[G.R. No. 118691.

July 5, 1996]
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, and ALBERTO MAGDATO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul the Order of 18 October 1994
[1]
of the
respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 2708, a
petition for relief from judgment.
[2]
The Order set aside the final and partly executed judgment
[3]
of the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, in an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 262,
[4]
and
remanded the case to the MCTC for proper disposition.
The antecedent facts are not disputed:
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog (hereinafter, BAYOG) and private respondent Alberto Magdato
(hereinafter, MAGDATO) entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot with an area of 0.8 hectares located in
Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique,
[5]
with BAYOG as the LANDOWNER-LESSOR and MAGDATO as TENANT-
LESSEE. The contract commenced with crop year 1975-1976 and expressly provided that matters not therein stipulated
would be governed by the provisions of R.A. No. 3344, as amended.
On 19 April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 3844, and P.D. No. 1425,
issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold
[6]
to MAGDATO, declaring that the latter had complied with all the
requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land cultivated by him and owned by BAYOG located in Centro
Pojo, Bugasong, Antique. The certificate enumerated the following rights of MAGDATO, inter alia:
1. He shall not be ejected, dispossessed, excluded, removed or ousted from his farmholding by any landowner,
agricultural lessor or anybody except when his disposition has been authorized by the proper court;
2. He shall have the right to peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of his farmholding;
3. He shall have the right against conversion of the farmholding into . . . any non-agricultural use or to the
production of any other crop by the landowner . . . or anybody acting for and in his behalf, without prior
approval of the proper authorities and payment of disturbance compensation. . . .
On 3 September 1990, BAYOG, in consideration of P250,000.00, executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage,
with right of redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. The document covered four parcels of
unregistered riceland in Bugasong, Antique, with a total area of 30,187 square meters.
[7]

In a letter dated 19 October 1992, BAYOG asked MAGDATO to remove his (MAGDATO's) house from BAYOG's
land. BAYOG explained that the house was an obstacle to the cultivation of the land by Jorge Pesayco, Jr., the brother
and civil law lessee of Santiago Pesayco.
[8]

As MAGDATO did not comply, BAYOG and Jorge Pesayco, Jr. filed with the Third MCTC of Patnongon-Bugasong-
Valderama, Antique, a complaint, dated 26 November 1992, for "Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for
Demolition," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 262.
[9]

In its Order of 15 December 1992, the MCTC declared that the case fell under the Rule on Summary Procedure and
directed the issuance of summons which, together with complaint, was served on MAGDATO on 11 January 1993.
[10]

MAGDATO had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22 January 1993) to file his Answer,
[11]
but he filed it
only on 25 January 1993. In his Answer, MAGDATO admitted BAYOG's ownership of the lot, but asserted that he was in
actual possession thereof as BAYOG's agricultural lessee as evidenced by the Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed
on 17 June 1975. As defenses, MAGDATO alleged that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, it being an agrarian
dispute; and that he had not been able to cultivate the land because plaintiff Jorge Pesayco, Jr. threatened to shoot
anyone who would work on it.
[12]

On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order
[13]
holding that since MAGDATO's Answer was filed outside the
reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg.
129. It then considered "needless" for the court to resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then
claiming authority under Section 5
[14]
of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiffs BAYOG and Pesayco, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant, as follows:
1. Ejecting defendant from the parcel of land plaintiff Alejandro Bayog described in paragraph 2 of this
complaint and ordering defendant to remove his house therefrom before judgment becomes final and
executory;
2. Ordering the Provincial Sheriff, or his defendant, to demolish and destroy defendant's house on the above-
mentioned land of plaintiff Alejandro Bayog, in case defendant should fail to remove the same therefrom
before judgment against him becomes final and executory; and
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the sum of P1,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and
by way of actual litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.
[15]

MAGDATO's counsel, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, received a copy of the Order on 11 October 1993.
[16]

