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FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166577 : February 3, 2010
SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, Petitioners, v. AYALA LAND, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision
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cralaw dated
December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784, which reversed and set aside the Summary Judgment
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cralaw dated
December 22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 255. Also subject of the present petition is the CA
Resolution
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cralaw dated December 16, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier decision.
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title
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cralaw with the RTC of Makati
City against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC), and the Register of Deeds of Las Pias, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
292.
In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
296463 issued in their names.
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cralaw They further alleged that Ayala Corporation was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366,
T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity
contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision. Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of
Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo. Tindig
na Manga, Las Pias with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of
May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 218,523 square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the Sitio of
May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Pias with an area of 155,345 square meters.
No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.
According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 and their derivatives "appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala
and purport to cover and embrace the Carpo's property or portion thereof duly covered registered under the already indefeasible and
incontrovertible TCT [No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the duly issued derivatives of the Carpos
title."
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cralaw The Carpos additionally applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Ayala Corporation and APVC from
doing construction and development works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos rights.
The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368 and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala
Corporation and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of
the Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the Carpos the properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said
corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No. 296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the
property described therein "including the parcels of land being claimed and occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and
enforceable titles"; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000 as attorney's fees plus costs
of suit and litigation expenses.
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cralaw
On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala Land,
Incorporated (ALI) in lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las Pias that the title to the subject
property was registered in the name of ALI and not Ayala Corporation.
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cralaw
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On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Counterclaims and Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction
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cralaw and Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended Answer,
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cralawrespectively.
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT
Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the dispute pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos
TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala
Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged
that it is the true owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in
1950 while the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in
view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro
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cralaw which upheld the ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject
property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262, over the property previously covered by TCT No. T-
5333.
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cralaw
In the Order
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cralaw dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to
the RTC of Las Pias where the disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las Pias RTC and docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the only issue for the court to resolve was a purely legal one which of the two (2) titles should be accorded priority. According to ALI, the
parties were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years
earlier than the Carpos predecessor's title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior. Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, arguing that there were "genuine issues and controversies to be litigated."
In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI's motion for summary judgment. This denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision
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cralaw dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI's petition and ordered the RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties
moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render the summary
judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were
genuine issues in this case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 12, 1998.
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cralaw
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on certiorari . In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CA's refusal to
render a summary judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CA's ruling that trial was unnecessary.
In separate minute Resolutions,
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cralaw the Court denied both petitions. Both parties motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding the Carpos title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of
any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property
surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying
this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application
should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey
plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being
accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed
under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the
same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to
credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved
by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration
Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the
same is void.
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It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date
of survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs property covered by TCT No. 296463 was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of defendant ALI's predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior
registration cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is
already a record of a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the
Bureau of Lands. This must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayala's predecessor-in-interest did not anymore bear the approval of the
Director of Lands because had it been submitted for approval, the records of the Bureau of Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land
had already been made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be
disputed on the basis of Ayala's answer is its admission that SWO survey without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted
in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of
defendant Ayala's TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(d) To pay the costs.
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cralaw
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed by the CA in a Resolution
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cralaw dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay
the full amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at
the RTC Las Pias. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI's
petition meritorious, the Court, in a Decision
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cralaw dated November 22, 2000, reversed the CA's dismissal of ALI's appeal and remanded the
same to the CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias,
Branch 255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered as follows:
(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title
to the subject property;
(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to be NULL and VOID;
(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel plaintiffs-appellees TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued covering the
subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and effect.
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cralaw
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant
petition for review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo.
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cralawThe Petition contained the following assignment of errors:
A THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN
APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE
VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN
PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415, WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE PRESENT.
