De La Salle University

A Comparative Analysis on the Nuclear Energy Policies of France and Germany

Using the EU Energy Policy as a Benchmark

Submitted to Mr. Lorenzo de los Santos
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Completion of the Course THSISEA
By
Portillo, Patricia Bianca N.
Sangual, Cara Marie S.

Malate, Manila
04/15/14

i

Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis on the recent turn in the
nuclear energy policies of France and Germany using the EU energy policies as a benchmark. In
the first part, the paper provides an overview and the evolution of the energy policies of EU,
France and Germany. Second, the researchers have gathered data on the specific nuclear policies
of the three institutions. The data is then used by the researchers to analyze how France and
Germany have come up to their decision to either continue or withdraw from nuclear energy.
In conclusion, the thesis argues that, using the theory of historical institutionalism, the
rationale behind the shift on nuclear policies of the two countries is because of three factors:
history, public opinion, and political institutions. It is also concluded that the EU energy policies
is not strong enough for the states to be bound by the law on nuclear energy.
This thesis hopes to offer students from De La Salle University necessary information on
the nuclear policies of France and Germany, especially that to date, there is no existing thesis
regarding this subject matter in the university.






ii

Table of Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction
Background of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Scope and Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Review of Related Literature
History of Energy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Overview of the European Union Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
EU Nuclear Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
French Energy Policy Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Account of the German Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Nuclear Power Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
iii

Understanding the Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Comparative Analysis on the Recent Turn in French and German Energy Policies . . . . 21
The 1973 Oil Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Three Mile Island Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chernobyl Catastrophe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Fukushima Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Theoretical Framework
Historical Institutionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Core Assumptions of Historical Institutionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Application of the Theory to the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Operationalization of Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Methodology
Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Data Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
iv

Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Evolution of EU Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Road to a More Integrated Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Call for a Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Data Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
EU Specific Policy Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Energy Policy Developments in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Harmonization of Nuclear Liabilities in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
The Nuclear Liability Patchwork in the EU member states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
EURATOM and the Nuclear Liability Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Current EU Energy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Nuclear Policies between Chernobyl and Fukushima, and beyond . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Nuclear Policies of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Institutional and Industrial Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The French Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Legal Framework for Nuclear Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
v

National Legislatives and Regulatory Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Licensing and regulatory infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Nuclear security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Nuclear safety and radiological protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
International co-operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Nuclear Policies of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Energy Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Energy Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
National Legislatives and Regulatory Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Radiation protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Nuclear Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Transport of radioactive material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Regulations on nuclear trade (including non-proliferation) . . . . . . . . . . . 81
State Internalization of EU policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Convergence and Divergence on Nuclear Policies of France and Germany . . . . . . . . . . 84
vi

History of Energy Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
The 1973 Oil Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Three Mile Island Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Chernobyl Catastrophe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Fukushima Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Public opinion in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Public opinion in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Political Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Political Institutions in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Political Institutions in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Comparative Analysis of Political Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
vii

Acknowledgements
First of all, we would like to thank Mr. Lorenzo De Los Santos, our thesis mentor and the
ISE thesis coordinator, for guiding us throughout the process of writing our thesis proposal and
thesis proper, for providing us insightful information, and for his expert advice and
encouragement that helped us worked our way through our paper,. We also would like to thank
Ms. Tey Tana and Mr. Alvin Camba, for helping us establish the topic and theory to be utilized
in our thesis, and for teaching us the basics in writing a dissertation.
We also acknowledge the help and insights given to us by our friends/classmates, Nicole
Sze and Johana Que, despite having different topics.
Finally, we would like to thank the members of each our family for the extraordinary
support they have given us in the thesis writing process.







1

Introduction
Background of the Study
Nuclear energy is considered as a contentious issue, particularly in the 20th century where
nuclear power has become fundamental in playing a role in the global community as part of the
security policy, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and eventually as part of the energy
policy, the European Energy Program for Recovery. This power has been used both in the
destruction and the restoration of human life. Nuclear energy is a manifestation one of the
strongest energy forms man has ever known.
It came to a point where most governments around the world have devoted to nuclear power as
significant to their national energy security programs and environmental responsibility. In doing
so, they are responding to a directive that is gaining ever greater relevance on every continent.
1

The energy policies of the European Union vary significantly from each member states, and
nuclear energy only accounts for 14.4% of energy consumption. Nuclear energy became highly
contested in the European Union as public and political opinion have been very critical about the
effects of nuclear energy as it poses too high risks and too high costs to the environment and to
the people. Regardless the EU is likely to pursue nuclear energy as its goal is to restructure into a
low-carbon economy.
2
There are critical factors that will impact and shape the future of nuclear
energy within the European Union. The essential factor is a persistent safe operation of the
existing nuclear facilities. The second is the appeal of energy, most especially in electricity. The

1
Fabrizio Nocera, The Legal Regime of Nuclear Energy: A Comprehensive Guide to International Law and
European Union Law (Mortsel: Intersentia nv, 2005).
2
Susanne Langsdorf, EU Energy Policy: From the ECSC to the Energy Roadmap 2050 (Heinrich Boll
Stiftung, 2011)
2

third is the aptness of the nuclear sector to meet and share the need of nuclear energy in a
competitive way.
3

However, following the Chernobyl accident and the recent Fukushima crisis, several
countries have thought of dismantling their nuclear power facilities, and these countries,
particularly Germany, have eventually decided to fully back away on their nuclear power
programs and pursue a nuclear phase-out.
4
By the disagreement of President Angela Merkel,
Germany, through the popular vote of the people, have pushed to appeal as the first state to
completely abolish nuclear power plants and to plan on transferring its interest into renewable
energies such as solar energy. Germany is first of the consequent propositions of a nuclear phase-
out. On the other hand, France is deemed as an exception since it has invested a lot in nuclear
energy. Therefore, a declination in the support for nuclear power would bring about extensive
consequences in the domestic as well as in the international level.
5
France has not considered
following Germany's decision on a nuclear phase-out during the term of President Sarkozys
presidency not until the recent 2012 election where Francois Hollande has been elected.
Hollande regime has formulated a proposal for a nuclear phase-out, and several debates have
emerged on whether or not this should be pursued, but eventually the people outweighed the
interests of the president and France continues to expand the lifespan of its nuclear reactors.
As the EU strives to promote sustainable energy through a nuclear energy policy, there are
comparable differences in the recent turn in nuclear energy policies of France and Germany as a

3
Fernando De Estebal et al., The Future of Nuclear Energy in the European Union (Brussels, 2002)
4
Nina Netzer and Jochen Steinhilber, eds., The End of Nuclear Energy? (Berlin: The Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2011).
5
Philip Ball, Frances Nuclear Power Program Continues in Force, MRS Bulletin 36, no. 6 (2011): 418-
421.
3

response to a number of accidents which can be analyzed using the EU energy policy as a
benchmark
Statement of the Problem
The researchers would like to determine and analyze the differences between the policies
of France and Germany concerning their nuclear energy after the different events that happened
in the nuclear power plant history which affected their interests and led to a shift in their nuclear
policy decision-making process.
The corollary questions are:
1. What are the past events that triggered for a turn in the nuclear energy policies of
France and Germany?
2. How can these nuclear policy reforms be analyzed using the EU policy as a
benchmark?
Variables
The dependent variable is whether maintaining or dismantling the nuclear power facilities
in France and Germany after a number of events which had a huge impact on the nuclear energy
policies of the States. The independent variables include the events prior to the policy reforms,
the stands of different organizations which challenge the status quo of nuclear policies and the
public opinion concerning the said matter.

4

Scope and Limitation
After the events, such as the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accident,
have led to different perceptions about nuclear energy, different States have also implemented
diverging policies concerning their own nuclear facilities. This paper aims to provide a
comparative analysis on the nuclear energy policies of France and Germany, two States that have
separated in their path of pursuing nuclear energy. The researchers will perform a case study of
the strategic strengths of the French nuclear power industry as it stands, and how Germany was
able to challenge the nuclear policy status quo and to successfully withdraw from the realms of
nuclear energy. This study aims to discuss the decision-making of both States regarding their
nuclear energy starting from the birth of the EU energy policy, to the number of events that
occurred in the account of nuclear energy, which have influenced the actors behavior today and
how it contributed to the present revisions of their policies. This also serves as an overall
evaluation of the energy policies in the 21
st
century.
This study is analyzed using the EU energy policy as a benchmark. There would be
problems on time constraints the researchers have to work in. Since the main focus is on Europe,
the researchers would also be limited in finding resources, particularly first-hand sources as well
as understanding literatures written in French or German.



5

Review of Related Literature
The review of the literature for this study focuses on the different occurrences and
amendments in France's and Germany's nuclear energy policies in the aftermath of several
nuclear incidents such as the Chernobyl and the Fukushima accident. These will be analyzed
using the EU energy policy standards. It would also be possible to look at different organizations
which have taken a position on nuclear power some are proponents, and some are opponents
in order to understand how nuclear energy can be beneficial to a state, or otherwise detrimental.
This chapter focuses on the political costs it brings in maintaining nuclear energy. By
definition, political costs are costs that groups external to the firm might be able to impose on
that firm as a result of political actions. Basically, these can be political interventions made by
EU to the nuclear firms of the states, particularly through policy regulations. Then, the status quo
of both countries will be discussed wherein primary and secondary state actors such as private
industries, organizations, companies and individuals will be looked at. Lastly, this chapter will
be conducting a case study of the nuclear power in France and Germany using the EU as a policy
benchmark.
History of Energy Policies
Overview of the European Union Energy Policy
To endure the widespread paucity of a common energy in the 1950s, the six founding
states of the European Union (West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg) looked at nuclear energy as a means of achieving energy independence. Since a
6

single state could not afford the costs of investing in nuclear energy, the founding States united
to establish the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
6

The EURATOM has a significant function in civilian nuclear activities within the EU.
There have been no major changes to the treaty since it entered into force. The fundamental goal
of the treaty is to contribute to the formation and development of Europe's nuclear industries, so
that all member states can benefit from the progress of nuclear energy, and to guarantee security
of supply.
7
The treaty also ensures high safety standards for the public and prevents nuclear
materials intended primarily for civilian use from being used in military purposes.
8

There were several attempts to create a common energy policy throughout the
development of the EU, but the success is only definite. The vital reason for its failure was
because member states are hesitant to consolidate sovereignty in this extremely sensitive policy
area.
9
Although EU has legislated in the area of energy policy for several years, the notion of
introducing a compulsory and inclusive European energy policy was only approved on
October27, 2005 at the meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court.
10
The Treaty of
Lisbon legally includes harmonization of energy supply and revisions to the energy policy within
the EU. Before, EU energy legislation was based on the EU jurisdiction in the area of the
common market and environment. However, in practice many policies vis--vis energy stay at

6
European Commission, Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/
treaties_euratom_en.htm (accessed Nov. 20, 2013).
7
International Energy Agency, IEA: European Union 2008 (Paris: IEA Publication, 2008).
8
EC, Europa.
9
Francis McGowan, ed., European Energy Policies in a Changing Environment(New York:
Springer, 1996).
10
Paul JJ Welfens, ed., Energy Policies in the European Union: Germany's Ecological Tax Reform (New
York: Springer, 2001).
7

the national member state level, and advancement in policy at European level requires voluntary
cooperation by member states.
11

Now that these energy policy goals are enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, it aims to make
possible the progress towards policy coherence. The anticipated result of this new governance
structure is definitely to decrease existing conflicting signals between the EU and its member
states' policies, which is one of the biggest concerns for the EU.
12

EU energy policy has three key elements: market competition, sustainability and security.
Energy networks within the EU have traditionally been formulated and conducted on a national
ground by vertically integrated monopolies, generally in full or partial state ownership, with the
states interest utilized either by central or regional governments.
13
Each member states energy
policy must be assessed in terms of these objectives. Therefore, energy policy has been largely
nationally based, with restricted cross-border trading. The EUs interest in reinforcing
cooperation and integration of EU-wide energy networks has grown since the 1980s.
14

EU Nuclear Energy Policy
Nuclear energy is, at present, the largest source of low-carbon electricity in the EU,
which is 14% of the EU total energy supply. There are 146 nuclear power plants (NPPs)

11
Ibid.
12
Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval, eds., European Energy Policy: An Environmental
Approach (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012).
13
Julia Black, European Union energy regulation, in International Regulatory Co-operation: Case
Studies (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013).
14
Ibid.
8

operating in 15 member states and in 2007, these provided 31% of the total electricity produced
in the EU. European NPPs are among the most efficiently operated reactors in the world.
15

Nuclear power remains a contentious issue and the EU nuclear reactors are getting old.
EU nuclear generating competency will begin to decline, unless a considerable investment is
imminent in the near future for plant lifetime extensions and the replacement of facilities
reaching the end of their operating lives. Without this investment, this low-carbon source of
electricity generation could go down from 31% to 21% of the total electricity generated in the
EU in 2020. Diminished electricity generation in NPPs will make the ambitious EU goal of a 20-
30% decrease of carbon dioxide emissions by 2020 even more difficult to achieve.
16
NPPs in the
EU were originally constructed and managed by private and national government-owned
utilities. Privatization since the 1980s has led to more NPPs being owned and controlled by
private-sector utilities. The activities of these private utilities are often multinational in scope.
Some utilities that own and administer NPPs located in member states with nuclear phase-out
legislation or policies are investing in NPP operation and creation in EU countries that support
the use of nuclear power to generate electricity.
17

Nuclear power develops EU security of energy supply since uranium is extensively
spread and about 50% of global mine production comes from reliable, politically stable trading
partners. While every EU member is free to decide upon their own energy mix, the

15
International Energy Agency, IEA: European Union 2008.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
9

Commissions policy should continue to support those member states that choose to use nuclear
energy as a part of their electricity generation mix.
18

States without nuclear phase-out legislation or policies are, to a greater extent,
acknowledging that nuclear energy has a significant role to play in producing low-CO2
electricity. This is changing future expectations for nuclear power and the way in which
investment partnerships in nuclear power projects are organized, but it is impeded by negative
public view of nuclear technology in many member states of the EU. Since public perception of
nuclear power has an essential economic and environmental consequences today and in the
future, it is important that public opinion is shaped on factual information. The Commission
should therefore consider increasing awareness of the functional history of nuclear reactors in the
EU and the impact that this technology has had and can have in future efforts to reduce
emissions of CO2.
19

Nuclear regulation is a national responsibility. Regulatory agreement processes for NPPs
are usually long and contribute to investor skepticism, and they vary from one country to
another. Construction time is usually more than five years. While regulation will remain a
national responsibility, there are measures for greater cooperation internationally such as the
Multinational Design Evaluation Program, a multinational proposal to expand innovative
approaches to pull the resources and knowledge of the national regulatory authorities who are
currently or will be tasked with the evaluation of new reactor power plant designs; and the
activities of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association, an association of agencies
or regulatory agencies in the field of nuclear countries of Western Europe. The EU is encouraged

18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
10

to expedite this cooperation so that the new designs of reactors marketed today, developed in
recent years to improve safety and operational efficiency, are available for construction under an
effective and efficient regulatory system. Furthermore, developing a blueprint for advancing
power uprates and new build should also be taken into account.
20

Notwithstanding the improving point of view for nuclear power and the transboundary
partnerships formed today to invest in plant restoration, power uprates, life extensions and new
build, EURATOM is encouraged to continue to assess its role to ensure that its activities are
continuing to serve member states, in particular those with a positive policy towards nuclear
power generation.
21

French Energy Policy Records
France is known as one of the leading countries in the world today with regarding the
production of electricity from nuclear power. It has undertaken a distinctive role for itself in the
modern, postcolonial world; the French people as well as the leaders eagerly embraced large
technological projects in general and nuclear power in particular.
22
Even before, nuclear
research has already been tied to France, starting with the discovery of natural radioactivity by
Henri Becquerel in the 1890s which has been continued by Pierre and Marie Curie, famous
nuclear scientists.
French energy policy over the past decades has been characterized by a centralized
approach with strong government involvement. This key approach has not changed

20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II

(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009).