On 16 December 1993, the MCTC issued an Order of Execution
[17]
commanding the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy
to eject MAGDATO, his "attorney-in-fact, agent, or any other person acting on his behalf" from the parcel of land in
question and to "demolish and destroy" MAGDATO's house standing thereon "should he fail to remove it before the
judgment against him becomes final."
The Sheriff's Return of Service
[18]
dated 26 January 1994 reported that the order was personally served on
MAGDATO on 24 January 1994, and upon MAGDATO's receipt thereof, "he and any other person acting under his . . .
authority were ejected from the parcel of land . . . and his house was demolished and destroyed." However, "there was no
monetary satisfaction of the judgment since [MAGDATO] refused to give the amount and he has no real/personal
properties [sic] that can be levied on execution."
On 9 February 1994, MAGDATO filed a petition for relief from judgment with injunction and prayer to litigate as a
pauper with the RTC of San Jose, Antique, Branch 12 (Civil Case No. 2708). MAGDATO alleged therein that the late
filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for at the time he received summons, he was stricken with
pulmonary tuberculosis which restricted his mobility and sound judgment. Further, his illiteracy limited his understanding
of the English language, hence, he was unaware of the "unextendible" 10-day period, and by the time he consulted a
lawyer in San Jose, Antique, said period had already lapsed. In fact, it was only when his house was demolished in the
latter part of January 1994, that he learned of the judgment rendered against him.
MAGDATO further asserted that he had good, valid, and strong evidence to counteract BAYOG's claim, and if given
a chance to be heard, would prove that he was a duly instituted tenant of BAYOG, as evidenced by copies of the
Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold. More importantly, this tenancy relationship
had never been terminated for cause. Finally, he contended that as the MCTC judgment had already been partly
executed, he was bereft of other avenues, to protect his rights. He thus prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent disturbance of his possession; that he be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis, as he owned no real property as
attested to by a certification from the Office of the Municipal Assessor;
[19]
and that the MCTC judgment in Civil Case No.
262 be set aside and a new trial ordered.
[20]

On 19 May 1994, BAYOG filed a Motion to Dismiss
[21]
Civil Case No. 2708 on grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC; (b) failure of the petition to state a cause of action; and (c) prescription and/or laches.
As to the first, BAYOG asserted that a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under Section 19(d)
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Moreover, the petition was not accompanied by the affidavit of merit
required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Anent the second, BAYOG maintained that the petition did not contain a statement of facts constituting fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. In any event, the cause of action was mooted by the partial execution of the
MCTC judgment, for it was settled that relief from judgment was not available where the judgment had already been
executed, without, however, prejudice on the part of the aggrieved party to sue to recover the property.
[22]

Finally, BAYOG contended that Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court required that petitions for relief from
judgment be "filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment . . . to be set aside, and not more than
six (6) months after such judgment . . . was entered. . . ." Considering that MAGDATO learned of the MCTC judgment
through his lawyer on 11 October 1993 when the latter received a copy thereof, the 60-day period expired on 12
December 1993. Since the petition for relief was filed only on 9 February 1994, it was then filed out of time.
On 22 June 1994, MAGDATO filed an Opposition
[23]
to the Motion to Dismiss, to which BAYOG filed a Reply
[24]
on 7
July 1994.
On 16 September 1994, BAYOG filed another Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 on the ground that the petition
for relief from judgment was not accompanied by a sworn certification against forum-shopping as required by
Administrative Circular No. 9-94 of this Court.
[25]
MAGDATO filed his Comment
[26]
thereto on 3 October 1994, while
BAYOG filed a Reply
[27]
to the Comment on 10 October 1994.
In its Order
[28]
of 18 October 1994, the RTC denied BAYOG's first and second motions to dismiss and ruled as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Civil Case No. 262 rendered by Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong and Valderama is set aside and let this case be remanded back to that court for
proper disposal.
The grounds relied upon for the denial were: (1) that the petition for relief from judgment is not a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure since the latter does not apply to Regional Trial Courts, per the ruling in Jakihaca
vs. Aquino;
[29]
(2) the petition states a cause of action as MAGDATO, as shown in Annex "B" of the petition, is a tenant
farmer who is entitled to protection against ejectment; (3) the issue of prescription must yield to the fact that MAGDATO is
a tenant farmer, or his ejectment by the MCTC was a violation of the law; (4) BAYOG and Pesayco did not come to court
with clean hands as they did not reveal the fact that MAGDATO is a holder of a certificate of agricultural leasehold; (5) the
MCTC should not have disregarded MAGDATO's answer filed therein which showed that the MCTC had no jurisdiction
over the case; and (6) Administrative Circular No. 04-94 took effect only on 1 April 1994, or before the filing of the petition
for relief from judgment, hence, it could not be given retroactive effect.
BAYOG's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
[30]
was denied on 12 December 1994.
[31]

