks, triplicates.
To deal with the present is a little more complicated and sophis-
ticated. To remove it, we should not simply block transcendental
subjectivity, we must eradicate it . That presumes the transition from
the human to the post-human.
80 Alexander DUGIN
The working on the genome, the cloning, the enhancement of the
robots and the new generations of cyborg all this is close enough to
the advenement of the post-human. The goal is to produce the crea-
tures that would lack existentional dimension with zero subjectivity.
The simulacra can be made not only of the reason but also of the
inconsciousness. The most important operation is the abolition of
the present. Non-human creatures - animals, vehicles, plants, stones
and so on dont know the taste of present.
If globalization continues, what is the fate of the subjectivity?
What is the ontology of the future that (probably) will never hap-
pen?
Here we could suggest one no orthodox theory.
Let us assume that the multipolarity disappeared, the history end-
ed and the project of globalization has become a reality. How will
be organized the fnal exorcism of transcendental subjectivity? How
will be implemented the fnal decision concerning the abolition
of Dasein? After all, as long as a society and a man are present they
should make this decision regarding themselves. It is impossible to
make appeal to the someone other which could be to blame for that
or praised. The reference to the other is acceptable only when we
have the same. If we are going to loose any identity, we will no more
have tha alterity. So the end of histoty is made by us and concerns
ourselves and nobody else.
So the fgure of other being excluded there rests to explain how
the man can accomplish the last gesture of auto-dissolution and how
can he transfer initiatives of existence to the posthuman world, that
will disappear immediately after last man there wiil be no more
the witness.
This is a great problem, and requires even deeper insight into
the structure of the transcendental subject that generates time and
its types.
Nobody else can make decisions about how to reset the time and
its liquidation. And of the self liquidation by the way. Of the fnal
self-immolation by the exaltation of a short circuit. Hence, the sub-
ject itself carries in himself the possibility of such a chronocide plan.
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Fourth Political Theory
Globalization and the end of the story can not be reduced to the will
of someone who would have been different from the one who is the
source of the time. At least in limits of immanent philosophy. Con-
sequently, this means only one thing: in the depths of transcendental
subjectivity, there is another layer to which Husserl had not dug.
Husserl was convinced that one discovered by him was the last. But
it turns out that it wasnt. There had to be another dimension around,
the most hidden one.
We can designate it as the Radical Subject.
If Husserls transcendental subjectivity constitutes reality through
the experience of self-referencing manifestation, Radical Subject is
to be found not on th way out, but by the way in.
He shows itself only in the moment of ultimate historic catastro-
phe, in the drastic experience of short circuit that lasts for a mo-
ment longer and mightier than it is possible to endure.
The same experience that makes the transcendental subjectivity
manifest itself and deploy its content creating thus the time and with
its intrinsic music is regarded by Radical Subject as the invitation
to show itself by in the different manner in the other side of the
time. For him the time in all forms and confgurations is noth-
ing more than a trap, the trick, the bogus, delaying the real decision.
For Radical Subject not only the virtuality and network but already
reality is the prison, the concentration camp, the suffering, the tor-
ture. The mild dozing of the history is something contrary to the
condition where he could be, complete itself, become. All creation
of the subjectivity being the secondary formation of temporality is
the obsctacle for its pure will.
If we accept the hypothesis of Radical Subject we acquire im-
mediately the instance that explains us who has taken the decision
of the globalization, the suicide of humanity and the end of history;
who has conceived this plan and brought it in the reality. It can be
therefore the drastic gesture of Radical Subject interested in the lib-
eration from time and in the construction of non-temporal (impossi-
ble) reality. The Radical Subject is incompatible with all kinds of the
82 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
time. He vehemently demands the anti-time, based on the exalted
fre of eternity transfgurated in the radical light.
When everybody is gone there rests only those that could not be
gone. Maybe that is the reason of greatest probation.
CHAPTER 7. GLOBAL TRANSITION
AND ITS ENEMIES
What are the historical, political, ideological and economic fac-
tors and actors that now defne the dynamics and confguration of
power in the world and what is the U.S. position in what is known as
the New World Order?
The World Order Questioned
The New World Order (NWO) as a concept was popularized in
a concrete historical moment, precisely when the cold war ended in
the late 1980s and genuine global cooperation between the USA and
Soviet Union was considered not only possible, but very probable.
The basis of the NWO was presumably a realization of convergence
theory predicting the synthesis of the Soviet socialist and Western
capitalist political forms and close cooperation of the Soviet Union
and USA in the case of regional issues for example frst Gulf War
in the beginning of 1991. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed
soon after this, the project of a NWO was naturally set aside and
forgotten.
After 1991 the other World Order was considered to be some-
thing under formation before our very eyes a Unipolar World with
the open global hegemony of the USA. It is described well in Fu-
kuyamas political utopia, The End of History. This world order
ignored all other poles of power except the USA, with its allies; Eu-
rope and Japan. It was conceived as a universalization of free market
economics, political democracy, and human rights ideology as the
global system accepted by all countries in the world.
84 Alexander DUGIN
Skeptics, however, thought that this was rather illusionary and
that the differences between countries and peoples would reap-
pear in other forms, for example, in Samuel Huntingtons infamous
Clash of Civilizations thesis, or ethnic or religious conficts.
Some experts, in particular John Mearsheimer, regarded unipo-
larity not as a proper world order but, rather, as unipolar momen-
tum.
In any case, what is questioned in all these projects is the exist-
ing order of nation-states and national sovereignty. The Westphalian
system no longer corresponds to the current global balance of pow-
ers. New actors of transnational and subnational scale are affrming
their growing importance and it is evident that the world is in need
of a new paradigm of international relations.
So, the actual contemporary world cannot be regarded as a prop-
erly-realized NWO. There is no defnitive world order of any kind.
What we have instead, is the transition from the world order we
knew in the 20th century to some other paradigm whose features
are yet to be fully defned. Will the future really be global? Or will
regionalist tendencies dominate? Will there be one unique world or-
der? Or will there instead be various local or regional orders? Or,
perhaps, what we are going to have to deal with is global chaos? It
is not yet clear. The transition is not accomplished. We are living in
the middle of it.
If the global elite, and frst of all the US political and economic
elite, has a clear vision of the future, which is is rather doubtful,
circumstances may and can prevent the realization of it in practice.
If, however, the global elite lack a consensual project the issue
becomes much more complicated.
So only the fact of transition to some new paradigm is certain.
The paradigm as such is to the contrary, quite uncertain.
World Order from the US Point of View
The position of the USA during this shift is absolutely as-
sured but its long-term future is under question. The US is now
85
Fourth Political Theory
undergoing the test of its global imperial rule and has to deal
with many challenges some of them quite new and original.
This could proceed in three different ways:
Creation of an American Empire stricto sensu with a consolidat-
ed and technically and socially developed central area, or imperial
core, with the periphery kept divided and fragmentized in a state of
permanent unrest, near chaos. The neo-cons, it would seem, are in
favor of such a pattern.
Creation of multilateral unipolarity where the USA would coop-
erate with other friendly powers (Canada, Europe, Australia, Japan,
Israel, Arab allies, and possibly other countries) in solving regional
problems and putting pressure on rogue states (such as Iran, Ven-
ezuela, Belarus, or Northern Korea) or preventing other powers
from achieving regional independence and hegemony (China, Rus-
sia, etc). It would seem that the democrats and President Obama are
inclined to this vision.
Promotion of accelerated globalization with the creation of a
world government and swift de-sovereignization of nation-states in
favor of the creation of a United States of the world ruled by the
global elite on legal terms (for example - the CFR project repre-
sented by the strategy of George Soros and his foundations). The
colored revolutions are viewed here as the most effective weapon of
destabilizing and fnally destroying states).
The US often seems to be simultaneously promoting all three
strategies at the same time, as part of a multi-vector foreign policy.
These three strategic directions of the USA create the global context
in international relations, the USA being the key actor on a global
scale. Beyond the evident differences of these three images of the
future, they have some essential points in common. In any case, the
USA is interested in affrming its strategic, economic and political
domination; in strengthening the control or other global actors and in
weakening them; in the gradual or accelerated de-sovereignization
of what are now more or less independent states; in the promotion
of supposedly universal values refecting the values of the Western
86 Alexander DUGIN
world, i.e. liberal democracy, parliamentarianism, free markets, hu-
mans rights, and so on.
Therefore we face a contemporary world in a strong and seem-
ingly permanent geopolitical arrangement where the US is the Core
and where the rays of its infuence (strategic, economical, political,
technological, informational and so on) permeate all the rest of the
World, depending of the strength of their will to accept or reject it
in the case of different countries, ethnic or religious particulars. It is
a kind of global imperial network operating on a planetary scale.
This USA-centric global geopolitical arrangement can be de-
scribed on several different levels:
Historically, the USA considers itself to be the logical conclu-
sion and the peak of Western civilization. Once it was presented in
terms of the Manifest Destiny of the USA and then the Monroe
Doctrine. Now they speak in terms of enforcement of universal
human rights norms, promotion of democracy, technology, and free
market institutions and so on. But in essence we simply deal with an
updated version and continuation of Western universalism that has
been passed down from the Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity,
Modernity with the Enlightenment and colonization, and up to the
present-day postmodernism and ultra-individualism. History is con-
sidered to be a univocal and monotone process of technological and
social progress, the path of growing liberation of individuals from
all kinds of collective identities. Tradition and conservatism are thus
regarded as obstacles for freedom and should be rejected. The USA
is in the vanguard of this historical progress and has the right, ob-
ligation, and historical mission to move history further and further.
The historical existence of the US coincides with the course of hu-
man history. So, American means universal. The other cultures
have either an American future or no future at all.
Politically: there are very important trends in global politics that
defne the transition. The peak of the political thought of Modernity
was the victory of liberalism over the alternative political doctrines
of Modernity: fascism and socialism. Liberalism has gone global
and become the only possible political system. It is now progressing
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Fourth Political Theory
further towards a post-modern and post-individual concept of poli-
tics, generally described as post-humanism. The USA again plays
here the key role. The form of politics promoted globally by the
USA is liberal democracy. The US supports the globalization of lib-
eralism, thus preparing the next step to political post-modernity as
described in Empire, the famous book by Negri and Hardt. There re-
mains some distance between liberal ultra-individualism and prop-
erly postmodern post-humanism, promoting cybernetics, genetic
modifcation, cloning and the chimeras. But the worlds Periphery
we still faces the universalizing process the accelerated destruc-
tion of any holistic social entities, the fragmentation and atomiza-
tion of society including via technology (internet, mobile phones,
social networks), where the principle actor is strictly the individual,
divorced from any natural and collective social context.
An important testimony to the dual use of democracy promotion
has been explicitly described in an article by the American military
and political expert, Stephen R. Mann
1
, who affrmed that democ-
racy can work as a self-generating virus, strengthening existing and
historically ripe democratic societies, but destroying and immers-
ing in chaos traditional societies not properly prepared for it. So
democracy is thought to be an effective weapon to create chaos and
to govern the dissipating world cultures from the Core emulating
and installing the democratic codes everywhere. Evidence of this
process can be seen in the chaotic aftermath of the heady events of
the so-called Arab Spring. After accomplishing the full fragmen-
tation of societies to individualization and atomization, the second
phase will begin: the inevitable division and dissolution of the indi-
vidual human itself via technology and genetic tinkering to create a
posthumanity. This post-politics can be seen as the last horizon
political futurism.
Ideologically: There is a tendency for the US to increasingly
link ideology and politics in their relations with the periphery. Be-
fore, US foreign policy acted on the basis of pure pragmatic realism.
1
Mann, Stephen R. (1992). Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought, Param-
eters 2U3, Autumn.
88 Alexander DUGIN
If the regimes were pro-US they were tolerated without regard to
their ideological principles. The longstanding US-Saudi Arabia alli-
ance represents the perfect example of this foreign policy realism in
practice. Thus some features of this schizophrenic and dual morality
were ideologically accepted. However, It seems that recently the US
has began to try to deepen democracy, supporting popular revolts
in Egypt and Tunisia whose leaders were trusted allies of the US as
well as corrupt dictators. The double standards in the USs political
ideology are slowly vanishing and the deepening of democracy pro-
gresses. The culminate point will be reached in the case of probable
unrest in Saudi Arabia. At this moment the practice of democracy
promotion on an ideological basis, including in politically diffcult
and inconvenient circumstances, will be tested.
Economically: The US economy is challenged by Chinese
growth, energy security and scarcity, crippling debt and budget def-
cits, and the critical divergence and disproportion between the f-
nancial sector and the zone of real industry. The overgrowth or bub-
ble of the American fnancial institutions and the delocalization of
industry have created a discontinuity between the sphere of money
and the sphere of the classical capitalist balance of industry supply
and consumer demands. This was the main cause of the fnancial
crisis of 2008. The Chinese political-economy is trying to reestab-
lish its independence from US global hegemony and may become
the main factor of economic competition. Russia, Iran, Venezuela
and some other relatively independent countries control over large
reservoirs of the worlds remaining natural resources puts a limit on
American economic infuence. The economy of the EU and Japa-
nese economic potential represent two possible poles of economic
competition to the US inside the economic and strategic framework
of the West.
The USA attempts to solve these problems using not only purely
economic instruments, but also political and, at times, military pow-
er, as well. We could thus interpret the invasion and occupations of
Iraq and Afghanistan, the interventions overt and covert in Libya,
Iran and Syria from a geoeconomic and well as geopolitical perspec-
89
Fourth Political Theory
tive. Promotion of domestic political opposition and insurgents in
Russia, Iran and China are another similar method towards the same
goal. But these are only technical solutions. The main challenge is
how to organize the post-modern and fnance-centric economy with
continued growth, overcoming the widening critical gap between
the real economy and the fnancial sector whose logic and self-inter-
est become more and more autonomous.
It has been asserted that the USA is the main and asymmetric
actor in the center of the present transition state of world affairs.
As Vidrine has noted, this actor is a true hyperpower and the strong
current geopolitical arrangement that includes all the levels and net-
works examined above is structured around this American Core. The
question raised here, then is: Is this actor fully conscious of what
it does and does it fully understand what it will obtain at the end,
that is, which form of international system or world order it is go-
ing to achieve? Opinions on this important point are divided. The
neocons proclaiming the New American Century are optimistic as
to the future American Empire, but in their case it is obvious that
they have a clear, if not necessarily realistic, vision of an American
dominated future In this case the world order will be an American
Imperial Order based on unipolar geopolitics. At least theoretically,
it has one redeeming point: it, at least, is clear and honest about its
goals and intentions.
The multilateralists are more cautious and insist on the neces-
sity to invite the other regional powers to share the burden of global
hegemony with the USA. It is obvious that only societies similar to
the USA can be partners, so the success of democracy promotion
becomes an essential feature. The multilateralists act not only in the
name of the USA but also in the name of the West, whose values, are
or must be made, universal. Their vision of a future world order dic-
tated by global, but US led, democracy is foggier and not as clearly
defned as the neocons American Empire.
Even hazier is the extreme vision of global governance envis-
aged by promoters of accelerated globalization. It might be possible
to effectively overthrow the existing order of sovereign nation-states
90 Alexander DUGIN
but in many cases, this will only open the door to more archaic, lo-
cal, religious or ethnic forces and conficts. The vision of a single
open and, by necessity, largely homogenous society on the scale of
the earth is so fantastic and utopian that it is much easier to imagine
the total chaos and Hobbes War of All Against All in the state of
nature of a world without states.
The visions of possible future world orders from the perspective
of the US and West differs among competing factions of American
elites, ideologists, and decision makers. The most consequent and
well-defned strategy, the neocons unipolar world order, is at the
same time more ethnocentric, openly imperialistic and hegemonic.
The other two versions are much more dimly conceived and un-
certain. Thus, it is as likely they could lead to an increase in global
disorder, as order. Richard Haass has termed the paradigms of an
international system according to these two visions, as being char-
acterized by non-polarity.
So the transition in question is, in any case, American-centric
by its nature and the global geopolitical arrangement is structured
so that the main global processes would be moderated, orientated,
directed, and sometimes controlled by the unique hyperpower actor
performing its work alone or with the help of its Western allies and
regional client states.
The World Order from the Non-US Point of View
The Americano-centric world perspective described above, de-
spite being the most important and central global tendency, is not
the only one possible. There can be and there are alternative visions
of world political architecture that can be taken into consideration.
There are secondary and tertiary actors that are inevitable losers in
the case of the success of the US-strategies; the countries, states,
peoples, and cultures that would lose all, even their own identity,
and gain nothing if the USA realized its global aspirations. They are
both multiple and heterogeneous, and can be grouped into several
different categories.
91
Fourth Political Theory
The frst category is composed by the more or less successful
nation-states that are not happy to lose their independence to a su-
pranational exterior authority not in the form of open American
hegemony, nor in the Western-centric forms of world government
or governance, nor in the chaotic dissolution of a failed internation-
al system. There are many such countries foremost among them
China, Russia, Iran, and India, but including many South American
and Islamic states. They dont like the transition at all, suspecting,
with good reason, the inevitable loss of their sovereignty. So, they
are inclined to resist the main trends of the global American-cen-
tric geopolitical arrangement or adapt to it in such a manner that it
would be possible to avoid the logical consequences of its success,
be it via an imperialist or globalist strategy. The will to preserva-
tion of sovereignty represents the natural contradiction and point of
resistance in the face of American/Western hegemonic or globalist
trends. Generally speaking, these states lack an alternative vision
of the future international system or world order, and certainly do
not have a unifed or common such vision. What they all want and
share in common is a desire to preserve the international status quo
as enshrined in the UN Charter and thus their own sovereignty and
identity as nation-states in the present form, adjusting and modern-
izing them as an internal and sovereign process as necessary.
Among this group of nation-states seeking to preserve their sov-
ereignty in the face of US/Western hegemonic or globalist strategies
are:
1) Those states who try to adapt their societies to Western stand-
ards and to keep friendly relations with the West and USA, but to
avoid direct and total de-sovereignization; including India, Turkey,
Brazil, and up to a certain point Russia and Kazakhstan.
2) Those states who are ready to cooperate with the USA but un-
der the condition of non-interference in their domestic affairs; such
as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
3) Those states who, while cooperating with the USA, strictly
observe the particularity of their society by permanent fltration of
what is compatible in Western culture with their domestic culture
92 Alexander DUGIN
and what is not, and, at the same time, trying to use the dividends
received by this cooperation to strengthen their national independ-
ence; such as China, and, at times, Russia.
4) Those states who try to oppose the USA directly, rejecting
Western values, unipolarity, and US/Western hegemony; including
Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea.
However, all of these groups lack an alternative global strategy
that could be symmetrically comparable with American visions of
the future, even if without consensus or a clearly defned goal. All
these states generally act individually on the world state and in their
own direct interests. The difference in foreign policy among them
consists only in the amount of radicalism in their rejection of Ameri-
canization. Their position can be defned as reactive. This strategy of
reactive opposition, varying from rejection to adaptation, is some-
times effective, sometimes not. In sum it doesnt give any kind of
alternate future vision. Instead, the future of the world order or in-
ternational system is considered as eternal conservation of the status
quo, i.e. Modernity, nation-states, the Westphalian system of state
sovereignty, and strict interpretation and preservation of the existing
UN Charter and UN confguration.
The second category of actors who reject the transition consists
of subnational groups, movements, and organizations that oppose
American dominance of the structures of the global geopolitical ar-
rangement for ideological, religious, and/or cultural reasons. These
groups are quite different from one another and vary from state to
state. Most such are based on the basis of an interpretation of reli-
gious faith incompatible with the secular doctrine of Americaniza-
tion, Westernization, and globalization. But they can also be moti-
vated by ethnic or ideological (for example. socialist or communist)
considerations or doctrines. Others may even act on regionalist
grounds.
The paradox is that in the process of globalization, which aims
to universalize and make uniform all particularities and collective
identities on the basis of a purely individual identity, such subna-
tional actors easily become transnational the same religions and
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Fourth Political Theory
ideologies often being present in different nations and across state
borders. Thus, among these non-state actors we could potentially
fnd some alternative vision of the future world order or interna-
tional system that can stand opposed to the American/Western led
transition and its structures.
We can roughly summarize the different ideas of some of the
more important sub-national/trans-national groups as follows:
The most recognized is the Islamist world vision which repre-
sents the utopia of an Islamic World State or global Caliphate. This
project is as opposed as to the American-led transitional architecture
as it is to the existing status quo of modern nation-states. Osama
Bin Laden remains symbolic and archetypal of such ideas, and the
attacks which brought down the towers of the World Trade Center
in New York on 9/11, and which are supposed to have changed the
world, are proof of the importance of such networks and the seri-
ousness with which they must be taken.
Another such project can be defned as the transnational neo-so-
cialist plan represented in the South American Left and personally
by Hugo Chavez. This is roughly a new edition of the Marxist critic
of capitalism, strengthened by nationalist emotion, and, in some cas-
es, such as the Zapatistas and Bolivia, in ethnic sentiments or Green
ecological critiques. Some Arab regimes, such as until recently the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya under Quaddaf, can be considered in the
same vein. The vision of the future world order here is presented
as global socialist revolution preceded by anti-USA liberation cam-
paigns in every country across the globe. The US/Western-led tran-
sition is envisioned by this group as an incarnation of the classic
imperialism criticized by Lenin.
A third such example can be found in the Eurasianist (aka
multipolarity, Great Spaces, or Great Powers) project, proposing
an alternative model of world order based on the paradigm of civi-
lizations and Great Powers. It presupposes the creation of differ-
ent transnational political, strategic, and economic entities united
regionally by the community of common civilizational areas and
shared values, in some cases religious and in others secular and/
94 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
or cultural. They should consist of states integrated on regionalist
lines and represent the poles of the multipolar world. The European
Union is one such example, the nascent Eurasian Union proposed
by Russias Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstans President Narsultan
Nazarbayev, another. An Islamic Union, a South-American/Bolivar-
ian Union, a Chinese Union, an Indian Union, a Pan-Pacifc Union
are other possibilities. The North-American Great Space, covering
todays NAFTA, would be regarded as just one among several other
more or less equal poles, nothing more.
This is not an all-inclusive list of such non-state actors or theories
with alternate visions of world order. There are others, but they are
of smaller scale and thus beyond the scope of this work.
In the present state of world affairs there is a serious divide be-
tween the nation-states and the sub-state or transnational actors and
ideological movements operating on different levels, mentioned
above. The nation-states lack vision and ideology, and the move-
ments lack suffcient infrastructure and resources to put their ideas
into practice. If in some circumstance it were possible to bridge that
gap, taking into consideration the increasing demographic, econom-
ic, and strategic weight of the Non-Western world or the Rest, an
alternative to the American/Western-led transition could obtain re-
alistic shape and be regarded seriously as a consequent and theoret-
ically-founded alternate paradigm of world order.
CHAPTER 8. THE NEW POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE POLITICAL MAN AND HIS
MUTATIONS
Man as a Function of Politics
What man is, is derived not from him, but from politics. It is
politics, being the dispositive of violence and legitimate power that
defnes the man. It is the political system that gives us our shape.
Moreover, the political system has an intellectual, conceptional,
power and shape-shifting potential that can turn us into everything.
The answer to the anthropological question rests on the confgura-
tion of power in the society. The power itself consists of two ele-
ments: it is the power to shape the paradigm, integrated in the soci-
ety through state institutions, and the dispositive of violence, which
serves as a means to integrate this very paradigm into the society in
every concrete case. Consequently, the one, controlling power and
its structure, controls our concept of the man. The sphere of political
anthropology emerges here, the sphere of the political view on the
man. But there is also the concept of the political man. The differ-
ence between these two categories is that the political concept of
the man is the concept of the man as such, which is installed in
us by the state or the political system. Whiles the political man is a
particular, a proposed way to correlate with this very state. At frst
the state or the political system installs us, and then it grants or takes
away our rights.
However, on the pre-conceptional level, on the level of politi-
cal anthropology, it takes to install us to give (or to take away) our
rights, to add (or remove) a political status. We believe that we are
causa sui, and only then we fnd ourselves in the sphere of politics.
96 Alexander DUGIN
In fact it is politics that constitutes us. Whether we are given birth in
a maternity hospital or in an open feld, whether we are carried into
an electrifed ward or a dark smoky hut later, depends on politics.
Politics grants us our political status, our name, our anthropologi-
cal structure. The mans anthropological structure shifts when one
political system changes to another. Consequently, the political man,
the political anthropology is given another shape after the conver-
sion from the traditional society to the modern society. If we remain
in the bounds of the conventional polit-anthropological structures,
which were described rather in detail in the textbook The Philoso-
phy of Politics, we may set a stress on two notions. First of all, we
may say: Look, how tremendous the shift in the political anthropol-
ogy, resulted from the conversion from the traditional state to the
modern state, is. We may be astonished by it, we may be amazed,
as along with political institutes the man mutates on the fundamental
level. But later we inevitably encounter the fact that right now we
are in the state of the shift from the political mode of modernity to
post-modernity and we realize that a completely new sight surrounds
us. It becomes clear from our perspective,that the parameters of both
the traditional and modern society interfow. In fact, the political
man, Homo Politicus, the political animal was postulated in both of
these paradigms. Of course, on the pole of Modernity we have the
rational autonomous individual, and we have a particle of a certain
holistic ensemble on the other pole. As for postmodernity, it declares
that there are no differences as such between these two types of so-
ciety, politics and concepts of the man. It matters not, whether this
very man is constituted according to the liberal individualistic ap-
proach or by the holistic eidos, it is the Man which is the outcome.
The Boundaries of Post-anthropology
and the Origin of Post-politics
At this very stage we are able to single out completely new signs
of the man, constituted by the politics of post-modernity: depolitisa-
tion, autonomisation, microscopisation, sub- and transhumanisation.
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Fourth Political Theory
That is, today the man is not regarded as a whole his parts are
considered to be independent. It is his desires, emotions, moods and
inclinations that matter. At the same time, on the one hand the atten-
tion is transferred from the individual to sub=individual level, and
on the other hand, the sub-individual level merges with other sub-
individualities, that is it enters the domain of the trans-individual. A
contemporary discotheque, chaos, can be regarded as a metaphor for
this trans-individuality. It is possible to distinguish between pairs,
fgures, passes, expressions, sexes during quadrille or even rock-n-
roll dance, which is late Modernity. But as for discotheque, there are
creatures of uncertain sex, undefned appearance, and vague iden-
tity, slowly and regularly shaking to the tact of music. Moreover,
the shaking has an over-individual nature: the people arent shaking,
they are being shaken. What shakes each concrete discotheque visi-
tor, shakes the others. In this case, are all they shaking together? No,
their parts are shaking simultaneously, giving in to a common reso-
nator. Something like this is happening in politics: the de-individu-
alisation of the individual and the sub- and transindividualisation of
political institutions and structures.
Thus, we are confronting a completely new politics, which es-
sence is the denial of politics as a certain distinct political authorita-
tive line. No matter how we solve the question of power (as to whom
it belongs to the elite, to the caste, to the priests, to the warriors,
or to the democratic parliament), - it will still be a formalization
of political relations. Interests, positions, levels, statuses, roles are
always visible. We are dealing with a political society (modern or
traditional). But if one proposes to remove the question of power,
if one says there is no such concept, if we are ordered to withdraw
this question, if the notion of the subject of the political process is
forbidden, it will be ousted by a rhizomatic entity, which Negry and
Hardt name multitude. These multitudes act for both subject
and authority. Consequently, the concept of the State is replaced by
the concept of the post-State. What is the post-State? It is the notion
of the abolition of the State. The process of the demonization of the
State starts, which basis is the thesis that the state interferes with pri-
98 Alexander DUGIN
vate property. The state becomes a swearword sometime late, and its
abolition becomes an obvious measure. After that, everything that
interferes with absolute freedom is abolished.
In the end, all forms of vertical symmetry (the orientation top-
bottom, hierarchy) are subjected to destruction, and it becomes
horizontal. Similarly, the vertical line of power and the state be-
comes horizontal, and thus the political anthropology, implying this
or that constitution of the individual, dissipates and disperses in the
space of rhizomatic dust. One could call it apolithea. But if it really
were apolithea, we would observe a gradual fading of the Political,
its entropy. But we are not speaking about apolithea or indifference
towards politics. We encounter a deliberate, axiological trend. That
is the liquidation of political structures, or the structure of the po-
litical, if we include the structures of both political Pre-modernity
and Modernity there. That is, while confronting Postmodernity, both
of them are rejected. At the same time, to actively denounce the
Political, political will is required. It turns out that Postmodernity
is loaded with political meaning. And at that, it is loaded with an
imperious, epistemologically obsessional and the obligatory politi-
cal meaning of a-politization. That is, this is not pure entropy of
the political structure, its a revolutionary contr-project, a theoretical
scheme of political postanthropology. And the core of this postan-
thropology is, of course, this rhizomatic sub and trans-individual
network. It is this dispersed nebula of multitude that is deliberately
destroying the structures of the will that belong to the Political (das
Politische) in its classical Schmitt meaning.
The Core Subjects of Postpolitics
Today we may sum the situation up in this way: we add the de-
structive, corrosion strategy of political post-modernity (possessing
the same authoritative, offensive dispositive) into the sphere of the
Political (which is Schmitts classical politics, including Pre-moder-
nity and Modernity), and we receive politics in its widest mean-
ing, in its absolute meaning. This is the Absolute Political (absolut
99
Fourth Political Theory
Politische) in the boundaries of which we can place two basic an-
thropological models. It sounds natural: on the one hand we are
dealing with the contemporary man, constructed by the Political,
struggling against politics as such, that is the aforesaid shaker
from House discotheque. He has his blog, his presence on the TV,
he pretends he votes for the opposition (that is, he latently identi-
fes himself with the destructive, anti-state political trend, even if
he doesnt have a well-thought political conception). That is, when
confronting any integral political concept, he starts saying no, his
advance is very aggressive, and it creates a specifcally aimed radial
infuence. The other fgure is the political soldier (Das politische
Soldat). The political soldier is a different concept, formed in the
30-ties, which is a personality, summing up what we have called the
classical approach to das Politische, the classical approach to the Po-
litical. Its defnition is very picturesque: the political soldier differs
from the common one in the fact that he kills and dies for politics.
His killing and personal death become an existential element of the
manifestation of the Political, thus, for him the Political acquires
the existential dimension. The politician, unlike the political soldier,
deals with the Political, but doesnt kill or die for it. When the politi-
cian confronts death and murder, he says: No, Id better rethink my
convictions.
This is a wonderful romantic image, employed by Modernity and
the XX century, where we could see these splendid political soldiers.
Nietzsches words can illustrate their role in the history of the XX
century: Today, in the XIX century, people make wars for resources
and material values, but I foresee a time when they will be killing
each other for ideas. Where is this time? Its in the XX century.
All this century was flled with political soldiers killing each other
for their beliefs. They killed and were killed. Besides, every tradi-
tional society (like that of Genghis Khans) was founded by political
soldiers. The Russian Empire was also built by political soldiers.
Modernity was very sensitive to this fgure. They say the political
soldier fghts for only elevated and spiritual ideas. But that is not the
case. Even a liberal can become a political soldier (although there is
100 Alexander DUGIN
nothing spiritual or noble in liberal ideas). He may die for quite fshy
ideas, but he remains a political soldier, and that is very important.
The political soldier is an instrumental notion, dont hyperbolize it.
Its a charming, but technical position of Modernity.
We believe that on the level of political anthropology this po-
litical soldier is confronting the decomposed rhizomatic posthuman
android. We register this reading, and it may seem that we are ready
to throw away our ideological differences for the political soldier to
confront postmodern world. But my thesis is that from the perspec-
tive of the phase shift, we are living in a society where this confict
is possible, but, at the same time, the outcome of which is predeter-
mined. In fact the fgure of the political man is removed. And his
anthropological space is being occupied by a new personality, a very
cunning and fshy personality, which is not the political soldier, but,
at the same time, is not related to the hissing, rhizomatic Twitter-
sub-individual. This personality is the political mans simulacrum.
