Winter 2013 | 59

20J2 Published for the Ioreign Policy Research Institute by Llsevier Ltd.


Surprise, Deception, Denial and \arning:
Strategic Imperaties


by Lani Kass and J. Phillip Jack` London

Lani Kass, Ph.D., is a Corporate Strategic Adisor at CACI International. Kass preiously
sered as a Senior Policy Adisor to the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta. She was the
irst woman to sere as Proessor o Military Strategy at the National \ar College.
J. Phillip London, Ph.D., is Chairman o the Board o CACI International. A graduate o
the U.S. Naal Academy, he spent 24 years on actie and resere duty. London is the
recipient o numerous industry awards and seres on seeral boards, including the U.S.
Naal Institute and CAUSL. 1he iews presented here are the authors` alone. 1his article is
a tribute to the National \ar College`s distinguished graduates, among them Serice Chies,
Combatant Commanders, and literally hundreds o senior diplomats, warriors and statesmen.

Abstract: 1bi. articte frave. tbe bigbt, covte vatiovat .ecvrit, cbattevge. of .vrri.e, aeviat
ava aecetiov. 1be.e vttivate a.,vvetric tbreat. etoit rvtverabititie., caitatiivg ov bvbri.,
covtacevc, ava .etfaetv.iov. vcb actiov. rerevt tbe fvtt ava accvrate a..e..vevt of oovevt.`
caabititie. ava ivtevtiov., ava bivaer aroriate actiov.. 1be tovg ava freqvevt bi.tor, of
.vrri.e, aeviat ava aecetiov .vgge.t tbat tbe.e are e..evtiatt, .,cbotogicat bevoveva. 1be, are
effectire becav.e tbe, cbattevge ava etoit ercetiov. tbat fitt tbe ga betreev rbat i. /vorv ava
vv/vorv. 1be avtbor. re.evt aeci.iov .veriorit, a. tbe fv.iov of ivforvatiov aovivavce ava
aeci.ire actiov. 1ecbvotog, ava ivtettigevce cav evbavce aeci.iov .veriorit, b, avetiorativg, bvt
vot etivivativg, tbe tivit. of bvvav ercetiov. 1rav.tativg /vorteage ivto caabititie. ava actiov.
reqvire. agite, aaatire roce..e. ava oev iv.titvtiovat cottaboratiov ritbiv tbe ivteragevc,, ritb
gtobat attie. ava tbe rirate .ector.

n May 1863, on the ee o the battle o Chancellorsille, General Joseph
looker, commander o the Union Army o the Potomac, said: My plans are
perect. may God hae mercy on General Lee, or I will hae none.` General
looker`s oer-conidence had immediate, mid- and long-term consequences: lirst,
he was crushed by General Lee. Second, he was ired by Abraham Lincoln. Last,
I
doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2012.10.005
2012 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.
60 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
his name became a synonym or certain ladies o the eening. 1he enduring lesson
is that humility is a irtue in strategic planning. lubris, in contrast, oten spells
disaster.
Strategy is hard to do, because it is both an art and a structured intellectual
process. It is the constant adaptation o ends and means to shiting conditions, in
an enironment where chance, uncertainty, og, riction, and ambiguity dominate
1o make it een more complex, strategy is a multi-sided aair: the objecties,
intentions, actions, and reactions o other participants-both allies and
opponents-are oten opaque and aried. National interests and policy goals play a
critical role, as do diplomatic, inancial, technological, and military resources. Other
actors, such as history, culture, ethos, and personalities, all inluence strategic
behaior in subtle, but signiicant ways. In today`s globalized world, drien by a
24,,365 news cycle, these realities require a broader, more integrated, less linear
approach.
1he twenty-irst century strategist`s task demands that it be approached in
the context o its enironment, actoring in a ast array o dynamic and increasingly
complex ariables. Strategy is not deeloped in a acuum. Any use o orce is,
ultimately, a political act. Military power must be considered and ealuated in
tandem with other instruments o statecrat, as well as public-priate interaces.
1his task requires rigorous, precise thinking and the ability to reconcile or choose
among a spectrum o competing options. 1here are no easy answers to guide the
strategist along, except the knowledge that the only alternatie to a holistic approach
is inconsistency, wasted eort, delayed decisions, and increased risk.
1

Strategic success is built on our mutually supporting pillars: grasp o
strategic theory and historic practice, innoation, integration, and alignment.
1he unction o any theory is to describe, organize, and explain a body o
knowledge. Strategic theory has an added unction: it guides action. 1hus, it is
nothing but pragmatic. 1o quote one o America`s oremost strategists, Bernard
Brodie: Strategy is a ield where truth is sought in the pursuit o iable solutions.`
2

1hereore, all strategies seek to optimize aailable means to achiee the desired ends
with acceptable risk.
Innoation is the ability to think anew and capitalize on changed
circumstances-the usion o creatiity and logic Some innoations inole
science and technology, while others are in the realm o concepts and organizational
design. In all cases, the ability to innoate rests on oresight-the aptitude to read
both current and emerging trends, as well as to anticipate their impact. Innoation
also requires courage, perseerance, entrepreneurship, and readiness to break
glass,` especially in large bureaucracies and across sector boundaries.

1
lor a most elegant analysis o the subject see Mackubin 1homas Owens, Strategy and the Strategic
\ay o 1hinking,` ^arat !ar Cottege Rerier, Autumn 200.
2
Bernard Brodie, !ar ava Potitic. ,New \ork: Macmillan, 194,, pp. 452-3.

Winter 2013 | 61
Strategic Imperaties

1hroughout history, some leaders hae chosen to stick with comortable
assumptions and time-tested constructs, ailing to realize that the strategic
enironment within which they unction has been undamentally transormed.
Other leaders hae managed to exploit the potential or innoation, using new
concepts, technologies, approaches, and organizational structures into
oerwhelming combinations o eects. 1heir git was integration and holistic
thinking.
Integration is the ability to connect the dots` and relate seemingly
disparate actiities to one another. Absent integration, second and third order
eects are diicult, i not impossible, to anticipate. lolistic thinking is an approach
that captures both the whole and its parts, allowing one to grasp multi-dimensional,
dynamic relationships as they are today and as they might eole tomorrow. It
prepares the practitioner to oresee a wide array o potential consequences, yet
neither assumes nor expects perect congruence or linearity. \ithout integration
and holistic thinking, one would be a permanent ictim o surprise, reacting
haphazardly to unanticipated, seemingly random eents.
All strategic designs must be integrated horizontally and ertically. 1he best
plan, een i lawlessly executed, will ail i its implementation does not support the
oer-arching objecties. Likewise, a loty strategy unsupported ,or unsupportable,
by operational or iscal realities is, at best, an academic exercise or, more oten, a
prescription or disaster.
3

Alignment and coordination within and among military Serices and
goernment agencies, and with the priate sector, produce synergies, sae lies, and
enhance strategic eectieness. 1hey are predicated upon and relect trust and
conidence in each other`s capabilities, as well as an in-depth understanding o and
ability to compensate or their inherent limitations.
In sum, strategy is the product o imagination, creatiity and sound logic.
Lectieness comes rom an integrated, synchronized eort, sustained oer the
long-term, and guided by a clear ision o the desired end-state.
Against this backdrop, surprise is a strategic discontinuity, a startling seismic
shock. It upends best laid plans, unbalances a comortable posture, and gies a
whole new meaning to the adage that the opponent gets a ote.` Surprise causes
psychological dislocation and at least temporary paralysis: one is no longer driing
eents and is orced, instead, to respond in and to an enironment shaped by
another`s actions.


3
Mackubin 1homas Owens Strategy and the Strategic \ay o 1hinking,` ^arat !ar Cottege Rerier,
Autumn 200. lor a lengthier discourse see: Colin S. Gray, Moaerv trateg, ,New \ork: Oxord
Uniersity Press, 1999,, Michael loward, 1be Cav.e. of !ar ,Cambridge: larard Uniersity Press,
1983,, Colin S. Gray, low las \ar Changed Since the Lnd o the Cold \ar,` Paraveter., Spring
2005, pp. 14-26, and Colin S. Gray, toratiov. iv trateg, ,\estport: Praeger, 1998,.

