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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento
SET I CASE DIGESTS


1. Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot , 74 Phil. 579
Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads
as follows

Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60

Issue: Whether or not the advertisement is ethical.

Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of merchantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)




2. Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)
Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October
13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him
as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio,
because the Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the
motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:
No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a
mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact
that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts
or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court].
The lawyer involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as defendant-
appellants counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new
counsel for the defendant-appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio
(People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the
highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and
given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
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The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de officio for such action as it may
deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)



(Another Digest)
Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge.

On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced
discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte.

The respondent Judge not only denied the motion but also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants.

On November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent
him from handling adequately the defense.

On November 6, Judge denied the motion. Hence, Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as Election Registrar.

Held: The ends of justice would be served by requiring Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio because: the case has been
postponed at least 8 times at the defense's instance; there was no incompatibility between duty of petitioner to defend the accused,
and his task as an election registrar. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time.

Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known
that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

In People v. Holgado: In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be convicted
not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons
who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of
his own.

The present Constitution provides not only that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel but further
provides that Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel,
and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. This made manifest the
indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of the accused.

Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.


3. JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUI
FACTS:
! Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care
and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by
legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of
donation.
! Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."
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! Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the
administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became
the administrator.
! Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned
in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next
day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or
of his brother's assumption of the position.
! Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office
be turned over to him; and the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui
later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned
by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
! As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is
the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation.
However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
! The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws
from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify
him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated
by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio
de Barili.
! Court a quo - decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged
lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be
given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator? YES
RATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has
reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138
such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission
to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed
all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed
there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession
of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the
"titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions
subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable
value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less
exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
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For the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the
founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio
Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews.
Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the
circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line
and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.


4. Villegas vs Legaspi

FACTS:
On 27 Sept 1979, Villegas filed a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the
Court of First Instance Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were represented by Valentino
Legaspi, an assemblyman and a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged the representation made by Legaspi as
counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional; as pointed out by Villegas no member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction. The presiding Judge however overruled Villegas challenged
and proceeded with the trial. Judge said that Courts of First Instance have appellate jurisdiction. Villegas appealed the decision.

ISSUE: whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can
appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance

HELD: NO

We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance by legislators before Courts of First
Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that
whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must be
deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. 14

It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that members of the Commission on
Appointments shall not appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction. The intent was clear
that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of
appellate jurisdiction. The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments could not appear before Courts of First
Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the framers was appellate jurisdiction more than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, the scope of the prohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from
appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction. Consistently, the principal criterion is appellate jurisdiction.
So that, when a legislator appears in an original case filed with a Court with appellate jurisdiction.

Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in the legislature. 15Their office has always
favored them with the influence and prestige that it carried. Today, as before, it is only appellate practice that is allowed with the
significant difference that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This so because with the removal of the legislative power
to review appointments the source of power and influence that members of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the exercise of
the legal profession has been greatly minimized.

The limited application to appellate practice is a view-point favored by constitutionalist of eminence, Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, in his scholarly work The Constitution of the Philippine, 22 where he said:
It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal case, but he cannot do so before any administrative body.
Also, while it is only appellate practice that is allowed a member of the National Assembly, formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a
Senator or Representative who was in the Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the present Constitution. Those
differences should be noted (Emphasis supplied) 23

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were acting in
the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two
cases involved herein.



5. Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960]

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Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and
vesting in it the ownership and control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, Bauan Batangas passed
Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.

Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of
Bauan in an action to be brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act. Given this, the municipality
engaged the services of a special counsel to commence an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.

The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing
that the Municipality of Bauan had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel

Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage the services of a special counsel

Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty
to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this case he is not. A fiscal cannot refuse the
performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of
a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of
the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General
was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.




6. Salcedo vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-42992. August 8, 1935]
Ponente: DIAZ, J.

FACTS:

Attorney Vicente Francisco, representing the petitioner-appellant, inserted alleged contemptuous paragraph in his motion for
reconsideration read as follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some
voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of
which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.

The court required him to show cause, if any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that
purpose. In his answer Atty. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion,
reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not contempt to tell the
truth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent-appellee is guilty of contempt.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Francisco ordered to pay a fine of P200.00 in ten days and reprimanded.

RATIO:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its
dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not right (Malcolm,
Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
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the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such guarranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation.