Its something that imitates the political soldier, in the same way as
Postmodernity imitates Modernity. In the fnal analysis, the readings
do not give us the human vs posthuman picture. What we see is
the undisguised rotten liberal posthuman and the pseudo-human, the
pseudo-soldier, within whom the general phase substance of history
found itself. Thats why we have this phenomenon of contemporary
fascism, which is an excellent illustrator of this condition. Every
last bit of the fascism, that constituted the structure of the political
soldier, ran out in 1945. Each and every declared fascist after 1945
is a simulacrum. The liberals fears, taking the form of fascists, is
a complete parody, they dont differ much from decomposed and
half-dissolved masses. Communism (which has held out longer that
fascism) created its simulacrum within itself. The late communists
already were pseudo-political soldiers. Today there are no chances
for communism to return to life, the same goes for fascism. Just a
little more time, and we will see that liberalism rests nearby. At least
our liberals demonstrate it (who are not liberals at all): give them
some money, and they will declare everything. We are dealing with
entities, lacking the classical political anthropology.
101
Fourth Political Theory
The Fatalism of Postanthropology and Angelpolis.
As for me, we are dealing with Deleuzes fold: we have the
confrontation of postpolitical anthropology and the pseudo-political
soldier. In this case, the antithesis of the post-human is the non-
human. If we face it, we will get a very complex and intriguing
perspective. Its either phantasmagoric despair, to which Baudril-
lard, describing the world with radical post-historical categories,
gave away, or the feeling that we are not satisfed with this fold, this
postanthropological perspective. However, if we do grasp the fatal-
ity of this pair we are discussing, we will cool down. Having raised
the question of anthropology we must look for a solution, and at the
same time we must acknowledge this postanthropology, that is, not
to wait for the coming to come, but to consider that it is here. What
do we get in this perspective? I think that Schmitt, who have created
the classical approach to the Political, might give us some hints. He
spoke about political theology. Schmitt said that all political ideolo-
gies and systems are integral theological models with religions, dog-
matic, institutions, and rites of their own. That is why to understand
politics one must grasp it as a certain religious phenomenon. But
political theology presupposes the existence of the political telos,
which can be human-made, like Gobbss Leviathan, or it can be of
non-human making, like the catholic model of imperium, which
was near Schmitts heart. Naturally, in the post-anthropological
structure, in Postmodernity, this appeal to telos as a political factor
which unfolds the system into an integral theology, wont me much
of a help, as we have crossed the boundaries of political theology.
It is impossible to speak about political anthropology while de-
scribing the post-anthropological model of todays politics. We are
forbidden to speak about an integral political theology because we
have witnessed this fundamental mutation if the fold. What are we
allowed to speak about? Because you know, we have political pro-
cesses, sources of power and dispositives of infuence, we observe
paradigmatic epistems, which are pushed and promoted in the same
way as they were in the frames of classical politics. They remain
102 Alexander DUGIN
here, they are staying, and it means that the Political in its wider
sense is here, its just that neither man nor God is there. Who is the
actor of this post-politics? There is a certain hypothesis, that I call
the concept of Angelopolis, (the city of Angels) or Angelpoliteia
(angelic politics), that is a turn from political theology to political
angelology. What we mean, is that the sphere of the Political is start-
ing to be controlled by and is starting to ground on the confrontation
of over-human entities. That is neither human, nor divine (or not
divine at all). Angelopolis possesses a huge potential to distribute
political roles without taking humanoids and post-humanoids into
the account. You probably think that the man sends an SMS, but
its the SMS that sends itself. Considering the growing level of the
standardization and stereotyping of these messages, its over-individ-
ual essence is getting more and more evident.
There really is a command center in Postpolitics, there are actors,
there are decisions, but they are totally dehumanized in Postmoder-
nity, they are beyond the frames of anthropology. We can fnd a cer-
tain proof of this hypothesis in traditional teachings, in traditional
eschatologies, which state that the End Times wont be triggered by
the human hand, that it will stand still prior to the fnal hour. The rest
will not depend on the man, that will be a war of angels, a war of
gods, a confrontation of entities, not tied by historical or economic
laws and patterns, which dont identify themselves with religions
or certain political elites. And this angelic war can be thought over
politically. That is Angelopolis, or Politische Angelologie, which I
bring forward as a concept, devoid of mysticism and esotericism,
which has the same sense and nature as Schmitts metaphor of po-
litical theology. Political angelology must be thought over as a
metaphor which is both scientifc and rational. Angelopolis is a
method to understand, to interpret and to make hermeneutical deci-
phering of the contemporary processes, which surround us and are
regarded as being alienated from the political anthropology, from
human as a specie, a politically institutionalized and constituted no-
tion.
CHAPTER 9. FOURTH POLITICAL PRACTICE
Having chosen this subject of a seminar I realized a very simple
plan. The plan is based on the following idea: if we have Fourth
Political Theory as some concept, set of concepts and theoretical
defnition, we should have the realization of this political theory be-
cause every theoretical construction either can be brought to life, or
cannot because of some circumstances.
So, I conceived of a rather simple and primitive idea if we theo-
rize and talk about the Fourth Political Theory, we should also think
about how it could be realized in practice. However, when I almost
had come around the necessity of enunciating some proposals on
realization of the Fourth Political Theory some halting happened.
It has happened because Fourth Political Theory strains to fnish up
with the political topography of Modernity and with all implicit hid-
den there dualistic models in accordance. Ive made a scheme repre-
senting the correlation between the theory and the practice in differ-
ent felds of knowledge: science, metaphysics, religion, philosophy,
technologies and common use. Ive got two columns concerning
Term 1 and Term 2. First column contains all that about theory,
and the other one is about practice range.

Field Term 1 Term 2
science theory (contemplation) practice
(things)
metaphysics principle manifestation
religion myth ritual
philosophy mentality activity
technology idea (project) realization (imple-
mentation)
common use thinking action
104 Alexander DUGIN
Of course, contemplation of these columns by itself can bring
us to some very interesting conclusions starting with the question
what is theory in the terms of science (i.e. contemplation, vision)
and what is praxis (the term, formed after greek pragma, i.e. ob-
ject, objectifcation, acting). When the problem of what is thing
(res, hereof reality) had been arised few years ago, the attempts
to come across the conterpart of this basic term in contemporary
philosophy led to the revelation that theres no acceptable adequa-
tion of this Latin word in Greek at all. There is a pragma as an
action and the act at the same time, it is an active object, but not
accomplished as we consider it to be. And there is an existent after
Aristotel, which is expounded as res in further Latin translations.
Therefore, there is no such a word thing in Greek and it is very
important, because it means that the concept of the reality is also
absent. Reality is formed on the base of res, reality is a property
of res, reality is (whose? what?) something referred to the thing,
thingness. Therefore, there are Greek words pragma, existent
and practice for Latin res. Pragma is the action and the object
at the same time.
It is very interesting: the whole Greek metaphysics evolves be-
tween theory as contemplation and action (praxis) keeping short
of severe Latin subjectivity, thingness hidden in the term of res.
If we amplify mentioned duality of the aforecited chart we would
come across Guenons model of priciple-manifestation. Notably
that manifestation here is more close to the practice, but not to the
something manifested; we can see the activity at the second term. If
we make some more further profounds in history and sociology of
religion we would come across functionalism and human sociology
of Malinovsky where mentioned division between myth and ritual
exists.
Lets remember original Greek defnition of myth: myth is some
story being told during the rithual. The duality of myth and ritual is
one of the basic items both in history of religion and social antropol-
ogy and it is extensively discussed. Then we go to philosophy and
we see mentalty-activity (this pair of terms is much alike theory-
105
Fourth Political Theory
practice) And fnally, technology is rather simple this is the dual-
ity of project and its realization.
So, we have two columns. If Fourth Political Theory expands the
frst column Term 1, then we should probably fnd some specify
concept in for the Fourth Political Practice to expand the column
Term 2 in accordance with it. If Fourth Political Theory was an
ideovariation or some combination of the elements of political theo-
ries of Modern, we should have done that strictly. I mean, if we
create additional concept made-up of the same elements and based
on the the same topograhy as political ideologies of Modern are, we
should talk about the column Term 2
And generally, it would be interesting to do that because talking
about semantic felds associated with Fourth Political Theory in con-
nection with column Term 2 could be very resourceful. But I leave
this problem for somebody else and suggest another way.
The point is in that fact, that if we talk about the very core of the
Fourth Political Theory and its fundamental problems we would
comprehend that the main idea of the Fourth Political Theory is to
wander off the dualism between the subject and the object, between
intention and realization and from the dual topography which phi-
losophy of Modern, science of Modern and politology of Modern
are based on.
It is no mere chance that we talk about Dasein as about the sub-
ject of political theory. Dasein is the instance, suggested and pro-
posed by Heidegger as an aspiration to overcome the subject-object
dualism that is an aspiration to fnd the root of ontology.
Lets remind that Heidegger mentioned the inzwischen, i.e.
between while talking about existence of Dasein. The principal
character of Dasein is being between. Dasein is inzwischen. We
shouldnt use the system of classical political dualism, the scientifc
topography of both New and Aristotles time while talking about
Fourth Political Theory and presuming that fact that the subject and
the core, the basic instance of the Fourth Political Theory pole is
Dasein
106 Alexander DUGIN
Talking about Fourth Political Practice we should act in another
way considering Heideggers critics of forming up non-fundamental
onthology, i.e. onthology as is. Heidegger said that if we want to
understand Dasein we should realize and form up fundamental on-
tology which would not lose contact with ontic roots of Dasein and
would not ascend or sublimate (sooner or later) to anything correlat-
ed with 2000years old (if we follow the way from Platon or even lat-
est Pre-Socratic philosophers up to Nietzsche) general philosophical
construction on which Modern time is based on.
We should centralize Dasein as the center and the pole of Fourth
Political Theory. What does it mean in the context of practice? It
means that we shouldnt qualify Dasein neither as theoretical con-
struction, nor as principle. Should we use it like a myth, like a nar-
rative? It may be so because it is much closer, but it should be care-
fully thought over. We shouldnt exactly use it like a mentality (at
least as onthologic mentality). We cannot exactly use it like idea or
anything concerning the subject.
Keeping this universal and pre-dualistic status of Dasein at Hei-
deggers philosophy in our mind I want to suggest to refer to some
root, to something that antecede this dualism to defne Fourth Po-
litical Practice. In other words wheres that something interesting,
what is the center of Fourth Political Practice? This is something
between the columns, between Term 1 and Term 2. But I dont
mean theirs combination or happy medium. Nothing at all. Happy
medium is a nonsense that we should keep away from. We should
not look for happy medium or compromise of column 1 and column
2 polarity, but we should fnd the root these pairs grow from, their
common root. From the point of Dasein analytics both subject and
object are ontological constructions, grown from between, inz-
wischen ontic.
So, we are interested in that kind of instance both theory and
practice appeared from, the instance where theory and practice are
not divided yet and, a fortiori, are not opposite. We are interested in
that kind of instance both principle and manifestation have common
root at (they can never have common root, not for a moment, and
107
Fourth Political Theory
that is the most interesting for us), that kind of instance myth and
rithual are not channeled off yet at and that kind of instance men-
tality and activity are common at, where idea means relization and
realization is idea, and where thinking and acting have one source.
We are interested in this very intermediate level not achieved by
horizontal attitude toward these pairs, but only by new non-horizon-
tal dimension. Unlike Hegelianism, Marxism, communicational the-
ory and whole modern structure in principle we are not interested in
anything upon the line between theory and practice. We are looking
for something that does not belong to horizontal subspace or to some
ratio confguration of the columns or to the line between theory and
practice. We are interested at something hidden under the theory and
practice, somewhere in their common root they both grow up from.
From this point of view the question of priority of either conscience
or matter during the Soviet period is absolutely idiotic. The priority
for us is the problem of the common root and we should grow Fourth
Political Theory and Practice from this root.
Having subtracted this instance as basic we can say that Fourth
Political Theory is the theory to the same degree as it is the practice
and it is the practice to the same degree as it is the theory.
In other words, if we can feel the between related with depth
over these two columns, if we can seize geometry of this political
vector (that is, of course, philosophical and metaphysical vector for
real) we will see that these two trees grow up from the same root.
If we fx on the subject of Fourth Political Theory, i.e. Dasein, or
what is inzwischen, we will understand that it does not belong to
the horizontal disposition between these two columns. Why do we
talk about roots but not head? This is very serious and deep moment
because we should realize the reduction. If we realize horizontal
reduction frst and we get unsatisfactory result, we will reach a con-
clusion to realize vertical reduction, to move towards ontic roots but
not ontological heights. So we should postpone such items as spirit
and divine dimension and move toward chaos and other vertical and
depth oriented items.
108 Alexander DUGIN
Nietzsche said The cognizer hesitantly step into the water not
when it is dirty but when it is shallow. According to that how can
we try to form a clear view of what Fourth Political Practice is? -
Having reversed the order of these two columns at least! We should
obtain practice as theory, take principle as manifestation, mentality
as activity and thinking as action. What is the Fourth Political Prac-
tice. It is a contemplation. What is the manifestation of the Fourth
Political Practice? It is a principle to be revealed. In what aspect the
myth is realized as a rithual? It becomes teurgical fact (lets recog-
nize that neoplatonic teurgy is vivifcation of the statues) What is
activity as mentality? It is a suggestion that thoughts are magic, that
thoughts can change the reality; it is a suggestion that thoughts re-
place reality by fact. Fourth Political Practice brings us to the nature
of charmed world, to the antithesis of Webbers metaphor in realiza-
tion of its technological aspect of the project. What the charmed
world is? It is a world where is no barrier between idea and realiza-
tion. It is a principle of magical attitude to the world itself based on
the idea that thinkable is the only one we come across with, and ev-
erything we come across is nothing more than a thought. What kind
of thought it is? Pure thought. The vehicle of Fourth Political Theory
and practice lives in a charmed world. What is mentactivity? It is a
trans-substance, spirit into body and body into spirit transformation
and it is the main problem of hermetism.
So, we came across that fact, that Fourth Political Practice isnt a
rough realization of Fourth Political Theory in some space suggest-
ed to be different to the space of Fourth Political Practice. There is
no more space, no more topos and even no more topology in Fourth
Political Practice besides theory; we had annihilated any other spac-
es before we stated, not in the consummation but in the very begin-
ning, before we started in a per-onthologic context. In other words,
we should not look forward (it will never be changed) or backward
if we really want to change that squalor we live in, because all that
crumbs that have made this ultimate form of degeneration possible
and existent have been appeared and stored there. These roots are
not mere chance. That scrap-heap we have manifested in is not acci-
109
Fourth Political Theory
dental and has a profound logic. Primordinal metaphysics, primordi-
nality is expressed in technics, modern and post-modern. According
to it the only way for real political struggle is appealing to the Fourth
Political Practice as to the roots, free from the evolutionary process
from the conception to the last point where we are now, because
either our political struggle is soteriological and eschatological or it
has no sense.
And the last one. Bring to notice, what does it look like: world
avoiding any duality? Of course, it looks like Postmodern, like virtu-
ality. Contemporary virtual wired world just says: this is not a theory
and not a practice, not a principle and not a manifestation, not a myth
and not a rithual, not a thought and not an action. Virtuality is just
a spoof on Fourth Political Theory and Practice. It is counterintui-
tive enough, but this postmodern reality is more close to us then all
previous topologies incl. theological and prototheological. Virtual-
ity is closer to that very unique model of Fourth Political Theory and
Practice than any other element. And according to that we can raise
the question how does our traditionalism or new metaphysics relate
to Postmodern. I consider them to be very close. Virtuality tries to
mix semantic felds of columns on the horisontal level up to the in-
distinguishability. We can say that Deleuzes rhizome is postmodern
and postsrtucturalism spoof of Heideggers Dasein. They are alike
and they are described with the same words very often. But pay your
attention to the fact how does Postmodernism solve the problem of
reversing the columns order. It solves the problem by the appealing
to the surface and it is the main idea we see at Deleuzes. Remem-
ber his interpretation of Artauds body without organs, his inter-
pretation of destruction necessity, structure fattening and his inter-
preation of mans epidermic coat (the skin) as a basis for the screen
where image is projected on. It is a point of spoof where Fourth
Political Theory and Postmoren meet each other. If columns mix
horizontaly some demetia appears, that means madness. We can use
the thesis that Homo Integros, i.e. complete integral man consists
of Homo Sapiens and Homo Demens. Deleuze says: Free Homo
Demens!. He says that madness should escape from under Homo
110 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
Sapiens and realize the transgression between these two columns in
political sphere. Here comes desire machine, here comes rhizom-
atic process, ionic and chrionical temporality ideas. This Postmod-
ern dementia much alike Fourth Political Theory differs from it only
with its principle horizontality and fatness.
So, the main problem of Postmodern is eliminating of any verti-
cal orientation both height and depth. Finally I want to say that the
end of times and Eschatological meaning of politics wouldnt realize
on their own, we wait for the end for vain. The end will never come
if we wait for it and it will nerer come if we dont. It is essential be-
cause history, time and reality have special strategies to avoid Judge-
ment Day, or, rather they have a special strategy of a reversionary
maneuvere that will make an impression that everybody have taken
a grip over themselves, have realized and have understood. This is
a huge arsenal of so-called after Heidegger Noch Nicht. Eternal
not yet.. If Fourth Political Practice will not be anle to realize the
end of times it would be invalid. The end of days should be made, it
will not come by itself, this is a task, it is not entity, it is active meta-
physics, it is a practice. And it can be high-potential and rational
solution of enigmatic layers, discovered while talking about Fourth
Political Practice.
CHAPTER 10. GENDER IN THE FOURTH
POLITICAL THEORY
To begin with lets analyse, what gender tenet is characteristic for
three political theories of the Modern. If we attentively look at with
what standard fgure operates both a socialism, and liberalism, and
nationalism, and to a large extent the various forms of what is called
a third political theory fascism, national socialism - we will notice
some feature which makes specifcity of classical understanding of
a gender in all political theories of the Modern. On the one hand,
it is not originality of the Modern, because Modern follows here
the traditional European society (even Pre-Modernistic, Christian),
which was primarily patriarchal. Even before Christianity, it was
also patriarchal, till those immemorial times which were studied in
the Mediterranean by Bachofen in his Mother Right (Johann Ba-
chofen, Das Mutterrecht). In other words, behind Modern, behind
Moderns gender is Western or global patriarchy. This patriarchy has
infuenced gender structure of Modern and political understanding
of gender in Modern. But in fact, that patriarchy has undergone cer-
tain modifcations in the fnal formulation of gender norms in the
political theories of the Modern.
Note that it is accepted to name a gender a sociological gen-
der, gender as a social phenomenon. In contrast to the anatomical
sex inherent in an animal, the gender is a social convention which
can change from a society to a society. At the same time, the politi-
cal gender - it is the social norm, which is approved as an impera-
tive on the basis of political power. Thus, in archaic societies, only
who undergo the initiation can be regarded as a man, otherwise he
has no social sex, i.e. a gender, and is deprived mans social func-
tions (marriage, participation in hunting and ritual). Depending on
112 Alexander DUGIN
a society requirements gender tenets change. For example, in some
slaveholding societies slaves werent identifed with men, they wore
womens clothes. Slaves were used as women because they did not
have the social status of men. Hence the phenomenon of castration
- deprivation of physical attributes of men on a par with the social.
Therefore, gender - it is a social phenomenon and a political one. Po-
litical, because we are dealing with the management of social norms,
regulated by a society: community, police, the retreat from which
leads to a variety of sanctions.
For the three political theories of the Modern ask the question:
Who is the political person, what is the political gender? First, the
person is the man. While from the sociological point of view, the
woman became the person more recently, and till now sharply raises
the question of the womens political rights. From the viewpoint of
Modern, a woman - not the person, not a human being. The person
can be a man only, but not every man, and a special social man. The
characteristics of a real man: the availability of money, wealth (until
the end of the 19th century in Europe, the property requirements was
necessary attribute of citizenship, ie, a political gender), rationalism
/ reasonableness (thrift), city dweller (the peasant was not consid-
ered mature in the socio-political signifcance). Thus, on elections in
the frst State Duma in 1905, the voice of one townsman was equal
to 100 peasants voices. In a Modern peasant - it is not quite person.
Another characteristic - maturity, age. These socio-professional and
age categories are included in concepts of a gender and gender func-
tions. The last characteristic is also a man belonging to European
civilization, or white skin color. Taken together, this is a political
man, lhome politique, from an anthropological point of view.
Such gender tenet is an axis for all three political ideologies of
the Modern. However, within these ideologies there are differences
in relation to this fgure of the man. The most male-affrming is
the theory of liberalism, as considers this fgure of the rational, rich,
adult white man as the norm and as a natural phenomenon. Liberal-
ism canonize this gender and standardize it, trying to eternize this
bourgeois social system, typical of 18-19 cc. Liberalism ascertains
113
Fourth Political Theory
factuality of this gender and projects it on the future: The mod-
ern world is constructed by men, conceived and anticipated by men,
and will belong to men, homo economicus, homo faber. Such un-
derstanding of a gender is undergoing changes with time: the area
of gender men increases, the standard archetype begins to involve
the peasants, the poor, women, and then the non-white. How does
this mechanism is the case of women? To women regulatory proper-
ties of man start to be attributed: business lady is a woman who
manifests male quality, female - citizen, a woman - white. Thus, the
woman starts to be thought as the man. So, liberal feminism, or as-
piration to give women freedom means to identifed a woman with
a man and equalize them sociopolitically, that is, represent social a
woman as a man. The same procedure is to represent the peasant as
city dweller, non-white as white, poor as rich, stupid as reasonable.
A woman who sits behind the wheel is a man or a caricature of a
man. However, as though liberalism didnt expand the infuence, in
gender sense it remains adhered to its own archetype.
The second political theory starts with the same position that
gender - is a bourgeois political man. But while this situation is criti-
cized, and expressed the need to change this setting. From here there
is an idea of total equality, including gender. The concept of gender
equality of the second political theory qualitatively differs from un-
derstanding of equality in the frst political theory. The feminism,
or gender egalitarianism of Marxism believes that both men and
women who will be engaged in Marxist ideology, as a matter of fact,
cease to be men and women who constitute standard and imperative
gender pair of liberalism. That is, we see a desire to move beyond
gender in bourgeois interpretation. In fact, the man here loses the ra-
tionality. So, the Hungarian Neo-Marxist philosopher Georg Lukcs
said that the proletariat is in whom the subject and object are the
same. Proceeding from such formulation, consistent Marxists call
for the insanity, to a schizophrenia, to schizo-revolutionary (De-
leuze). They rely on urban poor, the proletarians, who could never
become full-fedged bourgeois, they turn to non-white urban strata,
however, ignore the country, seeing it through the prism of bour-
114 Alexander DUGIN
geois perception. But on the whole, in the gender policy of commu-
nists we see a new tendency: they recognize the gender status quo
and offer to change it under the banner of the matter. This means
the transgression of bourgeois man in downward direction and the
appeal to the material substance (literally what stands below --
sub-stare), to the undifferentiated realm of the work, where there is
no qualitative difference between the good cooking woman
1
, the
sailor or the masculine hero. Marxists offer even lower down, where
nothing is left of gender hierarchies and strategies. Thus, in the most
extreme Marxist ideas have a desire to destroy the bourgeois arche-
type. In reality, however, was different: in Stalins Russia this mans
archetype, the rational, domineering man, despite attempts to recre-
ate gender Marxist equality right after revolution of 1917 has pre-
vailed. But the idea of overcoming of the man through the reference
to a body, to the desiring-machine, is characteristic for Marxism.
The fascism accepts known model of townspeople, white, Eu-
ropean, reasonable, wealthy man, and exalting it. If liberalism ac-
cepts this model as the norm, that fascism begins to fll a man with
additional properties. He should be not simply white and the Nordic
white, not just reasonable, but the unique reasonable (in the form of
that only Germans possess rationality). This is similar to the position
of Lvy-Brhl, who postulated that only the Europeans have a logos,
and the others guided by pre-logical social structures. Further, the
masculinity exalted, and women were urge to be engaged in kinder,
kirchen, kchen. On periphery other gender tenets were offered also:
for example, Julius Evola and his The Metaphysics of Sex, where
it is a question of the superiority of masculine over feminine, argues
that the fact that the men are dormant potential Gods, and women
are dormant potential Goddesses, but standing a little lower in the
hierarchy of the sexes. Also for the third political theory should be
mentioned marginal direction associated with the Nordic matriar-
chy: there was an ontology of the feminine. Herman Wirth, a dis-
1
V.Lenin said once: Under socialism any good cooking woman could with
the same ease rule a state.
115
Fourth Political Theory
ciple of Bachofen, argued that the supreme being is a woman, but
woman is completely different from men, a woman in her ontology,
weisse Frau. However, in the third political theory an image created
by as far back as liberalism remained as a mainstream.
The Fourth Political Theory represents aspiration to overcoming
of three political theories. In this case, what is its gender strategy,
its imperatives? First of all, the Fourth Political Theory puts outside
the brackets the man, i.e. that man with which gender installations
we have got acquainted in the Modern. To such last man the Fourth
Political Theory doesnt address, as he represents the closed arche-
type of the Modern. Outside of space of a gender of the Modern
the Fourth Political Theory gropes contours of its man. If we see
reason, wealth, responsibility, city, white skin color, we took out a
gun and shoot. This man must die, he doesnt have chance to survive
as he is closed at the Moderns historical deadlock, he reproduces
the small hierarchies and can not go beyond his own borders. Such
man is immortal, in the self-refection he creates permanent realities,
the mirrors looking in mirrors. The same goes for all those whom
the man of the Modern has included: a business-woman, children,
non-white.
Positive attribute of man, beyond the paradigm of Modern: non-
adult. The subject of the Fourth Political Theory is a non-adult male.
For example, Le Grand Jeu (the name of the literary group close
to surrealism) of Gilbert-Lecomte and Ren Daumal who offered to
build life without maturing to remain playing children. This can be
considered as an invitation to develop gender tenets of the Fourth
Political Theory, system of esthetic and political philosophy. Under
the non-white man meant the world pre-logical systems of Lvy-
Brhl, where the logos is not the only means of social organization.
Here we draw from Lvi-Strauss, social anthropology, ethnosoci-
ology, that is, from the analysis of experience of many non-white
societies. Further, the madness: its all forms of intellectual trans-
gression, the practice of voluntary insanity from Friedrich Hlderlin
and Nietzsche to Bataille, Artaud. Madness is a gender arsenal of
the Fourth Political Theory. In general, non-white, insane, not city
116 Alexander DUGIN
or entered in a landscape. For example, the ecologist, the representa-
tive of a community, that is, the person who not broke with the na-
ture, Redfeld with his The Folk Society. Thus, we create a search
entourage, woven of those elements that are ignored by the Modern.
These elements make a huge feld of existence and the metaphysics,
a feld of the intensive being of the Fourth Political Theory. Supple-
menting the Fourth Political Theory, we should refuse all gender
tenets, which a liberalism carries in itself. In gender sense from the
second political theory it would be possible to borrow idea of the
desiring-machine, idea of overcoming of the man through global
egalitarianism within the limits of a matter. From classical fascist
gender model of the third political theory, as well as liberalism, there
is nothing to learn, while the marginal areas may be of great interest,
namely sex ontologization (Evola), Nordic matriarchy.
What is the subject of the Fourth Political Theory? The subject
of the Fourth Political Theory is Dasein or Zwischen, the between
in the space between the subject and object which it is possible to
identify with the traject of Gilbert Durand. And here Dasein, traject,
limaginaire, whether it has a sex? And what is the gender of Das-
ein? Lets describe a normative and imperative gender of the Fourth
Political Theory. A gender of the Fourth Political Theory same as a
sex of Dasein, that is, we have explained one unknown through an-
other. Dasein somehow can be sexualized, but that sex which it has,
cant be neither mans, nor female in gender sense. Perhaps, it makes
sense to speak about androgyne? The Fourth Political Theory may
be addressed to the androgynous being, and its gender is androgi-
nat? Maybe, but only if to not project on the androgynous obviously
split models of sexes as a halfs. Sex, according to Plato, is that is
follows unity division. But also traject which, on Durand, is between
the subject and object and it is primary in relation to them, and Das-
ein which, on Heidegger, is in Zwischen, on border between internal
and external, constitutes the fnding on border existentiells which
belong to the sphere previous division. And limaginaire in itself
contains division (Greek. ), as one of its possible regimes.
So, if we understand androginat in this way, not as something that
117
Fourth Political Theory
is composite, but as something rooted or radical, then we can talk
about a radical feld, which is not sex in the sense that it is half of
what else. That is it is that half, that sex which is simultaneously the
whole and doesnt need its antithesis, as self-suffcient within itself.
About this gender we can get an idea is not so much from an analysis
of sexual or gender archetypes, but because of thinking (philosophi-
cal, political) on the subject of the Fourth Political Theory. Thus,
we change the formulation of the question, we do not ask what kind
is a sex of Dasein, we answer that the gender of the subject of the
Fourth Political Theory is the same as that of Dasein. In this case,
we can also talk about the radical (root from the Latin. Radicula)
androginate, which exists not by addition of the men and women,
and represents the primordial unity.
How the gender in the conditions of the Postmodern changes?
The Postmodern represents a combination of all three political theo-
ries. On the one hand, this is an accomplished Modern, which has
reached the logic end as hypermodern (or ultramodern). Thus,
all three political theories projected on Postmodern their gender ar-
chetypes, which represents the limits of their own strucrures. It is
expressed in an institutionalization of a gender of the Postmodern.
What is the Postmodern gender? It is a maximization of liberal men,
the archetype of which applies to all of its antithesis: the stupid, the
poor, not white, little. It also is the gender of globalization, when
properties of certain type extend as social standards on all other
types. Hence the idea that the proletarians are the bourgeoises who
have not grown rich yet, black are not modernized white, women
are not fully liberated men. That is, we see that this all-consuming
archetype becomes meaningless. The reextension of gender sexual
models can lead to that the hypermodern will explode like rotting
fungus and a gender archetype will fail. Now we are in the moment
of a reextension and fnal break of a gender. Stages of this break are
feminism, homosexuality, sex-change operations.
The second political theory in the West had a great infuence on
the elites, the creative professions (actors, philosophical). This is a
the desiring-machine, left feminism with its ideas of freedom from
118 Alexander DUGIN
the sex (Donna Haraway - feminist, rather loosely a neo-Marxist and
a postmodernist). In the words of Donna Haraway, as a woman
liberate, it in the best case would be a man, and all. Therefore it
is necessary to overcome both the man, and the woman - through
a cyborg. According to her, the sex can be overcome, only having
overcome the person. One more way: Foucault and his concept of
sexuality, that is, sexuality prior to the sex, as a neutral disposi-
tifs, sexuality, spreading along the surface of the screen, the Body
without Organs (a concept adopted by Deleuze from Artaud). This
pansexuality, which is a smooth surface of sexual arousals of un-
clear whom, for what reason, and most importantly - no matter what
orientation & direction. As a whole, to erosion, to destruction of a
gender of the Modern, the Marxist thought introduces the consider-
able contribution. Elements of fascism in Postmodern are represent-
ed by the practice of BDSM. Moreover, contemporary fascism - that
is sado-maso, and perverted fascism comes to Postmodernism as an
essential attribute, along with feminism, cyborg, a Body without
Organs, etc.
Eventually we found ourselves in an interesting situation: the
predominant gender of Modern is exposed to a reextension, erosion
and, in some sense, is about to explode, or perhaps has already ex-
ploded. We stand on transition between a hypermodern and the Post-
modern, and we dont know, where the truth, and where the reality.
So, in a postmodern gender will not be any men. Let us imagine this
situation: the archetype of male fies into pieces, which do not con-
stitute parts of the whole anymore, but symbolize only themselves.
Conservative forces can stand up for this archetype, demand to re-
turn the man, this reasonable, wealthy white person, but, thereby,
they only try to continue the Modern. This position seems hopeless,
here again the Fourth Political Theory, in our opinion, goes forward.
We suggest to take a step towards gender that belongs to Dasein,
without notorious representations that we will receive. Going be-
yond the limits a gender which we know, we get to the domain of
uncertainty, androgyny, sex of angels. In the same sphere it is neces-
sary to search for a gender of the Fourth Political Theory, namely in
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Fourth Political Theory
sphere of as much as possible absolute risk behind a limit of the col-
lapsed chimera of the Modern. We can outline only lines: we know
that it is gender of Dasein, traject, that this gender represents a root
reality, that it belongs to limaginaire. By extending the chain of our
refections, we can raise the question about a gender of the Radical
Self, which is beyond the basic paradigms.
