IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
JOHN C. MIDDLETON, : Petitioner-Appellee, : No.: 14-2677 : v. : : DONALD P. ROPER, Superintendent, : Potosi Correctional Facility, : Respondent-Appellant. : :
MOTION FOR REHEARING OF VACATUR
Respondent moves to vacate the second stay of execution entered by Chief Judge Perry on July 15, 2014, (Doc. 139), in relation to Mr. Middletons Supplemental Petition raising Ford claims (Doc. 130). Pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the district court ruled to stay the pending 2254 proceedings and hold them in abeyance to permit Petitioner to exhaust claims in state court that this Court, in a panel decision entered last night (July 15), determined was necessary but, the panel expressly acknowledged, would require the Missouri Supreme Court to adapt its procedures in order to permit adjudication of Ford claims. Middleton v. Roper, No. 14-2667, ID 4175573 at 3. Middleton has been more than diligent. He has been hyper-vigilant in pursuing his Ford claim in the Missouri courts, despite the total absence of process for bringing such claims. In fact, Middletons efforts have illuminated that the Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637
2 Missouri Supreme Court Rule 91 is a narrow writ which applies only in certain, enumerated categories. Middleton v. Roper, No. 14-2667, ID 4175601 at 4 (Bye, J., dissenting). The opportunity for the Missouri Supreme Court to adaptat has been presented from time to time since Ford was rendered in 1986, with the latest such occasion arising in November 2013 in relation to Mr. Joseph Franklins execution. The Missouri Supreme Court has always declined these opportunities. Along with staying the 2254 proceedings to permit exhaustion per this Courts order of last night, the district court granted another stay of execution. Whether the Court should now vacate that stay and permit the execution of Mr. Middleton in light of the States strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments is to be determined by evaluation of certain factors bearing upon the equitable nature of this remedy. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). I. Claims have significant possibility of success on the merits As the district court found, Middleton has established a significant possibility of success on the merits. Hill, 547 U.S. 584, citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-96 (1983). In the district courts earlier ruling on July 15 staying Middletons execution, the court found: Although the psychiatrist characterizes this opinion as preliminary because he wishes to obtain additional information, it is sufficient to make the substantial threshold showing of incompetence that Ford recognized would entitle him to a stay of execution and a full hearing. This evidence is certainly as strong as that submitted in Panetti. There the petitioners sufficient showing consisted of a letter and a declaration from two individuals, a psychologist and a law professor, who had interviewed petitioner while on death row on February 3, 2004. Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637
3 (Doc. 135 at 3-4), citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 931, 938 (2007) (emphasis added). This finding of fact is subject to review for clear error. Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 495 (8th Cir. 2011), citing Armstrong v. Kemna, 365 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 2004). As such, this crucial finding establishes the first element under Hill to require the court to uphold the stay of execution. Further, as the district court had correctly reasoned, the contentions the Respondent-Appellant has made in an effort to contest the quality or nature of the substantial showing Middleton has made are the kind of arguments that should be considered at a full Ford hearing, not on a motion to stay execution. (Doc. 135 at 4). II. Petitioner cannot be faulted for not using Rule 91 The district court found that Middleton has shown good cause for not exhausting the claim before the Missouri courts, because of the lack of a clear procedure under Missouri law for raising the claim, and because of reasonable confusion about the appropriate way to raise the claim before the Missouri courts. (Doc. 139). See also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005). The panels ruling yesterday vacating Middletons stay stated that the Missouri Supreme Court would need to adapt its procedures to accommodate a Ford-based Rule 91. This is correct, as the State itself has argued in the last fruitless attempt to litigate Rule 91 in that court. In Joseph Franklins November 2013 filed Rule 91 habeas petition on his Ford claim, the State argued: The proper vehicle for litigating fitness for execution is 552.060, RSMo., not by way of a habeas proceeding. (Exh. 1 at 1 n.1). Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637
4 Apart from the States own view of this question, the panels speculation as to the Missouri Supreme Courts willingness to adapt to accommodate Ford litigation is mooted by what that court has actually said on the matter. When presented with the very question, the court held that 552.060 is the exclusive procedure for determining competency to be executed. In re Competency of Bobby Lewis Shaw, No. CV186-897CC, slip op. at 2-4 (Mo.Cir.Ct. Oct. 7, 1987), appeal dismissed, No. 69954 (Mo.Sup.Ct. Nov. 12, 1987). III. Petitioner expeditiously presented claim after it ripened and the necessity for a stay is due to Missouris choice to set execution dates with insufficient notice As the district court further held, Middletons counsel did not intentionally delay resolution of the claim or delay it for tactical reasons. From all the evidence there is no reason to believe that the claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring a stay. (Doc. 139); see Hill, 547 U.S. at 584, citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004). Chief Judge Perry ruled that, [b]ecause a Ford claim is not ripe until an execution date is set, and because this court denied petitioners request for funds to hire a psychiatrist to evaluate petitioner until the execution date was actually set, the time period from the date the execution was set until today was not sufficient for petitioner's counsel, acting with reasonable diligence, to have a mental health expert conduct the kind of complete evaluation of a person confined on death row that is necessary to present a Ford claim. (Doc. 139). In sum, Chief Judge Perrys considered opinion in granting the stay of Middletons execution in light of the effort of Petitioner to exhaust his claims in state Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637
5 court immediately upon this Courts determinationright or wrongthat he had not exhausted those claims warrants protection. Petitioners zealous effort to bring his Ford claim in the Missouri courts and his being kept out of those courts strongly counsels, as an equitable matter, against vacating the stay of execution. Middleton pursued a Ford hearing in the Missouri Supreme Court using the very mechanism that the panel has criticized Middleton for not usingthe motion for appointment of a special master pursuant to Rule 68.03. Middleton, No. 14-2667, ID 4175573 at 3-4. Middleton is blameless with regard to his pursuit of a Ford hearing court and, should this Court vacate the second stay of execution he has obtained in relation to his pending federal habeas application, his execution assuredly will be hastened despite the showing that, under the long-held constitutional standard of Ford, there is strong medical evidence to indicate that he is not sane. It is no less abhorrent today than it has been for centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications. Ford, 477 U.S. at 418 (Marshall, J.). IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner-Appellee respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion to Vacate Stay of Execution. Should the court grant the motion, Petitioner requests that the Court issue a stay pending an expedited filing of a petition for rehearing en banc. Respectfully submitted, s/Joseph J. Perkovich Joseph J. Perkovich Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637
6 PO Box 2171 New York, NY 10008 (212) 400-1660 (Tel.) jjp@jos.perkovich.name
RICHARD H. SINDEL, #23406 KATHRYN B. PARISH, #61781 SINDEL SINDEL & NOBLE, P.C. 8000 Maryland Ave., Suite 350 Clayton, MO 63105 Clayton, MO 63105 (314) 721-6040 (tel) (314) 721-8545 (fax) kparish@sindellaw.com
Counsel For Petitioner John C. Middleton
July 16, 2014 Appellate Case: 14-2677 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/16/2014 Entry ID: 4175637 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the foregoing document was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. Notice of this filing and its viewing and downloading are thereby provided to all counsel of record by cooperation of the CM/ECF system.
Dated: July 16, 2013 New York, New York
s/Joseph J. Perkovich Joseph J. Perkovich Church Street Station PO Box 2171 New York, NY 10008-2171 (212) 400-1660 (Tel.) jjp@jos.perkovich.name