7. ALAWI V. ALAUYA
PARTIES
ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa
ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court

FACTS
Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by ALAUYA of a housing unit
A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC)
Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on thegrounds that his
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and proceeded
to expound using acerbic language
A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa
ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of hisloan
Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loanfrom NHMFC
NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions
Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA
o 1) Committed malicious and libelous charges
o 2) Usurped the title of attorney

ISSUE
W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARI'A BAR CAN USE THE TITLE "ATTY"

HELD
1. FIRST ISSUE
YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4. Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and public interest
ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use language which is abusive,offensive,
scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper
His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused

2. SECOND ISSUE
NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged membersof the
Philippine Bar and may practice law only before Sharia courts
ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is immaterial becausedisinclination to use said
title does not warrant his use of the title attorney".



8. PANGAN V. RAMOS
Legal Ethics 93 SCRA 87 Lack of Candor by a Lawyer

FACTS:
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly
appeared before a court in Manila. When the records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found
that he used the name Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the right to use such name because in his
birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio Ramos. D.D. stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mothers surname.
However, in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.

HELD:
No. The attorneys roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice
law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official
oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has
irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and frankness. In representing himself to the court as Pedro D.D. Ramos instead of
Dionisio D. Ramos, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The Supreme Court hence severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction will warrant suspension or disbarment.
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9. PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA
G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals who
passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is
the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application
of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected
with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the
law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions
of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.




10. IU VS. BONIFACIO
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly
carrying an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she
and Carlos got married in 1985 but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they
were married in 1987.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law.

Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession
simply by passing the bar, he must also have a continued possession of good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the good and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of
social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution.

Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it
was with what she believed as a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference
to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.

On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable that she did not know the
year of her marriage or she failed to check that the information on the document she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of malpractice.


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11. DELES V. ARAGONA
FACTS:
Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of the intestate estate of the late Joaquina
Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are heirs of the estate concurrently with other forced heirs) in
special proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. On July 26, 1961, the intestate court issued an order denying a proposed
lease of ten hectares of the estate by the complainant to one Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of the
said land. In effect, the order likewise sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said
land being tenanted by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.

In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of the landholdings by placing thereon her
own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their rights, countered by filing against a the complainant two petitions with
the Court of Agrarian relations in Iloilo. They alleged in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr.
since 1960 on a parcel of riceland located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at the start
of the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent [complainant herein] ordered one Bonifacio Margarejo to
harrow the plowed land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners. Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of an
interlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her representatives from interfering with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in
question pending determination of the merits of their petitions.

On June 18, 1962, the complainant's men again entered the land in question and planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry
prompted the Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the
respondent), to file an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no objection by the complainant against the
said motion, and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued the interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the respondent,
her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners
in their respective landholdings."

On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies of the order on the
complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers to the possession of their landholdings.
On the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the complainant, about the said order. For several months
thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the palay planted on the land in question became ripe and ready
for harvest.

Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a telegram which reads as follows:
BALASAN OCT 2 62
GILDA ACOLADO
ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY
TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT HARVEST TODAY....
MAMANG
The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda Acolado, their daughter.

After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City; when informed
that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon of that same day. She went to see
the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had sent the telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was
personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and
harvested the palay thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed
companions harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that instead of filing a
complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she decided instead to see the respondent without delay.

Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the agrarian court a verified "Urgent Motion to
Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court", praying that the complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for,
contempt of court for violating the interlocutory order. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very same day it was filed, an instant
reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out from the, records claiming that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it
was the respondent who should be punished for contempt for deliberately misleading the agrarian court.

Complainant thus filed a a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Aragona upon a verified letter-complaint of Aurora Soriano Deles
charging the former with having made, under oath, false and unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian
Relations, which allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering. Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court
in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for contempt filed by the respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's
countermotion, also for contempt, against the former instead, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the
complainant's counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao brothers.


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ISSUE: Whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente E. Aragona, Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under
oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases, which allegedly contains false and libelous
imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant

HELD:
NO, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
This Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the questioned motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis
for disciplinary action against the respondent. But since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the
questioned motion for contempt are statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255
besides being relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding
any liability on the part of the respondent.

To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned pleading lack sufficient factual basis. But
even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in
the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings." In fact, "Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake
of the individual .... The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms .... A
privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive
scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides."

Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of his clients. For, contrary to
the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh. 5) when he prepared the motion for
contempt. According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, he asked
the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he
waited for her. True enough Mrs. Soriano saw the respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was
personally present when one Albert, a tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed men, went to the landholdings of the
Aglinao brothers and, against the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her inquiry, she was
informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.

The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and experience. "The
privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of
law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers,
and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution
or an action for the recovery of damages."