CHAPTER 11. CONSERVATISM
AND POST-MODERNITY
We are in postmodernity
A process that has a really global nature is the process of pre-
vailed Modernity turning into Postmodernity. There are centres,
seats, locuses, regions, where this process goes by logically and se-
quentially. These centres are the West, the Western Europe and espe-
cially the USA. The US had a historical opportunity to create in the
laboratory conditions an optimal Modern society on the ground of
principles that were developed by occidental thought. It was an op-
portunity to create a society by turning over a new leaf, without bur-
dening european traditions, starting from scratch (American indians,
as is known, were not referred to people). In the work Empire
1
by
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri it is shown that american constitu-
tion initially regarded negroes as second-rate people and American
indians were not regarded as people at all. Thereby, a specifc ameri-
can system has been an ideal place for implementation the maximum
of liberty but only for whites and at the expense of defned exclu-
sion of all others. Anyway, the United States of America are in the
vanguard of liberty and the locomotive of moving to postmodernity.
The pole of liberty and the liberty of channel choosing
Weve spoken about a pole that west european civilization ap-
pears to be but in the space of thought, in philosophy, in geography
of human spirit the pole of the unipolar world is something differ-
ent than the USA or Europe as simply geopolitical formations. It is
1
Hardt M, Negri A, Empire, Moscow, 2004
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Fourth Political Theory
exactly the idea of maximum liberty. A movement to achievement
of this liberty is the meaning of human history in the understanding
of west european humanity. The west european society succeded in
imposing this understanding of the meaning of history on all the
other humanity.
Thus, there is a pole of unipolar world the pole of liberty that
came from Modernity and now is coming to a new stage, to Postmo-
dernity, where a man starts to free himself from himself. Because he
is an obstacle in the way of himself, he disturbs and bothers himself.
A man falls to individual schizomasses as it has been depicted by
Deleuze in Anti-Oedipus.
People have become the contemplators of television, they have
learned how to switch channels better and faster. Many of them
dont stop at all, they click the remote control and its already not
important what is on TV is it actors or news. The spectators of
Postmodernity dont understand anything at all in principle of what
is going on. Its just a stream of impressive pictures. The specta-
tor gets used to microprocesses, he becomes a subspectator that
watches not the channels or programmes but separate segments, the
sequences of programs. In this case the ideal movie is Spy Kids 2
by Rodriguez. It is made up like there is no any sense. But it is possi-
ble to be distracted from this fact because as soon as our conscious-
ness is bothered with it, at the same instant appears a fying pig and
we are bounded to watch where is it fying. And likewise when the
fying pig bothers us the next moment a little dragon comes out from
a pocket of the main character. This work of Rodriguez is perfect.
Roughly the same effect reaches a person that tirelessly clicks a re-
mote control all the time. The only channel that works in the other
rhythm is the Culture (Russian channel) because there are still
some unhurried stories about composers, art workers, students, the-
atres the remains of Modernity. If you take it from the list, you
can go on calmly switching the channels and not expecting to meet
something that is shown not in the rhythm that is necessary to live
in.
122 Alexander DUGIN
Paradoxes of liberty
So, Postmodernity is coming. What can resist it? Is it possible to
say it no? This is a question of principle.
By the way, on the assumption of the same liberal proposition
about a statement that a man is free, it is implied that he is always
able to say no to whatever he wants. This is the most danger-
ous moment of the philosophy of liberty that starts to withdraw the
freedom to say no under the auspices of absolutization of liberty.
West european model says: do you want to resist us? Please, youve
got a right, but you cannot uninvent a shearing machine, do you?
A shearing machine is the absolute argument of progress defenders.
Everybody wants to have a shearing machine negroes, american
indians, conservatives, the orthodoxes. By other logic communists
also said that socialism would come after the capitalism. Socialism
has come but we hadnt had capitalism plainly. It has been for a little
time, it has destroyed many people and disappeared. The same thing
is about the shearing machine. If you think about the metaphysics
of a shearing machine, how much it is joined with the real values of
the philosophy system, you can come to a conclusion that in general
a human life is possible without a shearing machine and could be
fully happy.
But for a liberal society it is a scary thing, almost a sacrilege.
Everything could be understood but a life without a shearing ma-
chine? This is a real unscientifc statement: a life without a shearing
machine is impossible. Theres no life. Life is a shearing machine.
This is the power of liberal argument on stream that turns out with
its totalitarian side. In a liberation there is always an element of con-
straint this is the paradox of liberty. At least it is a constraint to
think that liberty is the supreme value. Imagine that a man says:
liberty is the supreme value. The other man objects: nothing
of the kind. Then the frst answers: Are you against the liberty? I
will kill for the liberty.
The idea that there could not be any alternative to it lays in the
liberalism. And there is some truth in it. If logos stands in the way
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Fourth Political Theory
of liberty, if the social logos got mixed up in the adventure of total
liberation, where had been the frst push in this way? It should be
searched not in the time when Descartes, Nietzsche or XX century
came but somewhere in pre-socratic philosophy. Heidegger has seen
this moment in the concept of physis and in the suffcient disclo-
sure of Platos study of ideas. But the other thing is important the
movement of logos to the liberty is nonrandom and yet it is possible
to say it no.
Conservatism as a rejection of the logic of history
Yet there is still an ontological opportunity to say no. Here sets
in conservatism.
First of all, what is conservatism? It is no said to everything
all around. In the name of what? In the name of something that was
earlier. In the name of something that was overcome during the so-
cio-political history. Conservatism means stranding an ontological,
philosophical, socio-political, individual, moral, religious, cultural,
scientifc position that denies the course of things that we are dealing
with now, that we had identifed and described earlier.
Now we will talk about conservatism and about how it is possible
to deny the logic of history leading to Modernity and Postmodernity
by basing on specifc socio-philosophical topic. We take the Early
modern period with its linear vector of progress and its postmodern
bend taking us away into the labyrinths of dispersion of individuals
reality in the rhizomatic subject or postsubject. We can include here
even earlier stages that made this trend possible and predominant.
Conservatism builds its position by opposing to the logic of devel-
opment of historical process. An argument in this opposition is a
phenomenology of Modernity and nowadays Postmodernity that
conservatism use to push from. But conservatism as a structure is
not reduced to contestation of phenomena. Negatively evaluated
phenomenology is nothing more than pretence. Conservatism builds
a topic, a negating topic, a work and a direction of historical time.
124 Alexander DUGIN
Conservatism is able to construct its opposition to historical time
differently. It has three fundamental opportunities of using the con-
ceptual trend Modernity-Postmodernity. This is where starts a sys-
tematization without any preferences because what is at issue is a
scientifc not valuation judgement.
Fundamental conservatism: traditionalism.
First approach is so-called traditionalism. Conservatism can well
be traditionalism. Some politological patterns differentiate tradition-
alism and conservatism as in Mannheims theory, for example. Yet
an urge towards leaving everything the same like it was in a tradi-
tional society, saving its lifestyle, is undoubtedly conservatism.
The most logical traditionalism - substantial, philosophical, on-
tological and conceptual is the one that criticizes not various sides
of Modernity or Postmodernity but denies fundamental vector of
historical progress, that is per se opposes the time. Traditionalism
is the form of conservatism that affrms: the separate moments that
arouse our rejection are not bad, everything that is modern is bad.
The idea of progress is bad, the idea of technical development is
bad, the philosophy of subject and object of Descartes is bad, the
Newton metaphor of watchmaker is bad, modern positive science,
education and pedagogy based on it are bad. This episteme, - says
the conservator-traditionalist further, - does not do at all. This is a
totalitarian, false, negative episteme that we should fght with. And
next, if to continue his thought: I like only what had been before
the beginning of Modernity. It is possible to go further and subject
to criticism those tendencies that made possible the emergence of
Modernity in the traditional society. Right up to emerging an idea
of linear time.
When monarchies fell down and church was separated from
state, when all socio-political, cultural and historical peoples picked
up the baton of Modernity, such traditionalist conservatism was
considered to be non-existent. In Russia it was brought down by
militant atheists. As it was considered to be fully eliminated it was
125
Fourth Political Theory
stopped being talked about, no more social groups standed for it and
soon it disappeared even from some politological reconstructions
(Mannheim). That is why we dont see the conservatism and dont
start from it. And we shouldnt. If we want to trace back a genealogy
of conservatism and build a complete topic of conservative posi-
tions, we should study exactly such an approach on a priority basis.
In the traditionalism we have a full-fedged and the most complete
complex of conservative attitude to history, society, world.
In the XX century, when it seemed to be that for such conserva-
tism there had been left no social platform, suddenly appeared an
entire pleiad of thinkers, philosophers, that started to defend this
traditionalist position as if nothing had happened. It was defended
radically, sequentially and persistenly that was inconceivable in XIX
or XVIII centuries. Those thinkers are: Ren Gunon, Julius Evola,
Titus Burckhardt, Leopold Ziegler and all those who are called tra-
ditionalists in the narrow sense of a word. It is signifcant that in
XIX century when there were monarchies and churches, when the
Pope had made some decisions, there were no people with such radi-
cal opinions. Traditionalists suggested a programme of fundamental
conservatism when Tradition was not going well at all. Thus, funda-
mental conservatism could develop into philosophical, political and
ideological model when Modernity had almost conquered all of the
positions but not when it was in a process of conquering and when
it was being stuggled against by specifc political and social forces.
In XX century a number of politologists attempted to identify or
to attribute the phenomenon of fundamental traditionalism with fas-
cism. Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, the authors of The Morn-
ing of the Magicians
1
wrote: fascism is guenonism plus such divi-
sions. Of course this is absolutely wrong. We spoke that fascism
is rather philosophy of Modernity that was affected by elements of
traditional society to a considerable degree but it does not act nei-
ther against Modernity nor against time. Moreover, both Gunon
and Evola rigidly criticised fascism.
1
Pauwels Louis. Jacques Bergier. The Morning of the Magicians. Moscow,
2008.
126 Alexander DUGIN
Gunon and Evola gave in their works an exhaustive description
of fundamental-conservative position. They have described a tradi-
tional society as a timeless ideal and modern world (Modernity) and
its main principles as a result of decay, degradation, degeneration,
blending of castes, decay of hierarchy, carrying over the attention
from spiritual to material, from celestial to terrestrial, from eternal
to transient etc. Traditionalists positions are notable for blameless
symmetry and a large scale. Their theories can serve as a model of
conservative paradigm in its pure form.
Of course some of their assessments and prognoses turned out to
be wrong. In particular, both of them anticipated the victory of the
fourth caste that is proletariat (USSR) over the third caste (capi-
talist camp) which proved to be wrong. They disputed communism
not quite understanding how much traditional elements it had. Some
of their assessments need to be corrected. At one of the congresses
in Rome dedicated to the 20
th
anniversary of Evolas obituary I gave
a lecture Evola visto da sinistra (Evola a view from the left)
where I suggested to have a look at Evola from the left positions
(though he considered himself to be right, even the extreme right).
Fundamental conservatives today
In our society we also have fundamental-conservatism. Firstly,
the islamic project is fundamental-conservatism. If you detach
it from negative publicity, it will be possible to see how in theory
should feel and think muslims struggling against modern world and
that they stand for the position of fundamental conservatives. They
ought to believe every word of the Koran ignoring any comments
from tolerance preachers that blame their views fnding it cruel and
obsolete. If a fundamentalist meets such a commentator on a tv, he
arrives at a conclusion: the tv must be thrown out with the com-
mentator.
In the US there are also movements of this kind among funda-
mentalist protestant groups. Strange as it may seem, considerable
percentage of Republican party electorate of the US holds roughly
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Fourth Political Theory
the same views. Millions of tv viewers in the USA watch tv shows
with these protestant fundamentalists who criticize everything of
Modernity and Postmodernity from a protestant perspective razing
it to the ground. There are crowds of televangelists like Jerry Falwell
Sr. who criticize in medias res all of the foundings of the modern
world and interpret all of the events from a protestant version of
chiristianity.
Such people can be found both in orthodox and catholic environ-
ment. They negate Modernity structurally and completely consider-
ing religious prescriptions as absolutely topical and Modernity with
its values as an expression of a kingdom of antichrist where nothing
good can exist. These tendencies are widespread among russian old
believers. Paraklitovo Soglasiye (one of old believers trend) on
Ural refuses to use light bulbs so far. Light bulbs are light of Lu-
cifer, thats why they use only the light of a splinter and candles.
Sometimes it reaches very profound penetration into the essence
of things. One of old believers authors claims: who drinks coffee,
will be attacked by evil coff, and God will be in despair of who
drinks tea (untranslatable pun: coffee and coff, tea and be in
despair sounds alike in russian). Others claim that it is not allowed
to eat a buckwheat kasha (boiled buckwheat) because it is sinful (in
russian words buckwheat and sinful sounds alike). Grechnevaya,
greshnevaya therefore greshnaya (buckwheat therefore
sinful).
Coffee was strongly prohibited. This may sound silly. But silly
for whom? For the modern rational people. Coff lukavij (evil
coff) is silly indeed. But imagine that in the world of fundamen-
tal conservatives there could be found a place for the evil coff.
Some kind of old believers congress can be dedicated to evil coff.
There will be defned to which sort of demons it belongs. In XVIII
century there were shtanniye sobori (pants councils). When a
group of old believers young people picked up a habit of wear-
ing checked pants, fedoseyans assembled a council in Kimry that
is sometimes called pants council. There was discussed whether
those who wears checked pants should be isolated from communica-
128 Alexander DUGIN
tion because at those times it seemed to be indecent to wear checked
pants for a christian. A part of councillors voted for isolation and
the other not to. These searches are not that ridiculous indeed. Old
believers look retarded for us but they are not so. They are dif-
ferent, they act within other topic. They deny time and progress as
well. Time for them is regress and people of Modernity are victims
of evil obsession.
Here we can give Claude Lvi-Strauss ideas
1
. He proves that
initial logic that Lvy-Bruhl and scientists-evolutionists studying
primitives talked about does not exist. A society of aborigines or
a structure of indians myths are as much complex in their rational
relations, taxonomy of enumerated and compared objects, and as
dramatic as cultural forms known to contemporary europeans. It is
just different. We deal not with initial logos but with other lo-
gos where a system of relations, nuances, recognitions, diversities,
building models works in the other system of hypotheses. But in its
complexity and main setting of structure (hence the structuralism)
it is absolutely comparable with consciousness, thinking and social
models of socialization and adaptaion of developed peoples.
In the fundamental conservatism a renunciation of Modernity has
absolutely rational and organic form. If we accept this point of view,
we will see that everything perfectly fts, everything is logical, ratio-
nal but it is other logos. This is logos in which space there is evil
coff, pants council, Paraklitovo soglasiye living with splinters
everything that evoke a contemptuous smile of a modern man,
does not evoke any smile. This is a totally different mode.
Conservatism status quo liberal conservatism
There is a second type of conservatism that weve called con-
servatism status quo or liberal conservatism. It is liberal because
it says yes to a main trend fulflling in Modernity. But at every
stage of this fulflling trend it tries to slow down: lets make it more
slowly, not now, lets postpone it.
1
Levi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow. 1983.
129
Fourth Political Theory
Liberal conservative argues like this: its good that there is a free
individual but free postindividuum is too much. Or a question of
the end of history. At frst, Fukuyama thought that politics have
disappeared and it is just about to be replaced with global mar-
ket6, where there will be no nations, states, ethnoses, cultures and
religions. But then he decided that it would be better to slow down a
bit and implement Postmodernity more calmly, without revolutions.
Because revolutions could be accompanied with something undesir-
able that can foil a plan of the end of history. So Fukuyama began
to write that it is necessary to strengthen the nation states for a time
this is liberal conservatism.
Liberal conservatives dont like lefts. They dont like rights as
Evola and Gunon as well. They take no notice of the rights but
when they see lefts, they stand up.
Liberal conservatism is notable for the following qualitative
structural characteristics a consent with a general trend of Mo-
dernity but a disagreement with its most vanguard manifestations
that seem to be too dangerous and too harmful. For example, at frst,
an english philosopher Edmund Burke was in sympathy with the
Enlightment but after the French Revolution he rejected it and de-
veloped a liberal conservative theory with a frontal criticism of a
revolution and the lefts. Hence it appears liberal conservative pro-
gramme: defending liberties, rights, a human independence, prog-
ress and equality with a help of other means evolution but not
revolution. This is for not letting out from some basement the dor-
mant energies that had spilled over into the terror in the jacobinism
and then into antiterror and so on.
Thereby, liberal conservatism does not dispute the tendencies
that are the essence of Modernity and even Postmodernity on prin-
ciple. Though liberal conservatives in the face of Postmodernity will
push the brake pedals more often than before. They can even scream
at some moment: stop! Seeing what Postmodernity is bringing and
looking hard on the rhizome of Deleuze they feel being in the wrong
box. In addition, they fear that an accelerated dismantling of Mo-
130 Alexander DUGIN
dernity disappointing in Postmodernity can free the Pre-modernity.
This is what they write about frankly.
For example, the liberal Habermas
1
, once the left, says that if we
dont save a hard spirit of the Enlightment now, a fdelity to the ide-
als of a free subject, a moral liberation, if we dont hold the human-
ity on the verge, not only will we fall down into chaos but we will
come back into the shadow of tradition the meaning of struggling
with is the Modernity itself. In other words, he fears that funda-
mental conservatives will come.
Bin Laden as a symbol
A fgure of bin Laden, whether he exists in reality or he was in-
vented in Hollywood, has a fundamental philosophical signifcance.
It is a perspective of transition from Postmodernity to Premodernity
flled with grotesque. It is a sinister warning that Premodernity (Tra-
dition) as a faith in the values that have been piled and brought to
junkyard at the very beginning of Modernity can get up and come to
the surface. The face of bin Laden, his gestures and appearance on
our screens and in fashion magazines it is a philosophical sign. It
is a sign of warning to humanity from liberal conservatives.
Simulacrum of Che Guevara.
Usually liberal conservatives dont do an analysis of liberalism
and communism correlation that weve done and so they continue to
fear of communism. We have already said that events of 1991 the
end of USSR have enormous philosophical and historical signif-
cance that has few analogues. There are only several events like this
in the history because in 1991 liberalism proved its exceptional right
for orthodox legacy to a paradigm of Modernity. All the other ver-
sions and above all, communism turned out to be the deviations
in the way of Modernity, the branchings leading to another aim.
Communists thought that they were going on the road of Modernity
1
Habermas J. Modernity: An Unfnished Project? 1992
131
Fourth Political Theory
in a direction of progress but as it became clear they were going to
some other aim that was located in the other conceptual space. But
some liberals do believe today that communists lost ground just
temporarily and can return.
Extrapolating wrong fears, contemporary anticommunism cre-
ates chimeras, ghosts, simulacra to an even greater degree than con-
temporary antifascism. There is no communism (as theres no fas-
cism for a long time) istead there is still a grotesque replica, a safe
Che Guevara advertising mobile phones or adorning with himself
the t-shirts of idle and comfort petty bourgeois boys and girls. In the
age of Modernity Che Guevara is an enemy of capitalism. In the age
of Postmodernity he is on giant billboards advertising mobile com-
munication. This is a look of the communism that may return the
look of simulacrum. A meaning of this publicity gesture consists in
postmodern mock of communism claims to alternative logos within
the bounds of Modernity.
Yet liberal conservatism as a rule is alien to this irony and is not
inclined to make fun of red or brown. The reason of it is that
liberal conservatism fears of relativization of logos in Postmoder-
nity while being uncertain that the enemy is completely destroyed.
It dreams that a thrown down corpse is still moving and thats why
it does not recommend to approach to it closely, to mock at it and to
play with it.
Conservative Revolution
There is also third conservatism. From a philosophical point of
view its the most interesting. This is a family of conservative ide-
ologies that is usually called a Conservative Revolution (CR). It is a
constellation of ideologies and political philosophies that regards a
problem of correlation between conservatism and Modernity dialeti-
cally.
One of Conservative Revolution theorists was Arthur Moeller van
den Bruck whose book was recently translated into Russian
1
. Other
1
Moeller van den Bruck, The Third Reich, Moscow, 2009
132 Alexander DUGIN
thinkers that belong to this school are: Martin Heidegger, brothers
Ernst and Friedrich Jnger, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Werner
Sombart, Othmar Spann, Friedrich Hielscher, Ernst Niekisch and an
entire pleiad of mostly german authors. Sometimes they are called
the dissenters of national socialism because the majority of them
in some periods of time supported national socialism but soon they
have got into in-emigration and some even in prison. Many of them
participated in underground antifascist activity and helped jews to
rescue. Particularly, Friedrich Hielscher, a frst-rate conservative
revolutioner and supporter of german national renaissance helped
very famous jewish philosopher Martin Buber to escape.
Conservatives must lead a revolution
It is possible to describe a general paradigm of conservative
revolution world-view in a following way. There is an unbiassed
process of degradation in the world. It is not just an aspiration of
evil forces for making tricks, it is the forces of faith and fate that
lead the humanity on the path of degeneration. From conservative
revolutioners point of view, the peak of degeneration is Modernity.
At this moment everything matches with traditionalists. As opposed
to them, conservative revolutioners start to think: why is it turned
out to be that the faith in God that created the world, in divine provi-
dence, in sacral, in myth in a certain period started turning into its
own opposition. Why does it weaken and why do Gods enemies
gain? Then they have a suspicion: maybe that wonderful Golden
Age defended by fundamental conservatives contained some kind of
gen of further perversion? Maybe not everything was good in reli-
gion either? Maybe those religious, sacral, holy forms of traditional
society that we can discern before coming of Modernity had kept a
specifed element of decay in it? And then conservative revolution-
ers say conservative fundamentalists: you suggest to go back to
the state when the frst symptoms of an ill man revealed, when just
frst hacking appeared. Today this man is at deaths door and you
state how well he felt before. You oppose a hacking person and a
133
Fourth Political Theory
dying person. By turn we want to fnd out where an infection came
from, why he started to cough? And the fact that he does not die
coughing and that he goes to work does not convince us of his
health. The virus should had had its seat somewhere in the past
We believe, - continue conservative revolutioners, - that in a very
source, in deity, in a very initial cause lays an intention to orga-
nize this eschatological drama. In this point of view Modernity
acquires paradoxical type. This is not just an illness today (in the
denied present), this is a disclosure in a todays world of what had
been prepared in yesterdays world (so valuable for traditional-
ists). Modernity does not become better because of this, but tradi-
tion by the way looses its defnite positiveness.
One of the main formulas of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck was:
conservatives tried to stop a revolution previously but we must lead
it. This means that by expressing solidarity with destructive ten-
dencies of Modernity, partly for practical reasons, it is necessary to
reveal and discern the bacillus that had gave rise to the tendencies of
further decay, that is Modernity, initially. Conservative revolution-
ers want not only to slow down the time (like liberal conservatives)
or to go back to the past (like traditionalists) but to pull out the root
of evil from the world structure, to abolish the time as a destructive
charactetistic of reality by fulflling some secret, parallel, non-obvi-
ous plan of the Deity.
Dasein and Ge-Stell
Heideggers history of philosophy is constructed with the same
model. At dawn of philosophy Dasein as a fnite and localized objec-
tive reality of a man took a path of stating a question about an ob-
jective reality, that is about itself and surrounding. One of frst such
concepts expressing this stating of question was a concept of phy-
sis assimilating an objective reality with nature and comprehending
it as a chain of risings. The second concept was agrarian metaphor
of logos a concept formed from the verb legein that is crop
and later obtained the meaning think, read, speak. Accord-
134 Alexander DUGIN
ing to Heidegger, the pair physis-logos defning an objective reality
included it into too narrow bounds. These bounds got even more
narrow in Platos study about ideas. And further, european thought
only worsened an alienation of objective reality through increasing
rationalism up to oblivion of the thought of objective reality at all.
This oblivion at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries developed into
nihilism. A general term in Heideggers philosophy describing the
essence of growing domination of technics is Ge-stell, that is erec-
tion of more and more alienating and nihilistic models.
But for Heidegger Ge-Stell is not a fortuity. It is an expression of
that the opposite side of an objective reality is nothing as its internal
perspective. In the authentic Dasein the objective reality and nothing
are to co-exist. But if a man makes an accent at an objective reality
as a universal (koinon), just on what exist (idea of physis), he
looses sight of nothing that reminds of itself bringing philosophy to
nihilism through Ge-Stell. Thereby, the contemporary nihilism is
not just evil, but news of objective reality inversed to Dasein and
given in such a complicated way. Therefore a goal of conservative
revolutioners is not just to manage with the nothing and nihilism
of Modernity but to unravel a tangle of history of philosophy and
decrypt the message maintaining in Ge-Stell. Thus, nihilism of Mo-
dernity is not just an evil (as for traditionalists) but also a sign indi-
cating profound structures of objective reality and paradoxes laying
in it.
Sad end of Spectacle
Conservative revolutioners hate the present so much that they are
not satisfed only with opposing the past to it. They say: the present
is awful but it should be lived out, carried through to the very last
end.
Liberal Postmodernity assumes an infnite end. The End of
history of Fukuyama is not just disappearance economic trans-
actions and markets continue to carry out, hotels, bars, discotheques
continue to twinkle inviting, stocks continue to work, dividends for
135
Fourth Political Theory
securities continue to be paid off, computer and tv displays continue
to glow, securities continue to be produced. Theres no history but
there are TVs.
Conservative revolutioners make it in a different way. In the end
of history they mean to appear at the opposite side of Dasein, from
the dim space of other side, and turn the Postmodernity game into
not-game. Spectacle (the Guy Debords society of the spectacle)
will end something very unpleasant for the spectators and actors. In
due time this logic was followed by a group of surrealists-dadaists
(Arthur Cravan, Jacques Rigaut, Julien Torma, Jacques Vach) who
glorifed a suicide. But critics considered it to be a vacuous bragging.
At one moment they commited suicide publicly which proved that
art and surrealism were such a grand thing for them that they gave
their lives for it. Here we can remember about Kirillov from Dos-
toyevskys The Possessed (original russian title The Demons)
for whom a suicide became an expression of complete freedom that
was revealed after the death of God.
There were not less terrifying events in Russia lately. For ex-
ample, Nord-Ost. An obscene untidy comic actor Sasha Cekalo
stages a spectacle attended by imposing Moscow audience. Here
chechen terrorists appear and at frst people think that its a part of a
perfomance. And then they realize with a horror that there is some-
thing wrong at the stage and next begins a dreadful, real tragedy.
Roughly the same conservative revolutioners imagine: let the
buffoonery of Postmodernity take its course, let it dilute the defnite
paradigms, ego, superego, logos, let the rhizome, schizomasses and
divided consciousness enter, let nothing carry along with it all of the
world content so then the secret doors will be opened and ancient,
eternal ontological archetypes will come to the surface and terribly
fnish off the game.
Left conservatism (social-conservatism)
Theres one more orientation so-called left conservatism or
social-conservatism. A typical representative of social-conservatism
136 Alexander DUGIN
is Georges Sorel (his work Refections on Violence
1
). He adhered
to left views but in a certain period he found out that the lefts and
rights (monarchists and communists) fght against a common enemy
bourgeoisie.
Left conservatism is close to russian national-bolshevism of
Nikolay Ustryalov. Under the pure left marxist ideology he found
out russian national myths. Even more distictly it is recounted in left
national-socialism of Strasser and in german national-bolshevism of
Niekisch. Such left conservatism could be attributed to the family
of Conservative Revolution or sorted out as a separate orientation.
Interestingly that United Russia party adopted social-conser-
vatism as a component of its ideology. This orientation is being de-
veloped today by Andrey Isaev. On the other pole of United Rus-
sia there is a liberal-conservatism of Pligin.
Eurasianism as an episteme
Eurasianism is both a political philosophy and an episteme.
It applies to a category of conservative ideologies and has features
both of fundamental conservatism (traditionalism) and of Conserva-
tive Revolution (including social-conservatism of left eurasianists).
The only thing that is not acceptable for eurasianists is liberal con-
servatism.
Realizing a claim of western logos on universality, eurasianism
denies to admit this universality as an inevitability. This is a specifc
character of eurasianism. It considers Western culture as a local and
temporary phenomenon. It affrms a plurality of cultures and civili-
zations that coexist in different moments of a cycle. For eurasianists,
Modernity is a phenomenon that is peculiar only to West, and other
cultures should unmask these claims on universality of western civi-
lization and build its own societies with its inherent values. There
is no unifed historical process, every people has its own historical
model that moves in different rhythm and sometimes in different
directions.
1
Sorel Georges, Refections on Violence, 1906
137
Fourth Political Theory
Eurasianism is per se gnosiological pluralism. A plurality of epis-
temes built on a basis of every existing civilization (Eurasian epis-
teme is for Russian civilization, Chinese for Chinese, Islamic for
Islamic, Hindu for Hindu etc.) is opposed to an unitary episteme
of Modernity including science, politics, culture, anthropology. And
only on a basis of these epistemes purifed from the western non-
optionality should be built further political-social, cultural and eco-
nomical projects.
We see a specifc form of conservatism in it differing from oth-
er close conservative versions (excluding liberal-conservatism) by
taking an alternative to Modernity not in the past or in an unique
revolutionary-conservative coup. We take it in societies that histori-
cally coexist with the western civilization and geographically and
culturally differ from it. Here eurasianists partly draw closer with
Gunons traditionalism who also considered that modernity is a
western concept, when there are still forms of traditional society
in the East. No coincidence that the frst among russian authors who
referred to Gunons book East and West was a eurasianist N.N.
Alekseev.
Neo-eurasianism.
Neoeurasianism arised in Russia in the end of 80s of XX century
completely grasped the main points of episteme of former eurasian-
ists but also added the use of traditionalism, geopolitics, structural-
ism, Heideggers fundamental-ontology, sociology, anthropology. It
has done much work on harmonization the basic points of eurasian-
ism with actualities of the second half of XX century beginning of
XXI century taking into account new scientifc developments and
researches. Eurasian journals are published today in Italy, France,
Turkey.
Neoeurasianism is based on philosophical analysis of thesis
about Modernity and Postmodernity. A detachment from western
culture allows to determine a distance owing to that it is possible to
comprehend the whole Modernity and say it all a fundemental no.
138 Alexander DUGIN
In the XX century Modernity and western civilization were
subjected to a similar systemic criticism. The criticism came from
Spengler, Toynbee and especially from structuralists, Levi-Strauss
in the frst place, the one who created structural anthropology. This
structural anthropology is based on principle equality of different
cultures from primitive to very developed that deprives west euro-
pean culture of any kind of superiority over the most wild and
primitive unwritten tribe. Here it should be recalled that eura-
sianists, the founders of phonology and the greatest representatives
of structural linguistics Roman Jakobson
1
and Nikolay Trubetzkoy
2

were the mentors of Levi-Strauss and had taught him the skills of
structural analysis. And Levi-Strauss gladly admits this fact. Thus,
an intellectual chain can be retraced eurasianism-structuralism-
neoeurasianism. In this sense neoeurasianism becomes a restoration
of wide range of ideas, insights, intuitions that had been outlined
by frst eurasianists and that have naturally included the results of
scientifc work of schools and authors (in most cases it had conser-
vative orientation) simultaneously developing throughout the whole
of XX century.
1
Jakobson R O, Role of linguistic indications in the comparative mythology
- VII
2
Trubetzkoy N S, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, Moscow, 2000.
CHAPTER 12. CIVILIZATION AS A CONCEPT
The Need for a Specifc Defnition
Dealing with the defnitions of civilization in several intel-
lectual, scientifc and wide social aspects the agreement appears to
be unattainable. Though, the same situation is for some other basic
terms. This stems from the fundamental sense of our epoch, the pe-
riod of transition from the Modern to the Postmodern and this af-
fects some semantic felds and linguistic forms. And, since we are
living in the period of incomplete transition - there is a great confu-
sion in terms: some people interpret the basic terms according to
their principal historical meanings, some people already looks to the
future feeling the need of semantic shifts (that has not come yet),
some people dream (and may be approaching the future or simply
indulging in individualistic irrelevant hallucinations) , some people
are simply confused.
