Cultural identity - from embracing value systems to recognizing a “local

knowledge”; interpretive anthropology contributions to a contextual explanation of

left-right orientations in the contemporary Romanian political parties

Motto:
“Adev•rul doctrinei relativismului cultural (sau istoric – e acela•i lucru) este c• nu putem
niciodat• s• în•elegem perfect imaginarul altor popoare sau al altor timpuri ca •i cum ar fi
al nostru. Falsitatea ei este c• din aceast• cauz• nu putem s• îl în•elegem deloc” (Geertz,
C. 1993, p. 44).

With the people for the people, and against those who think human rights are a joke, or
better yet a Machiavellian way to get reach, oh so ”liberally” reach.

Rationalist approaches in studying culture.

Even though most of the times it did not take the central role (that of variable to be
explained through the discovery of its determinant factors), culture was not completely
missing from social studies following a rationalist approach. More often, studies
interested in describing and explaining differences between countries or communities
reserved this central role to concepts such as: the level of economic development, the
stability of political systems, or degree of democratization. The cultural particularities
became of interest in such an approach especially in the situations in which the other
determinant factors of, for example, economic growth, failed to explain all the observed
differences between the cases studied. Whether coming from political science or
management, the studies interested in investigating cultural variables from a rationalist
perspective have several common characteristics: the definition of culture as a system of
values, operationalization of these values through indicators that are common for all the
cultures studies, and a preference for survey as data collection method.

One insightful and very influential example of the rationalist approach to culture is the
1996 Granato, Inglehart and Leblang study where culture is defined as “a system of basic
common values that help shape the behavior of the people in a given society.” (Granato,
J., Inglehart, R., Leblang, D. 1996, p. 608). They distinguish between societies that are
more inclined to manifest achievement motivation and societies that consider other
values to be more important and worthy of being taught to children. The values
investigated pertain to religion, obedience, parcimony, determination, postmodern values
(environment protection, tolerance for minorities) and are measured with large sample
surveys representative for the population of the countries studied.

A slightly different definition offers Hofstede - “culture is the collective programming of

thinking that distinguishes between the members of a group or category from people that
belong to other groups or categories” (give reference p. nr.). However, in terms of the
cultural characteristics studied here, the mere replacement of “values” with “dimensions
of the thought programming” does not change in essence the approach in studying
culture. The five cultural dimensions – power distance, uncertainty avoidance,

1
individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity and short term/long term orientation –
are defined and measured quite similar to the way Inglehart defines and measures what he
calls cultural values. Much like Inglehart, Hofstde and his collaborators’ preferred
research methods are based on surveys. Both in the IBM study and subsequent inquiries
on cultural variables, the questionnaire items are asking people to choose from a series of
predefined choices the ones that are closer to their individual values.

In the rationalist approach, the specific culture of a country is identified by placing the
aggregated responses of people on the scales of the indicators used – cultural dimensions
and their corresponding values. Often, the classification is completed with attempts to test
the connection of the cultural indicators to other factors in causal relations.

The nature of explanation in social sciences after the postmodern critique of the
universality of the western rationalist discourse

According to Clifford Geertz, the change in the way of studying culture belongs to an
entire process of “reconfiguration of social thinking” (Geertz, C. 1993, p.20). This
consists in challenging the strit delimitation of the field of social sciences in relation with
the humanist sciences both in what concerns the distribution of the adequate investigation
methods and the issues to be studied.

Actually, as Geertz points out, this tendency does not limit to scientific investigation. One
of the striking characteristics of the contemporary social life is the continuous
reconfiguration (and even oblivion sometimes) of the barriers that distance or geographic
location could hold to the social action. Whether we talk about economic globalization or
the impressive developments in the access to information due to the digital
communication, the geographic limitations seem to become less and less relevant or at
least to have a more limited impact on social actions compared to the 20th century.

The way this tendency manifests in the academic life is of particular interest for this
study. What Geertz is pointing to, is quite an irreverence towards the limits that restrict
what is appropriate for a particular literary or scientific field in the literary or academic
publications. Moreover, he considers that the difficulty with which may of the recent
literary and academic publications can be categorized in the classic domains of social
sciences and humanities is enough of a general ad distinct phenomenon to suggest that we
are facing not only a redesigning of the cultural map – with the moving of a few
controversial boundaries […] – but an alteration of the principles that fundament the
mere map building. Something is happening with our way of thinking about the way we
think. (Geertz, C. 1993, p. 20).

With regard to the social sciences, this change affects the essence of the investigative
approach – the nature of scientific explanation. The recent research aiming at studying
social actions seem to distance from the explanations which consist in identifying its
determinant factors, the relative intensity of the causal relationships between these factors
and the emergence or the nature of the studies social action its effects. Such a way of

2
modeling the social action allows predictions and implicitly the control of the effects of a
social action by manipulating its determinant factors. Now, the essential change here is
that the goal of scientific explanation is no longer the control the social action but the
interpretation of it.

The contribution of postmodern critique to acknowledging the contextual, cultural (i.e.

historical, geographical, political) determinations of the scientific explanations and ,
implicitly, of the worldviews that generated those explanations overshadows the
importance of discovering the cause-effect relationships and reorients the explanation
towards the interpretation of the social action. The postmodern disapproval of the
universality of a particular scientific discourse localizes the cause-effect explanations, it
makes it dependent of the place, time and sometimes even the politics in which that
particular explanation was written. The anthropological addition to the postmodern
critique is that even the object to be explained (in particular the social action) may be just
as non-universal as the attempts to explain it. The social action does not mean the same
thing in different cultural contexts. Even if on the surface, it seems to be the same thing –
for example respecting the law – the meaning of it says Geertz, may be quite different in
a Islamic, Indian or western culture.