Hence, BAYOG and Pesayco (hereinafter, Petitioners) filed this petition for certiorari and ask us to set aside the
above order. They reiterate their arguments regarding the prohibition against petitions for relief from judgment; maintain
that Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
allege that since MAGDATO's Answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time, it should be deemed not to have been
filed at all, in light of Lesaca vs. Court of Appeals;
[32]
assert that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition for relief from
judgment since the decision challenged therein was already final and executory; and characterize the Order in question as
void as it directs the conduct of a new trial, contrary to Section 19(c) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
As to the petition for relief from judgment itself, the petitioners assert that it was fatally defective for it was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit; it was filed out time; its subject matter had become moot and academic; and it is not
the proper remedy pursuant to Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca,
[33]
where this Court held that the proper remedy was
an action to annul the judgment and enjoin its enforcement, if not yet carried into effect; or an action to recover the
property if the judgment had already been executed and the property of the aggrieved party disposed of.
We required the respondents to Comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order.
In his Comment, MAGDATO admits that his answer in Civil Case No. 262 was filed out of time; however, he insists
that the MCTC should not have disregarded it as it alleged the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties,
thereby bringing the case beyond its jurisdiction, and within that of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
As to the affidavit of merit, MAGDATO countered that "the affidavit of merit may be set forth in the petition itself and
need not be in a separate document (Consul vs. Consul, L-22713, July 26, 1966)," if the "facts constituting petitioner's
substantial cause of action or defense . . . are alleged in the verified petition for the oath elevated the petition to the same
category as a separate affidavit (Fabar, Inc. vs. Rodelas, L-46394, Oct. 24, 1977)."
In their Reply to the Comment, the petitioners contend that while MAGDATO used to be a tenant-lessee on another
parcel of land of petitioner BAYOG, this ceased when MAGDATO sold his tenancy rights, without BAYOG's prior
knowledge or consent, to Federico Valdevieso, Sr. under a Deed of Mortgage of Tenancy Rights dated 31 August
1987. Valdevieso then tilled the land and delivered to petitioner BAYOG the latter's share of the harvest, as evidenced by
the receipts of 5 December 1987, 10 April 1988, and 15 August 1988.
[34]
Then, in September 1989, Valdevieso, with
petitioner BAYOG's consent, sold his tenancy rights to Jose Bayog, as evidenced by the 3 May 1994 affidavit of Arturo P.
Valdevieso, Federico's son.
[35]
The petitioners then argue, citing Yabut vs. Lillies,
[36]
that the above Deed of Mortgage
"amounted to [MAGDATO's] declaration against his interest and an express waiver of his tenancy rights" resulting in the
extinguishment of the tenant-lessor relationship between them.
We gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with.
It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15 November 1991, the
MCTC Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15 December 1992 order. While it may be true
that this did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules
and circulars adopted by this Court which affect the conduct of cases before them.
Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No.
262 since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian relationship between him and
MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer
asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG
and MAGDATO, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued in MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se, did not automatically
divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case,
[37]
nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the MCTC
should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed
jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[38]
Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the
MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
[39]

The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely, on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of simply adopting a strange
theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of
B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the
answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed after
the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of
default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that MAGDATO's defense of lack of
jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under paragraph (a) of Section 19 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare defendant in default;
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(j) Reply;
(k) Third Party complaints;
(l) Interventions. (Italics supplied)
Worse, in its Order of 20 September 1993, the MCTC ordered MAGDATO "to remove his house . . . before judgment
becomes final and executory," and the Provincial Sheriff to demolish and destroy [MAGDATO'S] house on the . . . land of
[BAYOG] in case [MAGDATO] should fail to remove the same . . . before judgment against him becomes final and
executory."
[40]
This was clearly in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 21 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Such orders of "removal" and "demolition" before the judgment becomes final and
executory were obviously intended to render futile any appeal which MAGDATO could interpose therefrom pursuant to
Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Compounding this palpably oppressive and capricious Order, the MCTC, in its Order of Execution
[41]
of 16 December
1993, directed the Provincial Sheriff "to demolish and destroy defendant's [MAGDATO's] home standing in the above-
described parcel of land in case defendant should fail to remove the same therefrom before judgment against him
becomes final and executory." And, in strict obedience to this said order, Sheriff IV Amando S. Lapos, acting for the Ex-
OfficioProvincial Sheriff, accompanied by Edgar Tondares (Sheriff IV), the Barangay Captain of Centro Pojo, members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Bugasong, Antique, as security escorts, and BAYOG himself, served on
MAGDATO the order of execution on 24 January 1994 and forthwith ejected MAGDATO from the land in question
and demolished and destroyed MAGDATO's house.
[42]

This was a clear abuse of authority or misuse of the strong arm of the law. No demolition of MAGDATO's house
could have been validly effected on the day of service of the order of execution. MAGDATO should have been afforded a
reasonable period of time to remove his house, and only after he failed to comply within the given period could a
demolition order have been issued by the court, pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
[43]

