1.

SEAFDEC vs ACOSTA

FACTS:
Two labor cases were filed by respondents against the
petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), before the NLRC Iloilo for an
alleged wrongfully terminated from their employment by
the petitioner.
Petitioner contending to be an international inter-
government organization, composed of various
Southeast Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss,
challenging the jurisdiction of the public respondent in
taking cognizance of the above cases. However the
motion to dismiss was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner SEAFDEC is an international
organization enjoying diplomatic immunity?

RULING:
Yes, SEAFDEC is an international organization beyond
the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Philippines
was one of the signatories to the agreement. Being an
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the
state. One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction. The
obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would
afford a convenient medium thru which the host
government may interfere in their operations or even
influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-
states.
WHEREFORE, our resolution, dated 30 March 1992,
dismissing the petition for certiorari, is hereby
reconsidered, and another is entered (a) granting due
course to the petition; (b) setting aside the order, dated
20 September 1990, of the public respondent; and (c)
enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding
with RAB Case No. VI-0156-86 and RAB Case No. VI-
0214-86. No costs.

US vs Ruiz

Facts

The United States oF America, herein Petitioner, had in
sometime a naval base located in Subic, Zambales.
thereafter, Petitioner invited submissions for Repair of
said naval base. Eligio De Guzman & Co INC, herein
Respondent, responded to the invitation of Petitioner for
bidding of said repair contract in which the latter replied
and ascertained to the former its price proposals and
bonding company.

Thereafter, Petitioner informed respondent that the latter
did not qualify to perform such obligation due to
unsatisfactory work done by it in its previous Contract
with the US. hence, Respondent filed a suit of specific
performance against US to enforce such acceptance of
contract and in case of impossibility therof, damages be
awarded to Respondent. on the contrary, Petitoner
contends that it did not waive its right to be sued.

Issue
waiver of State immunity

Ruling
the Supreme Court held that there was no waiver of
State imminity on the part of the Petitioner.

it noted that the state only waives its rights to be sued
when it enters into contracts which are private,
commercial and proprietary in nature and does not
waives the same in Governmental acts.

In the case at bar, the repair of Military base is for the
defense of the Philippines and the US which is a
governemntal function in the highest order. hence the
Petitioner did not waive its right of state immunity.



Govt of Hongkong vs Judge Olalia

FACTS:
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong
Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance,
Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts
of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were
issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the
Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued
an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That
same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr.
issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that
there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8
presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail and this was granted by respondent
judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence,
the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail
to a potential extraditee.

HELD:
Honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and
defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extradites rights to life, liberty, and due process. Where
these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party.

We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can
neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the
prospective extradite from fleeing our jurisdiction.

clear and convincing evidence should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases

The potential extradite must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO,
respondent

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition
Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999 requesting
the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.
Upon learning of the request for extradition, respondent
sought before the RTC Manila, Branch 25 that he be
given TRO and a right to notice and hearing. This was
initially granted by the court, but was later reversed by
the same number of votes of 9-6.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the
United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition alleging that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
on April 15, 1999 and in order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD
No. 1069. Again, respondent filed an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. Also, the court allowed respondent to post bail
for his temporary liberty.

ISSUE: WON Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing
before a warrant for his arrest can be issued.

HELD: NO. The law specifies that the court sets a
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In
connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however,
the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision.
Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage
been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence
of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with
a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.

"It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend
something reasonable and something not inconsistent
with generally recognized principles of International Law,
nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States.
If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
reasonable x x x ."

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons
sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of
both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.

CAIRE CLAIM (ahm, guys, p-check na lang dun sa
syllabus ung complete name nung case, haha! Nasa
office xe ako, salamat!!! Sana po ma-gets nyo! ^_^v)
Jean-Baptiste Caire Claim

FACTS:

On December 11, 1914, an amount of $5,000 in national
gold was demanded from French national Jean-Baptiste
Caire by Commander Avila with two armed soldiers. As
Caire does not possess such amount, he was led to the
barracks and there remained until seven oclock. When
he was driven back to his house, for the second time,
with a threat of shot, they demanded of him such
amount. Mr. Caire proposed to give them everything he
owned in paper money, which is only $200. He was
brought back again to the barracks, stripped him off his
clothes and afterwards was taken to hacienda El Prieto
where he was shot between eleven oclock and
midnight, with Mr. Rafael Flores who had intervened in
his favor.