What does an interpretative explanation look like? Reorienting the scientific explanation
from control to hermeneutics/interpretation has consequences on both its nature and the
methodology used in constructing it. The analogies inspired by the natural sciences in an
ambition to create a “social physics” (Geertz, C.1993, p.23) are replaced by analogies
inpired from literature or theater, from the humanities in general. The explanation
becomes “connecting the action with its meaning rather than connecting behavior to its
determinats” (Geertz, C. 1993, p.34).

Cultural system – local knowledge as a contextually determined pattern of

interpretation of reality

Differences between cultures, between localized systems of knowledge become visible

during the attempts to intercultural understanding, and they do so by creating difficulties.
When a person that belongs to a particular culture is in a position to observe a social
action in a cultural context that is different from his own, he will have difficulties in
evaluating that situation especially because the evaluation criteria he will be using belong
to the culture he is coming from and not to the culture he is evaluating. Such cross
cultural encounters are of course not new, they have existed long before the post-modern
orientation in social sciences. However, quite new, (in - what else than - relative terms) is
taking in consideration these difficulties as opportunities to interpretation rather than
automatic evaluation of difference as something that is less or under developed.

Common sense as domain of cultural expression. Even if it is perceived by the ones

who are practicing it as a natural attribute, inherent and defining of the normal behavior,
an attribute that accompanies without any cognitive effort the behavior of a common

3
person, the common sense is, according to Geertz, a cultural product. To be exact, Geertz
claims that the common sense is a system of knowledge comprised of practical
information about the environment in which a particular community lives, knowledge
that is socially and historically determined. Communities belonging to different cultures
will have different knowledge that they will consider truth that o not need any
argumentation since these are truth that belong to the domain of the common sense.

The Robert Edgerton study that Geertz is referring to offers an example of such
differences. Edgerton compares the different reactions that are dictated by the common
sense, actually generated by the different common senses characteristic to the three
cultures studied – North American, Navajo and Pokot. Since the systems of practical
knowledge on which the common sense rules are based are different in the three cultures,
the reactions that these rules are dictating are also different. And this even though each of
the members of the three different communities feel that his/her reaction is natural and
the only possible way to respond to extreme phenomena such as genetic malformations.
According to the author, these reactions are rejection and corrective measures in the
American culture, reverence and even mystical gratitude in Navajo culture, and the
indifference with which one accepts an error that renders the affected individual as
completely useless to the community in the Pokot culture. In all these different cultures,
the systems of practical knowledge on which the common sense rules are based are
different and hence the different reactions to what appears to be the same stimulus. There
is however something that the localized systems of knowledge have in common.
Acording to Geertz, these common features of all different common senses are that: they
are perceived as natural by the ones who inhabit them, they have a predominantly
practical character, they lack depth, they have no well thought-out method, and they are
accessible.

Intercultural understanding requires translation between different cultural systems,

and an analysis of the symbolic expressions of the reality interpretation patterns
could help

If the cultural determination of the meaning given to social action and, consequently, its
interpretation becomes an important variable in explaining any social action, the relevant
question for comparative or intercultural studies is: to what extent is intercultural
knowledge possible? The existence of differences in the attribution of meaning makes
intercultural understanding problematic. That, of course, if in the attempt to understand
other cultures one does not start from the assumption that his own way of understanding
the world is the only one, and thus all the differences he encounters are just errors that
await correction. Such an universalistic pretension has already been cautioned against by
the observers of cultural relativism. However, accepting that cultural differences could be
caused by other factors than delays or advancements in development does not mean that
understanding between cultures is not at all possible. ”The truth about the cultural
relativism (or historical – it’s the same thing) is that we can never completely understand
the imaginary of other people or of other times as if it were ours. Its falsity is that because
of that we cannot understand it at all” (Geertz, C. 1993, p.44).

4
The imaginary of other cultures (their perspective on the world) can be known to the
extent to which it is translated. Translation is (in Geertz terms) the understanding by
which the imaginary of a certain time or culture can be understood without making it less
different in the process (Geertz, C. 1993, p48). Such an understanding would need a
partial access to “the interpretative implications of the social actions for both cultures,
would also need localizing the thinking and emotional instabilities that a different
interpretation generates, and, finally the social framing of these interpretations” (Geertz,
C. 1993, p.45).

What is the most adequate method of studying a local perspective and what exactly from
it is cross-culturally translatable? Geertz is somewhat skeptical about the ability of the
observers of a different culture to manifest an exceptional sensibility that would allow
them to “think, feel and perceive like a native [of the observed culture]” (Geertz, 1993 2,
p.56). Such an exacerbation of sensibility would be necessary for the empathic
understanding to really work, even though the empathic approach has been the way of
acquiring intercultural knowledge that was traditionally accepted by the anthropological
community. Actually, Geertz is just as skeptical about the extent to which the object of
anthropological or ethnographical knowledge – i.e. the way of thinking of different
cultures – is inter-culturally intelligible. The content of the native representations, what
they perceive, remains, in his opinion, inaccessible to an ethnographer. She can only
observe and understand (and consequently study) only the mechanisms by which the
perceptions and the representations of the natives are constructed. Following this believe,
in studying local communities from Java, Bali or Morocco, he does not attempt to
identify himself with a member of any of these communities, he rather tries to identify
some of the mechanisms of interpretation that are specific to the local way of thinking.
The ways of constructing representations of reality are different not only from a western
understanding but also different from one another (Geertz, C.1993, 2, p.59).