12. BLANZA V. ARCANGEL
FACTS:
Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against respondent Atty.Agustin Arcangel, who
volunteered to be their counsel to file pension claims, for professional non-feasance for (1) his failure to attend to complainants'
pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documentsdespite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his
failure toreturn to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents. Respondent contended that the complainants failed to co-
operate and pay for photostat services, and explained thatthere were no agreement for his compensation as their counsel.

ISSUE: WON respondent can be held liable.

HELD:
No. x x x complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims for their
failure to cooperate and pay for the photostat services. But while we are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for
being legally insufficient, yet we cannot but counsel against this actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a moredynamic and
positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As aman of law, he is necessarily a
leader of the community,looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this
case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have
forthwith terminated their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. x xx let this be a reminder to Atty.
Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him. Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed.



13. MELANIO L. ZORETA vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO [A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several documents during
the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.
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It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not commissioned as notary
public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590 documents after the expiration of his commission as
notary public without having renewed said commission amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed an ex-
parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut
complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting
his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively,
respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

ISSUE: What is the significance of the commission?

RULING:
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents.

For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the
notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had
occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that
he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers
oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.



14. A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. LAARNI N.VALERIO, Respondent.

Facts:
A-1 Fiancial Services filed with the IBP- Commission on Bar Discipline(IBP-CBD), against Atty Laarni Valerio, a complaint for Violation of
Batas Pambansa 22 and non-payment of debt. Respondent had loaned an amount of P/50,000 in Nov13, 2001. A post-dated check was
made for the payment due on April 2002, butupon collection, the check was refused due to insufficient funds.Despite repeated
demands, Atty Valerio failed to pay the said amount. Thusin Nov 2004, a BP 22 criminal case was filed against her. Respondent failed
to showduring scheduled arraignment in August 2004, subsequently a warrant of arrest wasissued but Atty Valerio failed to post bail.
Complainant sent her a letter requestingher to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail, but in spite of the factthat
respondent signed the receipt for the postal registry return card, respondentdid not heed this. Thus complainant filed an administrative
case before the IBP.A few months later, the mother of Atty Valerio submitted a letter that herdaughter had schizophrenia and thus
cannot appear in court, and that she willpersonally undertake the debt of her daughter. Atty Valerio did not appear for amandatory
conference nor did she file a position paper despite orders.

ISSUE: Whether a lawyers acts to deliberately not pay debts constitute misconduct.

HELD:
Yes, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio be suspended from
the practice of law for a periodof two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors, in
consideration of Atty Valerio, lowered the recommended suspensionto one year on condition that she will appear in court and present
the doctor whosigned her medical certificate within a non-extendable period of ten (10) days. This, Atty Valerio failed to comply with,
and the original findings andrecommendations of the IBP-CBD for a suspension of 2 years was thus meted on her.



15. Re: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS (wild nito! Read the full text to this guys, interesting shiznit :P)
[B.M. No. 1222. February 4, 2004]
En Banc

FACTS:
In the morning of September 21, 2003, the third Sunday of the 2003 bar examinations, the examination in commercial law was held in
De la Salle University on Taft Avenue, Manila, the venue of the bar examinations since 1995. The next day, the newspapers carried
news of an alleged leakage in the said examination.[1]

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Upon hearing the news and making preliminary inquiries of his own, Justice Jose C. Vitug, chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, reported the matter to the Chief Justice and recommended that the examination in mercantile law be cancelled and that a
formal investigation of the leakage be undertaken.

Acting on the report and recommendation of Justice Vitug, the Court, in a resolution dated September 23, 2003, nullified the
examination in mercantile law and resolved to hold another examination in that subject on Saturday, October 4, 2003 at eight oclock in
the evening (being the earliest available time and date) at the same venue. However, because numerous petitions, protests, and
motions for reconsideration were filed against the retaking of the examination in mercantile law, the Court cancelled the holding of
such examination. On the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court instead decided to allocate the fifteen (15)
percentage points for mercantile law among the seven (7) other bar examination subjects (Resolution dated October 7, 2003).

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2003, the Supreme Court created an Investigating Committee composed of three (3) retired
Members of the Court to conduct an investigation of the leakage and to submit its findings and recommendations on or before
December 15, 2003.

The Court designated the following retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to compose the Committee:

Chairman: Justice CAROLINA GRIO-AQUINO
Members: Justice JOSE A. R. MELO and Justice VICENTE V. MENDOZA

The Investigating Committee was directed to determine and identify the source of the leakage, the parties responsible therefor and
those who benefited therefrom, and to recommend measures to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations. The investigation
commenced on October 21, 2003 and continued up to November 7, 2003. The Committee held nine (9) meetings - six times to conduct
the investigation and three times to deliberate on its report.

