TENEBRO VS CA

Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted
yet another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there
being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared
void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
REPUBLIC VS CA AND MOLINA
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a
year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the
marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with
them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances.
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their
child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker,
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize
the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or
she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or
her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and
that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1)
The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly
explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must
be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents
and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for
the State.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding
that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GINA LAO-TSOI
GR NO. 119190 January 16, 1997

FACTS: Ching married Gina on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Intramuros, Manila as evidenced
by their marriage contract. After the celebration they had a reception and then proceeded to the house
of the Ching Ming Tsois mother. There they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the
first night of their married life.
Ginas version: that contrary to her expectations that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love that night of their marriage, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, Ching however
just went to bed, slept on one side and then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them that night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honey moon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first
week as husband and wife they went to Baguio City. But they did so together with Chings mother, uncle
and nephew as they were all invited by her husband. There was no sexual intercourse between them for
four days in Baguio since Ching avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping
on a rocking chair located at the living room.
They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 (day of their marriage)
until March 15, 1989 (ten months). But during this period there was no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Gina claims that she did not even see her husbands private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag. Results
were that Gina is healthy, normal and still a virgin while Chings examination was kept confidential up to
this time.
The Gina claims that her husband is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She
said she had observed him using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
She also said her husband only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man
Chings version: he claims that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with Gina. He does not want their marriage annulled for reasons of (1) that he loves her
very much (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable (3) since
the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
reconciled and that according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty
that this will not be cured.
Ching admitted that since his marriage to Gina there was no sexual contact between them. But, the
reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse
with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed
his hands.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering as
VOID the marriage entered into by Ching and Gina on May 22, 1988. No costs.

The Supreme Court held that the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children basedon the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital
obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observer mutual love,
respect and fidelity, the sanction therefore is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner
in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self.
The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia
and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three
children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso
was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they
were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and
Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They
started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how
Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew
as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who
both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate
by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time
of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or
have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that
of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided
that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and
Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents
estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having
been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of
this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,
and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not
mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that
they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Balogbog vs. CAG.R.No. 83598 March 7, 1997
Facts:Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog andGenoveva
Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino,
but he died
in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, privaterespondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog bro
ught an action for partition andaccounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate
children of Gavinoby Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of
Gavinoin the estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing
privaterespondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue intheir parents'
residence at Tag- amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment
for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render anaccounting from 1960 until the finality of its
judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio
and Genoveva, and to payattorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
Issue:Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absenceof marriage
certificate
Ruling:Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conductingthemselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebuttedonly by cogent proof to the
contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certificationpresented by private respondents, to the
effect that the record of the marriage had beenlost or destroyed during the war, was belied by the
production of the Book of Marriagesby the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue
that this book doesnot contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents' parents.This contention has no merit.
Although a marriage contract is considered primaryevidence of marriage the failure to present it is not
proof that no marriage took place.Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Here, private
respondents proved,through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that
they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935when
Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were recognizedby Gavino's family and
by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino. Hence, themarriage between Gavino and Catalina is
valid.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8,
1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant
lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He attempted
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only
after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article 36
of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of
the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded
to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her
marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.


Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did
not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved.
Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not
needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness.
Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.




SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON
Facts:
Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
More than 15 years, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance a petition to declare
Alice presumptively dead which was granted. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared
presumptively dead Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent). Bailon, who was a
member of the Social Security System and a retiree pensioner thereof, died. Respondent filed a claim for
funeral benefits. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa
Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She
claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her
mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings,
paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the
SSS in support of her claims are spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension to respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon to respondent is bigamous?
Ruling:
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in
a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their of fspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons
and respondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent
spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been
contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had
been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the
three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.




Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013

Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children. To support the family, Cesar went abroad and
worked as an OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working abroad, Cesar learned that Lolita is having
an illicit affair with Alvin Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal dwelling together with the two children.
But even with such circumstances, Cesar never failed to send financial support for the family. On June
1995, Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolitas psychological incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing even presented a psychological evaluation
report on Lolita with the finding that Lolita was not suffering from any form of psychiatric illness, but
had been unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship.... and her transferring from one job to another depicts some interpersonal problem with
co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions .... and her refusal to go with her
husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship... Cesar
found ally in RTC as it gave him a favourable decision which declared his marriage to Lolita null and void.
The court of Appeals also affirmed the decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is indeed present in the person of Lolita as to nullify a
valid marriage.
Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State and any doubt should be
resolved in favour of its existence and continuation against its dissolution and nullity. In this case, sexual
infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
actually prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations, which the court
found not present in the person of Lolita.
AGRAVIADOR V. AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR
G.R. No. 170729, [December 8, 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique Agraviador y Alunan (Enrique)challenges the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed the resolution of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) MuntinlupaCity, declaring the marriage of
the petitioner and respondentErlinda Amparo-Agraviador (Erlinda) null and void on the ground of the
latters psychological incapacity.
In 1971, Enrique, then a security guard, first met Erlinda at a beerhouse where the latter worked, and
later on became sweethearts after courtship. They soon entered into a common-law relationship, but
later contracted marriage in 1973, whereby they begot four children. Enriques family, however,
expressed their apprehensions because Erlinda came from a broken family and because of the nature of
her work.
In 2001, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of respondents
psychological incapacity, alleging that she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household
chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair
with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child to the point of his death; consulted a witch doctor in
order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. He also
claimed that she refused to have sex with him because she became very close to a male border of their
house, and even caught their love notes and trysts. However, because the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition, motion was denied.
The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his claims
through the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac, who claimed that Erlinda is suffering
from a Personality Disorder (Mixed Personality Disorder). She was said to been having this disorder since
her adolescence, with no definite treatment for her disorder.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
HELD:
No, the totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondents psychological incapacity.
The court held that both Enriques court testimony,as well as Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties. First, petitioners claims should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright
refusal or neglect, in theperformance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages
to thelevel of psychological incapacity that the law requires. He merely showed that Erlinda had some
personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked
details necessary to establish that therespondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. His
claims that Erlinda does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform
areinsufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
Second, Dr. Patac failed to clarify the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she did in
her attempt to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents condition. The report that
he submit likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition, as his
enumeration of therespondents purported behavioural defects (as related to him by third persons), and
on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder
deemed insufficient. There was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the respondents
condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it incapacitated her to comply with the
duties required in marriage. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how
Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite
treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder
in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is
incurable.
Toring v. Toring, August 2010, G.R. No. 165321
FACTS: A and B were husband and wife. B filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that
A was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the
time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage.

Ricardo offered; the psychological evaluation of his expert witness, psychiatrist. Dr Albaran testified A
had Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
essential marital obligations based on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation
on B and the couples son, C. The doctor did not personally examine A. B alleged that A was an
adulteress and a squanderer.

The RTC annulled the marriage. The CA reversed saying that RTC failed to specifically point out the root
illness or defect that caused As psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity
already existed at the time of celebration of marriage. The CA found that the conclusions from Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and
fair sources, and dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos
allegations on As overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in declaring the nullity of the marriage.
RULING: No, the RTC was wrong. CA decision affirmed.

According to Molina case, the definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article
are the following:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

The intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious
cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of
the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she contracted.

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence to
be insufficient to prove that A was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife.

Though the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a
physician or by a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36. However, it is still essential although from sources other than
the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of
marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the
gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition.

In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements
for purposes of As psychological evaluation was C, the spouses eldest son who would not have been
very reliable as a witness because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and
could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his
birth.

Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans psychological
evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and since when of Teresitas
alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Dr. Albaran never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of
Teresitas alleged personality disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she
failed to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how
grave and incurable was As psychological disorder.

B failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that TA suffered from psychological incapacity; thus,
his petition for annulment of marriage must fail.

We reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as the
same may only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of
marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

B also failed to show the adverse integral element and link to As allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, B failed to prove that As alleged character traits already existed at the inception of their
marriage.