To summarize, the method adopted by Clifford Geertz in understanding a different

culture is the analysis of “symbolic forms – words, images, institutions, behaviors” that
the members of the local communities use in constructing their representations about
themselves, about the others and about the world (Geertz, C. 1993, p58). The Study of
cultural systems is, in this perspective, the study of systems of meanings attributed to
social actions and it takes place in two steps:

1. identifying the interpretive implications of the social action for the particular
culture studied, and
2. socially framing these interpretations.

Going through both steps requires, in Geertz’ opinion, “a continuous dialectical zigzag
between the most local of the local details and the most global of the global structure”
(Geertz, C. 1993, p.69). This process will finally allow a simultaneous perception of both
levels. The elements of the local culture – automated emotions and behaviors, uncritically
accepted believes – take different forms in different cultures due to the different systems
of meaning in the local knowledge.

5
6
What does left-right orientation mean in the Romanian post 89 political context?

In the following section of this paper I will apply the local knowledge theoretical
framework to a political problem: that of cultural determination of the meaning of left
right orientations on the political arena. The study uses the example of two countries –
Romania and US – in which being on the left or on the right side of the political scale
takes different meanings that find their expression in different symbolic aspects of social
life. The interest in studying this issue was prompted by the hypothesis emerged during a
visit in the US that it might just be the case that the meanings of political left and right
could be if not completely reversed at least remarkably different in the two cultural
contexts. The study uses comparative data from World Values Survey (2005) on values
related to the left-right orientation of Romanian and US political parties and their electors
to have a measure of the hypothesized difference in meaning. The explanation of these
differences, however, stems from the local knowledge understanding of culture rather
than from a value system model of it.

The peculiarities of left-right politics in Romania and how are they reflected by the
World Values Study

There are structural differences between the electoral systems of the two countries. The
most relevant for the question of this study is the number of political parties competing
for electoral support and, at least in theory, to better represent the citizens who are
offering this support. One would expect that left-right orientations to be a constant, a
common sense type of knowledge that would rather help politicians and citizens
interested in politics to share experiences or collaborate in a cross-cultural setting such as
supra national organizations for example. However, the WV data shows a rather different
situation, one that serves as an example for the theoretical view presented above
according to which common sense as a stage for local knowledge is only common to the
people inhabiting a certain culture and ceases to be as such when approached by people
living in different cultures with their own, respective, common sense.

There are three groups of variables pertaining to the attitudes of electors that I have
analysed using results from World Values Survey 2005. The first is composed by the
basic measures for the issue of the study: a self placement on the left-right scale and the
political party preference. The second group of variables refers to attitudes that in a
“common sense” approach, but also in academic literature are associated with preferences
for the left or the right ends or the political spectrum: attitudes about equality,
materialism/post-materialism, ownership of business by the state, how much
responsibility government should assume in solving social problems, whether hard wok
guarantees success, the importance of people having real voice in political decision. The
third group is composed of variables that are measures of progressive values in a cultural
context. These emancipative (or self-expression) values as Inglehart, their author calls
them, are measures of eagerness to move the society forward and they are capturing the
directions that the current political discourse sees progress: tolerance and not conformity,
gender equality and not patriarchy, autonomy and not authority, participatory inclusion in

7
political decision and not order and security (Inglehart, 2009). The reason these last
group of variables are in this study is because another “common sense” idea is that there
is a certain correspondence between the notions of left/right and liberal/conservative. The
correlation being in the sense that left orientation is associated with a liberal, progressive
attitude, while the right orientation is more inclined to embrace and conserve traditional
values.

In what follows two types of comparisons will be made for each of these variables. One
comparison is between the electors of the political parties which have declared their
position on the left-right scale within each of the two cultures. There are three main
political parties at the moment in Romania: PNL (National Liberal Party) and PDL
(Democratic Liberal Party) which place themselves to the right of the political scale, and
PSD (Social Democratic Party) which is the main contender to the left of the political
spectrum. The second comparison is between the two cultures and aims to test whether
there are indeed cultural differences in the values preferred by the supporters of the left or
right wing parties in Romania and in the US.

Left and right self placement of electors, attitudes on equality, ownership of business
by the state, responsibility of the government, hard wok and success, materialism.

On the left-right self placement scale a score of 1 means the most left oriented while the
score ten is the measure for the highest right orientation. As one can notice in Figure
No.2, there are no big surprises here, neither within nor between the two cultural cases
studied. Electors placed themselves congruent to the orientation of the party they are
supporting.

Figure No. 2 – Average values on the self positioning on political scale for the groups of
electors of political parties
Romania US

8
Figure No. 3 – Average values on the income equality, ownership of business by the
state, responsibility of the government, hard wok and success for the groups of electors of
political parties

9
When we are considering the congruence between the orientation of the political party
preferred by the groups of electors and the types of values they are expected to embrace if
they are supporting a left or a right oriented party, for this group of variables there is one
case in which responses of Romanian electors differed significantly from the responses of
American electors. It is the case of hard work. While the left oriented electors in US
disagree with the idea that only hard work can guarantee success, the left oriented
electors in Romania do not share the same opinion and are closer to the responses given
by their right oriented counterparts in the US.

