Notes on Franois Laruelles

Les Philosophies de la difference: Introduction critique

(Paris: PUF, 1986).
Provided on 13 October 2009 by Anthony Paul Smith for personal use and
edification.
Originally posted at An und fr sich !itself."ordpress.com# as part of a series of
notes on important te$ts in %aruelle&s development of non'philosophy. All (uotes are
my o"n translation) but they should be treated as rough translations not suitable for
direct (uotation. Also) as these are reading notes) * e$pect there may be spelling errors
and grammatical mista+es) but hope they may still be of use. ,eaders are advised to
loo+ for ,occo -angle&s translation) entitled Philosophies of Difference: A Critical
Introduction to Non-Philosophy) to come out in 2010 "ith .ontinuum.
Instructions for Use
A short "ord about the boo+ itself before * summari/e the preface 0entitled
1*nstructions for 2se 34ode d5emploi61. 7irst) before anyone as+s) %es Philosophies
de la diff8rence9 *ntroduction criti(ue 0P27) 19:;< is currently being translated by
,occo -angle for .ontinuum. * thin+ "e&ll see that =nglish translation come out
sometime in mid'2010 in an affordable hardbac+ and then a year later in paperbac+.
*n %aruelle&s o"n history of non'philosophy this "or+ is placed in the period called
1Philosophy **>. ?his is the period of non'philosophy "here %aruelle intentionally
begins to develop his science of philosophy. ?he negative finding of this science of
philosophy is in the theory of the philosophical @ecision as the invariant structure of
all philosophy. ?he philosophical @ecision is the structure that dooms philosophy to a
hallucinatory specularity) blinding it to the ,eal as ,eal. ?he positive theories
developed in this stage are that of the vision'in'One and the reclaiming of science&s
relationship "ith the ,eal for thought. *n short) this boo+ provides the criticism of
philosophy and gives us the map to avoid the traps of philosophy&s structure. A
necessary prolegomena for the positive "or+ of non'philosophy found in the "or+s of
Philosophy *** and Philosophy *A 0"or+s * hope to provide notes for in the future
include the magnum opus Principes de la non-philosophie and Mystique non-
philosophique lusage des contemporains<.
%aruelle begins by noting the need for 1instructions> to reading the studies found in
the boo+. *n these instructions he "ill provide some e$plication on the method of the
boo+) its ends) the interior problematic of philosophy it intends to introduce 0in a
critical "ay< as found in the most manifest problematic of contemporary philosophy
0difference<) and the boo+&s internal organi/ation.
4ethod9 %aruelle is e$plicit that this is not a do$ography) it is not a typical history of
philosophy boo+. But rather it ma+es use of figures) te$ts) themes) positions) and the
usual elements of philosophy as if they "ere obCects of one problematic and
underta+es a reconstruction of that problematic from the suspended material of
philosophy. %aruelle is considering @ifference here as the most enveloping and
comprehensive problematic of contemporary philosophy from Diet/sche on"ards.
?he tas+ of this "or+ is not to sho" "hat particular thin+ers thought about @ifference
1
0one might say 1thought they thought><) but to use names li+e 1Diet/sche>)
1Eeidegger>) 1@errida>) and 1@eleu/e> as indicies) indications of problems) the limits
and the possibilities in the problems) etc.) and to bring out the 1synta$> of philosophy.
Fhile the boo+ aims to be an introduction it does so not descriptively) but critically of
the thin+ers it introduces.
=nds9 ?he goal of the boo+ is not primarily criticism. %aruelle moc+s the usual
philosophical commentary industry tactics of "ritings boo+s. =ither the author sho"s
that there are no problems in the thin+er e$amined or it claims to have found the
insurmountable problem in the thin+er or it claims to +no" the thin+er better than the
thin+er himself and to provide a ne" Eegelianism beyond Eegel or ne" Spino/ism
beyond Spino/a. 7or this +ind of "riting philosophy becomes primarily criticism)
"hereas for %aruelle&s proCect the criticism is secondary and an effect of the
transcendental approach to philosophy. *ts real end is to develop a theory of
philosophy itself in order to e$it the trap of philosophy. *t does so in its 1scientific
theory> of the philosophical @ecision.
*nternal Problematic9 7irstly) %aruelle appears to be resolutely humanist. *t is this
non'philosophical humanism of 1immanent man> that he sets against the problematic
of @ifference or rather demands that @ifference be thought through. Ee "rites)
1philosophy is made for man) not man for philosophy 010<.> *t is "ith this in mind
that he then states a maCor thesis for the boo+) 1Fe e$periment here) in this case from
@ifference) from Eeidegger and @errida principally) and from Diet/sche and @eleu/e
also) "ith the 1thesis> that) in the One 0in the sense "e have e$tended to it<) "e find
the radical unity of man and of +no"ledge 3savoir6 the most immanent and the most
real 010<.> Fe are "arned not to confuse unity "ith unitary philosophy. *nstead unity
refers to the privileged mode of +no"ing that science has of the ,eal) "hich %aruelle
names 1gnosis> in honour of the forgotten martyrs of greco'occidental philosophy. *t
begins by ta+ing up the forgetting of Being in the name of the One. According to
%aruelle the One) as found in @ualists and -nostics) is the minoritarian position in
thought even as it is the scientific one. ?he tas+ then becomes to thin+ Being from the
thought of the One and not) as has been the case) the One from ontology. ?he One is
beyond ontological systems and open to the ,eal that is irreducible to a unitary
conception of Being or the One or @ifference.
Organi/ation9 %aruelle then summari/es each chapter. ?he first chapter establishes the
conditions of possibility for a real and scientific criti(ue of @ifference and the
philosophical @ecision in general. *t e$plains his concept of the 1vision'in'One>. ?he
second chapter e$amines the synta$ of @ifference) though "ith the problem of
7initude 0"hich "ill become a maCor theme in the chapters on Eeidegger and @errida<
suspended as this chapter deals "ith thin+ers of the infinite 0@eleu/e and Diet/sche<.
?he third chapter e$amines the reality of @ifference and introduces the irreducible
dimension of 7initude as 1ontic> and 1real>. ?he fourth chapter analyses the
overlapping of @ifference and 7initude in order to overcome the opposition of
1.oncept> and 1finite @ifference>. ?he fifth chapter considers the "or+ of @errida in
order to sho" the interior of the universal and invariant schema of @ifference. Eere
the Ge"ish'Occidental philosophy of @errida overturns the -ree+'Occidental
philosophy of Diet/sche and Eeidegger through a radical concept of finitude. ?his is)
ho"ever) an idealist overcoming of the prevailing hierarchy. ?he follo"ing t"o
chapters continue this overcoming but through a replacing of the idealist elements
"ith the Aision'in'One and begins the real criti(ue of @ifference. ?he si$th chapter is
the most fundamental and sho"s ho" the One in its rigorously transcendental essence
is re(uired and denied by @ifference. ?hat the One has been forgotten. *t goes on to
2
e$amine scientific and non'philosophical aspects of the real criti(ue of @ifference.
?he seventh chapter moves past the specific problematic of @ifference to develop the
theory of the philosophical @ecision using the tools uncovered through the preceding
studies.
*t is in order to move past the aporias of both -ree+'Occidental and Ge"ish'
Occidental philosophy that non'philosophy underta+es its transcendental science. ?his
is not primarily a criticism of philosophy) but a critical introduction to the practice of
non'philosophy.
Ca!ter 1 " Intro#uction: Fro$ te a!orias of %ifference to
te &ision'in'(ne
?he first section is entitled) 1Eo" @ifference became a philosophical decision>.
@ifference is understood here as a name for the constellation "hich assembles certain
contemporaries in comple$ relations but nevertheless remain in pro$imity to one
another. ?his means Diet/sche and Eeidegger but also those "ho follo" after them
07oucault) @eleu/e) @errida<. @ifference is the shado" of the old -reco'occidental
"orld. ?he dominance of 1Being> on thought came to be replaced) partly due to
Eeidegger&s o"n thin+ing) by 1@ifference>. @ifference isn&t an *dea or a category) but
rather a synta$ and concrete invariant of philosophy.
1@ifference is a synta$) a manifesting of articulating philosophical language. *t is also
a thesis of reality) a certain e$perience) itself multiple) of the real 01;<.> *t is a
functional unity of both synta$ and e$perience "hich elevates it to the level of a
principle H real and 1transcendentally> logics H and in this "ay is an instance of the
philosophical @ecision that can be found in other such principles 0.ontradiction)
=$istence) Structure<.