Anyway, for the correct use of terms (especially principal terms)
including the term civilization, nowadays it is necessary to make a
simple deconstruction that would create meanings according to their
historical perspective and examine some semantic shifts.
Civilization as a Stage of Societys Development
The term civilization has gained a wide use in the epoch of a
hectic development of the theory of progress. And this theory is a
result of the two paradigmatic axioms of the Modern - the progres-
sive and unidirectional nature of human development (from minus
to plus) and the universality of man as a phenomenon. In this con-
140 Alexander DUGIN
text, the American GL Morgan defnes civilization as the stage
in which humanity (in the 19th century everybody uncritically
believed in the obvious existence of such a thing as humanity)
comes after the stage of barbarism and that, in turn, is replaced by
the stage of savagery
The Marxists easily took this interpretation by putting it into a
theory of economic change of the formations. According to Morgan,
Taylor and Engels, savagery characterizes the tribes that hunt in
a primitive way.Barbarism refers to nonliterate societies engaged
in the simplest forms of agriculture and animal husbandry - with
no clear division of labor and the development of social and politi-
cal institutions. Civilization is known as a stage when writing ap-
pears, social and political institutions, cities, trades, technological
improvements, the stratifcation of society into classes, the emer-
gence of advanced theological belief systems.Civilization consid-
ered to be historically stable and could easily continue to develop,
but without changing the essential characteristics for thousands of
years (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Hindu, Chinese and Roman).
Civilization and Empire
However, along with the historical concept of civilization -
though less explicitly a territorial sense was also put in it. Civi-
lization implied rather extensive area of distribution that meant a
signifcant amount of time as well as the wide territorial distribu-
tion. In this sense, the territorial boundaries of the term civiliza-
tion have partly coincided with the meaning of the word empire,
world power. Empire in a civilized sense does not refer to the
feature of the political and administrative structure, and the fact that
active and intensive dissemination of infuences emanating from the
centers of civilization of the surrounding territory, inhabited by sup-
posedly barbarians or savages. In other words, the term of
civilization is already possible to identify as the nature of expan-
sion and export of infuence which are common to Empire (an-
cient and modern).
141
Fourth Political Theory
Civilization and the Universal Type
Civilization has created a new generic type, completely differ-
ent from models of the barbarian and savage societies. This type
is built mostly on the globalization of the ethno-tribal or religious
basis, which stood at the origins of this civilization. But in the course
of this globalization and namely through equating a particular eth-
nic, social, political and religious image of the universal standard,
came the very important process of transcending ethnic group, the
translation of its natural and organic - often unconsciously transmit-
ted - to the rank of a man-made traditions and conscious rational sys-
tem. A citizen of Rome, even in the early stages of the Empire have
differed signifcantly from the average resident of escalation, and
the diversity of Muslims praying in Arabic, is far gone beyond the
Bedouin tribes of Arabia and their direct descendants of the ethnic.
Thus, the transition to civilization has a qualitatively different so-
cial anthropology: a person belonging to a civilization had a col-
lective identity, embodied in a fxed body of spiritual culture, which
he was obliged to a certain degree to master.
Civilization implied that person should make a rational and force-
ful effort and in the 17 century after Descartes philosophers named
subject. But the necessity of such effort and culturally fxed ex-
ample to a certain extent equalized both representatives of heart eth-
nicity (religion), which is the basis of civilization and those who
fell in the zone of infuence of different ethnic contexts. It was easier
to Learn basics of civilization than to be accepted into the tribe, be-
cause it was not required to learn huge reservoirs of unconscious ar-
chetypes, but to do the rational number of logical operations.
Civilization and Culture
In some aspects (depending on the country or a particular author)
in the 19th century the term civilization was identifed with the
concept of culture. In other cases, some hierarchical relationships
were established - more often culture was considered to be a spiritual
142 Alexander DUGIN
base for civilization, and civilization itself meant a formal structure
of society that answered for general points of the defnition.
Oswald Spengler in his famous book The Decline of the West,
opposed civilization and culture , considering the last as an
expression of the organic life spirit of the humanity and the frst as
the product of this cooling spirit in the mechanical and technologi-
cal shapes. By Spengler civilization is a product of cultural death.
However, such a witty observation, that correctly interprets some
features of modern Western civilization, has not received universal
acceptance, and more often today the term civilization and cul-
ture are used as synonyms.
Anyway, each researcher can have his own opinion
Postmodern and synchronic understanding of civilization
Even the most fuent review of the term civilization points that
we are dealing with a concept which is deeply connected with the
spirit of the Enlightenment epoch, progressivism and historicism
that was principal for the Modern epoch in its non-critical stage,
before fundamental reconsidering in the XX century. Belief in the
progressive development of history, in a universal way of human-
ity by means of principal logical development of humidity from
savagery to civilization was the hallmark of the XIX century. But
since Nietzsche and Freud, the so-called philosophers of suspicion,
this optimistic axiom was questioned. And throughout the XX cen-
tury Heidegger, existentialists, traditionalists, structuralists, and f-
nally, post-modernists have left no stone unturned.
In the Postmodern critique of historical optimism, universalism
and historicism has acquired a systematic character and created the
doctrinal prerequisites for a total revision of the conceptual appa-
ratus of Western philosophy. The revision itself is not fully imple-
mented, but what is done (Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Ricoeur, Foucault,
Deleuze, Derrida, etc.) are already suffcient to ensure that the in-
ability to use the Dictionary of the Modern without its thorough and
meticulous deconstruction .
143
Fourth Political Theory
P. Ricoeur, generalizing the thesis philosophers suspicion,
shows the following picture: man and human society consist of the
rational-conscious component ( that Bultmanu named kerygma ,
Marx named superstructure, and Freud considered it as ego) and
the unconscious component (in fact the structure in the structural-
ist sense, the basis, will to power ;subconscious) . Though it
seems that mans way leads directly from the unconscious prison to
the realm of the mind and it just represents the progress and content
of stories, in fact, upon closer inspection, it appears that the uncon-
scious (a myth) is much stronger and continue to be signifcant-
ly prejudge the work of consciousness. Moreover, the intellect and
the conscious logical activity almost always have nothing but a great
work for the repression of unconscious impulses - in other words,
the expression of the complexes, a strategy of displace, the replace-
ment of the projection, etc. Marx considered productive forces
and productive relations as unconscious.
Consequently, civilization does not fully exclude Savagery
and barbarism but it bases on them itself that turns into the uncon-
scious area but at the same time they do not disappear but gain un-
limited power over mankind mostly because they are considered
to be already overcoming and more non-existent.. This explains
the striking difference between the historical practice of the life of
nations and societies, full of wars, violence, cruelty, full of wors-
ening mental disorders and the intention of mind to a harmonious,
peaceful and enlightened existence under the shadow of progress
and development.
Thus, the critical tradition, structuralism and philosophy of post-
modernism forced to move from a predominantly diachronic (sta-
dial) interpretation of civilization that was the norm for the XIX
century and gradually continued to prevail in wide use, to the syn-
chronic. Synchronicity implies that civilization does not come to
replace savagery and barbarism, not after them, and with them,
and continues to coexist with them. One can imagine the civiliza-
tion as the numerator, and savagery - barbarism as the denomi-
nator of the conditional fraction. Civilization affects conscious-
144 Alexander DUGIN
ness, but unconsciousness for a moment through the ongoing work
of dreams (Freud) continually misinterpret everything in their fa-
vor. Wild Things - is what explains the civilization is the key to
it. It turns out that mankind hastened to announce the civilization
as that had really happened, while it remains no more than an unfn-
ished plan, constantly crashing under the onslaught of clever energy
unconscious (no matter how we understand it psychoanalytically
or as Nietzsche named it the will to power).
Deconstruction of civilization
How is it possible practically to apply structural approach to de-
construct the concept of civilization? In accordance with the gen-
eral logic of this operation we should question the irreversibility and
the novelty of what constitutes the main characteristics of civiliza-
tion in contrast to the savagery and barbarism.
The main characteristic of civilization is often considered to
be an inclusive universalism and namely openness of civilization
package for those who would like to join it from outside.
At the frst glance, inclusive universalism appears to be a com-
plete antithesis of the exclusive particularism that is general for
clannish and tribal communities of the pre-civilized period.
But historically, the claim to universality of civilization - ec-
umene and, accordingly, the uniqueness - constantly meet with the
fact that, in addition to the barbarian peoples, beyond the borders
of this civilization there were other civilizations with their own
and an excellent version of universalism. In this case, there was
a logical contradiction: either civilization had to admit that the
claim to universality is insolvent, or enlist other civilization in the
category of the barbaric.
With the recognition of insolvency different solutions can fol-
low: either to try to fnd a syncretic model of combining the two
civilizations (at least theoretically) into the overall system, or to take
that another civilization is right. Typically, when faced with such
a problem, civilization comes on the basis of an exclusive (not
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inclusive) principle it considers the other civilization to be defec-
tive, namely barbaric, heresy, particularism In other words,
we are dealing with the transfer of customary tribal ethnocentrism to
a higher level of generalization. Inclusion and universalism, in fact
results in savage exclusions and particularity
It is easy to recognize in these vivid examples that the Greeks,
who considered themselves as civilization, referred the rest to the
barbarians. Origin of the word barbarian actually goes as a de-
scription of someone whose speech has no meaning and is a collec-
tion of animal sounds. Many tribes encountered a similar attitude
to strangers- not knowing their language, they think that they do
not have it at all, and therefore they do not consider them human
beings. Hence, by the way, the Slavic tribes were called the Ger-
mans, or dumb, because they didnt know know the Russian
language.
The ancient Persians with civilizations claim to the universal
mazdian religion, it was expressed even more clearly: the division of
Iran (people) and Turan (demons) was performed at the level of re-
ligions, cults, rituals and ethics. It came to the absolute endogenous
connections and normalizing incest - to sunny spirit of the Iranians
(Ahura Mazda) has not been desecrated by an admixture of the sons
of Angra Magno.
Judaism as a world religion that claims to universalism and
founded the theological base of monotheism Christianity and Is-
lam, built several civilizations simultaneously - until now almost
ethnically restricted blood and a tribal code of Halacha.
Tribes are based on the initiation, during which the neophyte is
informed about the basis of tribal mythology. At the level of civili-
zation, the same function is performed by religious institutions, and
in more recent times by a system of universal education, clearly
ideological. Myths of the Modern neophytes learn in different cir-
cumstances and in other backgrounds, but their functional signif-
cance remains unchanged, and the logical validity (given the Freud-
ian analysis for repressive activities of intellect and ego) is not far
away from the legends.
146 Alexander DUGIN
In short, even a rough deconstruction of civilization shows
that claim to overcome the previous phases is no more than an il-
lusion, but in fact great and developed groups of people united
in the civilization, which actually repeats the behavior and value
systems of savages. Hence the endless and increasingly bloody
wars, double standards in international politics, rampant passions
in private life, always cracking normative ethical codes of moderate
and rational society appear. Developing the idea of good savage
of Rousseau (who strongly criticized the civilization as a phenom-
enon and considered it to be the source of all evil), we can say that
so-called civilized man is a ugly savage corrupted and perverted
barbarian
Nowadays synchronistic and plural understanding
of civilization prevails
With these preliminary remarks we can fnally come to what we
are implying today in the concept of civilization, when we de-
velop the thesis of Huntington about the clash of civilizations or
object to him along with former Irans President Khatami, by insist-
ing on a dialogue of civilizations.
The fact that almost no consensus in the use of the term civiliza-
tion clearly indicates that the stadial (purely historicist and progres-
sistskoy) interpretation of the concept that prevailed in the era of
modernity and common in the frst half of the XIX and XX century.
Now obviously lost its relevance.
It seems that nowadays only conservatives may oppose civi-
lization and barbarism who stuck in the noncritical Nouveau
Compte, or Benthams researchers. Although instrumentally in the
historical analysis of the term civilization it is reasonable to use
when describing the types of ancient societies, but an ideological
strain as the global plus compared with a global net (of barbarism
and savagery), it has lost. Universalism, sustainable development
and the anthropological unity of human history - all this on a philo-
sophical level, has been questioned.
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Levi-Strauss by means of his research in structural anthropology,
based on a rich ethnographic and mythological material life of the
tribes of North and South America, had convincingly shown that the
conceptual and mythological system of the most primitive socie-
ties in their complexity and richness of colors, links and functional
differentiations of maturity does not inferior to the most civilized
countries.
In political discourse, benefts of civilization are still widely
discussed, but it already looks like an anachronism. We have faced
with such a surge in non-critical ignorance when liberal reformers
tried to present the history of Russia as a continuous chain of the
persistence in the face of barbarism. However, not only was it the
result of induction of networks of infuence, but also a form of Rus-
sian cargo-cults: the frst McDonalds, private banks and movies of
rock bands on the Soviet television is perceived as sacred objects.
Except for these promotional stamps or hopeless retardation in
even remotely colored acquaintance with modern philosophy, but
not contrary to the mainstream discourse, the concept of civiliza-
tion is treated without any moral burden, but rather as a technical
term, and implies not something opposed to barbarism and sav-
agery, but other civilization.
In the above-mentioned article of Huntington, there is no word
about the barbarism, he speaks exclusively about the boundaries,
structure, features, frictions and differences between different civili-
zations, opposing each other. This features are not only his position,
or a line that goes back to Toynbee, which is followed by Hunting-
ton. The use of this term in a modern context implies a deliberate
pluralism, comparative research and matching. It directly affects
philosophical criticism and rethinking of the Modern carried thou-
sands of different ways throughout the twentieth century.
So, if we discard the recurrence of uncritical liberalism and nar-
row-minded naive pro-American (wider - Atlanticist) Advocating,
we will see that today the term civilization in the operational and
up to date political analysis is used mainly synchronic and func-
tionally to denote a broad and stable geographical and cultural ar-
148 Alexander DUGIN
eas, united around common spiritual, values, stylistic, psychological
attitudes and historical experiences.
Civilization in the context of the XXI century. means exactly that:
a zone of stable and rooted infuence of certain socio-cultural style,
often (but not necessarily) coincide with world religions. Moreover,
the political design of the individual segments belonging to a civi-
lization can be quite different: civilizations are usually wider than
a single state and they may consist of several or even many coun-
tries, moreover, the boundaries of some civilizations pass through
the country, dividing them into parts .
Ancient civilizations often coincided with empires and were
somehow politically united, but now their boundaries are invisible
lines irrelevantly superimposing on the administrative borders. Some
of these states were once part of a unifed empire (such as Islam
spread almost everywhere in the conquests of the Arabs, who built
the world caliphate). Others didnt know the general state(
), but were united among themselves differ-
ently - religiously, culturally or racially.
The crisis of classic models of historical analysis
(class, economic, liberal, race)
So we established that the use of the term civilization in the
twentieth century . and in the criticism of modernity there was a qual-
itative shift in the direction of synchronicityand plurality. But you
can make one more step and try to understand why, in fact, this us-
age has become so relevant nowadays?
In fact, earlier the concept of civilization has not been a subject
of deliberate problematization, and only Humanitarian usual aca-
demic classes could think by means of such categories . In the politi-
cal science and discourse another attitudes dominated and namely-
economic, national, racial, class and social. Today we observe that
thinking economically, talking about the national state and national
interests, let alone putting at the head of analysis class or racial at-
titudes are less and less accepted. Conversely, rarely any politicians
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speech can do without mentioning the word civilization, and sure-
ly in every analytical text this term is perhaps the most common.
Huntington made an attempt to civilize the central feature
of political,historical and strategic analysis. We are obviously go-
ing to think civilizationally.
Here we should pay more attention to the fact what actually the
word civilization in the trunk versions of the political discourse
means. To talk seriously about race is not confrmed after the trag-
ic history of European fascism. Class analysis has become main-
streamly irrelevant after the collapse of Soviet bloc and the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
It might seem that the only paradigm of political science is lib-
eralism. This has created the impression that national borders of ho-
mogeneous, essentially liberal-democratic states no longer face with
any other system that may claim to be a planetary-scale alternative
(after the fall of Marxism), and soon would be abolished, so that the
world government and one world state with a homogeneous market
economy, parliamentary democracy (World Parliament), liberal sys-
tem of values and a common information technology infrastructure
will be created. An image of the wonderful new world was made
in the 1990 by Francis Fukuyama in the program book (and his frst
article) End of History. Fukuyama put an end to the development
of stadial interpretation of the concept of civilization: the end of
history, according his version, means that barbarism was fnally
defeated by civilization in all its forms and variations.
It was Fukuyama who Huntington argued with, suggesting as the
main argument the fact that the end of the confict between clearly
defned ideologies of the Modern (Marxism and liberalism) does
not mean the automatic integration of humanity into a unifed lib-
eral utopia, because by the formal structures of national states and
ideological camps the deep tectonic plates were found - sort of the
continents of the collective unconsciousness, which, as it turned out,
were by no means overcome by modernization, colonization, ideol-
ogy and education and continue to predetermine the most important
aspects of life - including politics, economics and geopolitics - in a
150 Alexander DUGIN
particular segment of society, depending on belonging to a civiliza-
tion
In other words, Huntington offered to introduce the concept
of civilization as a fundamental ideological concept, designed
to replace not only class analysis, but also a liberal utopia, seri-
ously and uncritically apprehending demagogic propaganda of
the Cold War and, in turn, became her victim. Capitalism, market
liberalism, democracy seem universal and common only in ap-
pearance. Each civilization misinterpret the content of its uncon-
scious templates, where religion, culture, language, psychology
play an important, sometimes considerable role. In this context,
civilization gains a central importance in political analysis, mov-
ing to the foreground, and replacing a liberal cliche Vulgates.
Developments in 1990 have shown that Huntington was closer to the
truth, and Fukuyama was forced to revise his views having recog-
nized that he had obviously hastened. But this Fukuyamas revise of
thesis about the end of history requires a more careful considera-
tion.
Liberal utopians step back : state building
The fact is that Fukuyama, analyzing the inconsistencies of his
predictions about the end of history through the prism of the glob-
al victory of liberalism, still tried to stay within the logic that he
had originally created. Consequently, at the same time he had to do
reality check (reconciliation with reality), and to avoid recogniz-
ing the correctness of his opponent - Huntington, who by all appear-
ances was in his prediction closer to the truth.
Fukuyama then made the following conceptual approach: he of-
fered to postpone the end of history for an indefnite period, and to
strengthen the socio-political structures, which were the core of lib-
eral ideology in the previous stages. Fukuyama then put forward a
new thesis - state-building
As an intermediate step for moving towards global state and
world government, he suggested strengthening the nation-states
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with a liberal economy and democratic system of governance, in
order to prepare the ground for the fnal victory of global liberalism
and globalization. This is not a rejection of the perspective, but a
simple postponing it with a concrete proposal concerning a relative
stage.
Fukuyama says almost nothing about the concept of civiliza-
tion, but explicitly keeping in mind Huntingtons thesis, indirectly
responding him: the sustainable development of national states,
which was crumpled in the era of colonialism, and in an era of na-
tional liberation movements, and in an era of ideological confronta-
tion between the two camps, - now has to go through properly. This
will gradually lead to the fact that different societies, which have
taken the market, democracy and human rights, will take away the
remnants of the unconsciousness, and prepare more reliable (than
now) way for globalization.
The world as a network (by Thomas Barnett)
There is a new edition of a purely globalist theory, presented by
Thomas Barnetts works in American political science and for-
eign policy analytics. The meaning of his concept appeals to the
fact that technological development creates the zonal division of all
territories of the world into three regions: the core zone (the core),
the zone connectivity (the zone of connectedness) and the off-zone
(the zone of disconnectedness). Barnett believes that the network
processes penetrate freely across borders of states and civilizations,
and somehow structure the strategic space of the world. The U.S.A
and the EU form the core, where all the codes of new technologies
and decision-making centers are concentrated.To the zone of con-
nections - most other countries belong, doomed to users atti-
tude to the networks (they are forced to consume ready-technology
tools and to adapt to the rules produced by the core). Countries
and the political forces that are in a direct opposition to the U.S.,
West and globalization belong to the zone of disabled.For Thom-
as Barnett (and D. Bell) technology - is fate, and it embodies the
152 Alexander DUGIN
quintessence of civilization, that understood technically, almost
like Spengler did, but only with a positive sign.
The American view of the world order ( three versions)
In the American political analysis - and we must admit that the
Americans set the tone in this area - co-exist, all three concepts of
the selection of subjects on the world map. Globalism and civili-
zation (singular), in the spirit of early Fukuyama, are refected in
the construction of the Burnett. Here the subject is core, the rest
is subject of external administration - that is de-subjectifcation
and de-sovereignty.Fukuyama himself, critically examining his
early optimistic statements, occupies an intermediate position, in-
sisting that the subject should still be the national states, that
development should prepare a more solid ground for thefuture of
globalization.
Finally, Huntington and supporters of his views, believe that civ-
ilizations - are too severe and profound realities that may claim to
be global actors in world politics in a situation where the old ide-
ological models have collapsed, nation-state is rapidly losing real
substance of sovereignty under the infuence of some effective di-
mensions of globalization. But globalization itself, breaking the
old broads, is not able to penetrate deeply into traditional socie-
ties with stable components. It is signifcant that for Hunting-
tons thesis hold those forces in the world that seek to escape from
globalization, Westernization and American hegemony, in order
to preserve and re-strengthen the traditional identity. Only instead
of dark catastrophic discourse of Huntingtons clash and con-
fict, they began to talk about dialogue.But this moralistic nu-
ance should not mislead us about the main task of those who
generally take Huntingtons model. First of all, its an Iranian Khata-
mi. Crash or dialogue is a secondary question, and principle
agreement that civilization is now the main subject of the con-
ceptual analysis of international politics is much more important. In
other words, unlike the globalists and the maximalists (such as Bar-
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nett), and moderate liberal-tatist, supporters of civilized meth-
od explicitly or implicitly take the position of structuralist philo-
sophical approaches to understanding global processes.
Declaring civilization as the main subject of the pole and as an
actor of world politics is the most promising ideological course for
those who want to estimate the real state of affairs in world poli-
tics, for those who seek to fnd an adequate tool for political science
generalizations of a new era - the era of postmodernism, for those
who seek to defend their own identity in terms of progressive con-
fusion, as well as real-world attacks, the network of globalization.
In other words, appealing to civilization allows organically fll the
vacuum created after the historical crisis of all theories, opposing
liberalism, and after the internal crisis of liberalism itself, unable
to cope with the tutelage of the modern world space and it can
be proved by the unfortunate experience of utopias of Fukuyama.
Civilization as a concept, interpreted in contemporary philosophi-
cal context, is the center of a new ideology. This ideology can be
defned as multi-polarity.
Boundedness of opponents ideological globalization
arsenal and the unipolar world
The opposition to globalism, which is declaring itself at all levels
and everywhere on the Earth, has not formed a specifc belief system
yet. And it is weakness of the anti-globalization movement - it is not
systematized, lacks ideological harmony, in this system fragmentary
and chaotic elements dominate and often represent vague mixture of
anarchism and irrelevant leftism, ecology and even more extrava-
gant and marginal ideas
Losers from the western goshizm are aimed to play the main role.
In other cases globalization encounters resistance from the nation-
states that do not want to transfer some sovereign powers to an ex-
ternal control.
Finally, representatives of traditional religions, the proponents of
ethnic and regional identities (especially in the islamic world) ac-
154 Alexander DUGIN
tively resist globalism and its Atlantist Western liberal-democrat-
ic code, its network nature and value system (individualism, hedon-
ism, laksizm). The three existing levels of opposition to globalism
and American hegemony cannot lead to a common strategy and a
coherent ideology that would unite various and scattered forces, of-
ten disparate in size.
Anti-globalization movement suffers from childhood disease of
Leftism and blocked by a series of defeats by the worlds left-
ist movement in recent decades.
Nation-states usually do not have suffcient scale to challenge
the highly technological power of the West, and in addition their
political and economic elites are very often involved in transna-
tional projects.
Though sometimes local, ethnic and religious move-
ments and communities can effectively oppose to globalization, at
the same time they are too disjointed to change the basic trend of the
world or even to correct the course.
The meaning of the concept civilization as an opposition to
globalism
In such situation civilization appears to be a real panacea
and a fundamental category for the organization of a full-fedged al-
ternative project in the world.
If this concept is put in the spotlight, we can fnd a basis for har-
monious putting governmental, public, social and political forces in
one system.
Taking the plurality of civilizations into account, we can unite
the peoples, religious and ethnic communities living in different
states, to offer them a general centralized idea (within a particular
civilization) and leave a wide selection to fnd the identity within it,
allowing the consistent existence of other civilizations that differ on
key parameters.
And that prospect does not necessarily lead to confict of civili-
zations, contrary to Huntington. Conficts, and alliances are possi-
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ble here. The multipolar world that arises in this case, will create real
prerequisites for the continuation of the political history of mankind,
as to adopt the regulatory diversity of socio-political, religious, val-
ues, economic and cultural systems.
Otherwise, a simple and sporadic resistance to globalization at
the local level or on behalf of the ideologically amorphous mass of
anti-globalization (and in the best case) would only postpone the
end, but will not be a viable alternative.
To the Large space
Making civilization as a subject of world politics in the XXI cen-
tury will allow for regional globalization - a union of countries
and nations belonging to the same civilization. This will take advan-
tage of social inclusion, but not with respect to all indiscriminately,
but primarily to those who belong to a common type of civilization.
An example of such integration into a new political entity is the
European Union. It is the prototype of a regional globalization
that includes the countries and cultures that share common culture,
history and value system.
But, recognizing the undoubted right of Europeans to form a new
political entity on the basis of their civilizational differences, it is
natural to assume similar processes in the Islamic civilization, and
in China, and Eurasia, and Latin America and Africa.
In political science, after Carl Schmitt it is common to call all
similar projects of integration as integration of large spaces. In
economy Friedrich von List, even before Schmitt, theoretically
comprehended, and with great success into practice the creator of
the model of German customs union. Great Space is another
name for what we mean by civilization in its geopolitical, cultural
and spatial sense. Great Space differs from the currently existing
national states precisely because it is constructed on the basis of
a common value system and historical relationship, and combines
several or even many different states of common destiny.
156 Alexander DUGIN
In various large spaces integrating factor may vary - somewhere
religion will dominate, somewhere some ethnic origin, somewhere
cultural form, somewhere the socio-political type, somewhere a ge-
ographic location.
The following precedent is important: the creation of the Euro-
pean Union shows that the embodiment of large space in practice,
the transition from state to supra-national education, built on the
basis of civilized community, is possible and constructive and de-
velops positively in reality.
Roster of Civilizations
Unlike the nation states, we still can argue about the number and
boundaries of civilizations. Huntington identifes the following:
1) Western,
2) Confucian (Chinese)
3) Japan,
4) Islamic,
5) Hindu
6) The Slav-Orthodox,
7) Latin American and possibly
8) African civilization.
However, several ideas are questened. In Western civilization
Huntington includes the U.S. (with Canada) and Europe. Histori-
cally, this is true, but still nowadays, from a geopolitical point of
view, they form in relation to each other two different large space,
and their strategic, economic and even geopolitical interests diverge
more and more.
Europe has two identities - atlantist (that can be identifed with
Europe and North America) and Continental (which tends, by
contrast, not to be just military springboard for the North American
big brother but to conduct an independent policy and the return of
Europes history as an independent actor)
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Evroatlantizm bases in Britain and in the Eastern Europe (direct-
ed by inertial Russophobia) and evrokontinentalizm bases in France
and Germany, with the support of Spain and Italy (its a classic Old
Europe). Civilization in all cases is the only one, and namely West-
ern, and talking about large space it must be admitted that it may
be organized somewhat differently.
it is reasonable to match the Eurasian civilization with the Slav-
ic-Orthodox civilization, which organically, historically and cultur-
ally includes not only the Slavs, and not only orthodox, but also
other ethnic groups (including Turkic, Caucasian, Siberian, etc.) and
considerable part of the population professing Islam.
The Islamic world, of course, united religiously with growing
awareness of its identity, in turn, is divided into several great spac-
es - the Arab world , continental zone of Islam (Iran, Afghani-
stan, Pakistan) and the Pacifc region with spread of Islam.
A special place in this situation belongs to Muslim Africa, as well
as the ever-growing communities in Europe and America. And yet,
Islam is civilization, more and more conscious of its peculiarities
and distinction from other civilizations - and primarily from liberal
Western civilization, that is actively attacking the Islamic world in
the course of globalization.
It is diffcult to establish the boundaries between the zones of
infuence of Japanese and Chinese civilizations in the Pacifc, whose
civilizational identity remains largely open.
And of course, it is diffcult to talk about the general conscious-
ness of the inhabitants of the African continent, although in future
this situation may change, because this process has at least two his-
torical precedents: League of African countries and pan-African
ideas.
Rapprochement of countries in Latin America is evident, but
given the pressure of the North America within the last few years,
we cannot speak about any integrational processes there.
There are no signifcant obstacles for the integration of the Eura-
sian space around Russia , because these areas for centuries were
158 Alexander DUGIN
politically, culturally, economically, socially and psychologically
integrated.
The western boundary of the Eurasian civilization is somewhat
east of the western border of Ukraine, making this new state fragile
and unsustainable.
Enumeration of Civilizations, in fact, gives us an idea of the num-
ber of poles in a multipolar world. All of them - except the west - are
being in a potential state, but at the same time, each of these civiliza-
tions have serious grounds for moving toward integration and forma-
tion of high-grade actors in the history of XXI century.
Multipolar ideal
The idea of a multipolar world, where the number of poles and
civilizations are the same, will offer humanity a wide range of cul-
tural, philosophical, social and spiritual alternatives.
We will have a model with the presence of a regional universal-
ism in a particular large space that will give to large bands and
signifcant segments of humanity necessary social dynamics ( that is
typical for globalization and openness), but devoid of the shortcom-
ings that globalism has taken on a planetary scale.
However, regionalism can also develop in this situation, as well
as local, ethnic and religious communities, since the unifying pres-
sure inherent in nation-states will be signifcantly weakened.
(We see it in the EU, where integration contributes substantially
to the development of local communities and the so-called Euro-
regions).
In addition to everything else we can fnally resolve this fun-
damental contradiction between exclutizivizm and incluzivizm of
imperial identity: the planet does not appear as one single oiku-
men (with uniqueness of this cultural racism in the distribution
of titles of civilized nations and, on the contrary, the barbarians
and savages), but as several eykumens several universes,
where they will live at their own pace, in their context, with its
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own time, with his consciousness and his unconscious during sev-
eral generations.
It is impossible to say in advance what relations between them
will be. Maybe both dialogue and confrontation will take place. But
thing is of greater importance: the story will continue and we will
remove the fundamental historical impasse, where we were brought
by uncritical belief in progress, rationality and progressive develop-
ment of mankind.
With time something is changing in man, but something is eter-
nal and unchanging. Civilization can severely dilute everything in
its place.
Reason and created by it philosophical, social, political and eco-
nomic systems will develop according to their laws, and the col-
lective unconscious will be able to keep their archetypes and base
untouched.
And in every civilization, rationality and the unconscious are
free to assert their own standards, to keep them faithful, to strength-
en them, or modify.
There no universal standard - neither material nor spiritual - will
be. Each civilization will fnally proclaim that it is a measure of
things. Somewhere it will be a man somewhere - religion, some-
where - ethics, somewhere - matter.
But for realization of this project we have to endure a lot of fghts.
First and foremost, it is necessary to cope with the main enemy -
Globalism and the desire of the Atlantic western pole once again to
impose all the peoples and cultures of the Earth its sole hegemony.
Despite the deep and true observations of his best intellectuals,
many of the political establishments in the United States still use the
term civilization in the singular, implying the American civiliza-
tion.
That is the real challenge that we all, all nations of the earth, and
especially Russian, should simply have to give an adequate response
for.
CHAPTER 13. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LEFT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Left philosophy in crisis
The present day gives no opportunity to speak of any strictly
defned space for any leftist (social, socialist or communist) project,
if compared with the contrast of the situation which for a century
ago predominated the feld of political ideas and projects. The case
is that the leftist movement, leftist ideas, leftist philosophy and left
politics saw a fundamental expectations crisis. First of all, it was
caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the
Socialist camp as well as by the decline of infuence and prestige of
the European Marxism, which virtually became for a certain period
of time a spare ideology in the Western Europe.