Figure No. 4 – Average values on the materialist/post materialist scale for the groups of
electors of political parties

Figure No. 4 shows the most striking response so far, which was given by the electors of
the PSD, the Romanian main party that places itself on the left of the political scale.
Scores on the materialist/post-materialist scale range from the 0 materialist to 5 post-
materialist. While the left oriented counterparts in the US declare themselves as less
attached to the materialist values the PSD supporters are the most materialist from the
Romanian electors.

On the emancipative values variables (see Figure No. 5), there are again results that show
rather incongruence between the responses of Romanian and American electors. Before
mentioning this incongruence, one result may call for attention – the fact that on the
gender equality scale, the highest gender equality score on the Romanian electors had the
electors of a Conservative party. There are two items here on which again the PSD
supporters contradict the expectation from a left oriented electorate. They are the most
intolerant from the Romanian electors (even more intolerant than the supporters of the
nationalist party Great Romania).

Significance tests performed for all the comparisons presented above showed only two
instances in which differences between the groups compared were not statistically
significant. Both were on the Romanian sample and they were related to the materialist
scale and gender equality scale variables. (see ANOVA tables in the Annexes).

10
Figure No. 5 – Average values on the gender equality, tolerance, autonomy, and voice for
the people in political decision scales for the groups of electors of political parties

11
There are several questions that the survey results presented above are raising and they all
pertain to the fact that on several of the indicators, the responses of PSD electorate was
not quite what one would expect from a left political orientation. The main question is
whether these noticed inconsistencies are due to an immaturity of the electorate - one
could think of that possibility especially since on several other left orientation issues the
responses were quite in the line of expectation. An alternative possibility is that these
inconsistencies are underlined by a structural characteristic that is more than a mere lack
of political experience. The last part of this study uses the local knowledge approach to
offer an explanation for the rather intriguing results that show the left party Romanian
supporters to be the most materialist and the most intolerant of the Romanian electors.

The Table No.1 below presents a comparative analysis of the two local cultures and the
author’s take on translating the cultural meaning of the left-right orientation. The table
summarizes the symbolic expressions of the meaning attributed to manifesting political
attachment to the left or the right parties on the political stage.

The main idea suggested by this analysis is that inconsistencies revealed by the survey
data are actually consistent to the cultural characteristics of the contemporary Romanian
society: a divided society in which independent individual success is rare and in which
the patterns of social interaction have yet to free from the duality of the projected image
and the truth. There is a recent history that could account for the resistance of these
characteristics, the landmark of it being the 1989 moment. From the perspective of a
politically uninvolved local, the division was rather clear just before 1989 and in the
years immediately following the revolution. The two obvious opposing groups were, on
the one hand, the privileged of the communist regime and on the other hand the rest of
the population. Of course, things were never that simple, they just appeared to be as such,
especially if you put in a black box the roles played by various groups within the party
elite, within the army and the various secret services. To a regular citizen such a black
box could not be avoided as information on these roles or actors was scarce and had
mainly the form of a dangerous folklore that needed to be whispered or, better yet,
shunned altogether for safety reasons1.

In retrospect2, it seems that in the early nineties, it was fairly easy to pick your side on the
political arena. You could have felt closer, for example, to nostalgic communists and
ready to support their strong arm actions against “dangerous and highly undesirable in
terms of social morality” opponents. The alternative would be to support these opponents
– who, at that time, could have been described in categorical terms as they were mainly
students, intellectuals, political dissidents of the communist regime. There were, also,
other communism discontents, who would not be easily assigned to any of these afore
mentioned categories. Now, if this were a logical exercise, we would expect the
1
The main formal channels of mass communications were at the time the extremely censured Romanian
TV and radio stations. Of course accessible to a lower audience but still present werethe illegal radio
stations like Romania Libera or BBC, as well as video cassettes for the non political messages coming from
the west.
2
To keep in line with the theoretical approach I am embracing in this paper I have to admit possible
personal influences on this reconstructed recollection of Romanian average citizen politics twenty years
after

12
nostalgics to not have stood a chance in the early elections. In a logical unfolding of this
argument, if some people regretted the old regime they probably had reasons to, they
probably were not so worse off during it after all, they were probably the privileged. The
non-privileged were the majority of the population who suffered severely from the
policies of communist rulers. These policies3 - from planned economy to family planning
- invaded public and private lives of most Romanians. In such a situation, the logical
expectation would be that the majority would vote against any party and any candidate
even remotely resembling the old Communist Party elite. What really happened was quite
the opposite. In the 1990 and 1992 elections, the population voted overwhelmingly for
Ion Iliescu (a Moscow schooled member of communist elite at the time in disgrace) and
the political party supported him.