11

significantly. However as with all EU27 member states, Frances energy policy is more and
more governed by EU directives. For example, energy policies and measures in France have
been recently driven by the introduction of competition into the electricity and natural gas
sectors and by the growing regionalization of the energy sector in Europe as it moves towards a
single market. The four key principles of French energy policy have not changed since the last
IEA review: security of energy supply; competitive energy supply; sustainable energy
development; energy service to all territories and all citizens.
23

In the aftermath of the Second World War, France suffered from the death of millions of
people besides the damage done by the German troops inside the country. Frances power and
prestige were both stolen from them as well as their title as one of the worlds leading nations in
the post-war era.
24
French nuclear effort has conquered an eminent position in the country's
national identity. It could even be claimed that a French exit from civilian nuclear power could
become a serious possibility after that identity would be envisaged once again and after France's
nuclear impediment would be reconsidered. Nuclear research took on a larger role when
President Charles de Gaulle established the Commissariat lEnrgie Atomic (CEA) to boost the
development of a nuclear armament.
25
De Gaulle was one of the forerunners of the nuclear
initiative. After the wartime effects, immediate action was taken place in conducting an
alternative to regain the lost glory the French had. The solution offered by technocrats and
scientists was technological prowess through which nuclear programs were ensued. This served
as an indicator that France would rebuild its economy, restore its role as a world leader, and

23
International Energy Agency, IEA: France 2009 (Paris: IEA Publication, 2009).
24
Ibid, 1.
25
Anthony Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement (New York: Taylor &
Francis, 1972).

12

develop national independency by technological developments.
26

In 1946, the French Government nationalized the production, transport, distribution, and
the import and the export of electricity and natural gas and created Electricit de France (EDF).
Frances energy policy has three main pillars security of supply, respect for the environment,
and dedication to properly managing radioactive waste. Nuclear power in France has made EDF
the highest electricity producing corporation in European Union, and the biggest exporter of
electricity in Europe.
For the French people, nuclear weapons are widely considered as instrument of influence,
guarantee of international status, and potentially crucial means of providing security against
attempted coercion or aggression.
27
In fact, technocrats, scientists, and engineers are widely
respected in the country. According to Mitterrand, nuclear force is the pivot of French strategic
policies.
28
Nuclear weapons are deemed to be symbols of national sovereignty, independence,
and accomplishment.
29
De Gaulle eagerly pushed for the creation of nuclear weapons (the force
defrappe) primarily to gain military power, economic independence from the United States, and
to pursue its own French foreign policy.
30
This was also one way in order for his country to play
a major role in the European policies and ensure its superiority over Germany.
31

The Account of the German Energy Policy
In 1954, Werner Heisenberg, a German physicist and a Nobel laureate had the U.S.

26
Hecht, The Radiance of France.
27
John Hopkins and Weixing Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear
WeaponsPolicies of France, Britain, and China (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995).

28
Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French Security Policy (Pennsylvania: Diane
Publishing, 1995).
29
Hopkins and Hu, eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier.
30
Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher and Garret Martin, eds., Globalizing de Gaulle:
InternationalPerspectives on French Foreign Policies (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010).

31
Hartley, Gaullism.

13

government convinced in Washington that nuclear research could be taken up in Germany. A
year later a civil nuclear program was instituted. It was granted full national sovereignty after
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had abdicated producing, engaging and being in
possession of nuclear weaponry.
32
Nuclear research centers and a ministry for atomic issues was
established that were equipped with research reactors. Operations began as the experimental
nuclear power plant with a capacity of 16 MW was conducted in 1960.
33
In the late 1950s,
majority of the German citizens still associate the recent establish nuclear industry with atomic
bombs and its hazardous effects. However, because the people have insufficient knowledge
about radiation, the potentially dangerous issue of explosion and the memories of the war in
Germany were sources of fear as an initial response to the atomic community. The anti-nuclear
protests were focused on the military use and were expressed by the peace movement.
Germany has been using nuclear power since 1960, when the first nuclear power plant
went critical. However, following the Chernobyl accident, skepticism began to grow and the
government concluded the first agreement on a nuclear phase-out in 2000.
34

The German government's energy policy mainly relied for many years on regulatory
policy, which defined certain technological minimum standards.
35
As Germany is organized as a
federal state, the execution of federal laws lies in principle within the responsibility of the federal
states, the Lnder, unless otherwise specified. The regulatory body is, therefore, composed of
federal government and Lnder government authorities. The Lnder perform their nuclear
regulatory activities on behalf of the federal government. By organizational decree, the federal

32
Tina Flegel, Public Protests Against Nuclear Power in Germany, Turkish Policy Quarterly 9, no. 2
(2010): 105-115.
33
International Atomic Energy Agency, Country Nuclear Power Profile: Germany (IAEA, 2003).
34
International Energy Agency, IEA: Germany 2013 (Paris: IEA Publication, 2013).
35
Welfens, ed., Energy Policies in the European Union.
14

government names the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
as the supreme regulatory authority in charge of nuclear safety and radiation protection. The
BMU is responsible for federal oversight of the lawfulness and expediency of the actions of the
Lnder, including the right to issue binding directives. The subordinate authority to the BMU is
the Federal Office for Radiation Protection. This supports the BMU technically and
scientifically, especially in the execution of federal oversight, the preparation of legal and
administrative procedures, and in intergovernmental co-operation.
36
According to the Atomic
Energy Act, the respective Lnder governments determine their own supreme authorities in
charge of the licensing and supervision of NPPs. For technical matters in the licensing procedure
and the supervision of nuclear facilities, the regulatory authorities of the Lnder are supported by
independent technical support organizations, in general the nuclear departments of the technical
support organizations. In 2010, adoption of the 12th Act amending the Atomic Energy Act, not
only implemented the EU Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a community framework
for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations, but also added new provisions introducing
additional safety precautions. The aim of these new provisions is to implement additional
security precautions that serve to increase safety margins and to ensure that NPPs achieve the
highest possible levels of safety.
37

Nuclear Power Debate
There is a debate concerning the use of nuclear energy in process. The Environmentalists
for Nuclear Energy, the World Nuclear Association, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) are some of the proponents of nuclear power. They argue that nuclear power is a

36
IEA, IEA: Germany 2013.
37
Ibid.
15

safe and adequate source of energy that decreases carbon emissions. On the other hand,
opponents, such as Greenpeace International and Sortir du nuclaire in France, argue that nuclear
power is a danger to the citizens as well as the environment. In an investigation, it has been
certified that there is less number of lives lost per unit of energy produced in nuclear power than
the other major sources of energy.
The nuclear power debate is about the controversy which has surrounded the deployment
and use of nuclear fission reactors to generate electricity from nuclear fuel for civilian purposes.
The debate about nuclear power peaked during the 1970s and 1980s, when it "reached an
intensity unprecedented in the history of technology controversies", in some countries.
Proponents of nuclear energy claim that nuclear power is a sustainable source of energy
which lowers carbon emissions and can develop energy security if its use eliminates a reliance
on imported fuels. Proponents promote the idea that nuclear power generates virtually no air
pollution, contrary to the major applicable substitute of fossil fuel. They also believe that nuclear
power is the only feasible system to acquire energy independence for most Western countries.
They point out that there is only little risk of accumulating waste and it can be further decreased
through modern technology in newer reactors, and the operational safety record in the Western
world is great when compared to the other major kinds of power plants.
Opponents argue that nuclear power is hazardous to the citizens as well as the
environment. The dangers include health risks and environmental damage from uranium
excavation, transformation and transfer, the risk of nuclear weapons generation or destruction,
and the unaddressed problem of radioactive nuclear waste. They also argue that reactors
themselves are extremely complicated machines where a lot of things can and do go wrong, and
16

there have been several severe nuclear accidents. Critics do not believe that these risks can be
decreased through modern technology. They claim that when all the energy-concentrated stages
of the nuclear fuel series are taken into account, from uranium excavation to nuclear withdrawal,
nuclear power is not a low-carbon electricity source.
38

In Germany, the debate spurs from a wide array of the public who is concerned with
nuclear power plants and reactors its effects in the environment, the people and their
businesses. Environmentalists suggest that the nuclear lead structural conditions conducted a
concentration of economic power and as a consequence public regulative influence has been
demeaned. Nuclear power ushers new challenges for the safety at work. With this, the local
economy is in jeopardy by nuclear facilities: the farmers are deprived of their soil and dairy
products, winemakers are intimidated by losing the quality of their products due to local climate,
the fishermen are afraid of losing a huge amount of fish due to the increasing temperature of the
water and lastly, tourism agencies lose its potential in its customers because of the fear of nuclear
activities around the area.
39

The debate on nuclear energy in Germany also concerns the governments interests on
the matter. There are proponents and opponents that focus on three factors that affect the phase-
out or the non-nuclear phase-out of Germany by 2020.
First, nuclear proponents argue that nuclear energy source does not emit carbon dioxide
and that nuclear power is important in order to prevent a deficit in the countrys electricity

38
Benjamin K. Sovacool, The costs of failure: A preliminary assessment of major energy accidents,
Energy Policy 36, no. 5 (2008): 1802-1820.
39
Flegel, Public Protests.
17

supply as it is also one of the largest producers of nuclear energy as electricity.
40
On the other
hand, opponents express their concern on the overall figures for the reduction of greenhouse gas,
insisting on the fact that carbon emissions from the generation of electricity have been on the rise
since 1999. According to Environment Minister Gabriel, in 2007, utility emission increased as an
outcome of the offset in having an offline nuclear plant and as well as having more electricity
produced by a higher carbon dioxide emitting coal fired plants in response to an uprising in
natural gas prices. Opponents also state that the two key elements in electricity; higher energy
efficiency and more renewables provide for energy needs that reduce greenhouse gas emissions
without the help of nuclear power. In accordance, there is also an agreement that investment will
be necessary to develop not only renewable sources but also in adapting the electricity
transmission grid and in creating storage technologies in accommodating the irregular electricity
flow from sources like wind farms and solar energy.
41

Second, proponents in the German government, the pro-nuclear Christian Democrats
called for a passing of a resolution to extend the lifespan of operating nuclear reactors but
opposing to build new reactors. According to Ronald Pofalla, they do not want to build nuclear
power plants. He says that nuclear power will only provide as a bridge in order to maintain the
energy until the transition sets place with the new renewable technologies already developed.
Proponents argue that the immediate shut down of nuclear plants will result in an unacceptable
electricity shortage in Germany. It continues that nuclear power is cheaper. However, nuclear
opponents oppose to the extension of the lifetimes on the nuclear reactors. They fear that longer
operating times will be for the benefit of the utilities that profit, more nuclear waste to be

40
Brigitte Knopf et al., Scenarios for Phasing Out Nuclear Energy in Germany (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2000)
41
Jens Kersten, Frank Uekoetter and MarkUs Vogt, Europe After Fukushima: German Perspectives on the
Future of Nuclear Power (Federeal Ministry of Education and Research, 2012)
18

disposed when the country currently do not have any permanent repository for high-level waste,
an increase in accidents, and a decrease in investment for renewable energy. According to Bjorn
Klusmann, the managing director of the umbrella Association for Renewable Energy, there is no
enough grid capacity for a lengthening of the reactors while simultaneously expanding the
renewables.
42

Thirdly, nuclear energy proponents are questioned on the prospect of nuclear power
plants and reactors being safe as well as the management of their waste disposal to continue their
nuclear legacy. Nuclear proponents assure the public that all of their reactors have the same
genetic pool with regards to its technology and safety. It insists that the old reactors are up to
par with the new nuclear plants having invested more than $1.4 billion to modernize the reactors.
Utilities vie that the similar DNA of the countys reactor inflate their safety, nuclear opponents
say that this make the risk more prevalent.
43
As the evidence, they point to accidents in June 2007
at the two reactors in northern Germany in concert owned by utilities E.ON AG and Vattenfall
and operated by the latter, a subsidiary of Swedens Vattenfall AB. The 806-megawatt
Brunsbutte reactor to be turned off on June 28 and that the day the fire broke out in the
transformer building at the 1 402-megawatt Krummel reactor. The plants are located at
Schleswig-Holstein who is ministered by GitaTrauernicht where the accidents had not directly
affected the public but exhibited the vulnerability of complex nuclear technology.
44

Understanding the Status Quo
In March 11, 2011, Fukushima was shaken by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake lasting three

42
Kersten, Uekoetter and Vogt, Europe after Fukushima.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
19

minutes resulting to a fifteen meter tsunami that disabled three of its nuclear reactors. This led to
the nuclear accident that started the awareness against nuclear energy all over the world. Major
nuclear power holders such as Germany have decided on a nuclear phase-out succeeding the
nuclear accident.
45
France, being the world's largest net exporter of electricity has been reluctant
to pursue a nuclear phase-out despite widespread anti-nuclear protests. A nuclear power phase-
out is termination of observance of nuclear power for energy production that includes shutting
off nuclear power plants in accordance to an alternative renewable energy and other fuels. In
subsequent to the election proceeds a national debate with President Nicolas Sarkozy supporting
nuclear power and against it, Franois Hollande suggesting a significant decrease in nuclear
powers electricity contribution inside the country.
Former President Nicholas Sarkozy can be considered as a proponent of nuclear energy
as he continually tried and persisted to extend the life of the nuclear reactors. President Sarkozy
stated that there is no better alternative to nuclear power as of recent. Instead of completely
abolishing its nuclear power, France has chosen to reevaluate and strengthen its safety in the
generation of its nuclear power. According to Sarkozy, France will invest a total of 1billion, or
roughly $1.5 billion, in nuclear technology as the governments response in its energy industry in
the aftermath of the nuclear crisis in Japan. The said amount is inclusion of the funds for a new
generation of power plants and research on nuclear safety.
46
However, the newly elected French
President, Francois Hollande has been open to pursue a new energy policy for France; an energy
transition from nuclear energy to renewable energy - wind energy and solar power. Apart from
the nuclear accident that occurred in Fukushima, what prompted Hollande to set aside nuclear

45
David Elliott, Fukushima: Impacts and Implications (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
46
Yuka Fukushima,Implication of the Determinant of Energy Policy: The Case Study of Nuclear Power in
Germany and France(Tokyo: 2011).
20

energy is also the alleviation of climate change, the preservation of natural resources and the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In his efforts, budgetary cuts for nuclear energy are
attempted to decrease France's dependence on nuclear power as he vowed to reduce atomic
reactors by fifty percent. In contempt of Hollande, there is currently a rise in popular support for
nuclear power against recommendations on a new energy policy for France. Recent poll shows
that the proportion of people in support of Hollandes proposal to diminish nuclear energy
because of the dangers it projects is declining.
Since the radioactivity drifted in Germany during the 1986 Chernobyl catastrophe,
nuclear power in the country has been widely out favored. Despite Germany being the fourth
largest producer of nuclear power, the social acceptance deficit for the former nuclear leader
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder was insufficient in validating the law enactment of nuclear phase-
out power by 2021. Nevertheless, Chancellor Markel spent a significant amount of political
capital in conferral to Schroders decision only a few months before the Fukushima crisis. This
extended all the lifespan of seventeen reactors in Germany by roughly twelve years. The policy
change was the most important in Merkels second term in office. The reversal represented her
unchanging commitment to make nuclear power an important component of Germanys energy
plans for the future.
47

After the recent crisis in Fukushima, the German governments response was to execute a
three-month moratorium on plans of nuclear extension and to shut down its two oldest reactors in
the country. Exactly two weeks since the accident, Angela Merkel of the conservative party was

47
John Moore, How Much Precaution is Too Much: Evaluating Germanys Nuclear Phaseout Decision in
Light of the Events in Fukushima, Public Sphere Journals, no. 1 (2007): 42-53.