%aruelle then summari/es the historical ascendency of @ifference in 20
th
.entury
philosophy) tracing its importance in diverse fields li+e semiotics and
phenomenology. ?his arises at the same time as the 1thin+ing of limits> occurs in
Diet/sche and Eeidegger as inscribed in the metaphysics of 1=nd> and 1%imit>. 7or
all that it still appears as yet another variation "ithin philosophy itself of the
philosophical @ecision that has the invariant structure of claiming to close the
net"or+ on its o"n openness) but it does so by supplementing this "ay "ith the
alterity that renders it preferable to anterior attempts.
Eo" does @ifference become a real principle or a philosophical decisionI 7irst) it
elaborates the properties of its synta$ and this gives it a real and transcendental
essence. Secondly) no" raised to the level of a transcendental it Coins the ran+s of
1Being> and 12nity>. As a category it assumes some pregiven ontic reality) yet it rises
to the level of decision "hen it is freed from this double subCection and becomes itself
that 2nity) capable of 0at the same time< bringing itself about) determining its synta$)
its o"n transcendental e$perience of reality) and of carrying out the genesis of
empirical reality. ?hirdly and finally it must themati/e its synta$ical structure.
So %aruelle "ill concern himself "ith the (uestion of uncovering the synta$ that "e
call 1@ifference> and ho" to distinguish it from other synta$s) li+e 1@ialectics>.
7urther to that (uestion %aruelle as+s "hat is the specific e$perience) or rather
eperiences) of the real that animate that specific synta$ and render it concreteI Fhat
+ind of real is it that articulates and specifies it each timeI *s it Being) SubCect) Spirit)
Po"er 3Puissance6) the Other and if so) "hat OtherI
3
Ee ha/ards some thoughts on the philosophical @ecision that "ill be developed more
as the boo+ progresses. A philosophical decision is each time the total unity of co'
membership and co'penetration of a synta$ and an e$perience of that "hich it calls
the 1real>. *t determines the one and the other reciprocally and individuali/es them
until it renders them undecidable. Against this %aruelle posits the 1thin+ing from
One>) "hich he says is not a decision but a 1science>) that denies its dismemberment)
as if being pulled by horses) bet"een a synta$ical side and a real side. ?hus) the
analytic of @ifference "ill re(uire t"o descriptions. ?he first "ill be that of synta$
and the problems of philosophical synta$. ?he other "ill be that of real e$periences
that suppose the idea of a synta$ destined to articulate them) in this case that of
@ifference) and "hich "ill be able to introduce us to the problems of philosophical
materiality and reality.
1Eo" @ifference has re(uisitioned the One>
Of course) the One is not completely foreign to discussions of @ifference. @ifference
is in this case a repetition of the most ancient -reco'occidental (uestion H that of
duality'as'unity) or ho" to thin+ the unity or the passage of a contrary to the other H
and presents itself as a solution to that (uestion. ?he contemporaries have largely
as+ed the same -ree+ (uestion and responded by re(uiring the One and placing it in
differing models of the dialectic) "here it stands for the unity of the contraries. ?he
(uestion %aruelle "ants to as+ is if "e have e$hausted the One) its essence its o"n
1evidence>) in @ifference.
Polis! Physis! and "osmos are names of the Same) and the Same serves to order and
conCoin the being in the One. ?he One is understood here to be the Fhole) or the
Fhole is as One) "hich allo"s us to drift off into a philosophical slumber. Fa+ing to
the One as such) to its essence "hich distinguishes it from that of the Same and its
cosmological tautology) is the condition for understanding the absurdity that is the
emergence of the cosmos and nature.
@ifference is a theory and practice of 1mi$ture> 3mite6) but mi$ture as such) in their
essence mi$ed. ?hese 1mi$ed> are "hat generate or give place to the fundamental
aporias of -reco'occidental thought. @ifference is the thought of the aporia as such.
1Eo" a theory of @ifference is possible>
Some may obCect that it is possible to find a invariant common to Eeidegger)
Diet/sche) @errida) and @eleu/e. ?o assuage that suspicion %aruelle discusses
deploys Eeidegger&s o"n insistence that a 1turn> did not occur in his thought and that
there is an invariant aspect to Eeidegger&s o"n thought even as it changes in many
"ays throughout its development. %aruelle does not deny that there is the @ifference
of Eeidegger) or that of @eleu/e) that of @errida) etc.) but "hat is common to them all
is refusing to thin+ the minority position of the One as such that is indifferent to 2nity
as described by philosophers "ith regard to @ifference and @ialectic.
?he one is that "hich it distinguishes absolutely from the philosophical decision H
under the form of a unilaterial duality) "ithout reciprocity or reversibility H a domain
of reality that %aruelle calls the effecti#ely and "hich contains all entities)
philosophical or not) "hich are obtained by the unitary combination of the t"o
parameters of immanence and transcendence) "hich are then mi$ed 0the best model
for this is the philosophical 2nity'of'contraries<. ?he one is not that "hich
distinguishes the mi$ed 0this "ould be to repeat the old philosophical gesture of
transcendence<) rather the One is that "hich is sufficiently finished or 1autonomous>
4
by constraining the mi$ed. ?he po"er of distinction belongs to the One) but it affects
the philosophically mi$ed and not the One itself. %aruelle aims to unilaterali/e
@ifference then) to ta+e it as if it "ere the obCect of the One) indifferent to the aporias
it creates.
1?he -reco'Occidental invariant>
%aruelle recogni/es the actual limits to this proCect and recogni/es that in many "ays
it "ill remain in the aporias of 2nity and 4ultiplicity) 2niversal and Singular) etc.)
but the obCect of the studies is to a"a+en philosophers to a problem) or rather 0he
says< a non'philosophical e$perience that is li+ely to found a rigorous science of
philosophy.
?his invariant is seen in the combination) each time philosophy thin+s obCect J K) of
an immanence and a transcendence) of an ideality and a supposed real. ?his
combination has regularly been called 1difference> 3"hich e$plains "hy %aruelle is
focusing on @ifference as a privileged site of the philosophical decision as this is the
structure of the decision H APS6.
?here are t"o +inds of duality) one that is reCected by %aruelle and one that is given a
different sense. ?he first is the duality of religious dualists 0-nostics< and poorly
formed philosophy 0the unity'duality dialectic of @ifference<. ?he second is a
unilaterali/ation of a second term by the One "hich does not assert the second term
and conse(uently is not determined by it. A duality transcendentally founded in a
thin+ing of the One allo"s one to pull out at the root the ancient mode of Festern
thought H @ifference in the model of 2nity'tension or of the One'4ultiple. 3Don'
philosophical duality is still at this point obscure. H APS6
By sho"ing that there is a invariant parallelism of the empirico'transcendental
%aruelle "ill sho" ho" the three understandings of @ifference in Eeidegger)
Diet/sche) and @errida are different 1@ifferences>) but share the same structure
-reco'occidental thought 0"hich is the parallelism of the empirico'transcendental<.
17rom science to the criti(ue of @ifference>
%aruelle has repeatedly claimed that this "or+ "ill develop a description and a
criti(ue of difference "hose foundation is both scientific and transcendental. Ee
clarifies here that transcendental does not here indicate an ultimate circular synta$)
but an e$perience that 0"hen reduced to its essence< is the #eritas transcendentalis
tested as such and distinguished from rationalist and subCectivist use.
?he one is that indivision that forms the essence of all the transcendentals 0Being)
@iversity) .ontingency) Decessity) ?ruth and the -ood) etc.<. Let even this can
become an error or become trapped in philosophy. %aruelle&s discourse about the One
is about the One as irreflective 3irr$fl$chie6 or absolutely immediately given
transcendental e$perience and non'thetic 0of< itself. Absolutely immediate because
the One of the *ndivision is given 0in< self "ithout passed by the mediation of a
universal hori/on) of nothingness) of ecstasy or scission) of 1distance>. *t is
irreflective meaning it is absolutely singular and autonomous as such from all
universals 0form) sense) relation) synta$) difference) etc.<. *t is then 1unarity> 3unarit$6
to distinguish it from philosophical 12nity>. ?he unarity is inherently immanent 0of<
self and non'thetic 0of< self) Cust as unity is al"ays immanent and transcendent.