Why would that happen? One possible answer could be that the public can make a choice
against its own interest when there are no channels of communication available for all the
alternatives. When communication media are only channeling one side of the debate the
public is deprived of the minimum necessary for a critical evaluation, and it fails to
distinguish between a projected image and a true one. In the early nineties, the obvious
interest of the people was to put behind the communist past. The contenders to the post
communist party were the historical parties which had then the prestigious figures of
politicians who lived in democracy before communism and who were imprisoned during
it. How could the majority of Romanians who wanted to break with their past not to
prefer to be represented by the politicians who were clearly against everything that this
past represented? They did not hear this message. The only mass media voice in place at
the time was portraying Iliescu’s opponents as socially inadequate using the same
strategy that one could see happening in the main news TV channels during the 2009
presidential elections. Maybe one of the most perverse techniques of discrediting
someone is to turn their qualities against them. In the early nineties the obvious
opponents of communist dictatorship, who have had experienced living in democracy and
could have represented a key for taking the country through the reforms needed to bring
it out of the Eastern block were presented by the media as the agents of the corrupt west.
The result of not hearing two sides of the story was that even though the majority of the
population dreamed of the western life style and democracy could not realize the

3
Especially in the late eighties the picture was really gloomy on what today would be called standard of
living criteria: rationed food, empty stores that were active only on the rare occasions in which they
received supplies and had to face street long queues of customers, heating quotas, an average of two hours
of TV airing a day, of which often half was taken by Ceausescu’s absurd speeches, rationed electrical
power (the blackouts became increasingly frequent and the authorities explanation for them was
consideration for a “rational” use of energetic resources, actually the rationality and patriotism were called
in to account for the sacrifices population had to make in order for the country to put an end to foreign debt
and progress towards the promised bliss of the new man in the new society); the social life happened in the
family and with close friends and this was the main venue the reach Romanian soul could express itself.
Reading books was extremely popular as not many other entertainment means were available. In a way, the
Romanians social life in communism was quite post-materialist – no prospects of wealth accumulation took
the issue out of the daily concerns and redirected interests to enjoying friends and family and culture at
least until late eighties, when the unbearable economic harshness threatened to put an end to this last
resistance too. Writers and theatre actors were the true pop culture icons – this was easily noticed 1989
when dissident writers and not successful singers were taken by the population as their representatives.

13
contradiction between having that dream and rejecting the ones could accomplish it. In
1996, the newly independent TV channel PRO TV was the venue for the alternative

14
Table no. 1 – Applying the intercultural knowledge model to understanding the left –right orientation in Romanian and US
The Symbolic expression of the meaning attributed to the left –right orientation
left/right Romanian political culture
orientation
believes The social image of belonging to the power group
Interpretation of the meaning attributed to the left-right orientation
The left/right distinction of parties in Romania is not based on ideas about
political or social life. This distinction is between two groups: one group
has inherited political power from the former communist party elite and
wants to maintain this status quo, while the other group is formed by the
contestants of the first, the people who are still striving to bring the
country to a true modern democratic state. These groups’ boundaries are
not fixed and have varied in size over the last twenty years - some people
or political parties have changed sides or disappeared, or emerged on the
political stage. However, it was always relatively easy for a local to
recognize the core constituents of these opposing sides, to recognize who’s
right and who is placing himself on the left.
Social framing of the interpretation
Two scars left by the communist regime are still vividly marking the
Romanian social life: collectivism and the prevalence of “image” in social
engagement. Whether in action or in reasoning about aspects of life (public
or private), an individual is mainly guided by mere conformity to external
queues rather than critical thinking and by the concern for projecting the
correct image of unconditional compliance to what those queues are
pointing to. There are probably several historical circumstances that have
contributed to this cultural practice, the most recent is the unfortunate
Romanian past of secrecy under the fear of repression sustained by the
former communist regime
15
American political culture
The liberal/conservative life style reflective of two
understandings of individual success
The right/conservative orientation understanding is that an
individual’s success is the result of his hard work and talent
while the left oriented success understanding is that hard work
and talent can lead to success if there are no social barriers to it
(such as gender, poverty and belonging to a minority group –
racial, ethnic, religious). These two understandings underlie the
differences in relating to the other that determine a person to be
rather in favor or abortion, poverty reduction, minority rights or
not.
The strong respect for individual rights in the American culture,
whether it takes the more compassionate form of ensuring that
no one if disadvantaged or it takes the strong version of
reassuring the rules of fair competition maintains the
environment in which individuals develop and maintain a high
self-esteem.
message and the result was a change in the political power. What happens in the 2009
presidential elections is quite similar to the early 1990’s. In a country in which autonomy
was systematically discouraged and more and more aspects of social and economic life
succumb to the rule of cliques, Traian Basescu the candidate who displays independent
behavior is stigmatized by the media for exactly that and is presented as a potential
dictator.

In this context, the electoral message of the other candidate to the presidency, Mircea
Geoana, “We shall succeed together” is just another instance of the concern for image
rather than solving problems. This message des not show concern with the problems
Romania is now facing, it doesn’t even intend to touch upon these problems. This
message is just a symbolic expression of the cultural practice of projecting the image that
you are similar and thus ready and eager to belong to a certain group – in Mircea
Geoana’s case, and for the momentary interests, to the western political left. It has
nothing to do with the country he wants to be president of. Before uniting, Romanian
people need truth and reconciliation, they need a social environment in which success
could be achieved through the hard work and talent of autonomous individuals rather
than the desire to surrender to power groups.

Bibliography
Geertz C. (1993) Primordial Loyalties and Standing Entities: Anthropological
Reflections on the Politics of Identities, lecture delivered at Collegium Budapest,
Budapest, 13 December 1993.
Geertz C. (1993) Local Knowledge, Basic Books Inc., Publishers, New York.

WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009.

