1

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON
respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner
Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders,
dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which
denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion
for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a
citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines; that they
begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11,
1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in
the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil
case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal.
certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the
trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion
was patently committed, or the lower Court acted
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
1
Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the
proceedings.
2
Weconsider the petition filed in this case
within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from
laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of
the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community
of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree
issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to
determine whether the property relations between
petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community property,
upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce,
had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It
also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who,
giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case,
Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground
of incompatibility in the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community
obligations.
3
As explicitly stated in the Power of
Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent
him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do an things necessary and proper to
represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the
ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to
be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4

There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
5
only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
6
In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
2

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce
from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides, in the nature
of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent
Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed
in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.









G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner
which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against
the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a
decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an
unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on
April 20, 1980.
1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,
1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April,
1982.
2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil
Case No. 83-15866.
3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law
said court was locally and internationally competent for
the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal
Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
5
However,
upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of
two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
6
The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
presided by the respondent judge; while the other case,
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James
Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to
the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court.
7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution
of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against
her be dismissed.
8
A similar petition was filed by James
Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434.
The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State
3

Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the
Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review.
9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon.
10
As a consequence, Judge
Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge
merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of
the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings
in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the
resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice.
11
A motion to quash was also
filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction,
12
which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The
latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner
refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the
former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment.
13
Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty.
14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying her motion to
quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the
charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot
be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987
and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No.
87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner.
16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for
shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
17
the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
18

While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court
over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the
requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which
starts the prosecutory proceeding
19
and without which
the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and
nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for
the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four
offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as
parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity
or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing
of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule
in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the
Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
"private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively
within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage
in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
trial.
20
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that
the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is
a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case.
21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be
absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the
institution of the case. We would thereby have the
4

anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law
can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused
be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution
of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in
that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours,
yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.
22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held
that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced
except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband
of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists
that his status was not such as to entitle him to
make the complaint. We have repeatedly said
that the offense is against the unoffending
spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we
are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should
not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the
matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must
be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned
23
in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,
24
after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American
husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an
accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this
Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such
stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of
that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. ...
25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private
respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not
have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance
or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery,
26
since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be
successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially
the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code,
which punished adultery "although the marriage be
afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
"the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even
though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void,
until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still
be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being
no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no
longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was
consequently contemplated and within the purview of
the decision in said case is the situation where the
5

criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of
its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,
27
must suffer the same
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an
issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's
motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary
restraining order issued in this case on October 21,
1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision
1
and the March 24, 1999 Order
2
of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City
as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties."
3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the
above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.
4
They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,
5
a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.
6

Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help
Church in Cabanatuan City.
7
In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single"
and "Filipino."
8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. While the two were still in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.
9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
10
in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage
and its subsequent dissolution.
11
He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;
12
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."
13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained
be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.
14
The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.
15
The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.
16
After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.
17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an
essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based
its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to
nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.
18

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
6

legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of
Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this
case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that
the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts."
19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1)
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more
necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha
Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the
divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
20
petitioner argues that the
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be
given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of
the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She
adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to
show the conformity of the marriage in question to the
legal requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.
21
A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15
22
and 17
23
of the Civil Code.
24
In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26
25
of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry."
26
A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law."
28
Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
29
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52
of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,
each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper
local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
x x x x x x x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where
the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x x x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties
has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of
nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and
the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document a
written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.
30
A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.
31
The decree purports
to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.
32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
33
by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
34

7

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.
35
However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility,
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
36
The trial court
ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.
37
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.
38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
39
Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
40

Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of
the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides,
the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice
of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with
"the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
41

In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are
denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden
of proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters.
42
Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
43
Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
44
The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof
of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to
marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab
initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian
law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves
the bond in full force.
45
There is no showing in the case
at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory
decree a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.
46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage
may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court
may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.
47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before
this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce
obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce
decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39
49
of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity
required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the
legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.
50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that
8

proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
A review of the records before this Court shows that
only the following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A"
Complaint;
51
(b) Exhibit "B" Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;
52
(c) Exhibit "C"
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March
1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;
53
(d) Exhibit "D"
Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between
Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its
records;
54
and (e) Exhibit "E" Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;
55
(2) for respondent:
(Exhibit "1" Amended Answer;
56
(b) Exhibit "S"
Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;
57
(c) Exhibit
"3" Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;
58
(d) Exhibit "4" Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;
59

and Exhibit "5" Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.
60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe
that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in
that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties'
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, *
respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were
not however blessed with children. Somewhere along
the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but
their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which
was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced
by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the
final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution
of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan
children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due
notice. On the same day, the trial court required the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which,
with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao
1
which
held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction,"
2
disregarded the divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until
the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid
their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due
to lack of judicial approval.
3
On the other hand, it
opined that there was no showing that marriage existed
between private respondent and Arturo, much less was
it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her.
As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of
Arturo. On 27 November 1987
4
only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary
estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.
5

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan
children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized
as his illegitimate child, had been made in their
respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988
6

partial reconsideration was granted declaring the
Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to
one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan,
and petitioner to the other half.
7
Private respondent
was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence
of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the
case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec.
1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September
1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court,
and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
8
On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration.
9

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no
need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan
children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as
to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be
resolved in the present petition based on establish facts
and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon
by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as
to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself
even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;
10
nor
as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing
on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the records
of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
10

receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be
deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion
private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also
invoked the above quoted procedural rule.
11
To this,
petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce
they obtained.
12
Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a
hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue
with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as
well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that
the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of
the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.
13
that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set
for hearing.
14
Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.
15
The
trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for
a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
citizens and were married in the Philippines."
16
It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage
as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their
divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still
a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
petitioner's citizenship;
17
it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.
18
In the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the
reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's
duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When
asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner
answered that she was since 1954.
19
Significantly, the
decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained
in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to
file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about
her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual
issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not
err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo
were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage
of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from
the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship.
20

As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt
of court and that the present petition be dismissed for
forum shopping,
21
the same lacks merit. For forum
shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of
action, subject matter and issue.
22
The present petition
deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern
the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of
certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo.
Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of
forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe
D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying
its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely,
Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with
the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED.
The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should he limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in
contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition
for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

11

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
74456 which set aside and declared as null and void the
September 30, 2002 Order
2
of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting petitioners motion
for leave to file intervention and admitting the
Complaint-in-Intervention
3
in Civil Case No.
Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution
4

denying the motion for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig
5
twice on May 16, 1968. The first
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila
while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic
Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced
four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to separate from each other.
Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a
divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27,
1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of
Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court
of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its
laws.
6

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents
filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On
June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic
ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and
Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States
7
and
both lived as husband and wife until October 2001.
Their union produced one offspring.
8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void
under Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan
about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize
their union after he obtains an annulment of his
marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the
petitioner that he would adopt their son so that he
would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that
of each of his children with Lily.
9

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case
No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File
Intervention
10
claiming that she has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation because she knows certain
information which might aid the trial court at a truthful,
fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which
the trial court granted on September 30, 2002.
Petitioners complaint-in-intervention was also ordered
admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition and declared as null and
void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court
granting the motion for leave to file intervention and
admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends
that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error subject of the recourse is one of
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the
proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the said Rules.
11
This is based on the premise that in
issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate
if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower
court.
12

It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed decision
and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion
may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant,
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
13
The word
"capricious," usually used in tandem with the term
"arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and
unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective
hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.
14

The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a
person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
12

as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of
an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
15

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest
in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be
given as to whether the adjudication of the original
parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not.
16

Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene,
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment.
17
Such interest must be actual, direct and
material, and not simply contingent and expectant.
18

Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be
intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner
was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her claim of
legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984,
Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce
decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond
between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
19
Regardless of
where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she
will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his
or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino
regardless of whether he or she was married here or
abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute
divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful
in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines
will not recognize such absolute divorce.
20

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their
marriage was governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code
21
which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case
of Tenchavez v. Escano
22
we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is
the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan
even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest
as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.
Since petitioners motion for leave to file intervention
was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal
interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order
granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave
abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said
order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated
January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing
the February 4, 1998 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside
the September 12, 1995
2
and January 31, 1996
3

Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
1998 Resolution
4
denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married
Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
5
before the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.
6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
7
He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration
8
before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc.
No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
13

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that
the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be
issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss
9
on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this
was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal
10
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court
issued an Order
11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition
12

thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public
office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house
in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which
they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that
the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had
the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,
13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
15

They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of
Article 256
16
of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify
Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing
the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
17

denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was
properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic
18
because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge
Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition
19
against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar
also filed a motion for reconsideration
20
from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it
does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
21
granting the motion for inhibition. The case was
re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,
22
the trial court required the parties
to submit their respective position papers on the twin
issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file
the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested
23
that he
is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position
paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14,
24
and June 20,
25
1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab
initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration
26
and for the
disqualification
27
of Judge Arcangel but said motions
were denied.
28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.
29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73
of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence
or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged
his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
30
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
31
It
found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2,
Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
14

Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No.
227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the
individual view sweeping statement of Judge
Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code,
contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny
what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992,
32
the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x
33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration
34
which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
35
Rodolfo later
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted.
36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time
of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray
37
and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City,
38
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile"
which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a
person can only have one domicile at any given time.
Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous
marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the
surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,
39
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
40

we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence as contradistinguished from domicile of
the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence"
and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.
41

(Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence,"
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between
"residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning.
42
However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.
43
Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence
in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his
death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale
44
dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements
45
from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address
of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association
46
and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
47

letter-envelopes
48
from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and
the deceaseds calling cards
49
stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
15

the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently,
the subject petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
50
which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The
subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that
time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the
branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.
51
Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal
personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering
that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
52
involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the
divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The
Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce
and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the
divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a
wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.
54
(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera
55
where the Court recognized the validity
of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was
held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other."
56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
57
the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.
58

Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in
the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law."
59
In Garcia v. Recio,
60

the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26.
61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
62
the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article
26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
16

prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The
Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our
lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
64

Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15
65
and 17
66
of the Civil Code
in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in
his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
67

In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
68
the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find
a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding
like robots to the literal command without regard to its
cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them."
x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every
case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts
warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render
justice, presuming that it was the intention of the
lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.
69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
70
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text
72
of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done
in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved.
73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that
the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
17

petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6,
74
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent.
75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144
76
of the Civil Code. This provision governs
the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning.
It provides that the property acquired by either or both
of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that
the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.
77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.
78
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
79

we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition
of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs.
80
The Court described the property
regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their
respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up
to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
x x x x
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. x x x
81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family
Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN
and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision
1
of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August
6, 2004, which reversed the Decision
2
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil
Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between
respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza
void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution
3

dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent
Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
4

Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of
America and allegedly became naturalized citizens
thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and
Orlando divorced in April 1988.
5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
Pangasinan.
6
Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the
RTC of Dagupan City
7
against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
8
on the ground of
lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a
real party-in-interest, but it was denied.
9
Trial on the
merits ensued.
On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff
Felicitas Amor Catalan and against defendants Orlando
18

B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:
1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza
with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null and void ab
initio;
2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally
to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages the
amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P200,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit;
and
3) The donation in consideration of marriage is
ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.
Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B.
Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.
SO ORDERED.
10

Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT
the appeal and consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE
the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case
No. D-10636, RTC, Branch 44, Dagupan City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED
STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE
NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS;
II.
WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED
MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE
ERROR.
12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the
respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and
her children, confers upon her an interest to seek
judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect
her family from further embarrassment and humiliation.
She claims that the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not declaring the marriage void
despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy
discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.
13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has
the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of
bigamy. However, this issue may not be resolved
without first determining the corollary factual issues of
whether the petitioner and respondent Orlando had
indeed become naturalized American citizens and
whether they had actually been judicially granted a
divorce decree.
While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case,
14
there
are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the
findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are
conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based.
15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner and respondent Orlando were naturalized
American citizens and that they obtained a divorce
decree in April 1988. However, after a careful review of
the records, we note that other than the allegations in
the complaint and the testimony during the trial, the
records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their
naturalization and divorce.
The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it
held:
In light of the allegations of Felicitas complaint and the
documentary and testimonial evidence she presented,
we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are
American citizens and had this citizenship status when
they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are
not therefore dealing in this case with Filipino citizens
whose marital status is governed by the Family Code
and our Civil Code, but with American citizens who
secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered
by their national law to be free to contract another
marriage. x x x
16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the
failure of the petitioner to refute or contest the
allegation in respondents brief, that she and respondent
Orlando were American citizens at the time they
secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to
establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.
17
We
note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her
complaint that they acquired American citizenship and
that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree.
18
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.
19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for
a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.
20
A divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.
21
However, before it can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it, which must be proved considering that our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of
the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether
petitioner has the personality to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree
obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or
the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the
divorce decree becomes absolute.
23
In such case, the
RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being
already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Mabini, Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between
Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,
24
and the other,
in Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between
the respondents.
25

19

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained
and which, following the national law of Orlando, does
not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be
correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality
to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the
former spouses no longer has any interest nor should
each have the personality to inquire into the marriage
that the other might subsequently contract. x x x Viewed
from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing
interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the
validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status
of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x
26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the
Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest
27
and must be based on a cause of action.
28
Thus,
in Nial v. Bayadog,
29
the Court held that the children
have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.1awphi1.net
Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15,
2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
x x x x
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the divorce decree and the
foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando
was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign
law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio
but reduce the amount of moral damages from
P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for its proper disposition.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its
Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his
wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees,
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,
1
all surnamed "Escao,"
respectively.
2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the
following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948
in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was
then enrolled as a second year student of commerce,
Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do
and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish
ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age,
an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one
Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the
marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker
and go-between, they had planned out their marital
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their
first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A
few weeks before their secret marriage, their
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling
Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his
return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to
get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement,
Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their
marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize
because when Vicente went back to her classes after the
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college.
Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she
had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao
were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great
scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the
Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed
to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop
or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to
celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take
place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao
was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does
not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San
Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
20

would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor
met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents
while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of
22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh.
"1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the
days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
already estranged (Exh. "2-Escao"). Vicenta had gone
to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There,
a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not
sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she
applied for a passport, indicating in her application that
she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she
was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to
return after two years. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950,
she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on
the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce,
"final and absolute", was issued in open court by the
said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with
the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's
marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She
acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against
Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and
asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal
separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.
It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and
Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to
this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding
defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and
in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto
Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for
damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him
to pay the damages to the defendant parents on
their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the
relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao,
were validly married to each other, from the standpoint
of our civil law, is clearly established by the record
before us. Both parties were then above the age of
majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented
to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic
priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said
priest was not duly authorized under civil law to
solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical
authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary,
as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law,
not only because of the separation of Church and State
but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature
(which was the marriage law in force at the time)
expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus
only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential
to give the marriage civil effects,
3
and this is emphasized
by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the
following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements.
No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal
requirements of this Act if, when it was performed,
the spouses or one of them believed in good faith
that the person who solemnized the marriage was
actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage
was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and
hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim,
45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448).
It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to
the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after
the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very
act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies
an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and
binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she
contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been
21

in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting,
for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and
assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud
and undue influence, such vices did not render her
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the
marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid
marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from
the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County,
State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.
4
She was then subject to Philippine law,
and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep.
Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and
in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize
its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the
husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil
Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1,
Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be
severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent
violation of the declared public policy of the state,
specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of
the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to
such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to
an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of
wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of
our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the
Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant
Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada
divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the
mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none
(Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there
flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared
to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that
her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for
which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous
letter charging immorality against the husband
constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not
her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law,
and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
subject, particularly those that were rendered under our
laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act
(Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective;
and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely
reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before
Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be
ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could
not legalize their relations; and the circumstance
that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to
participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited
to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural
children. The children of adulterous relations are
wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted
to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo
Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the
case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the
proposition that such union is adulterous in this
jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the
first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law.
In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous
situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where
the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new
in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in
Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
22

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members
of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature
if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say
that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's
parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa
Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter
and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him
strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this
suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on
App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly
apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and
for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive
blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit
and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to
prove that he would not have been accepted to marry
Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good
manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of
the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at
such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed
and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice
that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was
not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but
to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the
spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their
daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected
her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does
not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither
does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money
while she was in the United States; for it was natural
that they should not wish their daughter to live in
penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit
for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears
to have acted independently, and being of age, she was
entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her
decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing,
certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections
in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which
have not been shown, good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin.
The law distinguishes between the right of a parent
to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child
and the absence of rights in a stranger to
intermeddle in such affairs. However, such
distinction between the liability of parents and that
of strangers is only in regard to what will justify
interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter
to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless
he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts
and advises his child in good faith with respect to
his child's marital relations in the interest of his
child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not
terminating his right and liberty to interest himself
in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment,
or where he acts under mistake or misinformation,
or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the
parent is liable for consequences resulting from
recklessness. He may in good faith take his child
into his home and afford him or her protection and
support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed
his child away, or does not maliciously entice or
cause him or her to stay away, from his or her
spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied
in the case of advice given to a married daughter,
but it is equally applicable in the case of advice
given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of
the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are
not established for parties to give vent to their
prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by
appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente
Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his
patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret,
and its failure was not characterized by publicity or
undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the
parties never lived together; and (c) that there is
evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
annulment of the marriage, although such a promise
was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art.
88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry
under our law, this fact is a consequence of the
indissoluble character of the union that appellant
entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than
of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are
of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000
only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by
the court below, we opine that the same are excessive.
While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured
their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society.
What is important, and has been correctly established in
the decision of the court below, is that said defendants
were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the
damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition
23

as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her
co-habitation with a person other than the lawful
husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one consort entitles the other to recover
damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the
parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby
modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez
entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to
pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the
appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

24

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and
HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed
by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE
MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo
T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who
was then the Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private
respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one
suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent
Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to
take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for
examination by the police investigators to determine his
complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators
submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who
on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2")
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly
stated that further investigation was still to be
conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry
issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro
Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged
anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory
crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding
that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing
in the checks and other documents involved in the
fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie
detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative
results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of
the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet
complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
a complaint for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, later amended to just estafa.
Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through
Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was
for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lwph1.t Two of these complaints
were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office,
which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All
of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the
fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's
resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the
Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their
dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a
notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment
has been terminated effective December 13, 1972.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However,
the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal
from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's
decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order
with the Office of the President. During the pendency of
the appeal with said office, petitioners and private
respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO,
wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive,
and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry,
claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through
Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of
private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages,
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00)
as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the
RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand,
Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However,
the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31,
1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners
are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable
for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that
because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing
him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from
them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the
damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
25