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cralaw
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Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting aside the CA Decision dated December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated
December 16, 2004; (b) reinstating and affirming in toto the RTC's Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998; or in the alternative (c)
remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court
should be reversed and set aside.
Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy
At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT
No. [125945] T-6055A) covering a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land area of 254,085 square
meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite
the lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368 with the property covered by the Carpos TCT No.
296463 or any portion of said property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of the trial court considering that
the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No. 296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the
properties in the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA ruled that:
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents.
Instead, it alleged:
"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs, completely overlaps the property covered by ALI's TCT No.
T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463 traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No. 242 (the title from which ALI's
TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950 (on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI's TCT No.
T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. xxx."
This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question, and that the property described in private respondents
TCT No. 296463 completely overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic
Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence and experience, declared under oath:
"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots
described in the title of plaintiffs, TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-5333 of LPVI, and, more
previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, x x x.
9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions found in the plaintiffs and ALI's respective titles. The
standard operating procedure, adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the technical description in the titles
and at the same time, to get all the available survey plans described in the titles for reference.
9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan reflecting Plaintiffs title vis-a-vis ALI's title. Attached hereto as
Annex "G" is an original copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.
9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan
that plaintiffs claimed property entirely overlaps ALI's property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs claimed property (Lot 3, PSU-56007) is in
fact identical to ALI's lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).
9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the boundaries of ALI's TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is clearly
shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs claimed property."
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and identical boundaries between the private respondents TCT No. 296463 and
petitioner's TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333).
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cralawIn addition to the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise
attached to its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:
x x x x
In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioner's allegation that their (private respondents) title, TCT No. 296463 traces its
origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover, the
private respondents attached no supporting document to its Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment appear to have been satisfied xxx.
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x x x x
Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are
admitted in the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for
Summary Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting
ones) is superior and must be upheld.This issue may be decided on the basis of the affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties,
as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial
court should do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents attached by the parties in their respective pleadings
and/or submitted together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its
responsive pleading, to wit: res judicata, prescription and laches which may likewise be resolved without going to trial.
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cralaw (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with
finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CA's factual finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions overlap
are those covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and ALI's TCT No. T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for the
trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2,
plan Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners claims with respect to these properties are already barred by res judicata.
In Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
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cralaw petitioner Morris Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these
two properties based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan number (Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his
claim was discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. (Realty), ALI's predecessor in interest,
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cralaw is the one with valid
title to these properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity of
the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Paraaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21,
1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT
No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants
were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. x x x.
x x x x
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on
June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm
his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty
and QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case
No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and identical
applicants/oppositors.
x x x x
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa,
Notary Public of Manila dated October 9, 1970. x x x.
x x x x
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga
in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino
Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings
over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered
therein.
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Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve
years before the issuance of the title in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is
the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliestcertificate issued in respect thereof
x x x."
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cralaw (Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.
First Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even without the requisite survey plan approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CA's ruling on this point. It is the CA's view that the trial court's pronouncement that
OCT No. 242 was issued without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of regularity that said title enjoys.
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the Summary Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of
any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No. 242 covers the property
surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying
this court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land registration cases, it is mandatory that the application
should be accompanied by a survey plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. A survey
plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being
accepted as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed
under SWO and not bearing the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan without the
approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands the
same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not entitled to
credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly approved
by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the Land Registration
Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law, the
same is void.
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cralaw
To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or amended answer would show that, contrary to the trial court's allusions thereto, there is no
admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
There is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial court's finding that the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in
the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the
notation "SWO" appeared in the technical description of the said title which was attached to the answer and due to ALI's failure to allege in its
pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
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cralaw
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate
authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part
of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the discussion of the CA on this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-
appellant's failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a
survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be
assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI's original predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of the
subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in favor of
ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon which
7