However, the left project even in its better days was not uniform
and universal. The fate of left ideas implementation in a specifc
political practice of different nations showed that even from purely
theoretical point of view there are several main trends within the left
philosophy itseft that should be studied separately.
Initially the left-winged philosophy was thought to be fundamen-
tal, unifying and systematized criticism of liberal capitalism. In the
middle of the 20 century such phenomenon as systematic criticism
of the left project arose (from both Liberals Hayek, Popper, Aron,
etc, and Neomarxists and Freudian Marxists). Philosophical schools
did the same to the leftist ideology as what the left project did to the
liberal capitalism 100-150 years ago.
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Three Varieties of the Left Ideology
From the perspective of todays historical experience, there are
three basic trends in the left political philosophy, which either con-
tinue previous ideological projects in a new stage, or reconsider the
past, or suggest something radically new. That is:
Old Leftists (Vetero-Gauchiste: vetero (veterant) old
and gauchiste left (French) );
Left Nationalists (National Communists, National Bol-
sheviks and National Gauchiste);
New Leftists (Neogauchiste, Postmodernists).
The frst two trends have been existing since the end of the 19
century and throughout the 20 century and to some extent they are
present in todays world. The third trend appeared in 1950-1960s.
It developed from the criticism of Old Leftists and was gradually
formed itself into a Postmodernist concept, which to a large degree
infuenced aesthetics, stylistics and philosophy of the modern West-
ern society.
Old Leftists today (orthodoxy deadlocks, evolutional strat-
egys perspectives and pro-Liberal revisionism)
Nowadays Old Leftists are divided into several directions:
Orthodox Marxists;
Social Democrats;
Post-Social Democrats (advocates of the Third Way, ac-
cording to Giddens).
European Orthodox Marxists
Inertia keeps up their existence in the European countries, the
United States and the Third World where they continue to stick to ba-
sic foundations of the Marxist doctrine. Oftentimes being politically
embodied in Communist parties they profess the relevant ideology.
Generally, these Orthodox Marxists slightly mitigate (in the spirit of
Eurocommunism) the radicalism of the Marxist doctrine and reject
the appeal for social upheaval and establishment of proletariat dic-
tatorship. Trotskyism movement (Fourth International) proved to be
162 Alexander DUGIN
the most stable form of the Marxist Orthodoxy, as it was left almost
unaffected by the falldown of the USSR and collapse of the Soviet
system, as it initially kept to harsh criticism of the Soviet regime.
Typically, the most orthodox followers of Marx can be found in
the countries that have undergone no proletarian socialist revolu-
tions, while Marx himself predicted that it should be the most in-
dustrialized countries with a settled capitalist economy where those
revolutions are destined to be a come-true. The European Marxism
to a certain extent put up with the fact that Marxist visions had not
been implemented in the countries where they were to, according
to all the logic, but on the contrary where they (strictly according to
Marx and Engels) in no way stood any chance for that. This version
of Old Leftists rejects the Soviet experience as a historical stretch
and does not believe in the success of Marxist previsions. However,
it continues to uphold their beliefs as adherence to moral feeling
and ideological tradition rather than really expects a revolt of pro-
letariat (which does not seem to exist as a class in the modern West-
ern world to that extent it has merged with petty bourgeoisie).
The main defect of the Western Orthodox Marxists is that they
continue to use terms of the industrialized society, while the Western
European and particularly the US society has passed to the brand
new stage the stage of post-industrial (information) society. And
it was mentioned by none of the Marxist Classics, except for vague
intuition of young Marx about real dominance of capital. The lat-
ter in absence or in case of failure of Socialist revolutions can
replace formal dominance of capital, inherent in industrialized
stage. However, Orthodox Marxists as a rule do not take interest or
focus on these fragmentary remarks.
Gradually Old Marxist discourse loses its prognostic and polito-
logical meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to present these ideas as
a project a left project. At the same time their criticism of the
capitalist system, ethical views, solidarity with the destitute, as well
as criticism of liberalism can arouse some interest and sympathy.
Almost all adherents of this ideological direction distrust other anti-
liberal forces, and are closed for dialogue and degenerate into a sect.
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European Social Democrats
European Social Democrats are slightly different from Ortho-
dox Communists. This political trend separated from Marxism, and
since the time of Kautsky it has chosen evolutionary rather than
revolutionary way, rejecting radicalism and aiming at making the
left infuence (social justice, Welfare State Etat-Provedance and so
on) by political means and organized trade union movements. This
version of the Old Leftists has achieved prominent results in the
European countries and determined social and political appearance
of the European society unlike the US society where by contrast
dominates a right-winged liberal model.
Nowadays the meaning of the Old Leftists socio-democratic
trend boils down to a number of economic theses, opposite to liberal
tendencies. Social Democrats advocate:
progressive income tax rate (Liberals advocate fat tax rate);
nationalization of big monopolies (Liberals privatization);
resting bigger responsibility on the state in public sector;
free medicine, education, pension provision (Liberals reduc-
tion of state interference in the economy, private medicine, private
education and retirement insurance).
Social Democrats try to implement these demands through par-
liamentary electoral mechanisms, and if confronted with critical
situations through mobilization of trade unions and public organiza-
tions right up to strikes and turnouts.
It is signifcant that Social Democrats use libertarian (do not con-
fuse with liberal!) slogans:
legalization of light drugs;
protection of sexual and ethnic minorities and homosexual
marriages;
extension of individual civil rights and freedoms;
ecology;
mitigation of legislation (abolition of death penalty), etc.
For Classical Social Democrats it is mandatory to combine left
economy requirements (social justice, emerging role of the state)
164 Alexander DUGIN
with extension of individual civil rights and freedoms (human
rights), democracy development, internationalism (today it is ac-
cepted to speak about multiculturalism and globalization).
Classical Social Democrats future aimed project consists in con-
tinuing this policy of concrete steps on socio-political evolution and
arguing with both liberals (about economy) and national-conserv-
atives (about politics). Besides, classical Social Democrats often
advocate:
progress;
struggle against archaic and religious prejudices;
science and culture.
Nevertheless, there are no serious theoretical elaborations regard-
ing new conditions of the postmodern society and there is almost no
criticism of classical Marxism and thematization of capitalism in the
new historical phase (unlike postmodernists and New Leftists).
Third Way socialists
There is another version of the Old Leftists Social Democrats
that in the face of increasing popularity of liberal ideas in 1990-
2000s decided to make a compromise with Liberalism. Theorists
of this trend (particularly, an Englishmen Antony Giddens) called
it the Third Way something between classical European Social
Democracy and American (wider Anglo-Saxon) Liberalism.
The advocates of the Third Way suggest fnding a compromise
between Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats on the grounds
of common roots stretching back to the Enlightenment and common
rejection of both Conservatism and left extremism. The compro-
mising platform is based on mutual concessions regarding concrete
agreements on to what extent the Social Democrats agree to lower
the progressive tax rate, as well as Liberals to lower the fat tax
rate. Regarding the human rights, the guarantee of minorities protec-
tion and multiculturalism they have no fundamental disputes (except
for Liberal Conservatives who combine the idea of fat income tax
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Fourth Political Theory
rate with conservative principles of family, morale, religion, like
American right-wingers Republicans and Neocons).
According to Giddens, the point of the Third Way is to make
Liberals and Social Democrats to cooperate on building the Europe-
an Community based on extension of freedoms, preservation of pri-
vate property by varying the participation of state and mechanisms
of income distribution in each specifc case within preestablished
limits. Unlike the classical Social Democrats, not to mention the Eu-
ropean Communists, the advocates of the Third Way sympathize
with the US and insist on the Atlantic community consolidation
(while the Leftists, both old and new, tend to criticize harshly the
US and American society for Liberalism, inequity and imperialism).
It is the advocates of the Third Way that are renegades of the
left movements indeed. And only former Trotskyites go farther than
that (the American Trotskyites main neocon theorists, and the Eu-
ropean Trotskyites, for instance, Barroso, the Portuguese President
of the European Commission), who have changed their views from
extremist Communism and revolutionary Socialism for equally rad-
ical defense of Liberalism, market and economic inequity.
The Third Way Socialists view the left project as maintenance
of status-quo.
National Communism (conceptual paradox, ideological dis-
crepancies, underground energies)
National Gauchism should be considered a very special phe-
nomenon. Unlike Orthodox Marxism and Social Democracy this
trend has been underexplored and its correct interpretation is a mat-
ter of the future. The case is that National Gauchism itself almost
never advertises its national idea, conceals or even openly criticizes
it. Consequently, the studying of direct and open discourse of Na-
tional Communist movement, parties and regimes is complicated
due to the fact that the discoursed theses either correspond with
the reality to the half or not at all. We can meet realized, open and
integral National Gauchist discourse only on the sideway of those
166 Alexander DUGIN
regimes and political parties that in fact profess and implement this
very ideological model, and refuse to admit it. Therefore, National
Gauchism avoids frontal rational research, preferring to keep half of
this phenomenon: everything connected with National in the
shadow.
National-Communists consider themselves just Communists,
Orthodox Marxists, who strictly follow Marxist classics ideas. In
order to understand what it all really is about it is enough to establish
the following criterion: only those countries underwent the Socialist
(proletarian) revolutions, which, according to Marx, were not ready
for it due to the following reasons:
agrarian structure of these countries;
underdevelopment (or even absence) of capitalist relations;
small number of urban proletariat;
weak industrialization;
preservation of traditional society basic conditions (as a re-
sult of the fact that these countries belonged to premodern).
That is the fundamental paradox of Marxism: in those countries
where Socialism should have won and where the conditions were fa-
vorable, it has not; although purely theoretically it is in those coun-
tries where Orthodox Marxist trends and parties existed and are still
there. And they won in those countries where, according to Marx,
could not have won. The victorious Communists themselves in
the frst place, Russian Bolsheviks did their utmost to conceal and
retouch this obvious discrepancy with the forecasts of their teacher,
without analyzing it conceptually. On the contrary, they preferred to
voluntaristicly adjust the reality to their theoretical conclusions to
adjust the society, politics and economy to make them artifcially
and mechanically agree with abstract criteria. Only outside observ-
ers (sympathizers or critics) noticed National Communist charac-
ter of the success Marxist revolutions and recognized their driving
force and factor that had opened for their success and steadiness
within national archaic element, which was mobilized by Marxism
as a nationally interpreted eschatological myth. One of the frst sym-
pathizers that noticed it was Sorel, then Ustrialov, Savitsky, Ger-
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mans Niekisch, Petel, Lauffenberg, Wolfhaim, etc; on the part of the
critics Popper, Hayek, Kon, Aron.
National Communism predominated in the USSR, communist
Chine, Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Kampuchea and in a number of
Communist movements in the third world countries from Mexi-
can Chiapas and Peruvian Camino Luminiso to the Kurdistan
Workers Party and Islamic socialism. Leftist socialist elements
are present in Mussolinis fascism and Hitlers National Socialism,
however, in this case these elements are fragmented, non-systematic
and shallow; they constituted themselves more in marginal or spo-
radical ideas (left Italian fascism in its early futuristic phase and
Italian Socialist republic, brothers Schtrassers left anti-Hitler Na-
tional Socialism or anti-Hitler clandestine organization of National-
Bolsheviks Niekisch and Schulz-Boysen, etc). However, it should
seem that on the face of it and by its name we should ascribe Na-
tional Socialism to this category, still there was no Socialism as such
in National Socialism there was more likely etatism multiplied by
invocations of archaic energies of ethnos and race. However, the
Soviet Bolshevism, which was recognized by smenavekhite Nikolay
Ustrialov as National Bolshevism, did contain both principles: so-
cial and national, though the latter did not have a conceptual defni-
tion.
Up to now a lot of political movements, for example, in Latin
America are inspired by this idea-complex; and political regimes in
Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia (Evo Morales is the frst Latin Ameri-
can leader of Indian origin) or Ollanta Humala, whose supporters
nearly seized the power in Peru, and other National Communist
movements are full-fedged political reality. State system is either
based on them or it may well happen in the near future. When Com-
munism contains left ideas multiplied by national (ethnic, archaic)
energies and implemented in terms of traditional society it has real
chances. Actually, it is unorthodox Marxism, a kind of National
Marxism (however it assesses itself). And those countries, where
are all classical preconditions for implementation of Communism
(industrialized society, developed industry, urban proletariat) are
168 Alexander DUGIN
fulflled, did not undergo Socialist revolution (except for ephemeral
Bavarian Republic), are not undergoing and, probably, will never
do.
The meaning of the Left Nationalism (National-Gauchism) con-
sists in mobilization of archaic basis (local as a rule) in order to set
free onto the surface and realize itself in social and political creativ-
ity. Here comes Socialist theory that serves as a kind of interface
for these energies, which without Socialism remain as a local phe-
nomenon; and due to Marxism though understood and interpreted
in a specifc way these energies get an opportunity to intercom-
municate with substantially similar, but structurally different phe-
nomena and even lay a claim to universality and planetary scope,
transforming Nationalism, warmed-up due to Socialist rationality,
into a messianic project.
Grand experience of the USSR shows how large-scale a National
Communist initiative can be, having created almost for a century
a fundamental headache for the whole global Capitalistic system.
And Chine in current conditions, more and more focusing on na-
tional component of its social and political model, proves that this
basis, transformed in proper time and in a delicate way, can remain
competitive even after the global triumph of Liberal Capitalism. On
the other hand, experience of Venezuela and Bolivia shows that Na-
tional Communist regimes appear nowadays and demonstrate their
viability even in the face of serious pressure. North Korea, Vietnam
and Cuba have been preserving their political system since the So-
viet time without undertaking any market reforms like Chine and
without losing grounds like the USSR.
From theoretical point of view in case of National Gauchism we
deal with Marxism which was a bit changed in the spirit of archaic
eschatological expectations, deep national mythology connected
with waiting for the end of the world and return of the golden
age (cargo cult, Premilennialism). Thesis about justice and state of
the truth, which is a basis for Socialist utopia, is religiously realized
and awakens fundamental tectonic energies of an ethnos.
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Fourth Political Theory
Has National Gauchism got a future project? Not in a complete
form. As there are a number of obstacles:
a shock after the collapse of the Soviet National Communism
(as far back as in the 1920s Russian Eurasianists predicted
this collapse unless the Soviet authorities realize the impor-
tance of direct appeal to national and religious element);
absence of conceptualization and rationalization of the na-
tional component in the whole idea-complex of National-
Communist movements and ideologies (most of the adher-
ents of this ideological direction consider themselves just
Marxists and Socialists);
poor institutional communication between National Bolshe-
vik circles around the world (there are almost no serious and
large-scale conferences on this issue, no theoretical maga-
zines or they remain somewhat marginal, no philosophical
elaborations).
Nevertheless, to my way of thinking, National Gauchism may
well have global future, as most of human segments have not yet
spent their archaic, ethnic and religious energies, unlike the citizens
of the modernist enlightened and rational West.
New leftists (antiglobalism, postmodern routes, labyrinth of
freedoms, to the advent of posthumanity)
Something that today most fully correspond with the word com-
bination left project is called new leftists (Neogauchism) or
Postmodernism. In the whole spectrum of left ideas at the begin-
ning of the 21 century this direction is not only the brightest, but
also the most thought-out, intellectually regulated and systematized.
New leftists appeared in 1950-1960s in Europe at the periph-
ery of the left-winged Marxists, Trotskyites and Anarchists. Marx
was sine qua non for them, however, they used actively other theo-
retical and philosophical sources and unlike old leftists they un-
hesitatingly introduced borrowed elements into their own theories.
Therefore, Marxism rapidly expanded in this direction, developed,
170 Alexander DUGIN
was constantly juxtaposed with other philosophical concepts, recon-
sidered, subjected to criticism in one word, it became an object of
concentrated refection. This loose attitude of new leftists towards
Marxism yielded ambiguous results: on the one hand, it has been
diluted, on the other hand, it was signifcantly modernized.
However, new leftists were infuenced to a large degree by
so called philosophers of suspicion including not only Marx, but
also Freud and Nietzsche. Through Sartre, new leftists classic,
Martin Heidegger and existentialist problematic have profoundly
infuenced the left movement. Structuralism has had a telling impact
on it from the main theorist of structural linguistics Ferdinand de
Saussure to Levi-Strauss. In the philosophical sense new leftists
were structuralists, however, since mid-1980s they have passed to
poststructuralism, further developing this philosophical impulse,
and have begun to criticize their own views of 1960-1970s.
New leftists took Marxism from structuralist point of view
they considered Marxs idea about basis fundamental impact (usu-
ally bourgeois society, concealed from ideological recognition)
on superstructure the most important. Marxs analysis of ideology
as a false consciousness became for new leftists a key to in-
terpretation of society, philosophy, man, economy. However, they
discovered the same approach of idea with Nietzsche, who derived
the whole spectrum of philosophical ideas from the initial Will to
power (that was the basis, according to Nietzsche) and Freud,
who used subconsciousness and unconscious impulses rooted
in foundation of human sexuality and in its initial structuralization in
the early childhood as a basis. Heideggers model with pure ex-
istence Dasein as a basis was put over it. New leftists reduced
all versions of deciphering of the basis to the integrating scheme,
where the role of basis as it is regardless the specifc philosophi-
cal trend was shifted to the concept of structure. Structure is
at the same time production forces, refected in production relations,
subconsciousness, Will to power and Dasein.
The basic idea of new leftists was about the bourgeois society
being a result of many-sided violence and suppression by su-
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Fourth Political Theory
perstructure (bourgeois political system, everyday consciousness,
power elites, generally accepted philosophical systems, science, so-
ciety, market economy, etc) of basis and structure (also widely
understood including the unconscious, proletariat, body,
the masses, authentic existence experience, freedom and justice).
Thereby, new leftists in contrast to old leftists have waged a sys-
temic critical attack on capitalistic society in all directions from
politics (the May 1968 events in the European countries) to culture,
philosophy, art, conception of man, intellect, science, reality. In the
course of this huge intellectual work (which, by the way, was no-
ticed by neither old leftists nor National Gauchiste) new leftists
came to the conclusion that Capitalism is not only socio-political
evil, but also a fundamental expression of global lie about a man,
reality, intellect, society; therefore, the whole alienation history is
focused on Capitalistic society in a resultant moment. New leftists
reincarnated Rousseaus ideas about a noble savage and offered
a deployed panorama of the ideal society, where one can fnd no
exploitation, alienation, lie, suppression, exclusion, by analogy with
archaic groups with gift economy.
The analysis of new leftists showed that Modern era not only
did not implement its liberation slogans but made the dictatorship
of alienation even more cruel and disgusting, putting a faade of
democracy and liberalism to hide it. So the postmodern theo-
ry was formed. It was based on the assumption that at the heart of
worldview, science, philosophy and political ideologies, formed in
the early modern era or in the course of its development, lie stretch-
es, errors, delusions and racist prejudices, that even theoretically
block a possibility of liberation of structure (basis) from dicta-
torship of superstructure. It led to revision of philosophical tradi-
tion of the Modern era and disclosure of those mechanisms that are
focused on the knots of alienation. Such practice was called decon-
struction, which implies attentive and thorough structural analysis
of the context, from where any given idea is generated, with detailed
exarticulation of meaningful core from strata of pathos, moralizing,
fgures of speech and deliberate distortions. Foucault in his Mad-
172 Alexander DUGIN
ness and Civilization and The Birth of the Clinic showed that
modern attitude to mental insanity and even to the disease itself has
all signs of intellectual racism, apartheid and other totalitarian
prejudices. It becomes obvious in equating ill men with criminals,
as well as in structural identity of penitentiary and therapeutic insti-
tutes, that used to be one and the same thing during the early Modern
era.
Bourgeois society despite its mimicry and democratic faade
turns out to be a totalitarian and disciplinary society. Though
new leftists put deep and hardly ever called in question normative
ideas about intellect, science, reality, society, etc, as well as political
and economic mechanisms, which are a far-reaching consequence of
deeper alienation mechanisms, in the center of this liberal dictator-
ship.
That is the main difference between new leftists and old left-
ists: new leftists cast doubt on intellects structure, dispute pro-
fundity of reality concept, disclose positive science as a mystifca-
tion and dictatorship of the science world (Feyerabend, Kuhn)
and harshly criticize the concept of a human as a totalitarian ab-
straction. They do not believe in possibility of changing anything
by evolution of the current system in left way; what is more, they
dispute the effectiveness of radical Marxism, remarking: in those
countries where Marxism should have won, it has not, and in the
countries where Marxism has won, it is not orthodox Marxism (they
borrow criticism of Stalinism and Soviet experience from Trotsky).
Thus, new leftists defne a large-scale project of the right
future with the following requirements in the centre:
refusal from intellect (appeal for conscious choice of schizo-
phrenia by Deleuze and Guattari);
abolition of a man as a measure of all things (the death of
the man by Levy and the death of the author by R. Bar-
thes);
overcoming of all sexual taboos (freedom to choose the sex,
repeal of the ban on incest, refusal from considering a per-
version as perversion, etc);
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Fourth Political Theory
legalization of all kinds of drugs, including hard drugs;
passing to new forms of spontaneous and sporadic being
(rhizome by Deleuze);
destruction of structured society and state in favor of new free
anarchic communities.
The book by A. Negri and M. Hardt Empire, where new left-
ists theses are simplifed up to primitiveness, may be considered
a political manifesto of these trends. Negri and Hardt call the glob-
al Capitalistic system Empire and equate it with globalism and
American global domination. According to them, globalism creates
conditions for universal planetary revolution of multitudes, which
by using universal globalism and its opportunities of communica-
tion and spreading open knowledge will create a network of global
sabotage for passing from human (that acts as subject and object
of violence, hierarchical relations, exploitation and disciplinary
strategies) to posthuman (mutant, cyborg, clone, virtual), who can
chose sex, appearance and individual rationality in ones own way
and for any period of time. According to Negri and Hardt, it will
lead to liberation of creative potency of multitudes and one day
will blow up the global dominance of Empire. This topic has been
played up in many popular flms, for instance, The Matrix, Fight
club, etc.
Antiglobalization movement in whole is oriented towards such
future project. And such events as Conference in San-Paulo,
where globalists for the frst time tried to lay down a general strat-
egy, indicate that the new left project tries to form a specifc politi-
cal implementation. A number of concrete activities Gay Prides,
ecological actions, antiglobalization actions and strikes, unrest in
emigrant suburbs in the European cities, the riots of autonomists
in defense of squats, widespread protests of new trade unions, more
and more reminiscent of carnival, movement for legalizing drugs,
etc ft in this trend.
Furthermore, postmodernism as an art style, which has become
a mainstream in modern Western art, expresses just this new left
political philosophy, entering our everyday life through paintings,
174 Alexander DUGIN
design and Tarantino and Rodriguez flms without preliminary po-
litical and philosophical analysis, leaving behind a conscious choice
and imposing itself against our will. It is accompanied by spread-
ing of virtual communication technologies, which carry an implicit
invitation to postmodern and dispersal into posthuman, hedonistic
fragments. SMS and MMS messages, blogs and video blogs in the
Internet, fashmobs and other usual activities of modern youth is
in fact implementation of some aspects of new left project, yet
controlled by the bourgeois system, which is making proft out of
fashion though the fashion is now introduced not by the bourgeois
system, but by its hidden opponent.
Here we should dwell on attitude of new leftists, antiglobalists
to modern liberals and globalists. Like once Marx thought that Capi-
talism with all its horrors was more progressive than Feudalism and
the Middle Ages (as it brings closer the advent of Socialism), today
modern postmodernists and new leftists, harshly criticizing Em-
pire, support it to a certain extent, as Empire, according to them,
aggravating alienation and toughening its planetary dictatorship,
prepares global revolutions of multitudes.
Leftists in modern Russia
In conclusion we should dwell on positions of left forces in Rus-
sia. In practice, we see that there are no old leftists in full sense
in this country at all, as well as in the Soviet time. The group of the
Soviet dissidents (Zinoviev, Shchedrovitsky, Medvedev) does not
count, as they did not manage to develop any outstanding school.
On the other hand, National Communists represent broad social,
psychological and political strata with Communist Party of the Rus-
sian Federation at the helm. Since the whole Soviet history marked
with victory of Socialism (a sure sign of archaic basis) is the his-
tory of unconscious National Gauchism, this trend is hardly surpris-
ing.
At the frst stage of establishing the Communist Party Zyuganov
(not without my participation and participation of Prokhanov, which
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Fourth Political Theory
was expressed in position of the newspaper Den (Day) (Za-
vtra Tomorrow) in the early 1990s) tried to comprehend and con-
ceptually assess National component in the Soviet ideology (Nation-
al Bolshevism); however, the authorities of the Communist Party
shortly after gave up this initiative, dealing with some other prob-
ably more important matters. Though, at the level of rhetoric and
primary reaction Russian communists speak as National Conserva-
tives and sometimes as Orthodox Monarchists.
What is more, average Russians especially, of middle and older
generation on the whole are unconscious National Gauchiste. They
always support this idea-complex at the fst opportunity (the Party
Rodina (Motherland)) and thereby interpret a lot of things that
have nothing to do with it (Social Conservatism of United Russia
and Putin). While the marginal groups that imitate European neona-
zism and try to use National Socialism in their names, have never
been National Gauchiste, as they imitate (as a result of inferiority
of mind) Hitler regimes gadgets, continuing to play soldiers and
watch TV series Seventeen Moments of Spring, admiring raven
uniform of Bronevoy-Mueller. The project of NBP (National Bol-
shevik Party), which at one time I was going to develop in authentic
Russian National Gauchism based on ideas of Ustrialov, Niekisch
and left Eurasianists, unfortunately, by the end of 1990s had degen-
erated into rowdy, meaningless formation and later it began to serve
antirussian orange ultraliberal forces, fed-up by the West (it con-
tradicts fundamental aims of National-Bolshevism, which is both
in theory and in practice conscious left consequently infexibly
antiliberal, Russian patriotic and therefore antiwestern project.
New leftists and postmodernists are almost absent in Russian
political spectrum; philosophical discourse of postmodern is too
complicated for them. A small group of conscious (representa-
tive) antiglobalists exist, but they are more famous in the Western
countries and do not represent anything serious (neither in organi-
zational, nor theoretical sense). In the Russian art in particular
in Vinzavod, Guelmans gallery, as well as in the Russian flms
postmodern trends are clearly visible, and their artistic expression
176 Alexander DUGIN
is sometimes impressive. The books by Sorokin or Pelevin represent
postmodern in a literary form.
Furthermore, an average artistic or even technological (which
is more important!) Western product carries a hidden part of post-
modern, thereby occupying Russian cultural space with active signs,
elaborated in new leftists creative laboratories, and then churned
out by global industry, which takes a short-term advantage of it (and
gradually undermines its bases). Russia plays a role of inactive con-
sumer, which does not understand political and ideological meaning
of what it automatically consumes following fashion and global
trends (and forgetting that, according to postmodernists, every trend
has trend-setters the subjects that launch a particular trend with a
specifc aim).

CHAPTER 14. LIBERALISM
AND ITS METAMORPHOSES
In 1932 the German National-Bolshevik Ernst Niekisch, whose
ideas were remarkably similar to both the Russian National-Bol-
sheviks (Ustryalov) and the Eurasianists, wrote a book with the re-
vealing title: Hitler: Disaster for Germany. The book went almost
unnoticed but after a few years led him straight to the concentra-
tion camps. He turned out to be absolutely right Hitler in fact
had appeared precisely to be a fateful fgure for Germany. Fateful,
meaning not accidental; well founded, engrained in the course of
things, joined with the logic of Fate, but embodying her darker as-
pect. And in this book, as in other of his works, Niekisch repeated:
In human society there are no fatalities such as those inherent in
nature the changing of the seasons, natural disasters. The dignity
of man consists in the fact that he can always say no. He can
always rebel. He can always rise and fght against even that which
seems inevitable, absolute and unbeatable. And even if he loses he
gives an example to others. And others take his place. And others
say no. Thats why the most fateful and fated occurrences can be
defeated with the strength of the soul.
Niekisch fought with Nazism and Nazis, and predicted earlier
and more precisely than others what will be the consequences of
their bloody rule for Germany and mankind. He did not give up.
He threw down a challenge to evil fate, not letting down his fsts.
Most importantly: he resisted a strength that seemed invincible with
a handful of like-minded anti-Nazis. A group of Niekischs follow-
ers one of them the National-Bolshevik Harro Schultz-Boysan
became the core of the Red Orchestra. It was he, almost blind
178 Alexander DUGIN
then, that the Soviet troops freed from a concentration camp in 1945.
He did not see he physical victories for which he gave his life, but
until the end of his days he remained convinced that it is necessary
to stand opposed to the evil fate of human history, even if it comes
forth from its deepest fywheels.
Today the same could be said about liberalism as an ideology,
which was victorious in the West and which spreads its infuence
using many old and new ways across the entire world, supported
by superpower number one, the USA. It seems again that this might
is inevitable, not accidental, and follows the fundamental fateful law
and to argue with this power is useless. But again, as in the case of
Ernst Niekisch, people are found who are ready to carry out that
same program, only this time not as regarding a separate country but
rather all mankind: Liberalism is the evil fate of human civiliza-
tion. The battle with it, opposition to it, refutation of its poisonous
dogmas this is the moral imperative of all honest people on the
planet. At all costs, we must, argumentatively and thoroughly, again
and again, repeat that truth, even when to do so seems useless, un-
timely, politically incorrect, and sometimes even dangerous.
Liberalism as a Summary of Western Civilization,
and its Defnition
In order to adequately understand the essence of liberalism, we
must recognize that it is not accidental, that its appearance in history
of political and economic ideologies is based on fundamental pro-
cesses, proceeding in all of Western civilization. Liberalism is not
only a part of that history but its purest and most refned expression,
its result. This principal observation demands from us a stricter def-
nition of liberalism.
Liberalism is a political and economic philosophy and ideology,
embodying in itself the most important lines of force of the modern
age, of the epoch of Modernity:
The understanding of the individual as the measure of all
things;
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Belief in the sacred character of private property;
The assertion of the equality of opportunity as the moral law
of society;
Belief in the contractual basis of all social-political institu-
tions, including governmental;
The abolition of any governmental, religious and social au-
thorities who lay claim to the common truth;
The separation of powers and the making of social systems
of control over any government institution whatever;
The creation of a civil society without races, peoples and re-
ligions in place of traditional governments;
The dominance of market relations over other forms of poli-
tics (the thesis: economics is fate);
Certainty that the historical path of Western peoples and
countries is a universal model of development and progress
for the entire world, which must, in an imperative order, be
taken for the standard and pattern.
It is specifcally these principles which lie at the base of historical
liberalism, developed by the philosophers Locke, Mill, Kant, later
Bentham, and Constance, right up to the neoliberal school of the 20
th

century, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper. Adam Smith, the
follower of Locke, on the basis of the ideas of his teacher adopted
to the analysis of business activity, laid the foundations of political
economy, having written the political and economic Bible of the
Modern epoch.
Freedom From
All the principles of the philosophy of liberalism and the very
name liberalism are based on the thesis of freedom - liberty.
At the same time, the liberal philosophers (in particular Mill) un-
derscore that the freedom they stand up for is a strictly negative
freedom. Moreover, they separate freedom from and freedom to,
suggest using for these things two different English words: liberty
and freedom. Liberty implies freedom from something. It is
180 Alexander DUGIN
from here that the name liberalism is derived. Liberals fght for
this freedom and insist on it. As for freedom to -that is, the mean-
ing and goal of freedom here liberals fall silent, reckoning that
each individual can himself fnd a way to apply his freedom, or he
can neglect altogether to search for a way to use it. This is a ques-
tion of private choice, which is not discussed and which has no po-
litical or ideological value.
On the other hand, freedom from is defned precisely and has a
dogmatic character. Liberals propose to be free from:
Government and its control over the economy, politics and
civil society;
Churches and their dogmas;
Class systems;
Any form of common areas of responsibility of the economy;
Any attempt to redistribute with one or another government
or social institutions the results of material and non-material
labour (the formula of the liberal philosopher Philip Nemo, a
follower of Hayek: Social justice is deeply immoral);
Ethnic attachments;
Any collective identity whatsoever.