Finally, the root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code. What is not required is the expert opinion to prove the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. CA decision affirmed.
NAVALES VS NAVALES
FACTS: In 1986, Nilda and Reynaldo met in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of his
fear that Nilda may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in
1988. Reynaldo is aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their
marriage went well until Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. She
later worked as a gym instructor and according to Reynaldos allegations; her job makes her flirt with
her male clients. She also drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to
fetch her. She also projected herself as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo
because that would only destroy her figure. Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be
annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness that attested that Nilda was flirting with other guys
even with Reynaldos presence. Reynaldo also presented the findings of a psychologist who
concluded that based on Nildas acts, Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a
social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which
illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas psychological incapacity to perform her marital
role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on her part attacked Reynaldos allegations. She said that it is
actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has filed a case of concubinage against
him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job in order to support herself
because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she projected herself as a
married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females only. The RTC
and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nildas
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The petition must be granted because the States participation in this case is wanting. There
were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no
controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. And even if the SC
would consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented
by Reynaldo by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is
serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will
on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is
contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the psychological expert to be insufficient
to prove the PI of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the expert interviewed were not
concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their respective information
was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that Nilda had had sex with different guys a
condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nildas PI the SC ruled that this case be resolved
in favor of the validity of marriage.

PARAS VS PARAS

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy,Negros Oriental. They begot
four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose(deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years
thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosafiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a
complaint forannulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as CivilCase
No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise theessential obligations of marriage
as shown by the following circumstances: (a) he dissipatedher business assets and forged her signature in one
mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with aconcubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support
to his children; and (d)he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in
1961in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courtedher, frequently spending
time at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964 convinced that he lovedher, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was
considered one of the "most celebrated"marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia.It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocutedwhile Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice tobring
Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with thedeath of the children,
the entire family went to the United States. However, after three months,Justo abandoned them and left for the
Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she wasshocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
in debt and he disposed without herconsent a conjugal piece of land. At other times, he permitted the municipal
government to takegasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress
and siring anillegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found thatafter
leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitationresulted in the birth of a
baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and
Justos
deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained thathe did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal ofa
sugar crop loan before the
banks
authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in theUnited States. For his part, he was granted only three
(3) months leave as municipal mayor ofBindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his
childrens
education.At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides,their
conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though thatthere were times he
failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. Whatcaused the inevitable family break-
out was
Rosas
act of embarrassing him during his birthdaycelebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests.
When confronted, she retorted thatshe has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of
concern. This wasfurther aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in
amountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that JocelynChing is not his
mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by herboyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a
Decision upholding the validity ofthe marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he
was forced toleave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets weresufficient
to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limitedsalary; and (c)
the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed thatthe relationship between the parties started well,
negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
And lastly, it ruled thatthere appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of
the irmarriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosas
signature in bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He wassuspended from the practice of
law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the practice of lawfor SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wifes signature in bank documents andother related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR
from the practice of law on the chargesof immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties
to be served simultaneously. Letnotice of this Decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney,
and notice of the sameserved on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator
forcirculation to all the courts concerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed theRTC Decision
in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short ofthe standards required by law to
decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justos alleged efects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by
the evidence," Rosa contends that this Courts ctual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on
the presentcase. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, sheargues
that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993

Issues:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the presentcase;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the rootcause of
Justos alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part ofJusto

Held:
1) A reading of the Court of
Appeals
Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her
charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an
ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void
due toan incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was
truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not
necessarily show incurability, such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not
necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,(b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained inthe decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were
mentally or psychically ill to such anextent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them,could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need begiven here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdemgeneris, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
itsincapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatristsand clinical psychologist
3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability
REPUBLIC VS IYOY
Facts:The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the
marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went
to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that
Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last
name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011
FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone
had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with
Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more children. In 1990, Tyrone
went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de
facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply
with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1)
She leaves the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night; 2)
She leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-naked in the
hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu Disorder and that it may have been evident
even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing. Fr. Healy
concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He explained that
her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly
inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary.

ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity

HELD: No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the
alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Malyns sexual
infidelity was also not proven because she wa
s only dating other men. Even assuming that she had an extramarital affair with another man, sexual
infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.