the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it effectively.This
is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that decree may
be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by repeated actions,
compel a court to review a decree previously issued by another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be
destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it faulted ALI's
failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original land
registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings, much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the
requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title
to determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the
transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for
the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the
fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and
to dispense with the need of inquiring further.
30
cralaw(Underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land
registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI's TCT No. T-41262,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Disputable presumptions . The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within
an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; x x x.
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna
31
:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March
3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot
be overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v. Enriquez:
32
cralaw
To overturn this legal presumption carelessly more than 90 years since the termination of the case will not only endanger judicial stability, but also
violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to
meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the
requisites for the issuance of a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan accompanied the
issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to
present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALI's title since the burden of
proof purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC.
This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALI's
title is null and void and that such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never alleged the
purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI's title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALI's titles should be declared void for not
being derivatives of the Carpos title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over
8

ALI's. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved
survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CA's Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which between
the two titles, purporting to cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners themselves are aware, in Realty,
it was held that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails x x x. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is
the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof x x x."
33
cralaw (Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite,
34
cralaw we held that "[w] here two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether
wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived."
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the principle "Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time, Stronger in
Right) in this case and found that ALI's title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Second Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to
them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe.
However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record.
Verily, the premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA's finding that:
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI's predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-
appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court's firmly held view that plaintiffs-appellees claim is barred not only by
prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued,
any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees complaint was for quieting
of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in
said complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-
settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice.
Since ALI's title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-
appellees, as well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALI's title
was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on
the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:
"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised xxx subject,
however, to the right of any person xxx to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration
not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other
encumbrances for value."
35
cralaw
Third Assignment of Error
The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged
admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos title, as declared by the CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffs-
appellees title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALI's statement to be of no moment.
9

Nowhere in ALI's statement was there an admission of the validity of plaintiffs-appellees title. x x x.
The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but
also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees certificate of title. x x x.
36
cralaw
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI's supposed admission of
the existence of Carpos title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid. Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:
The existence of plaintiffs TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No. 8575 which
was issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs TCT No. 296463
both originated from Decree No. 131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to defendant ALI's answer. This
admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer,
and the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44
Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of
any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs in their complaint. x x x.
37
cralaw
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted the validity of Carpos title with its admission of the said title's existence,
that is the unmistakable import of the trial court's statements that ALI's admission of the existence of Carpo's title "are conclusive upon it" and bars
ALI from taking a "position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer" followed by the statement that the trial court is "not inclined to concur with
Ayala's claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic) any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs." This is yet
another non sequitur argument on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly pointed out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro
38
cralaw was binding on the Carpos as it
proceeded to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Paraaque, Rizal,
which was subdivided into eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of an
accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALI's TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guico's application was opposed
by, among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was derived.
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of
Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar
claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their
predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the
merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the
first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to
the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the
instant case.
39
cralaw
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-in-
interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties
respective OCTs were not issued in these persons names but rather a certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically
said that there was identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res judicata, i.e. , that there
must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA's questioned Decision had sufficient basis in
fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 22, 2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
10

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD
and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTO, Respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision
1
promulgated on July 3,
1991 and the subsequent Resolution
2
promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals
3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration
and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos,
residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.
5
The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
6
However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs - Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado - represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad
litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the
applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:
7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application
for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides:
8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the
provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the
opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is
procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without
it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial
hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision
that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November 19, 1991.
11

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel
anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.
9

The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion"
10
in holding -
. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in
not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process."
11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:
13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it
cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon
the court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it
justified its disposition in this wise:
14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of:
publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these
are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. -
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to
have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
12

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
15
While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,
16
the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.
17
Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely
affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the
identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.
18
He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned - nay, "the whole world" - who have rights
to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is
due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.
19
There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
x-x-x











13

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171631 : November 15, 2010
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ,
represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela
Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land[3] under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known
as the PropertyRegistration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila, describedunder survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D,
Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-
000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7)
Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered
by any land patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the
tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob[4] dated June 18,
1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased
parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay[5] dated March 10,
1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred
that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the
filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor theirpredecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or
the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default[6] against the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter,
respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion
of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title
of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084
(consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred
Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the
order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.[7]
14