62 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
Learning the Lessons of History

Surprise, denial and deception are as old as war itsel. Surprise attacks, ruses,
and guiles were practiced by biblical warriors and kings. A millennium later and a
continent apart, their irtues were recognized and extolled as the strategist's key to
ictory` by the Chinese warrior-philosopher Sun 1zu in his seminal .rt of !ar.
lrom ancient empires, through two \orld \ars, to the twenty-irst century, nations
and non-state actors hae practiced surprise and deception and allen ictim to
them-oten with deastating consequences.
4

Surprise and deception are not only undamental, enduring elements o
diplomacy and warare, they are a basic and recurring part o eeryday lie. \e
constantly ail to anticipate eents. lrequently, we spring traps, more oten, we all
into them. And always we promise to learn rom experience and do better next
time.
In his 1962 introduction to Roberta \ohlstetter`s ground-breaking book
Peart arbor: !arvivg ava Deci.iov, 1homas C. Schelling wrote words that are as true
and resonant today as they were 50 years ago:

Surprise, when it happens to a goernment, is likely to be a complicated,
diuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect o responsibility, but also
responsibility so poorly deined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets
lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string o
pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitie to gie to those who need it. It
includes the alarm that ails to work, but also the alarm that has gone o so
oten it has been disconnected. It includes the inattentie watchman, but also
the one who knows he`ll be chewed out by his superior i he gets higher
authority out o bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but
also those that eeryone assumes somebody else is taking care o. It includes
straightorward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal
disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability o indiidual human beings
to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion-which is usually
too late. ,Unlike moies, real lie proides no musical background to tip us o
to the climax., linally, surprise may include some measure o genuine noelty
introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.
5


1he best intelligence serices and most elaborate warning systems hae ailed to
predict war. lor example, the Soiet leadership was as surprised by the German

4
1he academic literature on surprise and deception is quite rich, albeit predominantly a product o the
twentieth century. Among the best sources are: Lphraim Kam, vrri.e .ttac/: 1be 1ictiv`. Per.ectire
,Cambridge: larard Uniersity Press, 1988,, updated in 2004 with a chapter accounting or the
September 11, 2001 attacks, Richard Betts, vrri.e .ttac/: e..ov. for Defev.e Ptavvivg ,\ashington, DC:
1he Brookings Institution, 1982, and, o course, the all-time classic, Roberta \ohlstetter, Pearl
larbor, \arning and Decision ,Stanord: Stanord Uniersity Press, 1962,.
5
\ohlstetter, op.cit, p.iii.

Winter 2013 | 63
Strategic Imperaties


inasion o June 1941 as was the United States six months later by Japan`s attack on
Pearl larbor. Israeli intelligence ailed to anticipate the coordinated Lgyptian-
Syrian attack o October 193 and the ensuing oil embargo. In between these two
eents, U.S. intelligence ailed on at least ie occasions to oresee attacks on
American orces and security interests. 1he record since 193 is not much better,
and includes the lebruary 199 Chinese inasion o Vietnam, the December 199
Soiet inasion o Aghanistan, the September 1980 Iraqi attack on Iran, the April
1982 Argentine inasion o the lalklands, and the August 1990 Iraqi attack on
Kuwait. Likewise, Operations Desert Storm, Allied lorce, Lnduring lreedom, Iraqi
lreedom and Odessey Dawn ,Libya, all inoled successul surprise and deception
by the belligerents.
6

On the political ront, the United States ailed to anticipate and prepare or
such inlection points as the all o the Shah in Iran and the subsequent hostage
crisis, the collapse o the Soiet Union and the \arsaw Pact, the genocides in
Rwanda and Sudan, the rise o iolent Islamist extremism as a global ideological
moement, the collapse o the U.S. lending, banking and housing bubble, escalating
deicits and oreign debt, leading to the downgrading o U.S. credit rating, the Luro-
zone crisis, the Arab Awakening and its still eoling atermath, to including the
ongoing ciil war in Syria and upheaal in Lgypt.

\hile unpredictable by its ery nature, the international community has also
been caught unprepared or such disasters as the meltdowns o two nuclear reactors
,Chernobyl, 1986 and lukushima, 2011,, deastating tsunamis, earthquakes, loods,
oil spills ,Lxxon and BP,, and hurricanes-most notably Katrina, which oreer
changed America`s iew o domestic disaster preparedness, cross-sector
coordination, and relie operations.
Cyber attacks straddle the categories noted aboe: some are clearly
deliberate military attacks ,e.g. Russia`s on Georgia prior to their 2008 war,, some
accord plausible deniability and strike at the intersection o orce and diplomacy
,e.g., the Stuxnet attacks on Iran`s nuclear production acilities, physically destroying
inrastructure without using kinetic orce,, others remain unattributed and disclosed
only through unauthorized leaks or written o to natural causes. Accumulating
warnings notwithstanding, it is a sae bet that i and when a major cyber attack
cripples the United States., paralyzing both our inter-netted way o lie and LMS-

6
Roy Godson and James J. \irtz, trategic Deviat ava Decetiov: 1be 1revt, ir.t Cevtvr, Cbattevge ,New
Brunswick: 1ransaction Publishers, 2004,. See also Michael I. landel, !ar, trateg, ava vtettigevce
,London: lrank Cass and Co, Ltd., 1989, and Lphraim Kam, vrri.e .ttac/: 1be 1ictiv`. Per.ectire,
op.cit.

One o the ew books dedicated exclusiely to diplomatic surprise is Michael I. landel, 1be Ditovac,
of vrri.e ,Lanham: Uniersity Press o America 1981,.
64 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
reliant military-all hinging on unimpeded access to the electro-magnetic
spectrum-it will be considered a surprise to rial Pearl larbor.
8

listory, in the sense o humanity`s collectie experience, has also not been
a good teacher. lor example, each o the great powers inoled in \\II was both
a ictim and a perpetrator.
9
Lgypt, militarily surprised by Israel in October 1956,
ailed to learn the lesson and was surprised again in June 196. Israel, haing twice
managed a deastating surprise attack on Lgypt, was in turn surprised by it and Syria
in October 193. 1he ensuing reorganization o its intelligence serices
notwithstanding, Israel was surprised again by the Palestinian vtifaaa and, most
recently, by the demise o the Mubarak regime, which sustained a ital Peace 1reaty
or 30-plus years.
Likewise, since the October 1983 homicide bombing o the Marine
Barracks in Beirut, the United States has been the target o seeral high-impact
terrorist acts, including: the 1993 attack on the \orld 1rade Center, the 1998
bombing o Lmbassies in Kenya and 1anzania, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cote
in Aden-all traceable to al Qaeda ,AQ,. \et, until September 11, 2001 ew
Americans knew that AQ has declared war on the U.S. ,irst in 1996 and again in
1998,. Consequently, the 9,11 attacks, the most deastating surprise perpetrated
against this nation since Pearl larbor, caught both the U.S. Goernment and the
American people unaware o the danger and stunned by the consequences.
10

Most recently, \ashington was astounded by the scope, scale and elocity
o the Arab Spring. It stood by as erstwhile allies were toppled in Lgypt, \emen,
and 1unisia-and shaken at their moorings across the Arabian Peninsula. 1he
ensuing ascent o the Muslim Brotherhood ,a closely-monitored group ounded in
1928 and rooted in both ascism and Islamic extremism, undamentally transormed
the strategic landscape in a region where ital U.S. interests are at stake. As the ull
implications o this inlection point unold, uncertainty remains the only sure
thing.
11