One can think that we have some kind of version of anarchy here,
but thats not exactly right. Anarchists at least those like Proudhon
consider as an alternative to government free, communal labour,
with a complete collectivization of its products, and they come out
strongly against private ownership, while liberals, on the other hand,
see in the market and in the sacredness of private property a pledge
for the realization of their optimal socio-economic model. Besides,
theoretically considering that the government must sooner or later
die out, opening up a place for the world market and world civil
society, liberals, for pragmatic reasons, support the government if it
is bourgeois-democratic, facilitates the development of the market,
guarantees to civil society safety and protection against aggressive
neighbours, and staves off the war of all against all (T. Hobbes).
In everything else liberals go rather far, repudiating practically
all social-political institutions, right up the family and sexual differ-
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entiation. In the extreme cases liberals support not only the freedom
of abortions but even the freedom from sexual differentiation (sup-
porting the rights of homosexuals, transsexuals, and so on). The
family, as another form of society, is thought by them to be a purely
contractual thing, which, as other enterprises, is conditioned by
legal agreements.
On the whole, liberals insist not only on freedom from tradi-
tion and sacrality (to speak of previous forms of traditional soci-
ety), but even on freedom from socialization and redistribution,
on which Left socialist and communist political ideologies insist
(if to speak of political forms that are contemporaries of liberalism
or even pretenders to its throne).
Liberalism and the Nation
Liberalism was engendered in Western Europe and America in
the epoch of bourgeois revolutions and strengthened as Western po-
litical, religious and social institutions that preceded the imperial-
feudal periods gradually weakened: monarchy, the church, estates.
In its frst stages, liberalism dealt with the idea of the creation of
contemporary nations, when in Europe they conceived the nation
as a uniform political formation founded on a contractual basis, op-
posing the more ancient imperial and feudal forms. The nation
was understood as the totality of citizens of a state; a totality in
which is embodied the contact of a population of individuals con-
nected with a common territorial residence and common level of
economic development. Neither ethnic, nor religious, nor class fac-
tors had any signifcance. Such a nation-state (Etat-Nation) had
no common historical goal, no determinate mission. It conceived
of itself as a corporation or business that is founded through the
reciprocal agreement of its participants and that can theoretically be
dissolved on those same bases.
The European Nations kicked religion, ethnoses and classes to
the curb, believing these to be remnants of the dark ages. This is
the difference between liberal nationalism and other versions there-
182 Alexander DUGIN
of: here, no values of ethno-religious or historical communities are
taken into consideration; the accent is put only on the benefts and
advantages of the collective agreement of individuals, who have es-
tablished a government for concrete, pragmatic reasons.
The Challenge of Marxism
If with the dismantling of feudal-monarchic and clerical regimes
everything was going smoothly for liberalism and no ideological
alternatives stemming from the European Middle Ages were able to
oppose liberals, then in the depths of the philosophy of the modern
era there appeared a movement contesting with liberals for the right
to frst place in the process of modernization and coming out with a
powerful conceptual criticism of liberalism not from positions of the
past (from the right) but from positions of the future (the left). Such
were socialist and communist ideas, receiving their most systematic
expression in Marxism.
Marx carefully analyzed the political economy of Adam Smith,
and, more broadly, of the liberal school, but he made from these
ideas an absolutely original conclusion. He recognized their partial
correctness in comparison to feudal models of traditional societies
but he offered to go further and in the name of the future of man-
kind to refute what are for liberals the most important postulates.
In liberalism, Marxism:
Denied the identifcation of the subject with the individual
(thinking instead that the subject has a collective-class na-
ture);
Recognized the unjust system of the appropriation of surplus
value by capitalists in the process of a market economy;
Reckoned freedom of bourgeois society a veiled form of
class supremacy, masking under new clothes the mechanisms
of exploitation, alienation and oppression;
Called for a proletarian revolution and abolition of the mar-
ket and private property;
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Fourth Political Theory
Pinned its hopes on the aim of the social collectivization of
property (expropriation of the expropriator);
Claimed creative labour as the social freedom of the commu-
nist future (as the realization of mans freedom to);
Criticized bourgeois nationalism as a form of collective vio-
lence over the poorest layers of their societies and as an in-
strument of international aggression in the name of the ego-
istic interests of the national bourgeoisie.
Thus, over two centuries Marxism transformed into the most im-
portant ideological opponent and competitor of liberalism, attacking
its system, and ideologically following and sometimes scoring im-
portant successes (especially in the 20
th
century, with the appearance
of a world socialist system.) At some point it seemed as though
precisely the leftist powers (Marxists and socialists) would win the
argument over the heritage of modernity and for the orthodoxy
of the new age, and many liberals began to believe that socialism is
the unavoidable future, which would correct considerably the liberal
political system, and maybe altogether abolish it. From here the
tendencies of social-liberalism begin, which, recognizing certain
moral theses of Marxism, strove to smooth over its revolutionary
potential and to combine two foundational ideologies of the new era
for the price of rejecting their cruelest and most pointed affrma-
tions. Revisionists on the side of Marxism, in particular right-wing
social-democrats, moved in the same direction from the opposite
camp.
The question about how to relate to socialists and leftists reached
its most diffcult moments for liberals in the 1920s-1930s, when the
communists frst proved the importance of their historical intentions
and the possibility of seizing and holding power. In this period the
neo-liberal school arises (von Mises, Hayek, and a little later Popper
and Aron), formulating a very important ideological thesis: liberal-
ism is not a transitional stage from feudalism to Marxism and social-
ism, but rather an entirely completed ideology, holding an exclusive
monopoly on the heritage of the Enlightenment and the Modern Era;
Marxism itself is no development of Western thought but rather a
184 Alexander DUGIN
regressive return under (modernist slogans) to the feudal epoch of
eschatological uprisings and millenarian cults. Neo-liberals proved
this by the systematic critique of the German conservative philoso-
pher, Hegel, as well as by references to the totalitarian Soviet ex-
perience, and called for a return to the roots, to Locke and Smith,
standing frmly on their principles and by criticizing social-liberals
for their concessions and compromises.
Neoliberalism as theory was most clearly formulated in Europe
(Austria, Germany, England) but its large-scale realization hap-
pened in the USA, where liberalism dominated in politics, ideology
and economic practice. And although at the time of Roosevelt there
were strong social-liberal tendencies even in the USA (the New Deal
era, the infuence of Keynes, and so on) the indisputable advantage
was with the liberal school. In a theoretical sense this tendency
received its greatest development in the Chicago school (M. Fried-
man, F. Knight, G. Simons, J. Stigler, and others).
After the Second World War, the deciding stage of the battle for
the heritage of the Enlightenment began: liberals supported by the
USA fought the fnal fght with Marxism, personifed by the USSR
and its allies. Europe occupied the third-place in the ideological
war: social-liberal and social-democratic tendencies prevailed there.
The Defnitive Victory of the Liberals in the 1990s
The fall of the USSR and our defeat in the Cold War signifed
from an ideological point of view the fnal distribution of roles in
the fght for the heritage of the Enlightenment, for the way of the
future. Exactly on the strength of the fact that the USSR lost and
fell apart, it became obvious that the historical right was on the side
of the liberals - especially of the neoliberals, who prevented social-
ism and communism from claiming the future as the progressive
tomorrow. Soviet society and other socialist regimes turned out to
be carefully disguised versions of archaic structures, having inter-
preted in their own way the mystically, religiously understood
Marxism.
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Fourth Political Theory
This all important moment in the political history of mankind
frst of all put the dot on the i with respect to the most important
question of the times: which of the two central ideologies of the
twentieth century would follow the past (the spirit of the Enlighten-
ment) and automatically receive the future (the right to dominate by
ideological means the coming days). The question of the goal of the
historical process was principally settled.
In the middle of the 20
th
century the French philosopher, a He-
gelian of Russian origin, Alexander Kojeve, suggested that the He-
gelian end of history would mark a communist world revolution.
The traditionalists (R. Guenon, J. Evola) who rejected the Enlight-
enment, defending Tradition and foretelling the end of the world
through the victory of the fourth caste (The Shudra of Proletari-
ans) thought similarly. But in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR
it became clear that the end of history would carry not a Marxist
but a liberal form, about which the American philosopher Francis
Fukuyama hurried to inform humanity, proclaiming the end of his-
tory as the planetary victory of the market, liberalism, the USA
and bourgeois-democracy. Marxism as a possible alternative and
project of the future became a meaningless episode of political and
ideological history.
From that moment there not only begins the take-off of liberal-
ism, and that in its most orthodox, fundamentalist Anglo-Saxon and
anti-socialist forms, but also the laying bare of the fundamental fact
of the ideological history of man: liberalism is destiny. But this
means that its theses, its philosophical, political, social and econom-
ic principles and dogmas should be looked at as something universal
and absolute, having no alternatives.
On the Threshold of the American Century
As a result of the political history of the 20
th
century it was dis-
covered that liberalism won the war for the contemporary times,
having beat all its opponents on both the right and the left. The
186 Alexander DUGIN
huge cycle of the modern era was completed with the triumph of
liberal ideology, which received henceforth a monopoly on the con-
trol and direction of historical development. Liberalism was left
with no symmetrical enemy, no large-scale subject with an adequate
historical self-understanding, a convincing and orderly ideology, se-
rious material and military resources, and comparable technological,
economic and military foundations. All that still opposed liberal
ideology showed itself as a chaotic collection of simple nuisances,
mistakes, in a word noises, opposing through inertia the builders
of the new liberal order. This was not a rivalry of alternative civi-
lizational and geopolitical subjects, but the reactive and passive re-
sistance of a disorganized environment. Thus, the structure of soil,
rain, karstic emptiness or marsh land bothers the builders of roads
the discussion is not about the pushing of another route that another
company insists on, but about the resistance of materials.
In this situation the USA, as the citadel of world liberalism, took
on a new quality. From this time on, it became not only one of two
superpowers, but the single planetary hero, suddenly pulling away
from its rivals. The French critic of the USA Hubert Vedrin sug-
gested that the USA should henceforth be called not a superpower
but a hyperpower, underscoring its solitariness and its asymmetrical
superiority. From an ideological point of view, the victory of liber-
alism and the rise of the USA is not an accidental coincidence but
two sides of one and the same occurrence. The USA won the Cold
War not because it amassed more potential and got ahead in the
technological competition, but because it based itself on the liberal
ideology, proving both its technological competence and its histori-
cal rightness in the ideological war, substantiating the balance of the
modern era. And just as liberalism displayed its fated dimension,
the USA received a visual confrmation of its messianism, which in
the ideology of the Manifest Destiny was, since the 19
th
century,
an article of faith for the American political elite.
American neoconservatives recognized this arrangement of mat-
ters more clearly than anyone else. In the words of one of their
most important ideologues, William Kristol, the 20
th
century was
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Fourth Political Theory
the century of America, but the 21
st
century will be the American
century. Let us consider that statement: what difference is there
between the century of America and the American century?
The century of America signifes that in that period the ideology
of liberalism fought with its rivals (residual traditionalism, fascism,
socialism and communism) and smashed them to bits. America,
having been one of a few world powers, transformed into the only
one. And now, according to the thinking of the neoconservatives,
America is due to affrm the American model the American way
of life - as a world order obligatory for all. Before ones eyes the
USA stops being a national government and becomes a synonym
for world government. The entire planet must henceforth become
a World America, World Government, World State. This is
what they call the American century, the project of globalizing
the American model on the world scale. Not simply colonization
or a new form of imperialism, this is a program of the total im-
plementation of the one and only ideological system, copied from
the American liberal ideology. America henceforth has pretensions
to the universal spreading of a unitary code, which penetrates into
the life of peoples and governments in a thousand different ways
like a global network through technology, the market economy,
the political model of liberal-democracy, information systems, the
model of mass culture, and establishment of direct strategic control
of Americans and their satellites over geopolitical processes.
The American century is thought of as a remelting of the existing
world order into a new one, built up on strictly American patterns.
This process is conditionally called democratization, and it is di-
rected to a few concrete geopolitical enclaves that are in the frst
place problematic from the point of view of liberalism. In this way,
there came to be the projects of the Great Middle East, Great
Central Asia and so on. The meaning of them all consists in the
uprooting of inertial national, political, economic, social, religious
and cultural models and their replacement by the operational system
of American liberalism. But it is not that important whether the dis-
cussion is about the enemies of the USA or their allies: both friends
188 Alexander DUGIN
and enemies are subject to re-formatting, as are those who wish to
remain neutral. This is the meaning of the American century: lib-
eralism, having defeated its formal enemies, penetrates completely.
And now it is not enough to be on the side of the USA in local con-
ficts (as many countries behaved that were not liberal those like
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). Henceforth, liberalism must
penetrate into the depths of all societies and countries without ex-
ception, and the slightest resistance will be, by the thoughts of the
neoconservatives, broken as happened in Serbia, Iraq or Afghani-
stan.
American critics of such an approach for instance, the clas-
sic conservative, Patrick Buchanan declare: America acquired
the whole world, but lost itself. However, this does not stop neo-
conservatives, inasmuch as they take the US not only as a national
government but also as the avant-garde of the liberal ideology. And
it was no accident that the neoconservatives emerged from Trot-
skyism. Just as Trotskyites sought a global communist revolution,
mercilessly criticizing Stalin and the idea of building socialism in
one country, contemporary neoconservatives call for a global lib-
eral revolution, categorically rejecting the call of isolationists to
limit themselves to the American borders and their historical allies.
Precisely the neoconservatives, setting the tone for contemporary
American politics, most deeply understand the ideological mean-
ing of the fate of political teachings at the dawn of the 21
st
century.
American neoconservative circles most adequately perceive the sig-
nifcance of the large-scale changes happening in the world. For
them ideology remains the most important subject of attention,
although today it also turns into soft ideology or soft power.
Liberalism and Post-Modernity
Having gone over from the formal opposition to the alternative
ideologies to the new phase of introduction on the world scale, the
liberal ideology changes its status. In the epoch of modernity liber-
alism always coexisted with non-liberalism, which means that it was
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Fourth Political Theory
an object of choice; like with modern computer technology, where
one can theoretically select a computer with a Microsoft, Mac OS
or Linux operating system. Having defeated its rivals, liberalism
brought back a monopoly on ideological thinking; it became the sole
ideology, not allowing alongside itself any other. One could say that
it switched over from the level of a program to the level of an operat-
ing system, having become something common. Notice, coming to
a store and selecting a computer, we more often than not do not say:
give me a computer that runs Microsoft. We simply say: give me
a computer. And in accordance with our silence were sold a com-
puter with a Microsoft operating system. So it is with liberalism: It
is implanted in us by itself, like something standard, which it would
be absurd and pointless to contest.
The content of liberalism changes, switching over from the level
of expression to the level of speech. Liberalism becomes not proper
liberalism, but sub-audition, silent agreement, consensus. This cor-
responds to the switch over from the epoch of modernity to post-
modernity. In post-modernity, liberalism, preserving and even in-
creasing its infuence, ever more rarely projects an intelligent and
freely adopted political philosophy; it becomes unconscious, self-
understood and instinctive. This instinctive liberalism, having pre-
tences to transform itself into the generally non-conscious matrix
of contemporariness, gradually acquires grotesque characteristics.
From the classical principles of liberalism, which have become un-
conscious (the world reserve unconscious along an analogy with
the dollar world reserve currency), the grotesque ways of post-
modern culture are born. This is already a sui generis post-liber-
alism, following from the total victory of classical liberalism, but
leading it to an extreme conclusions.
Thus there arises the panorama of post-liberal grotesques:
The measure of things becomes not the individual, but the
post-individual, the dividual, accidentally playing an iron-
ic combination of parts of people (his organs, his clones, his
simulacra all the way up to cyborgs and mutants);
190 Alexander DUGIN
Private property is idolized, transcendentalized, and trans-
forms from that which a man owns to that which owns the
man;
Equality of opportunity turns into equality of the contem-
plation of opportunities (the society of the spectacle Guy
Debord)
Belief in the contractual character of all political and social
institutions grows into an equalization of the real and the vir-
tual, the world becomes a technical model;
All forms of non-individual authorities disappear altogether,
and any individual is free to think about the world whatso-
ever he thinks ft (the crisis of common rationality);
The principle of the separation of powers changes into the
idea of a constant electronic referendum (electronic parlia-
ment), where each internet-user continually votes on any
decision, which leads to the multiplication of power to the
number of separate citizens (each is his own branch of gov-
ernment);
Civil society completely displaces government and con-
verts into a global, cosmopolitan melting pot;
From the thesis economy is destiny it takes up the thesis
the numerical code that is destiny, so far as work, money,
the market, production, consumption everything becomes
virtual.
Some liberals and neoconservatives were terrifed at that pros-
pect, which opened up as a consequence of the ideological victory
of liberalism, before the transition to post-liberalism and post-mo-
dernity. Thus, Fukuyama, the author of the thesis of the liberal end
of history in the last decade, has called on the US and the West to
turn back and to hold over on the previous phase of vintage clas-
sical liberalism, with the market, the nation-state and the customary
scientifc rationalism, in order to avoid sliding into the post-liberal
chasm. But in this he is contradicting himself: the logic of the trans-
formation from normal liberalism to the liberalism of post-moderni-
ty is neither arbitrary nor voluntary; it is written in the very structure
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Fourth Political Theory
of the liberal ideology: in the course of the gradual liberation of man
from all that which is not himself (from all non-human and supra-
individual values and ideals), one must sooner or later free a man
from his own self. And the most frightening crisis of the individual
does not begin when he is fghting alternative ideologies that deny
man is the highest value, but when he attains his conclusive and ir-
reversible victory.
Liberalism in Contemporary Russia
If we were to juxtapose all the aforementioned about liberalism
with what is understood by liberalism in Russia, we would have
to admit that there is no liberalism here. There are liberals, but no
liberalism. Until the beginning of the 90s, Marxist ideology for-
mally dominated in Russia, having brought up the outright majority
of those people who one way or another infuence the decisions of
government today. The principles of liberalism, in the frst place,
were foreign to the instinctive foundations of Russian society, they
were severely persecuted by the ideological organs in the USSR;
were either unknown or else construed in a caricatured and fragmen-
tary way. The sole meaning of liberalism in Russia in the 1990s
was freedom from Russian-Soviet political-economic traditions and
an uncritical, ignorant and parodic imitation of the West. Practically
none of the post-Soviet elite selected liberalism consciously and de-
liberately: until the last moment of the fall of the USSR, the leaders
of Russian liberalism eulogized the Communist Party, the ideas of
Marx, the Plan and Socialism, while the oligarchs made a living in
the Committee of Komsomols or served in the KGB. Liberalism as
a political ideology interested no one; not a penny was paid for it.
Such a cheap and crooked liberalism was maintained in the 1990s as
an ersatz-ideology of post-Soviet Russia. But instead of mastering
liberal principles its supporters and preachers engaged in careerism,
privatization and setting up their own little deals in the best case
fulflling the guidelines of the Western curators of the breakdown of
Soviet and Russian state. This was an ideological disintegration of
192 Alexander DUGIN
the previous structure without erecting anything new at all. No one
even really chose the dubious freedom from.
When Putin came to power and attempted to turn the process of
Russias disintegration around, he encountered, to a large measure,
no ideological opposition. He was challenged by concrete economic
clans, whose interests he discerned, and the more active agency of
infuence, deeply entrenched in espionage in the service of the West.
The absolute majority of liberals quickly transformed themselves
into backers of Putin, adapting themselves under the individual
patriotic sympathies of the new leader. Even iconic fgures of Rus-
sian liberalism Gaydar, Chubais, etc. - behaved like banal oppor-
tunists: they could not care less about the ideological content of Pu-
tins reforms.
In Russia, irrespective of the whole period of the 1990s, liberal-
ism did not penetrate deeply and did not spawn a political generation
of authentic, convinced liberals. It operated on Russia mainly from
without, which led in the end to a worsening of relations with the
US, to the obstruction of Putin and his course in the West, and, in
response, to his Munich speech.
But insofar as the number of conscious liberals in the critical mo-
ment of change in Russia turned out to be not more than the number
of conscious communists at the end of the 1980s, Putin did not in-
sist on their ideological harassment, opting to control only the more
unbridled of the liberal oligarchs and the direct agents of infuence
who became impudent from lawlessness. Intuitively striving to pre-
serve and consolidate Russian sovereignty, Putin entered into a con-
fict with the liberal West and its plans for globalization, but without
forming his actions into an alternative ideology. This was mostly
because there were so very few convinced liberals in Russia.
The real liberal is the one who acts in compliance with the fun-
damental principles of liberalism, including in those instances when
to do so could lead to serious consequences, repressions and even
deprivation of life. If people turn out to be liberals only then when
liberalism is permitted, in fashion or even obligatory, ready at the
frst diffculty to repudiate these principles, such liberalism has
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Fourth Political Theory
no relation to the real kind. It seems Khodorkovsky, the icon of
contemporary Russian liberals, understood that, having spent some
time in prison. But in this, it seems to me, he is an exception among
the liberals who remain free.
CHAPTER 15. THE POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION
IN POST-MODERNITY
The Morphology and Semantics of Revolution
There is a very important addition to the concept of revolution.
It is exactly this, that should immediately lead us to the center of
the aforementioned problems. Revolution is an empirical fact. This
means, that revolution was, is and will be. Having realized that, we
get in the mediastinum of the topic, since we discuss not something
abstract, but quite specifc. Recent years, a sociological paternos-
ter, which says that Russia has exhausted its limit for the revo-
lution, became very relevant. This is an absolutely mere assertion,
which essentially means, that Russia has exhausted its limit for the
history, historical existence, thought, and that it must be content
with what it has. In fact, revolution is not just something that can
be, but it is something, that always is, something that historically
happens, and something that lies in the very core of human being.
According to Arnold Gehlens thesis, the man is a Mangelwesen,
an insuffcient being, that essentially misses something. Moreo-
ver, the defnition of man lies not in its identity, but in its counter-
identity, in its oppositeness to identity. One never defnes himself
as this, but defnes himself as not this, which is fundamentally
important. According to it, one knows only what he is not. This is
due to the fact, that in the center of a human being stands Mangel
(defciency, scarcity), thats why a man is an unbalanced being, he
carries the emptiness of nothingness in self, thats why he is scienter
focused on a revolution as a statement of something that there is
not. In fact, according to T. Kuhn (referring The Structure of Sci-
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entifc Revolutions), revolution is dismantling of the old order and
establishing another one.
From the revolution perspective it doesnt matter that the ques-
tion is about establishing new order. Substantional part of revolution
is that, what will be denied by the subsequent revolution. The new
order, which revolution brings, is not principal, this order is needed
just to be overthrown once. However, the sense of revolution is not
about to remove the bad and replace it with good, or even to remove
the old order and put in its place a new one. The sense of revolution
lies in dissatisfaction with what exists, and in the statement, which
states that there must be something else. Revolution is a striving to
overcome what is present now. And this fact is more important than
what revolutionaries offer instead of the old order. In this regard, the
destructiveness of revolution becomes its constructive power. Why
is it so? The question lies in a fgure of Mangelwesen, the essence,
which main feature is insuffciency and defciency. If man would
not be such a like, then his revolution would aim replacement of one
regime with another. Really, in order to be himself, one must be in
revolution. His very existence is a process of revolution, that em-
bodies defciency of identity rather than striving for a new identity.
Thus, a revolution is more a human existence, than interims between
revolutions. One lives in revolution only, at other times he is deliri-
ous, dreaming, lives waiting for the revolution. Thats why being in
a revolution is a humane being.
Thus, the revolution, on the one hand, is an empirical fact, but
on the other an anthropological characteristics, that refects the
essence of the man. Accordingly, it is both possible and real, both
potential and actual. If we were talking about the revolution as of
something impossible, as of something that never took place before,
as of something that just may happen, then we would have talked
about its some idealization. But we talk of revolution as of empiri-
cal fact, and certainly, for our country, that had experience of such
a great revolution in XX century, it should be obvious. We are tried
to be convinced that there was no October Revolution, the last one
196 Alexander DUGIN
being called an overturn, a conspiracy, a dark forces infuence,
with conspiracy tools being used, with everything being translated
to the plane of economic models. We are tried to be said that there
was no revolution, but was a commercial deal. Naturally, the revo-
lution in Russia was, and defciency was manifested as the essence
of man. When one starts to live his essence, that is, insuffciency,
when identity withdraws, when disidentifcation takes place, only
then one begins to live in genuine humane time. Only revolution-
ary time is a time really, because it has no duration, since it is shift
time, a break, a time of appearance of the new, a time of Ereignis.
According to Heidegger, the notion of Event (Ereignis) is rou-
tine rupture, an encounter with something, what had not been. This
is anthropological, ontological and temporal essence of revolution.
Thats why the time of revolution is the opposite to any other time,
because one becomes himself in this time. The rest of time one is
essentially asleep waiting for revolution. The rest of time is anti-
time, that separates two revolutions, it is a moment of break. And
this anti-time is maximally alienated from one. During this dreamy
period between two revolutions one considers his identity as posi-
tive, that means he starts to associate himself not with defciency,
but with something present (with the food, welfare, care, fne details
of reality). According to Heidegger, this exact condition is defned
as unauthentic existence. One does not live as part of this existence,
he is being replaced with das Man, and genuine humane existence,
Dasein, is absent. Dasein is revealed only in revolution, the rest of
time is the time of das Man, a framework, which limits within one
identifes himself with a fction, with a fetish. But this is not a mans
fgure, this is not a man in his true sense.
Technology of revolution
Thus, the revolution is empirical, ontological, and conceptual in
nature. Now we can address revolution perspective in its technologi-
cal aspect. Here we move to the feld of sociology, and switch atten-
tion to the fgure of Vilfredo Pareto, who spoke about mechanics of
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revolution. He describes it very cynically after Leon Walras, Robert
Michels and Gaetan Mosca, representatives of neomachiavellistic
direction. Inheriting Machiavelli Pareto says that a political institu-
tion itself and its structure are a matter of primary, and the ideology
is secondary. Pareto calls to drop the issues of revolution teleology,
attention should be focused on a formula, according to which there
are two categories: those, who rule, and those, who obey (a similar
model of Hegels master and slave). According to his theses, the
elite is a sociological master, a social type, which can only rule,
and cannot refuse to rule. And mass is a category, whose members
can only obey, and can never rule. Pareto insists that any society is
built precisely on this model. And much of his work was dedicated
to description of how liberal elites camoufage their true goals (to
rule and control) under the names of democracy, human rights and
economic freedom.
But the question arises: if the situation is such a like, then society
should be absolutely stable, since the top is strong and the bottom is
weak. According to it, in such a society the revolution is impossible,
however, historically it happens. And Pareto has to say how revolu-
tion can occur in such conditions. For this purpose he introduces the
concept of counter-elite. That is that some part of the elite doesnt
have the powers and takes its place, which is not a rightful one. And
according to Pareto, such an elite, deprived of access to power, how-
ever, is not a mass. In a situation where a part of the elite is thrown
into a mass (historical example younger children f nobility, who
didnt receive an inheritance), it becomes the source of revolution.
Such an elite constantly feels that it doesnt take its rightful place.
Then the attention of counter-elite switches to the elite, which takes
this place. There appear options out of this situation. The frst one
is integration of counter-elite into a vertical of authority, its intro-
duction to powers implementation. Thus, sources of social instabil-
ity are removed. According to Pareto, such a mechanism is most
characteristic of democracy. In this context, it acts as a selection
instrument of the most active, passionary, irreconcilable ones from
counter-elite and their elevation to the rank of the ruling class. The
198 Alexander DUGIN
recognition of such characters stems almost instantly: the one from
the elite is the closest one to Mangelwesen category, so he is more
humane. One wants to rule over others, because he is disgustful of
himself, is insuffcient of himself, he needs to express himself some-
how, to put his fgure over the society, otherwise his life is entirely
dissatisfactory. Mass, in turn, pays for its tranquil and relatively safe
life with its status of a slave. And the elite is a master, that faces a
choice between death and power: either death or power. One from
the mass never seeks for such an issue.
The second way to deal with counter-elite, according to Pareto,
is to thoroughly ignore it, paying attention only to a mass. This is
the way to a suicide of ruling elite, because the counter-elite, being
among the masses, starts to transform it, and accretes with the anti-
elite. Anti-elite, in turn, which is a complex of perverts and deviants,
starts to corrupt broad masses. The next stage of counter-elites ac-
tion is its rallying on the basis of postulation of what it dislikes of
the ruling elite. Moreover, these claims can be both substantiated
and baseless, it is not of decisive importance, as long as the claim
is common. The next step is knocking the masses out from the elite
with the help of anti-elite elements, and taking the elites place by
the counter-elite.
Revolution and modernity. The challenge
of conservative revolution
Here we must note, that in the frames of democracy modernity
loved revolution. Modernity is a regime, that said yes to the revo-
lution, that made it acceptable and casual. Prior to this political re-
gimes regarded the revolution with negative emotions and tried to
prevent it. Because of such an openness to revolution, modernity
overlooks one very important point: appearance of the idea of con-
servative revolution. In contrast to conservatism, which protects the
old, the past, conservative revolution shows its creative origin. We
could say, that this is the exact moment when modernity ends, the
idea of revolution manifests its deterioration, and reach potential of
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conservative revolution reveals. An absolutely new situation arose
a situation of post-modernity, where a thought after Auschwitz
takes place.
The possibility of revolution in post-modernity
The revolution was not only sanctioned by modernity, it was
its very point. Recognition of insuffciency of a man, as of an an-
thropological or ontological outset, likewise, was recognized and
declared as a gain, as a reconquest of authorities negative identity
from petit bourgeois tales of positive identity of man. Herewith, mo-
dernity came to its own exhaustion itself and was reborn in post-
modernity by the end of the 20th century. Accordingly, everything,
that was empirical, adequate, obvious in modernity, has ceased to be
so in post-modernity. But if revolution was a point of modernity, in
post-modernity it becomes impossible, as modernity became impos-
sible itself. Moreover, getting out of modernity and entering post-
modernity, we go beyond the possibility of revolution, revolution
is factored out. Herewith post-modernity does not deny modernity
head-on, it doesnt say no to modernity and revolution, but it says
yes to their simulacra. It understands well, that in order to prevent
revolution, the last one should be simulated. Thus, the sense of post-
modernity is a permanent simulation of revolution. Its brand and
its face can be considered as Che Guevara, touting mobile phones.
If in modernity Che Guevara is a call for armed struggle against
capitalism, in which one exposes his life to a real risk, then now,
a man, wearing a T-shirt with Che Guevara does nothing, except
the simulation of revolution. And this is the most effective strategy
for fghting the revolution and modernity. In current conditions it
is very diffcult to get to the fact, that man is a Mangelwesen, be-
cause the boundary between what is empty and what is not empty,
between presence and absence today is diluted. Today there exists
some lifedeath, where that facet is absent. Modern man, that is
involved in the dynamics of the internet and television, no longer
200 Alexander DUGIN
knows whether he lives or already not. Whole culture and society of
post-modernity leads exactly to this.
The revolution in modern Russia
Does the modern Russian elite let in its ranks those ones, who
want to rule? Defnitely no. By and large the change of the elite to
the counter-elite took place only once in 1991, when Boris Yelt-
sin came to power. With this the door closed (we can rank only
Abramovich and Mamut as exceptions). Those, whom we now call
orthodox chekists were not taken there, because in fact those were
unorthodox non-chekists, St. Petersburgs company, who were
moved from one cabinet to another. In fact, they do not exist, in
modern Russia there are all prerequisites (according to Pareto line)
for revolution to happen, because ruling elite doesnt let in its ranks
younger, accumulating passionaries, who become aware of them-
selves as of a kind of a social power. Thus, in terms of classical
analysis a revolutionary situation develops in Russia.
Thus, the cold structural preconditions for revolution to take
place in Russia are to the fore. What this revolution can be alike?
Probably, a unique model, that lets to annihilate current political
elite simply and effectively, will be carried out here. This is counter-
liberalism. Whatever current elite is in its particular manifestations,
as a most adequate defnition for it the adjective liberal will serve.
Collective representation of the Russian elite is completely limited
to liberalism. If we want to deepen the ideology of this revolution,
we have to fght not even liberalism, but its origins and paradigms,
which are individualism and individual philosophy. And if the rul-
ing elite positions itself as liberal, then the counter-elite will have
to be anti-liberal. Here, the most appropriate platform will be Louis
Dumonts ideology and his work Essays on individualism. In this
work author insists that the main opposite force to individualism
is not Marxism, but (holistic) sociology as a scientifc discipline.