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[8]The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject
land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an
owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject
property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN,
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO
EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.[9]
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted,
public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents
failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to
establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to be owned
by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious,
continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in
the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig
to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan
of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents
assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review under Rule
45. chanrobles
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts.[10] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower
court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[11] chanrobles
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. chanrobles
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they,
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[12] These the respondents must prove by no less than clear,
positive and convincing evidence.[13]chanrobles
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the
State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.[15] chanrobles
15

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
000084[16] chanrobles (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan.
03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18] the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation appeari ng in the
Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the
lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the
proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,[19] the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.
In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable. chanrobles
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the
alienable and disposable zone.Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land
are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject
property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.[20] chanrobles
Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and
Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-interest'
possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939,[21] testified that since he
attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them.[22] Amado testified that he was a tenant of the
land adjacent to the subject property since 1950,[23] and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject
land.[24] chanrobles
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began
actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester,
who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of
ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that
general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[25] An applicant in a
land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.[26] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At
best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to
explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other
evidence.The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of
their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.[28] chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
16

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public
domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration
and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by
Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
x-x-x





















17


SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 167215 : October 8, 2008]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF EVARISTO TIOTIOEN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to set aside a part of the Decision
1
dated February 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 71358 insofar as it sustained the denial of the Notice of Appeal
2
filed on January 11, 2002 by the petitioner from
the Decision
3
dated August 30, 2001 of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-
LRC-0008.
*
Additional Member as per Special Order No. 520.
LRC No. 93-LRC-0008 involves the second application filed by Evaristo Tiotioen on September 6, 1993 for judicial confirmation and registration
under the Torrens System of two parcels of land denominated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan PSU-230646, situated in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, with
an aggregate area of 180,488 square meters. Evaristo Tiotioen was substituted by his heirs in the case when he died on June 21, 1997. Santiago A.
Santiago, the Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet, and the petitioner opposed the aforesaid application.
In a Notice of Appearance
4
dated October 20, 1994, the OSG formally requested that its appearance be entered as counsel for the petitioner and
that all notices of hearings, orders, resolutions and decision be served to the OSG at its given address. The said notice of appearance informed the
court that the OSG authorized the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet to appear in the case, subject to the conditions quoted hereunder:
The Provincial Prosecutor, La Trinidad, Benguet, is authorized to appear in this case, and therefore, should also be furnished notices of hearing,
orders, resolutions, decisions and other processes. However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision and control of the representation in this
case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interest of the Government, only
notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him will bind the party represented.
The petitioner filed its Opposition
5
dated October 20, 1994 and Supplemental Opposition
6
dated June 20, 1995 on the ground that the parcels of
land, applied for registration by the respondents, belong to the communal forest of La Trinidad, Benguet, and are therefore inalienable land of the
public domain, which have not been classified and considered as disposable and alienable.
After trial, the land registration court rendered its Decision dated August 30, 2001 which granted the application. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding that the Applicants have shown their adverse, continuous and notorious possession and in the concept of owners
of the land applied for since time immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby confirmed.
The applicants, namely: NICOLAS TIOTIOEN, single; ILDEFONSO TIOTIOEN, married to Adelaida Tiotioen; CONCEPCION TIOTIOEN-DIAZ, married;
NANCY TIOTIOEN-OGOY, married and FILOMENA TIOTIOEN-DULNUAN, married; all of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet
are hereby declared owners pro indiviso of a parcel of land situated at Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet containing an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE (123,935) SQUARE METERS for Lot 1 and FIFTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THREE
(56,553) SQUARE METERS for Lot 2. The subject land is particularly described in the Original Tracing Cloth Plan (Exh. "AA-1"), Survey Plan (Exh. "A"),
and in the Technical Description (Exhs. "B" & "B-2), subject to the claim of oppositor Santiago A. Santiago as per agreement with the applicants and
when the decision becomes final and executory, let a final decree be issued for the issuance of title accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner and the municipality received their respective notices of the above-mentioned decision on September 6 and 7, 2001. The
municipality filed its Motion for Reconsideration thereto on September 20, 2001. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed a Motion and
Manifestation
7
on October 5, 2001 adopting the said motion of the municipality.
In the Resolution
8
dated December 6, 2001, the land registration court denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration of the municipality
and declared the same as pro forma because the issues cited were already passed upon in the decision sought for reconsideration. The municipality
18