8
1he term Cyber Pearl larbor` is widely attributed to Richard A. Clarke, the ormer National
Coordinator or Security, Inrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism and author o C,ber !ar
,New \ork: larper Collins, 2010,. Secretary o Deense Leon Panetta has also used the term in
numerous media iews, as well as Congressional hearings.
9
1he best olumes on \orld \ar II deception operations are: 1haddeus lalt, 1be Deceirer.: .ttiea
Mititar, Decetiov iv tbe ecova !orta !ar ,New \ork: Simon and Schuster, 2010,, Ben Macintyre, Dovbte
Cro..: 1be 1rve tor, of tbe DDa, ie. ,New \ork: Crown, 2012, and Anthony Cae Brown, oa,gvara of
ie. ,Guilord: Lyons Press, 2002,. More general texts include: Larry Addington, "1he Second \orld
\ar, 1939-1945," 1be Patterv. of !ar ivce tbe igbteevtb Cevtvr,, 2nd ed. ,Bloomington: Indiana
Uniersity Press, 1994,, Victor Dais lanson, Carvage ava Cvttvre: avavar/ attte. ava tbe Ri.e of
!e.terv Porer ,New \ork: Anchor Books, 2002, and John Lynn, attte: . i.tor, of Covbat ava Cvttvre
,Boulder: \estiew Press: 2003,.
10
Richard A. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitter, 1actical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al
Qai`da`s Operations,` Miaate a.t Rerier of vtervatiovat .ffair., June 2004, pp. 56-9.
11
1he January,lebruary 2012 issue o !orta .ffair. Journal oers three distinct perspecties under the
joint title Arab Spring or Islamist \inter,` by Michael J. 1otten, lussain Abdul-lussain, and Daid
Schenker.
Winter 2013 | 65
Strategic Imperaties

1hese examples demonstrate that all surprises hae at least three things in
common. lirst, they are traumatic to the ictim. Second, they accord a signiicant,
albeit temporary, adantage to the initiator. 1hird, they generate a seemingly endless
stream o assessments and analyses seeking to determine what happened and why,
who was at ault, and how to reorganize the system in order to aoid a similar ailure
in the uture. \hile the irst two attributes apply primarily to military surprises, the
third is uniersally applicable to military, diplomatic, and economic surprises-and
een to natural disasters. 1his pattern will likely endure well into the twenty-irst
century, een as we continue the quest or technological and organizational
solutions that would alert authorities to emerging threats, acilitate warning, improe
decision-making, aert surprise, expose deception, and make the nation more
resilient, more eectiely organized and, thereby, better prepared to deal with their
atermath.

Propositions, Premises and 1enets

Strong, conident nations like the United States lack the natural incentie to
employ surprise, denial and deception. Indeed, these are oten dismissed as
weapons o the weak.` Surprise, denial and deception are the ultimate asymmetric
threats because they interere with one`s ability to assess adersary`s capabilities and
intentions, as well as account or one`s own ulnerabilities. In a democracy, this
reality urther impedes the ability to make timely, eectie decisions. Surprise and
deception also inluence policies and public opinion at home and abroad, thus
potentially shiting the balance o power by shaping perceptions in the adersaries`
aor.
12

Surprise, denial and deception exploit natural procliities and inherent,
systemic ulnerabilities, capitalizing on complacency, misperceptions, and sel-
delusion. Unable to take their opponents head on, asymmetric actors rely on the
orce-multiplying eects the shock and psychological dislocation that surprise
ineitably produces. Deeating these threats-denying them this asymmetric
adantage-requires a thorough understanding o the nature o surprise, as well as
the resole to minimize its impact and consequences.
Surprise determines the time, place, and nature o the irst engagement. It
does not deine the ultimate outcome. loweer, this principle is up or grabs and
must be reairmed each time by both the target and the initiator. Pearl larbor
both symbolizes and alidates this proposition.

12
1he best textbook on the role o perceptions in international aairs remains Robert Jeris, Percetiov
ava Mi.ercetiov iv vtervatiovat Potitic. ,Princeton: Princeton Uniersity Press, 196,. See also \aaco
Vertzberger, 1be !orta iv 1beir Miva.: vforvatiov Proce..ivg, Cogvitiov, ava Percetiov ,Stanord: Stanord
Uniersity Press, 1990,.

66 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
1he Japanese belieed that the destruction o the Paciic lleet would deny
the United States the ability to interere with 1okyo`s designs in Asia. Not only
were the Japanese wrong about America`s capabilities and intentions, the day that
would lie in inamy` brought the United States directly into \orld \ar II with the
stated objectie o unconditional surrender` o not merely Imperial Japan, but the
entire Nazi-led Axis. Japanese Admiral lara 1adaichi, who commanded Carrier
Diision 5 in the attacks, quickly concluded that: \e won a great tactical ictory at
Pearl larbor and thereby lost the war.`
13
lis prescience was quickly proen by
Doolittle`s Raid against the lome Islands on April 18, 1942, at the Battles o Coral
Sea and Midway on May 4-8, 1942 and June 4-, 1942, respectiely, at liroshima
and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, and, inally, at the surrender ceremony
aboard the USS Mi..ovri on September 2, 1945-three months ater Germany
surrendered on May .
14

1his piotal chain o eents demonstrates that surprise and deception are
means, not ends. 1o succeed, the initiator must be able to exploit the opportunity
thus created. Otherwise, the initial shock might be short-lied and the adantage
leeting. 1he target is just as likely to recoer and respond-oten in an asymmetric,
i not disproportionate, manner-imposing a price ar exceeding the initiator`s
original cost-beneit calculus.
\ith this in mind, what ollows are ten propositions intended to guide
soldiers, diplomats, and decision-makers at all leels, as well as all those who
support the endeaor to remain eer igilant in proiding or the common deense.

1. Always conduct a reality check rom not only your own perspectie but
also that o the opponent. Reality always has rough edges, ambiguities, and shades
o gray. I eerything is crystal clear and consistent with your best-case scenario,
and the adersary behaes just like you would in similar circumstances, you are
probably being deceied.

2. State assumptions clearly and explicitly. Identiy piotal assumptions,
those that i proen wrong would upend your entire approach. Deelop a system
to periodically realidate these assumptions, making sure you don't conuse
estimates with acts, or hopes with iable courses o action. Remember that any

13
lere lauler, Coaebrea/er`. 1ictor,: or tbe .ttiea Cr,tograber. !ov !orta !ar ,New \ork:
NAL, 2003,, p. 12. See also 1be Pacific !ar Ov ive vc,ctoeaia,
http:,,pwencycl.kgbudge.com,l,a,lara_Chuichi.htm.
14
O the many olumes coering the \ar in the Paciic, see, in particular, D. Clayton James,
American and Japanese Strategies in the Paciic \ar,` in Peter Paret, Lditor, Ma/er. of Moaerv trateg,:
rov Macbiaretti to tbe ^vctear .ge ,Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uniersity Press, 1986,, Russell l. \eigley,
1he Strategic 1radition o A.1. Mahan: 1he Strategists o the Paciic \ar,` 1be .vericav !a, of !ar:
. i.tor, of |vitea tate. Mititar, trateg, ava Potic, ,Bloomington: Indiana Uniersity Press, 19,, Allan
R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, or tbe Covvov Defev.e: . Mititar, i.tor, of tbe |vitea tate. of .verica
,New \ork: 1he lree Press, 1994,. See also, Paul lussell, 1hank God or the Bomb,` 1be Cvaraiav,
July 21, 1989, pp.1-8 and Michael \altzer and Paul lussell, An Lxchange on liroshima,` ^er
Revbtic, Sept. 23, 1981, pp. 13-14.
Winter 2013 | 67
Strategic Imperaties


plan that relies on more than two consecutie miracles and iolates more than one
law o physics is not suitable-een as a deception or eint.