5
?he goal of the thought from One is to escape the hallucinatory thin+ing of
@ifference) "hich is the form of -reco'occidental aporia and the philosophical
@ecision) in order to see in the One a principle not only transcendental but also
absolutely real and capable of founding @ifference itself "ithout e$hausting it) in its
essence) through using it.
?he po"er of the One is this) according to %aruelle) ' in the unilaterali/ation of
philosophy it thro"s into the abyss or casts in the light of indifference the alienation
that man carries "ith him into the Forld as a foreigner. ?he unilaterali/ation does not
allo" us to step outside the Forld) of philosophy and of its mi$tures) but rather gives
us access that is indifference and inalienable to the Forld as to the philosophies
therein.
Ca!ter ) " *+nta, of %ifference
1@ifference as 7orm of Order 3forme dordre6>
?he One) as its essence is saved from the philosophical decision) is no @ifference and
has no need of it. But difference is a philosophical interpretation of the One and does
have need of it. ?his chapter thus deals "ith the (uestion of ho" to pass from the One
0concretely and absolutely "ithout'division< to the synta$ of @ifference as the
articulation of the philosophical decision and thus to the minimum or residual synta$
of all possible philosophy.
@ifference is an inclusive dis'Cunction in "hich each 1neitherM norM> and 1not>)
though negative) produce or immediately give the *ndivision. *n this "ay "e can see
that the philosophies of @ifference repeat a fundamental gesture from neoplatonism H
the #ia negationis. ?his is a philosophical technology that is traditional and found in
1the adventures of transcendence and decision 03:<.>
?he One is not 1unified unity> 0for this "ould mean it "as divisible< but 1unifying
unity>) this being the transcendental sense of the One rather than empirco'ideal. 3Dote
there is a subtle differentiation here about 1unities> in %aruelle. ?he One 0a name for
the ,eal< is a unifying unity because it cannot be itself split 0even if "e try to split it it
remains indifferent to this 1artificial> splitting< "hile the obCects of thought) even
non'philosophical thought li+e 1unified theories>) can be split up into their parts and
rearranged in an infinite amount of mutations. H APS6
?he operation of @ifference is neither sub'sumption nor surper'sumption
3Aufhe%ung6) but is something li+e a 1co'sumption>. ?his means that it is beyond the
contrariness of the one and the other) subsumption and supersumption. @ifference is
immediate'Scission'as'2nity) a Becoming'as'Being) an immobile movement) a
transcendental hesitation. ?his locates the synta$ of @ifference in this constant
production of 1*ndivision> despite the divisions at place because of @ifference.
@ifference is grounded) "ithout +no"ing it) in the authentic One. ?his isn&t a
tautology 0@ifference is not the same thing as the One even if it is dependent upon it
as a unifying unity<) for the One as non'thetic 0of< self is never a tautology) but a only
the necessary and not sufficient condition for all logic 0including the tautologous<.
1Passage form the meta'physic form to the transcendental form of @ifference>
@ifference is not a simple 1fact>) "ith Diet/sche and @eleu/e it becomes a principle
for contemporary philosophy. ?his sho"s the common charateristics "ith the
6
philosophical decision "hich is al"ays in effect a discourse in double or doubly
articulated. One side of the discourse interprets @ifference according to the disparity
and multiplicity and the other according to unity.
A philosophical synta$ is al"ays real in the sense that it must be reali/ed in a process)
and not in a formal mechanism.
An e$ample of an empirical factum that is one part of the philosophical synta$ of
difference is the various modes of 1being'able> 3pou#oir-&tre6 in philosophies of
difference 01 active forces> of Diet/sche) 1desiring machines> of @eleu/e 3and
-uattari Hnaughty) naughty %aruelle6) the 1possibilities'of'being> of Eeidegger)
1te$tual forces> of @errida<. *n each of these cases) %aruelle argues) "e have a second
transcending in addition to the absolute transcendence present in philosophy. ?he
concepts "hich come out of these factums of 1being'able> foster an immanence
"hich repeats transcendence in its origin and ontic destination.
1?he impossible overcoming of metaphysics>
@ifference is interior and e$terior to metaphysics or to representation.
1Overcoming of metaphysics> is a very metaphysical formula already) and indicates a
problem "hich @ifference is the solution to. 1Overcoming> is the same operation of
metaphysical transcendence) but applied to all metaphysics. @ifference is then "hat
guards metaphysics as such and renders it impossible to overcome because it resists
any reified e$clusion of contraries and is not only a thin+ing to"ards the One but) in
its essence) the movement of the One 1in> itself. ?ranscending to"ards the One
02nity) not the authentic One< is able to be overcome) but transcending as One) that is
not possible to overcome.
1?he three stages of @ifference>
@ifference 0in all its forms and in each of the thin+ers of the study< pass by three
stages "hich continually chain it and finally define the double articulation of the
philosophical decision in general9
1) @ifference as present in the obCect'being) ontic difference) and that to
"hich it correspeonds) the category of difference H all of this is the
empirical level of @ifference. ?his is all under the la" of a representative
and transcendent unity.
2) @ifference as 1ontological difference>) the transcendence of presence by
relation to a being present. ?his operation releases transcendence in its
relation to the origin) in its relative to the obCect'being or present.
3) @ifference no longer as metaphysical or ontological) but transcendental 0in
the rigorous sense of a thought of the One that is from immanence as such
and overcomes every empirical) generic and even ontological division<.
1-enerali/ation of the passage from the categorical to the transcendental>
?he passage from the categorical to the transcendental can be e$tended beyond the
usual concepts 0Dothing) Being) @ifference itself< to all the categories of thought.
%aruelle describes here ho" the categories of thought become transcendental actors.
So the Dothing nothings) the =ssence essences) %anguage spea+s) @esire desires or is
desiring) the Forld "orlds) etc. *n doing this) for instance by saying the Dothing
7
nothings) the philosopher creates a co'membership of Dothing "ith Being as "ell as
beings. ?here is a problem here as is evidenced in the 1%anguage spea+s>) for it tells
us nothing about language H it isn&t even a thesis on languageN H but instead is a form
of a transcendental tautology.
@ifference) %aruelle says "e can no" see) is an a priori principle. ?he synta$ of
@ifference ma+es it the essence of Being) Dothing) @esire) Po"er) ?e$t) etc.) but it is
the same as their coupling. Let) for all this) saying that @ifference is the essence of
being is not ontological) saying that @ifference is the essence of %anguage is not
linguistic) etc.
Ca!ter III " -ealit+ of %ifference
17rom Synta$ to the reality of @ifference>
@ifference thin+ing itself or reflecting itself implies the disCunction and belonging
bet"een synta$ and reality) the articulation of the real and the e$perience of the real
articulated. ?his chapter e$amines the reality of difference in that disCunction.
*n order to consider the reality of @ifference %aruelle has recourse to the
philosophical discussion about finitude. Ee describes the Eeideggerian notion of
17initude> in (uasi'Oantian terms as the irreducible distinction of being in self in
relation to the obCective or present being) the ob'Cect. Opposed to this is the
Diet/schean raising of 7initude to the auto'position of Being as essence. ?his is
inseperated from the idealist and classic metaphysical spirit.
1?he difference of Eeidegger in relation to idealism>
@ifference in the Eeideggerian sense 1destroys> or 1deconstructs> the rationali/ed or
transcendental forms) but remains transcendental in the larger sense "here it is
already a thought of the One 0though along the model of Being<. *n Eeidegger&s
philosophy it is the 1Eistory of metaphyics> that forms the factum of his
philosophical decision and there is no philosophical decision "ithout a prior reduction
of the idealist +ind "hich isolates the obCect to deconstruct and constructs it as
factum.
Eo"ever) this notion of factum is complicated by the original conception of
17initude> found in Eeidegger. 7initude is a thesis about reality that does not allo"
for any idealist reduction. ,eductions are al"ays philosophical decisions) but one is
an idealist decision and the other is a 1finitist> decision.
?he idealist reduction suspends the thesis that the real e$ist in itself in an autonomous
manner in an attempt to insert the real into immanence) though it does this as a +ind
of transcendence of self.
?he 1finitist> reduction is the more radical reduction of the real 0"hil remaining a
philosophical decision<. *t is a reduction of 1ontic> finitude and in this "ay reduces
even itself. ?his notion of finitude allo"s for us 1< to pose a priori the real as that
"hich thought ma+es the obCect and 2< to conserve and include in Being) under the
name of finitude) a relation to the real in its ontic transcendence.