21

to face three important state elections.
48
With Germany being a pre-existing country that
practices caution towards nuclear energy, Fukushima undoubtedly started the transition of power
to the anti-nuclear Green Party. Across Germany, 100,000 demonstrators from different towns
and cities crowded the streets in protest of nuclear energy promptly after the crisis. For the sake
of her party, Merkel had to show the voters that her extension plans would be reconsidered.
The Ethics Commission on Safe Energy Supply was also organized in evaluation of
Germanys next nuclear strategy as a reaction to Fukushima alongside the moratorium. Although
the moratorium was only to provide assurance of the Germans as a campaign tactic, the Ethics
Commission proves to be more interesting. It provides solitary proof of the issue on nuclear
power that became salient in Germany that the closure of the early reactors was its only available
option.
The Ethics Commission, composed of seventeen representatives from research, industry
and politics, advocates to permanently shut down the countrys seven oldest reactors and
returning to Chancellor Schroders 2021 nuclear phase-out timeframe after two and a half
months after the crisis.
49
The phase-out is necessary reads the Commissions last report. It was
suggested to rule the out risks posed by nuclear power in Germany in the future.
50

Comparative Analysis on the Recent Turn in French and German Energy Policies
France and Germany are the two countries playing a huge role in the energy policy of the
EU, but they ironically lack in cooperation in the area of nuclear energy policy.They have held

48
Moore, How Much Precaution is Too Much, 52
49
Ibid.
50
Dr. Klaus Tpfer et al, Germanys Energy Transition: A Collective Endeavor for the Future, Ethics
Commission for a Safe Energy Supply (30 May 2011), 1.
22

onto different stands regarding the said area while the EU energy policy remained symbolic. The
rationale behind this difference in behavior is because of the increasing level of security
demands, a learning process which materialized the consequence of risks and time lengths, even
before Fukushima.
The 1973 Oil Crisis
Energy policies have been marked by the recent oil crises,
51
catastrophic accidents such
as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, not to mention the impacts of the recent Fukushima
nuclear accident.
52
The 1973 oil crisis started on October 16, 1973 when the members of OAPEC
proclaimed and oil embargo raising the oil price by 70%.
53
The embargo is inconsistent in
Europe. France has received steady supplies while Germany only faced partial decline. The price
increase had a much greater impact in Europe than the embargo.
54
Part of the decrease in prices
comes from the shift from oil consumption to alternate energy sources.
55
OPEC had relied on the
limited price inelasticity of oil demand to maintain high consumption but had underestimated the
extent to which other sources of supply would become beneficial as the price increased.
Electricity generation from nuclear power reduced the demand for oil.
56
The two countries had
pursued different actions following the oil crisis in 1973, with France investing heavily in
nuclear energy to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel compared with up to only 25% in
Germany.EU has not come up with a strong plan on energy security since the 1973 oil crisis,

51
Howard Stein, The Neoliberal Policy Paradigm and the Great Recession, Panoeconomicus59, no. 4
(2012): 421-440.
52
Stephen Thomas et al., The Economics of Nuclear Power (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 2007).
53
Ferenc L. Toth and Hans-HolgerRogner, "Oil and Nuclear Power: Past, Present, and Future,Energy
Economics 28, no. 3 (2006): 1 25.
54
Barbara Slavin, Milt Freudenheim and Willian C. Rhoden, "The World; British Miners Settle for Less,"
The New York Times.
55
Patrick L. Anderson, et al., "Price Elasticity of Demand," The Universal Tuition Tax Credit: A Proposal
to Advance Parental Choice in Education 11, no. 1 (1997): 13-17.
56
Ibid.
23

which gave an idea on how vulnerable the EU members are.
57

Three Mile Island Accident
The Three Mile Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdown which occurred in one of
the two Three Mile Island nuclear reactors in Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979 when the reactor
was operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the secondary cooling
circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to rise. This in turn caused the
reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took about one second. Then, a relief valve failed
to close, and so much of the primary coolant drained away that the residual decay heat in the
reactor core was not removed. The core suffered severe damage as a result.
58
This was
supplemented by communication problems which caused conflicting information to the public,
contributing to the public's fears.
59
This was actually said to be the worst accident in the nuclear
history of US. The operators were unable to assess or respond accurately to the unplanned
automatic shutdown of the reactor. Lack of control room for machineries and insufficient
emergency response training proved to be root causes of the accident. A small amount of
radiation was released from the plant but it was not serious and has no health hazards. It
produced a significant, long-term improvement in the performance of all nuclear power plants,
although public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in USA, strongly declined.
60



57
Stein, The Neoliberal Policy, 433.
58
J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2006)
59
Mike Gray and Ira Rosen, The Warning: Accident at Three Mile Island (New York: W.W. Norton,
2003).
60
Ibid.
24

Chernobyl Catastrophe
This disparity of the two countries vis--vis nuclear energy was clearly determined after
the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine on April, 26, 1986.
61
The accident was the result of a
damaged reactor design that was operated with inefficiently trained personnel. It was the first
major nuclear power plant accident that resulted in a large-scale fire and subsequent explosions,
immediate and delayed deaths of plant operators and emergency service workers, and the
radioactive contamination of a significant land area.
62
The resulting steam explosion and fires
released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind. Two
Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a
few weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning. Radioactivity was released over a 10-day
period which resulted in millions of Soviets, and other Europeans, being exposed to significant
levels of radioactive fallout.
63
Although there was an increase in the number of thyroid cancers
victims, there is no evidence of a major public health impact a priori to radiation exposure
twenty years after the accident. For France, the accident was seen as an irrelevant accident that
would not have an effect on the French territories which was later proved to be incorrect
while Germany has strongly begrudged its impacts from the start which reinforced the anti-
nuclear movement.
64

Fukushima Disaster
Following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at Chernobyl in 1986,

61
Frank Barnaby, "Chernobyl: The Consequences in Europe," Ambio 15, no. 6 (1986): 332-334.
62
Ibid.
63
Harold M. Ginzburg and Eric Reis, "Consequences of the Nuclear Power Plant Accident at Chernobyl,"
Public Health Reports 106, no. 1 (1991):32-40.
64
Barnaby, "Chernobyl: The Consequences in Europe," 332.
25

Fukushima will be remembered as the third major accident in the history of civilian nuclear
power reactors. Yet Chernobyl was and remains the worst trauma in this history as a result of
which nuclear developments slowed down significantly.
65
The Fukushima incident was caused
by a tsunami in Japan which produced equipment failures, and without this equipment a loss-of-
coolant accident followed with nuclear meltdowns and releases of radioactive
materials.
66
Although the aftermath of the Fukushima accident has established the need for a new
nuclear policy, it was not the cause for change since it took place after Germany and France have
followed different options.
67
Even before the incident, Germany has already planned the phasing-
out
68
while France was only considering a partial phase-out, lowering nuclear production of
electricity from 75% to 50% by 2020. The same shift to decrease nuclear dependence, although
non-binding, was recommended at the EU level.
69
This incident has stimulated a new turn to
respond to the risks of future huge disasters that can come in numerous ways, and avoid the
colossal costs of decommissioning reactors.
70

Although an immediate solution is not available, EU encourages its members to divert to
renewable sources of energy. It is more of a long-term objective, but a short-term solution to the
rising problem of energy access.
71
There have been a few coordinated moves at the EU level to
boost the rate of renewable energy in all member states; but this takes time since it is a lengthy

65
Selma Kus, "International Nuclear Law in the 25 Years between Chernobyl and Fukushima and
Beyond," Nuclear Law Bulletin 87, no. 1 (2011): 7-26.
66
Eliza Strickland, What Went Wrong in Japan's Nuclear Reactors, IEEE Spectrum 16, no. 3
(2011): 17-24.
67
Kus, "International Nuclear Law," 19.
68
Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: Cosimo Classics History,
2006).
69
Gary A. Dymski, Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs:
Paradoxes of the Global Crisis, Panoeconomicus58, no. 3 (2011): 285-308.
70
M. V. Ramana, "Nuclear policy responses to Fukushima: Exit, voice, and loyalty," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 69, no.2 (2013): 66-76.
71
Dymski, Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs.
26

process.
72
A solid EU policy which would set the energy policies of France or Germany should
be enforced; otherwise, a feeble EU policy would arise directly from the policies of these two
leading countries.
73

It seems that nuclear energy is not fully-developed to achieve the shift in energy sources.
The fact that nuclear reactors have been established in the last decade in developing countries is
more problematic.
74
A global administrative issue to avoid new huge accidents is likely to
appear. A possible solution is a successful energy transition mostly based on renewable sources.
This is a very ambitious path with the need to adapt the framework, to rationally utilize the
remaining fossil fuel sources and to develop profound energy saving ways of life and
production.
75
It seems that strong common European policy is essential to endure this problem.
The future energy transition policies will have to depend on energy saving on a large scale,
suggesting a remarkable financial effort that can only be made at the regional level. It does offer
a new opportunity for a strong cooperation between Germany and France in an EU context.
76






72
Ibid.
73
JakubHandrlica, "Harmonisation of Nuclear Liability in the European Union: Challenges, Options and
Limits," Nuclear Law Bulletin 84, no. 2 (2010): 35-64.
74
Dymski, Limits of Policy Intervention, 292.
75
Ibid.
76
Handrlica, "Harmonisation of Nuclear Liability in the European Union," 41.
27

Theoretical Framework
This paper uses the historical institutionalism approach as the main theory in analyzing
the role of institutions and the policy behavior of the leaders, particularly how past events
contributed to the recent turns in nuclear energy policy of France and Germany.
This chapter will begin with a brief history of the said theory, its key concepts, and the
relationship among those concepts. It shows how it is characterized from the other types of
theories. It will be followed by its core assumptions and how are these applied to the decision-
making process and policies of the EU, France and Germany. Finally, concepts that are unique to
the theory would be defined; and some of these concepts would be found in the theoretical and
conceptual diagram, that would be further expounded.
Historical Institutionalism
The new institutionalism is a term that is now prominent in fields of political science
and international relations. It is a theory that aims to look at institutions sociologically the
way they interact and the way they affect society.
77
Three schools of thought are recognized as
new institutionalism historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism (different from
rational choice theory), and sociological institutionalism.
78

In order to precisely illustrate historical institutionalism, it is wise to set this approach in
a historical and metaphorical context, presenting the roots of this approach and its distinction

77
Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
78
Ibid.
28

from other approaches in the social sciences.
79
Although the term historical institutionalism
was conceived in the 1990s, this theory was created to respond to the behavioral outlooks that
were influential during the 1960s and 1970s and it seeks to shed light on the role that institutions
play in the backbone of social and political outcomes.
80
Some of the major proponents are Theda
Skopcol, Kathleen Thelen, Sven Steinmo, Ellen Immergut, and Peter Hall.
In a nutshell, historical institutionalism intercedes between the rational choice and
sociological institutionalism approach by looking at the effects of institutions over time.
81
It
examines the long-term implications of institutional decisions made at a particular time.
According to this theory, when institutions are established and developed, there is a tendency
that locking in of states will happen in which states are constrained by the institutions.
82
Present
behavior of states is constrained by the locking into place of past decisions, consequently
creating a path dependency that can be ceased only by a critical juncture.
The three approaches of new institutionalism agree that institutions can be seen as rules
that shape behavior. However, the key difference which sets out historical institutionalism from
the rest is over their knowledge of the nature of the beings whose actions or behavior is being
formed. The rational choice school argues that human beings are rational individualists who
measure the costs and benefits in the choices they face. Rational choice institutionalists assume
that institutions are essential merely because they structure the individuals strategic behavior.
They argue that individuals obey rules because humans are strategic actors who want to

79
Sven Steinmo, What is Historical Institutionalism? in Approaches in the Social Sciences, ed. Donatella
Della Porta and Michael Keating (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).
80
Ibid.
81
Mark Pollack, The New Institutionalisms and European Integration, in European Integration Theory,
ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
82
Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).
29

maximize their individual gain.
83
On the other hand, sociological institutionalists claim that
human beings as primarily social beings. They believe that humans are satisficers who act
consistently, rather than being self-interested or rational as the rational choice institutionalists
would have it. Institutions are not just rules in which they act, but they also structure the way
individuals view their world. Sociological institutionalists do not just find every possible option,
but they look for the most appropriate one. The significant institutions or rules in this approach
are social norms that regulate everyday life and social interaction.
84

Historical institutionalists take up a position between these approaches where they
believe that human beings are both norm-abiding and self-interested rational actors. Behavior
depends on the actor, on the circumstances, and on the rule. They dont believe that humans are
just rule followers or that they are solely strategic actors who use rules to maximize their
interests. What they want to know is why a certain choice was made and/or why a certain
outcome occurred. They are mostly interested in finding out the impetus of a decision and the
underlying causes of a certain outcome. Any momentous political outcome is best understood as
a product of both rule following and interest maximizing. Historical institutionalists would then
investigate historical records in order to find out which behavior has more significance.
85

The debate on power can be tracked down in the theory of historical institutionalism as
an approach to the study of politics, and the distinguishing view of this theory on institutional
development and change is characterized by the power-distributional struggles.
86
This alternative

83
Steinmo, What is Historical Institutionalism?
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Kathleen Thelen, Beyond Comparative Statistics: Historical Institutional Approaches to Stability and
Change in the Political Economy of Labor, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis, ed.
Glenn Morgan, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43.
30

approach on institutional change emphasizes the significance of structural incentives and
constraints, whereas it also permits the agency to participate in the assessment of change.
87
This
gives us a hint on the fact that institutions and rules naturally provide gaps that actors can abuse
in the undertaking of their own interests and in their political struggles for benefits on current
constraints.
88

Political actors are constrained by institutions, and yet also develop and alter institutions.
Another crucial feature of this theory is on the issue of preference formation. For the rational
choice institutionalists, preferences serve as a given. On the other hand, historical institutionalists
assume that self-interests of individuals are problematical.
89
Institutions not only constrain the
strategies of actors, but also essentially frame their preferences, interests, and goals in more
broad ways. Sine preferences are unsteady; ideas play a huge role by influencing how individuals
pursue their interests. Actors may be strategic, but position their goals in a historically situated
manner based on existing and contingent understanding of social situations.
90

In sum, historical institutionalism focuses on the long-term feasibility of institutions and
their expansive repercussions. It is more interested on how these institutions, as well as other
factors such as ideas and interests create preferences, and also how they develop over time.
91




87
Ibid, 53.
88
Ibid, 57.
89
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
90
Thelen, Beyond Comparative Statics, 68.
91
Elizabeth Sanders, "Historical Institutionalism ," in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional
Analysis, ed. R.A.W Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43.
31

Core Assumptions of Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism has four essentially distinguishing aspects. First, historical
institutionalists analyze the relationship between institutions and individual behavior comparably
in broad terms. Two approaches the calculus approach and the cultural approach are used
to determine the behavior of actors and the actions of the institutions. The calculus approach
assumes that individuals behave strategically through using all possible means in fulfilling
ultimate satisfaction in order to expand the attainment of goals given by a specific preference.
Institutions affect individual action and alter the certainty of actors on their present and future
behavior by shifting the expectations of an actor on the actions that other individuals are likely to
take in response to his own action.
92

On the other hand, cultural approach assumes that behavior is limited by an individual's
conception of the world, rather than completely strategic. Although it recognizes the rationality
of human behavior, it also asserts that individuals undertake known patterns of behavior to
achieve their objectives. It sees individuals as satisficers, meaning they act to satisfy the
minimum requirements for achieving a goal, rather than benefit maximizers, and their action
depends on the interpretation of a situation rather than calculation. In this approach, institutions
give out a righteous pattern for interpretation. Historical institutionalists use both of these
approaches where it can be seen in several works of proponents such as Immergut and Hattam.
93

Secondly feature of this theory is that historical institutionalists stress the inequalities of
the relations of power play in the performance and progression of institutions. This theory
focuses on the mechanisms of the institutions in the unequal distribution of power across social

92
Hall and Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.
93
Ibid.
32

groups. It assumes that institutions provide groups imbalanced access to the decision making
process and tend to emphasize that some groups lose while others win.
94

Thirdly, historical institutionalists are also likely to have a view of institutional
development that focuses on path dependence and unintended consequences. This theory
assumes that decisions that have been made in the past would generate a huge impact on the
actors present and future decisions. Institutions are deemed to be enduring features of the
historical context and one of the key factors pushing historical development along a set of paths.
Historical institutionalists focused on the problems on ways institutions create these paths such
as encouraging groups to adopt policies that are costly to shift which results to unintended
consequences and inefficiencies. They also break down the series of historical events into
periods of persistence emphasized by 'critical junctures', and seek to address the problem of
determining the underlying causes of such.
95

Lastly, they are mostly attentive in consolidating the institutional analysis and the efforts
that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes. Historical
institutionalists argue that institutions allow other factors to manifest their roles, rather than the
institutions being the only causal force in politics.
96

Application of the Theory to the Study
With path dependency that is articulated with critical junctures that may change an
agency's outcome, increasing the returns that further induce the path, and 'lock-in' that thrives
despite different policy regimes; institutions are developed. These institutions influence the

94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
33

preferences of state actors and on one hand, sprout unintended consequences that further define
the institutions.
The nuclear renaissance in France started after the Second World War when it was at its
lowest. Nuclear power was a way to regain its lost title by means of technological prowess, but
this may soon reach its peak due to the nuclear incident at Fukushima, Japan. France's energy
policy must seek to find an advantageous effect and importance of nuclear energy that despite
the administration of President Francois Hollande, the people may be able to realize and
recognize the power of nuclear energy and not pursue a nuclear phase-out. Nuclear power
institutions such as the Electricite de France (EDF) and the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA)
are led by the Corps des Mines, scientist and engineers elites that help influence the government
in decision-making with regard to nuclear energy policies. Despite that, unexpected
consequences take into effect when the technocrats dominate the government and decide on
matters of energy. This is actually a benefit to nuclear institutions since it is harder for it to be
penetrated by the government because of much opposition.