3. Don`t all in loe with any plan, policy, program, or assessment. Don`t
expect the opponent to cooperate. lae a branch and sequel to address the
unexpected along the lines o what i` and what next` Pay attention to what
both adersaries and allies are saying and doing-especially i there is a mismatch
between words and deeds. Don't discount indicators just because they point to
things ,ov would neer do. 1here are no uniersal standards o rationality or
recklessness.

4. Collaborate with all who might proide resh insights and dierent
perspecties. Keep this circle as dierse and wide as practicable. lelp your
colleagues by asking the right` questions. 1ell them explicitly what you need to
know and why. But be realistic: no existing technology is capable o assessing
intentions. Question the bova fiae. o any inormation-no matter how comorting,
conincing, or highly classiied.

5. \ou don`t know what you don`t know, and what you don`t know can
spell disaster. Create an organizational climate that allows or alternatie iewpoints
to be gien a air hearing. Beware o group-think and remember that just because
something neer happened beore does not preclude it rom happening. Lery
precedent was created by someone`s act o courage or olly.

6. 1rust your instincts and be ready to pay the price that might go with that.
\arning is about being sae, not about being right. Beware o the cry wol`
syndrome, but don`t dismiss the bearers o bad news. Sometimes the woles are
really at the gate and inlammatory rhetoric` indicates a real and present danger.

. 1imely, unambiguous warning is nice to hae, but don`t count on it.
Don`t assume or expect that appropriate decisions, authorities and actions would
automatically ollow. \ou hae plenty o latitude within your own organization.
Do what`s right, een i you hae to stake your career on it.

8. Don`t be a ictim! It`s painul, een i you ultimately win. Neer allow
the initiator to exploit his initial success. Surprise only determines where and how
the irst battles will be ought, but it`s up to you to realidate this principle eery
single time.

9. Don`t get complacent. lubris kills.
68 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
10. Guile is neither the opposite o alor nor an eectie substitute or
capability and capacity, but it saes lies and treasure. It is an asymmetric adantage
we oreit to others at our own peril.

Surprise, Warning and Decision

Asymmetric actors` use o surprise, denial and deception to leel the playing
ield has ar-reaching implications. 1o begin, it is useul to draw a clear distinction
between two perspecties inherent in any unequal human interaction: the target`s
and the initiator`s.
lor the initiator, surprise is a process or, more precisely, the outcome o a
deliberate, oten painstaking eort. It is a plan coming together in a concentrated
burst o actiity, a plan in which eerything worked just right to produce the
expected result. laing pulled it o, the initiator's mission is to exploit the initial
success in order to achiee the desired political, military, economic, or inormational
objecties.
lor the target, surprise is an eent: sudden, stunning, traumatic, and
humiliating. Surprise catches the ictim at his weakest, exposing and exploiting his
ailings. 1he ater-shocks linger on in the ictim's memory, shaping and impacting
uture behaiors. Assuming the target recoers-an assumption the initiator rarely
makes-surprise precipitates a scramble to recoer, allocate blame, and reorganize
the system` which ailed to warn o the impending disaster. It is only ater the act
that the ictim becomes aware o what caused the eent to happen. In other words,
the target learns the makings o surprise only in its atermath.
15

Looking at any surprise in retrospect, one tends to be less impressed by the
initiator`s skill than by what appears as the ictim`s atal sel-delusion, i not abject
blindness. 1he striking thing about surprises is that one can neer quite understand
how it could hae happened. low could the ictim be so obliious Indicators o a
calamity in the oing are always starker after the unthinkable` has occurred. \ith
20,20 hindsight, it is much easier to see how one could hae anticipated, planned or,
and perhaps een deterred or aerted the surprise.
In a way, this is akin to putting together a jigsaw puzzle or the third time.
Because the indiidual elements and the oerall pattern are amiliar, it is easy to pick
out the appropriate pieces, in the correct sequence, and it them into a coherent
whole. 1he task o connecting the dots,` een recognizing the dots, signals and
indicators out there, is quite simple once one knows what to look or. 1o appreciate
and learn rom the diiculties and uncertainties acing both the actor contemplating
surprise and its intended target, one must place themseles in the participants` shoes
and consider the situation rom their perspectie, as the actual eents were unolding.

15
Cynthia M. Grabo, .vticiativg vrri.e: .vat,.i. for trategic !arvivg ,Lanham: Uniersity Press o
America, 2004,. See also, John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, Mititar, Decetiov ava trategic vrri.e
,London: Cass Publishing, 1982,.

Winter 2013 | 69
Strategic Imperaties

In both politics and war, surprise is a diicult, but eminently worthwhile
endeaor. Lmpirical analyses conducted by Sir Basil l. Liddell lart in the 1930s
and by American researcher Barton \haley ,whose masterpiece tratagev was
republished in 2008, compellingly demonstrate that surprise and deception reduce
casualties and increase the likelihood o success. Deception is also amazingly cost
eectie. lor example, Operation lortitude, the massie diersion coering the
planning and execution o the Normandy Landings, consumed less than one percent
o the total expenditures, inoled less than 0.2 percent o the dedicated personnel,
and less than 0.5 percent o the allocated equipment. Its human toll was six-a
miniscule number relatie to the estimated 10,000 Allied D-Day casualties. 1he
enduring lesson is that by hiding the real ,denial, and showing the ake ,deception,
one can cause the adersary to misallocate resources, thus increasing the chances o
ictory at a remarkably low cost.
16

Because it causes both a psychological and physical dislocation, surprise
accords the initiator an obious adantage. Until the ictim recoers, the
perpetrator has the initiatie at the strategic, operational and tactical leels. In
military terms, surprise is a orce multiplier, allowing a numerically or
technologically inerior orce to gain the upper hand-the ery deinition o
asymmetry.
It is important to emphasize that surprise is a matter o degree. Its
spectrum ranges rom the rare total surprise with the ery occurrence o an eent
,9,11 being the most iid example, to the more common surprise as to the timing,
location, perpetrators` identity, or type o eent that was at least considered to be a
plausible eentuality. Likewise, the initial impact and lingering eects o surprise are
directly correlated with the depth o belies that made up the target`s original
perception o reality. 1he more ingrained and widely held the assumptions as to
whether an eent could happen-and, i so, when, where, by whom, and how might
it be carried out-the greater the cognitie dissonance when expectations are
shattered by a suddenly altered reality. By the same token, the strength and elasticity
o the planning assumptions determine both the degree o strategic dislocation
caused by an unexpected aderse action, as well as the ability to adapt and recoer in
its atermath.
1


16
Barton \haley and Jerey Busby, Detecting Deception: Practice, Practitioners, and 1heory` in Roy
Godson and James J. \irtz, trategic Deviat ava Decetiov: 1be 1revt, ir.t Cevtvr, Cbattevge ,New
Brunswick: 1ransaction Publishers, 2004,, pp.223-228. Michael I. landel, !ar, trateg, ava vtettigevce
,London: lrank Cass and Co, Ltd., 1989,, p. 381. See also, Deception Research Program, Oice o
Research and Deelopment, Central Intelligence Agency, Decetiov Maiv.: act ava ot/tore
,\ashington, D.C.: U.S. Goernment, 1980,, Basil lenry Liddell lart, trateg, ,New \ork: Signet
Books, 194,, Michael Dewer, 1be .rt of Decetiov iv !arfare ,New \ork: Sterling Publishing,
1989,,Mark Lloyd, 1be .rt of Mititar, Decetiov ,South \orkshire: Pen and Sword Books, 199,.
1
lor an in-depth discussion see Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. lerbig, eds., trategic Mititar,
Decetiov ,New \ork: Pergamon Press Inc., 1982,, Colonel John lughes-\ilson, Mititar, vtettigevce
70 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
1he issue o warning relects the uneasy intersection o policy, intelligence,
strategy, operations, and decision-making writ large. At its most basic, warning is
inormation pointing to an emerging threat. 1hat inormation is collected and
processed by the intelligence agencies and transmitted to decision-makers or action.
\arning, thereore, is the ital link connecting intelligence assessment with
countermeasures designed to ace the looming threat.
18

