Page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENBELT DIVISION



Brett Kimberlin
Plaintiff,
Vs.
National Bloggers Club,
Ali Akbar,
Patrick Frey,
Erick Erickson,
Michelle Malkin,
Glenn Beck,
Aaron Walker,
William Hoge,
Lee Stranahan,
Robert Stacy McCain,
J ames OKeefe,
Breitbart.com,
DB Capitol Strategies,
The Franklin Center,
Simon & Schuster, Inc.,
Kimberlin Unmasked,
Mercury Radio Arts.
The Blaze,
Ace of Spades,
RedState,

Defendant(s)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)




No. GJ H 13-cv-3059




DEFENDANT FRANKLIN CENTER FOR GOVERNMENT
ANE PUBLIC INTEGRETY MEMORANDUM OF SUPPORT
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Defendant Franklin Center for Government and Public Integrity (hereinafter FCGPI or
Franklin Center by and through counsel, hereby moves to dismiss all claims, with prejudice,
under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) and Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 8, for failure to state a claim upon
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 1 of 14
Page 2

which relief can be granted, and for failure to state a clear and concise claim. Franklin Center is
a named defendant in Claims I (Civil RICO), V (Invasion of Privacy, False Light), VII
(Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage), VIII (Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress), and IX (Conspiracy to Commit State Law Torts). Each of these claims should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

INTRODUCTION

On J une 24, 2014, the court granted Plaintiff Brett Kimberlins motion to file the above
referenced Second Amended Complaint, with Franklin Center as a named Defendant. The
amended complaint, as filed, starts out with a bizarre conspiracy theory laden narrative,
involving the National Security Agency, Edward Snowden, and the J oint Threat Research
Intelligence group. The first several pages of the complaint contains almost no relative
information to support the Plaintiffs claims, and certainly only serves to add layers of confusion
as to the nature of the Plaintiffs claims. In fact, in the 82 pages and 284 paragraphs of the
complaint, only 5 paragraphs on three pages contain any specific allegations against Franklin
Center. The majority of the Plaintiffs complaint only seems to focus on a few of the
Defendants, specifically Defendants Nagy, Walker, and Frey. All of the other Defendants appear
to be very ancillary to the Plaintiffs claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may move to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In considering a motion
to dismiss, the pleadings are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and
the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true. Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (85
th

Cir. 1994), Ossman v. Diana Corp., 825 Supp. 870 (D.Minn. 1993). Any ambiguities
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 2 of 14
Page 3

concerning the sufficiency of the claims must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.
Ossman, 825 F.Supp. at 880. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure states the pleadings shall contain
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A pleading
must contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Though theTwombly standard requires only a short and
plain statement, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. Id. Federal Rules of Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may
be dismissed if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). A
satisfactory claim for relief demand[s] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is subject to
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it merely offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action [or] if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement. Id.
ARGUMENT
I. Complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 8.
The complaint on its face does not meet the standard of qualifying as a simple, clear, and
concise under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro 8. Under the rule, a complaint must contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief (Fed. Rule Civ. Pro 8(a)(2),
and Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. (Fed. Rule Civ. Pro 8(d)(1).
Failure to comply with Rule 8 justifies dismissal, even for pro-se parties, if it creates an
unjustified burden on the parties and on the court (SeeJones v. Natl Commns and Surveillance
Networks, 266 Fed. Appx. 31, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2008) It can hardly be said that the Plaintiffs
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 3 of 14
Page 4

Second Amended Complaint contains short plain statements, nor that the statements are simple,
clear and direct. The sheer 82-page length and scattered content forces every other party to pick
it apart piece by piece in order to ascertain 1) which claims apply to them, 2) what allegations
apply to them, and 3) what is the argument the plaintiff is trying to make in order to support their
claims. This creates an unjust burden upon the parties and the court, and fails to comply with
rule 8.
II. Plaintiff fail to allege facts necessary to show conduct, an enterprise, and
racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)-(d).
The Plaintiffs first claim for relief should be dismissed because the Plaintiff failed to
allege the facts necessary to show defendant FGCPI engaged in conduct, enterprise, and
racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)-(d). Without naming FCGPI (or any other
defendants) specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendant(s) generally, engaged in racketeering
activity under the federal statute. To state a claim under 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege, (1)
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. Sedima v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). As the Court discussed in Sedima, conduct is the conducting or
participating in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1961, an enterprise is any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. 1961. Racketeering activity is any act "chargeable"
under several generically described state criminal laws, any act "indictable" under numerous
specific federal criminal provisions, including mail and wire fraud, and any "offense" involving
bankruptcy or securities fraud or drug-related activities that is "punishable" under federal law.
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 4 of 14
Page 5