34

Operationalization of Concepts
Concepts Definition Operational definition
Path dependency

The order in which things
happen affects how they
happen; the trajectory of
change up to a certain point
itself constrains the trajectory
after that point; and the
strategic choices made at a
particular moment eliminate
whole ranges of possibilities
from later choices while
serving as the very condition
of existence of others
97
.


The recognition of nuclear
power as a source of energy
and its establishment in the
European Union as well as its
member states despite the
Chernobyl accident and the
recent Fukushima crisis.

97
Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism." Political Studies 16,
no. 3 (1998): 955.
35

Critical juncture
Relatively short periods of
time during which there is a
substantially heightened
probability that agents
choices will affect the
outcome of interest
98
.
The nuclear accident in
Fukushima, Japan involving
the dismantling of three of its
nuclear reactors inherently
raised awareness on the
dangers and disadvantages of
having nuclear power plants
across the world and on the
probable yielding of nuclear
energy programs.
Institutions
Institutions are regimes or
systems of social interaction
under formal normative
control in which actors follow
the rules because they are not
only enforceable but also
legitimate, imbued with
authority by the society and
the actors who act within
them
99
.
The main organization
involved is the European
Union overseeing policy
regulations with regards to
nuclear energy as well as
being the policy benchmark
for both France and Germany.

98
Giovanni Capoccia and R, Daniel Kelemen. "The Study if Critical Junctures Theory, narrative, and
Counterfactuals in historical institutionalism."World Politics 59, no. 4 (2007): 343.
99
Hay and Wincott, "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism," 956.
36

State Actors
Actors appropriate
strategically a world replete
with institutions and ideas
about institutions. Their
perceptions about what is
feasible, legitimate, possible
and desirable are shaped both
by the institutional
environment in which they
find themselves and existing
policy paradigms and
worldviews
100
.
State actors concerned are the
prominent members of the EU
namely France and Germany
that are the known to use
nuclear energy as its primary
energy source.
Preferences
Preferences are caused by
historical processes; that is,
the theory attempts to suggest
how historical developments
cause a particular set of
preferences held by a given
actor
101
.
State preferences that include
France and Germanys
response to the recent
Fukushima Crisis on whether
to pursue a nuclear phase-out
or a non-nuclear phase-out.

100
KourisKalligas. "A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Security and Defence of the European
Union" Department of Politics and International Studies 14, no. 2 (2006): 11.
101
Ira Katznelson and Barry R, Weingast. Preferences and situations: points of intersections between
historical and rational choice institutionalism (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007), 3.
37

Increasing Returns
Increasing returns means that
the probability of further
steps along the same path
(dependency) increases with
each move down that path
102

With regards to Germanys
shift from nuclear energy to
renewable energy and their
plans for complete nuclear
phase-out by 2020.
'Lock-in'
The concept of lock-in refers
to a situation where an
institution or a policy structure
will remain intact regardless
of a sizeable alteration to its
political environment
103
.
Although series of events have
occurred to prove the dangers
of nuclear energy, France
remains to pursue nuclear as
its primary source having
planned to lengthen the
lifespan of its reactors.
Unintended Consequences
Unintended consequences
occur because even though
actors can design an institution
or a policy structure, they
cannot hope to foresee the
eventual development of their
own actions
104

Inevitably outcomes from
pursuing a nuclear phase-out
may occur such as global
warming as nuclear energy
decreases carbon emissions.



102
Mycle Scneider. Nuclear France Abroad History, Status and Prospects of French Nuclear Activities in
Foreign Countries (Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2009).
103
Scneider, Nuclear France Abroad, 7.
104
Ibid, 10.
38

Theoretical Framework


Path Dependency












Critical Juncture
Institutions Unintended
Consequences
Preferences
State Actor State Actor
Lock In Increasing
Returns
39

Conceptual Framework


Path Dependency












Fukushima Crisis

European
Union
Global
Warming
Nuclear
Energy Policies
France Germany
Non-Nuclear
Phase-out

Nuclear
Phase-out
40

Methodology
Research Design
This study is focused mainly on comparing the recent turn in nuclear energy policies of
France and Germany and analyzing their differences using the EU energy policy as a benchmark.
The research is classified as a basic research in which it is stated by a fixed plan geared to
acquire the understanding of the fundamental aspects and observable facts or greater intelligence
in the absence of identified applications in the direction of processes or products in mind. It is a
research providing the foundation for technological progress.
105
The data used in this research is
qualitative in nature since it describes social phenomena as they occur naturally, and the impact
of these events on different actors.
106
Finally, the data collected is descriptive, and at the same
time comparative, in which the researchers gathers information about the present existing
conditions in France and Germany, particularly the present domestic and regional role of nuclear
energy. The researchers collect data in order to determine the differences between nuclear
policies of the two countries and the rationale behind their policy reform.
Qualitative method is used in gathering data, and these data are used to develop concepts
and theories, particularly the historical institutionalism theory, in order to fully understand the
social world. The researchers seek to understand the behavior of actors, the formation of their
opinions and attitudes, the effects of a particular phenomenon to their decision-making, and the
differences of these actors.
107



105
Department of Defenses administration and support of basic research under the Code of Federal
Regulations.


106
Beverly Hancock, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Leicester: Trent Focus Group, 2001).

107
Ibid.
41

The priority method for the researchers to use is a case study. It illustrates a description
of a single event, as well as analyzes a social situation over a period of time. It traces events
involving the same actors over a period of time which enables the analysis to reflect changes.
108

Data Gathering
The researchers need data on the decision-making processes of previous French and
German administrations with regards to energy policies and specifically, the utilization of the
countries nuclear energy. The researchers seek to collect data with the complete details of
nuclear accidents, together with its impacts on different states. Moreover, the researchers will
need data on the theory used in this study which is historical institutionalism. It is important to
gather resources which can help in the application of this theory to the present situation in
France.
As stated in the scope and limitations, the study will be limited to secondary sources
which is why this research primarily utilizes books (hard copy or electronic) and journals.
However, there are instances where primary sources such as government documents and
official websites which are directives are also utilized. Most of the books used are obtained
from the De la Salle University Library and Google Books, while journal articles are gathered
from JSTOR, EBSCO, and Cambridge Journals. The most useful sources that the researchers
utilized can be retrieved from the OECD library.
The sources have met the following criteria: credibility, authenticity, representativeness,
and meaning. Authors of books and journals are acknowledged and usually experts in their
fields. Sources are real and not edited. Also, they also speak as whole and are not biased.

108
Ibid.
42

Data Analysis
The research primarily used documentary analysis to organize the data into concepts and
verify the data collected. Then, the analysis of the data itself is conducted through inductive
analysis where the researchers get into the full details and specifics of the data to discover
important pattern, themes, and interrelationships. It begins by exploring, then confirming,
guided by analytic principles.
109

It analyzes the patterns of behavior exhibited by actors after the Chernobyl and
Fukushima accidents which affected the energy policies of different states. The thesis aims to
make an analysis relating to the differences of these policy provisions using the EU energy
policy as a benchmark. The researchers also tried to determine the impacts domestically and
regionally of nuclear energy.








109
Burke Johnson and Larry Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed
Approaches, 2
nd
ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008), 362.
43

Evolution of EU Energy Policy
Post-war policies in Western Europe are based on the principle that it must reserve as
much fuel as possible in the domestic level through the expansion of the coal industry. The
aspiration to promote this objective has led to the creation of the ECSC the stepping stone
toward European integration.
110
When it became clear by 1957 that coal production could not be
radically expanded, proposals for a massive nuclear power program emerged; although two
events at the end of that year established a demand for more comprehensive energy policy. In
spite of the aggravated competitive pressures, the coal market started to decline roughly. This
made the member states of ECSC agree to establish two new communities the EEC and
Euratom, which has a more extensive course than ECSC.
111
Assuming that there will be an
overextended responsibility for energy policy among the communities, ECSC decided to work
with the others to develop a policy. Consequently, a number of proposals have emerged from
different joint committees established by the three communities, but the member states have not
arrived at a final agreement. The fundamental problem is that the states are not willing to support
the level of security for coal promoted in these proposals.
112
It suggests that this inclination
emerged from the central role given to ECSC with its direction toward coal. The other
communities, especially EEC, have taken a more liberal approach, but the final reports made
profound acknowledgment to ECSC mindset.



110
M. A. Adelman, Oil Prices in the Long Run, Journal of Business 37, no. 7 (1964): pp. 143-161.
111
Richard L. Gordon, Energy Policy in the European Community, The Journal of Industrial Economics
13, no. 3 (1965): 219-234.
112
Ibid.
44

Road to a More Integrated Policy
The idea of an integrated energy policy indicates that it is necessary to take into account
all sources of fuel rather than just European coal. At the outset, ECSC anticipated that it is
practical to have an independent coal policy. In 1957, the need for a more extensive vision was
officially recognized. The member states and ECSC signed an agreement which allowed ECSC
to cooperate with the EEC and Euratom in developing a coordinated policy. A number of reports
have been made by the communities, but so far, only the vast principles of such a policy have
been authorized. The details have proved to be relatively contentious.
113

It should be acknowledged first that ECSC and the other European institutions have
constantly determined the goal of such a policy with a broad notion of an economic optimum.
The content of this optimum can be found in fundamentally the same terms in either the ECSC
Treaty or the 1962 statement of the European Parliament on Energy Policy; both emphasized the
expansion of an integrated market which produces abundant, low-cost, stable supplies, freedom
from public and private policies which alter competition, and a minimum displacement of
labor.
114






113
Richard L. Gordon, Coal Price Regulation in the European Community, Journal of Industrial
Economics 10, no. 2 (1962): pp. 188-203.
114
Ibid.
45

Call for a Nuclear Policy
The EU nuclear policy was only manifested through the Euratom Treaty of 1957. In
1955, the Messina Declaration by European Heads of State and Government called for more
abundant energy at a cheaper price to be put at the disposal of the European economies.
115

The communities advanced their efforts to develop this policy through various reports
starting in 1959. These reports all acknowledged the rapid decline of coal and the need for
policies that assisted coal in a way that minimized intervention with the market. However, the
earlier reports were vague about the level of difficulty and were given limited distribution.
116

DATA CHAPTERS
EU Specific Policy Proposals
The 1960 plans for establishment of target prices for energy were the initial specific
policy proposals of the EU. These target prices would provide an outline for long-term planning
and could be situated at either the expected free-market level or at some higher price that would
allow more coal to be sold valuably. In the latter case, trade limitations would offer the necessary
security. However, this mechanism failed to obtain the consent of the member states. On one
hand, it took so long for them to decide on the particulars of the policy and the states were not
able to agree upon them. On the other hand, the states were a bit doubtful about the feasibility of

115
IEA, IEA Energy Policies Review: The European Union (Paris: IEA, 2008).
116
Ibid.
46

the approach. Not only are prices merely unpredictable, but the estimates that were made also
seemed to minimize the strength of oil competition.
117

Since there is no specific article on energy in the ratified EU treaties at present, energy-
related legislation has been introduced to this point under the following legal basis
Environment (Art. 175); Approximation of laws (Art. 81-97); Trans-European networks (Art
154); Difficulties in the supply of products (Art 100); Research (Art 166); and External relations
(various articles in the treaties).
118

Recognizing that some aspects of energy policy are critical to the member states, EU
energy policy measures adhere to two principles: first, that member states are ultimately
responsible for their national energy mix; and secondly, that indigenous energy resources are
national, not European, resources. Despite this, member states have previously accepted legally
binding, although non-enforceable EU targets for specific energy sources, such as renewables,
and are negotiating legally binding, enforceable, national targets within the framework of the
draft Renewables Directive. Significantly, the EU has for more than a decade given consent on
the legal provisions for liberalizing energy networks within the internal energy market and
promoting cross-border partnership, interconnection and energy flows.
An external energy policy was also established by the EU where it operates in fields of its
own competence, such as economic, technical and financial cooperation, with agreements
covering trade, investment, infrastructure development and use (e.g. Energy Community Treaty,
Energy Charter Treaty), etc. The structure of political cooperation under the EUs Common
Foreign and Security Policy (Title V, Treaty on European Union) also discusses energy issues.

117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
47

While the CFSP to some extent has been engaged, most of the Commissions external ability is
drawn from the EC Treaty.
The legal framework for EU energy policy will be authenticated and reinforced by the
new Lisbon Treaty, once it has been ratified by all member states. A general legal basis for
energy policy in Article 176a is included, which validates and expands the EUs specific
competences in issues concerning the implementation of the internal energy market, to security
of energy supply, energy efficiency, the development of renewable energy and the
interconnection of energy networks. It also promotes unity among member states in energy
matters.
Energy Policy Developments in the EU
The evolution of energy policy at the EU expanded in 2005 when a new political force
has surfaced among the member states to cooperate more closely in the fields of energy and
reinforce the common policy in some areas. This was first conveyed at the G8 Summit at
Gleneagles in July 2005 in an action plan which covers climate change, clean energy and
sustainable development, and this matter was taken up during the UK presidency of the EU in
the mid-2005. Consequently, it took a larger stride during the informal summit of EU leaders at
the Hampton Court in October 2005, when heads of EU states and governments asked
Commission to immediately arrange how the EU could collaborate in the fields of energy.
Global geopolitics, climate change and the implementation of the internal energy market were
the vital factors of these political changes.
119


119
Gordon, Coal Price Regulation in the European Community.
48

Unity in matters of energy supply and energy policy reform within the EU is included
under the EU Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. Before the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, EU energy
legislation was only based on the control of the EU in the field of the common market and
environment; although many policy competencies vis--vis energy actually remain at the state
level and development in policy at European level are not legally binding to the member states.
Harmonization of Nuclear Liabilities in the EU
There have been current discourses which have recognized gaps in the existing nuclear
liability regimes in a more targeted way.
120
The so-called nuclear renaissance or nuclear new
build cannot be restricted to merely the reproduction of nuclear power plants. It must occur along
with the formation and reinforcement of legal frameworks for nuclear safety and radiation
protection, security and defense.
Currently, negotiations on the harmonization of nuclear liability regimes have opened at
the EU level. While indifferent on this matter during the decades subsequent the signing of the
Euratom Treaty in 1957, the thoughts of the European institutions towards EU nuclear liability
mechanisms changed significantly after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. In 2005, a patchwork
situation discourse concerning nuclear liability has also opened under the auspices of the
European Commission which was later cut short because of the tough disagreement from the
new Central and Eastern European member states.
121

On the event of the International Nuclear Law Association (AIDN/INLA) biannual
meeting held in Brussels in October 2007, the European Commissioner for Energy, Andris

120
Jakub Handrlica, Harmonization of Nuclear Liability in the European Union: Challenges, Options and
Limits, Nuclear Law Bulletin 2, no. 14 (2010): pp. 35-64.
121
Ibid.
49

Piebalgs, described the nuclear liability framework as extremely inadequate from the
Commissions standpoint. Commissioner Piebalgs proclaimed supplementary activities at the
level of the European Community towards an integrated nuclear liability regime. Later, in
December 2007, the Commission adopted a Spanish law firm to develop and issue a survey
analyzing the views of EU member states and EU industry on the existing nuclear liability
regimes, with a view towards harmonizing Community law in that area.
122

The Nuclear Liability Patchwork in the EU member states
There is no legal framework on nuclear liability at the EU level. The context of nuclear
liability in the Community is essentially ruled by existing multilateral treaties in this area and the
legislation differs from one member state to another, depending on which treaty or treaties, if
any, it has signed and ratified.
123

Prior to the 2004 enlargement, the plan of the Community appeared to correspond with
the plan of the contracting parties to the 1960 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability
as revised in 1964 and 1982 (Paris Convention). This changed when several contracting parties
to the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963 Vienna
Convention) joined the Community during the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.
124




122
Ibid.
123
Norbert Pelzer, On Global Treaty Relations Hurdles on the way towards a Universal Civil Nuclear
Liability Regime, Zeitschrift fr Europisches Umwelt- und Planungsrecht 13, no. 2 (2008): p. 273.
124
Ibid.
50

EURATOM and the Nuclear Liability Framework
At present, European secondary law is restrained vis--vis nuclear third party liability.
Therefore, the legal framework for nuclear liability in member states is that provided for under
the international convention to which they have held on.
I. Article 98 Euratom Treaty on facilitating the conclusion of insurance contracts covering
nuclear risks.
When signing the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom
Treaty) on 25 March 1957, the member states agreed to:
Take all measures necessary to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering
nuclear risks. Within two years of the entry into force of this Treaty, the Council, acting
by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which shall first request the
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, shall, after consulting the European
Parliament, issue directives for the application of this Article
125

The interpretation of this provision suggests the following observations and consequences
for nuclear liability in member states:
(1) Article 98(1) of the Euratom Treaty requires member states to take all actions
necessary to facilitate the termination of insurance contracts constituting nuclear risks. This
requirement is due to the fact that the contracting parties to the treaty were already aware in 1957
that nuclear insurance is an essential element of a suitable framework for nuclear liability.