We now turn to the acts of the RTC.
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca
[44]
ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment
[45]
of a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court,
[46]
it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions
for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court,
respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38
and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a
special civil action ofcertiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of this case, unless some form of relief is made
available to MAGDATO, the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no fault or negligence on his
part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or treated, pro hac
vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of
the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held that the circumstances alleged therein and the
justification pleaded worked in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708 was without
merit. And contrary to the petitioners' contention, the petition for relief from judgment was filed within the period fixed in
Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. Time for filing of petition contents and verification. A petition for in either of the preceding sections of this rule
must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and
must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
While the MCTC Order of 20 September 1993 was received by MAGDATO's lawyer, Atty. Marcelo C. Josue, on 11
October 1993, the latter, however, did not inform nor notify MAGDATO about it; worse, the said lawyer took no action
whatever after he received a copy of BAYOG's motion for execution on 22 November 1993. MAGDATO learned of the
Order of 20 September 1993 only on 24 January 1994, when he was served with a copy of the Order of
Execution.
[47]
MAGDATO filed the petition for relief from judgment on 9 February 1994, or FIFTEEN days from the time he
learned of the judgment. BAYOG's insistence then that the period must be reckoned from Atty. Josue's receipt of the
Order on 11 October 1993 deserves scant consideration. Under what we considered above as the unusual and peculiar
circumstances in this case, we cannot consider as notice to MAGDATO of the 20 September 1993 Order the notice to his
lawyer, who to us appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible. So we did in People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation vs. Tiongco,
[48]
where we declared:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such
doctrine has beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should
be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise, in the court's desire to make a short
cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would
then be easy for one lawyer to sell one's rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the
court affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
In any event, the 60-day period in this case can, with equal force and effect, be reckoned from MAGDATO's receipt
of the Order of Execution on 24 January 1994 and the petition may then be treated as a petition for relief from the said
order. Tiongco is likewise authority therefor, to wit:
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment under consideration, may even be considered as one for relief from the
order of execution, which was filed within the reglementary period, inasmuch as Section 2 of Rule 38, Revised Rules,
does not only refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other proceedings.
[49]

Furthermore, as regards the mandatory second period of six months, the least that can be said is that it had not even
begun to run as the records do not disclose that the Order of 20 September 1993, which is the chal lenged "decision," had
been entered. On this score, Section 3 of Rule 38 speaks of entry of the judgment or order, not its rendition nor finality,
thus the 6-month period must be reckoned from the entry. On this matter, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his
Remedial Law Compendium,
[50]
states:
The 6-months period is computed from the date of actual entry of the order or judgment as this is defined in Sec. 2, Rule
36, that is, from the recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments and not from the date of the
order of default or the rendition of the judgment or the finality of the judgment. With respect to the "proceedings" in Courts
of First Instance which can be subject of petitions for relief, supra, the date when the proceedings were taken control
(Dirige vs. Biranya, L-22033, July 30, 1966, reviewing all previous decisions and expressly repealing all contrary
doctrine). Also, in judgments upon compromise, being immediately executory, prescription runs from the date of its
rendition, hence the 6-months period also runs therefrom (Bodiongan vs. Ceniza, et al., O.G. 8058; Dirige vs.
Biranya, supra).
We likewise agree with the RTC that the absence of an affidavit of merit was not fatal since the petition itself, which is
under oath, recites the circumstances or facts which constitute the grounds for the petition. Such being the case, a
separate affidavit reiterating the grounds already laid bare in the petition would be superfluous. Elsewise stated, the
absence of the affidavit is of de minimis importance, as the oath elevates the petition to the same category as the
affidavit.
[51]

In the alternative, the petition for relief from judgment may properly be considered as MAGDATO's appeal from the
order (decision) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993, or an action to annul the said order. It is a settled rule that a final
and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways, viz., (1) by a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38; (2)
when the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, by direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack; and (3) when the
judgment was obtained by fraud and Rule 38 cannot be applied, by civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code.
[52]
The
fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. In the instant case, the unconscionable failure of MAGDATO's lawyer to inform
MAGDATO of his receipt of the Order of 20 September 1993 and the motion for execution, and to take the appropriate
action against either or both to protect MAGDATO's rights amounted to connivance with the prevailing party for
MAGDATO's defeat, which constituted extrinsic fraud.
[53]

