What is theory of mind?

You probably imagined that something has made this man despondent. That assumption suggests that you're capable of theory of
mind. See moreemotion pictures.
Back when you were a child of 2 or so, you were virtually mindless, at least compared to how you are now. In the first
few years of life, your primary focus was you: You wanted food, comfort, a colorful toy -- and you were willing
to cry very loudly to get it. In return, you offered nothing but potential uiet. You were egocentric. You can hardly be
blamed for this, however! you hadn"t developed to a point where you could look past your own needs.
#hen, at about age $ or % -- if you"re neurotypical, meaning your mental development was comparatively normal --
you underwent what seemed like a magical transformation. You became a genius at mind reading. You suddenly
were capable of looking past yourself and taking into account others" wants, needs, knowledge and mental states.
You had developed what is called folk psychology, an ability to think of the mind states of others. &ome researchers
think that you are able to pull off this nifty trick through theory of mind. #o recap: 'olk psychology is our ability to
make predictions about what"s on others" minds, and theory of mind is one e(planation for how we carry out that
ability.
You"ll note that theory of mind is missing a )the) ahead of it. In fact, in academic circles it"s often referred to as the
theory-theory. #hat"s because this term doesn"t refer to a theory on the mind. It refers to how we develop theories
about other people"s minds -- what they may be thinking, how they may be feeling, what they may do ne(t. *e make
these assumptions easily, without even recogni+ing that we are doing something fundamentally ama+ing: *e are
making predictions about what is going on in other people"s heads and, even more ama+ingly, these predictions often
prove correct.
,onsider this. -et"s say you"re on your way to get a book from the bookcase in the living room and you enter a room
where a loved one is seated with her chin to her chest, not engaged in any visible activity. You may rightly believe
that this loved one is sad and stop to ask what"s wrong. But what forms the basis of this belief. *hat is it about sitting
uietly and alone, with one"s head down, that suggests sadness. /ore importantly, what is the point of not only being
able to broadcast this sadness to others, but for them to be able to receive this transmission and stop what they are
doing to see what"s the matter. #he answers to those uestions probably lie in the evolutionary benefits folk
psychology could bestow.
Evolution and Folk sychology
#he concept of theory of mind has its roots in evolutionary biology. #he term was first coined in a 0123 paper by
primate researchers who concluded that higher apes like chimpan+ees couldn"t understand the mental states that
lead to action on others" parts, though later research has found that they likely can 4source: ,all and #omasello5.
&o what is the evolutionary benefit of theory of mind. 6s communications professor 'rancis '. &teen describes it, by
considering others" motives to predict their actions, an animal can determine whether a predator is moving toward it
to attack and eat the animal. ,onversely, when it appears the predator is too hot to move on a particularly warm day,
such a mechanism allows the animal -- which is likely hot, too -- to rest easy as well and not e(pend any
unnecessary energy running away from a predator that has no interest in pursuing it 4source:&teen5. 6nyone who has
seen footage of a lion and a ga+elle lying down, panting and watching one another only yards apart has seen this
mechanism in action.
But comparing a ga+elle"s ability to predict whether a lion is in a mood to attack with human folk psychology is slightly
off base. ,ognitive researchers don"t necessarily believe that animals like ga+elles and lions possess theory of mind.
#hey consider only humans and most likely higher apes in possession of this far more advanced intellectual analysis.
/ore to the point, if you"ve ever looked at a lion and considered that it looked happy or that it wished it were free,
you"ve 7ust proven yourself capable of the kind of higher order thinking that theory of mind is based on.
In fact, the e(ample using the ga+elle is a rival to theory of mind as an e(planation for how humans carry out folk
psychology. #his animalian concept, called mental simulation! says that we predict others" goals and actions based
on creating mental constructs of what we would do if we were in their shoes. *e use our past e(periences to create a
mental model of the situation, essentially using our brains" processing power to analy+e the available data and then
make our prediction 4source: /arraffa5.
*hat differentiates theory of mind from simulation and other e(planations for how we arrive at our ability to carry out
folk psychology is fairly nuanced. #heory of mind says that we practice folk psychology by forming ideas about what
other people believe at any given moment. 6nd recent findings in autism research have lent support to the theory-
theory.
"utism and Theory of #ind
#heory of mind stands apart from other theories that seek to e(plain how we can attribute mental states to those we
deem as )others.) &pecifically, it states that at some point around age $ or %, we become aware that other people
hold different attitudes, beliefs and knowledge than we do. It becomes apparent to our minds that knowledge can be
compartmentali+ed 8we may know something someone else doesn"t and vice versa9. *e reali+e that there is such a
thing as pretense 8the ability to create falsehoods9. 6nd we reali+e that other people may feel differently than us,
meaning we do not all share the same mental and emotional states and beliefs simultaneously. #his is the first, huge
step towardmetacognition, or thinking about thinking 4source: *iley-Blackwell5.
#he skills associated with theory of mind don"t emerge in all humans. :eople on the autism spectrum have long been
observed to have mindblindness, characteri+ed as an inability to consider others" points of view, wants, needs and
desires. #his has often been linked to a lack of empathy, although that idea has come under fire in recent years.
Instead, researchers have come to believe that people with autism lack theory of mind skills.
#o test this, researchers have given autistic children false-belief tests. #hese tests go something like this:
&ally is playing with her ball in her room. &he gets up to go to the kitchen for a while and places the ball in her top
dresser drawer. *hile she"s gone, her mother comes in &ally"s room and moves the ball from the dresser drawer to
the toy bo(. *hen &ally comes back from the kitchen, where will she look for her ball.
6 neurotypical child would correctly guess that &ally would look in the drawer for her ball, since that"s where she left
it. #his answer shows a child has developed an awareness that others may not have knowledge she has, a hallmark
of theory of mind. 6lthough that child knows &ally"s mother moved the ball, &ally doesn"t. ,hildren with autism
generally tend to answer that &ally will look in the toy bo(, which is where they know the ball has been moved.
6utistic children are even more prone to fail second-order false belief test. #hese elaborate on the &ally test, where
children are asked what they think a second character thinks about another character! for e(ample, what ;ohn thinks
#odd knows is in his lunch bo( 4source: Baron-,ohen5.
#heory of mind is an interesting concept. :erhaps further study of autism itself will yield more answers to how we
arrive at that ama+ing state of being able to think about others.
Sources
6nanthaswamy, 6nil. )-anguage may be the key to the theory of mind.) <ew &cientist. ;une 2$, 2==1. 8;an.
0>, 2=0%9 http:??www.newscientist.com?article?dn02$>2-language-may-be-key-to-theory-of-mind.html
Baron-,ohen, &imon. )#heory of mind in normal development and autism.) :risme. 2==0. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9
http:??www.autism-community.com?wp-content?uploads?2=0=?00?#@/-in-#A-and-6&A.pdf
,all, ;osep and #omasello, /ichael. )Aoes the chimpan+ee have a theory of mind. $= years later.) #rends
in ,ognitive &ciences. 2==3. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9 http:??email.eva.mpg.de?Btomas?pdf?#I,&$=.pdf
Cnobe, ;oshua. )#heory of mind and moral cognition: e(ploring the connections.) Dniversity of <orth
,arolina. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9 http:??www.unc.edu?Bknobe?(-phi?tics.pdf
-ant+, ;ohanna. )#heory of mind in autism: development, implications and intervention.) #he Eeporter.
2==2. 8<ov. 2>, 2=0$9 http:??www.iidc.indiana.edu?.pageIdF%2%
/arraffa, /assimo. )#heory of mind.) Internet Gncyclopedia of :hilosophy. 8<ov. 2>, 2=0$9
http:??www.iep.utm.edu?theomind?
@rrigi, Hloria. )#heories of theory of mind.) Dniversita di Bolonga. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9
http:??host.uniroma$.it?progetti?kant?field?tom.htm
:apaleontiou--ouca, Gleanora. )/etacognition and theory of mind.) ,ambridge &cholars :ublishing. 2==3.