Code is the codification of "some basic principles that
are to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order."
[REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39].
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of
the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law,
but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as
"guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden
threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance
of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise,
the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must
be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a
violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they
did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private
respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil
Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No.
L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can
be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply
Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances
called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co.
of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra;
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No.
L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA,
G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United
General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March
15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911,
August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the
Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for
which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the
fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported
the possible existence of anomalous transactions,
petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told
plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the
number one suspect and to take a one week vacation
leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his
table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said
defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2;
Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But
regardless of whether or not it was private respondent
Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the
latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering
the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who
harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing
the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve
to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded
Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And
this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to
continue when private respondent returned to work on
November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave.
Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by
Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and
swindler in this company." Considering that the first
report made by the police investigators was submitted
only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement
made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled
that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the
right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If
the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088,
August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine
Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September
27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving
26

the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19
in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing
Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination
from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973,
after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints
against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the
actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short
Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or
else the company would file a hundred more cases
against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that,
"You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked
petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken
against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark
about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements
about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear
violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26,
Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the
writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October
1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias
failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result
of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer
period of time. For this further damage suffered by
Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if
not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind
of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein)
was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further
claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal
obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen
of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or
property. And this includes warning one's brethren of
the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or
accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and
integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than
justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to
prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two
years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of
six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners
contend that there is no case against them for malicious
prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for
exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice
by filing criminal complaints against an employee who
was their principal suspect in the commission of
forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous
transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums
of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy
dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts
for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights
[Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)],
the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v.
Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA
5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No.
L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that
the right to file criminal complaints should not be used
as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of
the function of the criminal processes and of the courts
of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30,
1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment
against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and
attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner,
with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints
against respondent, all of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to
vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges
were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v.
CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render
a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122
SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the
criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
competent evidence to show that the complainant had
acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268,
January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a
finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the
criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:
x x x
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the
Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa
thru falsification of commercial document and
one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised
Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of
correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal
of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably
sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled
with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad
plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military
stockade, but this was frustrated by a
presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.
x x x
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police
reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro
Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila
Police Department, clearing plaintiff of
participation or involvement in the fraudulent
transactions complained of, despite the
negative results of the lie detector tests which
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and
although the police investigation was "still
under follow-up and a supplementary report
will be submitted after all the evidence has
been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6)
criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of
Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and one (1) for violation
of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much
so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases
were dismissed, with one of the investigating
fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one
case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is
the flurry and haste in the filing of this case
27

against respondent Tobias," there can be no
mistaking that defendants would not but be
motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.
x x x
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court,
the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints
were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal
case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains
the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the
trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their
good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints
were filed against Tobias when they could have
allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the
number of anomalous transactions committed against
GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is
belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of
the first complaint that one hundred more cases would
be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of
one hundred more cases was made to hang like the
sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine,
considering the haste in which the criminal complaints
were filed, the fact that they were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case against
petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the
cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports
exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies
committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into
no other conclusion than that petitioners were
motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal
complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was
excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners,
Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight
hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a
computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See
RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him
the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and,
costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been
guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e.,
the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias
from work including the baseless imputation of guilt
and the harassment during the investigations; the
defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the
scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to
RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible
employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage
wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to
petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages
was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable
actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein)
could have suffered was a direct result of his having
been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid
and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners
herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria,
damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a
legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable
[Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980,
100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542
(1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No.
L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle
finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that
even granting that petitioners might have had the right
to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in
which that right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only
in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages.
However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v.
Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA
648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219
(10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said
Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error
in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by
petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49
SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the
award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is
deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in
the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown
to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to
the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioners,
vs.
THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari
filed by Far East Bank and Trust Company (now Bank of
the Philippines Islands) seeking the reversal of the
Decision
1
dated August 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 which ordered it, together
with its branch accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay
respondent Themistocles Pacilan, Jr.
2
the total sum of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. The
assailed decision affirmed with modification that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental,
Bacolod City, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 4908. Likewise
28

sought to be reversed and set aside is the Resolution
dated January 17, 2003 of the appellate court, denying
petitioner banks motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with
petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. His
account was denominated as Current Account No.
53208 (0052-00407-4). The respondent had since then
issued several postdated checks to different payees
drawn against the said account. Sometime in March
1988, the respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the
amount of P680.00 and the same was presented for
payment to petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No.
2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. The next
day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondent deposited to his
current account the amount of P800.00. The said
amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence,
increasing the balance of the respondents deposit to
P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with
petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No.
2434866, he discovered that his current account was
closed on the ground that it was "improperly handled."
The records of petitioner bank disclosed that between
the period of March 30,
1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued four
checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for P6,000.00; Check
No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 for
P680.00 and; Check No. 2434886 for P680.00, or a total
amount of P7,410.00. At the time, however, the
respondents current account with petitioner bank only
had a deposit of P6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the
checks presented for payment on April 4, 1988
exceeded the balance of the respondents deposit in his
account. For this reason, petitioner bank, through its
branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the
respondents current account effective the evening of
April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a
consequence of the overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was
dishonored.
On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner
bank complaining that the closure of his account was
unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from
petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint
for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4908. The
respondent, as complainant therein, alleged that the
closure of his current account by petitioner bank was
unjustified because on the first banking hour of April 5,
1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund
his checks. The respondent pointed out that Check No.
2434886, in particular, was delivered to petitioner bank
at the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and,
following normal banking procedure, it
(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of the
following day, or on April 5, 1988, to honor the check or
return it, if not funded. In disregard of this banking
procedure and practice, however, petitioner bank
hastily closed the respondents current account and
dishonored his Check No. 2434886.
The respondent further alleged that prior to the closure
of his current account, he had issued several other
postdated checks. The petitioner banks act of closing
his current account allegedly preempted the deposits
that he intended to make to fund those checks. Further,
the petitioner banks act exposed him to criminal
prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
According to the respondent, the indecent haste that
attended the closure of his account was patently
malicious and intended to embarrass him. He claimed
that he is a Cashier of Prudential Bank and Trust
Company, whose branch office is located just across that
of petitioner bank, and a prominent and respected
leader both in the civic and banking communities. The
alleged malicious acts of petitioner bank besmirched the
respondents reputation and caused him "social
humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries
and sleepless nights" entitling him to an award of
damages.
In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado
maintained that the respondents current account was
subject to petitioner banks Rules and Regulations
Governing the Establishment and Operation of Regular
Demand
Deposits which provide that "the Bank reserves the
right to close an account if the depositor frequently
draws checks against insufficient funds and/or
uncollected deposits" and that "the Bank reserves the
right at any time to return checks of the depositor which
are drawn against insufficient funds or for any reason."
3

They showed that the respondent had improperly and
irregularly handled his current account. For example, in
1986, the respondents account was overdrawn 156
times, in 1987, 117 times and in 1988, 26 times. In all
these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the
issuance of checks against insufficient funds. The
respondent had also signed several checks with a
different signature from the specimen on file for
dubious reasons.
When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988,
it was obviously to cover for issuances made the
previous day against an insufficiently funded account.
When his Check No. 2434886 was presented for
payment on April 4, 1988, he had already incurred an
overdraft; hence, petitioner bank rightfully dishonored
the same for insufficiency of funds.
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered
judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered the
petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and severally,
to pay the respondent the amounts of P100,000.00 as
moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
and costs of suit. In so ruling, the court a quo also cited
petitioner banks rules and regulations which state that
"a charge of P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor
for any check that is taken up as a returned item due to
insufficiency of funds on the date of receipt from the
clearing office even if said check is honored and/or
covered by sufficient deposit the following banking
day." The same rules and regulations also provide that
"a check returned for insufficiency of funds for any
reason of similar import may be subsequently recleared
for one more time only, subject to the same charges."
According to the court a quo, following these rules and
regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had the right
to put up sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a
returned item for insufficient funds the day following
the receipt of said check from the clearing office. In fact,
the said check could still be recleared for one more time.
29

In previous instances, petitioner bank notified the
respondent when he incurred an overdraft and he
would then deposit sufficient funds the following day to
cover the overdraft. Petitioner bank thus acted
unjustifiably when it immediately closed the
respondents account on April 4, 1988 and deprived him
of the opportunity to reclear his check or deposit
sufficient funds therefor the following day.
As a result of the closure of his current account, several
of the respondents checks were subsequently
dishonored and because of this, the respondent was
humiliated, embarrassed and lost his credit standing in
the business community. The court a quo further
ratiocinated that even granting arguendo that petitioner
bank had the right to close the respondents account, the
manner which attended the closure constituted an
abuse of the
said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which states that "[e]very person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith" and Article 20 thereof
which states that "[e]very person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same," the court a quo
adjudged petitioner bank of acting in bad faith. It held
that, under the foregoing circumstances, the respondent
is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
The decretal portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and
Villadelgado], jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff [the
respondent] the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
plus costs and expenses of the suit; and
3. Dismissing [the] defendants counterclaim for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
4

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August
30, 2002, affirming with modification the decision of the
court a quo.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual
findings of the court a quo as it held that petitioner bank
unjustifiably closed the respondents account
notwithstanding that its own rules and regulations
allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds or
any reason of similar import, may be subsequently
recleared for one more time, subject to standard
charges. Like the court a quo, the appellate court
observed that in several instances in previous years,
petitioner bank would inform the respondent when he
incurred an overdraft and allowed him to make a timely
deposit to fund the checks that were initially dishonored
for insufficiency of funds. However, on April 4, 1988,
petitioner bank immediately closed the respondents
account without even notifying him that he had incurred
an overdraft. Even when they had already closed his
account on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank still accepted
the deposit that the respondent made on April 5, 1988,
supposedly to cover his checks.
Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA
declared that even as it may be conceded that petitioner
bank had reserved the right to close an account for
repeated overdrafts by the respondent, the exercise of
that right must never be despotic or arbitrary. That
petitioner bank chose to close the account outright and
return the check, even after accepting a deposit
sufficient to cover the said check, is contrary to its duty
to handle the respondents account with utmost fidelity.
The exercise of the right is not absolute and good faith,
at least, is required. The manner by which petitioner
bank closed the account of the respondent runs afoul of
Article 19 of the Civil Code which enjoins every person,
in the exercise of his rights, "to give every one his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
The CA concluded that petitioner banks precipitate and
imprudent closure of the respondents account had
caused him, a respected officer of several civic and
banking associations, serious anxiety and humiliation. It
had, likewise, tainted his credit standing. Consequently,
the award of damages is warranted. The CA, however,
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a
quo as it found the same to be excessive:
We, however, find excessive the amount of damages
awarded by the RTC. In our view the reduced amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages are in order. Awards for damages
are not meant to enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the
respondent] at the expense of defendants-appellants
[the petitioners], but to obviate the moral suffering he
has undergone. The award is aimed at the restoration,
within limits possible, of the status quo ante, and should
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
5

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00 and
the award of exemplary damages reduced to
P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
6

Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the said
decision but in the assailed Resolution dated January 17,
2003, the appellate court denied its motion. Hence, the
recourse to this Court.
Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account of
the respondent in the evening of April 4, 1988, it acted
in good faith and in accordance with the rules and
regulations governing the operation of a
regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank "the
right to close an account if the depositor frequently
draws checks against insufficient funds and/or
uncollected deposits." The same rules and regulations
also provide that "the depositor is not entitled, as a
matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the
bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of
the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds
or for any reason."
It cites the numerous instances that the respondent had
overdrawn his account and those instances where he
deliberately signed checks using a signature different
from the specimen on file. Based on these facts,
petitioner bank was constrained to close the
respondents account for improper and irregular
handling and returned his Check No. 2434886 which
30

was presented to the bank for payment on April 4, 1988.
Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or
rule which gives the respondent a legal right to make
good his check or to deposit the corresponding amount
to cover said check within 24 hours after the same is
dishonored or returned by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. It vigorously denies
having violated Article 19 of the Civil Code as it insists
that it acted in good faith and in accordance with the
pertinent banking rules and regulations.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo
and the appellate court show that the award of damages
in the respondents favor was anchored mainly on
Article 19 of the Civil Code which, quoted anew below,
reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised
in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
7
Malice or bad faith is at the core of the
said provision.
8
The law always presumes good faith
and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due
to acts of another has the burden of proving that the
latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.
9
Good faith
refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by
the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.
10
Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due
to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of
the nature of fraud.
11
Malice connotes ill-will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is
bad faith or bad motive.
12

Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the
account of the respondent based on the following
provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand
Deposits:
10) The Bank reserves the right to close an account if
the depositor frequently draws checks against
insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits.

12)
However, it is clearly understood that the depositor is
not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this
deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time to
return checks of the depositor which are drawn against
insufficient funds or for any other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate
court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right,
petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof.
Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse of
rights are not attendant in the present case. The
evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the
existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing the
respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the
said date the same was already overdrawn. The
respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988,
amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current
account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred
an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor
of his Check No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank
showed that in 1986, the current account of the
respondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his
issuance of checks against insufficient funds.
13
In 1987,
the said account was overdrawn 117 times for the same
reason.
14
Again, in 1988, 26 times.
15
There were also
several instances when the respondent issued checks
deliberately using a signature different from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.
16
All
these circumstances taken together justified the
petitioner banks closure of the respondents account on
April 4, 1988 for "improper handling."
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and
regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the
respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the
closure of the account for frequently drawing checks
against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could
be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the
records bear out that the respondent had indeed been
improperly and irregularly handling his account not just
a few times but hundreds of times. Under the
circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted for
exercising its right in accordance with the express rules
and regulations governing the current accounts of its
depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the
respondent had agreed to be bound by these terms and
conditions.
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the
deposit made by the respondent the day following the
closure of his account constitutes bad faith or malice on
the part of petitioner bank. The same could be
characterized as simple negligence by its personnel.
Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden
of proving bad faith on the part of petitioner bank or
that it was motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his
account on April 4, 1988 and in inadvertently accepting
his deposit on April 5, 1988.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were
done by petitioner bank with the sole intention of
prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is conceded
that the respondent may have suffered damages as a
result of the closure of his current account. However,
there is a material distinction between damages and
injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the
distinction between damages and injury in this wise:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount
to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of
31

duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying
basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that
the individual was injured in contemplation of law.
Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be
the proximate cause of the injury.
17

Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as
a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other insufficiently
funded checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It
was the respondents repeated improper
and irregular handling of his account which constrained
petitioner bank to close the same in accordance with the
rules and regulations governing its depositors current
accounts. The respondents case is clearly one of
damnum absque injuria.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated August 30, 2002 and Resolution dated January 17,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS
UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique
tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to
give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice
are the underlying principles of law and order in society.
We reaffirm them in this petition for review on
certiorari assailing the July 26, 2000 decision
1
and
October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was
approached by Juan Davalan,
2
Josefino Gabutero and
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a
criminal case for robbery
3
filed by Quiamco against
them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. Respondent asked for the original
certificate of registration but the three accused never
came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was
parked in an open space inside respondents business
establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was
visible and accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned
corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was
mortgaged to petitioner corporation.
4

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan
stopped paying the remaining installments and told
petitioner corporations collector, Wilfredo Verao, that
the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by
respondents men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,
5
went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle.
The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola,
talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent.
While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking,
petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a
motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in
his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle.
Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner
Uypitchings instruction and over the clerks objection,
took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law
6
against respondent in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.
7
Respondent
moved for dismissal because the complaint did not
charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought
the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint
8
and denied petitioner
Uypitchings subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 37.
9
He sought to hold the petitioners
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the
motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that
respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a
baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated
and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
10

finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with
malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief,
took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a
baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were found to be
contrary to Articles 19
11
and 20
12
of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to
respondent for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000
exemplary damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus
costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
affirmed the trial courts decision with modification,
reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.
13
Petitioners
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit
that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is
whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft
and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of
the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs
in favor of respondent.
Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were held
liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
complaint against respondent but also for making a
slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from
respondents establishment in an abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
32

As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA
that malice and ill will attended not only the public
imputation of a crime to respondent
14
but also the
taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to
have accepted the correctness of such findings. This
alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for
damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we also
find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled
that the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice
and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described
their action as a "precipitate act."
15
Petitioners were
bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this
connection, we quote with approval the following
findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the
complaint before the City Prosecutors Office]
because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or
ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there
was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity
against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no
personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the
motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his
bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that
Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining
installment(s) for the motorcycle because the
motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It
must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo
Verao in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for
the remaining installment was []taken[], not
[]unlawfully taken[] or stolen. Yet, despite the
double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not
only executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he
named [respondent] as the suspect of the stolen
motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of
qualified theft and fencing activity before the City
[Prosecutors] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of
probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of
malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan
Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not
accuse [respondent] or the latters men of stealing
the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case
for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty.
Uypitchings act in charging [respondent] with
qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with
malice is also shown by his answer to the question
of Cupid Gonzaga
16
[during one of their
conversations] - "why should you still file a
complaint? You have already recovered the
motorcycle"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug
motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of
motorcycle.")
17

Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is
a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are
conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason
to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as
Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporations exercise of its right as
seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle
preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose
on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly
mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a
well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.
18

Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on
respondents establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search
warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the
illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching
even mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its
co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the
prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts violated the
law as well as public morals, and transgressed the
proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of
right," prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise he opens himself to liability.
19
It seeks to
preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right
(or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another.
20
The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to harm another.
21

Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down
by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover
the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could
not in any way be considered to be in accordance with
the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime
was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions
showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused
damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify
him.
22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July
26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are
33

AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that
petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an
officer of the court, for his improper behavior.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 160273 January 18, 2008
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT,
RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L.
LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO
*
E. GARCIA and
JOSE B. SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision
1
dated
January 31, 2003 and Resolution dated October 2, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506.
The facts are:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic
corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock
private membership club, having its principal place of
business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are
members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special
company proprietary member of CCCI, designated
respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice
President and Operations Manager for the Visayas and
Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The
designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs
Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for
proprietary membership. The application was indorsed
by CCCIs two (2) proprietary members, namely:
Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5
million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI,
offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million.
Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain
Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on
September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership
Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30,
1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on
respondents application for proprietary membership
was deferred. In another Board meeting held on July 30,
1997, respondents application was voted upon.
Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent
received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCIs corporate
secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his
application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of
respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As
CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997,
wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept
silent. On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent
CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of the
Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not
reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig
City a complaint for damages against petitioners,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February
14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual or
compensatory damages.
2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral
damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way
of attorneys fees and P80,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
2

On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its
Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial
courts Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Decision dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case No.
67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly
and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of
P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly
and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly
and severally, plaintiff-appellee the mount of
P500,000.00 as attorneys fees and P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
3

On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion
for oral arguments. In its Resolution
4
dated October 2,
2003, the appellate court denied the motions for lack of
merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving
respondents application for proprietary membership
with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for
damages, and if so, whether their liability is joint and
several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals
34

erred in awarding exorbitant damages to respondent
despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith
in disapproving the latters application; and in
disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition
lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCIs Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and
membership therein as well as the right of
participation in its assets shall be limited to
qualified persons who are duly accredited owners
of Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the
corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCIs Amended
By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED The
procedure for the admission of new members of the
Club shall be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another
voting proprietary member, shall submit to the
Secretary a written proposal for the admission of a
candidate to the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary
for a period of thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin
board during which time any member may
interpose objections to the admission of the
applicant by communicating the same to the Board
of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30)
days, if no objections have been filed or if there are,
the Board considers the objections unmeritorious,
the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in the
"Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership
List" and after the candidate shall have acquired in
his name a valid POC duly recorded in the books of
the corporation as his own, he shall become a
Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable
admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that admission
fees will only be collected once from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as
follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30)
days, the Board may, by unanimous vote of all
directors present at a regular or special
meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in
the "Eligible-for-Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret
balloting known as the "black ball system" of voting
wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box.
A white ball represents conformity to the admission of
an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval.
Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a
unanimous vote of the directors is required. When
respondents application for proprietary membership
was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30,
1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball. Thus,
for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its
Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary membership.
But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily.
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on
Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,
5
we expounded Article 19
and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on
all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis
in the original)
In rejecting respondents application for proprietary
membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules
governing human relations, the basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of social order. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in
disapproving respondents applications. This is contrary
to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence,
petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article 19
in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of
CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote
of the directors present at a special or regular meeting
was not printed on the application form respondent
filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon
was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was
silent on the required number of votes needed for
admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not
printed on the application form due to economic
reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing.
Such amendment, aside from being extremely
significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost
twenty (20) years before respondent filed his
application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious
and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose
members are all affluent, did not have enough money to
cause the printing of an updated application form.
35