The assassination of Mr. Cairo was worn by the Legation
of France to the attention of the Secretariat of Foreign
Relations. The widow of the murdered submitted a
complaint to the National Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Mexican government is liable to pay
indemnity?

HELD:

Yes.

Under the doctrine of objective responsibility (state
responsibility for the acts of state officials or state organs
even in the absence of fault on the part of the state), a
state is internationally responsible for acts committed by
its officials or organs outside their competence if the
officials or organs acted at least to all appearances as
competent officials or organs, or used powers or
methods appropriate to their official capacity.

The officers in question, consistently conducting
themselves as officers, began exacting the remittance of
certain sums of money. As there were repeated
demands and a clear refusal in Mr. Caires end, he was
then finally shot. Even if it is to be regarded that the act
was outside their competence, it the officers have
involved the responsibility of the State, in view of the fact
that they acted in their capacity of officers and used the
means placed at their disposition by virtue of that
capacity.

The French-Mexican Claims Commission held that
Mexico was internationally responsible for the conduct of
army officers. Thus the indemnity award in the sum of
20,000 Mexican gold piastres in favour of Caires widow
is proper.



The Pinochet Case: Background

General Augusto Pinochet led a 1973 military
coup that overthrew democratically-elected Chilean
President Salvador Allende. During his subsequent 17-
year dictatorship, thousands were killed, have forcibly
disappeared, tortured or exiled.
On October 16, 1998, while seeking medical
help in London, British authorities detained Augusto
Pinochet on an arrest warrant issued by Spanish
Magistrate Baltasar Garzon. Garzon who had charged
Pinochet with genocide, terrorism, and torture committed
during the Chilean dictatorship was seeking his
extradition.
In November 1998, a panel of British law lords
ruled that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from
prosecution as a former head of state and could be
extradited to Spain. This decision, based largely on
customary international law, was set aside, however,
when one of the judges who heard the appeal was found
to have ties to Amnesty International. A larger panel of
law lords heard the appeal again in March 1999, and in a
6-1 decision, reaffirmed that Pinochet could be
extradited.

Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police

Lord Browne-Wilkinson

in my judgment, Senator Pinochet as former
head of state enjoys immunity rationae materiae in
relation to acts done by him as head of state as part of
his official functions as head of state. The issue in this
case is whether the alleged organization of state torture
by Senator Pinochet (if proved) would constitute an act
committed by Senator Pinochet as part of his official
functions as head state and thus vested immunity.
I answer in the negative. The notion of continued
immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Torture Convention. If the
implementation of the torture regime is to be treated as
official business sufficient to found an immunity for the
former head of state, it must also be official business
sufficient to justify immunity for his inferiors who actually
did the torturing. Under the Torture Convention the
international crime of torture can only be committed by
an official or someone in an official capacity. They would
all be entitled to immunity. Therefore, the whole
elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction over torture
committed by officials is rendered abortive and one of
the main objectives of the Torture Convention to
provide a system under which there is no safe haven for
torturers will have been frustrated. For these reasons
in my judgment, Senator Pinochet was not acting in any
capacity which gives rise to immunity rationae materiae
when he allegedly organized and authorized the tortures
after 8 December 1988 because such actions were
contrary to international law