8;an. 0>, 2=0%9 http:??www.c-s-p.org?flyers?12303%203>23>-sample.pdf
&eyfarth, Eobert. )#heory of mind.) You#ube. /ay 01, 2=0=. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9
http:??www.youtube.com?watch.vFIAt7-&a>=uk
&oraya, -ynne. )Gmpathy, mindblindness and theory of mind.) :sychology #oday. /ay 01, 2==3. 8;an. 0>,
2=0%9 http:??www.psychologytoday.com?blog?aspergers-diary?2==3=>?empathy-mindblindness-and-theory-mind
&teen, 'rancis '. )#heory of mind.) D,-6. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9 http:??cogweb.ucla.edu?,og&ci?#o//.html
*iley-Blackwell. )Young children"s "theory of mind" linked to subseuent metacognitive development in
adolescence.) &cience Aaily. 6ug. 02, 2==3. 8;an. 0>, 2=0%9
http:??www.sciencedaily.com?releases?2==3?=3?=3=30%0>%%21.htm
Teoria mintii
Adrian Nuta a adus in discutie, intr-unul dintre articolele sale,
semnele prin care iti poti da seama tu, ca si client, daca ai de a face cu
un psiholog intr-adevar bun sau cu unul nu chiar atat de profesionist.
Acesta a propus ca, inainte de a accepta sa ai o sedinta cu el, sa il
intrebi ce este teoria mintii, un subiect relativ nou in psihologie, de
care doar o persoana cu adevarat interesata de progresul acestei
stiinte si de acumularea unor noi cunostinte stie.
Teoria mintii reprezinta abilitatea de a atribui stari mentale
credinte, intentii, emotii, dorinte, cunostinte propriei
persoane, dar si celorlalti, si de a intelege ca ceilalti au stari
mentale diferite fata de ale noastre. Asadar, lipsa acesteia, este
opusul unei inteligente emotionale ridicate. Lipsa ei este un semn al
unui caz patologic, fiind foarte des intalnita atunci cand avem de-a
face cu boli psihice, precum autismul, schizofrenia, ADHD sau abuzul
de alcool.
Cu alte cuvinte, teoria mintii, la fel ca si inteligenta emotionala,
reprezinta capacitatea de a intelege ca ceilalti gandesc altfel decat noi
si ca ideile noastre nu sunt un adevar universal valabil.
Cum ne crestem inteligenta emotionala?
Asadar, cum facem sa identificam, mai bine, emotiile celorlalti si pe ale noastre, astfel
incat sa avem relatii interpersonale inteligente si placute? Nimic mai simplu, fiind
necesari doar cativa pasi:
1. Sa ne identificam propriile emotii
Un subiect des neglijat, desi dictonul troneaza in minti si pe ziduri de mii de ani,
autocunoasterea este una dintre principalele modalitati prin care ne putem mari
inteligenta emotionala. Din pacate, consecintele acestei neglijari sunt dintre cele mai
neplacute si, adeseori, o vedem manifestata prin proiectare (invinuirea celorlalti de
propriile incapacitati si varsarea propriilor nervi asupra lor).
e!ai gandit, vreodata, ca, dupa o zi obositoare la munca, nu vecinul care s!a decis sa
isi monteze rafturi pe pereti este cel care te deranjeaza, ci ca propriile tale rateuri sunt
vinovate de aceasta stare de nervi? Desigur, numesc "rateuri# acele vise, de cand
eram mici, si viata de adult ni se parea una roz, in care vom reusi sa devenim faimosi,
medici sau printese, piloti de avioane sau zane, dar care, intre timp, s!au materializat
sub forma unui program de la $ la %&, ce nu ne mai permite nici sa visam si nici sa
suportam zgomotele persoanelor care nu au intentie directa sa ne deranjeze, insa, s!a
nimerit ca tocmai atunci sa isi decoreze casa. 'e vreau sa e(emplific, de fapt, este ca,
in general, dam vina pe cauzele imediate, insa nu cautam sa aflam adevaratul motiv al
emotiilor noastre, ratand, astfel, o sansa de a ne autocunoaste si a deveni mai buni,
astfel.
2. Asumarea responsabilitatii pentru emotiile pe care
le-ai identificat
e!ai enervat atunci cand ti!am spus ca, daca ajungi obosita si nervoasa de la munca,
inseamna ca nu aceasta este cariera la care ai visat? De ce? )a iti spun un mic secret:
ne enervam doar atunci cand ne este atins un punct sensibil, iar aceasta sensibilitate
este data tocmai de faptul ca este un adevar pe care refuzam sa ni!l recunoastem ()au
sa il recunoastem in fata celorlalti). Daca nu ar fi fost asa cum am spus eu, nu ar fi
avut nici un sens sa te enervezi, nu? i!ai fi spus "lasa, ce stie ea, sa trec mai departe
si sa citesc acest articol foarte interesant, ca sa invat cum sa imi cresc inteligenta
emotionala# (daca ti!ai spus acest lucru, nu pot decat sa te felicit, esti printre cei *+
dintre romani care fac meseria pe care si!au dorit!o dintotdeauna si de care sunt
profund multumiti). otusi, afirmatia mea a creat o emotie in sufletul tau: eu, un
necunoscut, care nu am nici o influenta in viata ta, decat prin randurile articolelor
mele si doar daca tu imi permiti acest lucru.
,ntr!un cuvant, de multe ori ne este foarte greu sa acceptam unele emotii pe care le
traim, motiv pentru care si psi-icul nostru le masc-eaza, dand vina pe vecini sau
traind o alta emotie. otusi, recunoasterea si acceptarea unei probleme este primul pas
spre rezolvarea ei si, de aceea, trebuie sa faci acest lucru nu doar pentru o inteligenta
emotionala mai mare, ci si pentru a iti oferi dreptul la o calitate mai buna a vietii.
3. Invatarea compasiunii si a empatiei
Nota glumeata pe care am abordat!o in randurile de mai sus se estompeaza, atunci
cand ma gandesc la cat de putine cazuri de compasiune sau empatie am vazut.
Desigur, altruismul nu e(ista decat ca un egoism mascat sub un cuvant acceptat social
(dam bani cersetorilor pentru a ne simti mai bine cu noi insine), insa, compasiunea si
empatia par a se transforma intr!o rara avis, in zilele noastre. Nu este greu de g-icit de
ce: intr!o lume aflata intr!un ritm atat de rapid, cine mai are timp sa se gandeasca si la
emotiile si dorintele altor persoane? otusi, daca ne!am gandi mai des ca, manifestand
aceste doua forme, principalii care ar avea de castigat am fi noi, poate ca ele ar deveni
calitati la ordinea zilei si nu doar cuvinte intr!un dictionar sau subiecte de stiri.
Asadar, incearca, in fiecare zi, sa manifesti empatie pentru cel putin o persoana din
jurul tau. Daca nu intelegi emotiile pe care le traieste, observa!l si, in curand, ii vei
invata manifestarile. .epeta acest gest de cate ori poti si, in curand, vei putea sa
identifici foarte usor o emotie traita de cineva.
Theor of mind
'rom *ikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Theory of mind 8often abbreviated )#o/)9 is the ability to attribute mental statesJ
beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.Jto oneself and others and to
understand that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one"s
own.
405
Aeficits occur in people with autism spectrum disorders, schi+ophrenia, attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder,
425
as well as neuroto(icity due to alcohol abuse.
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#hough
there are philosophical approaches to issues raised in discussions such as this, the
theory ofmind as such is distinct from the philosophy of mind.
Definition$edit%
#heory of mind is a theory insofar as the mind is not directly observable.
405
#he
presumption that others have a mind is termed a theory of mind because each human
can only intuit the e(istence of his?her own mind through introspection, and no one has
direct access to the mind of another. It is typically assumed that others have minds by
analogy with one"s own, and based on the reciprocal nature of social interaction, as
observed in 7oint attention,
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the functional use of language,
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and understanding of
others" emotions and actions.
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Laving a theory of mind allows one to attribute thoughts,
desires, and intentions to others, to predict or e(plain their actions, and to posit their
intentions. 6s originally defined, it enables one to understand that mental states can be
the cause ofJand thus be used to e(plain and predictJothers" behavior.
405
Being able to
attribute mental states to others and understanding them as causes of behavior implies,
in part, that one must be able to conceive of the mind as a )generator of representations).