?he strength of Eeidegger&s relationship to that of Eusserl) Diet/sche or @eleu/e
0remembering that these are inde$es of thought< is a notion of finitude that is not
idealist. 17initude is not only a thesis about synta$) it is a thesis about reality 0;P<.>
8
?he "ea+ness of Eeidegger returns) ho"ever) is that this notion of finitude ris+
remaining partially idealist and dogmatic. ?hough Eeidegger and Oant both
unilaterally denounced the misguided notion of idealism that denied the real 0as the
factum and datum and not entirely seperable<) the idealist responds that 7initude is a
final concession to common sense. *n this "ar and because it is a "ar) %aruelle says)
there is nothing thin+able and so "e must continue to describe the agon and
"ampfplat'.
1A ma$imalist hypothesis on the meaning of 7initude>
%aruelle as+s if Eegel&s obCection to Oant&s system) the positive result "hich is the
dialectic) "or+s against Eeidegger&s notion of finitude. Oant instrumentali/es
finitude) or sees finitude as an empirical thing "hich leads to a discussion of being 1in
totality> and being 1in partial> or 1 particular>) but Eeidegger does not have an
empiricist idea about finitude and Being) but rather a 1realist> one although
transcendent to finitude. Beings are not created) but are constituted in and by Being.
Let there is al"ays a real) a real condition J K) that affects Being. ?his thesis on
finitude is incomprehensible "ithout ta+ing up again the Oantian theme of 1thing'in'
itself>.
7initude located in the 1thing'in'itself> or an ontic finitude becomes a real
transcendence in immanence itself. ?his real transcendence of the identity of a thing'
in'itself destroys the reversible immanence of Diet/sche that says obCects are
infinitely e$changeable.
?his hypothesis of ontic 7initude does not destroy the thing'in'itself but saves it from
"hat remains in the Oantian system of dogmatism and rationalism. ?his real
transcendence of the One beyond noumena and rational *dea is "hat differentiates
Eeidegger&s system from that of Eegel) Eusserl) and Diet/sche.
?his real transcendence is "hat allo"s %aruelle to distinguish the synta$ of
@ifference from the synthetic 2nity of the 1* thin+> and the real) "hich is the
essential element of the @ialectic.
7initude) interpreted as the transcendence of the ,eal) an ontic transcendence and not
obCective'ontological transcendence) allo"s becoming to then become a
transcendental trait that can confirm the 1relay of being> by the One by "ay of
1retreat> H even seeing the essence of Being. 7initude is thus the most po"erful
assault against the "alls of the System.
17rom metaphysical meaning to the transcendental meaning of 7initude>
?he passage from 1ontological @ifference> to finite @ifference is the destruction of
@ifference as 1meta'physical>. Fhat then remains of @ifference as such in 7initudeI
Some repetition of the previous chapters follo"s here sho"ing ho" this destruction
ta+es place. ?he simple 1ontological @ifference& "as already a unifying scission of
Being and being) the t"o being thought together as correlation. ?hin+ing is then a
repetition of that correlation of the ontological @ifference by and through the One)
repetition "hich is not eliminate the ontic reference of Being. Let) even Eeidegger&s
thin+ing of finitude is itself limited by being a transcendental analytic 3this being the
form of the philosophical @ecision H APS6 in that it ta+es part of 7initude as a factum
a priori. after have distinguished it from the same finitude as everyday forgetting of
self.
9
7initude is the essence of @ifferece) but is not that that essence "ithout being ta+en
up in a certain manner in difference and structured by it.
7initude as transcendental rather than metaphysical is the distinction of Being from
being) but allo"s for a indivisible relationship bet"een them nevertheless as the
1Same>.
1?he overlapping of 7initude and @ifference>
1Ontological @ifference> is not an ontological theses) it is a thesis on 7initude) on the
relation of Being to beings) and conse(uently a thesis on the essence of Being. But the
essence of Being is not itself 1ontological>) the essence is the overlapping of 7initude
and Being or @ifference.
2nder the name of 7initude Eeidegger allo"s for us to absolutely oppose the real) the
1Other> of every relation of obCectivation) the *n'obCectifiable real that is the essence
of being. ?he reality of @ifference has a primacy over the synta$ of @ifference.
1,eversibility and irreversibility>
?he finitude of @ifference corresponds to a primacy of the real over synta$) to "hich
it is irreducible. But the primacy of the real over synta$ also signifies that of the
irreversibility over reversibility.
*n Diet/sche&s "or+ @ifference is a non'static e(uilibrium "hich proceded by
reversibility or 1passage> of a contrary to its other.
?he real is ho"ever not reversible. 7or @ifference itself is irreversible) mar+ing it as
not only an immanence) but an inde$ of a real transcendence in the double visage
0unary and ontic<) of an irreversibility that is never lead to bring itself in an ideal
immanence.
@ifference has been used to try and thin+ the real as @ifference or) at best) as
difference or differentiating of @ifference) as Other in general. 7inite @ifference can
not conceive of irreversibility from its positive transcendental essence) but only in a
negative "ay. 1< By correlation "ith a certain empirical facticity that it ta+es to be the
facticity of the essence of 1Being> and by conse(uence the essence of Dothingness or
the retreat and 2< by the precise recourse to 0essential< Dothingness rather than Being)
to the retreat reather than to the unveiling. So the essence of irreversibility remains
finally in a negative mode "hich cannot become radically positive or the positivity
remains impregnated by facticity.
17rom Dothingness slave of Being to finished Dothingness>
?hesis of this section is that 7initude is not confused "ith Dothingness and
Dothingness does not end if it is itself already underta+en an ending.
%aruelle presents here a technical discussion and evaluation of the function of
Dothingness in Eeidegger. Dothingness is that "hich introduces in a privileged
manner 7initude) but because Dothingness is interlin+ed "ith @ifference 0as that
"hich unifies contraries) the Dothing nothings J @ifference differences<) it is
important not to confuse 7initude "ith Dothingness itself. Dihilism is founded on the
identity of Being and of Dothingness and on the opposition of Dothingness to the
particular being rather than to its obCectivity or even its presence. ?he thought that
overcomes nihilism gives again to Dothingness a positive that it can only find in the
10
One) no doubt to the po"er of the Same rather than the 1reciprocal> appearing of
Being and beings) Being and Dothingness. But this is a the One as such that the "ay
to it are found in 7initude and finished in itself) not identical to Being or the *dea)
identical instead to a certain real transcendence or a retreat 1outside> or 1in the
margins> of Being.
Ca!ter I& " .e/el an# .ei#e//er
3D.B. *&m not summari/ing a great deal of the technical discussion of Eegel and
Eeidegger here. %argely because %aruelle assumes a lot of +no"ledge form his
reader) some of "hich * have and some "hich * do not) but also because *&m not really
interested in his reading of the figures as such. ?hus * try to touch on the important
aspects of his o"n thought and so the notes for this chapter are a littler shorter than
the others. H APS6
1?he insufficiency of synta$ and the passage to 7initude>
*n this chapter %aruelle "ill e$plore the difference bet"een @ifference and the
dialectical 1.oncept>) hence the title 1Eegel and Eeidegger>.
@ifference is circularity and reversibility. *f one considers @ifference only from the
point of vie" of synta$ it seems to give much of itself to Aufhe%ung. *t is a reversible
immanence of contraries) each opposed being one "ith its its other and "ith itself)
and thus also the contrary of itself. @ifference does not e$ceed) in the general
conception of its mechanism or the synta$ of its essence) the -ree+ hori/on. ?he
reason that synta$ is insufficient to the reality of @ifference is because it inscribes
@ifference into a (uestion of identities and contraries) "hich turns out to (uic+ly be
insufficient "hen you as+ (uestions about the identity itself. ?hus "or+ing from
synta$ only is an idealist vision of reality and this is "hat differentiates Eeidegger&s
insertion of 7initude into @ifference from the rest of the tradition.
7initude is not suspended by *dealism 0%aruelle opposes Eeidegger&s realism fostered
by 7initude to the different *dealisms of Eegel and Diet/sche<) but is denied by it.