It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the
dark wondering why his application was disapproved.
He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the
Board members was required. When he sent a letter for
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an
objection to his application, petitioners apparently
ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this
kind of treatment. Having been designated by San
Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by
petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least,
they should have informed him why his application was
disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must
nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm.
When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or
excessively and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible.
6
It bears reiterating that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners
disapproval of respondents application is characterized
by bad faith.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle of damnum
absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to
state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,
7

we held that this principle does not apply when there is
an abuse of a persons right, as in this case.
As to the appellate courts award to respondent of moral
damages, we find the same in order. Under Article 2219
of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered,
among others, in acts and actions referred to in Article
21. We believe respondents testimony that he suffered
mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded
feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his
application. However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is
excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, the same should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are
not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer,
neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant.
8
Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we hold that an award to
respondent of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as
moral damages is reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229
allows it by way of example or correction for the public
good. Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are
imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another
but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions,
9
we
reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00
only.
On the matter of attorneys fees and litigation expenses,
Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among others,
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be
recovered in cases when exemplary damages are
awarded and where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered, as in this case. In any event,
however, such award must be reasonable, just and
equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount of attorneys fees
(P500,000.00) and litigation expenses (P50,000.00) to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be held
jointly and severally liable for damages because only
one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondents
application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.
Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation
or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees
shall be liable jointly and severally for all
damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification
in the sense that (a) the award of moral damages is
reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the
award of exemplary damages is reduced from
P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the award of
attorneys fees and litigation expenses is reduced from
P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
Seeking the reversal of the Decision
1
dated 1 June 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the
reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC
Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc.
(Calatagan) filed this Rule 45 petition against
respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of
Calatagan, indicating in his application for membership
his mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box
240, MCC," complete residential address, office and
residence telephone numbers, as well as the company
(Phimco) with which he was connected, Calatagan
issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May
1990 after paying P120,000.00 for the share.
2

Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet
expenses for general operations, as well as costs for
upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities.
The provision on monthly dues is incorporated in
Calatagans Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is
also reproduced at the back of each certificate of stock.
3

As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock
No. A-01295, the provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the
payment of monthly dues in an amount as may be
prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of Directors
which shall in no case be less that [sic] P50.00 to meet
36

the expenses for the general operations of the club, and
the maintenance and improvement of its premises and
facilities, in addition to such fees as may be charged for
the actual use of the facilities x x x
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge
stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his monthly
dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9
December 1991. Then he ceased paying the dues. At that
point, his balance amounted to P400.00.
4

Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to
collect Clementes back accounts by sending a demand
letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a
second letter dated 22 October 1992. Both letters were
sent to Clementes mailing address as indicated in his
membership application but were sent back to sender
with the postal note that the address had been closed.
5

Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having
failed to pay his monthly dues for more than sixty (60)
days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992.
Calatagan also included Clementes name in the list of
delinquent members posted on the clubs bulletin board.
On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board of directors
adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of
shares of delinquent members, including Clementes;
and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final
letter to Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate
Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains
a warning that unless Clemente settles his outstanding
dues, his share would be included among the delinquent
shares to be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993.
Again, this letter was sent to Clementes mailing address
that had already been closed.
6

On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted
on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the clubs
premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on
15 January 1993, and Clementes share sold for
P64,000.
7
According to the Certificate of Sale issued by
Calatagan after the sale, Clementes share was
purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.
8
At the time of the sale,
Clementes accrued monthly dues amounted to
P5,200.00.
9
A notice of foreclosure of Clementes share
was published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business
World.
10

Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in
November of 1997.
11
He filed a claim with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration
of his shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision
dismissing Clementes complaint. Citing Section 69 of
the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of
shares at an auction sale can only be questioned within
six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded
that Clementes claim, filed four (4) years after the sale,
had already prescribed. The SEC further held that
Calatagan had complied with all the requirements for a
valid sale of the subject share, Clemente having failed to
inform Calatagan that the address he had earlier
supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC
ruled, had acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed
that his non-payment of monthly dues would merely
render his share "inactive."
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. The appellate
court restored Clementes one share with a directive to
Calatagan to issue in his a new share, and awarded to
Clemente a total of P400,000.00 in damages, less the
unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SECs finding that the action had
prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SECs own
ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf
Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the Corporation
Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to
capital stock, and not to any other debt of stockholders.
With the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to
unpaid membership dues in non-stock corporations, the
appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code
as the proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the
prescription period of actions to recover movables at
eight (8) years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that
Calatagans first two demand letters had been returned
to it as sender with the notation about the closure of the
mailing address, it very well knew that its third and final
demand letter also sent to the same mailing address
would not be received by Clemente. It noted the by-law
requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board
has ordered the sale at auction of a members share of
stock for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall
notify the owner thereof and advise the Membership
Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that "a person who is in danger of the
imminent loss of his property has the right to be notified
and be given the chance to prevent the loss."
12

Hence, the present appeal.
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had
prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the Corporation
Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law
and the by-laws had been rendered to Clemente.
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover
delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing
of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of
sale. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
Section 69 is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled
"Stocks and Stockholders" and refers specifically to
unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which
is governed by the immediately preceding Section 68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans and the
SECs reliance on Section 69 by citing another SEC ruling
in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with
Section 69, Calatagan raises a peripheral point made in
the SECs Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as
take-off Section 6 of the Corporation Code which refers
to "such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be
stated in the articles of incorporation," pointed out that
the Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not
"impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf
Share [of Caram]," but only its (Valley Golfs) By-Laws
does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of
Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues
assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, along
with all other obligations of the shareholders to the club,
"shall constitute a first lien on the shares and in the
event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold
by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the
By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the
shareholders."
13
With its illative but incomprehensible
logic, Calatagan concludes that the prescriptive period
under Section 69 should also apply to the sale of
37

Clementes share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to
be a restriction is stated in the articles of incorporation
and not only in the by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence
or even analogy between the sale of delinquent stock
under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case.
At the root of the sale of delinquent stock is the
non-payment of the subscription price for the share of
stock itself. The stockholder or subscriber has yet to
fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed.
In this case, Clemente had already fully paid for the
share in Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding
obligation to deprive him of full title to his share.
Perhaps the analogy could have been made if Clemente
had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock
corporation, pursuant to an article or by-law provision
designed to address that situation, decided to sell such
share as a consequence. But that is not the case here,
and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the
case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clementes suit
is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which
establishes four (4) years as the prescriptive period for
actions based upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff on
the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a
second alternative still, Calatagan posits that Clementes
action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code
which sets five (5) years as the period of prescription
for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are not
fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither
article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code
which provides that an action to recover movables shall
prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagans action is for the
recovery of a share of stock, plus damages.
Calatagans advertence to the fact that the constitution
of a lien on the members share by virtue of the explicit
provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws
is relevant but ultimately of no help to its cause.
Calatagans Articles of Incorporation states that the
"dues, together with all other obligations of members to
the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares,
second only to any lien in favor of the national or local
government, and in the event of delinquency such
shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in
the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues
or other obligations of the stockholders."
14
In turn, there
are several provisions in the By-laws that govern the
payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the
member, and the constitution and execution on the lien.
We quote these provisions:
ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent
Members The Treasurer shall bill al members
monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every
month, a statement showing the account of bill of a
member for said month will be prepared and sent to
him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid by the
20th of the month following that in which the bill was
incurred, the Treasurer shall notify him that if his bill is
not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month his
name will be posted as delinquent the following day at
the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted, a member,
the immediate members of his family, and his guests,
may not avail of the facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60
days shall be reported to the Board and their shares
or the shares of the juridical entities they represent
shall thereafter be ordered sold by the Board at
auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as provided
for in Section 32 hereon. A member may pay his
overdue account at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The
club shall have a first lien on every share of stock to
secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall
be annotated on the certificates of stock and may be
enforced by the Club in the following manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered
the sale at auction of a members share of stock for
indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the
Secretary shall notify the owner thereof, and shall
advise the Membership Committee of such fact.
(b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all
applicants on the Waiting List and all registered
stockholders of the availability of a share of stock
for sale at auction at a specified date, time and
place, and shall post a notice to that effect in the
Club bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior
to the auction sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership
Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva
voce bidding and award the sale of the share of
stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning
bidder to the Club within twenty-four (24) hours
after the bidding. The winning bidder or the
representative in the case of a juridical entity shall
become a Regular Member upon payment of the
purchase price and issuance of a new stock
certificate in his name or in the name of the juridical
entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale shall
be paid by the Club to the selling stockholder after
deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder
fails to pay the amount of this bid within
twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding, the
auction procedures may be repeated from time to
time at the discretion of the Membership Committee
until the share of stock be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock
are not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of
the member, the member shall continue to be
obligated to the Club for the unpaid balance. If the
member whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse
to surrender the stock certificate for cancellation,
cancellation shall be effected in the books of the
Club based on a record of the proceedings. Such
cancellation shall render the unsurrendered stock
certificate null and void and notice to this effect
shall be duly published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a
clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the
payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member
as delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on the
shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the
members debts. Under Section 91 of the Corporation
Code, membership in a non-stock corporation "shall be
terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." The By-law
provisions are elaborate in explaining the manner and
38

the causes for the termination of membership in
Calatagan, through the execution on the lien of the
share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws, as
written, affords due protection to the member by
assuring that the member should be notified by the
Secretary of the looming execution sale that would
terminate membership in the club. In addition, the
By-Laws guarantees that after the execution sale, the
proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former
member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If
followed to the letter, the termination of membership
under this procedure outlined in the By-Laws would
accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law
provisions when it sold Clementes share? The appellate
courts finding on this point warrants our approving
citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the
third and final demand letter to Clemente on December
7, 1992. The letter states that if the amount of
delinquency is not paid, the share will be included
among the delinquent shares to be sold at public
auction. This letter was signed by Atty. Benjamin
Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golfs Corporate Secretary. It was
again sent to Clementes mailing address Phimco
Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. As
expected, it was returned because the post office box
had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to
"give or cause to be given, all notices required by law or
by these By-Laws. .. and keep a record of the
addresses of all stockholders. As quoted above, Sec. 32
(a) of the By-Laws further provides that "within ten (10)
days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a
members share of stock for indebtedness under Section
31 (b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner
thereof and shall advise the Membership Committee of
such fact.," The records do not disclose what report the
Corporate Secretary transmitted to the Membership
Committee to comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the
reason for this mandatory requirement is to give the
Membership Committee the opportunity to find out,
before the share is sold, if proper notice has been made
to the shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is
knowledgeable on the law and on the standards of good
faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of
corporate records, he should also have known that the
first two letters sent to Clemente were returned because
the P.O. Box had been closed. Thus, we are surprised
given his knowledge of the law and of corporate records
that he would send the third and final letter
Clementes last chance before his share is sold and his
membership lost to the same P.O. Box that had been
closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligence before
the foreclosure sale" and "sent several notices to
Clementes specified mailing address." We do not agree;
we cannot label as due diligence Calatagans act of
sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clementes
mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O. Box had
been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon
the Corporate Secretary the chief repository of all
corporate records the obligation to check Clementes
other address which, under the By-Laws, have to be
kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose
of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the
addresses of members on file is specifically for matters
of this kind, when the member cannot be reached
through his or her mailing address. Significantly, the
Corporate Secretary does not have to do the actual
verification of other addressees on record; a mere clerk
can do the very simple task of checking the files as in
fact clerks actually undertake these tasks. In fact, one
telephone call to Clementes phone numbers on file
would have alerted him of his impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had
failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter of its
own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly
conceived to afford due notice to the delinquent
member of the impending sale, and not just to provide
an intricate faade that would facilitate Calatagans sale
of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagans part
is palpable. As found by the Court of Appeals, Calatagan
very well knew that Clementes postal box to which it
sent its previous letters had already been closed, yet it
persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal
box. What for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had
known very well that the letter would never actually
reach Clemente.1avvphi1
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership
application had provided his residential address along
with his residence and office telephone numbers.
Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-Laws requires
that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely
through the members mailing address. Clemente cites
our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals
15
that "[a]
simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x
could have prevented this present controversy." That
memorable observation is quite apt in this case.
Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its own
By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of
Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course and
avail of its amenities, but also in significant pecuniary
damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could
be thrown Clementes way was his failure to notify
Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we
uphold Calatagan would cost Clemente a lot. But, in the
first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to
notify the club of the closure of the postal box? Indeed,
knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of
his home address as well as residence and office
telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that
the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact
him. In addition, according to Clemente, he was not even
aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance
of which was not his responsibility but his employer
Phimcos.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code,
16

under the Chapter on Human Relations. These
provisions, which the Court of Appeals did apply,
enunciate a general obligation under law for every
person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not
exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its
members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its
shareholders or members, even if the latter find
themselves contractually bound to perform certain
obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock
39

cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual
damages is of course warranted since Clemente has
sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagans
wrongful violation of its own By-Laws. It would not be
feasible to deliver Clementes original Certificate of
Stock because it had already been cancelled and a new
one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at
the auction who was not impleaded in this case.
However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that
Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new certificate of stock.
That sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained
by Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock is simply
the evidence of the share.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente
P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
We agree that the award of such damages is warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of
Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of
damages from any private individual "who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs" the right "against deprivation of
property without due process of laws." The plain letter
of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages
from Calatagan. Even without Article 32 itself, Calatagan
will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages
to Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he
had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and
wounded feelings by reason of Calatagans acts, thereby
entitling him to moral damages under Article 2217 of
the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that Calatagans
bad faith as exhibited in the
course of its corporate actions warrants correction for
the public good, thereby justifying exemplary damages
under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and
ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision
1
of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17,
1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo
vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent
court's resolution of September 3, 1991
2
denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the
salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual
findings of the court below, the evidence of record and
the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its
findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively
reproduced hereunder:
Based on the evidence on record, the following
facts are considered indisputable: On the
afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening,
said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his
grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together
as husband and wife for 21 days, or until
September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor,
Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application
for a marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the
afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an
unidentified male companion, abducted her in
the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where
she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted
her evidence, summarized the same which we
paraphrased as follows:
Plaintiff was 26 years old on November
5, 1974 when she testified, single and
had finished a college course in
Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It
appears that on September 8, 1973, at
about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
while she was walking along Figueras
Street, Pasay City on her way to the San
Juan de Dios Canteen to take her snack,
defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came
riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two
weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to
talk matters over with plaintiff, so that
he invited her to take their merienda at
the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila
instead of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as
she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp.
8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).
Plaintiff rode in the car and took the
front seat beside the driver while
Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car travelled north on its way
to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon
reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City,
it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo
ignored and instead threatened her not
to make any noise as they were ready
to die and would bump the car against
the post if she persisted. Frightened
and silenced, the car travelled its
course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard
until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was
then pulled and dragged from the car
against her will, and amidst her cries
40

and pleas. In spite of her struggle she
was no match to the joint strength of
the two male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a woman
and her small stature. Eventually, she
was brought inside the hotel where the
defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her
against her will and consent. She could
not fight back and repel the attack
because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her
to lie down and embraced her, his
companion held her two feet, removed
her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr.
threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her
feet if she did not surrender her
womanhood to him, thus he succeeded
in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff
described the pains she felt and how
blood came out of her private parts
after her vagina was penetrated by the
penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n.
pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
After that outrage on her virginity,
plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to
allow her to go home but the latter
would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were
married as he intended to marry her,
so much so that she promised not to
make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already
gone, and proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias,
Metro Manila where they arrived at
9:30 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26,
Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock
that same evening, defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived
and assured plaintiff that the following
day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply
for a marriage license, which they did.
They filed their applications for
marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C")
and after that plaintiff and defendant
Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of
Juana de Leon and lived there as
husband and wife from September 8,
1973 to September 29, 1973.
On September 29, 1973 defendant
Bunag, Jr. left and never returned,
humiliating plaintiff and compelled her
to go back to her parents on October 3,
1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she
went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against
her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p.
35, Nov. 5, 1974).
The testimony of plaintiff was
corroborated in toto by her uncle,
Vivencio Bansagan who declared that
on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff
failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in
the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look
for her but his efforts proved futile, and
he told his sister that plaintiff might
have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n.,
pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in
the afternoon of the next day (Sunday),
his sister told him that Francisco
Cabrera, accompanied by barrio
captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas,
Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that
plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in
Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the
plaintiff, which he did, and at the house
of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Pias, Metro Manila he met defendant
Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him,
"Pare, the children are here already. Let
us settle the matter and have them
married."
He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as
she had already lost her honor, she would bear
her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father
promised they would be married.
Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny
that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on
September 8, 1973. On the contrary,
plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date because of the
opposition of the latter's father to their
relationship.
Defendant-appellants claim that
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to
elope and get married, and this fact was known
to their friends, among them, Architect Chito
Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to
elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.,
accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr.,
met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate
named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de
Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to
(the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they
had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr.
took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could
get a ride home, thereby leaving the
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant alone. According to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo
Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and
plaintiff-appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate
and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a
room, but these were full. They finally got a
room at the Holiday Hotel, where
defendant-appellant registered using his real
name and residence certificate number. Three
hours later, the couple check out of the hotel
and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at
Pamplona, Las Pias, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant
claims that bitter disagreements with the
plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their
plan to get married.
41

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag,
Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de
Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she
would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
member of the board of directors of Mandala
Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s
employer, three times between the evening of
September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973
inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He
came to know about his son's whereabouts
when he was told of the couple's elopement late
in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his
mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise denied
having met relatives and emissaries of
plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage
to his son.
3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise
to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida
B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his
father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite.
On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that
petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
respondent, the trial court rendered a decision
4

ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent
P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the
costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was
absolved from any and all liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower
court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from
civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags,
as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal
several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which
were summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in
finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.
forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in
finding that defendants-appellants promised
plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in
awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of
defendants-appellants' promise of marriage.
5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent
Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both
appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for
review, contending that (1) respondent court failed to
consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for
petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions
of facts and violative of the law on preparation of
judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the
proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was
forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple
elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award
of excessive damages.
6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial
and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the
alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed
to marry, and that there was no case of forcible
abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and
agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to
marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of
the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits
presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the
credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by
the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court
to do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, presented before and
calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously
reviewed and discussed by respondent court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves
questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again
constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and
jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this
Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled
exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors
of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being
conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it
is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all
over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
errors of law that might have been committed by the
lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings
must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.
7
Neither does the instant case
reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions
which under our decisional rules may warrant a review
of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the
foregoing considerations and our review of the records,
we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of
private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a
breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise
to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the
right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary
incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in
cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under
Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of
said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages.
9
Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for
that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
42

for in the statutes.
10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private
respondent and having carnal knowledge with her
against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her
in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary
to morals and good customs. These are grossly
insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award
of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21
in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said
damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of
a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,
despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor
filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's
Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex
delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results
in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof.
11
Hence, extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.
12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of
the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is
no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil case might arise did not exist.
Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the
right of herein private respondent to institute a civil
action arising from the offense because such
preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the
two proceedings involved are not between the same
parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with
continuing validity up to now, that there are different
rules as to the competency of witnesses and the
quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.
In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of
evidence only.
13
Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon,
14
we
stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal
prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted
to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS,
respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its
Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797)
dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the
effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that
"defendant expressed and professed his undying love
and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration
of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented
and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge;
that regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff,
as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due
to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff
became unable to support herself and her baby; that due
to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised,
the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff
was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month
for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00
in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first
instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals,
and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with
the lower court that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its
support, but decreed that the complaint did state a
cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment
setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not
permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings
of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September
30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628,
January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for
damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court
of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the
43

Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the
foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has
not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is
no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of
marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the
girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article,
she and her parents would have such a right of
action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be
some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is
no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56).
She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have
and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence
of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the
willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her
the needed opportunity for the commission of the
act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery
in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and
residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while
defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at
525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served
with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became
acquainted with each other sometime in December,
1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started
visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and
frequent and in due time the defendant expressed
and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the
plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young
people in love had frequent outings and dates,
became very close and intimate to each other and
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the
defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff
consented and acceded to the former's earnest and
repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until
about July, 1959 except for a short period in
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the
country, the defendant through his protestations of
love and promises of marriage succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the
plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by
a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant
condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and
pleaded with him to make good his promises of
marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and
refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July,
1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents
and purposes has broken their engagement and his
promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand
out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of
the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without
44

prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the
child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if
any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement,
since the child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent
filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court,
amended his petition by stating that both he and his
wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In response,
respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered
into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July
4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral
damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6%
interest from the date of this decision plus
attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant
expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the
conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received
from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by
ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%)
of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or
P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per
annum from the date of this decision and one-half
(1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of
his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of
P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy
Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back
to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the
appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.
2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate
court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000
monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh
Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto,
praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for
oral argument.
3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to
P20,000.
4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the said Resolution.
5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a
Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit
and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.
6

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution,
which increased the monthly support for the son.
7

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these
two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
8

and the Petition for Certiorari
9
were ordered
consolidated by this Court.
10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims
that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord
with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1
MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS
FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION,
PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF
OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT
BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK
AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT
BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES
OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK
AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES,
ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE,
45

AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND
CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE
CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT
THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN
HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.
11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the
following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED
SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING.
12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT
OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN
AT PRESENT PRICES.
13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE
INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF
EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE
LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO,
INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."
14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE
HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE
CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.
15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court
of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after
findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not
only of the parties particularly the
defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of
Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant
deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him
by professing true love instead of revealing to her
that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he married
defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter
into marriage as in fact his career was and always
would be his first priority; that he was unable to
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband
but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no
inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that
of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he
had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their
son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to
reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights not only in those years the parties
were together but also after and throughout their
separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision
on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a
consequence of marriage may not be awarded.
While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided
case by the Supreme Court where damages by
reason of the performance or non-performance of
marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow
that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer,
specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The
lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found
full justification of awarding at least half of what
was originally prayed for. We find no reason to
disturb the ruling of the trial court.
16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based
on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as
follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article
2219
17
of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which
moral damages may be recovered and it mentions
Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that
Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause
loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is
willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting
moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court
of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on
which the moral damages were based were done
willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral
damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage
of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the
petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family
Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. . . .
18

46

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the
acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds
for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring
the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set
of facts was negated. The award of moral damages
should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have
been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity
means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the
private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the
petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was
without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it
follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot
stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
19

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil
Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission
has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur
expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2),
and where the Court deems it just and equitable
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11)
20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral
and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award
of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial
court is likewise fully justified.
21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower
court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act
in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage
cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private
respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on
petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained
above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither
can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is
what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of
annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme
Court has held that the declaration of nullity of
marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the
liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226
SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this
case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common
children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4,
1979, and therefore, all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of
the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal
partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry,
work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or
received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the
exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and
without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what
are the parties conjugal properties and what are
the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that
the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager
and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust
Co. received separation/retirement package from
the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which
after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21
gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and
actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations
other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the
Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In
this particular case, however, there had been no
47

marriage settlement between the parties, nor had
there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture
of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal
partnership properties. The previous cession and
transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share
in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T.
No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated
in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12,
1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually
intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant
wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be
followed, in the process of liquidation of the
conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on
which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed
upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom their only child has chosen to remain
(Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half
(1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant
so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid
support, while the other half was transferred to
their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the
defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she
be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or
derived from the labor, industry, work or profession
of said defendant husband in accordance with Art.
117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason,
she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding
shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies.
22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as
follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails
the order of the trial court for him to give one-half
of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East
Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding
shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as
the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial
Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same
Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that
henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved.
Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at
least half of the separation/retirement benefits
which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East
Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that
the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants
service for the bank for a number of years, most of
which while he was married to defendant-appellee,
the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is
true with the outstanding shares of
plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were
acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he
was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is
entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the
conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court.
23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment
of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community
or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do
not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that
in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal
co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon
City,
24
this Court expounded on the consequences of a
void marriage on the property relations of the spouses
and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article
144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied
in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage
is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a
48

man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of
the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to
the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s]
inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad
faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in
default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in
default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue
on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of
the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article
50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to
void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The
latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.
In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It
is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code,
on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac
vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid
and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on
the other, between common-law spouses or spouses
of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to
the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even
as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home,"
i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless
of the property regime of the spouses.
25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the
court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of
the parties appear to have been included or involved in
said distribution. The liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties owned in common by the
parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should,
therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only
child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he
is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27,
2005
26
and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the
Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot,
owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura,
as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition
for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are
deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the
retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and
Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
49

co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358)
contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of
September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which
increased the support pendente lite in favor of the
parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name
and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision
1
dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which affirmed with
modification the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case
No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages filed by Carlito Lacap
(respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly
published an "Invitation To Bid" dated January 27, 1992.
Respondent, doing business under the name and style
Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin
Construction), was pre-qualified together with two
other contractors. Since respondent submitted the
lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for the
concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
3
On November 4, 1992,
a Contract Agreement was executed by respondent and
petitioner.
4
On September 25, 1992, District Engineer
Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to Proceed with the
concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
5
Accordingly,
respondent undertook the works, made advances for
the purchase of the materials and payment for labor
costs.
6

On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the
District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted
a final inspection of the project and found it 100%
completed in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District
Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and
Final Acceptance.
7

Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for
the completed project.
8
The DPWH prepared the
Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner.
9
However,
the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the
District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA)
disapproved the final release of funds on the ground
that the contractors license of respondent had expired
at the time of the execution of the contract. The District
Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
Department on whether the contracts of Carwin
Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation
projects were valid and effective although its
contractors license had already expired when the
projects were contracted.
10

In a Letter-Reply dated September 1, 1993, Cesar D.
Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal Department
opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566),
otherwise known as the Contractors License Law, does
not provide that a contract entered into after the license
has expired is void and there is no law which expressly
prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is
enforceable and payment may be paid, without
prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability
action that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government officials or employees concerned.
11

In a Letter dated July 4, 1994, the District Engineer
requested clarification from the DPWH Legal
Department on whether Carwin Construction should be
paid for works accomplished despite an expired
contractors license at the time the contracts were
executed.
12

In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar D.
Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
recommended that payment should be made to Carwin
Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion.
13

Despite such recommendation for payment, no payment
was made to respondent.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages against petitioner
before the RTC.
14

On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the nature of the action since respondent did not appeal
to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to
disapprove the claim.
15

Following the submission of respondents Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss,
16
the RTC issued an Order dated
March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss.
17
The
OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration
18
but it was
likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23,
1996.
19

On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the
defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of non-suability of the State.
20

Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter, thru its
50

District Engineer at Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
to pay the following:
a) P457,000.00 representing the contract for the
concreting project of Sitio 5 road, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga plus interest at 12% from demand until fully
paid; and
b) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
21

The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay
the contract price since it has accepted the completed
project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold
otherwise would be to overrun the long standing and
consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at
the expense of another.
22

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.
23
On
April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining
the Decision of the RTC. It held that since the case
involves the application of the principle of estoppel
against the government which is a purely legal question,
then the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply; that by its actions the
government is estopped from questioning the validity
and binding effect of the Contract Agreement with the
respondent; that denial of payment to respondent on
purely technical grounds after successful completion of
the project is not countenanced either by justice or
equity.
The CA rendered herein the assailed Decision dated
April 28, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification in that the interest shall be
six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 21,
1995.
SO ORDERED.
24

Hence, the present petition on the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:
(a) RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND
(b) IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE
PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENTS
MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.
25

Petitioner contends that respondents recourse to
judicial action was premature since the proper remedy
was to appeal the District Auditors disapproval of
payment to the COA, pursuant to Section 48,
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines; that the COA has primary jurisdiction to
resolve respondents money claim against the
government under Section 2(1),
26
Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 26
27
of P.D. No. 1445; that
non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the principle of primary
jurisdiction results in a lack of cause of action.
Respondent, on the other hand, in his Memorandum
28

limited his discussion to Civil Code provisions relating
to human relations. He submits that equity demands
that he be paid for the work performed; otherwise, the
mandate of the Civil Code provisions relating to human
relations would be rendered nugatory if the State itself
is allowed to ignore and circumvent the standard of
behavior it sets for its inhabitants.
The present petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the
means afforded him by administrative processes.
29
The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to
decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to a court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the
same after due deliberation.
30

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
31

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d)
where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice;
32
(f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
33
(j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.
34
Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to
the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal
Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to
a contractor with an expired contractors license is
proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed
work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was
unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great
prejudice of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired
license at the time of the execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a
pure question of law. It does not involve an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts.
35
Said question at best could be resolved
only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The
final decision on the matter rests not with them but with
the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done.
36
The
51

issue does not require technical knowledge and
experience but one that would involve the
interpretation and application of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of
the COA disapproved respondents claim against the
Government, and, under Section 48
37
of P.D. No. 1445,
the administrative remedy available to respondent is an
appeal of the denial of his claim by the District Auditor
to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of
exceptions (c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for
specific performance and damages was not prematurely
filed and within the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve,
despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu
(Branch VIII):
38

The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath
and wait until the Commission on Audit and the
Ministry of Public Highways had acted on the claims for
compensation for the lands appropriated by the
government. The road had been completed; the Pope
had come and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid
for the properties taken from them. Given this official
indifference, which apparently would continue
indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to assert
and protect their interests.
39

On the question of whether a contractor with an expired
license is entitled to be paid for completed projects,
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price,
commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit
a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to
construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity
of a construction work within the purview of this Act,
without first securing a license to engage in the business
of contracting in this country; or who shall present or
file the license certificate of another, give false evidence
of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in
obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another,
or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall
be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon
conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than
five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand
pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without interpretation.
40
This rule derived from
the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intention or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of
such words as are found in the statute.
41
Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
42

The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not
declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
entered into by a contractor whose license had already
expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he
completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice
to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the
maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari
(no man ought to be made rich out of anothers injury)
states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of
the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.
This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience, x x x guides human conduct [that] should
run as golden threads through society to the end that
law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice."
43
The rules thereon apply
equally well to the Government.
44
Since respondent had
rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance
by petitioner, then the former should be compensated
for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished
project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust
enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of
respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by
law.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC
Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with
Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991
in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on
February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary
to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently,
the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish
his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego
1
insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his
conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability
is based.
52

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand,
opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that
the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is
pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v.
Castillo and Ocfemia
2
which held that the civil obligation
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this
issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue
posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility
and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged
crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the
controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final
judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability,
there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem.
Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal
precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from
Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de
1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las
penas personales siempre, y respecto a
las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido
sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed
employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473,
furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que
adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por
no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella
dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood
as one which is definite. Because, it is only
when judgment is such that, as Medina y
Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en
condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes
"una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination
by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists,"
for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the
same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book
One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is
similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention
the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is
already enforceable. This also brings to mind
Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final "after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing
his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and
opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final
judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil
action is not reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case."
People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G.,
No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68
Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure,
1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of
which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present
case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil
liability is sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as
we must, the criminal action and let the civil
53

aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called
upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the
source thereof criminal liability does not
exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al.
vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can
be found and held criminally liable in a civil
suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case
3

was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of
People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,
4

People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al.
5
and People
of the Philippines v. Satorre
6
by dismissing the appeal in
view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said
cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the
Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison
having been established, and considering that
there is as yet no final judgment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil
liability of the said accused-appellant Alison
was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised
Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed.,
p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A.,
56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against
him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of
Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar
7
and
Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals
8

ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this
court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of
physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any
claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention
of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of
the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in
view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil
liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of
1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative
eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of
the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation,
Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil
liability follows the extinction of the criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only
basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability
does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes
before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally
from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the
civil liability of the accused who was charged with
estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had
swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It
therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the
death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminal liability including fine, his civil liability
based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to
the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the
extinction of his criminal liability due to his death
pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability
to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court
9
requires the dismissal of all money claims
against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then
it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money
may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of
the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the title
of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused
should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from
Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the
survival of the civil liability depends on whether the
same can be predicated on sources of obligations other
than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability
is also extinguished together with the criminal action if
it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et
al.
10
departed from this long-established principle of
law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with
and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to
dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of
54

his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to
survive although it was clear that such claim thereon
was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision
was for the court to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the
correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite
dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court
issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of
Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted
him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action in
the absence of express waiver or its reservation
in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the
criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money
and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies
after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be
civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the
dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of
the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or
whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases
11
raising the identical issue have
maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in
other words, they were a reaffirmance of our
abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability
solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto)
is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due
to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling?
A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels
us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego:
The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in
the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the
latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text
is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex
delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense independently of any
criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said
civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible
with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction
of the criminal action due to death of the accused during
appeal of his conviction. This is because whether
asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the
accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the
expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the
civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil
action. This had the effect of converting such claims
55

from one which is dependent on the outcome of the
criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing
of criminal proceedings.
12
One would be hard put to
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce
to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in
the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This is but to render fealty to the
intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of
the criminal action due to death of the accused pending
appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all
things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising
from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of
the civil action, such that when the criminal action is
extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive.
The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a
crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of
the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced
in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished
from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the
Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate
civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal
proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by
treating the same as a separate civil action referred to
under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a
summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one
such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego
did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for
the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which
his estate would be liable.
13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his
civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced
adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as
the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served
as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate:
Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked
to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution
of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of
the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money
claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his
conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence,
the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money"
"and the defendant dies before final judgment
in the court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies
after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced.
From the standpoint of procedural law, this course
taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly
observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification
advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego
which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal
liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance
(now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of
Appeals can continue to exercise appellate
jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's
judgments subsequent and consonant to
Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside
and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil
procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its
application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in
law for the summary conversion from the latter
category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a
criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money
claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3
enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3
must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in
Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3,
in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86,
14
are contractual
money claims while the claims involved in civil liability
ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal
or real property."
15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an
exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
56

against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim
arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part
of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no
legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an
ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the
deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished
upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by
the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to
recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111
16

(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the
felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against
whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises
from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in
an injury to person or property (real or personal), the
separate civil action must be filed against the executor
or administrator
17
of the estate of the accused pursuant
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator.
No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala
18

where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to
persons thru an independent civil action based on
Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec.
5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to
those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to
purely personal obligations other than those which have
their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of
also arises from contract, the separate civil action must
be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling
herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict.
19
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 1155
21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right
by prescription.
22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold
that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on
the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is
DISMISSED with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L.
CANCIO, petitioner,
vs.
EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court raises pure questions of law involving the
March 20, 1998
1
and June 1, 1998
2
Orders
3
rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in
Civil Case No. G-3272.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three
cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of
Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the
following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1)
Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount of
P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the
57

amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No.
25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.
4

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed
Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22
covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the
check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days
from the date of the check. The two other cases for
Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and
13360) were filed with and subsequently dismissed by
the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch
1, on the ground of "failure to prosecute."
5

Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On
October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second
witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa
cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise
reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising
from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial
court granted the motions of the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of
these cases without prejudice to the refiling of the civil
aspect thereof and there being no comment from the
defense, let these cases be dismissed without prejudice
to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases.
SO ORDER[ED].
6

On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the
amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On
February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint contending that petitioners action is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent
further prayed that petitioner should be held in
contempt of court for forum-shopping.
7

On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of
respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court held
that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to
prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which
amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection.
It further held that the filing of said civil case amounted
to forum-shopping.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
8
Hence, the instant petition.
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1)
whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against
respondent bars the institution of a civil action for
collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa
cases; and 2) whether the filing of said civil action
violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code;
9
and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act
or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31
10
of the Civil Code,
11
intentional torts under Articles
32
12
and 34,
13
and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176
14

of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action [Article 33,
15
Civil Code].
16

Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject, however, to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party "cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission" or under both causes.
17

The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil
liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the
trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules,
which took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given
retroactive effect in the instant case considering that
statutes regulating the procedure of the court are
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
18

Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the
civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
x x x x x x x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1988 and under the present Rules, the civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, but the offended party is given the
option to file a separate civil action before the
prosecution starts to present evidence.
19

Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules
considered them impliedly instituted with the civil
liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules,
however, the independent civil actions may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil
action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
20

In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by
petitioner show that his cause of action is based on
culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent
portion of the complaint reads:
x x x x x x x x x
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to
CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE with office address at
Guagua, Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on
February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive,
58

defendant drew, issued and made in favor of the
plaintiff the following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
1. Interbank Check No. 25001151 March 10, 1993
P80,000.00
2. Interbank Check No. 25001152 March 27, 1993
P80,000.00
3. Interbank Check No. 25001157 May 17, 1993
P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the
said checks will be honored for payment on
their maturity dates, copy of the
aforementioned checks are hereto attached and
marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the
drawee bank for encashment, the same were all
dishonored for reason of DRAWN AGAINST
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the
defendant to make good the checks but she failed
and refused and still fails and refuses without
justifiable reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any
justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of the
checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of
undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per
appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any
justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing the
plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation
expenses in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court
that after due notice and hearing a judgment be
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal
interest;
b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per
court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.
21

Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondents
obligation to make good the value of the checks in
exchange for the cash he delivered to respondent. In
other words, petitioners cause of action is the
respondents breach of the contractual obligation. It
matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to
be one based on delict.
22
The nature of a cause of action
is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
23

Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in
the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the
civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil
action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may
be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. Under
Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, [e.g. culpa
contractual] such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter." Thus, in Vitola, et
al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,
24
the Court,
applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil
case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of
a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex
contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and
independent from the estafa case filed against the
offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the
criminal proceedings.
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes
of action.
25
In the instant case, it must be stressed that
the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil
action, which remains separate and distinct from any
criminal prosecution based on the same act.
26
Not being
deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa
criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will
have no bearing on said independent civil action based
on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after
the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did
not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of
forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose
from the same act or omission of respondent, they are,
however, based on different causes of action. The
criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal
while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa
contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping
in the instant case because the law expressly allows the
filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
27

Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing
petitioners complaint for collection of the value of the
checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil
action which is separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution and which require no prior reservation for
its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and
forum-shopping will not operate to bar the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1,
1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

59

G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C.
SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD,
MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge,
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M
SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
dated March 1,
2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from
the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil
indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their
kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M.
Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle
collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus
driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused
physical injuries to five (5) of the vans passengers. After
trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. However, as there was a reservation to file a
separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability
was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its
decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
2