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If a person does not have a complete theory of mind it may be a sign of cognitive or
developmental impairment.
#heory of mind appears to be an innate potential ability in humans, but one reuiring
social and other e(perience over many years to bring to fruition. Aifferent people may
develop more, or less, effective theories of mind. Gmpathy is a related concept, meaning
e(periential recognition and understanding the states of mind, including beliefs, desires
and particularly emotions of others, often characteri+ed as the ability to )put oneself into
another"s shoes). Eecent neuro ethological studies of animal behaviour suggest that
even rodents may e(hibit ethical or empathic abilities.
415
<eo-:iagetian theories of
cognitive development maintain that theory of mind is a byproduct of a
broader hypercognitive ability of the human mind to register, monitor, and represent its
own functioning.
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Eesearch on theory of mind, in human and animal, adults and children, normally and
atypically developing, has grown rapidly in the $> years since :remack and *oodruff"s
paper, )Aoes the chimpan+ee have a theory of mind.).
405
#he emerging field of social
neuroscience has also begun to address this debate, by imaging humans while
performing tasks demanding the understanding of an intention, belief or other mental
state.
6n alternative account of theory of mind is given within operant psychology and provides
significant empirical evidence for a functional account of both perspective taking and
empathy. #he most developed operant approach is founded on research on derived
relational responding and is subsumed within what is called, )Eelational 'rame #heory).
6ccording to this view empathy and perspective taking comprise a comple( set of derived
relational abilities based on learning to discriminate and verbally respond to ever more
comple( relations between self, others, place, and time, and the transformation of
function through established relations.
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Philosophical roots$edit%
,ontemporary discussions of #o/ have their roots in philosophical debateJmost
broadly, from the time of Aescartes" Second Meditation, which set the groundwork for
considering the science of the mind. /ost prominent recently are two contrasting
approaches in the philosophical literature, to theory of mind: theory&
theory and simulation theory. #he theory-theorist imagines a veritable theoryJ)folk
psychology)Jused to reason about others" minds. #he theory is developed automatically
and innately, though instantiated through social interactions.
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@n the other hand, simulation theory 8&#9 suggests #o/ is not, at its core, theoretical.
6ccording to simulation theorists, the primary method for understanding the minds of
others that people employ is simply to place themselves )in the mental shoes) of the
other. #his idea that is also e(plicit in the )golden rule): )#reat others as you would like to
be treated). In other words, imagine how you might react to someone else doing an
action to you before you do the same action to someone else. &# involves three steps:
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0. #he creation of pretend states to match those of the target.
2. #he processing of those pretend states by the same mechanisms that the
attributor uses to understand his own mental states.
$. #he assignment or )pro7ection) of those states onto the target.
#here are a number of different accounts of &#, each of which relies heavily upon the
activity of mirror neurons. 6rguably the consensus view is the )direct matching)
hypothesis. 6ccording to this theory, mirror neurons actually )mirror) the state of the
target in the observer. #his mirroring elicits a similar emotion or intention in the observer,
which is then implicitly or e(plicitly pro7ected upon the target. #he observer then infers the
meaning or intention of the target using this information.
40K540254035
6n alternative simulation theory has been proposed, the )inverse modeling) hypothesis.
6ccording to this view, the actions of mirror neurons simulate the intended goal of an
action first. 6fter this motor simulation, the observer uses his?her conceptual abilities to
infer the intention of the action.
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By this model, the role of mirror neurons is an
instrumental tool that can be used to guess the meaning of intentional behavior by
producing a model of that behavior in conte(t to aid understanding.
6nother simulation theory that tries to account for broadly congruent mirror neurons is
the response modeling theory. #hese theorists propose that the function of mirror
neurons in social cognition is not so much to )mirror) the targetMs action. Eather, the
function is to instantly prepare a complementary action in response to the target. #hey
dynamically couple action observation to action e(ecution. #he impetus for this view was
the discovery that mirror neurons are actually more active when preparing for a
complementary action rather than an imitative action.
42054225
In other words, the function of
some mirror neurons is to instantly anticipate and prepare a response to an observed
action.
#wo additional kinds of simulationism have been proposed.
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@ne version 86lvin
Holdman"s9 emphasi+es that one must recogni+e one"s own mental states before
ascribing mental states to others by simulation. #he second version of simulation theory
proposes that each person comes to know his or her own and others" minds through
what Eobert Hordon
42$5
names a logical ascent routine, which answers uestions about
mental states by re-phrasing the uestion as a metaphysical one. 'or e(ample, if Noe
asks :am, )Ao you think that dog wants to play with you.), :am would ask herself,
)Aoes that dog want to play with me.) to determine her own response. &he could eually
well ask that to answer the uestion of what Noe might think. Both hold that people
generally understand one another by simulating being in the other"s shoes.
@ne of the differences between the two theories that have influenced psychological
consideration of #o/ is that theory-theory describes #o/ as a detached theoretical
process that is an innate feature, whereas simulation theory portrays #o/ as a kind of
knowledge that allows one to form predictions of someone"s mental states by putting
oneself in the other person"s shoes and simulating them. #hese theories continue to
inform the definitions of theory of mind at the heart of scientific #o/ investigation.
Eecently other accounts of our ability to know the minds of others have been proposed.
'or e(ample, interaction theory, a recent theory based on &haun Hallagher"s work,
re7ects the standard interpretations as being overly )mental). In interaction theory, the
minds of others are directly perceived during intersub7ective encounters. 6ccording to I#,
very little mentali+ing occurs in our day-to-day interactions. Eather than first perceiving
another"s actions and then inferring the meaning of their actions, the intended meaning is
automatically apparent upon perception. Lidden away mental states like )beliefs) and
)desires) are therefore unnecessary to e(plain behavior. *e can see the meaning of their
behavior through their actions and e(pressive movements.
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'or e(ample, upon seeing
an angry face an observer does not see first a face that is contorted into a scowl and
then infer that the target is angry. #he anger is immediately apparent on the face of the
other. #he overwhelming ma7ority of interactions in our daily lives are face-to-face so it
makes sense that our primary way of understanding one another is from a second-
person perspective rather than a detached, theoretical, third-person perspective.
)In most intersub7ective situations, that is, in situations of social interaction, we have a
direct perceptual understanding of another person"s intentions because their intentions
are e(plicitly e(pressed in their embodied actions and their e(pressive behaviors. #his
understanding does not reuire us to postulate or infer a belief or a desire hidden away in
the other person"s mind. *hat we might reflectively or abstractly call their belief or desire
is e(pressed directly in their actions and behaviors).
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#his ability has been termed )primary intersub7ectivity) and includes emotional, sensory-
motor, perceptual, and nonconceptual embodied practices that are e(hibited by pre-
linguistic children.
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It is considered )primary) for two reasons: 809 @ntogenetically it is
the earliest appearing intersub7ective abilities in children, and 829 even into adulthood it
remains the most essential ability that we utili+e in interacting and understanding others.
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#hese abilities are multimodal and nonconceptual, which is evident in well-known
e(periments regarding neonate imitation.
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In these e(periments the neonate is only
minutes old and therefore does not have conceptual abilities! yet the neonate can imitate
the facial e(pressions of others, which is a multimodal process that reuires a
nonconceptual connection between visual stimulus and the neonates own facial
configuration.
'urthermore, the fact that most interactions take place in cooperative conte(ts leads to
)secondary intersub7ectivity). Auring most interactions, intentions are apparent based
upon the pragmatic conte(t of the situation in which they are occurring. *e can instantly
see what the other )intends) or )wants) based upon their actions and the current conte(t!
we do not need to infer their intentions as if they are hidden away.
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#here is a )shared
world) that we live in where we intuitively and instinctively perceive others as minded
beings like ourselves. Aan Nahavi echoed these sentiments when he wrote, )it is not the
case that we first see inanimate ob7ects and then animate them through a subseuent
addition of mental components. Eather, at first we see everything as e(pressive, and
then we go through a process of de-animation).
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#he intuitive assumption that others are minded is an apparent tendency we all share.
*e anthropomorphi+e non-human animals, inanimate ob7ects, and even natural
phenomenon. Aaniel Aennett referred to this tendency as taking an )intentional stance)
toward things: we assume they have intentions, to help predict future behavior.