125
Handrlica, Harmonization of Nuclear Liability in the European Union.
51

(2) By 1954 to 1955, since the nuclear industry is not able to pay the damages taking
place from a nuclear accident, it was apparent that it would not be able to expand without a
special liability. On the other hand, operators were aware of the fact that installations, in which
they had invested large sums of money, could also be totally damaged or destroyed in an
accident. At the same time, insurers started to rule out nuclear damage from the standard
coverage because of the colossal risks associated with industrial use of nuclear energy; and they
formed a special insurance system for the nuclear industry. Article 98 of the Euratom Treaty
considered this development and requires member states to engage in the conclusion of insurance
contracts.
(3) The Euratom Treaty does not mention any definite responsibility of member states
regarding the features of a nuclear liability framework. Therefore, it is impartial on the general
principles by which nuclear liability is to be enforced.
Ongoing discussions regarding new nuclear power plants or nuclear renaissance suggest
difficult issues related to public acceptance. The establishment of a legal framework on nuclear
liability is one of the fundamental pillars of the acceptance. The development of peaceful uses of
nuclear energy cannot be reduced to the growth in number of nuclear power plants, but must also
include the formation of an appropriate legal framework which covers all parts of the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
126

To some extent, harmonization within the Community could be achieved if all member
states would comply and ratify the existing amended conventions which, relating to the current
lack of legal instruments in the European Community, assume a political compromise among all

126
Ibid.
52

member states. This decision would require strong political motivation and is, from the
Communitys standpoint, somehow static even though it requires action on the part of individual
member states, in particular new member states.
Current EU Energy Policies
Despite having energy as one of the central issues in the EU, the 7
th
Framework Program
(FP7) only allocated a fair amount of funding for energy research. Much of the FP7 energy
funding is also committed to fusion research, a technology that is unable to help meet European
climate and energy objectives until past 2050. The European Commission tried to address this
deficit with the SET plan.
127

On 2008, the Steering Group on the implementation of the Strategic Energy Technologies
Plan (SET Plan) have laid down the outline for an EU energy technology policy. It will develop
the harmonization of national and European research and innovation efforts to place the EU
ahead in the low-carbon technologies markets.
The SET plan initiatives are: Solar Europe Initiative, which focuses on extensive
demonstration for photovoltaic and concentrated solar power; European Wind Initiative, which
centers on large turbines and large systems validation and demonstration (significant to on and
off-shore relevance); European CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage Initiative, which centers on
the whole system requirements, including efficiency, safety and public acceptance, to verify the
feasibility of zero emission fossil fuel power plants at industrial scale; Bioenergy Europe
Initiative, which focuses on the succeeding generation of biofuels within the framework of an

127
Jan Frederik Braun, EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a new policy and
business as usual, Politics and Institutions, EPIN Working Papers 4, no. 1 (2012): p. 14
53

overall bio-energy use strategy; Sustainable Nuclear Fission Initiative, which focuses on the
progress of Generation IV reactors technologies; and European Electricity Grid Initiative, which
focuses on the expansion of the smart electricity system, including storage, and on the
establishment of a European Center to execute a research program for the European
communication network.
128

Nuclear Policies between Chernobyl and Fukushima, and beyond
Despite the fact that the 1986 incident uncovered considerable gaps in the international
legal framework, it was not really after the Chernobyl accident that an international cooperation
and legislative agenda have begun.
129
As early as 1928, the International Committee on
Radiological Protection has been established, the major international organizations for
intergovernmental cooperation were instituted in the 1950s, and international mechanisms had
been adopted in the realms of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, physical security, radiation
defense and risk for nuclear harm. However, Chernobyl was a cautionary light for the
international nuclear community and promoted international cooperation in the long run in areas
that were until then rigorously guarded by individual nations as incorporated under their
sovereign authority, such as emergency organization, nuclear safety and radioactive waste
management. Also after this incident, there was a significant development in the international

128
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - A European strategic energy technology plan (SET-plan)
- 'Towards a low carbon future' {SEC(2007) 1508} {SEC(2007) 1509} {SEC(2007) 1510} {SEC(2007) 1511
129
Selma Kus, "International nuclear law in the 25 years between Chernobyl and Fukushima and beyond,"
Nuclear Law Bulletin 1, no. 87 (2011): 7-26.
54

third party liability mechanisms which is why the Fukushima incident in March 2011 was very
compared to the Chernobyl.
130

Subsequent to the Chernobyl accident was the accomplishment of what was thought of as
unachievable in the field of crisis readiness and response since the 1960s. In fact, it was attained
only in the span of four months. Based on existing non-legally binding guidelines, the
international community, under the support of the IAEA, adopted two legally binding
conventions the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification
Convention);
131
and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention).
132

Both conventions provide the legal basis for the notification by a state of nuclear
accidents to the IAEA and other states party to the convention, and also provide assistance at the
request of the state in which the nuclear accident or radiological tragedy occurred. The extent of
the two conventions is limited to the period of time subsequent to the accident without delay,
which is why the later negotiated and adopted Convention on Nuclear Safety includes a
provision on emergency measures. Article 16 of that convention requires contracting parties to
have their on- and off-site emergency arrangements checked regularly and to take the proper
measures to ensure that their own residents and the fit authorities of states in the area of the
affected nuclear equipment are provided with accurate information for emergency preparation
and response. Finally, at the European level, two Council mechanisms deal with radiological
emergencies one on the procedures for the rapid exchange of information in case of a

130
Rautenbach, J., Tonhauser, W., Wetherall, A., Overview of the International Legal Framework
Governing the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Some Practical Steps , International Nuclear Law in
the Post-Chernobyl Period, p. 7.
131
INFCIRC/335, 18 November 1986.
132
INFCIRC/335, 18 November 1986.
55

radiological emergency, and another on informing the general public about health protection
measures and steps to be taken in the case of a radiological emergency.
The main focus of the international cooperation since the Chernobyl accident has been
the safety of nuclear power plants. The 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) embodies a
high point in this period. It is the foundation of the international legal framework on nuclear
safety. It is a legally binding international instrument which does not require exhaustive safety
standards but rather, essential safety principles for land-based nuclear power plants. The 1997
Joint Convention represents a further milestone mechanism in international nuclear law when it
comes to safety. Finally, with Council Directive 2009/71/Euratom establishing a Community
framework on the Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations, the third legally binding safety means
was recognized at the European level. Moreover, there are countless safety conducts, standards,
assistance programs and conferences initiated and held correspondingly under the support of
international and regional organizations in order to set up, preserve and develop a high level
safety society within participating states.
133

Nuclear Policies of France
Institutional and Industrial Framework
A number of ministries contribute to the characterization of the French nuclear policy,
specifically the ministry in charge of energy and of the environment (MEEDDM), and the
ministry in charge of higher education and research (MESR). Remarkably, the government itself
does not control the compliance with safety and radiation protection rules. The Nuclear Safety

133
Kus, "International nuclear law in the 25 years between Chernobyl and Fukushima and beyond."
56

Authority (Autorit de sret nuclaire, ASN), an autonomous organization, executes this
operation.
134

The ASN is responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules and regulations regarding
the activities under its jurisdiction, offering advice to the state on draft declarations and
governmental decisions and circulating information to the public, including when an emergency
occurs. In this event, the ASN is responsible for notifying the public about the safety condition of
the installation concerned and any emissions into the environment and hazards to human health
and the environment. The ASN will play a crucial role in the development of the French nuclear
sector since it decides on the commissioning, the operational safety and the lifetime extension of
nuclear plants.
135

The Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de radioprotection et
de sret nuclaire, IRSN), an independent public organization, is the key public basis for
research and expertise on nuclear and radiological hazards in France. IRSN also contributes to
public policies vis--vis nuclear safety and protection of human health and environment vis--vis
ionizing radiation. One of its primary responsibilities is to offer technical support for the public
authorities, including ASN, and reports to the MEEDDM and four other ministries.
136

In 1945, the Commissariat lnergie atomique (CEA), a public association, was
established to be able to perform and maintain all progress and utilizations in both military and
civilian uses of nuclear energy. It is a plays a significant role in research, development and
innovation in the fields of low-carbon energy (nuclear, new energy technologies), health

134
IEA, IEA Energy Policies Review: France (Paris: IEA, 2009).
135
Ibid.
136
Ibid.
57

technologies, information technologies and communication, and defense. Its procedures include
giving recommendations to the French government in matters of foreign nuclear policy and
representing France in international nuclear organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). The CEA is also a major player in drawing different nuclear reactor
designs in France and is now responsible of the R&D needed for developing the fourth
generation of reactors. It has been recently announced that the CEA will become the Atomic and
Alternative Energy Commission in order to point up the development of its activities in low-
carbon energy.
137

The National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Agence nationale pour la
gestion des dchets radioactifs, ANDRA) is the national organization for radioactive waste
management. Electricit de France (EDF) is the chief owner and operator of all the commercial
nuclear power plants in France. Finally, AREVA is a world leader in nuclear energy and the only
vertically integrated company that encompasses all facets of the fuel cycle, from mining through
to waste treatment.
138

The French Energy Policy
The construction of an ambitious nuclear power program in France, coupled with a closed
fuel cycle, was compelled by the political will to attain a significant stage of energy
independence in a nation inadequately bestowed in fossil fuels and having local uranium
resources accessible in limited amount.
139
The energy independence objective given to nuclear
power has been accomplished. Since the early 1990s, nuclear power has been completing

137
Ibid.
138
Ibid.
139
IAEA, "The back-end of the fuel cycle in France: Status and prospects" in Spent Fuel Reprocessing
Options, ed. M. Giroux et al. (Vienna: IAEA, 2008).
58

roughly three-quarters of the electricity demand in France, which is a substantial contribution to
the diminishment in energy imports by 16 billion in 2006; and an important further benefit is
keeping away from the emission of C02 by about 126 Mt in 2006.
Based from the 2005 law establishing guidelines for France energy policy and security,
the state makes sure that nuclear power supplies a significant part of the electricity mix. A new
generation reactor must be available by 2015 on a commercial basis in order to keep the nuclear
preference open after 2020. The agenda of this 2005 Global Energy Act is also to formulate a
research policy that will carry out the expansion of innovative energy technologies constantly
with the French climate plan aspiring to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. A number of
major steps is included in this protocol. First is the implementation and testing of a first of a kind
GENERATION I11 (EPR) reactor in order to settle on for a chain by 2015. Second is a R&D on
upcoming nuclear systems (GENERATION IV fission reactors, fusion reactors). Lastly are new
energy technologies (including hydrogen economy, innovative fuels for transport sector) and
energy efficiency.
140

The role of nuclear power to the French energy policy was further underpinned with the
following major proposals: President Chirac declared in January 2006 the creation of a
Generation IV prototype reactor by the CEA to be accomplished in 2020; Launching of an
autonomous safety authority where its operation was defined in a new law on nuclear
transparency and security ratified by the French parliament on June 13, 2006; and in June 2006,
two major new laws regarding its nuclear sector was ratified by France. The Act on
Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Sector was the one that established the ASN, alongside

140
Ibid.
59

with another body, a High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security,
(Haut comit pour la transparence et linformation sur la scurit nuclaire (HCTISN)).
A national policy for the management of radioactive wastes and materials was defined by
the 2006 Planning Act regarding the Sustainable Management of Radioactive. ANDRA is
responsible for the long-term functions for radioactive waste management under this act. A
National Plan for the Management of Radioactive Materials and Waste (Plan national de gestion
des matires et des dchets radioactifs (PNGMDR)) was also formed under this Planning Act so
to be able to establish a broad outline for managing all kinds of radioactive waste and materials.
The Planning Act also emphasizes that the waste producers should be liable for the nuclear
wastes; and they will also be accountable for funding the costs of waste disposal. In this context,
what is in the interest of some is the disposal of drawn out high-level nuclear waste of French
origin, for which the law denotes a reference management solution, that is erratic disposal in
deep geological structures.
141

Legal Framework for Nuclear Waste Management
The legal framework for managing High-level wastes was defined in the Waste
Management Act of 1991. It systematized the R&D focusing on: Division and alteration (with
CEA and CNRS as major contributors); Disposal in deep geological layers (R&D led by
ANDRA); Long-term (sub)-surface storage (R&D led by CEA).

141
OECD, Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear
Activities: France, (Paris: OECD, 2003).
60

In 2005, a report on the status of concerning the evaluation of the most favorable R&D
methods was passed to French authorities. Therefore, the legal framework for the waste
management in France was revised and generated two important laws, both ratified in 2006:
- A new autonomous safety body ASN was created by the Law on Nuclear Transparency
and Security established. The ASN is led by a college of 5 members appointed for 6 years. It
ensures the control of nuclear safety and radiation protection to protect workers, patients, the
public and the environment from risks related to the use of nuclear technology.
- The Programme Act on the sustainable management of radioactive materials and wastes
concerns all kinds of radioactive waste (not only long-term high-level waste). It provides three
key standards vis--vis radioactive waste and substances: deep geological disposal, short-term
storage of radioactive substances and ultimate waste, cutback of quantity and toxicity. Deep
geological storage that can easily be regained remains to be the most significant solution for
long-term and high level waste under the law. By 2015, the potential blueprints of the disposal
site will once again be discussed by the French parliament; and by 2025 a national disposal
center might be regulated depending on the approval of the Parliament. In France, it is not
allowed to dispose foreign brightened fuel or radioactive waste. The law also identifies financial
provision for research, nuclear plants decommissioning costs, supplementary taxes on nuclear
facilities to fund research programs. It also gives clear definitions for radioactive materials and
waste and denotes that management is the key to decrease the radiotoxicity and volume of
nuclear waste. The conception of a national management plan providing the solutions, the
objectives to reach and the research actions to be commenced to achieve these objectives is the
essential point of this law. Based from the Law on Nuclear Transparency and Security, this plan
61

is updated every three years and published. The law is promoting transparency and democratic
control.
142

Aside from this legal framework, France has also adopted several national legislatives
and regulatory activities. These are as follows:
Licensing and regulatory infrastructure
Decree No. 2012-1248 of 9 November 2012 authorising the ITER Organisation to create the
"ITER" basic nuclear installation in Saint-Paul-lez-Durance (Bouches-du-Rhne).
143

This decree provides consent on the establishment of a basic nuclear installation
(installation nuclaire de base INB) for carrying out nuclear fusion reaction experiments using
tritium and deuterium plasmas. The function of the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor (ITER) facility will be to show the scientific and technological viability of fusion
energy.
144

Specifically, the decree regulates the operation of the installation, the qualities of the
installation, the central safety functions, the anticipation of disasters, and the protection of the
installation against dangers whether internally or caused by the environment.
A 25-year phase within which the facility is to be constructed was also launched in this
decree. The timing for the submission of an application for long-term operation was established

142
Ibid.
143
Dcret n 2012-1248 du 9 novembre 2012 autorisant lOrganisation international ITER crer une
installation nuclaire de base dnomme ITER sur la commune de Saint-Paul-lez-Durance (Bouches-du-Rhne),
Journal officiel lois et dcrets [Official Journal of Laws and Decrees] (J.O.L. et D.), 10 November 2012, p. 17847, Text
No. 14.
144
OECD, National Legislative and Regulatory Activities, Nuclear Law Bulletin 3, no. 91 (2013): pp.
115-129.
62

in the national regulatory framework.
145
Fundamentally, there are two different approaches to the
licensing of sustained operation of nuclear power plants: some OECD member countries grant
operating licenses that have fixed period of validity (fixed license term), while others issue
licenses that have indefinite validity (indefinite license term). France has the latter.
The consent to manage a nuclear reactor in countries with a fixed license term is issued
for a limited period of time, at the end of which the operator must formally apply for a license
renewal; while in countries with an indefinite license term, the legality of the operating licenses
is not limited in time, however the sustained safe operation of the plant and fulfillment of
regulatory requirements are subject to sporadic review. The operator is not required to formally
apply for a license renewal since the license remains valid. The nuclear power plant can operate
as long as the divergent is decided by the operator or the fit authority.
Both license terms are essentially legal and exhibit organizational concepts rather than
safety ones. The conformity of plants with the safety standards, license conditions, regulatory
requirements, and applicable legislation will constantly be managed by the regulatory authority,
regardless of their location in a country with a fixed license term or in a country with an
indefinite license term.