Nicaragua vs United States

FACTS:
In 1979, Nicaragua had a new government led by the
Frente Sandinista de Liberacibn Nacional (FSLN). The
FSLN was initially supported by the United States. On
the other hand, El Salvador joined the U.S. in their
Declaration of Intervention. When the US found out that
Nicaragua was providing logistical support and weapons
to guerrillas in El Salvador, the US withdrew its support
to Nicaragua. The US then controlled and supported an
armed opposition against the FSLN government called
Contras by funding military or para military operations in
Nicaragua, which aimed to overthrow the FSLN
government. Attacks included the mining of Nicaraguan
ports, oil installations and a naval base. Nicaragua
alleged that US aircrafts flew over Nicaraguan territory to
gather intelligence, supply to the contras in the field and
to intimidate the population. Nicaragua filed before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the US for
breach of customary international law. The US
contended that their actions can be justified since it is a
collective self defense, however, the ICJ ruled in favor of
Nicaragua. The ICJ held that the US violated customary
international law when it supported the Contras. The
U.S. later blocked enforcement of the judgment by the
United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented
Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation. The
Nicaraguan government withdrew the complaint from the
court in September 1992, following a repeal of the law
requiring the country to seek compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the US committed a breach of its
customary international law obligations to not intervene
in the affairs of another State; not to use force against
another State and not to violate the Sovereignty of
another State
HELD:
The International Court of Justice held that the US
committed a breach of its customary international law
obligations when it supported the Contras in their
activities to oust the FSLN government.
Articles 2 (4) of the UN Charter and in customary
international law prohibit the use of force of one state to
another state. Another concept under Article 2(1) of the
UN Charter provides that State sovereignty extends to
its internal waters, territorial sea and the air space above
its territory. On Non- intervention, it means that every
State has a right to conduct its affairs without outside
interference which is corollary of the principle of
sovereign equality of States.

On the other hand, Article 51 of the UN Charter and
customary international law, self-defense is only
available against a use of force that amounts to an
armed attack (para 211). Armed attack action by regular
armed forces across an international boarder and the
sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts
of armed force against another State of such gravity as
to amount an actual armed attack conducted by regular
forces, or its substantial involvement therein as stated in
Article 3 (g) of the UNGA Resolution 3314 on the
Definition of Aggression.
Here, The US breached its customary international law
obligations by supporting and participating in the
following acts: armed attacks against Nicaragua by air,
land and sea; incursions into Nicaraguan territorial
waters; aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace; efforts
by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the
Government of Nicaragua; using force and the threat of
force against Nicaragua; intervening in the internal
affairs of Nicaragua; infringing upon the freedom of the
high seas and interrupting peaceful maritime commerce;
and killing, wounding and kidnapping citizens of
Nicaragua. The US contention of collective self-defense
cannot be given merit since El Salvador never requested
the assistance of the United States.



INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION
COMMISSION, petitioner
vs
HON. PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES (TUPAS)
WFTU respondents.
G.R. No. 85750 September 28, 1990
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J
Facts:
* ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine
Government to operate the refugee processing center in
Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA,
at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency
involved in international humanitarian and voluntary
work. It is duly registered with the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys
Consultative Status, Category II. As an international
organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian
services in the Philippines, its activities are parallel to
those of the International Committee for Migration (ICM)
and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).
* On 14 July 1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank and file members employed by
ICMC The latter opposed the petition on the ground that
it is an international organization registered with the
United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.
* On 5 February 1987, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin
sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.On appeal by TUPAS, Director Pura Calleja
of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the
Med-Arbiter's Decision and ordered the immediate
conduct of a certification election. ICMC then sought the
immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for
Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly
granted but the same was denied by respondent BLR
Director. Thus, on 24 November 1988, ICMC filed the
present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction
assailing the BLR Order.
Issue:
WON ICMC has been granted diplomatic immunity
Ruling:
Yes, There can be no question that diplomatic immunity
has, in fact, been granted ICMC
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the
Philippine Government and ICMC provides that ICMC
shall have a status "similar to that of a specialized
agency." Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized
Agencies, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21
November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine
Senate through Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949,
explicitly provides:
Art. III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their
property and assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form
of legal process except insofar as in any particular case
they have expressly waived their immunity. It is,
however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall
extend to any measure of execution.
Sec. 5. The premises of the specialized agencies
shall be inviolable. The property and assets of the
specialized agencies, wherever located and by
whomsoever held shall be immune from search,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other
form of interference, whether by executive,
administrative, judicial or legislative action.


THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, JR. and STARBRIGHT SALES
ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949
December 1, 1994

FACTS: Lot 5-A, located in Paraaque and registered in
the name of the petitioner, was one of the three lots sold
to Ramon Licup upon the agreement that the earnest
money be paid by him and that the squatters be evicted
from the lots. Licup paid the earnest money and
assigned his rights to Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc..
However, the squatters refused to vacate and the
earnest money was returned. The subsequent sale of
Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corp.
without notice to private respondent prompted the same
to file a complaint with the RTC of Makati for the
annulment of the sale and specific performance plus
damages. Petitioner invoked the privilege of sovereign
immunity. However, the RTC ruled that petitioner shed
off its sovereign immunity by entering into the business
contract in question. The DFA filed a Motion for
Intervention stating that it has a legal interest with regard
to the diplomatic immunity of the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has sovereign immunity
RULING: YES. There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity: (1) the classical or absolute theory
wherein a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be
made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign
and (2) the newer or restrictive theory wherein the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
In fact, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate
test as such act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged
in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the act or transaction must be tested by its nature.
But if the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
Petitioner acquired the land as a donation from
the Archdiocese of Manila not for commercial purpose,
but for the construction of the official place of residence
of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to
acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state,
which is essential for the creation and maintenance of its
diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22) and
this was concurred by the Philippine Senate and entered
into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965. The
transfer of the property and the subsequent disposal
thereof are clothed with a governmental character since
petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain but
because the squatters refusal to vacate made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use the lot for the intended
purpose.
Petition for certiorari granted. Complaint against
petitioner dismissed.

United States vs. Iran
(1980) ICJ Report


FACTS

On November 4, 1979, the Muslim Student
Followers of the Imams Policy attacked the United
States Embassy in Iran. This militant group overrun the
US Embassy premises, held hostages its inmates and
appropriated its properties and archives. While the
Iranian State was under the obligation to take
appropriate steps to protect the US embassy, it did
nothing to stop the attack or to oblige the militants to
withdraw from the premises and to release the hostages.
This inaction was in contrast with the conduct of Iranian
authorities on several occasions at the same period
when they had taken appropriate steps.

After this militant group occupied the US
Embassy, the Iranian Government did not take
appropriate steps to end the infringement of the
inviolability of the Embassy premises and staff, and to
offer reparation for the damage. Instead, expressions of
approval were immediately heard from numerous Iranian
authorities. Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the Iranian
States endorsement of both the seizure of the premises
and the detention of the hostages. He described the
Embassy as a center of espionage, declared that the
hostages would remain under arrest until the US had
returned the former Shah and his property to Iran, and
forbade all negotiation with the US on the subject.


RULING

Iranian authorities inaction is a clear and serious
violation of its obligations to the US under Articles 22(2),
24, 25, 26, 27, and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, and of Article 11(4) of the 1955
Treaty. Apparently, the Iranian authorities were fully
aware of their obligations under the conventions in force
and also of the urgent need for action on their part, that
they had the means at their disposal to perform their
obligations, but that they had completely failed to do so.

Once organs of the Iranian State had given approval to
the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate tem as
a means of pressure on the US, those acts were
transformed into acts of the Iranian State: the militants
became agents of that State, which itself became
internationally responsible for their acts.

The Iranian authorities decision to continue the
subjection of the Embassy to occupation, and of its staff
to detention as hostages, gave rise to repeated and
multiple breaches of Irans treaty obligations, additional
to those already committed at the time of the seizure of
the Embassy.

Thus, the ICJ decided that (1) Iran has violated and is
still violating obligations owed by it to the US; (2) that
these violations engage Irans responsibility; (3) that the
Government of Iran must immediately release the US
nationals held as hostages and place the premises of
the Embassy in the hands of the protecting power; (4)
that no member of the US diplomatic or consular staff
may be kept in Iran to be subjected to any form of
judicial proceedings or to participate in them as a
witness; (5) that Iran is under an obligation to make
reparation for the injury caused to the US; and (6) that
the form and amount of such reparation, failing
agreement between the parties, shall be settled by the
Court.