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Lowever, there is an important distinction between taking an )intentional stance)
toward something and entering a )shared world) with it. #he intentional stance is a
detached and functional theory we resort to during interpersonal interactions. 6 shared
world is directly perceived and its e(istence structures reality itself for the perceiver. It is
not 7ust automatically applied to perception! it in many ways constitutes perception.
#he philosophical roots of the Eelational 'rame #heory account of #o/ arise from
conte(tual psychology and refer to the study of organisms 8both human and non-human9
interacting in and with a historical and current situational conte(t. It is an approach based
on conte(tualism, a philosophy in which any event is interpreted as an ongoing act
inseparable from its current and historical conte(t and in which a radically functional
approach to truth and meaning is adopted. 6s a variant of conte(tualism, E'# focuses on
the construction of practical, scientific knowledge. #his scientific form of conte(tual
psychology is virtually synonymous with the philosophy of operant psychology.
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Development$edit%
#he study of which animals are capable of attributing knowledge and mental states to
others, as well as when in human ontogeny and phylogeny this ability developed, has
identified a number of precursory behaviors to a theory of mind. Dnderstanding attention,
understanding of others" intentions, and imitative e(perience with other people are
hallmarks of a theory of mind that may be observed early in the development of what
later becomes a full-fledged theory. In studies with non-human animals and pre-verbal
humans, in particular, researchers look to these behaviors preferentially in making
inferences about mind.
&imon Baron-,ohen identified the infant"s understanding of attention in others, a social
skill found by 2 to 1 months of age, as a )critical precursor) to the development of theory
of mind.
4%5
Dnderstanding attention involves understanding that seeing can be directed
selectively as attention, that the looker assesses the seen ob7ect as )of interest), and that
seeing can induce beliefs. 6ttention can be directed and shared by the act of pointing, a
7oint attention behavior that reuires taking into account another person"s mental state,
particularly whether the person notices an ob7ect or finds it of interest. Baron-,ohen
speculates that the inclination to spontaneously reference an ob7ect in the world as of
interest 8)proto-declarative pointing)9 and to likewise appreciate the directed attention and
interests of another may be the underlying motive behind all human communication.
4%5
Dnderstanding of others" intentions is another critical precursor to understanding other
minds because intentionality, or )aboutness), is a fundamental feature of mental states
and events. #he )intentional stance) has been defined by Aaniel Aennett
4$$5
as an
understanding that others" actions are goal-directed and arise from particular beliefs or
desires. Both 2- and $-year-old children could discriminate when an e(perimenter
intentionally vs. accidentally marked a bo( as baited with stickers.
4$%5
Gven earlier in
ontogeny, 6ndrew <. /elt+off found that 03 month-old infants could perform target
manipulations that adult e(perimenters attempted and failed, suggesting the infants could
represent the ob7ect-manipulating behavior of adults as involving goals and intentions.
4$>5
*hile attribution of intention 8the bo(-marking9 and knowledge 8false-belief tasks9 is
investigated in young humans and nonhuman animals to detect precursors to a theory of
mind, Hagliardi et al. have pointed out that even adult humans do not always act in a way
consistent with an attributional perspective.
4$K5
In the e(periment, adult human sub7ects
made choices about baited containers when guided by confederates who could not see
8and therefore, not know9 which container was baited.
Eecent research in developmental psychology suggests that the infant"s ability to imitate
others lies at the origins of both a theory of mind and other social-cognitive achievements
like perspective-taking and empathy.
4$25
6ccording to /elt+off, the infant"s innate
understanding that others are )like me) allows it to recogni+e the euivalence between
the physical and mental states apparent in others and those felt by the self. 'or e(ample,
the infant uses his own e(periences orienting his head?eyes toward an ob7ect of interest
to understand the movements of others who turn toward an ob7ect, that is, that they will
generally attend to ob7ects of interest or significance. &ome researchers in comparative
disciplines have hesitated to put a too-ponderous weight on imitation as a critical
precursor to advanced human social-cognitive skills like mentali+ing and empathi+ing,
especially if true imitation is no longer employed by adults. 6 test of imitation by
6le(andra Lorowit+
4$35
found that adult sub7ects imitated an e(perimenter demonstrating a
novel task far less closely than children did. Lorowit+ points out that the precise
psychological state underlying imitation is unclear and cannot, by itself, be used to draw
conclusions about the mental states of humans.
Empirical investigation$edit%
*hether children younger than $ or % years old may have a theory of mind is a topic of
debate among researchers. It is a challenging uestion, due to the difficulty of assessing
what pre-linguistic children understand about others and the world. #asks used in
research into the development of #o/ must take into account the umweltJ8the Herman
wordUmwelt means )environment) or )surrounding world)9Jof the pre-verbal child.
4clarification needed5
False&belief task$edit%
@ne of the most important milestones in theory of mind development is gaining the ability
to attribute false belief: that is, to recogni+e that others can have beliefs about the world
that are diverging. #o do this, it is suggested, one must understand how knowledge is
formed, that people"s beliefs are based on their knowledge, that mental states can differ
from reality, and that peopleMs behavior can be predicted by their mental states.
<umerous versions of the false-belief task have been developed, based on the initial task
done by *immer and :erner 8013$9.
4$15
In the most common version of the false-belief task 8often called the )"&ally-6nne" test) or
)"&ally-6nne" task)9, children are told or shown a story involving two characters. 'or
e(ample, the child is shown two dolls, &ally and 6nne, who have a basket and a bo(,
respectively. &ally also has a marble, which she places in her basket, and then leaves
the room. *hile she is out of the room, 6nne takes the marble from the basket and puts it
in the bo(. &ally returns, and the child is then asked where &ally will look for the marble.
#he child passes the task if she answers that &ally will look in the basket, where she put
the marble! the child fails the task if she answers that &ally will look in the bo(, where the
child knows the marble is hidden, even though &ally cannot know this, since she did not
see it hidden there. #o pass the task, the child must be able to understand that anotherMs
mental representation of the situation is different from their own, and the child must be
able to predict behavior based on that understanding.
6nother e(ample is when a boy leaves chocolate on a shelf and then leaves the room.
Lis mother puts it in the fridge. #o pass the task, the child must understand that the boy
upon returning holds the false belief that his chocolate is still on the shelf.
4%=5
#he results of research using false-belief tasks have been fairly consistent: most normally
developing children are unable to pass the tasks until around age four.
4%05
8<otably, while
most children, including those with Aown syndrome, are able to pass this test, in one
study, 3=O of children diagnosed with autism were unable to do so.9
4%25
6lso adults can e(perience problems with false beliefs, for instance when they
show hindsight bias, which can be defined as: Pthe inclination to see events that have
already happened as being more predictable than they were before they took
place.Q
4%$5
'or instance, in an e(periment by 'ischhoff in 012>, adult sub7ects who were
asked for an independent assessment were unable to disregard information on actual
outcome. 6lso in e(periments with complicated situations, when assessing others"
thinking, adults can be unable to disregard certain information that they have been given.
4%=5
"ppearance&reality task$edit%
@ther tasks have been developed to try to solve the problems inherent in the false-belief
task. In the )appearance-reality), or )&marties) task, e(perimenters ask children what
they believe to be the contents of a bo( that looks as though it holds a candy called
)&marties). 6fter the child guesses 8usually9 )&marties), each is shown that the bo( in
fact contained pencils. #he e(perimenter then re-closes the bo( and asks the child what
she thinks another person, who has not been shown the true contents of the bo(, will
think is inside. #he child passes the task if he?she responds that another person will think
that there are )&marties) in the bo(, but fails the task if she responds that another person
will think that the bo( contains pencils. Hopnik R 6stington 801339
4%%5
found that children
pass this test at age four or five years.
'ther tasks$edit%
#he )false-photograph) task
4%>54%K5
is another task that serves as a measure of theory of
mind development. In this task, children must reason about what is represented in a
photograph that differs from the current state of affairs. *ithin the false-photograph task,
there is either a location or identity change.