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.
3
They cited
therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of improper service of summons, prescription
and laches, and defective certification of non-forum
shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q.
Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate
personality of Viron Transit from its officers.
4

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending,
among others, that the right to file a separate action in
this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the
finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there
was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the
complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal
ground that the cause of action had already prescribed.
According to the trial court, actions based on quasi
delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be,
prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of
action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the
complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
5

Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a
ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was
served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal
department without mentioning her designation or
position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing
out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment.
6
The trial court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict
and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code
because the complaint was filed more than four (4)
years after the vehicular accident.
7
As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court
reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be
dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal.
8
The appellate court also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reasoning that even if the respondent trial court judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order
of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible
remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they
failed to allege that the petition was brought within the
recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in
lieu of appeal.
9

In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application
of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing
obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought
to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is
not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted
that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based
on quasi delict and concluded that the action had
prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal
liability of private respondents, the cause of action
accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court
was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court
to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules
as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical
injuries caused by private respondents for which no
civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment
10
dated June 13, 2002, private
respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground of prescription was in order. They point out
that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of
action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four
(4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident
took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability
cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to
pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
60

presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the
case was instituted in the criminal case and no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to
the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of
the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners,
such as lack of certification against forum-shopping;
lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the
assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of
the full names and addresses of petitioners in the
petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply
11
dated September 14, 2002,
while private respondents filed a Rejoinder
12
dated
October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
13
Such
civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the
damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.
14
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly
waives the right to recover damages from the accused;
second, when the offended party reserves his right to
have the civil damages determined in a separate action
in order to take full control and direction of the
prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured
party actually exercises the right to maintain a private
suit against the offender by instituting a civil action
prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of
the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the
right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111
thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions.When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right
to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts
to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right
to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation,
the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as
to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction
and their reservation to file a separate civil action made
in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the
institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private
respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations
in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same,
declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on
quasi delict and should have been brought within four
(4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e.,
from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations
therein are consistent with petitioners claim that the
action was brought to recover civil liability arising from
crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause
of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex
quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of
negligence, the offended party has the choice between
an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime
under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi
delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
15

Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and
the similar proscription against double recovery under
the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in
this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the
remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation,
i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so
because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto
does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action
61

had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company
16
was
decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of
La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property. The
plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a
separate civil action. The driver was convicted which
conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff
filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi
delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court
upon finding that the action was instituted more than
six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted
another action, this time based on the subsidiary
liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed
the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil
case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to
enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate
the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto
to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion
to dismiss
17
and motion for reconsideration
18
of the
order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the offender.
19

However, since the stale action for damages based on
quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no
more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits
against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners
should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial
court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however,
should be exempted from the strict application of the
rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of
securing substantial justice.
20
We are loathe to deprive
petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled
by law and by a final judgment of conviction based
solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an
injustice.
21

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING
ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively
dismissing the present action and denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the
lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155223 April 4, 2007
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her
Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Marie Regine F. Fujita (petitioner) seeking to annul the
Decision
1
dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution
2
dated
September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52839.
Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at No.
589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila, which she acquired from Island Masters Realty
and Development Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a
Deed of Sale dated Nov. 16, 1990.
3
The property is
covered by TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati in the name of IMRDC.
4

On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY,
and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison (respondent), as the
SECOND PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement
5
over the property with the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum
of THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00) receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY
from the SECOND PARTY, the parties have agreed as
follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six (6)
months from the date of the execution of this
contract within which to notify the FIRST PARTY of
her intention to purchase the aforementioned
parcel of land together within (sic) the
improvements thereon at the price of SIX MILLION
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to the FIRST PARTY of
the SECOND PARTYs intention to purchase the
same, the latter has a period of another six months
within which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4
million.
2. That prior to the six months period given to the
SECOND PARTY within which to decide whether or
not to purchase the above-mentioned property, the
FIRST PARTY may still offer the said property to
other persons who may be interested to buy the
same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00
given to the FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY
shall be paid to the latter including interest based
on prevailing compounded bank interest plus the
amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00
should the property be sold at a price more than P7
million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer
within the first six months from the execution of
this contract, no interest shall be charged by the
SECOND PARTY on the P3 million however, in the
62

event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY
would decide not to purchase the aforementioned
property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of another
six months within which to pay the sum of P3
million pesos provided that the said amount shall
earn compounded bank interest for the last six
months only. Under this circumstance, the amount
of P3 million given by the SECOND PARTY shall be
treated as [a] loan and the property shall be
considered as the security for the mortgage which
can be enforced in accordance with law.
x x x x.
6

Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos
in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated check
dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which
rendered said check stale.
7
Petitioner then gave
respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between
petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and
notified petitioner through a letter
8
dated March 20,
1991, which petitioner received only on June 11, 1991,
9

reminding petitioner of their agreement that the
amount of two million pesos which petitioner received
from respondent should be considered as a loan payable
within six months. Petitioner subsequently failed to pay
respondent the amount of two million pesos.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint
10
for sum of
money with preliminary attachment against petitioner.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65367 and
raffled to Branch 30. Respondent alleged the foregoing
facts and in addition thereto averred that petitioner
tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by
making a false report
11
of the loss of her owners copy of
TCT No. 168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3,
1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a
petition
12
for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of said title with the RTC of Makati, Branch 142;
that the petition was granted in an Order
13
dated August
31, 1991; that said Order was subsequently set aside in
an Order dated April 10, 1992
14
where the RTC Makati
granted respondents petition for relief from judgment
due to the fact that respondent is in possession of the
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered
the provincial public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of petitioner for perjury and false
testimony. Respondent prayed for the ex-parte issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment and payment of two
million pesos with interest at 36% per annum from
December 7, 1991, P100,000.00 moral, corrective and
exemplary damages and P200,000.00 for attorneys fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Manila issued a writ of preliminary
attachment upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
two million pesos.
15

Petitioner filed an Amended Answer
16
alleging that the
Memorandum of Agreement was conceived and
arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is
also respondents lawyer; that she was asked to sign the
agreement without being given the chance to read the
same; that the title to the property and the Deed of Sale
between her and the IMRDC were entrusted to Atty.
Lozada for safekeeping and were never turned over to
respondent as there was no consummated sale yet; that
out of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took
the one million pesos which has not been returned, thus
petitioner had filed a civil case against her; that she was
never informed of respondents decision not to
purchase the property within the six month period fixed
in the agreement; that when she demanded the return of
TCT No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and
the IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these
documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 which
her secretary placed in her attache case; that the
envelope together with her other personal things were
lost when her car was forcibly opened the following day;
that she sought the help of Atty. Lozada who advised her
to secure a police report, to execute an affidavit of loss
and to get the services of another lawyer to file a
petition for the issuance of an owners duplicate copy;
that the petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her
knowledge and neither did she sign the petition nor
testify in court as falsely claimed for she was abroad;
that she was a victim of the manipulations of Atty.
Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing of
criminal charges for perjury and false testimony against
her; that no interest could be due as there was no valid
mortgage over the property as the principal obligation is
vitiated with fraud and deception. She prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint, counter-claim for damages
and attorneys fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, the
RTC issued a decision,
17
the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2
Million plus interest thereon at the rate of thirty
two (32%) per cent per annum beginning December
7, 1991 until fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P70,000.00 representing premiums paid by plaintiff
on the attachment bond with legal interest thereon
counted from the date of this decision until fully
paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of
P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and
exemplary damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys
fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation.
18

The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation to
pay respondent the amount of two million pesos with
compounded interest pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement; that the fraudulent scheme employed by
petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to
her loaned money when petitioner executed an affidavit
of loss and instituted a petition for the issuance of an
owners duplicate title knowing the same was in
respondents possession, entitled respondent to moral
damages; and that petitioners bare denial cannot be
accorded credence because her testimony and that of
her witness did not appear to be credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she
received from respondent the two million pesos in cash
but the fact that petitioner gave the one million pesos to
Atty. Lozada was without respondents knowledge thus
it is not binding on respondent; that respondent had
also proven that in 1993, she initially paid the sum of
P30,000.00 as premium for the issuance of the
63

attachment bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994,
and P20,000.00 for the renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff
should be reimbursed considering that she was
compelled to go to court and ask for a writ of
preliminary attachment to protect her rights under the
agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a Decision
dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
with modification, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the rate of
interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per annum,
effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid.
19

The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million pesos
to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission and partly as a
loan; respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated
check of one million pesos because she had decided not
to buy the property and petitioner knew of her decision
as early as April 1991; the award of moral damages was
warranted since even granting petitioner had no hand in
the filing of the petition for the issuance of an owners
copy, she executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No.
168173 when she knew all along that said title was in
respondents possession; petitioners claim that she
thought the title was lost when the brown envelope
given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen from her car was
hollow; that such deceitful conduct caused respondent
serious anxiety and emotional distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for petitioner
to say that the interest should be charged for six months
only and no more; that a loan always bears interest
otherwise it is not a loan; that interest should
commence on June 7, 1991
20
with compounded bank
interest prevailing at the time the two million was
considered as a loan which was in June 1991; that the
bank interest rate for loans secured by a real estate
mortgage in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum
as certified to by Prudential Bank,
21
that in fairness to
petitioner, the rate to be charged should be 25% only.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated September 11, 2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by petitioner raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED BANK
INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX (6)
MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM
OF AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF
CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF NOT
MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION.
22

Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at 32%
per annum awarded by the trial court or at 25% per
annum as modified by the CA which should run from
June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is contrary to the parties
Memorandum of Agreement; that the agreement
provides that if respondent would decide not to
purchase the property, petitioner has the period of
another six months to pay the loan with compounded
bank interest for the last six months only; that the CAs
ruling that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is
not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code
which provides that no interest shall be due unless it
has been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears
interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since a
simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to
pay interest,
23
we find no error committed by the CA in
awarding a 25% interest per annum on the two-million
peso loan even beyond the second six months stipulated
period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the
petitioner and respondent on December 7, 1990 is the
law between the parties. In resolving an issue based
upon a contract, we must first examine the contract
itself, especially the provisions thereof which are
relevant to the controversy.
24
The general rule is that if
the terms of an agreement are clear and leave no doubt
as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.
25
It is further
required that the various stipulations of a contract shall
be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.
26

In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only"
should be taken in the context of the entire agreement.
We agree with and adopt the CAs interpretation of the
phrase in this wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months
each. The first six-month period was given to
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her mind
whether or not to purchase defendant-appellants
(petitioner's) property. The second six-month period
was given to defendant-appellant to pay the P2 million
loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not to
buy the subject property in which case interest will be
charged "for the last six months only", referring to the
second six-month period. This means that no interest
will be charged for the first six-month period while
appellee was making up her mind whether to buy the
property, but only for the second period of six months
after appellee had decided not to buy the property. This
is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six months
only". Certainly, there is nothing in their agreement that
suggests that interest will be charged for six months
only even if it takes defendant-appellant an eternity to
pay the loan.
27

The agreement that the amount given shall bear
compounded bank interest for the last six months only,
i.e., referring to the second six-month period, does not
mean that interest will no longer be charged after the
second six-month period since such stipulation was
made on the logical and reasonable expectation that
such amount would be paid within the date stipulated.
Considering that petitioner failed to pay the amount
given which under the Memorandum of Agreement shall
be considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the
last six months continued to accrue until actual payment
of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or
cost of the use of money and thus, until the principal
sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest
continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use
such principal amount.
28
It has been held that for a
debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the
64

loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of
the loan without payment of the monetary interest,
would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the
debtor at the expense of the creditor.
29

Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned
amount shall earn compounded bank interests, and per
the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest
rate for loans in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per
annum. The CA reduced the interest rate to 25% instead
of the 32% awarded by the trial court which petitioner
no longer assailed.1awphi1.nt
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,
30
we upheld the
validity of a 21% per annum interest on a P142,326.43
loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
31
we sustained the
agreement of the parties to a 24% per annum interest
on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the interest rate of 25%
per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair
and reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were
awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a
fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security
for the loan; that such finding is baseless since
petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false
testimony filed by respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
32

While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony
and perjury cases filed by respondent against her, those
actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of
money with damages filed by respondent against
petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA
that petitioners act of trying to deprive respondent of
the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss
of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles
respondent to moral damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral
damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach
of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently
or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong.
It partakes of the nature of fraud.
33

The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the
event that respondent opts not to buy the property, the
money given by respondent to petitioner shall be
treated as a loan and the property shall be considered as
the security for the mortgage. It was testified to by
respondent that after they executed the agreement on
December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the owners copy
of the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between
petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, and
the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed
the Deed of Sale.
34
However, notwithstanding that all
those documents were in respondents possession,
petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that the owners
copy of the title and the Deed of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the
affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she was of the
belief that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada
the return of the title, she thought that the brown
envelope with markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on
May 5, 1991 already contained the title and the Deed of
Sale as those documents were in the same brown
envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to the
transaction with respondent.
35
Such statement
remained a bare statement. It was not proven at all since
Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her
claim. In fact, even petitioners own witness, Benilda
Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to establish petitioner's
claim that the title was returned by Atty. Lozada in view
of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope
was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and
she placed it in petitioners attach case
36
and did not
bother to look at the envelope.
37

It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of the
affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing of the
petition with the RTC for the issuance of new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173. Petitioners actuation
would have deprived respondent of the security for her
loan were it not for respondents timely filing of a
petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous
order granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award
of moral damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been
established, the award of exemplary damages is
proper.
38
Exemplary damages may be imposed upon
petitioner by way of example or correction for the
public good.
39
The RTC awarded the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. While
the award of moral and exemplary damages in an
aggregate amount may not be the usual way of awarding
said damages,
40
no error has been committed by CA.
There is no question that respondent is entitled to moral
and exemplary damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding
attorneys fees because the trial courts decision did not
explain the findings of facts and law to justify the award
of attorneys fees as the same was mentioned only in the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision.
We agree.
Article 2208
41
of the New Civil Code enumerates the
instances where such may be awarded and, in all cases,
it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same
were to be granted.
42
Attorney's fees as part of damages
are not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded
every time a party prevails in a suit because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate.
43
The award of attorney's fees is the exception
rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for
the trial court to make findings of facts and law that
would bring the case within the exception and justify
the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees
cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of
the decision.
44
They must be clearly explained and
justified by the trial court in the body of its decision. On
appeal, the CA is precluded from supplementing the
bases for awarding attorneys fees when the trial court
failed to discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding
the same. Consequently, the award of attorney's fees
should be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision
dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
65

CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA
CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN, and GERTRUDES
GONZALES, respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioners.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
The constitutional protection of our people against
unreasonable search and seizure is not merely a
pleasing platitude. It vouchsafes our right to privacy and
dignity against undesirable intrusions committed by any
public officer or private individual. An infringement of
this right justifies an award for damages.
On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc.,
was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy
Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was
given the authority to "undertake or cause to be
undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources
of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies."
1

Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation
received information that private respondents Agnes
Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales
were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia
without any authority. Petitioner de Guzman, an
employee of petitioner corporation, was tasked to
undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a
report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner de
Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two (2) other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion,
Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores
of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without
any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants,
dresses, and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The
seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed private
respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items.
The items were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to
petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then
filed against private respondents.
2
During its pendency,
petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent
Lugatiman the sum of THREE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,100.00) in order to be dropped
from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, after a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed the complaint against all the private
respondents. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the
return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands.
3
Private
respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of
business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the
seized items were returned. The other items returned
were of inferior quality.
Private respondents then filed Civil Case No. 51144
against the petitioners for sums of money and damages.
4
In its Decision dated January 9, 1987, the trial court
ruled for the private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants,
ordering the latter jointly and severally:
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff
Mirasol Lugatiman with interest at 12% per
annum from January 12, 1984, the date of the
last receipt issued, until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff Agnes Villa Cruz the sum of
P2,000.00 for the 26 pieces of girl scout items
not returned;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00
for and as moral damages and P15,000.00 for
and as exemplary damages; and
4. P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
The decision was appealed to the respondent court. On
January 18, 1989, its Fifth Division,
5
affirmed the
Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION; and, as
modified, the dispositive portion thereof now
reads as follows:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs (private respondents) and against
defendants (petitioners), ordering the latter
jointly and severally;
1. To return the amount of P3,100.00 to plaintiff
(respondent) Mirasol Lugatiman and cancel her
application for distributor's license;
2. To pay plaintiff (respondent) Agnes Villa Cruz
the sum of P2,000.00 for the unreturned 26
pieces of girl scouts items with interest at 12%
per annum from June 4, 1984 (date the
complaint was filed) until it is fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) the amount of
P10,000.00 each, or a total of P30,000.00, for
and as moral damages; and P5,000.00 each, or a
total of P15,000.00, for and as exemplary
damages; and
4. To pay plaintiffs (respondents) P5,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Costs of the case a quo and the instant appeal
are assessed jointly and severally against
defendants-appellants (petitioners) MHP
Garments, Inc. and Larry de Guzman.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPUTING
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES TO THE
PETITIONERS WHO DID NOT EFFECT THE
SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE.
66

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
MADE A FINDING THAT THE MANNER WITH
WHICH THE CONFISCATION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS WAS TORTIOUS BUT
PENALIZED INSTEAD THE PETITIONERS WHO
DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT OF CONFISCATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
FOUND FOR THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
We affirm.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution protects our
people from unreasonable search and seizure. It
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision protects not only those who appear to be
innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are
nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved.
6
In the case at bench, the seizure was made
without any warrant. Under the Rules of Court,
7
a
warrantless search can only be undertaken under the
following circumstance:
Sec. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. - A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
We hold that the evidence did not justify the
warrantless search and seizure of private respondents'
goods. Petitioner corporation received information that
private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts
items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific
date and time are not established in the evidence
adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then
made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents.
They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on
October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of
private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were
seized. The progression of time between the receipt of
the information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for
petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did
not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private
respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for
damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate
the right of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and
seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable
cause for the seizure. Probable cause for a search has
been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched."
8
These facts and
circumstances were not in any way shown by the
petitioners to justify their warrantless search and
seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for
unfair competition and later ordered the return of the
seized goods.
Petitioners would deflect their liability with the
argument that it was the Philippine Constabulary that
conducted the raid and their participation was only to
report the alleged illegal activity of private respondents.
While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team
should have been included in the complaint for violation
of the private respondents' constitutional rights, still,
the omission will not exculpate petitioners.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon,
9
we ruled for the
recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from public officer or private
individual, thus:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person
whose constitutional rights have been violated
or impaired is entitled to actual and moral
damages from the public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded.
xxx xxx xxx
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong
may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad
faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public
officials in the past have abused their powers
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an
end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In
the United States this remedy is in the nature of
a tort. (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver,
10
the Court En
Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly
67

responsible, viz:
[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is
the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person "directly or
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for
damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages
or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx xxx xxx
While it would certainly be too naive to expect
that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damages
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code
makes the persons who are directly, as well as
indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
xxx xxx xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to
have participated "directly" should be held
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses
within the ambit of its provisions those directly,
as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations.
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases,
the respondent court correctly granted damages to
private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly
involved in transgressing the right of private
respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their
covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting
supplies.
11
As correctly observed by respondent court:
Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of
unlawfully seizing appellees' (respondents')
merchandise and of filing the criminal
complaint for unfair competition against
appellees (respondents) were for the protection
and benefit of appellant (petitioner)
corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus,
reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it
was upon appellant (petitioner) corporation's
instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid
and effected the illegal seizure. These
circumstances should answer the trial court's
query posed in its decision now under
consideration as to why the PC soldiers
immediately turned over the seized merchandise
to appellant (petitioner) corporation.
12