World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File
Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid

16
Descriptives
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Std. Std. Lower Upper
N Mean Deviation Error Bound Bound Minimum Maximum
gendereq Other 69 12.1304 1.83842 .22132 11.6888 12.5721 6.00 16.00
US: Republican 385 11.7896 1.71843 .08758 11.6174 11.9618 6.00 16.00
US: Democrat 491 12.3238 1.69122 .07632 12.1739 12.4738 6.00 17.00
US: Independent 206 12.0097 1.57725 .10989 11.7930 12.2264 7.00 16.00
Total 1151 12.0773 1.70373 .05022 11.9788 12.1759 6.00 17.00
Self positioning Other 72 5.58 1.045 .123 5.34 5.83 3 10
in political US: Republican 384 6.95 1.790 .091 6.77 7.13 1 10
scale US: Democrat 498 4.91 1.650 .074 4.77 5.06 1 10
US: Independent 204 5.44 1.260 .088 5.26 5.61 1 10
Total 1158 5.72 1.836 .054 5.62 5.83 1 10
Autonomy Other 75 .09 1.199 .138 -.18 .37 -2 2
Index US: Republican 390 -.13 1.162 .059 -.24 -.01 -2 2
US: Democrat 502 .30 1.153 .051 .20 .40 -2 2
US: Independent 208 .24 1.077 .075 .09 .39 -2 2
Total 1175 .14 1.160 .034 .07 .20 -2 2
Post- Other 74 1.99 .585 .068 1.85 2.12 1 3
Materialist US: Republican 386 1.78 .606 .031 1.72 1.85 1 3
index 4-item US: Democrat 500 2.07 .614 .027 2.02 2.13 1 3
US: Independent 208 2.08 .617 .043 1.99 2.16 1 3
Total 1168 1.97 .624 .018 1.94 2.01 1 3
tolvconform Other 71 15.3944 7.18625 .85285 13.6934 17.0953 3.00 30.00
US: Republican 382 12.3272 6.43646 .32932 11.6797 12.9747 3.00 30.00
US: Democrat 486 16.4691 7.33457 .33270 15.8154 17.1229 3.00 30.00
US: Independent 203 15.2414 6.86618 .48191 14.2912 16.1916 3.00 30.00
Total 1142 14.7986 7.17673 .21237 14.3819 15.2153 3.00 30.00
Incomes more Other 74 5.42 2.393 .278 4.86 5.97 1 10
equal US: Republican 388 7.01 1.958 .099 6.82 7.21 1 10
US: Democrat 496 5.74 2.204 .099 5.55 5.93 1 10
US: Independent 207 6.02 2.114 .147 5.73 6.31 1 10
Total 1165 6.19 2.201 .064 6.07 6.32 1 10
Private Other 75 3.96 2.089 .241 3.48 4.44 1 10
ownership of US: Republican 388 3.11 1.781 .090 2.94 3.29 1 10

17
 US: Democrat 500 3.88 1.951 .087 3.71 4.05 1 10
US: Independent 208 3.69 1.974 .137 3.42 3.96 1 10
Total 1171 3.60 1.939 .057 3.49 3.71 1 10
Government Other 75 5.08 2.624 .303 4.48 5.68 1 10
more US: Republican 389 7.47 2.279 .116 7.25 7.70 1 10
responsibility US: Democrat 497 5.11 2.576 .116 4.89 5.34 1 10
US: Independent 208 5.93 2.530 .175 5.59 6.28 1 10
Total 1169 6.04 2.688 .079 5.89 6.20 1 10
Hard work Other 75 3.91 1.994 .230 3.45 4.37 1 9
US: Republican 386 3.32 2.049 .104 3.12 3.53 1 10
US: Democrat 500 4.16 2.329 .104 3.95 4.36 1 10
US: Independent 205 4.06 2.323 .162 3.74 4.38 1 10
Total 1166 3.85 2.247 .066 3.72 3.98 1 10
Democracy: Other 74 6.68 2.234 .260 6.16 7.19 2 10
People can US: Republican 389 7.77 2.243 .114 7.55 7.99 1 10
change the US: Democrat 496 7.48 2.474 .111 7.26 7.69 1 10
laws in
US: Independent 207 7.33 2.471 .172 6.99 7.67 1 10
referendums.
Total 1166 7.50 2.396 .070 7.36 7.63 1 10

Descriptives
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Std. Std. Lower Upper Minimu Maxi
N Mean Deviation Error Bound Bound m mum
gendereq I would not vote 182 12.3956 2.53976 .18826 12.0241 12.767 6.00 17.0
1 0
Other 19 13.0000 2.10819 .48365 11.9839 14.016 10.00 16.0
1 0
RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 86 11.9186 2.51684 .27140 11.3790 12.458 6.00 17.0
Democratic Party 2 0
RO: Partidul National Liberal 59 12.2712 2.01572 .26242 11.7459 12.796 8.00 16.0
(PNL) - National Liberal Party 5 0
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 35 11.4286 2.67104 .45149 10.5110 12.346 6.00 17.0
Maghiarilor din Romania 1 0
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 96 12.5208 2.28025 .23273 12.0588 12.982 6.00 17.0
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party 9 0