In the frames of (holistic) sociology a thesis about the primacy of
society in relation to the individual has a revolutionary potential.
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Holism, even taken in pure and crude form, can be opposed, on the
one hand, to elites individualism, and on the other hand, can at-
tract the dormant masses, who will recognize themselves in it. Only
post-modernity can prevent it, tending to change in places the elite
and the masses. In this regard, we should pay attention to Christo-
pher Laschs work The revolt of the elites. If previous version
of the sociological pattern of Ortega y Gasset was the fact that on
the forefront of society appear new social types, which are unable
to make history, then Lasch points out that new elites in fact re-
fect the content and main qualities, characteristics of the masses. In
fact, masses and elites swapped. Our new elites actually consist of
ordinary people, of middle class, of petit bourgeois, of people with
meager worldview. Moreover, modern elite avoids its elitist duties,
and becomes a double simulacrum. Thus, post-modernity will avoid
revolution, and already does. Our task is to understand and develop
a description of situation of post-modernity and possibility of revo-
lution in it. For this purpose I invite all participants of Conservative
Studies Center.
CHAPTER 16. AGAINST THE POST-MODERN
WORLD
The Evil of Unipolarity
The current world is unipolar with the global West as its centre
and with the United States as its core.
This kind of the unipolarity has geopolitical and ideologi-
cal characteristics. Geopolitically, it is the strategic dominance
of the earth by the North-American hyperpower and the effort of
Washington to organize the balance of forces on the planet in such a
manner as to be able to rule the whole world in accordance with its
own national (imperialistic) interests. It is bad because it deprives
other states and nations of their real sovereignty.
When there is only one instance to decide who is right and who
is wrong and who should be punished and who not, we have a form
of global dictatorship. I am convinced that this is not acceptable.
Therefore, we should fght against it. If someone deprives us of our
freedom we have to react. And we will react. The American Empire
should be destroyed. And at one point it will be.
Ideologically unipolarity is based on Modernist and Post-Mod-
ernist values that are openly anti-traditional ones. I share the vision
of Rene Guenon and Julius Evola who considered Modernity and
its ideological basis (individualism, liberal democracy, capitalism,
consumerism, and so on) to be the cause of the future catastrophe
of humanity and global domination of the Western lifestyle as the
reason for the fnal degradation of the earth. The West is approach-
ing its terminus and we should not let it drag all the rest of us down
into the abyss with it.
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Fourth Political Theory
Spiritually globalization is the creation of the Grand Parody, the
kingdom of the Antichrist. And the United States is the centre of its
expansion. American values pretend to be universal ones. That
it is new form of ideological aggression against the multiplicity of
cultures and traditions still existing in the rest of the world. I am res-
olutely against Western value which are essentially Modernist and
Post-Modernist, and are promulgated by the United States by force
of or by obtrusion (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, soon Syria and Iran) .
So, all traditionalists should be against the West and globaliza-
tion as well as against the imperialist politics of the United States.
It is the only logical and consequent position. So traditionalists and
partisans of traditional principles and values should oppose the West
and defend the Rest, if the Rest shows signs of the conservation of
Tradition whether in part or entirety.
There can be and there really exist people, in the West and even in
the United States of America itself, who dont agree with the present
state of affairs and dont approve of Modernity and Post-Modernity.
They are the defenders of the spiritual traditions of the Pre-Modern
West. They should be with us in our common struggle. They should
take part in our revolt against the Modern and Post-Modern worlds.
We would fght together against the common enemy.
Another question is the structure of a possible anti-globalist and
anti-imperialist front and its participants. I think that we should in-
clude in it all forces that struggle against the West, the United States,
against liberal democracy, against Modernity and Post-Modernity.
The common enemy is the necessary instance for all kinds of political
alliances. Muslims, Christians, Russians and Chinese, both leftists
and rightists, the Hindus and the Jews who challenge the present
state of affairs, globalization and American imperialism. They are
thus all virtually friends and allies. Let our ideals be different but we
have in common one very strong feature: hatred of the present so-
cial reality. Our ideals that differ are potential (in potentia). But the
challenge we are dealing with is actual (in actu). So, that is the basis
for a new alliance. All who share negative analysis of globaliza-
tion, westernization and post-modernization should coordinate their
204 Alexander DUGIN
effort in creation of a new strategy ofresistance to the omnipresent
evil. And we can fnd common allies within even the United States,
as well among those who choose the path of Tradition over the
present decadence.
Towards the Fourth Political Theory
At this point we should raise a very important question: what
kind of ideology should we use in our opposition to globalization and
its liberal democratic, capitalist, and Modernist (Post-Modernist)
principles? I believe that all previous anti-liberal ideologies (com-
munism, socialism, and fascism) are no longer relevant. They tried
to fght liberal-capitalism and they failed. This is partly because in
the end of time it is evil that prevails; and partly because of their
inner contradictions and limitations. So it is time to begin a deep
revision of the illiberal ideologies of the past. What are their posi-
tive sides? Their positive side is the very fact that they were anti-
capitalist and anti-liberal, as well as also anti-cosmopolitan and
anti-individualist. These features should be accepted and integrated
into a future ideology. But the communist doctrine is, itself, Modern,
atheist, materialist and cosmopolitan. That should be thrown out. On
the other hand, communisms social solidarity, social justice, social-
ism and general holistic attitude to society are good in and of them-
selves. So we need to separate the materialist and Modernist aspects
of communism of and reject them, while preserving and embracing
the social and holistic aspects.
As for the theories of the Third way (dear up to certain point to
some traditionalists such as Julius Evola) there were many unac-
ceptable elements, foremost among these being racism, xenophobia
and chauvinism. These are not only moral failures but also theo-
retically and anthropologically inconsistent attitudes. Differences
between ethnos dont equate to superiority or inferiority. The dif-
ferences should be accepted and affrmed without any racist senti-
ments or consideration. There is no common or universal measure
to judge different ethnic groups. When one society tries to judge an-
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other it applies its own criteria and so commits intellectual violence.
This ethnocentric attitude is precisely the crime of globalization and
Westernization, as well as of American imperialism.
If we free socialism from its materialist, atheist and Modern-
ist features and if we reject the racist and narrow nationalist as-
pects of the Third way doctrines we arrive at a comepletely new
kind of political ideology. We call it the Fourth Political Theory,
or 4PT, (The frst being liberalism, that we essentially challenge,
the second being the classical form of communism, the third be-
ing national-socialism and fascism). Its elaboration starts from the
point of intersection between different anti-liberal political theories
of the past (namely communism and the Third way theories). So we
arrive at the national-bolshevism that represents socialism without
materialism, atheism, progressivism, and Modernism, as well as the
Third way theories without racism and nationalism. But that is only
the frst step. The mechanical addition of deeply revised versions of
the anti-liberal ideologies of the past doesnt give us a fnal result. It
is only a frst approximation and preliminary approach. We must go
further and make an appeal to Tradition and to Pre-Modern sources
of inspiration. There we have the Platonic ideal state, medieval hi-
erarchical society, and theological visions of the normative social
and political system (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Jewish or Hindu)
. These Pre-Modern sources are a very important development to
the national-bolshevism synthesis. Therefore, we need to fnd a new
name for this kind of ideology, and Fourth Political Theory is quite
appropriate. It doesnt tell us what this Theory is, but rather what it
isnt. So it is a kind of invitation and appeal rather than dogma.
Politically we have here an interesting basis for conscious coop-
eration of the radical Left-wingers and the New Right as well as with
religious and other anti-modern movements, such as the ecologists
and Green Theorists for example. The only thing that we insist on
in creating such a pact of cooperation is to put aside anti-communist
as well as antifascist prejudices. These prejudices are the instru-
ments in the hands of liberals and globalists with which they keep
their enemies divided. So we should strongly reject anticommunism
206 Alexander DUGIN
as well as antifascism. Both of them are counter-revolutionary tools
in the hands of the global liberal elite. At the same time we should
strongly oppose any kind of confrontation between the various re-
ligious beliefs Muslims against Christians, the Jews against Mus-
lims, the Muslims against the Hindus and so on. The inter-confes-
sional wars and tensions work for the cause of the kingdom of the
Antichrist who tries to divide all the traditional religions in order to
impose its own pseudo-religion, the eschatological parody.
So we need to unite the right, the left and the worlds Traditional
religions in a common struggle against the common enemy. Social
justice, national sovereignty and Traditional values are the three
main principles of the Fourth Political Theory. It is not easy to put
together such a varied alliance. But we must try if we want to over-
come the foe.
In France, there is a saying: la droite des valeurs et la gauche
du travail (Alain Soral). In italian it goes: La Destra sociale e la
Sinistra identitaria. How exactly it should sound in English we will
see later.
We could go further and try to defne the subject, the actor of the
Fourth Political Theory. In the case of the communism the central
subject was class. In the case of the Third way movements, the cen-
tral subject was either the race or the nation. In the case of religions
it is the community of the faithful. How could the Fourth Politi-
cal Theory deal with this diversity and the divergence of subjects?
We propose, as a suggestion, that the main subject of the Fourth
Political Theory can be found in the Heideggerian concept of Da-
sein (being-t/here). It is a concrete but extremely profound instance
that could be the common denominator for the further ontological
development of the Fourth Political Theory. What is crucial for con-
sideration is the authenticity or non-authenticity of the existence of
the Dasein. The Fourth Political Theory insists on the authenticity of
existence. So it is the antithesis to any kind of alienation social,
economic, national, religious or metaphysical.
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Fourth Political Theory
But the Dasein is a concrete instance. Every individual and every
culture possesses their own Dasein. They differ between each other
but they are present always.
Accepting Dasein as the subject of 4PT, we should progress to
the elaboration of a common strategy in the process of the creation
of the future that fts to our demands and our visions. Such values as
social justice, national sovereignty and traditional spirituality can
serve us as the foundation.
I sincerely believe that the Fourth Political Theory, and its sec-
ondary variations, national-bolshevism and Eurasianism can be of
the great use for our peoples, our countries, and our civilizations.
The key manager of differences is multipolarity in all senses
geopolitical, cultural, axiological, economical, and so on.
The important concept of Nous (Intellect) developed by the
Greek philosopher Plotinus corresponds to our ideal. The Intellect is
one and multiple at the same time, because it has multiple differenc-
es in itself it is not uniform or an amalgam, but taken as such with
all their distinct particularities. The future world should be noetic in
some way multiplicity; diversity should be taken as the richness
and the treasure and not as the reason of inevitable confict: many
civilizations, many poles, many centres, many sets of values on one
planet and in one humanity. Many worlds.
But there are some who think otherwise. Who are aligned against
such a project? Those who want to impose uniformity, the unique
thought, the one (American) way of life, One World. And their meth-
ods are force, temptation, and persuasion. They are against multipo-
larity. So they are against us.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I. POLITICAL POST-ANTHROPOLOGY
Part 1. Introduction
1. The topic of this seminar is political post-anthropology. Each
type of political system/stage of political history operates with the
normative political type of the political human. We say a man of the
Middle Ages, a man of Modernity, etc., describing the specifc
historical and political constructs. These constructs are directly de-
pendent on the organization and formalization of power relations in
a society and relate to the axis of power, which is the essence of the
Political, and with collective friend/foe identifcation (C. Schmitt),
which is also the essence of the Political. The Political is power and
political identifcation (ours/not ours). Each political form provides
a different model of power and such identifcation. However many
political systems, there are that many political anthropologies. Po-
litical theology (C. Schmitt) suggests that the policy refects, and in
certain cases constitutes, a standard of Political Anthropology.
2. The political human is transformed from one form of Political
to another. This is suffciently traced in the Philosophy of politics
and Post-philosophy. Now we focus on which form of Political
Anthropology meets Post-modernity.
3. Post-modernity is something that sets in, steps on. Steps on us.
But it has not stepped yet. Therefore, the study of Postmodernity has
a hilarious creative gap. Although it steps on, it may also not step
on, we can (or cannot, it is not clear) wriggle out of it. So, talking
about Post-modernity is interesting, exciting and at the same time
risky. It is a process with an unknown end and uncertain meaning.
It is still possible to affect this end and this meaning. The history
(apparently) has ended, and the post-history is only beginning and
212 Alexander DUGIN
one have to search in it for a space of struggle, to win back this space
and expand it.
4. Political post-anthropology is forecasting/constructing the po-
litical human in Post-modernity. We do not just study what exists;
we follow the process and try to affect it. Wishful thinking and self-
fulflled prophecy is quite legitimate and welcome here. Exploring
the political postanthropology, we call it back to life.
Part 2. Political post-human and Post-State
1. Absolute features of the (post-) human of Postmodernity are:
Depoliticization;
Autonomization;
Microscopization;
Sub- and transhumanization (as a special form of dehumani-
zation);
Dividualization (fragmentation).
That is, the rejection and denial of something that was Political
on the previous phases becomes politics as the dominant form. The
politicization meets with the depoliticization, politics of the human
of Postmodernity is in the escape from the element and structure of
the Political into the new area. The human of Postmodernity declares
war on the Political: frst, based on the economy (homo economicus
against homo politicus), then against the classical subject-object
economy in the name of the network dynamics of the free (crea-
tive) game of disengaged sets (Negri, Hardt). Industry of fashion,
glamour and show business exhibits that for material prosperity one
does not need to earn money, he must enter the relevant social set,
become a member of the sliding glamorous network. Gloss pages,
on which a body without organs is sliding right and left, is like a
concrete embodiment of Deleuzes lespace lisse an image of
post-economics. For example, to get money one enough to be a gay
(in this case, working is not necessary, it is optional).
2. The postpolitical human overthrows the power and the col-
lective, and then the individual, identity. He does not recognize the
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power relations not over or under him, does not know ours or not
ours, and does not accept any long narratives that go beyond his mi-
crocosm. His policy is expressed in the form of desires and vegeta-
tive impulses of unknown ownership and aims. Maybe it is desire,
but it is no ones and nowhere specifcally addressed.
3. It is from a random game of subindividuality and transindi-
viduality post-human creates a model of Post-State. Post-state is an
ironic parody of State, it is State vice-versa. State-phantom, State-
mockery. In the Post-State, institutions are mobile and ephemeral,
policies and legal principles are continuously rapidly changing. It
has neither vertical, nor horizontal symmetry, aiming to merge with
the network. It is sort of a pirate republic placed in cyberspace. Or
a Brazilian carnival, which replaced the routine. In the Post-State,
the serious and frivolous swap, and it is a kind of permanentized
Saturnalia. In politics, post-human constitutes this Post-State being
amused by its deadly hallucinatory game.
4. In political postanthropology all is reversed: leisure and work
(the most serious occupation, actual work, is watching comic and
entertainment shows), knowledge and ignorance (complete idiots
are assigned as academics and correspondent members), public and
private (in the center of attention, including political debate, are the
tiniest details of personal life), male and female (the rapid growth of
women and homosexuals in politics), senators (elders) are assigned
out of schools (if, for example, they are the relatives of infuential
fgures), a victim and an offender (leniency towards criminals is in-
creasing, and the victim is assigned all the blame), etc.
5. Why are we talking about politics when it is obviously about
something directly opposite to the Political? Because such an an-
thropological type of Postmodernity in theory and social practice
steps on, i.e. attacks, persistently imposes itself, introduces itself and
is gradually becomes normative, i.e. acts as a basic personality (A.
Kardiner). And for such an attack and such an advance, dispositif
of power and collective identifcation, i.e. the Political again, is re-
quired. But, in this case, models of counter-power tend to affrm
their power and those models that deny all forms of a type as such
214 Alexander DUGIN
insist on universalization of their type (type, in this case, is a syno-
nym to eidos or universal). Apolitical singulars and divids compose
a sort of a ruling party of Postmodernity. Infuential one and close
to seizure of power or already in power.
6. This party has a stylistic and strategic arsenal. This is fashion
and interactive information technologies (Twitter, mobile phones,
social networks, blogs). In French, fashionable is transferred by a
slang word branche, literally, connected. Fashion and technol-
ogy are changing rapidly, and connected (branche) is the one who
is changing along with it, here and now, rapidly and dynamically.
There is no yesterday and tomorrow, not even today. There is only
now. Now it is Google and Twitter, but in a moment they will be pre-
historic events, such as word processor Lexicon or PC 286. Herein is
a dromocratic aspect (Virilio what was discussed at the seminars).
7. Twitter-revolution in the Arab world or iPad presidents are
clear signs of political postanthropology and phenomena of Post-
State. The revolt of the elites and the oscillation of the intensity level
of consciousness of the ruling groups are near-zero. A classic ex-
ample is a drug addict political strategist.
Part 3. Political soldier and his simulacrum
1. Like any political model, the political postanthropology can be
accepted and may be rejected doesnt matter how much it would
insist on its naturalness. A person can choose both the structure
of power and his identity. Post-State and Twitter-presidents just a
single trend, stepping on and intruding; may it be mainstream, but
not unique. There may be alternatives.
2. The frst alternative is the political anthropology of previous
forms. In the face of the political postanthropology, it can be gen-
eralized by the fgure of a political soldier. This is an anthropo-
logical concept. It doesnt give any idea of what political ideology
the political soldier follows. But this concept implicitly contains
a belief in the existence of political ontology: the political soldier
fghts for a model of power relationships, and directly and openly
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Fourth Political Theory
identifes himself with a particular group (ours). And fundamental
distinction of the political soldier is that he is ready and able to die
for his political idea. It tells him from an ordinary soldier and an
ordinary politician. A soldier dies but not for the idea. A politician
fghts for an idea, but to die for it he is not ready.
3. The political soldier may be a communist, a nationalist, and
even a liberal. But in any case, he personalizes Modernity. Moder-
nity in its specifc political form. The political soldier is a mediasti-
num of the political anthropology of Modernity. And as such (in
theory), it can fght the political postanthropology. This will be a
conservative answer. An individual fghts a dividual. Ending pre-
sent rejects the atemporal post-historical future. The drama of last
Humans clashing with Post-Humans in a political opposition. Very
heroically, tragically, poetically and hopelessly.
4. But (!): the political postanthropology makes such a position
almost impossible. The political soldier in the unique conditions of
corrosive waters of Postmodernity is immediately converted into a
simulacrum. This is the main delicacy of Postmodernity: it carries
an ironic mutation in regard to all aspects of Modernity, in regard to
anthropology in the frst place. Today we dont have a chance to
meet with the political soldier; we can only meet with his double, his
simulacrum, with his fake.
5. In anthropological series of political and anthropological
forms, Postmodernity installs a vicious link. All the threads that con-
nect the political arena of Postmodernity with Modernity and deeper
into political history are broken at the moment of Postmodernity and
have a knot. After that knot (with all the visible continuity), a fake
segment is situated.
6. Today there is no political soldiers. There is only its shell.
Part 4. Alternative in political postanthropology:
Pre-Human and RS
1. The edge of my thesis is reduced to the following affrmation:
in the context of the political postanthropology, Postmodernity and
216 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
Post-Human (Dividual) cannot be opposed to Modernity and Hu-
man (Individual). A couple will not be like dividual vs. individual
and post-human vs. human, but like dividual vs. pseudo-individual
and post-human vs. pseudo-human. There is the anthropological
fold (Deleuze) of the postmodern anthropology in this: a simula-
crum meets with a simulacrum.
2. A political soldier in Postmodernity is impossible. It can only
be a simulacrum.
3. Consequently, the opposition must be different. It is not a pre-
vious anthropological link that is designed to collide with a postan-
thropological segment of anthropological series, which is located
after the substituted element (knot), but an entirely different fgure.
That is, one should speak of political expression of the Radical Sub-
ject.
4. This topic should be somehow integrated with the 4PT. There
is no space and time here to develop it. But generally we can say: an
alternative to the political postanthropology is also postanthropol-
ogy, but different.
5. Humans bounds violation, the routes of transgression may not
be such as in the case of the dividual. It is not the human really
meets with the post-human in the political postanthropology, but
Pre-Human, Pre-Concept of the human. That origin that was before
the human is parallel to him and will be after him.
6. Here we concern subjects of the previous seminar and the deli-
cate theme of angelomorphosis. There is no accident that in the es-
chatology of most religions and traditions we are dealing with the
Endkampf panoramic view, which necessarily involves angels par-
ticipation. In blockbusters, indeed, it is also suffer from simulation.
But it is inevitable.
The political expression of the Radical Subject can be defned
not as the area of the political theology (C. Schmitt), but as the area
of the political angelology. This topic requires further development.
APPENDIX II. GENDER IN THE THREE POLITICAL
THEORIES OF MODERNITY
Part 1. Introduction
1. Before we start to study the 4-th PT (political theory, PT) it
is worth having a look at an issue of gender problematic in Modern
Age, which means to fnd out the way gender topic of Modern Age
affects three classical political theories.
2. The concept of a rational and adult well-to-do man, mostly
citizen (bourgeois the third estate) is placed in the basis of gender
paradigm of Modern Age. It makes a start from this particular nor-
mative fgure of a man. The basic anthropologic thesis is a political
man = a man-bourgeois.
3. Further each of three political theories of Modern Age works
with the thesis differently, but how?
4. 1 PT absorbs the normative as a general measure and agrees
with it as with an optimum. An adult and well-to-do (culturally
white), clever citizen (bourgeois) is the measure of (political)
things. But further the liberalism brings forward to project the idea
on more wide anthropologic areas which are structured around the
fgure. So earlier suffragettism proposes to include in the political
area of such maskulinoidny-bourgeois normative adult and clev-
er well-to-do women-townsmen (female citizens), and later demo-
crats stands for including also peasants, immigrants, little by little
widening an area of localization (from city to village), gender, sur-
vival rates, demands for rationality, ethnic characteristics (the semi
black Obama is a step toward the direction). But its important for
us that not adult and not white, not well-to-do (not very rational)
218 Alexander DUGIN
not men are being thought in 1PT as adult well-to-do rational
men (potential).
5. From here liberal (1 PT) feminism: to give to women fully
equal politically-social form with a standard liberal man-citizen-
bourgeois. The concept of a female citizen. A female citizen is
a citizen with separate anatomic peculiarities which are subject to
socially-political minimization. A liberal egalitarianism of sexes
is however a trend, but not a condition of business in practice, al-
though in theory normatively this is basic aim of 1 PT and re-
gimes which are based on it. But alongside with it a masculinity of
the aim is in the idea that a woman here is approximating to a man,
thinking like a potential (virtual) man; equalization is a stylization
to a man. Therere blue stockings and business lady from here.
(Everybody knows that women drive a car unusually; it seems that
somehow in a feminine way; no, they drive in a masculine way but
exaggeratedly, that is why men are angry at them they recognize
but do not refect consciously that a driving woman simply imitates
the way men drive; she copies him from here theres its annoyance;
at the same time so imitationally solders, Caucasians and provincials
drive a car).
6. Communism (2 PT) originates from the same position that 1
PT, but insists on the other attitude towards bourgeois masculine
normative. Communism proposes do not leave normative type as it
is (as opposed to 1 PT), but to transform it in post-bourgeois (prole-
tarian) way. It is quite diffcult politically-social and anthropologic
operation. In a gender sense it assumes an establishment of radical
equality of sexes (more rigorously than liberals do it), importantly
organized differently. And a bourgeois man and a bourgeois woman
as a subordinated construct of a bourgeois man must be transformed
into something another. Egalitarianism of sexes here is an expres-
sion of egalitarianism of people in society and represents the mea-
sure of liquidation of the line of command. If the line of command is
liquidated in practice the vertical symmetry man/woman is liquidat-
ed as well. A proletarian man is not more a bourgeois man as well
as a woman. Gender relationship in context of emancipated proletar-
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Fourth Political Theory
ian admits not liberation of essence of man/woman, but for instance
according to Bourdieu or Negri/Hardt the liberation of proletarian
from gender as a social convention. What is post-gender commu-
nistic proletarian? Many postmodern authors answer the question
in the following way this is mechanism of wishes (Deleuze/
Guattari), dispositif de la sexualite non-polaire (Foucault), rhi-
zome networks (Deleuze), not utilized sexually mutants (Negri/
Hardt), cyborgs (Donna Harraway). Ultra-leftisms (gauchismes)
feminism is program of liberation from sex as from a social hierar-
chical construct. And we are speaking here not about liberation of
womans essence, but about overcoming a sex as it is. If an attention
is stuck to particulars of another sex (by Simone de Beauvoir, Julia
Kristeva or Luce Irigaray), but only for relativization of masculinity
on the way to liberation. Wish is sexless. Liberty is a liberty from a
sex.
7. 3 PT had a few options toward gender. First of all its an ultra-
masculinity heroism. Exaltation of patriarchy. Theres also a white
well-to-do urban adult rational man who was like a normative, but
further was being exalted and expanded to exaggerated proportions.
This is a masculine hyper bourgeois. The aristocratic masculinity of
Evola is placed at a distance from others, The June Club (Gleichen,
van den Bruck) and Conservative Revolution. Here we have a deal
with masculine essentialism premodernistic sense (a man in The
Tradition as a bearer of ontological superiornost yan, Heaven, ob-
jective reality by contrast with yin, Earth, nonexistence). Secondly,
simultaneously there were in 3 PT stratums of Nordic matriarchy
(H.Virt, follower of Bachofen, Mathilde Ludendorff, Marthe Kun-
zel, etc.). Nordic matriarchy is symmetric by ontological masculinity
of Evola and onservative Revolution. Here we are speaking about
liberation of essence of womans. Its a woman such a particular
ontological type with its particular substance; feministic theurgy,
heathenism until matriarchy eschatology (advent of Wife). That
means that in 3 PT there were a few versions of gender policy: from
hypertrophy of bourgeois masculinity (as well as liberals have, but
220 Alexander DUGIN
exalted) until aristocratic ultra heroism and marginal Nordic femi-
nism.
Part 2. Approaching to a sex in 4-th PT. Radical gender
1. To create an idea about socio-political status of gender in 4-th
PT we have immediately reject a basic normative of Modern Age
the adult well-to-do white rational urban man-bourgeois. 4-th PT does
not know the type like this and doesnt want to know. That is why we
get feld of a residual principle. The feld is a not adult and white peas-
ant (not urban) and not rational (reckless) no-man. This is everything
which is placed behind the near or even distant concentric border of
the gender anthropology of Modern Age.
2. Not adult (for example the concept Big Game R. Daumal, R.
Gilbert-Lecomte, R. Vaillant je , etc.). This is the concept of broth-
ers-simplists.
3. Not white (the concept of ethnic polycentrism examines the
white world as a one possibility from infnite number of others
cultural and structural anthropology of F. Boas, C. Lvi-Strauss,
ethnosociology).
4. Peasant (for example an idea of ethnos as a folk-society by
Redfeld, again ethnosociology, Russian narodnik movement, so-
cialist revolutionarists).
5. Reckless (a concept of intellectual transgression, an opposition
between intellectual intuition according Guenon, and mind, also G.
Bataille with its Atsefal, and practice of philosophic and poetic
mindless from Hlderlin and Nietzsche to Artaud).
6. And fnally no-man. No-man in the socio-political sense
as Modern Age usually understands a man. The previous char-
acteristics approximate us to cultivation of the feld of main thesis
about a gender archetype of 4-th PT, to no-man. They specify
of its sense. Childishness, non-whiteness (or wildness), ethnicalizm
and mindless (or absence of classical European rationality) prepare
a platform for no-man of 4-PT. How it can be defned more con-
cretely?
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Fourth Political Theory
7. First of all 4-th PT can capitalize in this feld a vector of anti-
bourgeois gender models of 2 PT and 3 PT. It can be considered as
a preparatory phase. This is quite possible. A proletarian idea of
post-gender identity is interesting as a promptly critical project; in
the post-modernistic context it can be added to the arsenal (but only
without its materialistic connotation) in the spirit of earlier Dadaism
(anti-art), Marinetti or Nietzschean rogue. Also its interesting ex-
tremes of gender projects of 3 PT ultraheroism of Evolaism with
its superhuman ontology of warrior and simultaneously Nordic fem-
inism. All these tendencies were marginal in 2 PT and 3 PT being in
internal opposition to Modern Age. All of them can be incorporated
in 4-th PT as a pleasant aesthetic background. The proletarian post-
gender is breaking open a bourgeois citizen from below; ontology of
sex metaphysics of sex by Evola does the same but from above,
ontologinizing a sex in superhuman and super bourgeois, super civil
perspective of theurgic-Tantrikas realizations of male and female
extra human essences (provoked possession), Muses and musicality
of culture by A.Blok).
8. But all of them are only preliminary operations, yet by its own
quite intensive and captivating. An essence of no-man of 4-th
PT is placed still aside. This aside is of The Radical Subject. He is
no-man because he is no-human and being outside of paradigms
which defne rules and rows, including rows of divine ontologies.
A man surely presupposes a woman, and The Radical Subject pre-
supposes nothing on the outside, that is why he is not symmetric to
nothing.
9. Is he an androgyne or not? But why not An androgyne is a
root human, before the sex human and his radicalism is in it, mean-
ing (radix = root) belonging to the roots. We were speaking about it
at a seminar which was about 4-th PT. And we approached there to
the theme of the unusual zone where practice and theory coincide
even not distinguishing. Chaos precedes dual structures of order in
the same way. The Radical Subject in gender sense precedes differ-
entiation between male and female but does not exist a product of
222 Alexander DUGIN
their joining. He precedes them but do not follow. We can defne its
sex of The Radical Subject radical gender.
10. In the spirit of angelomorfsm of political anthropology of
4-th PT we can describe a sex of subject of 4-th PT as a sex of an-
gels. The sex can in due time establish in (masculinity) wish of Bene
Elohim enticed by beauty of humans daughters or can be presented
as a female android nymph of polar star by Siliany, Atalanta
Fugiens or Beatrice.
11. And else: the question which Heidegger didnt raise wheth-
er Dasein has a sex? Which sex Dasein has? It must be very funda-
mental one
Part 3. Radical gender and genders transformations
of Postmodern Age. Entropy of Eros
1. We can now examine the problem: how (approximately and
tentatively described by us) radical gender of 4-th PT correlates with
gender transformations the era of Postmodern Age?
2. In Postmodern Age the convergence of three gender trends
neoliberal, neomarxist and (very fragmentary) neonazi exists.
3. The neoliberal trend aspires to maximize the normative of a
citizen-bourgeois transferring it on all population of the Earth; this
is the theory of human rights. A masculine rational citizen is concep-
tualized as a human or individual losing touch with anatomic
and social sex and turning into a global imperative normative. A
man-bourgeois is coming so total and universal that he replaces all
other types: from here theres industry for youth and childhood and
fashion for dogs and cats.
4. The neomarxist trend insists on social conventionalism of sex
and actively becomes apparent in proliferation and legitimization of
homosexual and transgender codes. The liberty from sex is realized
through its game and permanent character. The both trends join in
the left liberalism (li-li) with its transgressive sexuality (fr. gauch-
isme or ultra-leftism), multiplied by individualism (classical liberal-
ism).
223
Fourth Political Theory
5. The other direction of ultraliberalism is freak out sado-mazo
nazi-satanism; exaltation bourgeois masculinity in individualistic
sexual sovereignty of atomic individual. These are Crowleys do
whatever you wish and with whom you wish with adding a f-
nancial compensation and a principle of voluntariness. Neonazi
today is a pathological parody which came from crude pasquinade
Visconti (The Damned) or weak-minded trash-exploitation in the
style Night receptionist. In the area of gender neonazi theres
ever-present entertainment attribute gay club and classical decora-
tions of sex-shop.
6. That means that a gender panorama expanding in front of a
face of keeper of 4 PT represents an explosion of bourgeois man, he
fies away by bits saving only virtual visibility of his domination.
The sex of Modern Age is coming to the end in our faces. The cen-
ter is being dispersed; concentric areas lose its orbits. An eccentric
sex of uncoordinated network dispersion exists. The swift entropy of
Eros is happening.
7. But the subject of 4-th PT (Dasein) is not a conservator. He
does not insist on (impossible) return to a bourgeois urban white
adult clever well-to-do man, who just on the point will hide in his-
torical horizon, making way for a carnival mutants in the spirit of
the Howard Stern Show or fgurants from Apocalypse Culture by
Adam Parfey; but even on more attractive but a lot of time ago sank
into oblivion archetypes (for instance medieval knights and erudite
beautiful Ladies with elegant philosophical books in pale palms and
tender unicorns near legs). 4-th PT here as usual suggests to make a
step forward.