4%25
In the location-change task, the e(aminer
puts an ob7ect in one location 8e.g., chocolate in an open green cupboard9, whereupon
the child takes a :olaroid photograph of the scene. *hile the photograph is developing,
the e(aminer moves the ob7ect to a different location 8e.g., a blue cupboard9, allowing the
child to view the e(aminer"s action. #he e(aminer asks the child two control uestions:
)*hen we first took the picture, where was the ob7ect.) and )*here is the ob7ect now.).
#he sub7ect is also asked a )false-photograph) uestion: )*here is the ob7ect in the
picture.) #he child passes the task if he?she correctly identifies the location of the ob7ect
in the picture and the actual location of the ob7ect at the time of the uestion. Lowever,
the last uestion might be misinterpreted as: )*here in this room is the ob7ect that the
picture depicts.) and therefore some e(aminers use an alternative phrasing.
4citation needed5
#o make it easier for animals, young children, and individuals with classical 8Canner-type9
autism to understand and perform theory-of-mind tasks, researchers have developed
tests in which verbal communication is de-emphasi+ed: some whose administration does
not involve verbal communication on the part of the e(aminer, some whose successful
completion does not reuire verbal communication on the part of the sub7ect, and some
that meet both of the foregoing standards. @ne category of tasks uses a preferential
looking paradigm, with looking time as the dependent variable. 'or instance, 1-month-old
infants prefer looking at behaviors performed by a human hand over those made by an
inanimate hand-like ob7ect.
4%35
@ther paradigms look at rates of imitative behavior, the
ability to replicate and complete unfinished goal-directed acts,
4$>5
and rates of pretend
play.
4%15
Early precursors$edit%
Eecent research on the early precursors of theory of mind have looked at innovative
ways at capturing prelinguistic infants" understanding of other people"s mental states,
including perception and beliefs. Dsing a variety of e(perimental procedures, studies
have shown that infants in their second year of life have an implicit understanding what
other people see
4>=5
and what they know.
4>05
6 popular paradigm used to study infants"
theory of mind is the violation of e(pectation procedure, which predicates on infants"
tendency to look longer at une(pected and surprising events compared to familiar and
e(pected events. #herefore, their looking times measures would give researchers an
indication of what infants might be inferring, or their implicit understanding of events. @ne
recent study using this paradigm found that 0K-month-olds tend to attribute beliefs to a
person whose visual perception was previously witnessed as being )reliable) compared
to someone whose visual perception was )unreliable). &pecifically, 0K-month-olds were
trained to e(pect a person"s e(cited vocali+ation and ga+e into a container to be
associated with finding a toy in the reliable looker condition or an absence of a toy in the
unreliable looker condition. 'ollowing this training phase, infants witnessed, in an ob7ect-
search task, the same person either searching for a toy in the correct or incorrect location
after they both witnessed the location of where the toy was hidden. Infants who
e(perienced the reliable looker were surprised and therefore looked longer when the
person searched for the toy in the incorrect location compared to the correct location. In
contrast, the looking time for infants who e(perienced the unreliable looker did not differ
for either search locations. #hese findings suggest that 0K-month-old infants can
differentially attribute beliefs about a toy"s location based on the person"s prior record of
visual perception.
4>25
Deficits$edit%
#he theory of mind 8#o/9 impairment describes a difficulty someone would have with
perspective taking. #his is also sometimes referred to as mind-blindness. #his means
that individuals with a #o/ impairment would have a hard time seeing things from any
other perspective than their own.
4>$5
Individuals who e(perience a theory of mind deficit
have difficulty determining the intentions of others, lack understanding of how their
behavior affects others, and have a difficult time with social reciprocity.
4>%5
#o/ deficits
have been observed in people with autism spectrum disorders, people
with schi+ophrenia, people with attention deficit disorder,
425
persons under the influence of
alcohol and narcotics, sleep-deprived persons, and persons who are e(periencing severe
emotional or physical pain.
"utism$edit%
In 013> &imon Baron-,ohen, 6lan /. -eslie and Dta 'rith published research that
suggested that children with autism do not employ a theory of mind,
4%25
and suggested
that children with autism have particular difficulties with tasks reuiring the child to
understand another person"s beliefs. #hese difficulties persist when children are matched
for verbal skills
4>>5
and have been taken as a key feature of autism.
/any individuals classified as having autism have severe difficulty assigning mental
states to others, and they seem to lack theory of mind capabilities.
4>K5
Eesearchers who
study the relationship between autism and theory of mind attempt to e(plain the
connection in a variety of ways. @ne account assumes that theory of mind plays a role in
the attribution of mental states to others and in childhood pretend play.
4>25
6ccording to
-eslie,
4>25
theory of mind is the capacity to mentally represent thoughts, beliefs, and
desires, regardless of whether or not the circumstances involved are real. #his might
e(plain why individuals with autism show e(treme deficits in both theory of mind and
pretend play. Lowever, Lobson proposes a social-affective 7ustification,
4>35
which
suggests that a person with autism deficits in theory of mind result from a distortion in
understanding and responding to emotions. Le suggests that typically developing human
beings, unlike individuals with autism, are born with a set of skills 8such as social
referencing ability9 that later lets them comprehend and react to other peopleMs feelings.
@ther scholars emphasi+e that autism involves a specific developmental delay, so that
children with the impairment vary in their deficiencies, because they e(perience difficulty
in different stages of growth. Sery early setbacks can alter proper advancement of 7oint-
attention behaviors, which may lead to a failure to form a full theory of mind.
4>K5
It has been speculated
4%15
that #o/ e(ists on a continuum as opposed to the traditional
view of a concrete presence or absence. *hile some research has suggested that some
autistic populations are unable to attribute mental states to others,
4%5
recent evidence
points to the possibility of coping mechanisms that facilitate a spectrum of mindful
behavior.
4>15
#ine et al. suggest that children with autism score substantially lower on
measures of social theory of mind in comparison to children with 6sperger syndrome.
4K=5
"lcohol use disorders$edit%
Impairments in theory of mind, as well as other social-cognitive deficits are commonly
found in people suffering from alcoholism due to the neuroto(ic effects of alcohol on the
brain, particularly the prefrontal corte( region of the brain.
4$5
Brain mechanisms$edit%
(n typically developing humans$edit%
Eesearch on theory of mind in autism led to the view that mentali+ing abilities are
subserved by dedicated mechanisms that can 8in some cases9 be impaired while general
cognitive function remains largely intact. <euroimaging research has supported this view,
demonstrating specific brain regions consistently engaged during theory of mind tasks.
Garly :G# research on theory of mind, using verbal and pictorial story comprehension
tasks, identified a set of regions including the medial prefrontal corte( 8m:',9, and area
around posterior superior temporal sulcus 8p&#&9, and
sometimes precuneus and amygdala?temporopolar corte(.
4K05
&ubseuently, research on
the neural basis of theory of mind has diversified, with separate lines of research focused
on the understanding of beliefs, intentions, and more comple( properties of minds such
as psychological traits.
&tudies from Eebecca &a(e"s lab at /I#, using a false belief versus false photograph
task contrast aimed to isolate the mentali+ing component of the false belief task, have
very consistently found activation in m:',, precuneus, and temporo-parietal 7unction
8#:;9, right-laterali+ed.
4K254K$5
In particular, it has been proposed that the right #:; 8r#:;9 is
selectively involved in representing the beliefs of others.
4K%5
Lowever, some debate e(ists,
as some scientists have noted that the same r#:; region has been consistently activated
during spatial reorienting of visual attention!
4K>54KK5
;ean Aecety from the Dniversity of
,hicago and ;ason /itchell from Larvard have thus proposed that the r#:; subserves a
more general function involved in both false belief understanding and attentional
reorienting, rather than a mechanism speciali+ed for social cognition. Lowever, it is
possible that the observation of overlapping regions for representing beliefs and
attentional reorienting may simply be due to ad7acent but distinct neuronal populations
that code for each. #he resolution of typical f/EI studies may not be good enough to
show that distinct?ad7acent neuronal populations code for each of these processes. In a
study following Aecety and /itchell, &a(e and colleagues used higher-resolution f/EI
and showed that the peak of activation for attentional reorienting is appro(imately K-
0=mm above the peak for representing beliefs. 'urther corroborating that differing
populations of neurons may code for each process, they found no similarity in the
patterning of f/EI response across space.