Eegel thin+s @ifference as the 1mQmet8> 3* am not sure ho" to translate this)
something li+e identity but not (uite H APS6 of +no"ledge or *dea. Eegel "as in some
"ays more radical than Eeidegger in creating a ontological understanding of
difference. Being does not appears in the +no"ledge of self or in the *dea e$cept
under their a priori obCective structures) as obCect or correlate of obCectification) as a
diversity such that transcendence is not only determined in) but %y the immanence of
the *dea that remains itself in its self'obCectification and self'alienation. ?his is not a
radical alienation of being because it is only the alienation in the obCectivity of the
obCect and not in its reality as such. Diet/sche does not fundamental leave this
Eegelian terrain by replacing Self'Ono"ledgeRPure *dea "ith the Fill to Po"er) but
simply moves the (uestion to forces rather than *deas.
1Absolute 7initude9 against alienation>
7initude is the essence of the Absolute) not the opposite. Only 7initude can save
@ifference) not from the Absolute) but from the ideal form of the Absolute. 7initude
is not "hat alienates @ifference) or "hat ta+es it outside of itself. 7initude is "hat
destroys the dialectic and instead fosters a .onciliation'"ithout'synthesis. A letting
remain different) because actual and finite) of "hat is.
11
1?he Absolute and its rending9 pain and phenomenology>
%aruelle is here concerned "ith developing a little more the transcendental approach
against the metaphysical or ontological approaches to 7initude. *n this approach
7initude is the transcendence of the One. ?his approach is then put to use on the
common thesis that 1?he Absolute is identical to its rending>. 7or Eegel this means a
focus on Dothingnes) specifically the negation of Dothingness. ?his is *dealism and
thus not a thin+ing from immanence. ?he phenomenological method) ho"ever) ta+es
pain as its model of immanence. *n pain there is no dialectic possible) there is only
pain and the forgetting of pain. 3%aruelle is clearly attempting an actualist thin+ing. H
APS6
1Systematic dissolution of the resemblances of Eegel and Eeidegger>
?he focus here is on a technical discussion of Dothingness) 7initude) and the Same in
Eegel and Eeidegger. =ssentially the dissolution of resemblance comes do"n to
Eegel&s *dealism that 1heals too (uic+ly> the contraries into a dialectical relief.
Eeidegger) ho"ever) focuses on thin+ing the amphibology of the ideal and the real
itself) rather than healing them it thin+s them from the aspect of 7initude.
1?he Eegel'Eeidegger conflict and the impossibility of a decision>
@espite all the differences of Eegel and Eeidegger there is still no clear criteria for
deciding bet"een the t"o of them. 7or the t"o begin from different perspectives on
7initude that "or+ "ithin their systems) and thus foster t"o philosophical gestures but
never a position. A philosophical decision is never able to convince itself of another
one.
?hus the difference bet"een Eegel and Eeidegger is a turning circle that feeds into
one another Cust as the disCunction of synta$Rreal feeds into itself. Fhat %aruelle ta+es
from this then is that there needs to be a change of synta$ 0@ifference still being the
e$ample of synta$ par e$cellence<) not to destroy Eegelianism by a certain notion of
7initude) but to renounce all possible synta$ and abandon it to the immanent
givenness of the One. Fith this he turns to the study of @errida.
Ca!ter & " %erri#a
1@errida bet"een Diet/sche and Eeidegger>
?his study of @errida is placed into the analytic of @ifference. ?his is in order) not to
denounce the philosophical decision) but to understand it "ithin the frame of not real)
hallucinatory) and re(uired. @errida is the thin+er "ho carries the philosophical
decision to its pure and simple aporetic dislocation. ?he deconstruction of metaphyics
is the 1truth> of it) the enlarging of it and radicali/ing of it as inconsistent that
characterises the non'real) purely fictional and hallucinatory that is philosophy in
general. ?his comes "ith a complimentary thesis that states 1the auto'dislocation of
the philosophical decision is at the same time its becoming'unitary) its auto'collapse)
its auto'inhibition in itself ' its paralysis 0122<.>
Ee is not applying deconstruction to itself. ,ather this study evaluates from a non
deconstructive point of vie" the mechanism 0its validity suspended from the One< of
1@ifferance> and of the affection of the logos by differance. %aruelle uses the capital
in order to designate the glocal system of @ifference 0"ithout the a< and the lo"er
case to designate the moment of alterity) cutting) or slo"ing do"n of continuities and
12
the specificity of the system of @ifferance. ?he same goes for @econstrution 0the
type< and the deconstruction 0the procedure<.
Fhat %aruelle hopes to sho" is that @ifferance is one of three types of @ifference) the
other t"o being the -reco'Diet/schean and @eleu/ian @ifference and the
Eeideggerian Differen'. Let) at the same time) @errida introduces an original and
important variation into the tradition and this constitutes @errida&s irreducibility into
the philosophical field. ?hat variation is found in the Ge"ish component that @errida
inserts bet"een the Diet/schean and Eeideggerain poles of @ifference. Specifically)
against the -ree+ notion of @ifference and the -ree+ notion of finitude) @errida
presents an elaboration of Ge"ish finitude. %evinas does not present the same thing) as
@errida has sho"n a -ree+ symptom in %evinas as "ell) and so "hat @errida adds is
not the difference of the -ree+ and the Ge") but the Ge"ish mode of the aporia.
1?he -reco'Ge"ish amphibology and ho" to process it 3la traiter6>
Present in %evinas is an amphibology of -ree+ philosophy and Ge"ish thought) a
1mi$ture> that is brought out by @errida. ?his mi$ture is that of thin+ing radical
Alterity alongside the -ree+ problematic of the Other and the Same. ?hus in -ree+
philosophy it is a certain +ind of immanence of the logos and in Ge"ish thought it is a
certain +ind of transcendence. @errida&s method of deconstruction problemati/es
accentuates in an incredible manner the in'consistency and e$teriority of -ree+
metaphysics and the similar in'consistency in the %evinasian figure of the Other
alongside the Same.
Let) %aruelle is not claiming that @errida repeats %evinas& mi$ture of Ge"ish'
Philospher0-ree+<) instead he is claiming that the po"er of @errida&s thought is found
in his ma+ing appear or revealing "hat remains apparent but hidden in the
amphibology.
?hus) from here) %aruelle "ill e$amine the theme and practice of 1relation "ithout
relation>) of the relation 0I< of the relation and 0I< of the non'relation "here it
concentrates the problem of @ifferance. ?he (uestion mar+s in the preceding sentence
are %aruelle&s.
1?he reduction of the amphibology>
@econstruction locates a double discourse at "or+ that spea+s both of relativity and
absoluteness. *t is impossible to separate these t"o discourses. ?he only relation
%aruelle ta+es as his obCect of study is that bet"een this relativity and absoluteness of
@ifference) "hich is a delicate point "here @econstruction has perhaps set its o"n
symptom and that it must analy/e.
@econstruction is an absolute process 0in the sense of autonomy< of relativityS it is not
absolute "ithout reserve) but relative'absolute.
An investigation of the 1plane of Ge"ish alterity>) that is the insertion of the absolute
alterity found in Ge"ish thought into -ree+ philosophy) is ho" %aruelle understands
@ifferance to be a mode of the philosophical decision derived by inversion from
@ifference.
%aruelle aims to actively recover @ifferance by reducing it to the synthetic synta$ of
@ifference.
1?he recovery of @ifferance9 as @ifference>
13
?his is a very difficult section to summari/e. At the beginning of the boo+) in the
preface * thin+) %aruelle said that there "ould be a +ind of introduction to the
.apitalism and Schi/ophrenia "or+s of @eleu/e 0and -uattari<. Fhile this "as true to
some e$tent in the chapter entitled 1Synta$ of @ifference> it is coming out in a rather
strange "ay in this chapter on @errida. *n short) %aruelle seems to be using @eleu/e&s
"or+ here to discuss @errida&s "or+) applying the 1realist> and 1materialist> tools
found in those "or+s to the theme of differance in @errida.
?his allo"s him to locate the "ay that continuums) from the relative to the absolute)
are al"ays a relation of connecting and cutting'off) a continuum is this relation and
also is in relation to other continuums in the same "ay. ?hus all of @errida&s "or+ on
inconsistency and the 1negative> movements of deconstruction found in the delay)
differance) arrest) etc.) are all merely instruments in a general an'economy that
mirrors the inclusive disCunction discussed in Anti-(edipus. @ifferance has the same
positive identity as @eleu/ian @ifferenceS it brings together things in a disCunctive
mode 1at the same time>. ?hus) %aruelle locates a 1Ge"ish plane of immanence> in
@errida) "hich both allo"s him to locate this positive identity of @ifferance "hen
placed into the general synta$ of @ifference but also foreground the specificity of
@errida&s thought.