8. Gender obscurantism of Postmodern Age and global entropy
of Eros have to be recognized in the spirit of the eschatological sce-
nario non dual eschatology (for example as in Indian Kalki Purana
presented so elegant and convincingly in eschatological camp Finis
Mundi) as anticipating a new transformation of gender, a rash and
preemptive parody, like farewell making grimace by retinue of Anti-
christ in the last death agony of the fnally getting cold world. Gen-
der disappears quickly, differentials are made equal, dynamic of op-
224 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
positions is made wipe and transforming into nothing. The Radical
Subject attentively looks after these transformations easily defning
in them something that they are being a parody and that the point on
which they are being a parody which means a parody on His Own.
Appendix III. 4PTh and Praxis
Part 1. The Term Praxis and its Meanings
Stating the seminar topic, I didnt know how will it be disclosed.
It was fuzzily seen, that being realized, fourth political theory should
lead to fourth political practice. This is starting point. Beyond this
free thought development begins.
Separation of theoretics (contemplation) and practice (operations
on objects pragmata), or thought and action, or idea and imple-
mentation, or principle and manifestation, or intellection and action,
or myth and ritual is the subject of dual topics of many disciplines.
All these pairs have different semantic geometry. But all of them are
constitutive.
Area Term 1 Term 2
Science Theory (contempla-
tion)
Practice (objects)
Metaphysics Principle Manifestation
Religion Myth Ritual
Philosophy Intellection Action
Technology Idea (project) Realization
(implementation)
Trivial usage Thought Activity

Now we discuss second column of terms. Since fourth political
theory is not something dividual, but claims to be at the same time
political science, political metaphysics (Angelopolis), politi-
cal theology (political eschatology), political philosophy, and
226 Alexander DUGIN
political technology (least developed area so far), we should think
about second column of terms altogether.
At once objection. As we found, but not decrypted yet, fourth
political theorys actor is Dasein. Dasein was lined up by Heidegger
as radical exit from any similar dualities. Same here what we said on
another occasion at seminars related to holism of imaginaire. What
these two columns are? this is typical ontological differentsializm
or the work of logos. In fourth political theory diurne and logos are
not excluded, though, both are deprived of exclusivity. Dasein re-
quires an appeal to new logos - to fundamental ontology. It means,
that for solution (rather, formulation) of fourth political practices
problem we previously need to go down to the area, where theoret-
ics (contemplation) and practice (operations on objects - pragmata),
thought and activity, idea and realization, principle and manifesta-
tion, intellection and action, myth and ritual match.
It is important. Fourth political practice is not simply application
of fourth political theory to reality, as in the case of three previous
political theories. Fourth political theory itself is not direct analogue
of other three political theories. The radical difference is that fourth
political theory seeks to overcome the dual topic of modernity. The
theoretics itself in fourth political theory is something different.
And it is nothing else, than practice. To understand fourth political
practice it is necessary to go down to the roots of fourth political
theory. And touch those roots, where division into two columns yet
doesnt exist. This is appeal to preconcept, to preontology or to
prehuman being (concerning anthropology).
Part 2. Political Theories of Modernity and Their political
Practices
In three classical political theories of modernity theory and prac-
tice are identifed quite clearly.
Liberalism as the frst political theory has economy and market
as appropriate political practice. Within the framework of frst politi-
cal theory market is the politics. Hence appears Webers homo eco-
227
Fourth Political Theory
nomicus. Realizing the market cycle, representative of frst political
theory implements his theory.
Marxism endows praxis a great value: this is revolution, class
struggle and (under socialism) and activity theory (labor, that creates
a human being again and again). According to Heidegger, frst and
second political theories are manifestations of Machenschaft phe-
nomenon. Pay attention to Machen - to make. That is, according
to Heidegger, praxis is the core of frst and second political theories.
Hence appears techne as destiny and metaphysics. That is, accord-
ing to Heidegger, generally, political practice is the essence of frst
two political theories.
In third political theory praxis is more complex. Firstly: the most
bright and monstrous praxis was praxis of holocaust and realization
of racial politics by Nazism. Secondly, Italian or Spanish praxis
in the context of third political theory was related to the state and
was reduced to corporate state-building (not gone far from classi-
cal, but keen and modifed bourgeois nationalism). Heidegger, who
himself was in the context of the third political theory, but rather
represented a cast into fourth political theory, sighted Machen-
schaft in third political theory also. And drafted to outdo and re-
fuse it. There are expressive passages about this in Geschichte des
Seyns.
These praxises of frst, second, and to some extent third political
theories represent embodiment of projects by itself . That is more
a technological section of term matches, that we are interested in.
However, there are attempts of wider interpretation. Marxs idea of
changing the world is a close to Heideggers comprehension of
Marxism concept of its technological essence. On the other hand,
Louis Dumonts analysis of Marxism as a theory, which is based on
methodological individualism, hence, on the technics, is demonstra-
tive.
In all cases Machenschaft is a common point of three political
theories of modernity. And this Machenschaft axiomatically pos-
tulates dual topics of subject object. Subject conceives (thought)
228 Alexander DUGIN
and realizes in object (action and reality). Praxis - as production,
Herrstellung.
Techne and Machenschaft is a model of subject and object
ratio, of theory and practice in three political theories of modernity.
And they are based on strict differentiation. The differential betwixt
theory and practice, which refect differential between subject and
object, is the essence of all three political theories of modernity. Pay
attention, that geometry of this differential in modernity is horizon-
tal.
Part 3. Geometry of Dasein and Virtual Reality
(ad Profundum)
Dasein is a subject (actor) of fourth political theory. Dasein pre-
cedes constitutioning of subject-object topics (which is the point of
modernity). Dasein precedes division into theoretics and practice.
The theoretics of Dasein is a practice of Dasein. Practice of Dasein
is theoretics of Dasein.
How can it be understood? There are several ways. For example,
by simply rearranging columns of our table. As a practice we take
the next variety:
theoretics (contemplation)
principle
myth
intellection
Idea (project)
thought
It is this which is practice, that has no need in operations on ob-
jects. At frst glance it seems to be solipsism and subjective idealism.
BUT.
We call it exactly PRAXIS. And this means, that we perceive
practice as theoretics, in other words, we emphasize that common,
which is in their root;
principle as manifestation;
myth as effective ritual;
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Fourth Political Theory
intellection as action;
idea as realization;
thought as activity.
We get a series of pre-concepts (not post-concepts!):
Theoretical practice (practical theory) not duality?
Manifested principle (principled manifestation) avatar?
Mythological ritual (ritual, sacral myth) - theurgy?
Intellective activity (active intellection) intellectual intuition
(according to Ren Gunon)?
Real idea (ideal reality) charmed world?
Thought-action (action-thought) transubstantiation?
Beyond dual topics of subject-object only these pre-dualistic se-
ries work.
Eyeing carefully? Doesnt it remind you something?
Yes, it does: virtual reality. The very one, in which postmoder-
nity rapidly involves us.
Part 4. Trans Subject-Objective Plan, Transgression, Di-
mension of Depth
Postmodernism and poststructuralism defne the horizon of virtu-
ality in surface. This stratifcation and merger of subject-objective,
consciousness/corporeality on the surface is a screen, a skin, an
epidermic coat, a glass of a showcase, a glossy magazine cover, a
television set, a sensor, an Ipad. Here transgression implements at
the cost of vertical axis loss. The sense of rhizome is in its absolute
horizontality (as modernity before insisted on strict horizontality of
subject-object topics).
Fourth political practice is being constructed in other way: it is
a union of two abysses top and bottom, absolutization of vertical
symmetry, BUT without a gap, which gives a birth to logos and ra-
tionality.This is a prelogic matrix of heroic spirit, which saves in it-
self free chaoss breath, which unites pain of the earth and heavenly
blues cold irony. Abissus abissum invocat. This is fundamental-on-
tology and its (not dual) implementation. Fourth political practice
230 Alexander DUGIN
deploys new fundamental-ontological layout. It is transgression of
the exit higher above and below the lower. Where hidden are back
of the sky and face of the earth. This is practice of short-circuiting
of ontology.
If postmodernity is immanentiation and surface, then fourth po-
litical practice appeals to integration of last two depths. Here the
convergence of all forms of maximal takes place. This is invocation
(clamatio) de Profundis et ad Profundum.
Fourth political party does not change the existing world and
doesnt build new one. It refuses the world in being, existence, rec-
ognizing it as chimaeric, shaky and unsuccessful construct. With
frst action fourth political practice sets the world aside, abolishes it.
Heidegger thought a lot on the problem noch nicht, yet not. We
stand close to the point of great midnight. Or still, yet not (in it).
Always this eternal yet not ( he wrote in Holzwege).
If we place fourth political practice in overcoming insurmount-
able distance (Zenos paradox about Achilles and tortoise - watch
Gunons The principles of infnitesimal calculus) of yet not,
we will stay forever in the labyrinth of infnite ending of time.
Fourth political practice doesnt end by taking of the problem of
not yet, with this it only takes its beginning. The start of fourth
political practice is a thesis about taking the world off, as well as
those one, who witnesses it. Videlicet carthusian cogito and its
conclusion on sum.
Part 5. Practices of Vertical Dementia (anoia, anoesia)
Remember Edgar Morin with his homo demens. Morin mod-
estly asks not to forget about him. There are those (Bataille, Artaud,
and after them Foucault, Barthes, Deleuze, Sollers, Blanchot and
many others), who talk about value of dementia more open and con-
vex.
But most of all postmodernists view dementia in horizontal ge-
ometry. According to Durand, it means they view it in nocturne sec-
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tion. This is purely passive feminoid dementia, which enjoys ex-
emption from repressive vertical of logos.
Fourth political practice suggests another model of vertical de-
mentia. This is pre-logical, heroic-diurne dementia. This form of
liberative dementia implies total control. But not from the side of
consciousness, but from the side of Angel those one, to whom the
trader gives a scalepan in Rilkes Duino Elegies.
Vertical dementia is integral, inasmuch as is based on complete
coverage of whole imaginaire. Night and Day do contact with each
other in other way, than it is in culture, that leads to logo-centric
systems. This is a short circuit of imagination modes. Extension of
vertical axis of heroic diaeresis to both sides is above the top and
below the bottom.
Part 5. Fourth Political Practice and Eschatology
The end time will never happen, if someone will not implement it.
Though everything leads to it, it doesnt mean anything. It can lead
to the end infnitely. For the end to happen, fniteness must be.
According to Heidegger, existence is fnite. Its highest and
last mystery is in this fniteness. Finiteness manifests in Ereignis.
Ereignis exactly is facticity of praxis.
Ereignis is eschatology. In Holzwege Heidegger wrights so
right eschatology of existence. Fourth political practice is es-
chatological practice par excellence.
APPENDIX IV. THE METAPHYSICS OF CHAOS
The modern European philosophy began with the concept of
Logos and logic order of being. During two thousand and some hun-
dreds years this concept was fully exhausted. All the potentialities
and the principles laid in this form of logocentric way of thinking
were now exhaustively explored, exposed and abandoned.
The problem of Chaos and the fgure of Chaos were neglected,
put aside from the very beginning of this philosophy. The only phi-
losophy we know at present is the philosophy of Logos. But the
Logos is something opposite to Chaos, its abslolute alternative.
From the XIX century with most important and most brilliant Eu-
ropean philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger
and up to the contemporary postmodernists the European man af-
frm began to suspect that Logos was approaching to its end. Some
of them dared to affrm that from now on we are living in the time
of the end of logocentric philosophy, approaching something else.
The European philosophy was based on the logocentric princi-
ple corresponding to the principle of exclusion, the differentiating,
Greek diairesis. All this corresponds strictly to the masculine atti-
tude, refects the authoritative, vertical, hierarchical order of being
and knowledge.
This masculine approach to the reality imposes order and princi-
ple of exclusivity everywhere. That is perfectly manifested in Aris-
totles logic where the principles of identity and exclusion are put in
the central position in the normative manner of thinking. A is equal
to A, not equal to not-A. The identity exclude non-identity (alter-
ity) and vice versa. There we see the male who speaks, thinks, acts,
fghts, divides, orders.
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Nowadays all this logocentric philosophy has come to an end
and we should think about the other possibility of thinking not in the
logocentric, phallocentric, hierarchical and exclusivist way.
If not any more Logos satisfes us, fascinates us, mobilizes us, so
we are inclined to try something else and to address the Chaos.
To begin with: there are two different concepts of Chaos. The
modern physics and philosophy refers to complex systems, bifurca-
tion or non-integrating equations and processes using the concept
chaos to designate such phenomena. They understand by that not
the absence of order but a kind of order that is diffcult to perceive
as such, so it rests to be the order but very complicated one, that
seems to be not order at all, but in the essence it is. Such chaos
or turbulence is calculable in nature but with more sophisticated
theoretical and mathematical means and procedures than the instru-
ments the classical natural science is dealing with.
The term chaos is used here in the metaphorical manner. In
modern science we are continuing to deal with an essentially logo-
centric manner of exploring the reality. So the chaos here is no
more than a dissipative structure of Logos, the last result if its decay,
fall, decomposition. The modern science is dealing not with some-
thing other than Logos but with a kind of post-Logos, the ex-Logos,
the Logos in the state ultimate dissolution and regression. The pro-
cess of the fnal destruction and dissipation of Logos is taken here
for chaos.
In the reality it has nothing to do with Chaos as such, with the
Chaos in original Greek sense of term. It is rather a kind of utmost
confusion. Ren Gunon has called the era we are living through
now, a era of Confusion. The Confusion means the state of being
that goes next to order and preceds it. Thus we should make a clear
distinction between two different concepts. On one hand we have the
modern concept of chaos that represents post-order or a mixture of
contradictory fragments of being without any unity and order, linked
among them by highly sophisticated post-logical correspondences
and conficts. Gilles Deleuse has called this phenomena a non-co-
possible system composed by the multitude of the monades (using
234 Alexander DUGIN
the concept of monads and co-possibility introduced by Leibnitz)
becoming by Deleuze the nomades. Deleuse describes postmo-
dernity as a sum of non-co-possible fragments which can coexist.
It wasnt possible in the Leibnitzs vision of reality based on the
principle of co-possibility. But within the postmodernity we can see
excluding elements coexisting. The non-ordered non-co-possible
monades (nomades) swarming around could seem to be the cha-
otic, and in this sense we usually use the word chaos in the evereday
talk. But strictly speaking we should make difference.
So we need distinguish two kinds of chaos, the postmodernist
chaos as an equivalent to the confusion, a kind of post-order and
the Greek haos as pre-order, as something that exists before the or-
dered reality has come into being. Only the latter can be considered
as haos in the proper sense of the word. This second (but actually
the original) sense the concept of Chaos should be examined care-
fully in the metaphysical way.
The epic vision of the rise and fall of Logos in the course of the
development of the Western philosophy and the Western history was
exposed by Martin Heidegger who argued that in the context of the
European or Western culture Logos is not only a main philosophical
principle but also the basis of religious attitude forming the core of
Christianity. We can also notice that the concept of kalam or intel-
lect is in the centre of Islamic philosophy and theology. The same is
valid for Judaism (at least in The Philo the Jew vision and above all
in the Medieval Judaism and the Qabballah. Thus in the high mo-
dernity where we are living we assist the fall of Logos accompanied
by the corresponding the fall of classical Greco-Roman culture and
the monotheistic religion as well. These processes of decadence are
completely parallel to that Martin Heidegger considers the present
condition of the Western culture in whole. He identifes the origin
of this state of thing in of some hidden and hardly recognizable er-
ror committed at the early stages of the Greek thought. Something
went wrong in the very beginning of the Western history and Martin
Heidegger sees this wrong point precisely in the affrmation of the
exclusivist position of exclusivist Logos in the thinking as such. The
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shift was made by Heraklites, Parmenides but above all by Plato
from the thinking to the philosophy that was equal to the install-
ing of two level world vision where the existing was perceived as
the manifestation of the hidden. Later the hidden was recognized
as the Logos, the idea, the paradigm, the example. From that point
the referential theory of truth proceeds. The true is the fact of the
correspondence of the given immediately to the presumed invis-
ible essence (the nature that likes to hide according to the Herak-
lites). The presocratics were in the beginning of the philosophy. The
unfettered explosion of the modern technique is its logical result.
Heidegger calls it Gestell and thinks it is the reason of the catas-
trophe and annihilations of the mankind that inevitably approaches.
According to him the very concept of Logos was wrong so that he
proposed to radically revise our attitude to the very essence of phi-
losophy and the process of thinking and to fnd another way which
he called the Other Beginning.
So Logos appeared frst with the birth of the Western philosophy.
The earliest Greek philosophy arose already as something that ex-
cluded Chaos. Precisely at the same time Logos has began to four-
ish revealing a kind of mighty will to power and the absolutisation
of masculine attitude to the reality. The becoming of the logocentric
culture ontologically annihilated the pole opposite to Logos itself
i.e. the feminine Chaos. So the Chaos as something that preceded the
Logos abolished by it and its exclusivity was manifested and dismissed
by the same move. The masculine Logos ousted the feminin Chaos, the
exclusivity and exlusion subdued the inclusivity and the inclusion. So
the classical world was born stretching its limits for 2 thousands and
5 hundreds years up to the Modernity and the rationalistic scientifc
era. This world has come to its end. But nevertheless we are still living
in its outskirt. At the same time in the postmodern dissipating world
all the structures of order are degrading, dispersing and confused. It is
the dawn of Logos, the end of order, the last chord of the masculine
exclusivist domination. But still we are inside the logical structure but
not outside it.
236 Alexander DUGIN
Stating this we have some basic solutions concerning the future.
First one the return to kingdom the Logos, the Conservative Rev-
olution, the restoration of the male full scale domination in all
realms of the life the philosophy, the religion, the everyday life. It
could be done spiritually and socially or technically. This way where
the technique meets the spiritual order was fundamentally explored
and studied by Ernst Junger, the Martin Heideggers friend. The re-
turn to the classicism accompanied by the appeal to the technical
progress. The effort to save falling Logos, the restoration of tradi-
tional society. The eternally new Order.
The second way is to accept the current tendencies and to fol-
low the direction of the Confusion involving more and more in the
dissipation of the structures, in the post-structuralism and trying to
get the pleasure of the comfortable glide into the nothing. That is
the option chosen by the left or liberal representatives of the Post-
Modernity. It is modern nihilism at its best originally identifed by
F.Nietzsche and explored thoroughly by M.Heidegger. The concept
of nothing being the potentially present in the principle of the iden-
tity proper to the Logos itself is here not the limit of the process of
the fall of the logic oreder but rather consrtucted rationally realm of
the illimitate expansion of the horizintal decay, inculculable multi-
didues of the fowers of putrefaction.
However, we could choose the third way and try to transcend the
borders of Logos and step out beyond the crisis of the Post-Modern
world, literally Post-Modern, i.e. laying beyond the Modernity,
where dissipation of Logos reaches its limit. So there the question
of this very limit is crucial. Seeing from the standpoint of Logos
in general, including the most decayed one, beyond the domain of
order lays nothing. So cross the border of being is ontologically im-
possible. The nothing is not: so speaks after Parmenides all logocen-
tric Western ontology. This impossibility asserts the infnity of the
outskirt ob Logos and grant to the decay inside the realm of order
eternal continuity. Beyond the border of being lays nothing and the
movement to this limit is analytically infnite and unending (here is
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fully valid aporia of Zeno of Elea). So nobody can cross the frontier
into the non-existent not-being that simply is not.
If we insist nevertheless in doing this we should appeal to the
Chaos in its original Greek sense, as to something that preceeds be-
ing and order, something preonthological.
We stand in front of a really important crucial problem. Great
number of people today isnt satisfed with what is going on around
us, with absolute crisis of values, religions, philosophy, political
and social order, with the Post-Modern conditions, with the confu-
sion and perversion, with the age of utmost decay.
But considering the essential sense of the becoming of our civili-
zation to the present state we cannot look to the precedent phases of
the logocentric order and its implicite structures because it was pre-
cisely the Logos itself that has brought the thing to the state where
they are now, bearing in itself the germs of present decay. Heidegger
identifed with the extreme credibility the roots of the technique in
the presocratic solution of the problem of being by the means of the
Logos. In fact Logos can not save us from the conditions installed
by itself. The Logos is of no use here anymore.
So only the preontological Chaos can give as a hint how to go
beyond the trap of the Post-Modernity. It was put aside on the eve
of the creation of the logical structure of being as a corner stone.
Now it is its turn to come to the play. Otherwise we will be doomed
to accept the postlogical dissipated Post-Modernity that pretends to
be eternal in some way because it annihilates time. The Modernity
has killed eternity and Post-Modernity is killing time. The architec-
ture of the Post-Modern world is completely fragmented, perverse
and confused. It is a kind of the labyirynth without exit, folded and
twisted as the Moebius trip. The Logos that was the guarantee of
stictness of the order serves here to grant the curvature and crooked-
ness, being used to preserve the impassability of the ontologically
border with nothing from the eventual trespassers.
So the only way to save us, to save humanity and culture from
this snare is to make a step beyond the logocentric culture, address-
ing to the Chaos.
238 Alexander DUGIN
We could not restore the Logos and the order addressing to them
because they bear in themselves the reason of their eternal destruc-
tion. In other words, to save exclusive Logos we should make an
appeal to the alternative inclusive instance that is Chaos.
But how could we use the concept of Chaos and base on it our
philosophy if philosophy has always been for us something logical
by defnition?
I order to resolve this diffculty we should approach the Chaos
not from the position of Logos but from that of Chaos itself. It can
be compared to the feminine vision, the feminine understanding of
the fgure other that is not excluded but, on the contrary, included in
the sameness.
The Logos regards itself as what is and as what is equal to it-
self. It can accept the differences inside itself because it excludes
the other that itself outside itself. So the will to power is working.
The law of sovereignty. Beyond Logos, Logos asserts, lays nothing,
not something. So the Logos excluding all other than itself excludes
Chaos. The Chaos use different strategies it includes in itself all
that it is but at the same all what it is not. So the all inclusive Chaos
includes also what is not inclusive as it and more than that what ex-
cludes Chaos. So the Chaos doesnt perceives the Logos as the other
as itself or as something non-existent. The Logos as the frst princi-
ple of exclusion is included in Chaos, presents in it, enveloped by it
and has a granted place inside of it. So the mother bearing the baby
bears in herself what is a part of it and what is not a part of her at
the same time. The man conceives the woman as external being and
seeks to penetrate her. The woman considers the man as something
internal and seeks to give him a birth.
The Chaos is eternal nascency of other, that is of Logos.
To sum up, the chaotic philosophy is possible because chaos
itself includes Logos as some inner possibility. It can freely identify
it, cherish it and recognise its exclusivity included in its everlasting
life. So we come to the fgure of the very special chaotic Logos, that
is completely and absolutely fresh Logos being eternally revived by
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the waters of Chaos. This chaotic Logos is at the same time exclu-
sive (and it is why is properly Logos) and inclusive (being chaotic).
It deals with the sameness and otherness differently.
The Chaos can think. It thinks. We should ask him how it does
it? We have asked the Logos. Now it is the turn of the Chaos. We
should learn to think with the Chaos and within the Chaos.
I could suggest, as an example, the philosophy of Japanese think-
er Kitaro Nishida, who has constructed the logic of basho or the
logic of places instead of Aristotles logic.
We should explore other cultures rather than the Western one to
try to fnd the different examples of the inclusive philosophy, the
inclusive religions and so on. The chaotic Logos is not only the ab-
stract construction. If we seek well we fnd the real forms of such
intellectual tradition. In archaic societies as well as in the Eastern
theology and mystical currents.
To make appeal to the Chaos is the only way to save Logos. Log-
os needs a saviour for itself, it couldnt save itself, it needs some-
thing opposite to itself to be restored in the critical situation of Post-
Modernity. We could not transcend the Post-Modernity The latter
cant be overcame without appeal to something that has been prior
to the reason of its decay. So we should resort to other philosophies
than the Western one.
In conclusion, I would like to say that its not correct to conceive
the Chaos as something belonging to the past. The Chaos is eternal,
but eternally coexisting with time. So the chaos is always absolutely
new, fresh and spontaneous. It could be regarded as a source of any
kind of invention and freshness because its eternity has in itself al-
ways something more than was, is or will be in time. The Logos
itself cannot exist without Chaos like fsh cannot live without wa-
ter. When we put a fsh out of water, it dies. When the fsh begins
to insist excessively that it is something other than water around it
(even it is true), it come to the shore and dies there. It is a kind of a
mad fsh. When we put it back in the water it jumps again. So let it
die this one if it wants. There are other fshes deep in water. Let us
follow them.
240 Alexander DUGIN Alexander DUGIN
The astronomical era that is coming to the end is the era of the
Fish constellation. The Fish on the shore. The dying one. So we need
water now very badly.
Only the completely new attitude to the thought, new ontology
and new gnoseology can save Logos left water, on the shore, in the
desert that grows and grows (as Nietzsche foresaw).
Only the Chaos and the alternative philosophy based on inclusiv-
ity could save the modern humanity and the world from the conse-
quences of the degradation and decay of the exclusivist principle
called Logos. The Logos has expired and we all can be buried under
its ruins unless we make the appeal to Chaos and its metaphysical
principles and use them as basis for something new. This is maybe
the Other Beginning Heidegger spoke about.
APPENDIX V. THE GREATER EUROPE PROJECT

(A geo-political draft for a future multi-polar world)

1. Following the decline and disappearance of the socialist East
European Block in the end of the last century, a new vision of world
geopolitics based on a new approach became a necessity. But the in-
ertia of political thinking and the lack of historic imagination among
the political elites of the victorious West has led to a simplistic op-
tion: the conceptual basis of western liberal democracy, a market-
economy society, and the strategic domination of the USA on the
world scale became the only solution to all kinds of emerging chal-
lenges and the universal model that should be imperatively accepted
by all of humanity.
2. Before our eyes this new reality is emerging the reality of
one world organised entirely on the American paradigm. An infuen-
tial neo-conservative think tank in the modern USA openly refers to
it by a more appropriate term the global Empire (sometimes be-
nevolent Empire R. Kagan). This Empire is uni-polar and concen-
tric by its very nature. In the centre there is the rich North, Atlantic
community. All the rest of the world, the zone of underdeveloped
or developing countries, considered peripheral, is presumed to be
following the same direction and the same course that the core coun-
tries of the West did long before it.
3. In such a uni-polar vision, Europe is considered the outskirts
of America, the world capital, and as a bridgehead of the American
West on the large Eurasian continent. Europe is seen as a part of
the rich North, not a decision maker, but a junior partner without
proper interests and specifc characteristics of its own. Europe, in
242 Alexander DUGIN
such a project, is perceived as an object and not the subject, as a
geopolitical entity deprived of autonomous identity and will, of real
and acknowledged sovereignty. Most of the cultural, political, ideo-
logical and geopolitical particularity of European heritage is thought
of as something pass: anything that was once valued as useful has
already been integrated into the Global Western project; whats left
is discounted as irrelevant. In such circumstances Europe becomes
geopolitically denuded, deprived of its own proper and independ-
ent self. Being geographically a neighbour to regions with diverse
non-European civilisations, and with its own identity weakened or
directly negated by the approach of the Global American Empire,
Europe can easily lose its own cultural and political shape.
4. However, liberal democracy and the free market theory ac-
count for only part of the European historical heritage and that there
have been other options proposed and issues dealt with by great Eu-
ropean thinkers, scientists, politicians, ideologists and artists. The
identity of Europe is much wider and deeper than some simplistic
American ideological fast-food of the global Empire complex with
its caricaturist mixture of ultra-liberalism, free market ideology and
quantitative democracy. In the cold war era, the unity of the Western
world (on both sides of the Atlantic) had more or less solid base of
the mutual defence of common values. But now this challenge is no
longer present, the old rhetoric doesnt work anymore. It should be
revised and new arguments supplied. There is no longer a clear and
realistic common foe. The positive basis for a united West in the
future is almost totally lacking. The social choice of European coun-
tries and states is in stark contrast of Anglo-Saxon (today American)
option towards ultra-liberalism.
5. Present-day Europe has its own strategic interests that differ
substantially with American interests or with the approach of the
Global West project. Europe has its particular positive attitude to-
wards its southern and eastern neighbours. In some cases economic
proft, the energy supply issues and common defence initiative dont
coincide at all with American ones.
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Fourth Political Theory
6. These general considerations lead us, European intellectuals
deeply concerned by the fate of our cultural and historical Moth-
erland, Europe, to the conclusion that we badly need an alternative
future world vision where the place, the role and the mission of Eu-
rope and European civilisation would be different, greater, better
and safer than it is within the frame of the Global Empire project
with too evident imperialistic features.
7. The only feasible alternative in present circumstances is to
found in the context of a multi-polar world. Multi-polarity can grant
to any country and civilisation on the planet the right and the free-
dom to develop its own potential, to organise its own internal reality
in accordance with the specifc identity of its culture and people, to
propose a reliable basis of just and balanced international relations
amongst the worlds nations. Multi-polarity should be based on the
principle of equity among the different kinds of political, social and
economic organisations of these nations and states. Technological
progress and a growing openness of countries should promote dia-
logue amongst, and the prosperity of, all peoples and nations. But at
the same time it shouldnt endanger their respective identities. Dif-
ferences between civilisations do not have to necessarily culminate
in an inevitable clash between them in contrast to the simplistic
logic of some American writers. Dialogue, or rather polylogue, is
a realistic and feasible possibility that we should all exploit in this
regard.
8. Concerning Europe directly, and in contrast to other plans for
the creation of something greater in the old-fashioned imperialistic
sense of the word be it the Greater Middle East Project or the pan-
nationalist plan for a Greater Russia or a Greater China we sug-
gest, as a concretisation of the multi-polar approach, a balanced and
open vision of a Greater Europe as a new concept for the future de-
velopment of our civilisation in strategic, social, cultural, economic
and geopolitical dimensions.
9. Greater Europe consists of the territory contained within the
boundaries that coincide with the limits of a civilisation. This kind
of boundary is something completely new, as is the concept of the
244 Alexander DUGIN
civilisation-state. The nature of these boundaries presumes a gradual
transition not an abrupt line. So this Greater Europe should be
open for interaction with its neighbours in the West, East or South.
10. A Greater Europe in the general context of a multi-polar
world is conceived as surrounded by other great territories, bas-
ing their respective unities on the affnity of civilisations. So we
can postulate the eventual appearance of a Greater North America,
a Greater Eurasia, a Greater Pacifc Asia and, in the more distant
future, a Greater South America and a Greater Africa. No country
except the USA as things stand today, can afford and defend
its true sovereignty, relying solely on its own inner resources. No
one of them could be considered as an autonomous pole capable of
counterbalancing the Atlantist power. So multi-polarity demands a
large-scale integration process. It could be called a chain of globali-
sations but globalisation within concrete limits coinciding with
the approximate boundaries of various civilisations.
11. We imagine this Greater Europe as a sovereign geopolitical
power, with its own strong cultural identity, with its own social and
political options based on the principles of the European demo-
cratic tradition with its own defence system, including nuclear
weapons, with its own strategic access to energy and mineral re-
sources, making its own independent choices on peace or war with
other countries or civilisations with all of the above depending
on a common European will and democratic procedure for making
decisions.
12. In order to promote our project of a Greater Europe and the
multi-polarity concept, we appeal to the different forces in European
countries, and to the Russians, the Americans, the Asians, to reach
beyond their political options, cultural differences and religious
choices to support actively our initiative, to create in any place or
region Committees for a Greater Europe or other kinds of organi-
sations sharing the multi-polar approach, rejecting uni-polarity, the
growing danger of American imperialism and elaborating a similar
concept for other civilisations. If we work together, strongly affrm-
ing our different identities, we will be able to found a balanced, just
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Fourth Political Theory
and better world, a Greater World where any worthy culture, society,
faith, tradition and human creativity will fnd its proper and granted
place.
Eurasian Movement
Moscow, Warshavskoye shosse, 1/1, offce A 803
+7(495)7836866
solomon2770@yandex.ru
evrazia.org
konservatizm.org