4K25
'unctional imaging has also been used to study the detection of mental state information
in Leider-&immel-esue animations of moving geometric shapes, which typical humans
automatically perceive as social interactions laden with intention and emotion. #hree
studies found remarkably similar patterns of activation during the perception of such
animations versus a random or deterministic motion control: m:',, p&#&, fusiform face
area 8''69, and amygdala were selectively engaged during the #o/ condition.
4K354K15
42=5
6nother study presented sub7ects with an animation of two dots moving with a
parameteri+ed degree of intentionality 8uantifying the e(tent to which the dots chased
each other9, and found that p&#& activation correlated with this parameter.
4205
6 separate body of research has implicated the posterior superior temporal sulcus in the
perception of intentionality in human action! this area is also involved in perceiving
biological motion, including body, eye, mouth, and point-light display motion.
4225
@ne study
found increased p&#& activation while watching a human lift his hand versus having his
hand pushed up by a piston 8intentional versus unintentional action9.
42$5
&everal studies
have found increased p&#& activation when sub7ects perceive a human action that is
incongruent with the action e(pected from the actorMs conte(t and inferred intention: for
instance, a human performing a reach-to-grasp motion on empty space ne(t to an ob7ect,
versus grasping the ob7ect!
42%5
a human shifting eye ga+e toward empty space ne(t to a
checkerboard target versus shifting ga+e toward the target!
42>5
an unladen human turning
on a light with his knee, versus turning on a light with his knee while carrying a pile of
books!
42K5
and a walking human pausing as he passes behind a bookshelf, versus walking
at a constant speed.
4225
In these studies, actions in the )congruent) case have a
straightforward goal, and are easy to e(plain in terms of the actorMs intention! the
incongruent actions, on the other hand, reuire further e(planation 8why would someone
twist empty space ne(t to a gear.9, and apparently demand more processing in the &#&.
<ote that this region is distinct from the temporo-parietal area activated during false belief
tasks.
4225
6lso note that p&#& activation in most of the above studies was largely right-
laterali+ed, following the general trend in neuroimaging studies of social cognition and
perception: also right-laterali+ed are the #:; activation during false belief tasks, the &#&
response to biological motion, and the ''6 response to faces.
<europsychological evidence has provided support for neuroimaging results on the
neural basis of theory of mind. 6 study with patients suffering from a lesion of
thetemporoparietal 7unction of the brain 8between the temporal lobe and parietal lobe9
reported that they have difficulty with some theory of mind tasks.
4235
#his shows that
theory of mind abilities are associated with specific parts of the human brain. Lowever,
the fact that the medial prefrontal corte( and temporoparietal 7unction are necessary for
theory of mind tasks does not imply that these regions are specific to that function.
4K>5
4215
#:; and m:', may subserve more general functions necessary for #o/.
Eesearch by Sittorio Hallese, -uciano 'adiga and Hiacomo Ei++olatti 8reviewed in
43=5
9 has
shown that some sensorimotor neurons, which are referred to as mirror neurons, first
discovered in the premotor corte( of rhesus monkeys, may be involved in action
understanding. &ingle-electrode recording revealed that these neurons fired when a
monkey performed an action and when the monkey viewed another agent carrying out
the same task. &imilarly, f/EI studies with human participants have shown brain regions
8assumed to contain mirror neurons9 are active when one person sees another person"s
goal-directed action.
4305
#hese data have led some authors to suggest that mirror neurons
may provide the basis for theory of mind in the brain, and to support simulation theory of
mind reading 8see above9.
4325
Lowever, there is also evidence against the link between mirror neurons and theory of
mind. 'irst, macaue monkeys have mirror neurons but do not seem to have a "human-
like" capacity to understand theory of mind and belief. &econd, f/EI studies of theory of
mind typically report activation in the m:',, temporal poles and #:; or &#&,
43$5
but these
brain areas are not part of the mirror neuron system. &ome investigators, like
developmental psychologist 6ndrew /elt+off and neuroscientist ;ean Aecety, believe
that mirror neurons merely facilitate learning through imitation and may provide a
precursor to the development of #o/.
43%543>5
@thers, like philosopher &haun Hallagher,
suggest that mirror-neuron activation, on a number of counts, fails to meet the definition
of simulation as proposed by the simulation theory of mindreading.
43K54325
(n autism$edit%
&everal neuroimaging studies have looked at the neural basis theory of mind impairment
in sub7ects with 6sperger syndrome and high-functioning autism 8L'69. #he first :G#
study of theory of mind in autism 8also the first neuroimaging study using a task-induced
activation paradigm in autism9 employed a story comprehension task,
4335
replicating a
prior study in normal individuals.
4315
#his study found displaced and diminished m:',
activation in sub7ects with autism. Lowever, because the study used only si( sub7ects
with autism, and because the spatial resolution of :G# imaging is relatively poor, these
results should be considered preliminary.
6 subseuent f/EI study scanned normally developing adults and adults with L'6 while
performing a )reading the mind in the eyes) taskJviewing a photo of a humanMs eyes
and choosing which of two ad7ectives better describes the personMs mental state, versus
a gender discrimination control.
41=5
#he authors found activity in orbitofrontal corte(, &#&,
and amygdala in normal sub7ects, and found no amygdala activation and abnormal &#&
activation in sub7ects with autism.
6 more recent :G# study looked at brain activity in individuals with L'6 and 6sperger
syndrome while viewing Leider-&immel animations 8see above9 versus a random motion
control.
4105
In contrast to normally developing sub7ects, those with autism showed no &#&
or ''6 activation, and significantly less m:', and amygdala activation. 6ctivity
ine(trastriate regions S$ and -@ was identical across the two groups, suggesting intact
lower-level visual processing in the sub7ects with autism. #he study also reported
significantly less functional connectivity between &#& and S$ in the autism group. <ote,
however, that decreased temporal correlation between activity in &#& and S$ would be
e(pected simply from the lack of an evoked response in &#& to intent-laden animations
in sub7ects with autism! a more informative analysis would be to compute functional
connectivity after regressing out evoked responses from all time series.
6 subseuent study, using the incongruent?congruent ga+e shift paradigm described
above, found that in high-functioning adults with autism, posterior &#& 8p&#&9 activation
was undifferentiated while watching a human shift ga+e toward a target and toward
ad7acent empty space.
4125
#he lack of additional &#& processing in the incongruent state
may suggest that these sub7ects fail to form an e(pectation of what the actor should do
given conte(tual information, or that information about the violation of this e(pectation
doesnMt reach &#&! both e(planations involve an impairment in the ability to link eye ga+e
shifts with intentional e(planations. #his study also found a significant anticorrelation
between &#& activation in the incongruent-congruent contrast and social subscale score
on the 6utism Aiagnostic Interview-Eevised, but not scores on the other subscales.
In 2=00, an f/EI study demonstrated that right temporoparietal 7unction 8r#:;9 of higher-
functioning adults with autism was not selectively activated more for mentali+ing
7udgments when compared to physical 7udgments about self and other.
41$5
r#:; selectivity
for mentali+ing was also related to individual variation on clinical measures of social
impairment! individuals whose r#:; was increasingly more active for mentali+ing
compared to physical 7udgments were less socially impaired, while those who showed
little to no difference in response to mentali+ing or physical 7udgments were the most
socially impaired. #his evidence builds on work in typical development that suggests
r#:; is critical for representing mental state information, irrespective of whether it is
about oneself or others. It also points to an e(planation at the neural level for the
pervasive mind-blindness difficulties in autism that are evident throughout the lifespan.
41%5
Non-human$edit%
See also: Animal consciousness
6n open uestion is if other animals besides humans have a genetic endowment
and social environment that allows them to acuire a theory of mind in the same way that
human children do.
405
#his is a contentious issue because of the problem of inferring
from animal behavior the e(istence of thinking, of the e(istence of a concept
of self or self-awareness, or of particular thoughts. @ne difficulty with non-human studies
of #o/ is the lack of sufficient numbers of naturalistic observation, giving insight into what
the evolutionary pressures might be on a species" development of theory of mind.