The Committee finds that the leaked test questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the examiner, Attorney Marcial O. T.
Balgos, had prepared and submitted to Justice Jose C. Vitug, as chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations Committee. The questions
constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some
cases with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as proposed by Atty. Balgos. Hence, any bar examinee
who was able to get hold of the leaked questions before the mercantile law examination and answered them correctly, would have
been assured of passing the examination with at least a grade of 82%!

The circumstance that the leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions prepared by Atty. Balgos, proves conclusively that
the leakage originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug, the Bar Examinations Chairman.

Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the source of the leaked
test questions was Atty. Balgos computer. The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty. Balgos computer without the latters
knowledge and consent, and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos legal assistant, Attorney Danilo De Guzman, who
voluntarily confessed the deed to the Investigating Committee. De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the help of
his secretary Reynita Villasis, to his fraternity brods, namely, Ronan Garvida, Arlan (whose surname he could not recall), and Erwin
Tan.

In turn, Ronan Garvida faxed the test questions to Betans Randy Iigo and James Bugain. Randy Iigo passed a copy or copies of the
same questions to another Betan, Alan Guiapal, who gave a copy to the MLQU-Beta Sigma [Lambdas] Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald
F. Collado, who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies to the MLQUs 30 bar candidates.

ISSUE:
W/N De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar
W/N Atty. Balgos should also be reprimanded for his negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for
the bar examination in mercantile law

HELD:
YES TO BOTH. The Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to
DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law
REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O.T. BALGOS and DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as an Examiner in Mercantile
Law;
DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to undertake further investigation of Danilo De Guzman, Cheryl Palma,
Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective accountabilities in the bar examination leakage and to conduct an investigation
on how Danilo De Guzman was able to secure a copy of the Supreme Courts CALR database.

Attorney Danilo De Guzmans act of downloading Attorney Balgos test questions in mercantile law from the latters computer, without
his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions were intellectual
property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge. Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an
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unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos right to privacy of communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized
search and seizure - rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. By transmitting and distributing the stolen
test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to given them undue
advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity
brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
members of the Bar.

However, the Investigating Committee does not believe that De Guzman was solely responsible for the leakage of Atty. Balgos
proposed test questions in the mercantile law examination. The Committee does not believe that he acted alone, or did not have the
assistance and cooperation of other persons, such as:

Cheryl Palma, Atty. Balgos private secretary, who, according to Atty. Balgos himself, was the only person who knew the password,
who could open and close his computer; and who had the key to his office where his computer was kept. Since a computer may not be
accessed or downloaded unless it is opened, someone must have opened Atty. Balgos computer in order for De Guzman to retrieve the
test questions stored therein.

Silvestre Atienza, also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer with the other
computers outside Atty. Balgos room or office, and who was the only other person, besides Cheryl Palma, who knew the password of
Atty. Balgos computer. The following persons who received from De Guzman, and distributed copies of the leaked test questions,
appear to have conspired with him to steal and profit from the sale of the test questions. They could not have been motivated solely by
a desire to help the fraternity, for the leakage was widespread (kalat na kalat) according to Erwin Tan. The possible co-conspirators
were: Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, Ronald Collado, and Allan Guiapal.

On the other hand, the Committee finds that the theft of the test questions from Atty. Balgos computer could have been avoided if
Atty. Balgos had exercised due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he prepared. As the computer is a
powerful modern machine which he admittedly is not fairly familiar with, he should not have trusted it to deep secret the test questions
that he stored in its hard disk. He admittedly did not know the password of his computer. He relied on his secretary to use the
password to open and close his computer. He kept his computer in a room to which other persons had access. Unfamiliar with the use
of the machine whose potential for mischief he could not have been totally unaware of, he should have avoided its use for so sensitive
an undertaking as typing the questions in the bar examination. After all he knew how to use the typewriter in the use of which he is
quite proficient. Atty. Balgos should therefore have prepared the test questions in his trusty typewriter, in the privacy of his home,
(instead of his law office), where they would have been safe from the prying eyes of secretaries and assistant attorneys. Atty. Balgos
negligence in the preparation and safekeeping of his proposed test questions for the bar examination in mercantile law, was not the
proximate cause of the bar leakage; it was, in fact, the root cause. For, if he had taken those simple precautions to protect the
secrecy of his papers, nobody could have stolen them and copied and circulated them. The integrity of the bar examinations would not
have been sullied by the scandal. He admitted that Mali siguro ako, but that was what happened.