18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Finally, a pattern of racketeering requires at least two acts of racketeering
activity. 18 U.S.C. 1961.
The Plaintiffs first claim for relief should be dismissed because the Plaintiff failed to
show any of the elements of the 18 U.S.C. 1961 claim. The only conduct alleged by Plaintiff
was the publication of a single press release by FCGPI informing possible participants about an
online seminar, or webinar on threats to freedom of the press, (Second Amended Complaint
125), hosting the webinar (Second Amended Complaint 126), publishing a factual blog post
about the Plaintiff (Second Amended Complaint 127), and co-hosting an event with the
National Bloggers Club (Second Amended Complaint 128). Publicizing and hosting a webinar,
and co-hosting a publicized social event are insufficient to implicate conduct in racketeering
activity. The Amended Complaint fails to identify any conduct that would constitute
racketeering under the applicable standard, or conduct chargeable under a criminal statute, let
alone a pattern of such racketeering activity. These facts are insufficient to state a claim under 18
U.S.C. 1962(c), and, as such, Plaintiffs first claim should be dismissed.
Secondly, even if the court were to construe that acts committed by others in the
enterprise construed Racketeering activity, Plaintiff has insufficiently claimed that Franklin
Center was even a part of the Enterprise. Plaintiff instead asserts conclusory statements stating
that the Defendant joined the RICO Enterprise (Second Amended Complaint, 125), but
in no way alleges any fact that shows that the Enterprise existed, or that Franklin Center was
involved, nor has he filed any Exhibits which support his conclusory statements. There are no
allegations of Defendant Franklin Center meeting with any other Defendants to conspire against
him. He does not allege that Franklin Center participated in any crimes against him. His only
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 5 of 14
Page 6

two factual allegations against Franklin Center are that they advertised a webinar, and that they
conducted a webinar.
The Iqbal standard is clear. In order to survive a Motion to Dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege
factual material sufficient to show that the Franklin Center was part of a RICO enterprise, or that
Franklin Center influenced or participated in any predicated events necessary to support a RICO
action.
III. Defendant has failed to state a claim for Invasion of Privacy False Light.
In his complaint, the Plaintiff has essentially substituted False Light claims for
Defamation claims which would otherwise be barred by statute of limitations. Maryland has
recognized this strong nexus between false light and defamation that it treats false light in a
similar matter as to defamation. In fact, "the Fourth Circuit, interpreting Maryland law, has
refused to allow a claim for false light invasion of privacy to stand where the claim failed to meet
the standards for defamation. Dobkin v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 6445, 37
(D. Md. Apr. 17, 1996).
a. The Plaintiffs claim for False Light is barred by statute of limitations.
Maryland law has gone so far with the analogous claim between defamation and false
light, that the court has adopted the Statute of Limitations for Defamation and has applied it to
false light where it is an analogous claim. Smith v. Esquire, Inc., 494 F.Supp. 967,969 (D. MD,
1980), holds that when "a false light claim is essentially analogous to a libel claim ... [it] should
be governed by the same statute of limitations To hold otherwise would allow a plaintiff, in
any defamation action where there has been a general publication, to avoid the otherwise
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 6 of 14
Page 7