The RTC cannot then be faulted for taking cognizance of the case. However, it acted with rather undue haste when,
in its Order of 18 October 1994 denying BAYOG's first and second motions to dismiss, it forthwith "set aside" the 20
September 1993 Order of the MCTC and "remanded the case to [the latter] for proper disposal." What it should have done
was simply deny the motions to dismiss, in light of Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which provides that if a motion
to dismiss is denied or if determination is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule
11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
The petitioners do not, however, question the RTC's error on this point. If we would then annul that portion of the
challenged order setting aside the MCTC's Order of 20 September 1993 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, then the petitioners herein would be allowed to file their Answer in Civil Case No. 2708. Thereafter, the RTC
would hold a pre-trial conference and trial on the merits. These would merely unduly delay the resolution of an otherwise
uncomplicated issue. Then, if respondent Judge Natino reaches the same conclusion and renders the same resolution as
that of his challenged Order of 18 October 1994, the case would have to be remanded to the MCTC for proper "disposal."
However, the pleadings filed in this case and the annexes thereto inexorably firm up the issue of jurisdiction of the MCTC
over the ejectment case. We have for MAGDATO, copies of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract between him and
BAYOG and Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued by then President Marcos; and for BAYOG, the Deed of
Mortgage of Tenancy Rights executed by MAGDATO and his wife in favor of Federico Valdevieso, the affidavit of Arturo
Valdevieso of 3 May 1994 to the effect that after the execution of the mortgage, his father Federico and the immediate
members of his family possessed its subject property and paid the rentals to BAYOG, and the so-called receipts issued by
the latter for the said rentals.
In short, there is nothing more the parties can offer on the issue of the jurisdiction of the MCTC. There is then
absolutely no acceptable reason to await the end of the tedious procedural rituals above indicated since that issue can
now be resolved in view of the foregoing considerations. It serves no useful purpose to withhold our verdict and remand
this case to the MCTC, only for it to order the dismissal of the ejectment case. The resultant further delay which may
accompany a likely appeal therefrom by BAYOG and Pesayco must be forestalled to serve the ends of justice.
[54]
Plainly,
the greater interest of justice, especially to MAGDATO, whose rights as an agricultural leaseholder were trampled upon,
demands that we dispose of the issue of the MCTC's jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
[55]

Accordingly, we adopt that portion of the challenged Order of 18 October 1994 of respondent Judge Natino in Civil
Case No. 2708 setting aside the order (judgment) of the MCTC of 20 September 1993 in Civil Case No. 262, consider
Civil Case No. 2708 closed and terminated, and declare the Third MCTC of Antique without jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 262.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit. That part of the
dispositive portion of the Order of 18 October 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 12, in Civil Case No.
2708 setting aside the Order of 20 September 1993 of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Patnongon-Bugasong-
Valderama, Antique, in Civil Case No. 262 is AFFIRMED, and the Order of Execution of 16 December 1993 in Civil Case
No. 262 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the said case is ordered DISMISSED.
Furthermore, Honorable Judge DEOGRACIAS K. DEL ROSARIO of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique, and Atty. MARCELO C. JOSUE are directed TO SHOW CAUSE, within ten
(10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with for gross ignorance of law
and violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished Judge Deogracias K. del Rosario and Atty. Marcelo C. Josue.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997]
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, petitioners, vs. HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR., Presiding Judge,
Branch XXIV, RTC, Iloilo City; HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA, Presiding Judge, Branch I, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Iloilo City; and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact, ROSALIE
GUEVARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an answer filed out of time
due to alleged oversight?
This is the main legal question raised in this petition for review assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 24,
[1]
which dismissed a special civil action for certiorari and injunction filed by herein petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the assailed RTC Decision reads:
[2]

WHEREFORE premises considered, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is denied and, with
respect to the merits, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed.
Double costs against petitioners.
Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as found by the Regional Trial Court are undisputed and admitted as correct by
the parties. A complaint for forcible entry
[3]
was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara
and Petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City.
Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the
reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire
jurisdiction over him. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file
an answer.
[4]
On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
[5]
On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the
summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer,
[6]
which was attached
thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. On
September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution.
[7]
On October 27,
1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[8]
Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the
MTCC
[9]
issued a decision
[10]
resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
Instead of filing an appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City,
[11]
Branch 24, praying mainly that the MTCC be ordered to admit the amended answer and to conduct
further proceedings in the civil case for forcible entry. As prayed for, a temporary restraining order was issued by the
RTC.
Thereafter, the RTC issued the assailed Decision
[12]
dismissing the petition. Respondent Judge Norberto E. Devera,
Jr., ratiocinated:
[13]

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides, among
others, as follows:
Sec. 36 - Summary Procedures in Special Cases x x x The Supreme Court shall adopt special rules or
procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an expeditions (sic) and inexpensive determination thereof
without regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that affidavits and counter-affidavits may be
admitted in lieu of oral testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-extendible.
Pursuant to the aforequoted legislative mandate, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure, the
pertinent provisions of which, as related to the issues raised in this case, are hereunder set forth -
II - Civil Cases
Section 3 - Pleadings
A. (P)leadings allowed - The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints, compulsory counter-claims and cross-
claims pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5 Answer - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and
serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of Failure to answer - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing should underscore quite clearly the reality that the ten-day-period to file an answer reckoned from the date
of the receipt of the summons is mandatory and no reason of any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse. The rule is
explicit. It is addressed more, being one of procedure, to counsels than to litigants. Counsels, therefore cannot assert the
validity of their clients cause to evade the mandate of the law.
Accordingly, the Court cannot fault the respondent judge [referring to Judge Jose R. Astorga] in acting the way he did in
Civil Case No. 130 (93) taking into account the admitted facts and circumstances.
Hence, this petition directly filed before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners submit for resolution the following questions of law:
[14]