<on-human research still has a ma7or place in this field, however, and is especially useful
in illuminating which nonverbal behaviors signify components of theory of mind, and in
pointing to possible stepping points in the evolution of what many claim to be a uniuely
human aspect of social cognition. *hile it is difficult to study human-like theory of mind
and mental states in species whose potential mental states we have an incomplete
understanding, researchers can focus on simpler components of more comple(
capabilities. 'or e(ample, many researchers focus on animals" understanding of
intention, ga+e, perspective, or knowledge 8or rather, what another being has seen9. ,all
and #omasello"s study
4$%5
that looked at understanding of intention in orangutans,
chimpan+ees and children showed that all three species understood the difference
between accidental and intentional acts. :art of the difficulty in this line of research is that
observed phenomena can often be e(plained as simple stimulus-response learning, as it
is in the nature of any theori+ers of mind to have to e(trapolate internal mental states
from observable behavior. Eecently, most non-human theory of mind research has
focused on monkeys and great apes, who are of most interest in the study of the
evolution of human social cognition. @ther studies relevant to attributions theory of mind
have been conducted using plovers
41>5
and dogs,
41K5
and have shown preliminary evidence
of understanding attentionJone precursor of theory of mindJin others.
#here has been some controversy over the interpretation of evidence purporting to show
theory of mind abilityJor inabilityJin animals.
4125
#wo e(amples serve as demonstration:
first, :ovinelli et al. 8011=9
4135
presented chimpan+ees with the choice of two
e(perimenters from which to reuest food: one who had seen where food was hidden,
and one who, by virtue of one of a variety of mechanisms 8having a bucket or bag over
his head! a blindfold over his eyes! or being turned away from the baiting9 does not know,
and can only guess. #hey found that the animals failed in most cases to differentially
reuest food from the )knower). By contrast, Lare, ,all, and #omasello 82==09
4115
found
that subordinate chimpan+ees were able to use the knowledge state of dominant rival
chimpan+ees to determine which container of hidden food they approached. *illiam 'ield
and &ue &avage-Eumbaugh have no doubt that bonobos have developed #o/ and cite
their communications with a well known captive bonobo, Can+i, as evidence.
40==5
Teoria mintii
Posted by: Daniela Martinescu on: 1 iulie, 2008
In: Autism

Scrie un comentariu
Termenul psiholoic de teria mintii se re!era la capacitatea de a recunoaste si intelee andurile, credintele
"conceptiile , dorintele si intentiile celorlalti oameni cu scopul de a da sens comportamentului lor si de a pre#ice ce
$or !ace in continuare %&n termen sinonim pentru teoria mintii ar !i empatia%
'opilul sau adultul cu Sindromul Asperer sau Autism inalt !unctional nu recunoaste si nu intelee intentiile si
sentimentele altor persoane%
Intr(un studiu !acut de Ami )lin *2000+, !olosind ,Social Attribution Tas-. *SAT+ s(a descoperit ca e/ista di!erente
semni!icati$e in interpretarea intentiilor celorlalti , intre persoanele cu S%A% si persoane de aceasi $arsta !ara nici un
dianostic%
0e putem da seama ce ar putea simti sau andi o persoana citindu(i e/presiile !etei, in special reiunea din 1urul
ochilor%
Pesoanele cu aceste tulburari au di!icultati in stabilirea contactului $i#ual , e$ita pri$irea celorlalti cand se a!la intr(o
discutie, iar obser$area mimicii !etei celuilalt le scapa: in consecinta nu pot obser$a care sunt intentiile celorlalti% Insa
chiar si atunci cand obser$a e/presia !etei celuilalt au probleme de interpretare a mimicii !aciale%
&nul dintre aspectele importante ale terapiei este ca terapeutul sa descopere care sunt andurile interioare ale
clientului%
Inteleerea , e/plorarea si e/teriori#area andurilor proprii si ale celorlalti este o problema pentru persoanele cu
aceste tulburari%
Introspectia este reu de reali#at pentru acest tip de clienti%
In incercarea de a e/plica acest lucru se !oloseste termenul de ,Teoria mintii.% Acest termen a !ost prima data !olosit
in psiholoia coniti$a%
Psihoterapeutul trebuie sa se !oloseasca de anumite tehnici pentru a de#$olta capacitatea de insiht a clientului2 a
intelee sentimentele si intentiile celorlalti , precum si cele proprii2 a(si de#$olta $ocabularul personal pentru a(si
putea descrie emotiile si andurile%
&n alt aspect care trebuie a$ut in $edere atunci cand lucram cu o persoana cu S%A% sau cu Autism este ca are
tendinta de a interpreta literalmente ceea ce i se spune , nu intelee meta!orele, lumele, alu#iile% Deasemenea nu
intelee ca mesa1ul transmis poate !i interpretat di!erit in !unctie de tonul $ocii si pro#odie%
Suntem capabili sa inteleem inconruenta dintre e/presia !etei , tonul $ocii si conte/t si sa reali#am cand cine$a
este sarcastic2 persoanele cu S%A% nu pot !ace acest lucru%
'and se ana1ea#a intr(o con$ersatie, persoana cu una dintre cele doua tulburari are tendinta sa $orbeasca numai
despre sine, despre propriiile interese si pasiuni% Acest lucru ii poate plictisi sau deran1a pe cei din 1ur, iar persoana
cu S%A% este incapabila in a citi pe !ata celorlalti indiciile subtile care arata cum se simt% 'opilul cu S%A% pare ca nu
respecta reulile sociale si nu raspunde la semnalele de alarma ca trebuie sa incete#e con$ersatia% Daca partenerul
de con$ersatie nu stie ca aceasta este o problema a persoanelor cu S%A% il poate percepe ca !iind lipsit de respect sau
obra#nic% Trebuie sa stim ca pesoana cu S%A nu are intentii rautacioase , de obicei nici nu este constienta ca a o!ensat
pe cine$a%
Persoanele cu S%A% sau cu Autism au un entu#iasm remarcabil in ceea ce pri$este propriile interese si nu isi dau
seama ca cei din 1ur nu impartasesc entu#iasmul lor%
Datorita !aptului ca au tendinta de a nu(i pri$ii pe ceilalti atunci cand $orbesc, nu isi dau seama cand ceilalti sunt
plictisiti sau cand au ales un subiect nepotri$it pentru con$ersatie%
Insa, aceste subiecte sau acti$itati care sunt interesante pentru ceilalti pot !i plictisitoare pentru o persoana cu una
dintre tulburarile pre#entate in lucrare%
3 alta caracteristica importanta a acestor tip de clienti este ca sunt mereu sinceri, nu stiu sa minta% Daca au !acut
ce$a nepermis , iar apoi sunt intrebati $or recunoaste nonsalant !apta%
Pot chiar sa(i 1ineasca pe ceilalti datorita sinceritatii lor% De e/emplu pot spune cui$a ca este ras si care ne$oie de o
cura de slabire !ara nici cea mai ica idee ca persoana respecti$a se $a simti o!ensata% Din punctul de $edere al
persoanei cu S%A% , celalalt ar trebui sa !ie recunoscator ca i s(a spus ade$arul2 nu se pot pune in locul celuilalt
pentru a(si da seama cum se simte%
Adultii cu S%A% sunt onesti, au un simt puternic al 1ustitiei"dreptatii si a respectarii reulilor% 'red cu tarie in principiile
morale si etice% Acestea sunt calitati admirabile , dar le pot cau#a probleme atunci cand cei din 1ur nu le aprecia#a2
pot duce la de#ilu#ii si depresie%
3 alta problema este ca persoanei cu S%A% ii este di!icil sa distina intre o !apta accidentala si una intentionata%
Toate aceste !apte ne indica !aptul ca nu trebuie neli1ata aplicarea terapiei coniti$ comportamentale necesara in
ca#ul acestor doua tulburari%
4e!erinte: Tony Att5ood, ,The complete uide to Asperer6s Syndrome. Scris de psih% Anca 0eau
Teoria mintii si metacognitie
Mintea va!uta" cu oc#ii mintii"
Dezvoltarea functiei e(ecutive $ teoria mintii, ne defineste ca fiinte umane si ofera
suport pentru activitatile metacognitive in care suntem angajati zilnic.