applicable one-year statute merely by phrasing the cause of action in terms of invasion of
privacy. Id. at 970.
Under Maryland law, the statute of limitations on a claim for defamation is one-year (Md.
Courts & J udicial Proc. 5-105). Any alleged defamatory statements related to the webinar ad
were made on J une 26, 2012. (Amended Complaint 125). Any alleged defamatory statements
related to the webinar itself were made on J uly 9, 2012. (Amended Complaint 125). Any
alleged defamatory statements related to Tabitha Hales blog post were made on May 25
th
, 2012.
The complaint was filed on or around October 17, 2013, which is more than one year removed
from the latest date, J uly 9, 2012. This claim is therefore barred by statute of limitations and
should be dismissed.
b. The Defendant has failed to state a claim for Invasion of Privacy False Light.
In order to state a claim for invasion of privacy, false light, in Maryland, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the defendant gave publicity to a matter that places the plaintiff before the public
in a false light; (2) that a reasonable person would find that the false light in which the
other person was placed highly offensive; and (3) that the defendant had knowledge of or
acted with reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light
in which the defendant placed the plaintiff. Mazer v. Safeway, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 412
(D. Md. 2005).

Plaintiffs claim for false light with regards to FCGPI should be dismissed because he merely
recites the elements of a false light claim (Second Amended Complaint, 242-245), fails to
specifically name FCGPI, and fails to challenge the veracity of statements made by FCGPI. A
complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if it merely offers labels and conclusions
or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[or] if it tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff also fails to
challenge the actual truth and veracity of the statements made by Franklin Center and therefore
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 7 of 14
Page 8

fails to state a claim for false light invasion of privacy. (Second Amended Complaint 125, 125,
127, 128). Under Maryland law, [w]here the truth is so close to the facts, the court will find that
no legal harm has been done. Dobkin v. J ohns Hopkins Univ., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, 29
(D. Md. Apr. 17, 1996). Additionally, Plaintiff fails to specifically name FCGPI in its Sixth
Claim for Relief and instead names Defendants without any attribution to specific activity
committed by FCGPI.
Even if the complaint were construed to be sufficient in meeting the elements of the
cause of action of false, light, the statements allegedly made by Franklin Center are either 1)
true, 2) grossly misrepresented by the Plaintiff, or 3) are not disclosures of a private nature.
First, when looking at the allegations in Paragraph 125 of the complaint, there are only two
statements which the Plaintiff could allege place him in a false light. 1) that he had filed 100
frivilous lawsuits, and 2) that he and his associates were involved with four swatting incidents.
To look at the first one, this is based on an admission by the Plaintiff in an email to Defendant
Frey. In an email to Defendant Frey on October 10, 2010, the Plaintiff stated I have filed over a
hundred lawsuits and another one will be no sweat for me. This statement was posted on
Defendant Freys blog http://patterico.com/2010/10/11/brett-kimberlin-threatens-to-sue-me.
Second, with regards to the swatting, this was not a disclosure of a private nature. Under
Maryland law, in order to prevail in a false light claim, the facts disclosed "requires publicity,
meaning that the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure, and not a private
one Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583,587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000). By the time FCGPI
published the press release on J une 26, 2012, the incidents of swatting and the allegations of
Kimberlins involvement were already very public as admitted by Kimberlin (Second Amended
Complaint 85, 86, 87), by appearances on CNN, Huffington Post, and on Glenn Becks radio
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 8 of 14
Page 9

program over a month prior. They could hardly be considered private facts by the time they
were published.
Regarding the allegations in Paragraph 126, the webinar does not contain any defamatory
information about the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff states or implies that the webinar states Aaron
Worthing was swatted last night and is a very high profile victim of Brett Kimberlin." This
statement is contained nowhere in the webinar, and the Plaintiff has provided no transcript of the
webinar that contains this statement. In fact, with regards to the swatting incidents the
statements in the webinar clearly state that Kimberlin is innocent until proven guilty (Franklin
Center Free Speech Webinar.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9Q1vWqN7E8&list=UUrz516XcbLZXwf4ZYIRZpGg at
14:09). Most of the webinar focused on legal tactics used to suppress free speech, such as filing
pro-se law suits alleging defamation, and conspiracy, and then amending lawsuits, and adding
defendants to the lawsuit as conspirators so that the defendants expend time and effort trying to
fight the lawsuit. In fact, it seems that much of the content of the webinar is almost like a
soothsayer predicting exactly what is happening in this current lawsuit as if this had been done
before by parties in this current lawsuit.
Paragraph 127 of the complaint contain the only allegations by the Plaintiff of false
statements by the Defendant FCGPI. He argues that FCGPI falsely stated that Plaintiff is a
child molester, assassin, who has filed over 100 frivolous lawsuits, and attacked "any blogger
who dared mention his name Franklin Center never accused the Plaintiff of being a child
molester, this statement is completely false. In the article, FCGPI quoted from Defendant The
Blaze that referred to the Plaintiff as an alleged child molester, which is a true statement because
there it refers to actually allegations admitted in the Plaintiffs own authorized biography
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 9 of 14
Page 10