The raid was conducted with the active participation of
their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to
stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By
standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.
13
So
with the petitioner corporation which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC
raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender
them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition.
Secondly, Letter of Instruction No. 1299 was precisely
crafted on March 9, 1983 to safeguard not only the
privilege of franchise holder of scouting items but also
the citizen's constitutional rights, to wit:
TITLE: APPREHENSION OF
UNAUTHORIZED
MANUFACTURERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF SCOUT
PARAPHERNALIA AND
IMPOUNDING OF SAID
PARAPHERNALIA.
ABSTRACT:
Directs all law enforcement agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines, to apprehend
immediately unauthorized manufacturers and
distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon
proper application by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the Philippines
for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant
with a judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law; and to impound the
said paraphernalia to be used as evidence in
court or other appropriate administrative body.
Orders the immediate and strict compliance with
the Instructions.
14

Under the above provision and as aforediscussed,
petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful
peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines for the proper application of a warrant.
Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot
be sacrificed to transient needs.
15
Petitioners did not
have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of
respondents' goods without any warrant.
And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the
raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint
against the raiding team for contribution or any other
relief,
16
in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of
Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not.
We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not
awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate
the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.
17

Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon,
op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the case at
bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have
suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded
feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners.
Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and
humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise
were supported by their testimonies. Respondent Cruz
declared:
I felt very nervous. I was crying to loss (sic) my
goods and capital because I am doing business
with borrowed money only, there was
commotion created by the raiding team and
they even stepped on some of the pants and
dresses on display for sale. All passersby
stopped to watch and stared at me with
accusing expressions. I was trembling and
terribly ashamed, sir.
18

Respondent Lugatiman testified:
I felt very nervous. I was crying and I was very
much ashamed because many people have been
watching the PC soldiers hauling my items, and
many/I (sic) heard say "nakaw pala ang mga
iyan" for which I am claiming P25,000.00 for
damages.
19

68

While respondent Gonzalez stated thus:
I do not like the way the raid was conducted by
the team sir because it looked like that what I
have been selling were stolen items that they
should be confiscated by uniformed soldiers.
Many people were around and the more the
confiscation was made in a scandalous manner;
every clothes, T-shirts, pants and dresses even
those not wrapped dropped to the ground. I
was terribly shamed in the presence of market
goers that morning.
20

Needles to state, the wantonness of the wrongful seizure
justifies the award of exemplary damages.
21
It will also
serve as a stern reminder to all and sundry that the
constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of
rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends
against intrusions directly done both by government
and indirectly by private entities.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%)
interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26)
pieces of girl scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT
(12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said
amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof.
22
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992
JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,
vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South
Cotabato, respondents.
Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This is still another dispute between brother and sister
over a piece of property they inherited from their
parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance
that the private respondent's counsel in this petition is
the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action
is being questioned.
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private
respondent Martin Paras.*
On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her
his share in the intestate estate for P300.00. The sale
was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years
later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to
Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by
a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a
complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos
City.
1
On the same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City.
2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted
a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South
Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused,
the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing
the criminal case on the ground that:
. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of
complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the
respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the
Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must
be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the
case of Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme
Court had already made a pronouncement that
"a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double
sale of property is a prejudicial question to a
civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale
and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries
of their signatures to the Deed."
3

The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was
denied on April 30, 1990. She then came to this Court
for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.
The Court could have referred this petition to the Court
of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP
129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of
the peculiar circumstances involved.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a
prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action
may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover,
this suspension may not be done motu proprio by the
judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of
the defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is
also stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal
would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the
double jeopardy rule because he has not yet been
arraigned.
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent
Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and
namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona,
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has
made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at
the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued
by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias
against his father.
Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests
there may have been a basis for the order in view of the
alleged double sale of the property which was being
litigated in the regional trial court. He concedes,
however, that the order may have been premature and
that it could not have been issued motu proprio.
Agreeing that double jeopardy would not attach because
of the lack of arraignment, he asks that his Comment be
considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal
action on the ground of prejudicial question.
The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that
the respondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of
discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988,
provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the fiscal or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for
69

trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the
same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests.
Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say
the least, in light of the clear provision of the
above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only
a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of
Court before they were amended. It plainly says that the
suspension may be made only upon petition and not at
the instance of the judge alone, and it also says
suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the
person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary
Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the
respondent judge.
But more important than the preceding considerations
is the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a
prejudicial question.
Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The
two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but
the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal.
4
It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the criminal action pending the
determination of the civil action, it must appear not only
that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would
be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused".
6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the
continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal
action that is prejudicial to the civil action.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his
Order does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras
v. Rasul.
7
Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision
but also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not
analogous to those in the case at bar.
In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land
which he later also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil
action for nullification of the second sale and asked that
the sale made by Ras in his favor be declared valid. Ras's
defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel
and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed
of sale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa
was filed against Ras based on the same double sale that
was the subject of the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for
Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case),
claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case
would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or
innocence.
Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this
Court ruled that a suspension of the criminal action was
in order because:
On the basis of the issues raised in both the
criminal and civil cases against petitioner and
in the light of the foregoing concepts of a
prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be
a prejudicial question in the case at bar,
considering that petitioner Alejandro Ras'
defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of
the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed
of sale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the
civil case and complaining witnesses in the
criminal case) is based on the very same facts
which would be necessarily determinative of
petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in
the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in
favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there
would be no double sale and petitioner would
be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction
in the criminal case (if it were allowed to
proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and
would have to be set aside if it were finally
decided in the civil action that indeed the
alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and
spurious.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his
answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 73
that he had never sold the property in litigation
to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his
signatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of
his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is,
therefore, necessary that the truth or falsity of
such claim be first determined because if his
claim is true, then he did not sell his property
twice and no estafa was committed. The
question of nullity of the sale is distinct and
separate from the crime of estafa (alleged
double sale) but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of
herein petitioner in the criminal action.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the
criminal action on the ground that the defense in the
civil case forgery of his signature in the first deed of
sale had to be threshed out first. Resolution of that
question would necessarily resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. By
contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case
at bar; and no less importantly, the respondent judge
had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising
in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have
ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action
would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case.
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in
the civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must
involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its
resolution should determine whether or not the latter
action may proceed.
The order dismissing the criminal action without a
70

motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111,
Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, and even without the accused indicating his
defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second
sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias
on the part of the respondent judge.
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be
faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence" and "should administer justice
impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his
questionable conduct in the case at bar, with the
warning that commission of similar acts in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17,
1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the
Order dated April 30, 1991, denying the motion for
reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for
further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different
judge.
SO ORDERED.

71

G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, HERMINIGILDO
FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A.
VILLANUEVA, Incumbent Member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R.
AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A.
VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D.
ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS
ORIENTAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD
DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA
ESTRELLANES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated 17 February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August
1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo
Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for
suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following
antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia
Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural
labor sectoral representative respectively, for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros
Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the
Department of Local Government. Private respondents
Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16
February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with
the Office of the President for review and recall of said
designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20
March 1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor
Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as
sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for
mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No.
9661, for recognition as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to
declare null and void the designations of private
respondents as sectoral representatives, docketed as
Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al.
versus Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, et al."
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16936
entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo
Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of
the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G.
FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P.
AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO
VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS
A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as
follows:
That during the period from February
1989 to February 1991 and subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused, all public officers,
Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G.
FABURADA, Sangguniang Members
MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO,
ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO A.
VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and
SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the
performance of their official functions
and taking advantage of their public
positions, with evident bad faith,
manifest partiality, and conspiring and
confederating with each other did, then
and there, wilfully and unlawfully
cause undue injury to Sectoral
Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and
Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay
despite demand the amount of NINETY
FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P95,350.00) and ONE
HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00)
representing respectively their per
diems, salaries and other privileges and
benefits, and such undue injury
continuing to the present to the
prejudice and damage of Bartolome
Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
1

On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with
the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 9955
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City.
2

On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision declaring null and void ab initio the
designations issued by the Department of Local
Government to the private respondents as sectoral
representatives for having been done in violation of
Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.
3

The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D.
Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No.
84663, along with 7 companion cases of similar
import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792,
87935, 88072, and 90205) all promulgated on
August 24, 1990, ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that
before the President (or the Secretary
of the Department of Local
Government) may appoint members of
the local legislative bodies to represent
the Industrial and Agricultural Labor
72

Sectors, there must be a determination
to be made by the Sanggunian itself
that the said sectors are of sufficient
number in the city or municipality to
warrant representation after
consultation with associations and
persons belonging to the sector
concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled
For that matter, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code even prescribe the
time and manner by which such
determination is to be conducted by
the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the
Sanggunian concerned has not yet
determined that the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors in their
particular city or municipality are of
sufficient number to warrant
representation, there will absolutely be
no basis for the
designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the
sufficiency in number of the sector concerned
to warrant representation, the Sanggunian is
enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with
associations and persons belonging to the
sector concerned. Consultation with the sector
concerned is made a pre-requisite. This is so
considering that those who belong to the said
sector are the ones primarily interested in
being represented in the Sanggunian. In the
same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the
Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or
body) as a condition sine qua non to a valid
appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total
absence of the required prior determination by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court
cannot help but declare the designations of
private defendants as sectoral representatives
null and void.
This verdict is not without precedence. In
several similar cases, the Supreme Court
invariably nullified the designations where the
requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were
not complied with. Just to cite one case, the
Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the
Sangguniang Bayan of Valenzuela that
the sectors concerned are of sufficient
number to warrant representation and
there was no consultation whatsoever
with the associations and persons
belonging to the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore,
the appointment of private
respondents Romeo F. Bularan and
Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo
Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al.,
G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990).
4

Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision
to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
36769, where the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion
for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said
respondent Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it
appears, nevertheless, that the private
complainants have been rendering services on
the basis of their respective appointments as
sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental;
and that their said appointments enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Having rendered
such services, the private complainants are
entitled to the salaries attached to their office.
Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional
Trial Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are
null and void, still the private complainants are
entitled to their salaries and compensation for
service they have actually rendered, for the
reason that before such judicial declaration of
nullity, the private complainants are considered
at least de facto public officers acting as such on
the basis of apparently valid appointments
issued by competent authorities. In other
words, regardless of the decision that may be
rendered in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled
to their withheld salaries for the services they
have actually rendered as sectoral
representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan.
Hence, the decision that may be rendered by
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955
would not be determinative of the innocence or
guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the
Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of
Prejudicial Question filed by the accused
through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
5

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned resolution in view of the decision
promulgated by the trial court nullifying the
appointments of private respondents but it was,
likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification
that the grounds stated in the said motion were a mere
rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the case in
abeyance.
6
The dispositive portion of its order reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
arraignment of the accused which was
scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo
Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P.
Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza, Hacubina V.
Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however,
hereby ordered to show cause in writing within
ten (10) days from service hereof why they
should not be cited for contempt of court for
their failure to appear in court today for
arraignment.
73

In case of an adverse resolution on the motion
to quash which is to be filed by the counsel for
the defense, set this case for arraignment,
pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all
dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
SO ORDERED.
7

On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan
issued an order holding consideration of all incidents
pending the issuance of an extended resolution.
8

No such resolution, however, was issued and in its
assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30
June 1993. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the
accused from the scheduled hearing today
which We deem to be excusable, reset this case
for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial
on the merits on June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993,
on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused and principal
counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones. Considering that
the accused come all the way from Himalalud,
Negros Oriental, no postponement will be
allowed.
SO ORDERED.
9

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'
motions for the suspension of the proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the
pendency of a prejudicial issue before the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the
proceedings that would entail a retrial and
rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e.,
the validity of the appointments of private
respondents and their entitlement to
compensation which is already pending
resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave
abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing
petitioners to be prosecuted under two
alternative theories that private respondents
are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation
of petitioners' right to due process.
10

In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or
not the legality or validity of private respondents'
designation as sectoral representatives which is
pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a
decision on that point is vital to the eventual judgment
in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the
prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues
involved in said criminal case.
11

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in
a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but
the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal.
12
It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally
in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case."
13

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
14
It has
two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
15

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench,
we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No.
36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to
warrant suspension of the arraignment and further
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt
that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No.
36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely
related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in
not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems
as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was
instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the
designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives were made in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will
certainly determine if there will still be any reason to
proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the
Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e])
due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with
manifest partiality, to pay private respondents' salaries
as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was
anchored on petitioners' assertion that said
designations were made in violation of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null
and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold
the trial court's decision declaring null and void private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives
for failure to comply with the provisions of the Local
74

Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the
charges against petitioners would no longer, so to speak,
have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of
bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no
obligation on their part to pay private respondents'
claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right
to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In
other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine
whether or not there is basis to proceed with the
criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations
are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for
actual services rendered.
16
We disagree. As found by the
trial court and as borne out by the records, from the
start, private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by petitioners.
They began with a petition filed with the Office of the
President copies of which were received by private
respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days
after they took their oath of office.
17
Hence, private
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered
services as sectoral representatives has not been
established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent
Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that
private respondents' designations are finally declared
invalid, they may still be considered de facto public
officers entitled to compensation for services actually
rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are
the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of
the office in good faith.
18

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the
aforestated elements are present. There can be no de
facto officer where there is no de jure office, although
there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
19

WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992
and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 of
respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is
enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and
trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending
final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first
marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said
marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated,
the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996
and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on
February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that
it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge
granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an
Order dated December 29, 1998.
1
Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner
argues that respondent should have first obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before
entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the
alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
Article 40 of the Family Code.
2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the
subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein.
3
It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
4
It must appear not only that
the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal
action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would necessarily be
determinative of the criminal case.
5
Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately
related to the same issue raised in the criminal action
and its resolution determinative of whether or not the
latter action may proceed.
6
Its two essential elements
are:
7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to
have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the prosecution has not
yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or
may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the
allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits
of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a
prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. The clear
implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage.
8
Whether or not the first
75

marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of
defense because there is still no judicial declaration of
its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements
concur two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had
it not been for the existence at the material time of the
first marriage.
9

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and
thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A
party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license -
and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario
would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As
succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case
before us was void for lack of a marriage license.
Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage
to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a
marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims
that prior to their marriage, they had already attained
the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years.
11
The issue in
this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial
question, and we are not called upon to resolve the
validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it
to state that the Civil Code, under which the first
marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."
12
[]
Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same
must be submitted to the determination of competent
courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists.
13
No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the
absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts
must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the
courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,
14

he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case
the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground
of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity.
In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question.
15
This ruling
applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose
the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an
excuse.
16
The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or
that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is
an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.
17
The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did
not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he
entered into the second marriage, why should he be
allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in
order to delay his criminal prosecution and
subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the
law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first
marriage before the second marriage was contracted
rests upon the defense,
18
but that is a matter that can be
raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it
should be stressed that not every defense raised in the
civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case
for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage
ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he
was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that
respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a
potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has
been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent,
without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have
validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact before any party can
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be
void.
19
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration
of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be
subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at
the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner.
20
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the
subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the
criminal action against him.
21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order
dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed
with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.

76

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE
FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the
RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside
the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge
Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No.
98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the
Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The
said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner
on the ground that the pending petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E.
Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
1

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of
marriage and four children,
2
petitioner filed a petition
for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before
Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.
3

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain
woman named Milagros Salting.
4
Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage
5
under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the
City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and
ordered the filing of an Information
6
against them. The
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to
Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant
of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the
determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order
7

dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise
denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the
proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on
certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998
and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
8
In an Order
9
dated January 28, 1999, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for
certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order
10
dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that
two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case
for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for
concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might
declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might
acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his
marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the
courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be
avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the
court rules on the validity of marriage; that if
petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity then by reason of the
arguments submitted in the subject petition, his
marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly,
petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case
because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
11

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,
12
this Court ruled that
the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other
evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said
Decision read:
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances
where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes other than
77

remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as
an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the
herein petitioner need not present a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence
in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other
than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage
void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state
that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova
1

cited in Donato vs. Luna
14
where this Court held that:
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties
to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for
nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134887 July 27, 2006
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. represented by
MICHAEL C. U. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
SEC. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD LICHAUCO and the HON.
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding
1

(MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
represented by then Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.
relative to the launching, ownership, operation and
management of a Philippine satellite by a
Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or
corporation.
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium of
private telecommunications carriers formed a
corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine
Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI), herein petitioner.
By letter
2
dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo
A. Silverio (Silverio) requested the then DOTC Secretary
Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital
slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
In response to Silverios letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by
letter
3
dated July 3, 1996, confirmed the governments
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E
to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the
launching, operation and management of its satellites
by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its
capital, conducting negotiations with its business
partners, and making an initial payment of US$ 3.5
million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite manufacturer.
Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed Jesli Lapuz
(Lapuz), President and CEO of the Landbank of the
Philippines, by letter
4
of December 3, 1996, of the
governments assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E
and 153E and requested the banks confirmation of its
participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11
million, the proceeds of which would be applied to
PASIs interim satellite.
It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzmans letter
to then DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco,
(Lichauco) who, by letter
5
of December 5, 1996, wrote
Lapuz as follows:
1. Kindly be informed that there is simply no basis
for Michael de Guzman to allege that the DOTC has
assigned two (2) slots to PASI. He conveniently
neglected to attach as another annex, in addition to
Sec. Lagdameos letter of 3 July 1996 (Annex "A")
the letter of 28 June (Annex "B") in response to
which the July 3rd letter had been sent to PASI.
Annex "B" precisely provides that one slot (153 E,
to which the interim satellite was supposed to
migrate) was to be used for the migration of the
Russian satellite in time for the APEC Leaders
Summit. This particular endeavor was not
successful. The interim satellite "Gorizont" never
moved from its orbital location of 130E Longitude.
Annex "C" is a letter from an official of the Subic Bay
Satellite Systems Inc., with its attachments,
addressed to me stating that as of the 13th of
November, no such voyage to 153E orbital slot had
been commenced. In fact DHI hid this fact from me,
and in fact stated that Gorizont had already moved
and was on its way to 153E.
78

Since this timely migration did not happen in time
for the APEC Leaders Meeting on 24 November, this
153E Longitude slot can no longer be assigned to
PASI.
The other slot 161E Longitude is the one that can
be made available for PASIs eventual launch, in
1998 most likely, in exchange for one free satellite
transponder unit utilization, for all requirements of
Government. These have yet to be embodied in a
contract between PASI and the DOTC.
2. I understand from my meeting with DHI/PASI
this morning, and from the de Guzman letter you
sent to me, that the latter are still interested in
pursuing their "interim satellite project" and are
applying for a loan with your bank. Of course they
can always pursue this as a business venture of
DHI/PASI which is their own corporate business
decision. The DOTC supports this venture but they
will be getting only one orbital slot for both the
Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch Project.
I understand from todays meeting with them that
this is technically feasible.
3. As regards the use of the name "Agila", Mr. de
Guzmans allegation that DHI/PASI has registered
"Agila" as a "corporate alias/trademark" is FALSE.
There is no such thing as registration of a
"corporate alias". Nor for that matter can the trade
name of a satellite be registered for just any
satellite, where it was the President who chose the
name for the first Philippine satellite in orbit. No
one else coined that name but he. He has therefore
given the name "Agila I" to the Mabuhay satellite
now in orbit at 144E, being the first Philippine
satellite in orbit. He made this announcement in the
presence of all the APEC Heads of State just before
the presentation to him of the Manila Action Plan
for APEC. (Underscoring supplied)
Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a
Notice of Offer
6
for several orbital slots including 153E.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge
and that it subsequently came to learn that another
company whose identity had not been disclosed had
submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot
153E, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint
7
before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against
Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction to
enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity,
and for damages.
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina
Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman
charged Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended,
reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees
of officers or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The complaint was docketed as OMB Case No.
0-98-0416. The Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, by Evaluation Report
8
dated April 15,
1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question after
considering that "the case filed with the RTC involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based and that the guilt or the
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined in the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil case." It thus concluded that the filing of the
complaint before the Ombudsman "is premature since
the issues involved herein are now subject of litigation
in the case filed with the RTC," and accordingly
recommended its dismissal. Then Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto approved on April 24, 1998 the
recommendation of the EPIB.
PASI moved to reconsider
9
the dismissal of the
complaint, but was denied by Order
10
dated July 17,
1998.
In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case
against respondent was denied by the trial court. On
elevation of the order of denial to the Court of Appeals,
said court, by Decision dated February 21, 2000,
ordered the dismissal of the case. This Court, by
Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the reinstatement
of the case, however.
11