145
Sam Emmerechts, Christian Raetzke and Benjamin Okra, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Long-term
Operation of Nuclear Power Plants in OECD Member Countries, Nuclear Law Bulletin 1, no. 87 (2011): pp. 45-71.
63

Nuclear security
Law No. 2012-1473 of 28 December 2012 authorizing the approval of the Amendment to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
146

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), particularly
creating rules in the area of international transport of civilian nuclear materials, was drafted in
1979 under the support of the IAEA and was implemented in 1987.
This French law gave consent to the authorization of the Amendment to the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which was adopted in Vienna on July 8, 2005 to
be able to expand the range of the CPPNM and reinforce its major provisions.
Nuclear safety and radiological protection
Complementary safety assessments; Follow-up of the stress tests carried out on French nuclear
power plants; Action Plan of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorit de Sret Nuclaire
ASN) December 2012
This national action plan illustrates a sense of balance on the actions decided by the
French nuclear safety authority after stress tests were carried out on French nuclear power plants
in the form of harmonizing safety assessments in 2011.



146
Loi n 2012-1473 du 28 dcembre 2012 autorisant l'approbation de l'amendement la convention sur la
protection physique des matires nuclaires, J.O.L. et D., 29 December 2012, p. 20786, Text No. 3.
64

I nternational co-operation
Decree No. 2012-1178 of 22 October 2012 publishing the Cooperation Agreement between the
government of the French Republic and the government of the Republic of Tunisia for the
development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signed in Tunis on 23 April 2009
147

This decree issued the cooperation agreement concluded between France and Tunisia for
the expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This Franco-Tunisian cooperation agreement
was concluded for a period of 20 years and may exercise cooperation in fields such as basic
research; biology or medicine, the training of workers; the application of nuclear energy to the
production of electricity; the development of nuclear energy applications in agronomy; the
drafting of legislation and regulation in the nuclear field; nuclear safety, radiation safety and the
protection of the environment; and nuclear security.
Decree No. 2012-1180 of 22 October 2012 publishing the Cooperation Agreement between the
government of the French Republic and the government of Mongolia in the field of nuclear
energy (with annex), signed in Ulaanbaatar on 14 October 2010
148

This decree issued the cooperation agreement concluded between France and Mongolia
in the area of the uses of nuclear energy for non-explosive purposes. This cooperation was
concluded for a period of 10 years and may exercise cooperation in fields such as the
exploration, extraction and processing of mineral resources; basic research; biology or medicine,

147
Dcret n 2012-1178 du 22 octobre 2012 portant publication de l'accord de coopration entre le
Gouvernement de la Rpublique franaise et le Gouvernement de la Rpublique tunisienne pour le dveloppement
des utilisations pacifiques de l'nergie nuclaire, J.O.L. et D., 25 October 2012, p. 16584, Text No. 3.
148
Dcret n 2012-1180 du 22 octobre 2012 portant publication de l'accord de coopration entre le
Gouvernement de la Rpublique franaise et le Gouvernement de la Mongolie dans le domaine de l'nergie
nuclaire, J.O.L. et D., 25 October 2012, p. 16589, Text No. 5.
65

the training of workers; the application of nuclear energy to the production of electricity; the
development of nuclear energy applications in agronomy; the drafting of legislation and
regulation in the nuclear field; nuclear safety, radiation safety and the protection of the
environment; and the prevention and response to crisis situations resulting from radiological or
nuclear accidents.
Nuclear Policies of Germany
The adoption of the Act on the Structured Phase-out of Nuclear Power for the
Commercial Production of Electricity on April 2002 marked the transformation of Germanys
law of deciding on a nuclear phase-out.
149
An establishment of rules by the legislation enabled
the termination for the commercial production of electricity of German nuclear power plants.
The amount of power remaining was taken into consideration. The total amount of power
that will be produced corresponds to the said amount throughout the average operational lifespan
thirty-two years. Once the decided quantity of power is reached, power plants will be turned off
as predetermined by law.
The energy concept was implemented by the federal government in autumn 2010. In
anticipation of the usage of renewable energy, the Energy concept verifies that nuclear power is
to function as a bridge in order for full transition.
150
Renewables are capable of having more
contribution in the supply of electricity; and to achieve this, an infrastructure is being
established. On December 2010 the 11
th
Act Amending the Atomic Energy Act was taken into

149
Axel Vorwerk, The 2002 Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act Concerning the Phase-out of
Nuclear Power (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2008).
150
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Energy Concept
150
for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Economics
and Technology, 2010), 3-4.
66

effect. It is rooted from the Energy Concept that eventually extended the life spans Germanys 17
nuclear plants through the increase of maximum remaining power amounts that is allowable to
produce by the nuclear power plants.
151

On the aftermath of the Fukushima tragedy in March 2011, the federal government
agreed on the reevaluation of the probable liabilities set forth in the continual use of nuclear
power. There has been a settlement on the cooperation with the Minister-Presidents of the
Lnder, where the nuclear power plants are in full operation, to direct an extensive safety review
to all German nuclear power plants. A component of the safety review shows that eight nuclear
power plants were either taken offline or have not been turned on. The Reactor Security
Commission with the participation of proficient nuclear regulatory authorities conducts the
safety review for all German nuclear power plants. A comprehensive analysis of the dangers
affiliated with German nuclear power plants was submitted on May 2011. In addition, the federal
government set up an independent ethics commission, the Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy
Supply, which in May 2011 submitted a comprehensive opinion on issues relating to Germanys
future energy supply. The findings of these commissions served as guidelines for the energy
policy decisions that needed to be taken. On 30 June 2011, the Bundestag decided by a large
majority that, no later than the end of 2022, Germany will fully terminate the generation of
power by German NPPs. This 13th Act amending the Atomic Energy Act took effect on 6
August 2011.



151
International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Germany 2013 Review (France:
OECD/IEA, 2013), 171.
67

Energy Concept
In September 2010, the Energy Concept was introduced by the Federal Government. It
sought out and was determined to pursue ambitious goals for energy and climate policy. First, in
comparison to levels on 1990, an 80% cut will be issued on emissions of greenhouse gases by
2050. Second, a large quantity of the German energy will be supplied by renewables in the
future. And third, energy efficiency is to be augmented and energy expenditure be decreased
notably.
With the unveiling of the Energy Concept last September 2010, central challenges of
energy and climate policy have arisen in the Federal Government. While the demand of energy
globally continues to increase, particular fossil fuels have been decreasing. This is projected to
claim long-term risks for supply security and energy prices. Moreover, most of the fossil fuels
are collected from only few regions in the world and part of it are politically unstable. Germany
is largely dependent on its energy imports with 88% from gas need and 98% of its oil needs.
Additionally, climate change is imperative for its energy policy. Germany's consumption of
energy accounts for approximately 80% of greenhouse gas emissions.
152

This is where the Energy Concept by the Federal Government was built upon. An
extensive approach composing of the areas of heat, transport and electricity, the Energy Concept
is founded on four pillars: ambitious goals, concrete measures, a funding concept and regular
monitoring.
Having a 40-year trajectory, the Energy Concept has a goal and a long-term focus to give
a precise degree of investment security and planning for the pervasive investments that are

152
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, Energy Concept.
68

necessary. Nonetheless, it is technology-neutral to reduce the risk of any barriers to newfound
technologies that are entering the market. This Concept gives a good balance amidst flexibility
and planning security.
Greenhouse gas emissions are planned to cut out by 40% on 2020, and at a minimum of
80% in 2050 by the Energy Concept as established by industrialized countries. To become the
pillar of energy supply, renewables will be developed. The objective is to expand their share in
gross final energy consumption to 60% in 2050 from about 10% in 2010. It is to increase by
2050 to as high as 80% in the share of renewable in electricity supply. In addition, over the years
the government is determined to decrease energy consumption. On 2050, there should be a
decrease in the main energy consumption compared to 2008 levels. This requests a 2.1% increase
annually in energy efficiency in relation to the final energy consumption averagely. It is
imperative that by 2050 electricity consumption is to decrease by 25% on levels compared to
2008, and should already be decreased by 10% at 2020. In the transportation sector final energy
consumption should be decreased by 40% at 2050 in comparison to 2005 levels. Moreover, the
rate of energy modifications annually for projects is to be doubled from current rates, from a
ratio of 1:2 of existing buildings per year.
Therefore the energy supply in Germany will be subjected to undergo an important
transition. If Germany is to persist as a vying business location, it should simultaneously be
essential to achieve a secure and affordable energy supply in the future. The groundwork for this
new era of energy was laid down by the Federal Government in the summer of 2011 alongside
the approval of an extensive legislative package known as the Energy Package. The Bundestag
and Bundesrat, the Federal Government and Germany's upper and lower houses respectively,
69

constituted one ordinance and six laws for the period of only six months. Other than the
continuous decrease of nuclear power by 2022, the laws passed are mainly on the grid expansion
and the progressive development of renewable energy.
153

Energy Package
In the aftermath of the recent unfortunate disaster in Fukushima, Germany
unquestionably decides to give up the use of nuclear energy by 2022. The Krmmel nuclear plant
and the seven oldest nuclear power stations are now permanently off the grid since spring 2011.
And progressively, the other nine remaining nuclear power plants will be cease to exist by 2022.
This disengagement from nuclear power plants is faster and compels a swifter implementation of
the nearly impossible feat defined in the Energy Concept to reconstruct the energy system.
To this end, the Federal Cabinet, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat authorized the
comprehensive Energy Package. The said package consist of six laws and one ordinance, each
one of one is focussing on different areas such as renewable energy, grid expansion and
upgrading and also ways to fund the transition to a new energy era
154
.
A key issues paper was approved by the Cabinet. It was on the subject of energy
efficiency that acts as the justification for the amendment to the Energy Savings Ordinance
(Energieeinsparverordnung) in 2012. The proposal to supply sufficient tax relief for energy
modifications in residential buildings is presently being taken into account by the Lnder (states
of Germany).

153
OECD, OECD Green Growth Studies: Energy (OECD, 2011
154
The Federal Government, National Sustainable Development Strategy (Germany: 2012).
70

The Energy Package established significant circumstances for investments and
implemented fundamental measures of the Energy Concept. The Energy and Climate Fund is
also available as a form of financing model. This special fund is sustained by the emissions
trading revenue. This means that price of CO2 emissions dictates the precise volume of the fund.
A range of areas are supported by the Energy and Climate Fund which includes electric mobility,
building modernisation and national, international climate protection projects, and an Energy
Efficiency Fund. Due to emission costs, an arrangement of remunerative payments for power-
intensive businesses to balance out the increase in electricity prices is being planned from 2013
onwards.
Act to Restructure the Legal Framework for the Promotion of Electricity Generation from
Renewable Energy Sources (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechtsrahmens fr die Frderung der
Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien, EEG), including the 2011 firsthand report on the
Renewable Energy Sources Act
The resolution by the federal government, the energy concept, points the way to the age
of renewable energies. For this purpose, the proportion of electricity is to be increased
continuously from renewable sources by 2020 with increase to at least 35 percent, by 2030 at
least 50 percent, by 2040 to at least 65 percent and by 2050 to at least 80 percent. The
achievement of these objectives requires the expansion of renewable energy in Germany to be
consistent and ambitious. This can only succeed if it is sustainable and efficient. At the same
time, the necessary decisions are needed to be made to interpret the energy supply system to
these high shares of renewable energies. The Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) must
therefore be developed further, that the transfer of renewable energy in the electricity sector to an
71

expected market share of 35 to 40 percent is guaranteed within the current decade.
For the attainment of the above policy objectives, the EEG is being amended. This amendment
provides a central building block for the transformation of the energy supply and for entry into
the age of renewable energy to the appropriate recommendations to the EEG. In particular, this
market integration of renewable energy as a new column in the EEG is recorded, and in the
introduction of a market premium, an important new incentive will be set which will help to
ensure that more electricity is sold directly from renewable energy in the energy market. It will
be on biogas plants with a capacity of more than 500 kilowatts of the market premium is made
mandatory from 2014.
155

Act on Measures to Accelerate the Expansion of the Electricity Grid (Gesetz ber Manahmen
zur Beschleunigung des Ausbaus der Elektrizittsnetze, NABEG)
The rapid expansion of the share of renewable energy in electricity generation, the
optimal economic use of conventional power plants and the increased cross-border trade in
electricity made the rapid expansion of high-voltage transmission network in Germany urgently
needed; but also in the distribution and especially in the 110 kilovolt high voltage level features
significant expansion. The aim of the law is an acceleration of the expansion of the power grids
of the high voltage level.
The law provides for lines of the transport of electricity with a European or supra-
regional importance, and a nationwide examination of the spatial impact and plan approval by
the Federal Network Agency involving all relevant in these proceeding statutory provisions,

155
Deutscher Bundestag. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung des Rechtsrahmens fr die Frderung
der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien. (Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
72

notably those regulations that the environmental and other space planning and nature
conservation law concerns.
156

Act to Restructure Provisions of the Energy Industry Act (Gesetz zur Neuregelung
energiewirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften, EnWGndG)
The conditions under which particular transport networks can enable as a neutral
marketplace more competition in the upstream gas and electricity markets were improved. In
particular, the existing separation between the power companies in competitive areas. In addition
to these organizational generic requirements, the objective is to further step towards a single
European energy market with harmonized market rules that requires the development of
infrastructure and stranded investments, which would be a burden for both businesses and
consumers that simultaneously avoid needless costs. With increasing competition as well as the
increase choices available to the consumer, high transparency should be made possible. At the
same time increases in competition also increases the risk of disputes between consumers and
businesses. Therefore, a fast and non-bureaucratic dispute settlement which has not previously
existed must be created. In addition, consumers have had no or little opportunity to actively
participate in the energy market due to the fundamental importance of energy to be devoted to
the special protection of critical infrastructures. This is done by including the EU Directive on
the designation of European critical infrastructures. This is to be implemented in the Member
States. The same is true also for ensuring the security of gas supply. Limited gas supplies in
Europe have shown in the past that functioning crisis mechanisms are required to ensure security
of supply in both national and European. In the interest of energy conservation, environmental

156
Deutscher Bundestag. Gesetz ber Manahmen zur Beschleunigung des Netzausbaus Elektrizittsnetze.
(Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
73

protection and the achievement of climate change objectives, the share of combined heat and
power generation is expanding.
The law directives are transposed 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC. There are in particular
the unbundling rules for the transport networks change, to strengthen the network companies.
The guidelines provide three equivalent unbundling options, all of which are implemented in the
design. In addition, the Federal Network Agency (FNA) receives additional skills in order to
enforce the obligations necessary.
With the bill coordinated, common network expansion planning of all transmission and
transmission system operators will be guaranteed for the first time. This contributes to one of the
special structures of the network operator landscape in Germany that accounts and avoids the
other planning errors that may arise in an individual. The planned rules will not be the public's
concern. It is produced by the rules for public participation and the fullest possible transparency
with the goal of achieving greater acceptance for the line extension.
Consumer rights are strengthened by short deadline changes of supplier, and clear rules
for agreements in invoices for more transparency. In addition, an independent arbitration service
is created, which is available to consumers in the energy sector as a contact person and to bring
about amicable solutions in disputes between consumers and businesses.
The rules for the introduction of the so-called smart metering systems provide the
foundation for a more active participation of the consumers in the energy market while
preserving its privacy.
74

To ensure the requirements of the Directive on European critical tables infrastructure, a
method is provided which in light of the responsibility for the system of transmission system
operators under the Energy Industry Act - the regular identification of European critical
infrastructures and the regular review of security plans and security officers in the area of power
supply allows.
As part of the implementation of Regulation (EU) No 994/ 2010 will be met by
jurisdictional rules in the field of security of gas supply. In accordance with Article 3, paragraph
2 of Regulation (EU) No 994/ 2010, the Federal Republic of Germany is obliged to 3rd formally
designate on December 2011, a competent authority which ensures implementation of the
provisions laid down in Regulation. This should be the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology. At the same time provide the legal basis' created which allows the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Technology to adopt by ordinance rules for data reporting to ensure security
of supply and to transfer the Agency if necessary to other tasks according to the EU regulation .
In addition, it can exempt those arising under the Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology, in particular the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance and the
Federal Office for Security in Information Technology, and other personnel requirements in
subordinate authorities.
Finally, the Directive 2008/114/EC will be implemented through European critical
infrastructures. In addition, the Combined Heat and Power Act is amended to allow the
promotion for systems with a start-up after 2016 and 2020. Based on a modified scheme, to use
75

flexible hours conditioning control strategies are allowed. Other laws may be revised in 2011
from the intermediate review pursuant to 12 of the Combined Heat and Power Act.
157