published about him detailing his exploits. Citizen K: The Deeply Weird American Journey of
Brett Kimberlin (Singer, Mark, Knoff, New York, 1996) is an authorized biography of Plaintiff
Kimberlin. In it the book insuinuates that the Plaintiff had an inappropriate relationship with a
ten year old girl. (Id. at 78.) Franklin Center never stated that the Plaintiff is an assassin.
Frankln Center stated that the Plaintiff is believed to have played a role in the assassination of a
grandmother because, as stated in the previously mentioned authorized biography of the
plaintiff, that he was suspected in having arranged a murder-for-hire of the ten year old girls
grandmother (at 82, 83). As far as the allegation of filing over 100 frivolous lawsuits, this again
is by the Plaintiffs own admission in an email to Defendant Frey where he stated I have filed
over a hundred lawsuits and another one will be no sweat for me.
(http://patterico.com/2010/10/11/brett-kimberlin-threatens-to-sue-me).
Lastly, the claim fails to meet the standards for defamation, and [t]he Fourth
Circuit, interpreting Maryland law, has refused to allow a claim for false light invasion of
privacy to stand where the claim failed to meet the standards for defamation. Dobkin v. Johns
Hopkins Univ., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, 37 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 1996); See supra Section V.
Under Maryland law, Plaintiffs allegation of defamation per se fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. To assert a defamation claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant made a defamatory statement regarding the plaintiff to a third person; (2) the statement
was false; (3) the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement; and (4) the plaintiff
suffered harm thereby. S. Volkswagen, Inc. v. Centrix Fin., LLC, 357 F. Supp. 2d 837 (D. Md.
2005). Plaintiff is a public figure and is therefore further required to allege sufficient facts to
show actual malice on the part of FCGPI. Dobkin v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6445, 45-46 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 1996). Public figures are defined as those who thrust
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 10 of 14
Page 11

themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 525 F. Supp. 585, 588-589 (D. Md. 1981).
Plaintiff is a public figure because he has had an authorized biography published about him
detailing his exploits. Plaintiff is, in fact, admittedly the notorious Speedway Bomber who
terrorized the town of Speedway Indiana in 1978. (Id.) Throughout Plaintiffs incarceration, he
sought the media spotlight by claiming to have sold marijuana to former Vice President Dan
Quayle (at. 90-91) and sought to tell his tale through a jailhouse press conference (at 117-119.)
These facts support the conclusion that Plaintiff is a public figure and must thus show actual
malice by FCGPI. Under Twombly, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 55. Therefore, this claim should be
dismissed.
IV. The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for Interference with Potential Business
Prospect.

The claim for Intereference with Potential Business Prospect, as it applies to FCGPI also
fails the Twombly test. The elements of this claim are (1) intentional or willful acts; (2)
calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful
purpose to cause such damage and loss without right or justifiable cause on the part of the
defendants (constituting malice); and (4) resulting in actual damage and loss. Kaser v. Fin. Prot.
Mktg, Inc. 831 A.2d 49, 53 (Md. 2003). Furthermore, the Plaintiff must identify with specificity
a possible future relationship which is likely to occur absent the interference. Baron Fin. Corp.
v. Natanzon, 471 F. Supp. 2d 535, 546 (D. Md. 2006). More specifically, he must demonstrate
that the Defendant Defendants engaged in "conduct that is independently wrongful or unlawful,"
Bell BCI Co. v. HRGM Corp., CIV. J FM-03-1387, 2004 WL 3222885, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 6,
2004).
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 11 of 14
Page 12