18
 RO: Partidul Social Democrat 228 12.3333 2.54879 .16880 12.0007 12.665 5.00 18.0
Roman (PSDR) - Social 9 0
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 265 12.5283 2.47720 .15217 12.2287 12.827 5.00 18.0
Alliance 9 0
RO: The Conservative Party PC 10 13.1000 1.79196 .56667 11.8181 14.381 9.00 15.0
9 0
Total 980 12.3643 2.46590 .07877 12.2097 12.518 5.00 18.0
9 0
Self I would not vote 86 5.62 1.750 .189 5.24 5.99 1 10
positionin Other 14 6.93 2.303 .615 5.60 8.26 2 10
g in RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 73 6.88 2.048 .240 6.40 7.35 2 10
political Democratic Party
scale RO: Partidul National Liberal 57 7.35 2.092 .277 6.80 7.91 2 10
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 19 6.42 2.411 .553 5.26 7.58 1 10
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 67 5.66 2.490 .304 5.05 6.26 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 164 4.43 2.492 .195 4.04 4.81 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 211 6.73 2.180 .150 6.43 7.03 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 8 5.25 1.832 .648 3.72 6.78 1 7
Total 699 5.99 2.436 .092 5.81 6.18 1 10
Autonomy I would not vote 240 -.13 1.080 .070 -.27 .01 -2 2
Index Other 20 -.20 1.196 .268 -.76 .36 -2 2
RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 108 -.06 1.159 .111 -.28 .17 -2 2
Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 72 -.33 1.021 .120 -.57 -.09 -2 2
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 42 -.05 .962 .148 -.35 .25 -2 2
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 111 -.06 1.012 .096 -.25 .13 -2 2
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party

19
 RO: Partidul Social Democrat 290 -.38 1.126 .066 -.51 -.25 -2 2
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 304 -.11 1.092 .063 -.23 .01 -2 2
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 .09 1.044 .315 -.61 .79 -1 2
Total 1198 -.18 1.094 .032 -.24 -.12 -2 2
Post- I would not vote 211 1.62 .600 .041 1.54 1.70 1 3
Materialist Other 19 1.79 .535 .123 1.53 2.05 1 3
index 4- RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 100 1.62 .663 .066 1.49 1.75 1 3
item Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 67 1.70 .628 .077 1.55 1.85 1 3
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 35 1.60 .695 .117 1.36 1.84 1 3
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 106 1.62 .577 .056 1.51 1.73 1 3
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 267 1.50 .564 .035 1.43 1.57 1 3
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 289 1.63 .606 .036 1.56 1.70 1 3
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 1.55 .688 .207 1.08 2.01 1 3
Total 1105 1.60 .603 .018 1.56 1.64 1 3
tolvconfor I would not vote 204 10.2794 7.25777 .50815 9.2775 11.281 3.00 30.0
m 3 0
Other 20 11.5000 6.73170 1.5052 8.3495 14.650 3.00 25.0
5 5 0
RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 97 10.6392 7.00474 .71122 9.2274 12.050 3.00 26.0
Democratic Party 9 0
RO: Partidul National Liberal 64 11.1563 7.59536 .94942 9.2590 13.053 3.00 30.0
(PNL) - National Liberal Party 5 0
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 36 13.5278 7.97670 1.3294 10.8289 16.226 3.00 26.0
Maghiarilor din Romania 5 7 0
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 104 8.3462 5.75852 .56467 7.2263 9.4660 3.00 30.0
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party 0

20
 RO: Partidul Social Democrat 260 7.6577 5.68970 .35286 6.9629 8.3525 3.00 30.0
Roman (PSDR) - Social 0
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 280 9.7321 6.88172 .41126 8.9226 10.541 3.00 30.0
Alliance 7 0
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 12.2727 7.77291 2.3436 7.0508 17.494 3.00 25.0
2 6 0
Total 1076 9.5530 6.81653 .20781 9.1452 9.9607 3.00 30.0
0
Incomes I would not vote 230 4.70 2.953 .195 4.32 5.08 1 10
more Other 20 6.10 3.493 .781 4.47 7.73 1 10
equal RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 108 5.15 2.935 .282 4.59 5.71 1 10
Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 70 5.74 2.738 .327 5.09 6.40 1 10
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 39 4.74 2.643 .423 3.89 5.60 1 10
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 107 4.73 3.036 .294 4.15 5.31 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 279 4.30 2.958 .177 3.96 4.65 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 296 4.68 2.773 .161 4.36 5.00 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 5.45 3.417 1.030 3.16 7.75 1 10
Total 1160 4.74 2.925 .086 4.57 4.91 1 10
Private I would not vote 223 4.67 2.916 .195 4.28 5.05 1 10
ownership Other 20 3.50 2.819 .630 2.18 4.82 1 10
of RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 105 4.61 3.046 .297 4.02 5.20 1 10
business Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 67 4.10 3.257 .398 3.31 4.90 1 10
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 35 4.14 2.809 .475 3.18 5.11 1 10
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 109 5.28 3.142 .301 4.69 5.88 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party