I. Are the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied
STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.
II. What is the legal effect of a belated answer under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Petitioners argue that the technical rules of procedure must yield to the higher interest of justice. Petitioners explain
that they filed the motion for extension of time to file an answer, a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary
Procedure, because of oversight. That was why immediately upon receipt of the denial of that motion, petitioners filed
their motion to admit answer which was later verified and had to be amended. All these (actions) were done in a period of
five (5) days from the lapse of the reglementary period to file an answer.
[15]
Furthermore, petitioners contend that no
prejudice to private respondent has been claimed or alleged by reason of the delay in filing an answer.
[16]
Petitioners also
argue that their defense in the action for forcible entry is based on substantial grounds, because they were in prior
physical possession of the premises subject of the action and that their houses have long been standing on the land in
question because the land on which said houses are standing are (sic) the common properties of the parties.
Citing Section 2, Rule 1
[17]
of the Rules of Court, petitioners pray that the provisions in the Rule on Summary
Procedure regarding prohibited pleadings and the period for filing an answer be given liberal interpretation. Petitioners
concede that said provisions appear to be couched in mandatory language. They contend, however, that other similarly
worded provisions in the Rules of Court have nonetheless been liberally applied by this Court to promote substantial
justice.
[18]

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that the provisions in question have to be strictly construed in order to
avoid delay, considering that the Rule on Summary Procedure is aimed at inexpensive, expeditious and summary
determination of cases.
[19]
Private respondent adds that the petition can also be dismissed on the ground of violation of
Revised Circular 28-91 on forum shopping, because three (3) months after the rendition of the assailed Decision, a
petition for quieting of title and partition, and damages, involving the same parcel of residential land (Cadastral Lot No.
709 x x x ), was filed xxx docketed as Civil Case No. 21618, by (Petitioner) Victoria Guevara-Gachon (x x x), Patricio
Guevara (father of Petitioner Alex Guevara), Lilia Guevara-Doreza and Fe Guevara-Burgos against herein private
respondent. Private respondent contends that the subsequent case is the appropriate forum where ownership of the
property in question may be threshed out.
[20]

As observed at the outset, the issue to be resolved is whether, under the undisputed facts of this case, the Rule on
Summary Procedure may be liberally construed in order to allow the admission of petitioners answer which
unquestionably was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Preliminary Matter
It bears noting that petitioners filed directly before this Court a petition for review assailing the RTC Decision. This
remedy is allowed under paragraph 2 of Circular 2-90
[21]
which provides:
Section 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. -- Except in criminal cases where the penalty
imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme
Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
[22]
this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that
(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
Petitioners ask the Court to interpret a provision of the Rule on Summary Procedure. This is a pure question of law
that may be properly raised in this petition for review.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: Interpretation of the Period
The pertinent provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure are as follows:
Section 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint
and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff x x x
Section 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the Court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shallrender judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Section 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper.
x x x x x x x x x
(Underscoring supplied.)
The word shall ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory character of a statute.
[23]
This,
however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration
of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the
other.
[24]

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings
taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
[25]

The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases.
[26]
For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of
motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure
shall be non-extendible.
[27]

Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,
[28]
and this rule should equally
apply with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the
mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature
of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late
answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to
redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
Other than a plea for the liberal interpretation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, petitioners do not provide an
adequate justification for the admission of their late answer. Oversight, which they candidly cite as the reason for their
filing a motion for extension of time to file an answer, is not a justification. Oversight, at best, implies negligence; at worst,
ignorance. The negligence displayed by petitioners is clearly inexcusable; ignorance of so basic a rule, on the other hand,
can never be condoned. In either case, the directory application of the questioned provision is not warranted.
Petitioners also cite Rosales vs. Court of Appeals
[29]
and Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[30]
but these
cases do not support their position.
In Rosales vs. Court of Appeals,
[31]
this Court applied the Rule on Summary Procedure liberally when the defendant,
instead of filing an answer, filed within the reglementary period a pleading labeled as a motion to dismiss. In treating the
motion to dismiss as an answer, the Court ruled:
[32]