In his complaint, the Plaintiff fails to plead how the actions of FCGPI in any way
interfered with any potential business relationship with anyone. Not only does he fail to create a
causal nexus between the actions of FCGPI and any future business relationship, he even fails to
mention the existence or nature of any future business relationship that could possibly exist.
merely recited the elements of the claim by alleging that DBCS intentionally and willfully
acted to disrupt and deprive Plaintiff of future business with actual damages and loss
resulting. (Second Amended Complaint, 265-68). The only possible conjecture is that the
Plaintiff alleges that the Article referenced urges readers to target the State Department for
working with Plaintiffs employer. (Second Amended Complaint 127). This is not true, the
article has no call to action. It merely reported the fact that the State Department was indeed
working with one of Kimberlins non-profit organizations.
The allegations against FCGPI fail to rise above the speculative level, and therefor does
not survive the Twombly standard. Therefore, Plaintiffs Claim for Relief for Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage should be dismissed.
V. The Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress

In his complaint the plaintiff merely states the elements of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional distress, without pleading in any detail who has done what to cause him this
emotional distress. A claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress must contain the
following elements. "(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be
extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct
and the emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be severe." Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun
Co., 164 Md. App. 497, 883 A.2d 1008, 1024 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). In addition, Maryland
Courts have cautioned the use of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress only in
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 12 of 14
Page 13

cases where the defendant committed "opprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous
conduct." Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8, 11 (Md. 1992).
In this case the Plaintiff provides insufficient facts to allege that FCGPIs conduct was
extreme or outrageous. The Amended Complaint also fails to allege a causal connection between
FCGPIs conduct and the emotional distress. Plaintiffs sole accusation against FCGPI is that
they posted a press release and held a webinar, and published that webinar on youtube. Even if
true, this allegation is insufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Maryland Law. This claim should be dismissed under the Twombly standard.
VI. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for Conspiracy to Commit State Law Torts
Like every other claim contained in the Plaintiffs complaint, the claim for conspiracy to
commit state law torts is completely absent of any facts to support it. He supplies no facts to
support the notion that FCGPI conspired with anyone to commit any underlying torts. He fails to
identify any torts which may have been committed, and he fails to state how the committing of
such torts has resulted in any injury whatsoever, each of which must be proven to show a claim
for Conspiracy to Commit State Law Torts. See Green v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commn, 259 Md. 206, 221 (1970); Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1,24-25,867 A.2d 276,290
(2005)
Furthermore, without the establishment on of an underlying tort, the claim for Conspiracy
to Commit State Law Torts cannot stand alone, the absence of other tortious injury to Plaintiff,
civil conspiracy is not a separate tort capable of independently awarding damages. Rood v.
Rosen, 482 B.R. 132, 141-42 (D. Md. 2012). It is not enough to merely state defendants
conspired with each other to commit the state law tortious acts alleged above. (Second
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 13 of 14
Page 14

Amended Complaint, 281-83). Therefore the claim for Conspiracy to Commit state law torts
does not meet the Twombly standard should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant FCGPI respectfully requests this court to dismiss Plaintiffs First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Defendant FCGPI, having stated its support for their motion to dismiss, prays for relief as
follows:
1. An Order dismissing this case
2. An Order granting Attorneys and Costs
3. An Order enjoining Plaintiff from filing any frivolous and meritless lawsuits against
Plaintiff without first receiving permission from the court vis--vis obtaining approval
from a court appointed special master or by posting bond to cover fees and costs
should such a claim be dismissed;
4. Any other such relief this court deems fit and proper.

Respectfully Submitted,
_________/s/________
LINDA S. MERICLE, Esq.
Linda S. Mericle, P.A.
7600 Hanover Parkway, Ste. 202
Greenbelt, MD 20905
Federal Bar #:09685
Local Counsel for Defendant, The Franklin Center
Phone: (301) 474-2044
Fax: (301) 861-0826
Case 8:13-cv-03059-GJH Document 156-2 Filed 07/16/14 Page 14 of 14