1heoretically, then, warning is the antithesis o surprise-an eectie
antidote to it. I orewarned means orearmed, warning should aert surprise. By
the same token, surprises result rom ailure to issue and react to adance warning.
\et, to paraphrase Karl on Clausewitz, eerything in policy and war is simple, but
the simplest things are diicult. And anticipating an impending disaster might be
the most diicult task o all. Crises are generally preceded by a period o
international riction, signaling mounting tensions. Oten, there is an explicit
declaration o hostile intent, as was the case with al Qaeda. Conentional military
actions usually require extensie preparations, which are diicult to conceal.
Nonetheless, the historic record o anticipating conlict is pretty dismal. \hy is it
so-een in this era o 24,,365 electronic monitoring, high-speed computers, and
sophisticated reconnaissance and sureillance technology-is worth exploring in
greater depth.
1he irst and probably most important aspect to note is the manner in
which humans, as well as machines built and used by humans, process data.
leuristics reers to experience-based approaches to problem soling. \hen time is
o the essence-as it almost always is in national security decision-making-an
exhaustie search or and thorough ealuation o inormation are oten deemed
impractical. leuristic methods are used to speed up the analytical process through
linear pattern ormation, intuitie judgments, and educated guesses.`
More undamentally, humans process all incoming inormation through a
perceptual prism, comprised o their culture, assumptions, biases, and experiences
with the most recent being the most iid and, thus, most impactul. 1his prism
determines which data would een be noticed and actored in and which inputs
would be iltered out or ignored altogether, what weight and importance each piece
o data would be accorded, which patterns would the inormation be arrayed into,
and, ultimately, which judgments and conclusions will be deried.
ligure 1 is a model o how humans-as well as systems and processes
designed and employed by humans-digest, sort, and order data. 1hese multi-
aceted, iteratie and highly dynamic processes take place literally in a blink o an eye
in the human brain and at the speed o light in modern computers.

tvvaer. ava Corer|. ,New \ork: Carrol & Gra, 2004,, Jon Latimer, Decetiov iv !ar ,\oodstock:
John Murray Publishers: 2003,.
18
John \. Bodnar, !arvivg .vat,.i. for tbe vforvatiov .ge: Retbiv/ivg tbe vtettigevce Proce.. ,\ashington,
D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003,.

Winter 2013 | 71
Strategic Imperaties

Perception
Filter
InIormation Flow
Ordered
InIormation
(Memory)
Irrelevant
InIormation
Dismissed
InIormation
Points Vulnerable to InIormation Loss
InIormation
Output
Irretrievable
InIormation
Filtered
InIormation

Iigure J: Model for Processing and Ordering Information

\ithin this natural, i rarely recognized, process are speciic points o
ulnerability where new inormation is iltered out, dismissed as irreleant, ignored,
or simply let allow. Insoar as the perceptual prism is dynamic and new acets are
ormed as inputs are sorted into the patterns that constitute memory, such
inormation becomes irretrieable. 1his goes a long way towards explaining why
collecting ast amounts o data does not necessarily lead to better situational
awareness and decision superiority, why we tend to repeat the past`s errors, and why
recording lessons is so undamentally dierent rom actually learning rom
experience.
Surprise short-circuits` this process. It orces the target to quickly come
to grips with biased perceptions, erroneous assumptions, and lawed pattern
ormation. 1his disruption generates two sets o possible outcomes, dependent on
the degree o surprise and the time aailable to adapt: 1, change in perceptions and a
new, lexible inormation low, allowing appropriate decisions and actions, and 2,
cognitie dislocation and persistent paralysis.
It is the latter case wherein the target becomes a ictim. 1he deeper the
surprise, the stronger the going-in assumptions, the more rigid the processes, and
the more aluable the inormation that has been lost along the way, the higher the
potential or cognitie dissonance and, consequently, the more persistent the
72 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
ensuing paralysis. By the same token, time is a critical actor in the target`s ability to
adjust to the new reality. 1his is why some nations manage to recoer and preail in
the atermath o a deastating surprise, while others are let with little choice but to
accept deeat. 1he United States in the wake o Pearl larbor, the Soiet Union
ater the June 1941 German inasion, Israel in the wake o the Lgyptian and Syrian
assault on \om Kippur in October 193, and the United States ater 9,11 are prime
examples o the agility and adaptability necessary to perseere and shape the war`s
inal outcome-despite initial setbacks. 1heir opponents` ate demonstrates how
dislocation, systemic dysunctions, and persistent rigidity accounted or their
ultimate deeat.
ligure 2 illustrates why the lessons o experience rarely last and surprise
continues to occur. 1he readiness to open the mental, institutional and
technological apertures and the ensuing ability to absorb and integrate new
inormation in new ways are usually short-lied. Soon ater the crisis that shocked
the system and induced new behaiors passes, stability and business as usual`
become the natural deault. 1he transormed behaiors become the new normal,
newly created memory boxes` become stale or irreleant, complacency ineitably
sets in. 1his allows determined adersaries to ind new opportunities to exploit the
target`s comort with and conidence in the ixes` that hae been introduced into
the collection, analysis, and decision-making system. Absent constant igilance and
adaptation to eer-eoling threats, ixes become ixations, generating new
ulnerabilities to be exploited both symmetrically and asymmetrically.
19

Memory
InIormation Flow
Create
'New Boxes
Acceptance oI
More
InIormation
Surprise
Change
Boxes
X
Eliminate
Boxes
'Changed
Perception
X
'Changed
Output
Acceptance oI
More
InIormation

Iigure 2: Changes to Processing and Ordering Information

19
Colin S. Gray, 1hinking Asymmetrically in 1imes o 1error,` , Spring 2002, pp. 5-14.

Winter 2013 | 73
Strategic Imperaties



1hroughout history, leaders at all leels hae operated with limited
inormation and constrained situational awareness. 1oday, decision-makers are
suering the embarrassment o riches, irtually drowning in data deliered at a
elocity and olume ar exceeding their ability to absorb. 1he United States must
continue to deelop systems that are not just network-centric, but knowledge-
centric. 1hese systems would integrate data in a manner consistent with natural
neurological patterns, presenting inormation in a ormat that enables timely, logical
decisions. 1o this end, we must ully harness the power o machine-to-machine
interace, reeing up human resources or actiities where intellect and esprit remain
indispensable.
\arning and decision superiority urther demonstrate this dilemma.
Indications and \arnings are collected, processed, ealuated, and disseminated by
the Intelligence Community-a highly complex, largely closed system, comprised o
indiiduals, groups, organizations, technologies, and processes. 1he people who
make up the system are subject to biases and preconceptions that deine their
perceptual prism-the mental lens through which each human processes
inormation. Inputs that could become warnings are interpreted by dierse groups
and hierarchies who shape content, detail, and leel o urgency-well beore the
warning is deliered to decision-makers or action.
20

\hether a warning was actually issued-and, i so, by whom and when-is
an interesting element o the post-mortem and institutional inger-pointing that
usually ollow surprise. \hile such claims might be personally or organizationally
gratiying, they are ultimately irreleant. \arning means nothing i decision-makers
ail to act. Such ailure might occur or any number o reasons. It might relect a
natural reluctance to delier or accept bad news, and the equally understandable
preerence or consensus-ersus a direct challenge to authority or dissent rom
conentional wisdom. Action might also be delayed due to oten justiiable
concerns that oert counter-measures and steps to enhance readiness might actually
be mistaken as aggressie and prooke the adersary. Last and perhaps most
pernicious, inaction might mirror the primordial inability to imagine the ull nature
and magnitude o a looming threat.
1hese perspecties shed new light on the oten-discussed distinction
between intelligence ailure` and policy iasco.`
21
1o use a recent example: there
is little doubt that the surprise attacks o September 11, 2001-and the in-depth
inquiries that ollowed-weighed heaily in the Intelligence Community`s and