3?his emphasis on specificity is something * find very interesting. 7or instance) "hile
it feels some"hat "rong at first to separate -ree+ philosophy from Ge"ish thought as
%aruelle does) he does not do so to deny Ge"ish thought the same authority as
philosophy or to someho" denigrate Ge"ish thought. *nstead) neither -ree+ nor Ge"
has any authority over the other or over the One) but both are thought from the One.
?his allo"s a certain +ind of relativism that subsumes them into elements in a
democracy of thought. *&m still not sure that this is entirely unproblematic as yet. H
APS6
1?he Ge"ish inversion of @ifference9 as @ifferance>
,ather than holding together contraries the holding together of contraries constitutes a
1cadaverisation> of everything as a necessary aspect of the system. ?hus @ifferance
aims to ma+e absolute the splitting of contraries) affirms as an unlimited yes holding
them apart in their specificity) rather than ma+ing them a cadaver of the same)
choc+ing them in the double band. %aruelle coins the phrase 1Body'"ithout'"riting>
3Corps-sans-$criture6 to name the process of @econstruction that conCugates and the
cadaverisation and the stimulating affirmation.
1?he Body'"ithout'"riting or the Ge"ish plane of immanence>
?he discussion here focuses on the 1unlimited Les> that @econstruction inherits from
Tarathustra. ?his unlimited Les is the same synta$ as the continuumRsplitting'
continuum described before. ?he unlimited Les al"ays privileges the highest side)
transcendence) the e$propriation 0affirmative certainly<) the absolutely absolute0ly<
unthin+ingable.
But ho" is this affirmation possible "ithout a prior acti#ityI ?his prior activity is the
synta$ of the unlimited term) also called the interminable) and it is universal and the
operative mechanism of differance Cust as much as affirmation.
.adaverisation and affirmation are t"o synta$al or structural functions that co'belong.
?hey both belong to a the system of the double band and the "or+ that prolongs it) but
also to a system outside that of the double band and its origin) a system not named by
14
@errida and that is designated by its effects and functions) this system %aruelle calls
the Body'"ithout'"riting 3B"F6. ?he B"F is constructed along t"o series or t"o
bands H the cutRcission) but one become unlimited and universal) and the continuum)
but become infinite. ?he B"F is the -ree+ plane of immanence "hich Ge"ish
alterity is nevertheless completely capable of H but simply denies it.
?he B"F is a shuttlecoc+ of inscription) it condenses energy and intensifies the "or+
of differance and reaffirmed the infinity of the double band.
%aruelle sums up the synta$ of @errida&s) and also @eleu/e&s argumentation9 they
absoluti/e the forms that the most immediately circular to destroy 0he gives the
e$ample of the signified) that of the signifier or of the 1symbolic>) that of
representation) of presence or the identity of obCects< and proCects the absolute
character of these forms) correlatives of a finite conscience) on the operation of their
destruction and more so along the "ay on the instrument of their destruction
0@ifferance) @ifference<.
1,elatively undeconstructable>
1@econstruction is from itself to itself for itself an 2ndeconstructable 01;1<>. Let) as
the first 2ndeconstructable) it is completely relative in itself. @econstruction is the
univocity of the system'of'the'Other) the Ge"ish plane of immanence. ?hus it is
relatively undeconstructable because its undeconstructability is its deconstructability
0the amphibology of the Same and @ifference<.
?he decline of @econstruction is brought on by its suture to the synta$ of @ifference.
?he more @errida "or+s and analyses) the more he contemplates agglutination or an
infinite gluing together of obCects for contemplation.
1On the good use of @errida9 Eo" the -ree+ logos overcame its Ge"ish challenge>
%aruelle repeats much of "hat "as "ritten above about the contribution of @errida&s
"or+. Ee ends by saying that @errida sho"s us ho" Ge"ish thought already
compromises "ith -ree+ philosophy "hen it ris+s doing philosophy. *t loses any
radical position vis'U'vis the philosophical decision. *t compromises "ith the -ree+
problematic of @ifference and the -ree+ plane of immanence.
A summary of the invariant structure of @ifference through the boo+ thus far9
1< Diet/sche gave @ifference its absolute and idealist metaphysical form
2< Eeidegger gave @ifference its finite and 1real> or ontico'-ree+ form) i.e.
anti'idealist
3) @errida gave @ifference a finitude no longer ontico'-ree+ or real) but
Ge"ish) in reversing the 1terms> of relation that it constitutes) and thus
recogni/ed in it) indirectly) a necessity9 beyond it simple presence as
historical te$t to deconstruct.
Ca!ter I&: Criti0ue of %ifference
1Of the One as ground 3fondement6 of criti(ue>
1Of philosophy in general) of @ifference in particular) "e "ant a non philosophical
criti(ueM ?he One is a immanent 2nity H but radically immanent under a form non
15
thetic that philosophy has not been able to programme H of philosophy and of the
science of the philosophy) of its real criti(ue as "ell 01;9<.>
*s the One immediately givenI Dot in the empirical sense of the "orld) because
nothing of the empirical is really immediate) but in the of 1a thoughtless
transcendental e$perience or devoid of transcendent content 01V0<.> ?his not a -ree+
One) it is the brea+ing a"ay from the -ree+ metaphysical One that is al"ays
reducible to Being and Dothingness. ?he One is the imperishable demand of reality
that precedes everything) even philosophy. *t does not operate in the same "ay as
@ifference) bringing together the identities of beings and man or man and -od. ?his
is the transcendental use that @ifference ma+es of the One. *nstead this is a gnosis of
the One) but one that is a transcendental science rather than theological) a gnosis
stripped of its mysticism. ?he essence of science is the dissolution of centres and
mi$tures.
?he one is the obCect of a transcendental e$perience that is not thetic 0of< self) an
absolute e$perience of self) that signifies it&s immediately given 0in< itself as that
"hich it is. *ndivision is given 0in< itself) it is 1unthought> or immediate.
3%aruelle introduces the term 1mysticism> 3mystique6 here. ?he meaning of this is
complicated by his synta$. Ee differentiates bet"een mysticisme) ) le * mystique) and
) la * mystique. ?his "ill be e$plained a little bit belo") in the course of these notes
*&ll use 1the> mysticism for ) le * mystique and no article for ) la * mystique. 7or
mysticisme *&ll simply note the "ord choice in brac+ets. 7or those curious) mystique is
feminine in 7rench. H APS6 @elivering the transcendental truth from metaphysical
ends is perhaps the "ays of recovering the irreducible 1mysticism> from every
philosophy. %aruelle&s introduction of the "ord mysticism is not meant to convey the
normal use of mysticism) "hich is a +ind of dogmatic ascent or a salto morale to
some decision. 1?he> mysticism is the essence of philosophy) "hich hides its essence.
Ee summari/es the three uses of mysticism9
1) 1?he> mysticism signifies an immediate donation of the One) of the Other in
the radical immanence of the One) and the giving of *ndivision as if and as
separated from the FholeS
2) mysticism claims an immediate donation of the Other "ithin that "hich it
retains of him despite every theological transcendenceS
3) mysticism 3mysticisme6 claims immediate donation of Being or of the Fhole
of reality.