PASI is now before this Court via petition for review on
certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman erred in
dismissing the complaint.
In issue are 1) whether there exists a prejudicial
question and, if in the affirmative, 2) whether the
dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is
that although it does not conclusively resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused, it tests the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint or information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.
12

Hence, the need for its prior resolution before further
proceedings in the criminal action may be had.
PASI concedes that the issues in the civil case are similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
case. It contends, however, that the resolution of the
issues in the civil case is not determinative of the guilt
or innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is
adjudged liable for damages, it does not necessarily
follow that she would be convicted of the crime charged.
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in
the case before the Ombudsman, it is necessary to
examine the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for
which Lichauco was charged and the causes of action in
the civil case.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quoted has
the following elements:
79

1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act
during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable negligence;
and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
Government or any private party, or gave any party
any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference
to such parties.
13

The civil case against Lichauco on the other hand
involves three causes of action. The first, for injunction,
seeks to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, the
DOTC having previously assigned the same to PASI; the
second, for declaration of nullity of award, seeks to
nullify the award given to the undisclosed bidder for
being beyond Lichaucos authority; and the third, for
damages arising from Lichaucos questioned acts.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot
153E is, in the civil case, declared valid for being within
Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from
liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act
to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury
claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The finding
by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial
question is thus well-taken.
Respecting the propriety of the dismissal by the
Ombudsman of the complaint due to the pendency of a
prejudicial question, PASI argues that since the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is silent on
the matter, the Rules of Court, specifically Section 6,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which now reads:
SECTION 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.
(Underscoring supplied),
applies in a suppletory character.
The Ombudsman, on the other hand, argues that the
above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court applies to
cases which are at the preliminary or trial stage and not
to those, like the case subject of the present petition, at
the evaluation stage.
The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the
evaluation stage, the investigating officer may
recommend any of several causes of action including
dismissal of the complaint for want of palpable merit or
subjecting the complaint to preliminary investigation,
and the evaluation of the complaint involves the
discretion of the investigating officer which this Court
cannot interfere with.
While the evaluation of a complaint involves the
discretion of the investigating officer, its exercise should
not be abused
14
or wanting in legal basis.
Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman reads:
SECTION 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the
complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or
agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for
fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
(Underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the
evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for
want of palpable merit. Want of palpable merit
obviously means that there is no basis for the charge or
charges. If the complaint has prima facie merit, however,
the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption
of any of the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f).
15

When, in the course of the actions taken by those to
whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a
prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a
suppletory character.
16
As laid down in Yap v. Paras,
17

said rule directs that the proceedings may only be
suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made
only upon petition,and not at the instance of the judge
alone or as in this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsmans dismissal of
petitioners criminal complaint due to prejudicial
question would not only run counter to the provision of
Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would
sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability, if there
be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis
Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code which
respectively read:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes
the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as
provided in Article 344 of this Code.
(Underscoring supplied)
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. Crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall
prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall
80

prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe
in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall
prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed
shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one,
the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the
application of the rules contained in the first,
second, and third paragraphs of this article. x x x
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.
The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to
run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of
respondent Ombudsman dismissing OMB Case No.
0-98-0416 against respondent then Secretary Josefina
Trinidad Lichauco is SET ASIDE.
The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to its
docket for further proceedings, in line with the
foregoing ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007
FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse
the (1) Resolution
1
dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, "Francisco
Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of
Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M.
Librojo," which dismissed petitioner Francisco
Magestrados Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong
remedy; and (2) Resolution
2
dated 3 May 2001 of the
same Court denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal
complaint
3
for perjury against petitioner with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.
After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the
appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for perjury
against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury
against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City. Pertinent portions of the
information are hereby quoted as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath
upon a material matter before a competent officer
authorized to receive and administer oath and which
the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe
and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public
Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page
No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely
alleging that he lost Owners Duplicate Certificate of TCT
No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a
Petition For Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of
Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98)
on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the
said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado
signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page
84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public
Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused
knowing fully well that the allegations in the said
affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter
being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant
Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of
P 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to
the property was surrendered by him to the said
complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, making
untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to
the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.
4

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch
43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 90721
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Francisco
Magestrado."
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion
5
for
suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308,
a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and
Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case
No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues
raised in the criminal action.
On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order
6

denying petitioners motion for suspension of
proceedings, thus:
Acting on the "Motion for Suspension of Proceedings"
filed by the [herein petitioner Magestrado], thru
counsel, and the "Comment and Opposition thereto, the
Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid
motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it
appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously
scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the
morning.
On 17 August 1999, a motion
7
for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an
Order
8
dated 19 October 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
9

81

under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a
prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that MeTC
Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90721.
On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the
petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, reasoning thus:
Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil
cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action
for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds that there is
no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome
of the civil cases. The civil cases are principally for
determination whether or not a loan was obtained by
petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of
real estate mortgage involving the property covered by
TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for
perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful
execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition
for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the
issue in the criminal case which may be resolved
independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit
of loss was executed in support of the petition for
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the
RTC. x x x.
10

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
11
but
this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order
12
dated
21 December 2000.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari
13
under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
63293. Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T.
Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition
for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect
sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioners
motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721, as well as his subsequent motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed
14
the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground that
petitioners remedy should have been an appeal from
the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for
Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of Appeals ruled
that:
Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the
correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in
the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section
10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not
by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same
rules. Thus, the said rule provides:
Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases.
In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and
habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of
briefs, their respective memoranda within a
non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of
the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral
and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby
DISMISSED.
15

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration
16
in a Resolution
17
dated 3 May 2001.
Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T.
Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioners
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, and her subsequent Order dated December
21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration
thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of
Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the
Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent
motion for reconsideration on the ground of a
prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and the prevailing
jurisprudence.
After consideration of the procedural and substantive
issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant petition
to be without merit.
The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the
proper remedy which petitioner should have availed
himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary
appeal or a petition for certiorari. Petitioner claims that
he correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83s Order of
dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No.
Q-99-39358 through a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. Private respondent and public
respondent People of the Philippines insist that an
ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
We agree with respondents. We hold that the appellate
court did not err in dismissing petitioners Petition for
Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised
Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10,
invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
5 March 2001).
The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was
appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 but
also because RTC-Branch 83s Order of dismissal was a
final order from which petitioners should have appealed
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally
disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can
be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the
order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court.
Au contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of
the case completely, but leaves something to be done as
regards the merits of the latter.
18
RTC-Branch 83s
Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioners
Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358
82

finally disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can
do nothing more with the case.
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be
appealable. The manner of appealing an RTC judgment
or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:
Section 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings
and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal
nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
available to petitioners. Here, appeal was available. It
was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact
or of law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court
might have committed. But petitioners instead filed a
special civil action for certiorari.
We have time and again reminded members of the
bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only
when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
19
Certiorari
cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal
a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
20

certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.
21

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have
repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of appeals in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the
failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the
trial court final and executory. This rule is founded upon
the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due
process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. Neither can petitioner invoke the
doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the
broader interest of substantial justice. While every
litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from
constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an
appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem as it
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the
appeal.
22

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.
23
A party
cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of
appeal. The existence and availability of the right of
appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special
civil action for certiorari.
24
As this Court held in Fajardo
v. Bautista
25
:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or
wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
successive. Accordingly, although the special civil action
of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is
available, it may be granted where it is shown that the
appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will
not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of
the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate
and ineffectual. Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where
such loss is occasioned by the petitioners own neglect
or error in the choice of remedies.
On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the
Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition for
Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had
until 18 January 2001 within which to file an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The Petition for Certiorari
filed by petitioner on 19 February 2001 with the Court
of Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. As petitioner failed to file a timely appeal,
RTC-Branch 83s dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari
had long become final and executory.
For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly
denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by
petitioner before it.
Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for
denying the instant Petition on the merits.
In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several
substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch 43
based on a prejudicial question still to be resolved in
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage)
and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of
money) which are pending before other trial
courts.1avvphi1
For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of
petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
(for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private
respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money).
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for
Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages
filed on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private
respondent with RTC-Branch 77. Petitioner alleges that
he purchased a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru private
respondent, a real estate broker. In the process of
negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of
Sale prepared by private respondent. Upon signing the
Deed of Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already
signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-fact
of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez.
Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special
power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter
failed to present one. Petitioner averred that private
respondent refused to deliver the certificate of title of
the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of
Sale and payment of the consideration. Petitioner was
thus compelled to engage the services of one Modesto
Gazmin, Jr. who agreed, for P100,000.00 to facilitate the
filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to
petitioner the certificate of title of the land; and/or to
cancel the certificate of title in possession of private
83

respondent. However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did nothing upon
receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner. In
fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr.
Gazmin, Jr.s wrongdoing. Petitioner further alleged that
he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate
Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner categorically denied signing the
mortgage document and it was private respondent who
falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful
withholding of TCT No. N-173163 from petitioner. Thus,
petitioner prayed for:
1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated
August 2, 1997 as null and void;
2. As well as to order [herein private respondent] to
DELIVER the Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-173163 to [herein
petitioner];
3. Condemning [private respondent] to pay
[petitioner] the sums of
a) P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;
b) P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;
c) P50,000.00 as Attorneys fees and
d) Cost of suit.
4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just
and equitable under the premises.
Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,
26
on the other hand, is a
complaint for a sum of money with a motion for
issuance of a writ of attachment filed by private
respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before
RTC-Branch 84. Private respondent alleges that
petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of
P758,134.42 with a promise to pay on or before 30
August 1997. As security for payment of the loan,
petitioner executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
covering a parcel of land registered under TCT No.
N-173163. Petitioner pleaded for additional time to pay
the said obligation, to which respondent agreed. But
private respondent discovered sometime in February
1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss
alleging that he lost the owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said
affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on
file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private
respondent further alleges that she also discovered that
petitioner filed a petition for issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as LRC Case No.
Q-10052. Private respondent demanded that petitioner
pay his obligation, but the latter refused to do so.
Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the
following:
A. That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the
Affidavit of attachment and a preliminary hearing
thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of preliminary
attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering
the Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner] property
sufficient to answer [herein private respondents]
claim in this action;
B. That after due notice and hearing, judgment be
rendered in [private respondents] favor as against
[petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the former
the sum of P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5%
per month from September 1997 up to the date of
actual payment; actual damages in the sums of
P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the
complaint; P200,000.00 as moral damages;
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%)
of the principal claim as attorneys fees plus
P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and
P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this
Honorable Court.
[Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice
and equity.
As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No.
90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case
No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take
into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
27

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but
the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused.
28

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal
proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
29

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in
the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is
84

no necessity "that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case," therefore, the civil
case does not involve a prejudicial question.
30
Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other.
31

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in
the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case
pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of cases on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action are settled, the
second action should be stayed.
32

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the
power inherent in every court to control the disposition
of the cases on its dockets, considering its time and
effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if
proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious
litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between
litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or
not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case before it is submitted to its sound
discretion.
33

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the courts
discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on
review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. As
the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in
Landis v. North American Co., "the burden of making out
the justice and wisdom from the departure from the
beaten truck lay heavily on the petitioner, less an
unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome
of a controversy to which he is a stranger. It is, thus,
stated that only in rare circumstances will a litigant in
one case is compelled to stand aside, while a litigant in
another, settling the rule of law that will define the
rights of both is, after all, the parties before the court are
entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination of
their case undetermined by the pendency of the
proceedings in another case. After all, procedure was
created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice."
34

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings
may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question
rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues
raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of
the issues in the civil cases would also determine the
judgment in the criminal case.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that
Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch
77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before
RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of
whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real
estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT
No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No.
90721 before MeTC-Branch 43, involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury
in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request
for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can
proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the
outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the
innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case
for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his
execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing
whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No.
N-173163.
MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the
pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for cancellation
of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case
No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a sum of money before
RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury
in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-Branch 83, likewise,
did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners
motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 90721.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed
with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case
No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without
prejudice to the right of the accused to due process.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 159323 July 31, 2008
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. and ERIC
MONTINOLA, Petitioners,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. DEAN
CLIMACO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
WE are confronted with triple remedial issues on
prejudicial question, forum shopping, and litis
pendentia.
We review on certiorari the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) upholding the order of the Social Security
Commission (SSC),
2
denying petitioners motion to
dismiss respondent Climacos petition for compulsory
coverage with the Social Security System (SSS).
The Facts
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a
corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
softdrink beverages.
3
Co-petitioner Eric Montinola was
the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City.
4

Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer
physician at the companys plant in Bacolod City.
5

In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered
into a Retainer Agreement
6
for one year, with a monthly
compensation of P3,800.00,
7
where he "may charge
professional fees for hospital services rendered in line
with his specialization."
8
The agreement further
provided that "either party may terminate the contract
85

upon giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the other."
9

In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco
"agrees to perform the duties and obligations"
10

enumerated in the Comprehensive Medical Plan,
11

which was attached and made an integral part of the
agreement.
Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no
employee-employer relationship shall exist between the
company and Dr. Climaco while the contract is in
effect.
12
In case of its termination, Dr. Climaco "shall be
entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due him at
the time of termination."
13

Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company
physician, performing all the duties stipulated in the
Retainer Agreement and the Comprehensive Medical
Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased to P7,500.00 per
month.
14

Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the Department of
Labor and Employment and the SSS whether he was an
employee of the company. Both agencies replied in the
affirmative.
15
As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint
16

before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Bacolod City. In his complaint, he sought
recognition as a regular employee of the company and
demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living
allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
Christmas bonus and all other benefits.
17

During the pendency of the complaint, the company
terminated its Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco.
Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaint
18
for illegal
dismissal against the company before the NLRC Bacolod
City. He asked that he be reinstated to his former
position as company physician of its Bacolod Plant,
without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of
backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for payment of
damages.
19

The Labor Arbiter, in each of the complaints, ruled in
favor of petitioner company.
20
The first complaint was
dismissed after Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr.
found that the company did not have the power of
control over Dr. Climacos performance of his duties and
responsibilities. The validity of the Retainer Agreement
was also recognized. Labor Arbiter Benjamin Pelaez
likewise dismissed the second complaint in view of the
dismissal of the first complaint.1avvphi1
On appeal, the NLRC, Fourth Division, Cebu City,
affirmed the Arbiter disposition.
21
On petition for
review before the CA, the NLRC ruling was reversed.
22

The appellate court ruled that using the four-fold test,
an employer-employee relationship existed between the
company and Dr. Climaco. Petitioners elevated the case
through a petition for review on certiorari
23
before this
Court.
Meantime, on November 9, 1994, while the NLRC cases
were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC in Bacolod
City, a petition
24
praying, among others, that petitioner
Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him
for compulsory social security coverage.
On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal
of the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They
argued that there is no employer-employee relationship
between the company and Dr. Climaco; and that his
services were engaged by virtue of a Retainer
Agreement.
25

Dr. Climaco opposed the motion.
26
According to Dr.
Climaco, "[t]he fact that the petitioner [i.e., respondent
Dr. Climaco] does not enjoy the other benefits of the
company is a question that is being raised by the
petitioner in his cases filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City, against the
respondent [i.e., petitioner company]."
27

On July 24, 1995, the SSC issued an order stating among
others, that the resolution of petitioner companys
motion to dismiss is held in abeyance "pending
reception of evidence of the parties."
28

In view of the statements of Dr. Climaco in his
opposition to the companys motion to dismiss,
petitioners again, on March 1, 1996, moved for the
dismissal of Dr. Climacos complaint, this time on the
grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.
29

SSC and CA Dispositions
On January 17, 1997, the SSC denied petitioners motion
to dismiss, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
respondents Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied for
lack of merit.
Accordingly, let this case be remanded to SSS Bacolod
Branch Office for reception of evidence of the parties
pursuant to the Order dated July 24, 1995.
SO ORDERED.
30

Petitioners motion for reconsideration
31
received the
same fate.
32

On April 29, 1997, the company filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. On March 15, 2002, the CA
dismissed the petition, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, under the premises, the Court holds that
public respondent Social Security Commission did not
act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed orders, and the herein petition is therefore
DISMISSED for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.
33

Hence, the present recourse.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for Our
consideration:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTIONS, HAVING DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE PREVIOUS COMPLAINT FOR
REGULARIZATION AND/OR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL,
WHICH IS NOW PENDING RESOLUTION BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT, POSES A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION TO THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESENT
CASE.
II.
GIVEN THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES,
RESPONDENT CLIMACO IS GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING, WHICH THEREBY CALLED FOR THE
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF HIS PETITION BEFORE
THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION.
86

III.
THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE ALSO BEEN
DISMISSED OUTRIGHT ON THE GROUND OF LITIS
PENDENTIA, AS THERE ARE OTHER ACTIONS
PENDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE
SAME CAUSE OF ACTION.
34
(Underscoring
supplied)

Our Ruling
The petition fails.
The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition,
averred that the appeal from the NLRC and CA
dispositions on the illegal dismissal of respondent
Climaco is still pending with this Court. Upon
verification, however, it was unveiled that the said case
had already been decided by this Courts First Division
on February 5, 2007.
While we deplore the failure of petitioners and counsel
in updating the Court on the resolution of the said
related case, We hasten to state that it did not operate to
moot the issues pending before Us. We take this
opportunity to address the questions on prejudicial
question, forum shopping, and litis pendentia.
No prejudicial question exists.
Petitioners allege that Dr. Climaco previously filed
separate complaints before the NLRC seeking
recognition as a regular employee. Necessarily then, a
just resolution of these cases hinge on a determination
of whether or not Dr. Climaco is an employee of the
company.
35
The issue of whether Dr. Climaco is entitled
to employee benefits, as prayed for in the NLRC cases, is
closely intertwined with the issue of whether Dr.
Climaco is an employee of the company who is subject
to compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. Hence, they
argue, said regularization/illegal dismissal case is a
prejudicial question.
The argument is untenable.
Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted from
Spain, where civil cases are tried exclusively by civil
courts, while criminal cases are tried exclusively in
criminal courts. Each kind of court is jurisdictionally
distinct from and independent of the other. In the
Philippines, however, courts are invariably tribunals of
general jurisdiction. This means that courts here
exercise jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases.
Thus, it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well
as the civil case in which a prejudicial question may rise,
may be both pending in the same court. For this reason,
the elements of prejudicial question have been modified
in such a way that the phrase "pendency of the civil case
in a different tribunal" has been eliminated.
36

The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
37
It comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action both
pend and there exists in the former an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed. This is so because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
38

Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is
no pending criminal case.
39
The consolidated NLRC
cases cannot be considered as "previously instituted
civil action." In Berbari v. Concepcion,
40
it was held that a
prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which must precede the criminal action, that which
requires a decision with which said question is closely
related.
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question be
applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed by Dr.
Climaco with the SSC involves the question of whether
or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.),
Inc. and subject to the compulsory coverage of the Social
Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr.
Climaco before the NLRC involved different issues. In his
first complaint,
41
Dr. Climaco sought recognition as a
regular employee of the company and demanded
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas
bonus and all other benefits.
42
The second complaint
43

was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement
to his former position as company physician of the
companys Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority
rights, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid
benefits, and for payment of damages.
44
Thus, the issues
in the NLRC cases are not determinative of whether or
not the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the
question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be
determinative of the case before the court.
45

There is no forum shopping.
Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since the
issues before the NLRC and the SSC are the same, the
SSC cannot make a ruling on the issue presented before
it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue
before the NLRC. It was patently erroneous, if not
malicious, for Dr. Climaco to invoke the jurisdiction of
the SSC through a separate petition.
46
Thus, petitioners
contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty of forum shopping.
Again, We turn down the contention.
Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and
condemned as trifling with the courts and their
processes.
47
It is proscribed because it unnecessarily
burdens the courts with heavy caseloads. It also unduly
taxes the manpower and financial resources of the
judiciary. It mocks the judicial processes, thus, affecting
the efficient administration of justice.
48

The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against
forum shopping is the rendition by two (2) competent
tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory
decisions. Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a
variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their
luck in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached.
49

It is well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in
private international law on choice of venues, which
later developed to a choice of remedies. In First
Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,
50
the
Court had occasion to outline the origin of the rule on
forum shopping. Said the Court:
x x x forum shopping originated as a concept in private
international law, where non-resident litigants are given
the option to choose the forum or place wherein to
bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including
87

to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass
the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to
select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than
honorable excuses, the principle of forum non
conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts
of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum
and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.
x x x x
In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a
connotation encompassing not only a choice of venues,
as it was originally understood in conflicts of laws, but
also to a choice of remedies. As to the first (choice of
venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff
to commence personal actions "where the defendant or
any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec. 2[b]). As to
remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a
choice of pursuing civil liabilities independently of the
criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A passenger
of a public utility vehicle involved in a vehicular accident
may sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa
criminal each remedy being available independently of
the others although he cannot recover more than once.
"In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice
of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of his
action. This was the original concept of the term forum
shopping.
"Eventually, however, instead of actually making a
choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through
the encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in
all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies
simultaneously. This practice had not only resulted to
(sic) conflicting adjudications among different courts
and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly
administration of justice. It had created extreme
inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.
"Thus, forum-shopping had acquired a different
concept which is unethical professional legal practice.
And this necessitated or had given rise to the
formulation of rules and canons discouraging or
altogether prohibiting the practice."
What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and in
our domestic law as a legitimate device for solving
problems has been abused and misused to assure
scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.
51

Thus, in order to prevent forum shopping, the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure now provide:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The
plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
52

Forum shopping is not only strictly prohibited but also
condemned. So much so that "[f]ailure to comply with
the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the initiatory pleading but shall be cause
for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions."
53

There is forum shopping when one party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded
on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court.
54
In short, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other.
55

There is res judicata when (1) there is a final judgment
or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or
order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two
cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.
56

Measured by the foregoing yardstick, Dr. Climaco is not
guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that the parties
are identical in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs
sought and the causes of action are different.
Admittedly, Dr. Climacos basis in filing the cases before
the NLRC and the SSC is his Retainer Agreement with
the company. This does not mean, however, that his
causes of action are the same:
x x x Some authorities declare the distinction between
demands or rights of action which are single and entire
and those which are several and distinct to be that the
former arise out of one and the same act or contract and
the latter out of different acts or contracts. This rule has
been declared to be unsound, however, and as evidence
of its unsoundness, reference has been made to the fact
that several promissory notes may, and often do, grow
out of one and the same transaction, and yet they do not
constitute an entire demand. The better rule is that the
bare fact that different demands spring out of the same
or contract does not ipso facto render a judgment on
one a bar to a suit on another, however distinct. It is
clear that the right of a plaintiff to maintain separate
actions cannot be determined by the fact that the claims
might have been prosecuted in a single action. A plaintiff
having separate demands against a defendant may, at
his election, join them in the same action, or he may
prosecute them separately, subject of the power of the
court to order their consolidation. There may be only
one cause of action although the plaintiff is entitled to
several forms and kinds of relief, provided there is not
more than one primary right sought to be enforced or
one subject of controversy presented for adjudication.
57

(Underscoring supplied)
As the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different laws
88

are applicable to the cases before the two tribunals. The
Labor Code and pertinent social legislations would
govern the cases before the NLRC, while the Social
Security Law would govern the case before the SSC.
Clearly, as the issues pending before the NLRC and the
SSC are diverse, a ruling on the NLRC cases would not
amount to res judicata in the case before the SSC.
The elements of litis pendentia are absent.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the petition of Dr.
Climaco before the SSC is defective because there were
pending actions between the same parties and involving
the same issues in different fora.
58

For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of
the parties or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.
59

In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to
speak of. As previously explained, although the parties
in the cases before the NLRC and the SSC are similar, the
nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted, and reliefs
prayed for in each tribunal, are different.lawp++il
As a last attempt, however, petitioners invoke Rule 16,
Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioners contend that the petition Dr. Climaco lodged
with the SSC is "another action" prohibited by the
Rule.
60

In Solancio v. Ramos,
61
the issue centered on whether
the pending administrative case before the Bureau of
Lands is "another action," which would justify the
dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff against defendants
before the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of
Cagayan. Ruling in the negative, the Court noted that
"both parties as well as the trial court have missed the
extent or meaning of the ground of the motion to
dismiss as contemplated under the Rules of Court."
62
Mr.
Justice Regala, who wrote the opinion of the Court,
explained the phrase "another action" in this wise:
This is not what is contemplated under the law because
under Section 1(d), Rule 16 (formerly Rule 8) of the
Rules of Court, [now Rule 1, Section 16(e) of the Rules of
Court, supra] one of the grounds for the dismissal of an
action is that "there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause." Note that the Rule
uses the phrase "another action." This phrase should be
construed in line with Section 1 of Rule 2, which defines
the word action, thus
"Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by
which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. Every other remedy is a special proceeding."
63

Evidently, there is no "another action" pending between
petitioners and Dr. Climaco at the time when the latter
filed a petition before the SSC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009
JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos
City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL
MIRABUENO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status
quo order seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution
1

of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision
2

dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are
engaged in the real estate business through their
company Primetown Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real
properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In
consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued
several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated
checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and
Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by
the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the
remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank,
they were dishonored for the reason that the "Account is
Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno
and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good
the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay
the amounts represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil
action for collection of sum of money, damages and
attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.
3
On December 15,
1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a
similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
6238.
4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The
criminal complaints were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case
No. 35522-I.
5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions
to suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private
prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.
6

Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal
cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before
the RTC were finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders
7
dated June 21, 2000 and July 4,
2000, denied the motions for lack of merit. Petitioner
filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration
8
relative to
89

Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order
Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account
of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to
Criminal Case No. 35522-I.
9
The subsequent motions
were denied in the Order
10
dated October 18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with
a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
11
before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case
No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order
12
denying the petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
13

which was denied in an Order dated October 18, 2001.
14

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction,
15
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision
16

dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA opined
that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of the petitioner
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos.
6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved therein is
not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by
the petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants
therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the
sum or the value of the checks which they have
rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to
state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks
are two transactions, separate and distinct from each
other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is
not the sale that is in question, but rather the
rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's
contention that the main issue involved in said civil
cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow ground.
Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is
contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot
fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by
filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least
invoked or prayed in his answer that the sale be
declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases
Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the
issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom
that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
17

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
18
which
was denied in the Order
19
dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION
OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE
PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231)
THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE
THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR
STATUS QUO ORDER.
20

The main contention of the petitioner is that a
prejudicial question, as defined by law and
jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the
petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238
for collection of sum of money and damages were filed
ahead of the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the
issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to
collect from the petitioner despite the lack of
consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the
court rules that there is no valid consideration for the
check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it
necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically
requires, among other elements, that the check should
have been issued for account or for value. There must be
a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of the said
law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the
reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to
the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his
account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the
bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to
deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to
him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in
Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue
in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between
the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants
therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks.
These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of
Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to
private complainants. The checks were subsequently
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG
maintains that the resolution of such issue has
absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner
may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
21

The present case hinges on the determination of
whether there exists a prejudicial question that
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the
MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny
the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the former an issue that
must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
22

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or
the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised
90

in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely
exist, provided the other element or characteristic is
satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution
of the issues raised in the civil action would be
necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of
the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
23

Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
24

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner
is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it
is whether the private respondents are entitled to
collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the
checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is
no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is
declared not liable for the payment of the value of the
checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere
issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an
offense.
25

In Jose v. Suarez,
26
the prejudicial question under
determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5%
was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to
cover said interest were likewise void for being contra
bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no
longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that
"whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners
is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores
will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases
because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere
issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial
question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22
cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a
bouncing check has been issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,
27
that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is,
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as
an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check
issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to
be presented for payment - has the same effect as an
ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P.
Blg. 22.
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check -
whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence
of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or
the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly
erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities.
So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere
act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
28

Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul
29
is
misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint for
nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged
double sale. While the civil case was pending, an
information for estafa was filed against Ras (the
defendant in the civil case) arising from the same
alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint.
The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question
considering that the defense in the civil case was based
on the very same facts that would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the
determination of whether the petitioner is liable to pay
the private respondents the value of the checks and
damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the
petitioner because the material question in the criminal
cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks,
regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that
the determination of the issues involved in Civil Case
Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and
damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration
may be raised as a defense during the trial of the
criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a
partys defense and accusation, as well as the
admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence
brought before the court, are better ventilated during
trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to
ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to examine
and to put to test all their respective allegations and
evidence through a well designed machinery termed
"trial." Thus, all the defenses available to the accused
should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This
court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the
facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed
against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in
affirming the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision
dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated July 17,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
91

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the
reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision
1
in SCA No.
08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253
in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed the Orders
dated October 16, 2007
2
and March 12, 2008
3
in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President,
Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance
and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint
Affidavit dated October 5, 2004
4
for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent
Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal
information for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by
her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006
5
for
the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages. The case
was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and
docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC,
were issued in consideration of the construction
agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007
6
in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and
criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the
issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. In other
words, private respondent claimed that the civil case
posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition
to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on
Prejudicial Question
7
on the grounds that: (1) there is
no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of
the contract upon which the bouncing checks were
issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of
whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2)
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one
of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is
missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded
the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007,
granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings, and
reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract
and the nullification of the checks issued as the same are
without consideration, then the instant criminal cases
for alleged violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The
belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did
not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a
motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed
at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule
111, Revised Rules of Court).
8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,
9
the MTC denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a
Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC issued
the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the
petition. On the issue of the existence of a prejudicial
question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of
a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to
obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any
intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The
criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when
the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil
action was filed after the criminal action was instituted
does not render the issues in the civil action any less
prejudicial in character.
10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE
NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO.
LP-06-0197.
11

The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 17,
1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial
question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases
12
that the
elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in the
above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,
13
are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal
92

Procedure, however, became effective and the above
provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which
applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for
a civil case to create a prejudicial question and, thus,
suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that
the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the
criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to
guard against the situation wherein a party would
belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending
criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the
latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which
the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not
be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed"
must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question
exists when the civil action is filed either before the
institution of the criminal action or during the pendency
of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes
that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the
Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter
considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of
the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction
that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change
the meaning of the provision from that it originally
had."
14
In the instant case, the phrase, "previously
instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil
action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to
the criminal action. This interpretation is further
buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly
before the term criminal action. There is no other logical
explanation for the amendments except to qualify the
relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the
civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena
15
that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and
resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their omnibus
motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending
final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements
of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is
understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil
Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction
that "a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system."
16
This principle is
consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare
leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.
17
1 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize
seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made
to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of
law. The phrase "previously instituted civil action" in
Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause
"before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however,
be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the
court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil
Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but
also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the situations when the motion to suspend
the criminal action during the preliminary investigation
or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based
upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the
court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is
this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that
93

should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant
provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in
the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action
and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal
proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial
question were a mere afterthought and instituted to
delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,
18
we found no prejudicial
question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a
criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case,
we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case
clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a ploy
to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner
filed the civil case three years after the institution of the
criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the
proceedings in the criminal cases.
19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the
institution of the criminal complaint and from the time
that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that
the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2
) years from the time that private respondent
allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building
for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case
praying for the rescission of the construction agreement
for lack of consideration was filed more than three (3)
years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show
that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought
on the part of private respondent and interposed for
delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this
scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions
cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted
prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial
question to speak of that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question
under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are: (1)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a
prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of
the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot
apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the
construction agreement between the parties is declared
null and void for want of consideration, the checks
issued in consideration of such contract would become
mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a
criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime
punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or
agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that
the checks were issued for valuable consideration does
not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court
has held in a long line of cases
21
that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In
Mejia v. People,
22
we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense
charge is the issuance of a bad check. The purpose for
which the check was issued, the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance, or any agreement surrounding
such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for
which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks
as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in
banking communities. The clear intention of the framers
of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
23
is even more poignant. In that
case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were
later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial
to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to
wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on
account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon
issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for
valuable consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn,
may consist either in some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or
some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered
or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do,
or not to do in favor of the party who makes the
contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed
several checks in blank, the subject check included, in
exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans
that will be made from said account. This is a valuable
consideration for which the check was issued. That
there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an
obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the
subject check was given by Bautista to private
complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no
longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July
94

1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed,
petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed
his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is
the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because the
thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless
checks and putting them into circulation.
24
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares
that the construction agreement between the parties is
void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case.
The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed
issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for
insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required
for the existence of a prejudicial question, that the
resolution of the issue in the civil action would
determine whether the criminal action may proceed, is
absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case
before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008 Decision
in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias
City and the Orders dated October 16, 2007 and March
12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC,
Branch 79 in Las Pias City. We order the MTC to
continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the
Decision
2
of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20
March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y
Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner),
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to
appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion
to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide,
the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the
RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May
2005
3
holding that the pendency of the case before the
RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC
Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent
and whether the case could be tried even if the validity
of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question.
The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion
to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the
Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit,
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
August 2005 Order,
5
the RTC Quezon City denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing
the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC
Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that
in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether the offender commenced the commission of the
crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil
action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled
that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at
the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is
still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court
assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of
the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
95

Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
6
provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted
first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case,
the Information
7
for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25
October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No.
04-7392 on 7 February 2005.
8
Respondents petition
9
in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and
was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a
prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
10
A
prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.
11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is
a key element in the crime of parricide,
12
which
punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."
13
The
relationship between the offender and the victim
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder
14
or
homicide.
15
However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
16
At
the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v.
Court of Appeals
17
that "the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect
of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was
no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."
18

In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned."
19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision
of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents,
ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre
Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590,
96

dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same
pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as
follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents,
sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan
City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a
result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per
month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion
and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to
allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had
later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause
of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be
untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa
mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that
annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator
Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and
unborn children may be accepted by those
persons who would legally represent them if
they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one,
some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;
but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die
before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of
'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article
291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that
the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not
a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child;
for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become
entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his
Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29
of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son
simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido
tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura
juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los
propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las
condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos
(que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata
de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from
is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint
in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the
damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the
same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21,
26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child
she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the
order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and
set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
97

(NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
1

dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution
2
dated 9
May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution
3
dated 20 November
2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement
leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a
member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in
the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and
the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
x x x x
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company
agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any
employee in case of death of the employees legitimate
dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
x x x x
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
x x x x
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe
Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to
the employee or his family in the following manner:
x x x x
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the
employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and
children). In case the employee is single, this benefit
covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only
with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death
certificate).
4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn
child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in
the 38th week of pregnancy.
5
According to the
Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia
secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting
of the death and accident insurance.
7

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of
Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences
held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,
8

prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region (NCR).
9
In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and
Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration
the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.
10
The parties
mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.
11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in
amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers,
12
Replies,
13
and
Rejoinders
14
to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not
specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be
covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited
cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation
(MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer
Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L.
Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife
also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already
died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive
paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and
Mayer Steel.
15
Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the
womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos
child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and
only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their
respective employees unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the
existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code,
which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety
of and decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for
the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and
(2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on
Articles 40, 41 and 42
16
of the Civil Code, contended that
only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at
98

all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it
ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the
CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the
parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally
accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically
accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to
have unborn child included in the definition of
dependent, as used in the CBA the death of whom
would have qualified the parent-employee for
bereavement leave and other death benefits bound the
Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter
term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases
involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK
Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were
irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate
and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither
could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of
bereavement leave and other death benefits to the
parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child
constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution
17

ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave
with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to
said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the
benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered
employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the
parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employees "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must
be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for
death and accident insurance as provided under Article
XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four
(4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is
"death"; (b) such death must be of employees
"dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate";
and (d) proper legal document to be presented.
18

Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the
death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred.
The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus
had to rely on another for support; he/she could not
have existed or sustained himself/herself without the
power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her
mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There
was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is
hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the
amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave
pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or
a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide
with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
19
under
Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in
granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with
pay and other death benefits because no death of an
employees dependent had occurred. The death of a
fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded
from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal
person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire
any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out
that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the
term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate
dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could
only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise,
no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions
sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February
2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death
to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the
legal sense in which the term "death" is used in the CBA
fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of
bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is
intended to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil
personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being
born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA
provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief
to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has
proposed a narrow and technical significance to the
term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for
granting bereavement leave and death benefits under
the CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there
can be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court,
however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply
cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of
human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant
to assuage the employee and the latters immediate
family, extend to them solace and support, rather than
an act conferring legal status or personality upon the
unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the
certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only
sadly misses this crucial point.
20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision
of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition
99

is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental
Steel].
21

In a Resolution
22
dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration
23
of Continental
Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel
persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of
death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a
juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for
bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e.,
parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee;
and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident
insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent,
who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion
of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are
clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for
denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and
other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper
interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as
used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed
clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort
to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death
benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein.
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code, the very first of the general provisions on
civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn
child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity
to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights
or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents.
The rights to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not
provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of
life.
24
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception,
25
that the State must protect
equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for
support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without
the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,
26
even an unborn child is a dependent of its
parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it
is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a
single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification
for the child dependent, such that the child must have
been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then
child shall be understood in its more general sense,
which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent
childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,
27
we have expounded on who is a legitimate
child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies
a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family
Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,
28
we identified an
illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family
Code. Now, there are only two classes of children --
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have
the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the
afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the
present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his
wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said
child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
100

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to
comply with the fourth element entitling him to death
and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation
of the death certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillanos claims for the same should have been
granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death
benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from
the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery,
is any less than that of parents whose child was born
alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in
favor of labor.
29
In the same way, the CBA and CBA
provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In
Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,
30
we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the
Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces
are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor
of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts
in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved
in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is
the amended CBA which is essentially a contract
between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight
of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to
labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC
[183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be
weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation
v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be
resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated
9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November
2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano
bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the
death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.