20
Mark M. Lowenthal, vtettigevce: rov ecret. to Potic,, :
tb
eaitiov ,\ashington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012,.
See also Cynthia M. Grabo, op.cit and Jonathan S. Lockwood, op.cit.
21
Russell G. Swenson, vtettigevce Di..evivatiov: . Ke, to trategic !arvivg ,\ashington, DC: Deense
Intelligence College, July 1994,, pp. 1-18. See also, Daniel l. Landers, "1he Deense \arning System,"
Defev.e vtettigevce ]ovrvat, Spring 1994, pp. 21-32.
74 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
Lxecutie Branch`s reaction to mounting indications and warnings that Iraq was
pursuing weapons o mass destruction ,\MD,. Relecting those concerns, the irst
^atiovat ecvrit, trateg, issued by the Bush Administration in September 2002
highlighted the policy o anticipatory action,` designed to orestall hostile acts
een i uncertainty remains as to the time and place o the enemy`s attack.` In
other words, the declaratory policy o the United States was to aert surprise
through preemption.
1hroughout 2002, the Bush Administration sought Iraqi compliance with
U.N. Security Council Resolutions, while holding out the possibility o U.N Chapter
VII ,all means necessary`, action i Iraq did not comply. Addressing the U.N.
General Assembly that September, President George \. Bush stated: 1he Security
Council Resolutions will be enorced . or action will be unaoidable.` In October
2002, the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use o United States Armed lorces
against Iraq,` reiterated that it should be the policy o the United States to remoe
the Saddam lussein regime and promote a democratic replacement` through any
means necessary.`
1he Administration`s intent was ormally stated in a March 1, 2003
ultimatum to Saddam lussein and his sons to leae Iraq within 48 hours. 1heir
reusal to do so,` President Bush said, would result in military conlict.we will
tear down the apparatus o terror.the tyrant will soon be gone.` Operation Iraqi
lreedom was launched three days later.
22

No \MDs were ound in Iraq and, within months o toppling the regime,
the ocus o the U.S.-led coalition shited to the more open-ended and demanding
mission o securing the enironment while helping establish goernance through
counter-insurgency operations. As casualties mounted and the war came to be seen
as a costly, multi-year occupation, public opinion turned dramatically. In lebruary
2003, 64 percent o Americans had endorsed military action to remoe lussein
rom power. By May 200, 55 percent belieed that the war had been a mistake.
President Barack Obama was elected in Noember 2008, promising, among other
things, to end this unwise` and dangerous distraction.` On December 18, 2011,
the last o U.S. troops pulled out o Iraq, een as the country continued to conulse
in sectarian iolence.
23

\hile debates as to the respectie roles played by intelligence and policy
hae largely ended in an uneasy truce, Iraq continues to cast a long shadow on U.S.
iews o other looming threats. Most notably, the Iraq \MD debacle has become a
key acet in the prism through which Iran`s quest or nuclear capability is iewed. I
9,11 is perceied as a ailure to connect the dots and respond in a timely manner,
Iraq is widely iewed as oer-reaction to what now, in hindsight, is seen as aulty
analysis. 1he policy toward Iran relects the desire to ind a middle path that aoids
both extremes. I so, it is worth noting that the propensity to procrastinate is

22
Congressional Research Serice Report: Oeratiov raqi reeaov: trategie., .roacbe., Re.vtt., ava ..ve.
for Covgre.., March 28, 2008.
23
Ibid.
Winter 2013 | 75
Strategic Imperaties

directly proportional to the time one beliees is aailable. 1he inescapable corollary
is that warning time is wasted time, unless action is taken.

Denial and Deception: 1he Keys to Surprise

Gien the United States` global interests and alliance commitments,
adersaries hae a major incentie to use denial and deception against U.S.
intelligence collection and analysis. I warning is denied or delayed, a fait accovti
might preclude timely action to aert the threat. 1errorist and criminal networks are
especially reliant on-and adept at-denial and deception at all leels. Prolierators
o \MDs and adanced weapons systems, as well as illicit narcotics and people
traickers, are also highly incentiized to aoid detection by modern intelligence,
sureillance and reconnaissance-the unblinking ISR eye.`
24

1here is limited understanding o the unique ways in which nations and non-
state actors iew denial and deception as orce-multipliers. 1he United States and its
allies are likely to be aced with Russian-style eorts to hide the real and show the
ake, regardless o the tenor o Last-\est relations.
25
Iran`s ongoing eorts to
literally bury its nuclear acilities in deep underground installations-while proessing
that its massie complex is designed or the peaceul purpose o producing energy
and medical isotopes-are prime examples in this regard. Meanwhile, China has been
ery consistent in employing surprise, denial and deception as asymmetric means to
thwart U.S. interests in a region it aspires to claim as its own sphere o inluence.
26

Likewise, AQ manuals and een a cursory Internet search clearly demonstrate that
these asymmetric tools and relatiely inexpensie enabling technologies are easily
accessible to terrorists, narco-traickers, and assorted criminal organizations.
2

Deception is critical to achieing surprise. Combined, surprise and
deception produce a synergy, signiicantly increasing the chances o success.
Indeed, denial and deception are usually clues-and, thus, warnings-o hostile
intent. Simply put, why would anyone bother to mask or obuscate something that
is legitimate and harmless 1he elements o deception-the alse depiction o
reality-one would want to show an adersary are quite simple:


24
Daid A. Kay, Denial and Deception Practices o \MD Prolierators,` 1be !a.bivgtov Qvartert,,
\inter 1995, pp. 83-105.
25
Richard N. Armstrong, oriet Oeratiovat Decetiov: 1be Rea Ctoa/, Deense 1echnical Inormation
Center DAI-PMl Repository, 1989, http:,,www.dtic.mil,dtic,tr,ulltext,u2,a21126.pd.
26
Daid Andrew Gra, 1he Dao o Deception: Unorthodox \arare in listoric and Modern
China,` ]ovrvat of Mititar, i.tor,, July 200, pp. 910-912.
2
Special Dispatch-Jihad and 1errorism Studies,` 1he Middle Last Media Research Institute
,MLMRI,, leb. 10, 2002, No. 344, pp. 1-4. lor more current translations and analysis see
www.memri.org and www.siteintelgroup.com. See also, Richard l. Shultz and Ruth Margolies Beitter,
op.cit.

76 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON

\our capabilities and ulnerabilities are dierent than they really are,
\ou intend to do something else than expected,
\ou intend to do it elsewhere,
\ou intend to do it in a dierent manner,
\ou intend to do it at a dierent time,
\ou know more ,or less, about your competitors than you really do, and,or
1heir actions are more ,or less, ruitul than they really are.

Conirming an opponent`s expectations is always easier than trying to change his
perceptions. 1hereore, a good deceier helps` the adersary build a alse picture
o reality by proiding consistent, reinorcing clues, through multiple channels, using
the target`s behaior as eedback to modulate these inputs. 1he aim is to cause the
adersary to commit the critical errors that will sere one`s own plan, increase an
opponent`s susceptibility to our actions, and deny him the opportunity to capitalize
on our ulnerabilities.
28

Successul denial and deception, as well as timely warning and decision,
hinge on an accurate understanding o the capabilities and limitations o Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance ,C4ISR,-both
one`s own, as well as the adersary`s. I collection and analysis sources, methods and
processes are known, an adersary might be able to aoid or delay detection, thus
buying time and enhancing the chances o achieing surprise. Likewise, insight into
adersaries` decision-making processes creates opportunities or controlling the low
o inormation, adding misleading inormation, and otherwise distorting
perceptions.
29


Strategic Implications

All strategic planning is based on a set o assumptions. Surprise occurs when
core assumptions are proen wrong. listory is replete with examples o militaries
and intelligence communities that ailed due to their inability to alidate
assumptions, adopt new concepts, transorm organizational culture, or leerage
breakthrough technologies. But militaries and intelligence serices do not ail by
themseles. lailure occurs in the context o an oerall, national iasco, caused by
systemic problems that all into three distinct but related categories:

aitvre to .vticiate the nature o and trends within the strategic
enironment, the character o the opponent, one`s own will and resole, the