21
 RO: Partidul Social Democrat 279 5.44 3.092 .185 5.07 5.80 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 295 4.13 2.976 .173 3.78 4.47 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 3.45 2.464 .743 1.80 5.11 1 8
Total 1144 4.69 3.064 .091 4.51 4.87 1 10
Governm I would not vote 231 4.78 2.880 .189 4.41 5.16 1 10
ent more Other 20 6.25 3.370 .754 4.67 7.83 1 10
responsibi RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 108 5.41 3.106 .299 4.81 6.00 1 10
lity Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 71 5.94 3.148 .374 5.20 6.69 1 10
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 37 6.05 2.768 .455 5.13 6.98 1 10
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 108 4.42 2.907 .280 3.86 4.97 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 285 4.79 2.974 .176 4.44 5.13 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 295 5.40 3.053 .178 5.05 5.75 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 4.00 2.366 .714 2.41 5.59 1 8
Total 1166 5.09 3.017 .088 4.92 5.27 1 10
Hard work I would not vote 225 3.77 2.681 .179 3.42 4.12 1 10
Other 20 3.25 2.712 .606 1.98 4.52 1 10
RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 107 3.94 2.719 .263 3.42 4.47 1 10
Democratic Party
RO: Partidul National Liberal 69 2.65 2.134 .257 2.14 3.16 1 9
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 41 3.27 2.062 .322 2.62 3.92 1 9
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 109 3.27 2.758 .264 2.74 3.79 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 282 3.24 2.552 .152 2.94 3.54 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati

22
 RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 295 2.99 2.284 .133 2.73 3.25 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 4.45 3.236 .976 2.28 6.63 1 10
Total 1159 3.33 2.540 .075 3.18 3.47 1 10
Democrac I would not vote 199 8.52 2.236 .158 8.21 8.83 1 10
y: People Other 19 9.00 1.633 .375 8.21 9.79 5 10
can RO: Partidul Democrat (PD) - 93 8.68 2.049 .212 8.26 9.10 1 10
change Democratic Party
the laws
RO: Partidul National Liberal 65 8.26 2.064 .256 7.75 8.77 2 10
in
(PNL) - National Liberal Party
referendu
RO: Uniunea Democrata a 31 8.71 1.442 .259 8.18 9.24 4 10
ms.
Maghiarilor din Romania
(UDMR) - Hun
RO: Partidul Romania Mare 99 8.37 2.582 .259 7.86 8.89 1 10
(PRM) - Greater Romania Party
RO: Partidul Social Democrat 241 8.30 2.507 .161 7.98 8.62 1 10
Roman (PSDR) - Social
Democrati
RO: The ´Justice and Truth´ 274 8.27 2.280 .138 8.00 8.54 1 10
Alliance
RO: The Conservative Party PC 11 9.09 1.700 .513 7.95 10.23 5 10
Total 1032 8.41 2.289 .071 8.27 8.54 1 10
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
gendereq Between 62.842 3 20.947 7.336 .000
Groups
Within Groups 3275.276 1147 2.856
Total 3338.118 1150
Self positioning in Between 920.546 3 306.849 118.830 .000
political scale Groups
Within Groups 2979.917 1154 2.582
Total 3900.463 1157
Autonomy Index Between 43.066 3 14.355 10.936 .000
Groups
Within Groups 1537.147 1171 1.313
Total 1580.213 1174

23
Post-Materialist index 4- Between 21.007 3 7.002 18.816 .000
item Groups
Within Groups 433.171 1164 .372
Total 454.177 1167
tolvconform Between 3754.414 3 1251.471 25.888 .000
Groups
Within Groups 55013.264 1138 48.342
Total 58767.678 1141
Incomes more equal Between 412.880 3 137.627 30.579 .000
Groups
Within Groups 5225.278 1161 4.501
Total 5638.158 1164
Private ownership of Between 142.938 3 47.646 13.063 .000
business Groups
Within Groups 4256.616 1167 3.647
Total 4399.554 1170
Government more Between 1297.712 3 432.571 70.568 .000
responsibility Groups
Within Groups 7141.234 1165 6.130
Total 8438.946 1168
Hard work Between 164.499 3 54.833 11.142 .000
Groups
Within Groups 5718.328 1162 4.921
Total 5882.827 1165
Democracy: People can Between 84.721 3 28.240 4.970 .002
change the laws in Groups
referendums. Within Groups 6602.765 1162 5.682
Total 6687.486 1165

ANOVA

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

gendereq Between Groups 71.208 8 8.901 1.469 .164
Within Groups 5881.742 971 6.057
Total 5952.950 979
Self positioning in political Between Groups 718.879 8 89.860 18.113 .000
scale Within Groups 3423.099 690 4.961
Total 4141.977 698

24
Autonomy Index Between Groups 20.127 8 2.516 2.117 .032
Within Groups 1412.929 1189 1.188
Total 1433.055 1197
Post-Materialist index 4-item Between Groups 4.362 8 .545 1.506 .151
Within Groups 396.838 1096 .362
Total 401.200 1104
tolvconform Between Groups 2206.960 8 275.870 6.165 .000
Within Groups 47743.020 1067 44.745
Total 49949.980 1075
Incomes more equal Between Groups 185.357 8 23.170 2.741 .005
Within Groups 9728.018 1151 8.452
Total 9913.376 1159
Private ownership of Between Groups 367.682 8 45.960 5.034 .000
business Within Groups 10361.911 1135 9.129
Total 10729.594 1143
Government more Between Groups 262.952 8 32.869 3.679 .000
responsibility Within Groups 10337.859 1157 8.935
Total 10600.810 1165
Hard work Between Groups 165.672 8 20.709 3.261 .001
Within Groups 7302.698 1150 6.350
Total 7468.369 1158
Democracy: People can Between Groups 33.620 8 4.203 .801 .602
change the laws in Within Groups 5369.073 1023 5.248
referendums.
Total 5402.694 1031

25