Parenthetically, petitioner argues in the present petition that, notwithstanding its being labeled as a motion to dismiss,
said pleading should have been considered as his answer pursuant to the liberal interpretation accorded the rules and
inasmuch as the grounds involved therein also qualify as defenses proper in an answer. In this instance the Court
agrees. Indeed, the rule on summary procedure was conceptualized to facilitate the immediate resolution of cases such
as the present one. Well-settled is the rule that forcible entry and detainer cases being summary in nature and involving
disturbance of social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and should not be allowed to override
substantial justice. With this premise in mind and having insisted, however erroneously, on its jurisdiction over the case, it
certainly would have been more prudent for the lower court to have treated the motion to dismiss as the answer of
petitioner and examined the case on its merits. As will be shown shortly, the long drawn out proceedings that took place
would have been avoided.
Furthermore, the said case did not involve the question of extension in the period for filing pleadings under the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
In Co Keng Kian vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[33]
this Court allowed the notice to vacate, served upon the tenant,
by registered mail instead of personal service as required by the Rules of Court. We thus ruled:
[34]

At this juncture it bears repeating that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because
they involve a disturbance a social order which must be abated as promptly as possible without any undue reliance on
technical and procedural rules which only cause delays. In the ultimate analysis, it matters not how the notice to vacate
was conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the written demand, whether handed to him by
the lessor, his attorney, a messenger or even a postman. The undisputed facts in the instant case show that the Manila
Times Publishing Company, through its manager, had informed petitioner that Plaza Arcade Inc. was the new owner of
the subject building; that on October 18, 1979, a demand letter was sent to petitioner advising him to leave the premises
but petitioner refused to receive the letter; that a second demand on January 12, 1981 elicited the same reaction; that a
final demand dated November 16, 1981 was sent to petitioner by registered mail which he again refused. And even on
the supposition that there was no personal service as claimed by petitioner, this could only be due to petitioners blatant
attempts at evasion which compelled the new landlord to resort to registered mail. The Court cannot countenance an
unfair situation where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the unwarranted delay resulting from the
obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the existence of a valid demand.
In both cases, there was substantial compliance with the law, something that cannot be said of herein petitioners.
Second Issue: Forum-Shopping
Private respondent assails petitioners for engaging in forum-shopping by pursuing the present ejectment suit,
notwithstanding the pendency of an action for quieting of title involving the same property and parties. We are unable to
find basis for this charge.
For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances; and
the actions must raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.
[35]
Suffice it to say that an action for quieting
of title and partition has a different cause of action than that in an ejectment suit. As private respondent herself
contended, ownership of a certain portion of the property which is determined in a case of partition does not necessarily
mean that the successful litigant has the right to possess the property adjudged in his favor. In ejectment cases, the only
issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set
forth by any of the party litigants. Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession
even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a partys possession, provided that he
has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
[36]
It has even been ruled that the institution of a separate
action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for defeating the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment.
[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED in
toto. Double costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 119337. June 17, 1997]
BAYVIEW HOTEL, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Bayview Hotel, Inc. to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 34800 entitled Bayview Hotel, Inc. v. Hon. Teodoro Lim and Club Filipino,
Inc. de Cebu.
[1]

The facts are well established. On May 27, 1959, petitioner Bayview Hotel, Inc. entered into a contract of lease
over a parcel of land located in Cebu City with its registered owner, private respondent Club Filipino, Inc. De Cebu. The
lease agreement gave petitioner the right to construct and operate a hotel complex known as the Magellan International
Hotel for a period of thirty (30) years. It also stipulated that ownership of the building and other permanent
improvements on the land built by petitioner will transfer to private respondent upon the expiration of the lease. Under
the agreement, petitioner was given the option to renew the lease for ten (10) more years, the amount of rent to be
computed at five percent (5%) of the approved value of the land and improvements. Before the expiration of the lease
contract on December 31, 1992, petitioner notified private respondent of its intention to extend the lease contract for a
longer period and at a rate of rent different from the terms as originally agreed upon. There was no meeting of the minds
between the parties as private respondent's Board of Directors insisted on adhering to the provisions of the original lease
contract. Private respondent then sent to petitioner a notice to vacate the premises and to pay accrued rentals. Private
respondent claimed ownership of the building and the improvements pursuant to the provisions of the original contract.
[2]