filed its notice of appeal on the following day it received its notice of the said resolution. The OSG was not furnished by the land registration court
with a copy of this resolution but it was informed of the said resolution only by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2002
9
, through
a Letter
10
dated December 19, 2001. Consequently, the OSG filed its subject notice of appeal for the petitioner on January 11, 2002.
The land registration court denied the notice of appeal of the municipality on the ground that the latter's pro forma motion for reconsideration did
not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal. The petitioner's notice of appeal was also denied supposedly for having been filed out of time
11
.
The petitioner sought the reconsideration of the denial of its notice of appeal which was again denied by the land registration court in
an Order
12
dated April 23, 2002, quoted hereunder:
ORDER
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) of the Order of the Court dated January 29, 2002
denying their Notice of Appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Be it noted that the OSG received the Decision dated August 30, 2001 on September 06, 2001 and filed its Notice of Appeal on January 11, 2002.
Conformably with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prescribing a 15-day appeal period, the last day for the perfection of an
appeal by OSG should have been on the 21
st
day of September 2001. Per se, it was filed beyond the reglementary period for which to perfect an
appeal.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that the right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the rules.
These rules, particularly the statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid down by law, must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business (Ben Sta. Rita v.
C.A., et al., G.R. No. 119891, August 21, 1995).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no convincing and logical reasons to reconsider its Order dated January 29, 2002 and hereby denies the
Motion for Reconsideration. [Emphasis supplied]
The municipality and petitioner separately assailed before the CA the orders of the land registration court denying their respective notices of
appeal. The CA granted the petition filed by the municipality and gave due course to its appeal but denied the one filed by the petitioner. The CA
pointed out that the petitioner filed its motion and manifestation adopting the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality beyond the
reglementary period to file an appeal and, thus, the decision of the land registration court already attained finality insofar as the petitioner was
concerned. The "strong grounds" alleged by the petitioner were likewise rejected by the CA which explained and ruled as follows:
The merit impressed in petitioner Republic of the Philippines' position is, however, more apparent than real. Notwithstanding the studied
avoidance of direct references thereto, the fact remains that the Solicitor General received its copy of the 30 August 2001 decision rendered in
the case on 6 September 2001 and thus only had until the 21
st
of the same month to either move for a reconsideration of said decision or
perfect an appeal therefrom. There is, therefore, no gainsaying the ineluctable fact that the selfsame decision had already attained finality as
against petitioner Republic of the Philippines by the time the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet filed the 4 October 2001
manifestation adopting petitioner municipality's motion for reconsideration.
It thus matters little that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet appears to have been duly furnished with a copy of the aforesaid 6
December 2001 resolution on December 10, 2001 or that it only informed the Office of the Solicitor General of said adverse ruling through the 19
December 2001 missive the latter received on January 4, 2002. The rule that copies or orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel,
acting as agent or representative of the Office of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually received by the latter has little
application where, as in the case at bench, said office had been duly furnished a copy of the decision in the main case which, for reasons it alone
can explain, it allowed to attain finality. Under the factual and legal milieu of the case, public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction for denying the 10 January 2002 Notice of Appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General way beyond the reglementary period for petitioner Republic of the Philippines' appeal.
Neither are we, finally, swayed by the strong grounds petitioner Republic of the Philippines purportedly has to pursue an appeal from public
respondent's 30 August 2001 decision. Except on jurisdictional grounds, correction of a lower court's decision could, for one, only be done by
regular appeal within the period allowed by law. Our perusal of the grounds cited by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, for another, yielded
nothing which had not yet been raised and will once again be raised by petitioner municipality.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by petitioner Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet is GRANTED and the assailed 23 January 2002 order and 30 April
2002 resolution are, acoordingly, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered GIVING DUE COURSE to said petitioner's appeal.
The petition filed by the Office of the Solicitor General for and in behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines is, however, DENIED for lack of
merit.[Emphasis supplied]
19