28
Lt. Gen. Bernard L. 1rainor, USMC ,Ret.,, Deception,` Marive Cor. Caette, October 1986,
reprinted October 25, 2011, www.mca-marines.org,gazette,deception.
29
Joseph \. Caddwell, Deception 101, US Army \ar College Monograph,` Strategic Studies Institute,
December 2004. ee at.o, Paul Rossa, 1he Denial and Deception Challenge to Intelligence` in Roy
Godson and James J. \irtz, op. cit., pp. 223-228.
Winter 2013 | 77
Strategic Imperaties


impact o technology-be it disruptiely new or employed in unexpected
ways, and ailure to anticipate the second and third-order eects o both
action and inaction.

aitvre to earv rom experience-both one`s own and others`. Selectie
reading o history is particularly pernicious here, as is mistaking lessons
recorded` with lessons actually learned.

aitvre to .aat behaiors, concepts and institutional constructs to the eer
changing domestic and international dynamics, as well as to eoling
adersarial operational, technological, and,or doctrinal innoations. lailure to
alidate piotal assumptions and adjust accordingly alls in this category as
well.
30


In contrast, ictory comes to those who oresee, recognize and act upon
emerging changes in the strategic enironment. 1hus, the irst strategic
implication is: beware o complacency and the perils o strategic myopia. 1he lack
o oresight which led the British to conclude ater the Second Boer \ar ,1899-
1902, that, henceorth, the Lmpire`s armed orces needed to prepare or nothing
but counterinsurgency was quickly exposed as allacy in the blood-soaked trenches
o Somme and Verdun. 1he corollary strategic implication is: beware o
concepts-howeer alid or a speciic time and place-becoming dogma and
stiling resh thought.
31

1he strategic inerences are readily apparent: lirst, aggressors tend to
assume risks that seem irrational and improbable to the intended ictim. 1his
leads to strategic dislocation and, potentially, catastrophic ailure. Second,
reputation and credibility born o past successes might not suice as a deterrent.
1hird, current exigencies must be balanced with uture requirements. Any single-
ocus approach bears a huge opportunity cost. 1he rest o the world has not taken

30
lor a brilliant, in-depth discussion see Lliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Mititar, Mi.fortvve.: 1be
.vatov, of aitvre iv !ar ,New \ork: lree Press, 1990,.
31
listory is replete with examples o disasters born o a lack o strategic prescience. 1he U.S. Army
ater the Ciil \ar spent 30 years ighting Natie Americans, only to struggle to deploy a brigade 80
miles o the coast o llorida, against Spain in Cuba. Similarly, Britain and lrance post-1815 let their
militaries atrophy-while their hubris blossomed-resulting in a blood bath in the Crimean \ar and
near-existential disasters in the two \orld \ars that ollowed. Likewise, in the wake o their
spectacular ictory in the June 196 Six Day \ar, the Israel Deense lorces rested on their laurels,
ceased innoating, and ocused on policing the newly acquired territories, secure in the soon-to-be-
proen allacy that past successes and strategic depth will deter any uture conentional threat. Six
short years later, in early October 193, Israel was ighting or its ery surial on the Syrian and
Lgyptian ronts, haing allen ictim to strategic surprise masterully orchestrated by the seemingly
deeated oe.

78 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
a time out while the United States tended to Iraq and Aghanistan. lourth, while
successes and ailures are both relatie, they are binary in the eye o the beholder.
Speciically, or a great power like the United States, there is no such thing as
minor setback.` Anything less than a clear success-perceied as such by riend
and oe alike--will echo in the interconnected global illage and eed the narratie
o America as the giant with eet o clay.`
A compelling description o what ailure might look like is as important as a
crisp articulation o the desired outcome. 1he latter describes how we want the
situation to be ater the mission is accomplished. 1he ormer lays out the
undesirable alternatie end state-the consequences o a mission let undone.
\et, imagining ailure is simply not in America`s-or any nation`s-DNA.
Consider the ollowing truism: the only certain thing about war is that one side
will lose. \et, since time immemorial, nations and armed groups hae gone to
war with nothing but a picture o ictory imprinted in their minds. Saying that
ailure is not an option` is, thus, nothing but an exhortation. In truth, ailure is
an eer-present possibility.
Debacles-in-the-making deelop oer time, usually with plenty o
opportunities to notice and rectiy the downward spiral. \hat preents the
needed course correction are systemic deiciencies, wishul thinking, as well as the
ingrained human ability to adjust to a new normal`-the shiting baseline o
what is deemed acceptable.
At its core, the inability to conceie anything but a resounding success is a
ailure o the imagination. It is also a natural deense mechanism. lumans tend
to repress or explain away the eer-present potential or ailure. Bad experiences
are particularly tempting to orget. \et imagining what ailure might look like is a
necessary step in laying out the oundation or success.
lor a nation whose security is predicated on an enduring strategy o
dissuasion, the most undamental risk is ailure o deterrence. Deterrence is a
unction o capability, will and credibility and exists in the eye o the beholder. Its
success or ailure is measured only in the breech. 1o mitigate the risk, we must
retain a modern, agile and well-trained military, a responsie, collaboratie
interagency, and a responsible, engaged priate sector. \e also need to eole
new deterrence concepts suitable or asymmetric actors deemed undeterrable` in
the Cold \ar construct.
32



32
George P. Shultz, \illiam J. Perry, lenry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Deterrence in the Age o
Nuclear Prolieration: 1he doctrine o mutual assured destruction is obsolete in the post-Cold \ar
era,` 1be !att treet ]ovrvat, March , 2011,
http:,,online.wsj.com,article,SB100014240524803300904561860530169414.html, Amatzia
Baram,Deterrence Lessons lrom Iraq: Rationality Is Not the Only Key to Containment,` oreigv .ffair.,
July,August 2012, http:,,www.oreignaairs.com,articles,13693,amatzia-baram,deterrence-
lessons-rom-iraq, Robert G. Joseph and Keith B. Payne, On Deterring Iran,` ^atiovat Rerier, June
25, 2012, http:,,www.nationalreiew.com,articles,303826,deterring-iran-robert-g-joseph.

Winter 2013 | 79
Strategic Imperaties


Strategic risk can also mount through the accumulation o shortalls in
recapitalization and modernization, stale strategic and operational concepts, and
ailure to reitalize organizational ethos, outdated structures, sector boundaries, and
hierarchical relationships. America`s uture success depends upon its ability to
adopt new, releant concepts and technologies, suitable to the dynamics o the
strategic enironment.

National Imperatives

1oday`s conluence o global trends oreshadows signiicant challenges to the
nation`s security. 1he world is at an historic inlection point, demanding an equally
comprehensie transormation. 1he uture strategic enironment will be shaped by
the interaction o globalization, economic disparities and competition or resources,
diusion o technology and inormation networks whose ery nature accords
unprecedented ability to cause wide-scale damage, and systemic upheaals impacting
state and non-state actors and, thereby, international institutions and the world
order. 1he ollowing are salient eatures o this increasingly complex, dynamic,
lethal, and uncertain enironment:

Violent extremism and ethnic strie-a global, generational, ideological struggle,

Prolieration o weapons o mass destruction and empowering technologies,

Rising peer competitors with oracious appetites or resources and inluence,

Predatory and unpredictable regional actors,

Increasing lethality and risk o intrusion by terrorist and criminal organizations,

Systemic instability in key regions ,political, economic, social, ecological,,

Unprecedented elocity o technological change and military adaptation,

Aailability o adanced weapons in a burgeoning global marketplace,

Lxponential growth in olume, exchange and access to inormation,

Greatly reduced ability to retain high-leel national security secrets, and

Lxtremely rapid decay rates or any domain adantage.