Act Amending the Act to Establish a Special Energy and Climate Fund (Gesetz zur nderung des
Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Sondervermgens Energie- und Klimafonds, EKFG-ndG)
Fourth Ordinance amending the Ordinance on the Award of Public-sector Contracts
The Fourth Ordinance amending the Ordinance on the Award of Public-sector Contracts.
Due to the accelerated phase-out of nuclear energy, considerable investment and research
activities will be required in the coming years to ensure the energy supply in Germany by fossil
and renewable energy. This objective can be implemented only on the basis of a long-term
secured funding for the Energy and Climate Fund. So far, the fund came mainly from the levy of
additional profits of energy companies from the term extension and, from 2013, the expected
revenues from the auctioning of emission allowances. By shortening the maturities, no further
revenues from the levy of additional gains are expected in the future, so that appropriate tax
losses have to be compensated.
With the bill, the fund from 2012 provided all revenue from emissions trading for the
accelerated phase-out of nuclear power, for the promotion of environmentally friendly, reliable
and affordable energy supply and for action in the field of international climate and
environmental protection available. In addition, future estimates by an extension of the purpose
of the fund's assets are previously distributed on four departmental sections of the federal budget

157
Deutscher Bundestag. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Neuregelung energiewirtschaftsrechtlicher
Vorschriften. (Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
76

program investment for the development of future market electric mobility centrally in the
economic plan of the energy and climate fund, and thus a transparent estimate of the expenditure
in this market of the future will be assured.
158

13th Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act (13. Gesetz zur nderung des Atomgesetzes, AtomG)
The nuclear effects of the earthquake disaster in Japan meant an incision for the peaceful
use of nuclear energy in Germany. In light of these events, the federal government with the
prime ministers of the countries where nuclear power plants are operated, checked the safety of
all German nuclear power plants by the Reactor Safety Commission, in close cooperation with
the competent nuclear regulatory authorities of the countries and also by an ethics committee
Secure Energy Supply. A social dialogue was conducted on the risks of nuclear power and the
possibility of an accelerated transition in the age of renewable energies. The federal government
has decided taking into account the results of the Reactor Safety Commission and the Ethics
Commission Secure Energy Supply and the absolute primacy of nuclear safety to end the use
of nuclear energy at the earliest opportunity. For this purpose, the quantities of electricity are to
be revoked in Appendix 3 and column 4. Additionally, authorizations of nuclear power plants for
power operation with a view to ensuring the security of supply, compliance with national and
international climate protection goals and ensuring praiseworthy and socially sustainable
development of electricity prices for the period necessary nor staggered in time to 31 December
2022 be introduced as a temporary and a fixed end date for the peaceful use of nuclear energy for
the commercial generation of electricity in Germany.

158
Deutscher Bundestag. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur nderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines
Sondervermgens Energie- und Klimafonds (EKFG-ndG). (Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
77

Through an amendment of 7, paragraph 1, sentence 1 and 2, the permissions of the
nuclear power plants for power operation are limited in time. These are contained in Appendix 3
Column 4 inserted with the Eleventh Act to amend the Atomic Energy Act quantities of
electricity accounts.
159

Act Strengthening Climate-Friendly Measures in Towns and Municipalities (Gesetz zur Strkung
der klimagerechten Entwicklung in den Stdten und Gemeinden)
The coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP of 26 October 2009 provides
to strengthen climate protection and internal development in planning law. In addition, the Land
Use Ordinance is to be fully tested. This is due to the World Climate Report of the United
Nations (UN). It has become clear that the fight against climate change and adapting to climate
change, sustainable future tasks are also includes the cities and towns. These objects also have an
urban dimension. The municipalities should bear the requirements for the local land use bill. In
addition, the energy concept of the Federal Government, established on 28 September 2010, is
for the expansion of wind energy use on land and in the construction and planning rules, that is
necessary and appropriate to secure the repowering and the replacement of old wind turbines.
Due to the nuclear disaster on 11 March 2011 in Japan, the establishments of the wind turbines
will be accelerated. The list includes the planning law. For this reason, the order of the coalition
agreement will initially be implemented in the context of climate change.
Through the present bill, Germany seeks to strengthen the climate inserted inter alia, a
climate protection clause that is expanding on the use and exploitation of renewable energy

159
Deutscher Bundestag. Entwurf eines Dreizehnten Gesetzes zur nderung des Atomgesetzes. (Berlin: H.
Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
159

78

sources and from combined heat and power generation. It introduced special rules for the use of
wind energy and facilitates the use in particular of photovoltaic systems in buildings.
160

Germany has also adopted several national legislatives and regulatory activities. These
are as follows:
Radiation protection
General administrative rules on Section 47 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance (2012)
Based on Article 85, paragraph 2, sentence 1 of the Basic Law (Constitution
Grundgesetz) in conjunction with Section 47, paragraph 2 of the 2001 Radiation Protection
Ordinance as last amended on 24 February 2012,
161
the Federal Government issued on 28 August
2012 General Administrative Rules on Section 47 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance.
162
The
Rules apply to the estimation of the radiation exposure pursuant to Section 47 paragraph 2 of the
Ordinance. The result of the estimation determines whether the facility is planned in a way such
that the radiation exposure resulting from the discharge of radioactive substances into air and
water does not exceed the dose limits provided for in Section 47 paragraph 1 of the Ordinance.
The General Administrative Rules shall ensure the uniform application of laws by the
authorities and are binding upon them. The Rules do not enjoy general applicability vis--vis
every individual in the same way that laws do. However, because regulatory bodies must base
their decisions on these rules, they have legal relevance also for those to whom administrative
decisions, e.g. licenses, are directed. In those cases the rules have a direct external effect and

160
Deutscher Bundestag. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Strkung der klimagerechten Entwicklung in den
Stdten und Gemeinden. (Berlin: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., 2011).
161
BGBl. 2012 I, pp. 212, 249. See also Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 89 (2012/1) OECD/NEA, Paris, p. 120.
162
Bundesanzeiger AT (5 September 2012), B1, p. 1.
79

concretize the norms which the license is based upon. For that reason, the Federal Administrative
Court ruled that those General Administrative Rules which concretize the norms on the license
must be published.
163

Nuclear Safety
Safety requirements for nuclear power plants (2012)
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety and
the nuclear regulators of the Lnder (states) agreed to amend and to update the Safety Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants of 21 October 1977
164
and the Incident Guidelines of 18 October 1983.
165

They also agreed to invalidate the Bases for Safety Management Systems at Nuclear Power
Plants of 29 June 2004.
166
The Federal Ministry and the Lnder regulators decided to issue the
new Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants of 22 November 2012.
167
The German
regulators will apply the new safety requirements and measure the nuclear safety of commercial
nuclear power plants against these requirements.
The requirements contain principal and overarching safety requirements within the non-
legally binding, sub-statutory, framework. They are designed to ensure that the necessary
precautions against damage required to be taken by the operator of a nuclear installation in
accordance with Section 7, paragraph 2 no. 3 of the Atomic Energy Act comply with the state of
the art in science and technology. They will also be applied if safety assessments take place in

163
Judgement of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht of 25 November 2004, BVerwG 5 CN 1.53.
164
Bundesanzeiger No. 206 (3 November 1977).
165
Bundesanzeiger No. 245a (31 December 1983).
166
Bundesanzeiger No. 138 (27 July 2004), p. 16275.
167
Bundesanzeiger AT (24 January 2013), B3, p. 1.
80

the course of government supervisory activities pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of the Atomic
Energy Act.
Section 49, paragraph 1 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance
168
defines the structural
and other technical protective measures against design basis accidents in or at a nuclear power
plant. According to sentence 3 of this paragraph, the licensing authority may consider these
precautions to have been taken, particularly when the applicant for the design of the facility has
used those design basis accidents as a basis that must, in accordance with the published safety
criteria and guidelines for power plants, determine the design of a nuclear power plant.
Compliance with the new safety requirements confirms that the precautions taken are
appropriate.
The regulators agreed to update the Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants at
regular intervals.
Transport of radioactive material
International Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road (2010, 2012)
The 22nd Ordinance of 31 August 2012 to Amend the Annexes A and B to the ADR
Agreement, as agreed in Geneva on 26-29 October 2010, 3-5 May 2011, 8-11 November 2011
and 8-10 May 2012, was published in Bundesgesetzblatt 2012 II p. 954. The Ordinance made
effective the amendments to Annexes A and B to the European Agreement of 30 September
1957 on the International Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road in the version published on 25

168
Verordnung ber den Schutz vor Schden durch ionisierende Strahlen (Strahlen schutz verordnung -
StrlSchV), BGBl. 2001 I, p. 1739.
81

November 2010
169
. The version of the Annexes which was made effective by the 21st Ordinance
of 7 October 2010 was repealed. The 22nd Ordinance entered into force on 1 January 2013.
Regulations on nuclear trade (including non-proliferation)
Export List (2013)
The 110th Ordinance to Amend the Export List Annex AL to the Foreign Trade
Ordinance of 15 January 2013 was published in Bundesanzeiger AT 22 January 2013 V1p. 1.
Part I Section C of the list contains the European Unions List of Dual-use Items and Technology
category 0 of which lists Nuclear material, facilities and equipment.
State Internalization of EU policies
Since the 1973 oil crisis, there has been no compelling EU plan on energy security, which
is quite unexpected.
170
Recent increases in oil prices have cautioned against the pressure that the
rate of depletion of oil placed on the market price. The 2000s showed that the emergence of
some major economies like China, India and Brazil put a pressure surge on oil and gas energy
prices. The global downturn that followed the financial crisis of 2008 did not release this
pressure. The danger is still there even if there are existing thoughts on new energy sources.
Shale gas has been considered in the more recent years as one of these new sources that could
return the trend to higher energy prices. Many observers believe that it will actually put a strong
downward pressure on energy prices, especially if large economies like the US will fully exploit

169
BGBl. 2010 II, p. 1412; BGBl. 2011 II, p. 1246. See also Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 85, (2010/1),
169
OECD/NEA Paris, p. 106.
169

170
Pascal Petit, "France and Germany Nuclear Energy Policies Revisited: A Veblenian Appraisal,"
Panoeconomicus 7, no. 5 (2013): pp. 687-698.
82

this source. However, this exploitation also exhibits environmental risks. For an instance, it is
forbidden in France, for instance. Reserves are also disappointing at times, as in Poland where it
was deemed for a while as a new main energy resource, but eventually turned out to be
somewhat secondary. Much of the buzz around shale gas is linked with the special conditions of
its extraction in the United States a large country where the gas extraction comes with some
valuable oil products while a relatively dense circuit of pipelines aid distribution. Private
ownership of land decentralized exploitation decisions, while the comparatively low
environmental apprehension helps to minimize the risk of pollution of water sources and
damages of methane leaks (a gas 25 times worse than C02 in terms of greenhouse gas effect)
often accompanying extraction. It is estimated to be as high as 9% of shale gas extracted. These
negative externalities should, in due time, significantly limit the exploitation of shale gas in other
countries and in the US. The use of shale gas in the US and the consequent decrease in energy
prices could disrupt the energy market for some time, with sometimes startling substitution
effect. Thus, the increasing use of shale gas in the US lowers the price of coal in the US, which is
finally used in Germany to cope with risks and setbacks in the production of renewable energy
sources. Overall, though, this windfall is unlikely to release the long term pressure on energy
access at reasonable prices. In that sense, shale gas is not an alternative.
171

Even though a solution is yet to be obtained, what is more important is that the EU
supports the transition to renewable energy (wind, solar or water). Planned actions have been
made by the EU to continue increasing the members' participation with regards to renewable
energy; however as this is considered a long term process, an immediate shift is not possible.
Also, because this is a time consuming objective skepticism arises on grand plans such as the

171
Ibid.
83

Germanled Desertec project (the production of solar energy to be transmitted to Europe from the
Sahara desert) and the UK development of wind farms. These in many instances are not
continued and are objectively shut down due to the costly expenditure and the implementation
process.
Ultimately, climate preservation is always understood to be the reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions and other uses. Although the one to lead this action is the European Union itself,
to achieve the goal of a 20% reduction in the consumption of the overall energy by 2020 is still
undeniably modest and is not likely to affect the energy prices. In the current circumstances of
slow growth, energy savings is unlikely to happen where facilities and equipments are not
invested upon because of their primary difficulty and when the same goal of energy savings is
not implied on non-EU competitors. In cases like the Kyoto Protocol, where countries are
committed to reduce significant amounts of greenhouse gas emissions from 2008-2012, was not
renewed mostly by non-EU partners pose a challenge on the capability of the EU to move
forward. Furthermore, the renewal of countries from 2013-2020 accounts for only 14% of
greenhouse gas emissions globally. Therefore for the next two decades, the EU cannot have a
policy that could decrease the cost of energy sources; although there is a reason for a low key
strategy. Any other possibility of accomplishing this feat would need an industrial policy that is
strong with proceeding actions to coordinate the supply and restrict use. Although standard
market mechanisms has already been reduced from former EU central coordination systems. The
European Commission conducted the new energy plan with the core to be confident that the deal
for non-EU energy producing countries by the EU member states is transparent. The only means
if adjustment that is recognized by the EU is market transparency. In facing the challenges of
energy security, the establishment of the Coal and Steel European Community by means of
84

interventionism could not be repeated today. Finally, on supposition that the EU policy is not as
strong as to bind the energy policies of France and Germany respectively, the opposite may have
enough evidence to point out that the lack of severity of the EU policy on the energy policy
would originate from the policies of France and Germany.
DATA ANALYSIS
Convergence and Divergence on Nuclear Policies of France and Germany
History of Energy Policies
This study is foreseeing the current shift in French and German policies concerning the
production of nuclear energy. France will apparently decrease the share of nuclear energy in the
production of electricity from the Factors that Pushed the Agenda of France and Germany
Forward present 75% to 50% by 2025 while Germany chose to pursue a complete nuclear phase
out from nuclear energy by 2022. These two countries had very different opinions after the oil
crisis of the 1970s with France's investments in nuclear power stations to increase up to 75% of
its electricity production compared to Germany with only 25%. The change in policy took place
when Europe faced a two point challenge: (1) the essential access to secure energy sources at
sensible prices in a time where we are looking at the consumption of nonrenewable sources is
pushing prices to increase; (2) the necessity to decrease greenhouse gas emissions in accordance
with the Kyoto Protocol that Europe has been advocating to prevent a sudden striking climate
changes in the near future. The change is also equivalent to the dismantling of nuclear power
stations established at the wake of the 1980s. It is questionable that there is such change when
nuclear energy is appropriately a part of the solution to the challenges invoked. The nuclear
85

accident in Fukushima, Japan is a perfect example of the need for a different nuclear policy,
although it was not the cause for change as it occurred after Germany and France chose their
paths; it pushed forward their seemingly different causes. Interestingly enough, the balance
between Germany and France in the functioning of the economy is surprisingly similar as the
two are regarded as coordinated economies in the written works on diversity of capitalism (see
Peter Hall and David Soskice 2001; Bruno Amable 2003).
The absence of cooperative effort between Germany and France's energy policies does
not come solely on the limited capability of the cooperation between the two countries.
Distinctions of nuclear energy are accountable for a large sum of the moves, to a great extent the
rate of the danger and time of the involved projects as it was gradually revealed. These suggests
that the European Union will hastily return the motivation for an energy policy that needs more
engagement and compliance to succeed in dealing with the challenges it faces.
Since the Fukushima accident, an official inspection was issued by the EU on the safety
and security of all power stations in the absence of the requirement of these tests that are
accountable for the risks of terrorism or the safe management of waste, all of which allow an
accurate perception that the nuclear technology is far from being a safe technology. Even after
increasing the safety measures to unparalleled levels that affected the economic justification of
constructing the new reactors did not bring confidence to the populations that are still terrified of
the extent of probable danger. A repetition of perhaps the Chernobyl accident occurring in a
power station near Paris would clearly impose an evacuation of the whole region for decades. At
this stage, safety is implied as the controlling power of the central state in a totalitarian regime.
86