Hence, the present Petition for Review on certiorari.
The petitioner claims that the OSG, as its principal counsel in the subject land registration case, is entitled to be furnished with copies of orders,
notices, and decision of the trial court, and that the date of service of such copies to the OSG is the reckoning period in counting the timeliness of
its appeal
13
. The petitioner contends that the OSG was not furnished with a notice of the Order[Resolution] dated December 6, 2001 of the land
registration court which denied the adverted motion for reconsideration of the municipality. The prescribed period within which to file petitioner's
appeal did not commence to run and, therefore, its notice of appeal should not be treated as filed out of time.
The petitioner prays in the alternative that issues of procedure should be set aside and its appeal should be given due course alleging again the
"strong grounds" that it has adduced against the decision of the land registration court.
In their Comment
14
and Memorandum
15
, the respondents contend that the appellate court correctly denied the notice of appeal of the petitioner
for having been filed out of time. They stress the fact that the petitioner received the adverted decision of the trial court on September 6, 2001 and
that the petitioner filed its notice of appeal thereto only on January 11, 2002 which is way beyond the prescribed period under the Rules of Court.
We find merit in the petition.
The relevant facts involving the procedural issues in this case are undisputed. The petitioner and the municipality received a notice of the adverted
decision of the land registration court on September 6 and 7, 2001, respectively. The municipality timely filed its motion for reconsideration of the
said judgment on September 20, 2001. The provincial prosecutor adopted this motion for reconsideration of the municipality on October 5, 2001
which was beyond the fifteen-day period counted from receipt of the petitioner of a copy of the decision. The land registration court denied the
said motion for reconsideration of the municipality in its Resolution dated December 6, 2001. The OSG was not furnished with a notice of such
resolution. The OSG was informed by the provincial prosecutor of such denial on January 4, 2002 when it received the Letter dated December 19,
2001 of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OSG filed the subject notice of appeal for the petitioner only on January 11, 2002 which the land registration
court denied for having been filed way beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal which the said court reckoned from September 6,
2001. The CA affirmed the land registration court's denial of the subject notice of appeal of the petitioner but gave due course to the appeal of the
municipality.
In deciding this case, this Court is guided by the settled doctrine that the belated filing of an appeal by the State, or even its failure to file an
opposition, in a land registration case because of the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of its
right to appeal from a judgment of the court. In Director of Lands v. Medina
16
, we said:
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal of the government on the basis of what it
perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in
any litigation or proceeding. As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the
alleged ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in
behalf of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat the time-honored Constitutional precepts
and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony."
In Heirs of Marina C. Regalado v. Republic
17
, we ruled:
The failure of the Republic to file any opposition or answer to the application for registration, despite receipt of notice thereof, did not deprive
its right to appeal the RTC decision.
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the application of herein respondent, as in fact on
December 26, 1969 an order of general default was issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this court in
Luciano v. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769, 'it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or its government, is usually not
estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.' And, in an earlier case, Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA
211, 'there was an enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude that
the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the auditor general.' It would consider estoppel
as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. [Emphasis supplied]
Moreover, we have advised the lower courts, under exceptional circumstances, to be "cautious about not depriving of a party of the right to appeal
and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the
constraints of technicalities."
18
In Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al.,
19
we recognized the importance of the facts and issues involved and gave due
course to an appeal despite that it was the wrong mode of appeal and that it was even filed beyond the reglementary period to do so, thus:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on
the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do
not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural
rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
20

maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
xxx xxx xxx
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:
[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should have
relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of substantial justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle
that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent
cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually
resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The vast tracts of land involved in this case are claimed by the petitioner to be a protected watershed area, which allegedly preserves the main
source of water of the Municipality of La Trinidad. Relative thereto, the petitioner raises substantial factual and legal issues which should be
decided on their merit instead of being summarily disposed of based on a technicality.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is hereby PARTIALLY
MODIFIED so as to give due course to theNotice of Appeal filed on January 11, 2002 by the petitioner from the Decision dated August 30, 2001 of
Branch 63 of the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 93-LRC-0008.
SO ORDERED.