RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387.

December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof which
imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment
into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as
well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not
have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran
for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their
respective certificates of candidacy.


ISSUES:

1. W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

2. W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

3. W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of
Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule.
This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination
that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that the
repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of
the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this
Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in
short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial
cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding
the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the
paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by vi rtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v.
Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-
period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding
its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts
do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the
legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.



PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

HELD: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.


LIBAN V. GORDON
G.R. NO. 175352, JULY 15 2009

FACTS: In 1947, President Roxas signed R.A. 95, otherwise known as the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Charter. The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary
organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Red Cross Convention.

The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion,
gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides 6 major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management,
Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.

Liban et al. are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. In 2006, during Gordons
incumbency as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Liban et al.s position: In Camporedondo v. NLRC, it was held that the PNRC is a GOCC. In accepting and holding the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.

Gordons position:
(1) He has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. He was already Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-
elected in 2005.
(2) PNRC is not a GOCC
(3) The prohibition under Art. 6, 13 of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service
to thePNRC is neither an office nor an employment

ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC.

HELD: NO.PNRC IS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION PERFORMING PUBLIC FUNCTIONS.

The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(Movement). The Fundamental Principles of the Movement provide a universal standard of reference for all its members.
The PNRC, as a member, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be
recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous. The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be
accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers
must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. The PNRC cannot be seen as a GOCC, and neither can
the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the
insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies. Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be
seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent.

The following are proof that the PNRC is not a GOCC:
(1) The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from Congress. The
PNRC is financed primarily by private contributions.

(2) The PNRC is not controlled by the government. Under its Charter, only 6 of the 30 members of the Board of
Governors are appointed by the President (of the 24 remaining, 18 are elected by the chapter delegates of the
PNRC and the other 6 are elected by the 24 members already chosen). The PNRC Board of Governors elects the
Chairman and all its other officers. Gordon was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-
controlled PNRC Board

(3) The PNRC Chairman is neither appointed by the President nor by the head of any department, agency,
commission or board of the Executive, Judicial or Legislative branches. Hence, the PNRC Chairman is not an
official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

(4) The PNRC boards decisions or actions are not reviewable by the President. Neither can the President reverse
or modify the decisions or actions of the Chairman, it is the Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions
or actions of the Chairman. This proves again that the office of the Chairman is a private office, not a government
office.

In the Camporedondo ruling, the test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for
the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the PNRC was created
under a special charter, the Court then ruled that it is a government corporation. However, it failed to consider the
definition of a GOCC in the Administrative Code.

A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of
the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government.
Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or control PNRC.

Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code
governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Constitution authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special
charters. Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that Congress can create corporations with
special charters only if such corporations are government-owned or controlled.

Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a GOCC in the absence of the
essential elements of ownership and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress
was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
provisions of the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates a private corporation and grants it corporate powers is void f or being
unconstitutional.



PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election
was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a
quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from
a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to
have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat
objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative
body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of
IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioners action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: NO, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He
bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is
clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is
clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What
could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.


AVELINO VS CUENCO

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to deliver a
speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the
Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his
speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12
Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the
court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of
the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the
Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most,
eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of
the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.


DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA
G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

FACTS:
During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority
leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

HELD:

Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the
petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the
Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.



ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

FACTS:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules
of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House


HELD:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform
to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not
be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.



PENDATUN V. OSMENA

FACTS:
Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from proceeding, as provided by
Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President during his privilege speech
entitled "A Message to Garcia" wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President's administration selling pardons.
For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was suspended for 15 months for the serious
disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner's words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech and
words of Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself as stated
in the provision that "xxx shall not be questioned in any other place".

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary,
because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the
contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the suspension of
the House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.



PAREDES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991.

FACTS:
In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight
years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Agusan del Sur. A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated
section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del Sur,
to favorably indorse his free patent application.
Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the
presence of accused because the summon was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes. His
motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing validity of the preliminary investigation that it was conducted without his
notice.
In the meantime, Paredes was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was reverted back to
public domain. Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. He refused to post bail in "protest
against the injustice to him as Governor". A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging that the
warrant for her husband's arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in
the information against him had already prescribed.

ISSUE:
1. WON the warrant of arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was conducted w/o notice to the
accused.
2. WON the crime had already prescribed.

RULING:
1. NOT VOID. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy is to demand that PI be conducted
before entering his plea, the court should then suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a PI, that is, to file a Motion
before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for
an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by
the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court . . ." . The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so

2. The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the criminal action
otherwise it would be deemed waived. Whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in
the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.

The accused may file a bail bond of P20,000, fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty.


US VS PONS
Conclusiveness of the Journal

FACTS:
Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered
5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on
record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one).
And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for
illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines.
Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381
should be null and void.

ISSUE:
WON the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on
28 Feb 1914.

HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals
in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and
the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the
court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in
this particular case.

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS GIMENEZ
Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported
abroad. Pursuant to RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law), the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1,
1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee, as provided in same law.

In compliance, Casco paid the fees but later moved for reimbursement as Casco maintained that urea and
formaldehyde are exempted from such fees. The CBP issued the vouchers for refund (pursuant to Resolution 1529 of the
CBP) but the banks auditor refused to honor the vouchers since he maintained that this is in contrast to the provision of
Sec 2, par 18 of RA 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of
section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.

The Auditor General, Gimenez, affirmed the ruling of CBPs auditor. Casco maintains that the term urea
formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be construed as urea and formaldehyde He further contends that the
bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of
this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by
members thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.

HELD:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently
distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as urea formaldehyde The opinions of any member of Congress does not represent the entirety of the Congress
itself.
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that the enrolled bill
which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the
printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which the SC
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.


ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS, April 30, 1974

Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory
prohibitory injunction. Denied.

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives passed on 3rd reading without amendments.
It was sent to the Senate for concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee, which recommended
approval with a minor amendment recommended by Senator Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the President
Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor).
When the bill was discussed on the Senate Floor, substantial amendments to Section 1 was introduced by Senator
Tolentino, which amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the Senate with amendments. Attached was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments
which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. House of Representatives signified their approval. The printed
copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretaries of Senate and House of representatives and the Senate
President. The bill with the Roxas amendments were signed by the president of the Philippines and it was subsequently
named RA 4065.

It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law by the President
was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate Floor. Senate President
admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result, the president sent a message to the presiding officer of both
houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature from HB 9266.

Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605. He also issued an order
recalling 5 members of the city police who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under the authority of RA
4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court.

Respondents contend that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and
that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.

ISSUES:
1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment.
2. WON RA 4065 can be considered as valid in the absence of the attestation required

HELD:
1. NO. Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification
that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. This
declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation that it invalidated. Certification that was made by the
presiding officer is merely a mode of authentication. The essential thing is the approval of congress and not the signature
of the presiding officers. Function of attestation is not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed
both houses. Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to the
president. Rationale of the enrolled bill theory the signing by the speaker of the House of Representatives and by the
president of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses, through their
presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. (Field vs. Clark) Enrolled bill theory based mainly on the respect due to coequal and
independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticate in the manner stated.

2. NO. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but he argues that the disclaimer thereof
by the Senate President, granting that it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all
but would not affect the validity of the statute. The argument of the petitioner would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine
within the bill had been duly enacted? In such case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the president and signed by him. Bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become law.


ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Doctrine Of Supremacy Of The Constitution

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file
election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying,
among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said
position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests
is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely
as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although
the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the
National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing
said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of
Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the
petitioner.