When petitioner failed to vacate the premises, private respondent, on May 18, 1993, filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Cebu a complaint for ejectment and recovery of accrued rentals amounting to P2,850,000.00 as of April 30, 1993
and P712,500.00 for every month thereafter.
[3]
Before petitioner could be served with a copy of the complaint and
summons, the building was destroyed by a fire of undetermined origin.
On June 1, 1993, petitioner filed its answer to the complaint for ejectment interposing the following affirmative
defenses:
"(a) Summons having been improperly and defectively served, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
"(b) Plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant.
"(c) Plaintiff's claim has been extinguished by the loss of the premises, from which defendant has been sought to be
ejected, in a fire on 21 May, 1993.
"(d) The fire has effectively ejected the defendant from the premises rendering the action for ejectment moot and
academic.
"(e) Since the defendant has been effectively ejected from the premises by the fire, defendant cannot be said to have
deprived plaintiff of its possession of the same, therefore, the complaint for ejectment should be dismissed and the case
be considered as an ordinary claim for a sum of money.
"(f) Consequently, since the amount being claimed is beyond the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the suit should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
"(g) Plaintiff's claim for a sum of money has been extinguished by compensation since under the lease contract with the
defendant, plaintiff was bound to pay the latter the value of all its furnishings and equipment in the leased premises upon
the termination of the lease."
Petitioner then moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which was denied by the trial judge on
the ground that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the motion. Aggrieved by this Order, petitioner, on
June 24, 1993, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, a petition for certiorariwith a prayer for preliminary injunction
against private respondent and Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Teodoro Lim.
[4]
Allegedly, Judge Lim abused his discretion
when he refused to dismiss the complaint for ejectment. In its answer to the petition for certiorari, private respondent
admitted the destruction of the building but alleged that petitioner has not completely vacated the premises since its
guards continue to remain in the premises and its cars are still parked thereat. As to the jurisdiction of the court, private
respondent argued that jurisdiction once acquired by the court remains with it until the termination of the case. Private
respondent also sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure. On November 26, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu granted the petition for certiorari and
ordered the Metropolitan Trial Court to dismiss the ejectment case.
Private respondent appealed to the public respondent Court of Appeals. On February 16, 1995, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the RTC of Cebu. It ruled: (1) that petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Court when it sought affirmative relief from the same court; (2) that despite the burning of the building, the trial court
retained its jurisdiction to try the case for the nature of the action remained to be an ejectment case; (3) whether
petitioner has vacated the premises and transferred its possession to Club Filipino is a question of fact that should be
threshed out in the trial court; and (4) that the petition for certiorarishould not have been given due course by the Regional
Trial Court for its filing is proscribed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner where it contends:
[5]

"THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOSE ITS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE BUILDING FROM WHICH PETITIONER WAS SOUGHT TO BE EJECTED HAD BEEN TOTALLY
DESTROYED BEFORE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER'S ANSWER
WHICH EMBODIED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IS TANTAMOUNT TO A MOTION TO DISMISS AND THEREFORE
PROSCRIBED BY THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE.
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
CANNOT ENTERTAIN A PETITION FORCERTIORARI AS IT IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE REVISED RULES ON
SUMMARY PROCEDURE."
We reject petitioner's submissions.
Petitioner's contention of lack of jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court is premised on its allegation that the
building it leased from the private respondent was completely burned down before it could be served with summons in
Civil Case No. R-32189. It maintains that it does not have anymore a lessor-lessee relationship with private respondent
citing Article 1655 of the Civil Code which provides that "if the thing is totally destroyed by a fortuitous event, the lease is
extinguished x x x."
Petitioner has overlooked that the case at bar involves land lease. Private respondent insists that petitioner is still
occupying the subject land although the building on it has been burned down. If the allegation is true, then the jurisdiction
of the MTC cannot be assailed. We have held in Commander Realty Inc. v. Court of apppeals,
[6]
that "an unlawful
detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the land or building against or from the landlord, vendor or
vendee or other person after the expiration or the termination of the detainer's right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract, express or implied." We also ruled in the same case that "the right of a lessee to occupy the land leased as
against the demand of the lessor to regain possession should be decided in a case of Ejectment or Detainer under Rule
70 of the Rules of Court."
[7]
To be sure, petitioner makes the contrary claim that private respondent is already in full and
complete possession of the premises. This is, however, a factual question that should be decided by the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
We likewise find no reason to fault respondent court when it rejected petitioner's contention that the Metropolitan Trial
Court should have granted its motion for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which raised the issue of
jurisdiction. Under the law, parties are not prohibited from filing an answer with affirmative defenses in cases falling under
summary procedure. However, the trial courts are enjoined from conducting a preliminary hearing on such affirmative
defenses to prevent unnecessary delay in disposing the case on its merits. Thus, time and again, we have ruled that
under summary procedure "x x x adjudication of cases can be done on the basis of affidavits or other evidence. The
proceeding must be as summary as possible in order not to defeat the need to dispose ejectment cases in as fast a time
as possible. The reason is because cases involving possession of properties usually pose a threat to the peace
of society."
[8]

Finally, we agree with the respondent court that the claim of the petitioner that the petition for certiorari it filed with the
Regional Trial Court is permissible is not in accord with Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure which
provides. -
"SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.- The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
"(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
"(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
"(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
"(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
"(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
"(f) Memoranda;
"(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
"(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
"(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;
"(j) Reply;
"(k) Third party complaints;
"(l) Interventions." (Emphasis supplied.)
The prohibition is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.