Germany and France are clearly apart, and where France is even compelled to withdraw
from its much too anticipated nuclear option. A debate would be useful but timely as a large
number of power stations have already reached the termination period of activity and will be
deactivated. The progression thereafter is costly and there are many peremptory requests of
deferral despite the fact that the general direction of developed countries is more in a relation to
reduction of the share of nuclear energy.
Ultimately, nuclear energy and its use for all the reasons already mentioned seem to be in
a preliminary phase which has been put to use ahead of time. This is aggravated by the fact that
nuclear reactors has been functioning for already two decades in the environment of a free
market where producers have attempted to cut costs at the liability of maximum safety which has
been continuously underestimated.
Enforcing this progression of alteration or movement and establishing its empirical nature
gives the impression of the belief that new development of nuclear reactors shall be confirmed to
bring a feasible, inexpensive, lasting source of energy. It justifies that a numerous set of the
members of the EU are taking part in a large international research project ITER which aims to
advance a new stage of nuclear power, specifically nuclear fusion that will bring an enduring
source of energy, with only a small amount of waste to be managed, but identical risks in the
concept of radioactivity in instances of accidents. This costly research project has been rather
doubtful because of always postponing the sphere of its inevitable success.
172

These current specific policies of France and Germany are analyzed by the researchers
using Historical Institutionalism as a theory. The researchers primarily look at history such as the

172
Pascal Petit, France and Germany Nuclear Energy Policies Revisited: A Veblenian Appraisal,
Panoeconomicus 7, no. 5 (2013): pp. 687-698.
87

events that have occurred in the past that might have affected the decisions of actors in shaping
its existing policies. Secondly, the researchers consider the public opinion and assess how it also
affects the states decisions. Lastly, political institutions of the two states are determined and
how it contributes to the decision-making process of the states is also viewed.
The 1973 Oil Crisis
Energy policies have been marked by the recent oil crises,
173
catastrophic accidents such
as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, not to mention the impacts of the recent Fukushima
nuclear accident.
174
The 1973 oil crisis started on October 16, 1973 when the members of
OAPEC proclaimed and oil embargo raising the oil price by 70%.
175
The embargo is inconsistent
in Europe. France has received steady supplies while Germany only faced partial decline. The
price increase had a much greater impact in Europe than the embargo.
176
Part of the decrease in
prices comes from the shift from oil consumption to alternate energy sources.
177
OPEC had
relied on the limited price inelasticity of oil demand to maintain high consumption but had
underestimated the extent to which other sources of supply would become beneficial as the price
increased. Electricity generation from nuclear power reduced the demand for oil.
178
The two
countries had pursued different actions following the oil crisis in 1973, with France investing
heavily in nuclear energy to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel compared with up to only 25%

173
Howard Stein, The Neoliberal Policy Paradigm and the Great Recession, Panoeconomicus59, no. 4
(2012): 421-440.
174
Stephen Thomas et al., The Economics of Nuclear Power (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 2007).
175
Ferenc L. Toth and Hans-HolgerRogner, "Oil and Nuclear Power: Past, Present, and Future,Energy
Economics 28, no. 3 (2006): 1 25.
176
Barbara Slavin, Milt Freudenheim and Willian C. Rhoden, "The World; British Miners Settle for Less,"
The New York Times.
177
Patrick L. Anderson, et al., "Price Elasticity of Demand," The Universal Tuition Tax Credit: A Proposal
to Advance Parental Choice in Education 11, no. 1 (1997): 13-17.
178
Ibid.
88

in Germany.EU has not come up with a strong plan on energy security since the 1973 oil crisis,
which gave an idea on how vulnerable the EU members are.
179

Three Mile I sland Accident
The Three Mile Island accident was a partial nuclear meltdown which occurred in one of
the two Three Mile Island nuclear reactors in Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979 when the reactor
was operating at 97% power. It involved a relatively minor malfunction in the secondary cooling
circuit which caused the temperature in the primary coolant to rise. This in turn caused the
reactor to shut down automatically. Shut down took about one second. Then, a relief valve failed
to close, and so much of the primary coolant drained away that the residual decay heat in the
reactor core was not removed. The core suffered severe damage as a result.
180
This was
supplemented by communication problems which caused conflicting information to the public,
contributing to the public's fears.
181
This was actually said to be the worst accident in the nuclear
history of US. The operators were unable to assess or respond accurately to the unplanned
automatic shutdown of the reactor. Lack of control room for machineries and insufficient
emergency response training proved to be root causes of the accident. A small amount of
radiation was released from the plant but it was not serious and has no health hazards. It
produced a significant, long-term improvement in the performance of all nuclear power plants,
although public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in USA, strongly declined.
182



179
Stein, The Neoliberal Policy, 433.
180
J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2006)
181
Mike Gray and Ira Rosen, The Warning: Accident at Three Mile Island (New York: W.W. Norton,
2003).
182
Ibid.
89

Chernobyl Catastrophe
This disparity of the two countries vis--vis nuclear energy was clearly determined after
the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine on April, 26, 1986.
183
The accident was the result of a
damaged reactor design that was operated with inefficiently trained personnel. It was the first
major nuclear power plant accident that resulted in a large-scale fire and subsequent explosions,
immediate and delayed deaths of plant operators and emergency service workers, and the
radioactive contamination of a significant land area.
184
The resulting steam explosion and fires
released at least 5% of the radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind. Two
Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and a further 28 people died within a
few weeks as a result of acute radiation poisoning. Radioactivity was released over a 10-day
period which resulted in millions of Soviets, and other Europeans, being exposed to significant
levels of radioactive fallout.
185
Although there was an increase in the number of thyroid cancers
victims, there is no evidence of a major public health impact a priori to radiation exposure
twenty years after the accident. For France, the accident was seen as an irrelevant accident that
would not have an effect on the French territories which was later proved to be incorrect
while Germany has strongly begrudged its impacts from the start which reinforced the anti-
nuclear movement.
186




183
Frank Barnaby, "Chernobyl: The Consequences in Europe," Ambio 15, no. 6 (1986): 332-334.
184
Ibid.
185
Harold M. Ginzburg and Eric Reis, "Consequences of the Nuclear Power Plant Accident at Chernobyl,"
Public Health Reports 106, no. 1 (1991):32-40.
186
Barnaby, "Chernobyl: The Consequences in Europe," 332.
90

Fukushima Disaster
Following the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 and at Chernobyl in 1986,
Fukushima will be remembered as the third major accident in the history of civilian nuclear
power reactors. Yet Chernobyl was and remains the worst trauma in this history as a result of
which nuclear developments slowed down significantly.
187
The Fukushima incident was caused
by a tsunami in Japan which produced equipment failures, and without this equipment a loss-of-
coolant accident followed with nuclear meltdowns and releases of radioactive
materials.
188
Although the aftermath of the Fukushima accident has established the need for a new
nuclear policy, it was not the cause for change since it took place after Germany and France have
followed different options.
189
Even before the incident, Germany has already planned the
phasing-out
190
while France was only considering a partial phase-out, lowering nuclear
production of electricity from 75% to 50% by 2020. The same shift to decrease nuclear
dependence, although non-binding, was recommended at the EU level.
191
This incident has
stimulated a new turn to respond to the risks of future huge disasters that can come in numerous
ways, and avoid the colossal costs of decommissioning reactors.
192

Although an immediate solution is not available, EU encourages its members to divert to
renewable sources of energy. It is more of a long-term objective, but a short-term solution to the

187
Selma Kus, "International Nuclear Law in the 25 Years between Chernobyl and Fukushima and
Beyond," Nuclear Law Bulletin 87, no. 1 (2011): 7-26.
188
Eliza Strickland, What Went Wrong in Japan's Nuclear Reactors, IEEE Spectrum 16, no. 3
(2011): 17-24.
189
Kus, "International Nuclear Law," 19.
190
Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: Cosimo Classics
History, 2006).
191
Gary A. Dymski, Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs:
Paradoxes of the Global Crisis, Panoeconomicus58, no. 3 (2011): 285-308.
192
M. V. Ramana, "Nuclear policy responses to Fukushima: Exit, voice, and loyalty," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 69, no.2 (2013): 66-76.
91

rising problem of energy access.
193
There have been a few coordinated moves at the EU level to
boost the rate of renewable energy in all member states; but this takes time since it is a lengthy
process.
194
A solid EU policy which would set the energy policies of France or Germany should
be enforced; otherwise, a feeble EU policy would arise directly from the policies of these two
leading countries.
195

Public Opinion
France and Germany are both democratic countries. If the German population is greener
than their French counterpart, it could be a plausible explanation why Germany abandoned
nuclear energy. However, it is impossible to compare the public opinion of France and Germany.
To only put into comparison the public polls is not equivalent in doing the same to public
opinion. Even through close investigation, there is no public poll that asked the same set of
questions for both countries. The questions asked in the poll are firstly very sensitive. And even
though the theme of the questions asked are the same, if the questions are asked in a different
manner, the result of the poll will also be different. But looking closely at both countries' public
poll on nuclear energy there are some findings.
Public opinion in France
On behalf of France, EDF took the public opinion poll concerning public acceptance of
nuclear power. After a close examination on all public opinion polls lead by the EDF, it suggests
that majority of the French people take nuclear energy as an economic reality that is widely

193
Dymski, Limits of Policy Intervention in a World of Neoliberal Mechanism Designs.
194
Ibid.
195
JakubHandrlica, "Harmonisation of Nuclear Liability in the European Union: Challenges, Options and
Limits," Nuclear Law Bulletin 84, no. 2 (2010): 35-64.
92

accepted. After the constant reminder of nuclear energy producing larger electricity share, 63%
favored the energy policy by the French government in December 1996.
196
Ultimately, the public
opinion poll shows that nuclear energy acceptance is high in France. Nonetheless, another
opinion poll conducted by the IAEA shows that in some years there are oppositions to nuclear
energy that reached closely 50% in poll.
197

Public opinion in Germany
There are rarely occurrences of institutions that take a public poll with regards to the
public acceptance of nuclear energy in Germany. However, there are still some institutions who
take the poll. Institut fr Demoskopie in Allensbach carried out an independent survey across
Germany, inquiring on the public's opinion concerning the use of nuclear power on 1992.
Surprisingly, the majority of the results show that Germans predict nuclear power to continue
existing as a major energy source in the near future, with just 5% of the public foreseeing a
nuclear phase-out and the complete dismantling of current nuclear power plants. As for the
people's personal opinions, results show that rather than expecting nuclear energy to be
decommissioned, it became apparent that opposition to nuclear power has reduced. Those in
approval of a nuclear phase-out amounted to only 22%, the lowest record over the two decades.
In total, 81% were in favor of nuclear power plants to continue operating or for new ones to have
a license for full operation. To confirm these circumstances, Vereinigung
DeutscherElektrizittswerke e.V. (VDEW) published a newer public opinion poll. As of July
1998 those who are interested for a nuclear phase-out were only 21%.
198


196
EURELECTRIC, Survey of Different Approaches.
197
IAEA, Country Nuclear Power Profiles. 2009.
198
EURELECTRIC, Survey of Different Approaches Utilized to Aid Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy.
93

Political Institutions
International Political Economy (IPE) has been discussing on the topic of political
institution as one of the factors that is liable for the political consequences of international
commitment or economic policy. Other literature mentions the nuclear industry of France is the
result of the outcome in French political institutions. On the other hand, there are no literature
discussing the concern of the causal relationship between political institutions and the energy
policy as well as the association of the two.
199
However, there is a significant role of the green
parties in both France and Germany in the history of its energy policies. From this an assumption
is granted; the election system, degree of decentralization of power, and the political institution
system have a causal interrelationship with the result of energy policy.
Political I nstitution in France
Frances election system is also known as a small district system. For the presidential and
legislative elections, the two-round system is followed. For the election of the president, only the
top two candidates are the ones allowed to run on the second ballot while in the election of the
legislators the candidates need a support of at least 12.5 per cent of registered voters in the first
round in order to be eligible for the second. There is a basic rule for both elections it must take a
majority to be considered on the first ballot and a second ballot is only required if that particular
circumstances are not satisfied.
200


198
(1999)
199
Magali Delmas and Bruce Heiman , Government Credible Commitment to the French and
199
American Nuclear Power Industries, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20, no. 3 (2002): 433456.
200
Andre Blais and Peter John Loewen, The French Electoral System and its Effects, West European
200
Politics 32 no. 2,(2009): 345359.
94

The power of the president in France is incomparable to older governments and to other
European countries. It includes the power to assign a prime minister and the authority to dissolve
an assembly, demand for a referendum and activate powers in cases of emergency. The French
president handles all issues in diplomacy and is also the commander in chief of the military with
the final say on all issues concerning the armed services. After the development of the nuclear
deterrent in France on 1960, presidential power expanded considerably. As well as the regard of
local jurisdiction by decentralization of government, France has always been a unitary state.
Political I nstitution in Germany
Proportional representation is what classifies the system of election in Germany.
Specifically, it is called as a personalized proportional representation where the people would
have to vote for both parties and electorate. The basic rules are as follows: first, the 656 seats
will be distributed accordingly to the parties considering the party vote. Only the parties that
have won at minimum three constituency seats based on the candidate votes can be accepted or
those that have won at least five percent on the second voting in the whole of Germany. Second,
the German Bundesrat is elected through direct voting in only 328 constituencies. Third, the
other 328 constituencies will be through the election of the German Bundestag by way of the
candidate list provided by the parties in the proportional representation. The order in the list of
candidates is predetermined by the parties themselves in advance and is permanent.
201

Implementing the parliamentary system in Germany; the president has the power which is
called chancellor prime minister. However, the administrative affairs of the federal state of
Germany belong to the state government. The lawmaking right of the federal government is

201
Kato Shigeru Jiro, Western Europe Comparing Politics. (Ichigei-sha, 2002).
95

limited as the field diplomacy, nationality, currency and so on. In other words, state government
has the lawmaking power.
202

Comparative Analysis of Political I nstitution
There is a considerable amount of difference between Germany and France's political
institution. Germany follows a federalism government while France has an Unitarianism
government. Centralization is more apparent in France. Decentralization of power is an
important variable in deciding the energy policy of each country. Nuclear power in France would
be easily accepted rather than in Germany. When the German government introduced and passed
the law on nuclear power, the state government easily circumvented the law as they have the
higher authority. Because of this, federalism in Germany allowed the lack of compelling force as
a result more nuclear energy power plants are dismantled in Germany than that of France.
Furthermore, seeing the election system, Germany has more of an advantage in
representing their minority opinion as they follow a propositional election system where there is
comparatively high possibility of coalition. This kind of system of election was inevitably
beneficial to the green party.
The party that strongly disagrees with the usage of nuclear power and played a significant
part in both France and Germany is the Green party. The coalition government under the green
party decided that Germany should abandon nuclear power. The participation of the Green party
in the French government also influenced the decision of France to slow down the progression of
nuclear power in the government. It is important to note that the green party justifiably played a
role in decision-making process concerning the energy policy.

202
Mikiko Iwasaki, Comparative Politics. (Iwanami Shoten, 2005)
96

Germany has a more beneficial system of election for the Green party, a minor party and
federalism realizes a characteristic that makes a federal government harder to progress by own
pace, the liability of the German government became higher that ultimately lead in abolishing
nuclear power. On the other hand, as France proclaims a unitary government, it poses as a
disadvantage for the Green party therefore they were able to enhance their nuclear energy
policy.
203

CONCLUSION
The researchers would like to determine and analyze the differences between the policies
of France and Germany concerning their nuclear energy after the different events that happened
in the nuclear power plant history which affected their interests and led to a shift in their nuclear
policy decision-making process.
The thesis has focused on the obstacles of the development in the areas of the energy
sector in both France and Germany and the external energy relations with the European Union
respecting the fragmented character of the EU energy sector. After that, the paper proceeds to the
analysis of the Member States, France and Germany and their respective formulation of an
energy policy appropriate for their country.
The history of the energy policies in France and Germany established and the conducted
the concern of the specific laws that outline France and Germany's energy policy today. This
laws project the divergence of both countries in the energy sector and their future aspirations as
well as their plans.

203
Fukushima Yuka, Implication of the Determinant of Energy Policy: The Case Study of Nuclear Power
in Germany and France. (PhD diss., University of Tokyo, 2007).
97

This paper has shown, among all others that France and Germany had very different
responses on the variables that affected their decision on proclaiming their very own energy
policies on whether to pursue or not a nuclear phase-out in the energy sphere. Both, France and
Germany, have used economic reasoning in terms of their attitude towards fulfilling as well the
commitment on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, they individually preferred
to strengthen their energy sector without much influence from the EU.
Furthermore, policy change in the integration of the internal market within both countries
occurs when particular energy crisis happens such as the oil crisis, the Chernobyl accident, and
the Fukushima disaster. However, we can assess that although public opinion on energy is
important, it does not necessarily correlate to the results of the energy policy in every country.
Moreover, there is also an assumption that the structure of France and Germany's political
institutions plays a very important role on the decision-making process.







98

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