1hese dynamics are closely intertwined with the changing character o warare.
laing experienced-or icariously learned-the cost o challenging the United
States head-on, would-be adersaries are deeloping asymmetric approaches to
80 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON
circument America`s core adantages, while undermining international support and
domestic resole.
33

1he unprecedented lethality and eectieness o \estern militaries deter
opponents rom massing on the battleield, driing them to adopt distributed and
dispersed operations. 1hey ind maneuer space and sanctuary in dense urban areas,
ungoerned hinterlands, and loosely regulated inormation and social networks.
1hese adersaries pose a signiicant challenge to America`s ital interests at home
and abroad.
Meanwhile, ascendant powers-lush with new wealth and hungry or
resources and status-are posturing to contest U.S. superiority. 1hese adaptie
competitors are also translating lessons rom recent conlicts into new concepts,
capabilities and doctrines tailored to counter U.S. strengths and exploit
ulnerabilities.
34
Consequently, the United States and its allies ace an
unprecedentedly aried array o threats, ranging rom existential to potentially
crippling perils.
Lxistential threats are risks to America`s way o lie as a democratic society
with a unctioning economy, goernance, public serices, and inrastructure. By
deinition, the result o an existential threat is that the United States, as we know it,
ceases to exist. Among such threats are: large-scale nuclear attack, biological attack
against people and,or ood supply chain, total cuto o energy, massie cyber
attack-to include electro-magnetic pulse ,LMP,-which brings our way o lie to a
standstill, rapidly spreading pandemic oerwhelming all serices, natural disaster on
an unimaginable scale, weaponized, disruptie technology that threatens extinction
or long-term paralysis ,e.g., bioengineered pathogens or plasma weapons,.
Among existential threats to allies-possible, but unlikely to the United
States-are: oreign inasion, genocide, iolent regime change resulting in ciil or
cross-border war, amine ,natural or man-made,, climate change leading to mass
migration.
Lxistential threats should be distinguished rom crippling threats which
seerely aect a segment o society, a geographic region, or an isolated portion o
the country`s inrastructure. A crippling threat is recoerable, although the recoery

33
1homas lammes, 1be tivg ava tbe tove: Ov !ar iv tbe 21
.t
Cevtvr, ,St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004,.
34
Consider, most notably: Anti access,Area denial weapons and operational concepts designed to limit
U.S. reedom o action, potentially placing Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious lorces at
unacceptable risk, Generation 4-plus` aircrat, like the Chinese J-29, that could challenge America`s
aging leet and, potentially, air superiority, Increasingly lethal, integrated air deense systems that could
negate weapons and tactics used to suppress or destroy these systems, Prolieration o surace-to-
surace missiles with growing range, precision, mobility, and maneuerability-capable o deliering
both conentional and non-conentional payloads, Prolieration o unmanned aerial systems capable o
conducting low obserable, persistent, intrusie missions in both lethal and non-lethal modes,
Resurgence o oensie counter-space capabilities, Increasing ability o een marginal actors to
obsere and track the disposition o U.S. assets through widely-aailable, inexpensie commercial
means, Attacks through cyberspace are already creating tactical, operational and strategic eects at low
cost and with relatie impunity.

Winter 2013 | 81
Strategic Imperaties

could be long and painul. A synchronized series o crippling threats could become
existential, i the goernment and the priate sector ail to break the chain o
cascading eects.
1he list o possible crippling threats is quite long and could include:
localized radiological explosions ,dirty bombs`,, threats to essential commodities
such as water, uel, ood, medicine, etc.: geographically isolated natural disasters,
isolatable low-order nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks, large-scale reugee low
into southeast or southwest United States, blockage o major transportation nodes,
sporadic cyber attacks on communications inrastructure, stock exchange, power
grid, and petro-chemical plants, synchronized terror attacks on high-alue, high-
prestige targets, massie public unrest and economic collapse.
Len i the United States continues to successully dissuade major
competitors, their adanced equipment is prolierating worldwide. America and its
allies must also be igilant to adersary breakthroughs in ields such as cybernetics,
nanotechnology, biotechnology, electromagnetic spectrum physics, robotics,
adanced propulsion, etc. No one should assume that the next military reolution
will originate in the \est. Indeed, the hub o innoation in science and engineering
education has shited eastward. 1hereore, the United States must anticipate
innoatie combinations o traditional and new concepts, doctrines, weapons, and
disruptie technologies.
lrom this point orward, the United States should expect to be challenged
in all domains, including in and through space and cyberspace, as well as on land, at
sea, and in the air. Perhaps or the irst time in history, the ability to inlict damage
and cause strategic dislocation is no longer proportional to capital inestment,
superior motiation and training, or technological prowess. Consequently, the
Nation is in dire need o a holistic approach that balances today`s exigencies with
the ar-reaching implications o looming threats. 1ime is not on our side. Indeed,
the window o opportunity is shutting ast because eer-lower technological and
inancial entry costs aor our competitors.
1he U.S. military`s non-negotiable commitment is to proide orces
proicient across the ull range o military operations to protect the United States, its
alues, interests and allies, deter conlict and preent surprise, and, should
deterrence ail, preail against any adersary. 1he Joint 1eam must enhance its own
asymmetric adantages while retaining the ability to saeguard the lomeland, assure
allies, dissuade opponents, and inlict strategic paralysis on adersaries.
35

During an era in which the national debt is itsel a major security threat, all
Serices should aoid duplication in acquisition, procurement, manning, and
operations. 1o this end, the series o cross-Serice initiaties already underway-

35
1be ^atiovat Mititar, trateg, of tbe |vitea tate. of .verica, Reaefivivg .verica`. Mititar, eaaer.bi, 2011,
http:,,www.jcs.mil,content,iles,2011-02,020811084800_2011_NMS_-_08_lLB_2011.pd.
82 | Orbis
KASS AND LONDON

aimed at generating both saings and synergies-should continue to expand.
36
1he
Department o Deense should also enhance collaboration with the Departments o
State and lomeland Security, the Intelligence Community, law enorcement, other
Interagency, and priate sector partners to acilitate a more eectie orchestration
o all elements o national power.
America`s strategic partnerships are more important than eer. 1he United
States must strengthen its coalitions, attending to interoperability among allies.
Building these relationships is both an engine o progress and prosperity, as well as a
potent instrument o America`s diplomacy in an interconnected world.
3

1he shared touchstone o the irtues enshrined in the Constitution and a
single, uniying purpose to proide or the common deense` must remain
unchanged. 1he United States will hae neither the buer o time nor the barrier o
oceans in uture conlicts. 1he character, tempo and elocity o modern warare
already seerely test the military`s ability to anticipate and adapt. 1hereore,
redeining the interagency and the priate-public relationship is an urgent national
security requirement-not a luxury we can deer. It is also a duty to bequeath a
dominant, agile, responsible joint, interagency, and public-priate team to those that
will ollow in serice to the nation. Rising to this challenge is not a choice. It is both
a shared responsibility and an urgent national imperatie.


36
1he U.S. Nay`s and Air lorce`s Air-Sea Battle is a good example. General Norton A. Schwartz,
USAl & Admiral Jonathan \. Greenert, Air-Sea Battle Promoting Stability in an Lra o
Uncertainty,` 1be .vericav vtere.t, lebruary 20, 2012, http:,,www.the-american-
interest.com,article.cmpiece~1212.
3
Robert M. Gates, lelping Others Deend 1hemseles: 1he luture o U.S. Security Assistance,`
oreigv .ffair., May,June 2010, http:,,www.oreignaairs.com,articles,66224,robert-m-
gates,helping-others-deend-themseles, Admiral James G. Staridis, USN, Partver.bi for tbe .verica.:
!e.terv evi.bere trateg, ava |.. ovtberv Covvava ,\ashington, D.C.: NDU Uniersity Press, 2010,.