Freedom of Expression: The Freedom of Speech and Expression, although believed a universal human right, does not have the same meaning everywhere. Within the umbrella right, there is considerable difference from nation to nation in the scope of the right, the limits placed upon it and the very notion of the right. This is visible in the very manner in which the right is protected internationally. The Freedom of Speech and Expression is often believed to belong exclusively to the western liberal tradition, having germinated in the late 1800s with the French Revolution, and the genesis of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. It is, however, safe to say that the right has now achieved a far more universal status. The right has been incorporated into instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both instruments that have been acceded to by nations far outside western traditions. Considerable leeway is visible in the way these instruments protect the Freedom of Speech and Expression. They are often worded in a vague and broad manner, and allow for considerable variation in interpretation. They may hence be adapted to differing legal traditions. Most instruments, for instance, while providing for the protection of the right, allow nations to place complementary duties and restrictions something which may be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions. The European Court of Human Rights amply exemplifies this approach. It has evolved the margin of appreciation doctrine, which allows countries to interpret the European Convention on Human Rights broadly. The Court often absolves itself from looking into the restrictions a member nation has placed upon the Freedom of Speech and Expression, as long as the same appears rational and necessary. This allows countries to place numerous restrictions, such as compulsory content in a particular language in order for its preservation, without being in breach of a convention.
Journalistic Freedoms Journalistic freedoms are of a nature far removed from the general freedom of speech, although both are placed under the broad umbrella of the freedom of speech and expression. While the former is a freedom to disseminate information - or facts, the latter is a right to distribute ideas, opinions or thoughts largely ones own creations. The protections afforded to them hence vary significantly in terms of limits, requirements and scope. The right to information is an active right; it is not only a general right to be informed of things of every nature, but also a guarantee that persons shall be protected in their attempts to disseminate it. This is the domain of the freedom of the press. In many jurisdictions, the press is given certain protections not afforded to all such as the right to not reveal ones sources. On the other hand, it also has heightened responsibilities, such as the need to be accurate, especially when there is the question of something like defamation at hand. The rights and duties afforded to journalists are part of an evolving process, with many questions remaining unanswered. The question of who can be termed a journalist is enormously complicated in todays era. People who may not traditionally be considered professional journalists may nonetheless play a major role in the dissemination of information through twitter, blogs and the like. It is unclear what protections we afford such persons, as are the duties that ought to be placed on them.
Passive Right to Information The traditional liberal view of the freedom of speech and expression sees the passive right of information as one where the government does not impede in the dissemination of information. There do, however, exist alternate views on such a right. There are at least three views that instead place a further positive obligation on the state. These include: 1. Public institutions play an important part in the dissemination. Through measures like the Right to Information Act, citizens have a right to demand information from public institutions, which places an active duty on the State. 2. In Europe, there is a tradition of public service broadcasting, where the citizens have a right to receive public service broadcasts. 3. The state might have the duty to remove undemocratic fetters placed on the access of information by private entities, such as cable companies, search engine services etc. Restrictions are often placed on active obligations in the interests of security, official secrets or national interests, and states usually have the discretion of placing appropriate standards to that effect. The United Kingdom, for instance, can place penalties on people that violate national interest by revealing information. In the context of episodes like Wikileaks, however, a question arises as to whether one can place liability on persons who reveal such information from outside the jurisdiction of a state. There is perhaps a need to come up with an international understanding for such cases, perhaps by articulating a standard of international public interest.