Teoria despre minte presupune abilitatea de a e(plica evenimentele observabile din
punctul de vedere al emotiilor si al dorintelor, de a accepta perspectiva altora, de a
evalua consecinte propriului comportament inainte de a ne angaja in efectuarea lui.
Apelul la termenul de /teorie# atrage atentia asupra faptului ca si copiii, asemeni
oamenilor de stiinta, utilizeaza ipoteze pentru a prezice evenimente observabile: daca
0 atunci 1. 2ineinteles ca teoriile copiilor despre minte nu sunt e(plicite ca teoriile
oamenilor de stiinta, insa daca sunt pe deplin dezvoltate, ei pot anticipa corect cum
anume va fi afectat un individ intr!o anumita situatie.
,n jurul varstei de 3 ani, copiii incep sa realizeze ca nu situatia ca atare e cea care
determina reactia emotionala, ci caracteristicile mentale ale fiecarui individ si, de
aceea, ceea ce este infricosator pentru o persoana nu este asa si pentru alta, iar ceea ce
cauzeaza o surpriza placuta pentru una, cauzeaza dezamagire alteia. ,ncep sa inteleaga
ca oamenii au convingeri diferite cu privire la lume, ca acestea por fi adevarate sau
eronate si ca le influenteaza actiunile.
De asemenea, reusesc sa observe ca ceilalti oameni au o lume interna de ganduri si
sentimente, care este independenta de starea lor mentala. ,nteleg ca gandirea se
petrece in minte, ca aceasta opereaza cu lucruri imaginare sau reale, ca a gandi se
deosebeste de a vedea, a sti, a vorbi. Dar nu inteleg, totusi, ca mintea este activa in
permanenta, ca oamenii gandesc in cuvinte sau pot "vorbi cu ei insisi in minte#.
4entru a identifica nivelul la care copiii au ajuns in dezvoltarea teoriei mintii,
psi-ologii au utilizat testul falselor credinte. 'onceptul de intelegere a credintelor
false se refera la realizarea faptului ca credinta unei persoane despre un anumit
eveniment real este un fenomen mental care poate sa difere de realitate.
estul este o povestire despre doua fetite, )all5 si Anne, pusa in scena cu papusi si
jucarii. 6olosind ca personaje doua papusi, ).2. 'o-en a pus in scena urmatorul
scenariu: )all5 are un cos, iar Anne are o cutie. )all5 are o minge pe care o pune in
cosul sau. Apoi, )all5 iese. ,n timp ce )all5 este plecata, Anne ia mingea si o plaseaza
in propria cutie. )all5 se intoarce si vrea sa se joace cu mingea. Dupa aceasta
povestire, cercetatorul ii adreseaza copilului urmatoarea intrebare:Unde va cauta
Sally mingea?. .aspunsul corect este In cos, deoarece )all5 are convingerea ca
mingea se afla in continuare in locul in care a pus!o initial.
,n concluzie, dupa varsta de 3 ani, copiii dobandesc abilitatea de a!si reprezenta
viziunea altei persoane, c-iar daca aceasta este in conflict cu a lor.
eoria mintii continua sa se dezvolte si dupa varsta de 7 ani si prezinta un rafinament
tot mai mare, insa modificarea conceptuala care are loc intre 8 si 7 ani, evidentiata
prin testul credintelor false, reprezinta cel mai important pas pe care il fac copiii in
intelegerea mintii altor oameni.
'opiii care au teoria mintii insuficient dezvoltata au dificultati in a intelege emotiile
celorlalti si in initierea si mentinerea relatiilor sociale, deoarece nu manifesta
comportamente precum cooperarea in joc, oferirea ajutorului sau impartirea jucariilor.
Abilitatile de mind-reading pe care le putem observa la copii sunt:
prezenta jocului simbolic spontan9
capacitatea de a lua in considerare ceea ce alte persoane cunosc9
apreciera nivelului de interes al interlocutorului9
intelegerea motivelelor pentru care ceilalti au actionat intr!un anumit mod9
anticiparea opiniei cuiva despre actiunile sale9
intelegerea inselatoriei9
asocierea unei emotii cu un factor declansator9
intelegerea umorului, a sarcasmului, a metaforelor.
:ste posibil ca dezvoltarea acestei abilitati sa fie determinata biologic, in sensul ca
este parte a repertoriului de comportamente adaptative cu care este ec-ipata specia
umana. otusi, e(ista indicii ca e(perienta sociala a copiilor influenteaza diferitele
aspecte ale dezvoltarii teoriei mintii.
6amiliile care incurajeaza jocul imaginar stimuleaza aptitudinile legate de teoria
despre minte. ;ucand roluri, copiii incearca sa adopte perspectiva altor oameni.
:mpatia apare mai devreme, de regula, la copiii care discuta in familie despre
cauzatilate si sentimente.
'opiii bilingvi obtin rezultate mai bune la anumite sarcini legate de teoria despre
minte decat cei care vorbesc o singura limba. :i inteleg ca un obiect sau o idee pot fi
reprezentate la nivel lingvistic in mai multe feluri, iar astfel pot intelege si ca oamenii
pot avea perspective diferite.
)tilul parental, securitatea atasamentului, numarul fratilor mai mari si conversatiile cu
ceilalti despre starile interne sunt factori care contribuie la masura si ritmul in care
copiii inteleg mintea umana.
Metacognitia
<etacognitia se poate defini simplu ca fiind gandirea despre gandire (t-in=ing about
t-in=ing), mai precis, abilitatea de a te uita la propria gandire (out of bod5
e(perience).
Avand la baza functia e(ecutiva teoria mintii, metacognitia se refera la un nivel de
gandire mai inalt la care ne putem angaja si care implica un control activ al proceselor
cognitive.
Diferenta in dezvoltarea teorii mintii si a metacognitiei se refera la faptul ca
majoritatea copiilor dobandesc o teorie a mintii destul de usor, fara interventii directe
(dar crescuti totusi intr!un mediul prielnic, bazat pe interactiuni sociale), in timp ce
metacognitia necesita suport din partea adultilor pentru angajarea voluntara a copiilor
in activitati de observare a propriei gandiri.
;o-n 6lavell a folosit pentru prima data termenul de metacognitie in anul %>&?:
#Metacognitia se refera la cunoasterea cuiva cu privire la propriile procese si
produse cognitive. De exemplu ma angae! in metacognitie daca observ ca am o mai
mare problema invatand " decat #.#
'ercetatorii au demonstrat ca dezvoltarea acestei abilitati ii ajuta pe oameni sa
inteleaga si sa invete mai bine, sa obtina rezultate academic mai bune si, mai ales, sa
isi dezvolte capacitatea de a lua deci!ii de viata intelepte.
4e masura ce folosesc cele 8 componente ale metacognitiei @ constientizarea
proceselor gandirii, planificarea si monitorizarea @ copiii pot adopta strategii
inteligente privind modul de a rezolva o sarcina.
,ncurajand copiii sa isi puna intrebari precum: "$e ar trebui sa fac mai intai?#, "$e
altceva as mai putea sa incerc?#, "$e pot sa fac sa obtin un re!ultat mai bun?#, "$e
fac cand nu inteleg ceva?#, le oferim o structura care ii determina sa gandeasca
metacognitiv.
Angajandu!se in activitati metacognitive, copiii pot identifica anumite blocaje,
repetarea anumitor idei, aspecte cu anumite probleme, probabilitatea unei concluzii,
dificultati in a avansa, gasirea unui nou punct de pornire.
Astfel ei realizeaza faptul ca poate e(ista o perspectiva noua, mai larga si mai
adecvata asupra situatiei, si ca isi pot sc-imba pozitia initiala (in baza unor argumente
mai puternice sau a unei perceptii mai e(tinse), in conformitate cu aceasta. ,n felul
acesta, isi pot e(tinde, nuanta si rafina gandirea.

%ibliografie
4apalia, D., Aend=os Blds,)., 6eldman,.. De!voltarea umana, :ditura rei,
2ucuresti *C%C
)c-affer, .., Introducere in psi%ologia copilului, :ditura A)'., 'luj!Napoca *C%C
Dar=in, )-irle5, Metacognition in young c%ildren @ a5lor E 6rancis e!Dibrar5, *CC>.