1?he reality of the criti(ue of the philosophical decision>
@ifference is unassailable on its o"n territory. So for a criti(ue of @ifference) and the
philosophical decision) to happen it must happen from a different position outside or
as a mutation of philosophy. ?hat position is from the One 0"hat he "ill later call the
vision'in'the'One and in later "or+s simply vision'in'One<. *n its essence the One is
not transcendent. *t is a%solutely separated from beings and Being and it is so only %y
its real immanence in itself+ *n reality it is not the One "hich is separated from Being)
it is Being "hich is separated form the One) it is not the One that is the Other of
@ifference) it is @ifference "hich is the Other of the One. ?he One is the reality of the
criti(ue of @ifference) the position from "hich one must begin) because it outside of
@ifference. Let) none of this is to inaugurate a supreme operation that reigns over
philosophy. Such an operation is not tolerated by the real and this is not finally the
16
last discourse on the real9 1one does not leave philosophy by the One) one describes
the vision'in'the'One of philosophy 01V3<.>
1@ifference is ultimate 1founded> as such in the One H i.e. in the thoughtless
transcendental e$perience of immanence H but it ma+es use of the One "hich denies
that e$perience) it is thus obligated to render it infinitely 1iterable>) becoming it o"n
sta+e) becoming'difference of @ifference "hich has in 1being> Self because it has
finale accepted the mediation of the One) the source of the Self 01VP<.>
%aruelle here gives a descriptive definition of science9 1Science is a non'thetic
representation 0of the< real) in fact completely distinct from that "hich philosophy
imagines as ,epresentation 01VV<.> *t gives its nature strictly immanent and
transcendental) its essence is not positional of self) and this is not a representation in
the usual sense. Let science is not the ans"er to the philosophical decision) on the
One is. Only an absolute science) from the One) "ill allo" us to 1ta+e leave> of
Diet/sche) Eeidegger) and @ifference in general) "hich never understand man)
instead confusing man "ith philosophy. Philosophy is the Other of man.
1?he impotence of @ifference in absolute Being 3&tre6>
?he end of @ifference is absolute becoming. But the mode it does this by in pulling
up transcendence to its relativity to being) to the presence of being. ?his is ho"
transcendence becomes inscribed in immanence) but this transcendence is not possible
"ithout the immanence it inscribes itself "ithin. Being of man tends to"ards the One.
?his inscription tries to split the One) to ma+e the One co'appear as universal retreat
of the thing in itself and the essence of the thing +no"n. ?he One is absolutely other
to 1obCect'being>. ?he duplicity of @ifference is that it uses the One) it captures it for
its o"n profit) in order to render it absolutely other than its ontological form) but to
contradict in the last moment the transcendental truth of the One. ?he One is no
longer absolutely metaphysically indeterminableS it is compromised by remaining
"ith the relativity of Being.
All of this obscures the essence of the One. ?he One in its essence is the positive
absence of form. @ifference introduces mediation into the One) it reintroduces from
outside the essence of the One.
Absolute difference is an interminable desire) but it is not the Absolute itself.
1Philosophy is in general the dissolution of the Absolute) the spirit of scepticism and
"ar doubled against the real) the most constant attempt to corrupt and destroy the
individual 01:W<.>
?he One does absolutely transcend) but is not any +ind of theological transcendence
as found in the theological origins of the thing'itself and 7initude. *t is the absolute
transcendence of the real) 1that separation that the real impose rather in the "orld
01:;<.> 3?he meaning being that the real) of "hich the One is a non'metaphysical
name) transcends the "orld or is not changed by the "orld but determines the "orld. H
APS6
1?he One as guardian of metaphysics>
%aruelle here delves into a medieval problematic about the place of the
transcendentals in securing +no"ledge. Ee turns to this problematic because
contemporary thin+ing is a thin+ing'to'the'limit) "hile no similar contempt is present
17
for 1terms> and the individual) "hich all shares in a parallel obsession "ith 1relation>.
?he transcendentals trace the limits of thought) often ending in ,epresentation. %imits
are ,epresented in thought by the transcendentals. 7or a limit is not thought of in
itself) only in the unconscious.
?he drama of classical and modern transcendental thought has been to tear it bet"een
its end 0immanence< and its medium 0transcendence< H this is the @ecision.
Do" the transcendental tradition uses the One and the other transcendentals in order
to establish the a priori or meta'physics itself) it see+s to 1save> and 1thin+>
metaphysics.
Of the transcendentals) "hich appear to be compromised in philosophy by their
1transcendental tautologies>) the One is the superior form because it is the real
%ecoming of the transcendentals. Fhereas the other transcendentals are split bet"een
their identity and empirical action 01Being beings>) 1Dothing nothings< the One is not
a tautology in this sense. ?he One does not one.
Fhile @ifference has been the main theme for contemporary philosophy) raising to
the level of a transcendental 01@ifference differentiates>< it does not save meta'
physics. *t only saves the most inferior and reified modes of metaphysics
0,epresentation) %ogocentrism< and e$tends its essence) the scission or
transcendence. =very positive identity of Dothing) @esire) %anguage is found
else"here than in themselves "ith @ifference 0as the Same<.
,ather than restoring the truth of Being) the tas+ becomes restoring the same essence
of truth as such that it is no longer ordained to safeguard ontological or metaphysical
difference. *t no longer cares for or "orries about Being 3* "onder ho" this thought
can help in critical animal studies and their tarrying "ith Eeidegger&s
anthropocentrism. H APS6. %aruelle here has a great line about labouring under a
1Samaritan piety> "here "e care and guard -reco'Festern metaphysics and all the
assumed 0contemporary< transcendentals that come "ith it 0Being) %anguage) @esire)
?e$t) Po"er) etc.<. But %aruelle cannot yet begin "ith 1man> or 1self> because under
philosophy man is nothing "ithout these transcendentals) he has no essence. ?hus he
must first restore the solitude of man outside of philosophy 0and the theological)
political) and economic "ants<. *n so doing it "ill restore the essence of truth and of
science. 1And only the essence of truth as transcendental and the transcendental as
given non'thetic 0of< self can save the truth from the tas+s of guarding metaphysics or
of onto'theo'logy "here it ris+s losing it essence and "inning a soul) a history) a
desire) a language) etc 019P<.> 3?he point appears to be that the One shouldn&t be
understood as the guardian of metaphysics as such. H APS6
1?he philosophical hallucination of the One>
*n many "ays "hat %aruelle presents here on the One appears) he says) to be a parody
of Deo'Platonism. But in Deo'Platonism the One does not present a choice bet"een
Being and the One) but poses the tas+ of thin+ing their coinciding or their indecision.
%aruelle&s One inaugurates a thin+ing "hich is hypo' and super'static and) in this
sense only) non'1static> and 1positional>.
17or the One) the Forld is a redundancy 019;<.>
1?he amphibology of the real and ideality and the auto'dislocation of philosophy>
18
?his section repeats much of "hat has already been said about amphibology) this time
focusing on the real and the ideality of the real. *n philosophy the real is obscured
through the ambiguity of "hat is real "ith the synta$ of thin+ing that real. ?he real is
mi$ed "ith the thought of the real. 3?his is e$plained in a much clearer "ay in
Principes de la non-philosophie "here he argues that the thought of K is mi$ed "ith
K itself such that one isn&t thin+ing either one in their essence) but the mi$ture of the
t"o being ta+en for one or the other. H APS6
Ee does give here a descriptive definition of the real 3later the ,eal6 from the aspect
of the One. ?he One in'self and irreflective 3irr$fl$chi , *n the notes * have translated
this as 1unthought> in a number of spots) "hich also "or+s) but only if you remember
that for %aruelle philosophical thin+ing is mar+ed by a narcissistic reflective thin+ing.
Irr$fl$chi captures both of these senses) but *&m not sure ho" to do that in =nglish and
"ill leave it to ,occo to figure it outN ' APS6 distinguishes the regions of the
transcendental'empirco mi$ture by a 1real> transcendental distinction. Do longer) as it
"as in Eeidegger 0on %aruelle&s reading< an ontic real or the real J ontic) but the
sphere of unthought immanence of the One. 1?he transcendental distinction is here
founded in 1in the nature of things>) in it reality that is neither ontic nor ontological. *t
is no longer simply formal) this transcendental reality is only that of the One 0202<.>
1?he impotence in thin+ing the individuals and multiplicities>
*t "ould seem that thin+ing multiplicities "ould get us out of the -reco'Festern trap
of thin+ing the One or the Other) Being and Dothingness) etc. *nstead of thin+ing the
One) "hy not thin+ multiplicitiesI %aruelle locates t"o problems "ith this) "hich he
"arns are very difficult to analyse. 3Ee isn&t +idding. ?his is the hardest section of the
boo+ thus far and *&m not (uite sure * understand it) but "ill ma+e an attempt to
summari/e. H APS6
1) ?he la" of the chiasm) "hich is the essence of @ifference in general. ?here is
a co'appearanceRbelonging of Being and being that is reversible in their unity.
But that reversibility is limited.
2< ?he problem of the multiplicity of being or of the real that enter in the chiasm.
*n short) it appears that this isn&t the "ay to begin thin+ing because it remains
ontological) but no" intra'ontological. *t doesn&t secure any transcendental
+no"ledge) but continues using the structures of philosophy 0the mi$ture of
transcendental'empirco< of Being and beings) but no" under the figure of the
1diverse>.
*n this thin+ing the One is still enchained in e$ternal tas+ transcendent to its o"n
essence. *t is in the logic of the One and Being. But) %aruelle as+s) "hat is the essence
of the thoughtI ?his logicI Or the vision'in'the'OneI
Ca!ter &II " 1eor+ of te Piloso!ical %ecision
17rom the 2ndecideable to the theory of the philosophical decision>
=very system of @ifference 0philosophy<) even those of 7initude) have posed the
(uestion) "hat is the essence of the philosophical actI But they have not been able to
pose that (uestion outside of that essence and that is the problem of a real logic of the
philosophical decision and the status of a principle of real non philosophical 3no dash
in original6 choice in philosophy. ?he only point of vie" that is radical immanent and
19
transcendental to the philosophical decision is that of the 1immediation> of the non'
thetic 0of< self) that is the One.
1?he 0non'<One and the contingency of the philosophical decision>
Fhat are the effects of the One on the philosophical decisionI %aruelle says there are
t"o +inds. ?his section e$plains the first and the follo"ing e$plains the second. ?he
first is the manifestation of a hallucinatory character of the non'real of the decision
that is reCected in turn through a radical contingency that is the correlate of the One.
%aruelle gives a general definition of the philosophical decision9 1*n general) a
philosophical decision is a brea+ 3coupure6 H repeated and revived H to"ards an
empirical or) more generally) given singularity and) at the same time) and an
identification "ith an ideali/es la" that it gives) supposing itself then real) a
transcendence to"ards the truly real. *t is a relation and it adCusts itself each time
according to the real assumed given and reduced) and of the real assumed achieved
and affirmed 021W<.>
Let there is a reali/ation of the radical contingency of this relation. ?here is no
sufficient reason "hy the la" and empirical singularity. ?his radical contingency is
given the name 0non'<One by %aruelle. ?his naming unilaterali/es the decision)
because it is derived from the One as its effect and the "ea+ negation of the decision
it has. ?he 0non'<One is transcendent to the situation) but an absolute transcendence
rooted in immanence. ?his means that it is a non'positional transcendence and un'
obCectifiable.
?he 0non'<One is not real in the strict sense) so not by its essence. But it is that "hich
is real in every transcendence) that "hich may'be by a radically finite subCect.
7initude is not e(ual to the One) but it "itnesses to a dereliction that only the One can
claim to recast the 1thing'in'itself> under the form of absolute transcendence but this
absolute is nevertheless measured by the immanent essence of the One.
?he real is) apart for the One) is a diversity in itself or non'positional transcendence)
that never falls under e$perience 0not the real as such<. *t is a diverse principal)
unobCectifiable) entirely determined as such) and not empirical 1given>. ?hus) since it
comes from the One) the 0non'<One escapes completely the obCectification of the
empirical and ideal it unilaterali/es the philosophical decisions 0@ifference) Being)
etc.<) not allo"ing them to return to or oscillate bet"een the empirical and the
transcendental. *t is a radical de'position of Being by the One.
1Don'thetic ?ranscendence 0D??<>
?he second effect of the One on the philosophical decision is "hat %aruelle calls non-
thetic -ranscendence. *t is the transcendent core at the base of every philosophical
decision. *t is the very possibility of a philosophical decision) its Apriori real 3this
isn&t a mista+e) this is ho" he "rites it in the boo+. HAPS6 ?his Apriori real is a mode
of the special real that is the 0non'<One. *t sho"s that the One is indifferent to the
internal conflicts of @ifference) staged in this "or+ a choice bet"een Eegel)
Eeidegger) Diet/sche or even bet"een @errida and @eleu/e. ?his is the true content
of these conflicts and dialectics of @ifference H an essence non thetic of
transcendence that they refuse to pay attention to.
1?he abyss of the philosophical decision>
20
?here is an abyss in the philosophical decisions bet"een the 0non'<One and D?? 0as
effects of the real<. ?he 0non'<One is the possibility of the decision) the ground of the
decision as such) and D?? is the element of choice that is radically indifferent to the
claims of the philosophical decision. One moves from the 0non'<One to the D?? by
considering the 0non'<One itself as a mode relative to the Forld and the D?? as the
affectivity of that mode that sho"s there is an other'than'empirical contingency to the
systems of @ifference.
1?he Diet/sche'Eeidegger conflict and its indifference>
.onsidering the philosophical decisions from the aspect of the effects of the One 3as
0non'<One and D??6 one can see ho" the philosophical decisions are e(uivalent to
one another. All of them promote some given and their insertion in an a priori fact
resting on an absent principle of sufficient reason.
?hus) ta+ing the indifference of the One to"ards the various philosophical decisions
allo"s us to deny certain things to philosophy. 7or instance) Being is no longer
something more than a historical factum of -reco'Festern thought.
1@ifference9 denigration 3d8n8gation6 of the real>
@ifference) and the other philosophical decisions 0Being) Dothingness) Presence)
etc.<) denigrate the real through a process of auto'position of themselves. ?his auto'
position confuses their o"n decisions "ith the real itself) and posits anything li+e
"hat %aruelle is doing as saddled bet"een the (uestion of dogmatism or scepticism.
Let) as a philosophical decision %aruelle sho"s that these things have a history) a
becoming) but more importantly they remain relative to a matri$ that is far more
po"erful then them) the matri$ of mi$ture. ?he 0non'<One and the D?? manifest this
matri$ and thereby sho" the absurdity of the absolute claims made by the
philosophical decision.
1.riti(ue of the philosophical decision>
*t is the One is its immanence that creates the apperception of non hori/ontal
?ranscendence as one of the t"o origins of @ifference and "hich denounces the
obCective absurdity of that final procedure of philosophy and philosophy generally.
?his is no longer about suspending all the transcendent philosophical positions) but of
indifferentiating every operation of suspension) of rendering the reduction useless if it
attempts to loo+ outside the essence of the #eritas transcendentalis. ?his truth) "hich
is the truth of the One) can&t be placed. ?ruth isn&t in the margins or in the centre.
Being has a topology) but there is no topology of the One.
1?he Aision'in'the'One and the decision in favour of Xdualism&>
According to the results obtained here) %aruelle must themati/e his o"n reasoning for
the real criti(ue of @ifferenceS in short) it is his 1decision> in favour of a dualism
against -reco'Festern difference.
7irst) a short summary of "hat has happened so far. *n the interior of the radical
suspension underta+en by the 0non'<One @ifference "as unilaterli/ed) reCected and
derived "ithout return. But the passage of the 0non'<One to the D?? assumes that "e
can place it again from the point of vie" of @ifference "ithout leaving the e$perience
of the One "hich serves immanence and leads to the scientific and no longer
philosophical description of the philosophical decision. ?he D?? is itself affected by
21
the 0non'<One and by its indifference) but it assumes the validity) in its order) of a
philosophical type of given 0Being) @ifference) or some other effective decision<. ?he
dual of the One and of the mi$tures of the effectivity is accompanied by the duality of
the One and the 0non'<One and follo"s the dualism of the One and the D??.
Fhat the philosophical decision does "ith this dualism is first sees in it a
contradiction and thin+s the solution is to rid itself of the D??. Let this leads to a
contradiction since it is itself a dualist thin+ing that can only be birthed in the spirit of
@ifference or Being. Philosophical thin+ing demands dualism even if) in this sense) it
probably isn&t philosophical at all.
So %aruelle chooses dualism because is e$cludes the unitary philosophi/ing subCect
and the unity of his philosophical decision) but does not e$clude) to the contrary) that
"hich founds it H immanence of the One in itself as real) non'unitary) essence of
Being) @ifference) etc.
?he po"er of the D?? is a transcendental po"er in relation to the philosophical
decision that ta+es root) in an abyssal "ay) in the One. *t aims to transform the
philosophical decision) to use it. ?his is "hy the dualism of the One and the D??
does not have the same meaning of truth as metaphysics) but is from the perspective
of the One) "hich sets it up li+e @ifference as 1auto'positional>.
Fhile it is really immanent to the e$perience of the One) it ma+es not pretention to
being the ne" unitary thin+ing about the One. ?hus dualism) because it is implicated
in the same trap as philosophical metaphysics) is not really an alternative) but it
manifests the radical contingency of the 0non'<One.
22