BENJAMIN CO., petitioner and appellee, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

oppositor and appellant.
1960-05-26 | G.R. No. L-12150
D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for naturalization which, after hearing was granted, the court ordering that after the
lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in
Republic Act No. 503 have been complied with, a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner.
Petitioner was born on March 13, 1931 in Bangued, Abra. He is the son of Go Cham and Yu Suan, both
Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go,
the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued, Abra. He speaks and writes
English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and
finished his primary studies in the "Colegio" in Bangued, Abra, both schools being recognized by the
government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral
turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive
organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad.
He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition
is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil department.
He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store known as "Go
Tian Store" in Bangued, Abra. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he
claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like
the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he
has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00
in his tobacco business. He expects to make P2,000.00 more from the same business without however
specifying to what years said income would correspond. With respect to the store of which he claims to
be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth
of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a
salesman therein.
He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He
claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his
income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which
he claims to have invested in his tobacco business. On cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him if
he believed in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution, he answered that "He believes in the
laws of the Philippines." However, he did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although
when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered "democracy". Asked why he did
not file his income tax return, he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return. He merely
promised, that he would file his. He presented his alien certificate of registration, but did not present the
alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.
The government is now appealing the decision of the trial court on the ground that it erred in finding that
petitioner has all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the
law.
The government contends that from the evidence itself introduced by petitioner it would appear that he
failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a
Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the
constitution and that it was only on cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him whether he believed in
the principles underlying the constitution, that he answered that "He believes in the laws of the
Philippines", and that when he was asked what those laws he believes in, he gave an answer which
conveys the meaning that he believes in democracy or in a democratic form of government. It is
contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must
believe in the principles underlying our constitution.
There is merit in this claim. Indeed, the scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not
necessarily include the constitution which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the
principles underlying our constitution. Thus, our constitution expressly declares as one of its fundamental
policies that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, that the defense of the
State is the prime duty of the government, that the duty and right of the parents to rear their children for
civic efficiency shall receive the support of the State, and that the promotion of social justice shall be its
main concern. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those
principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law.
Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government
as well as with the community in which he is living. It is contended that petitioner has also failed to
comply with this legal requirement for he failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to
register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act. He
has, therefore, failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our
government.
It furthermore appears that he failed to file his income tax return despite the fact that he has a fixed
salary of P1,440.00 a year and made a profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an
amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total
of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return, a fact which indicates
that he has not also conducted himself properly in his relation with our government. His reasoning that
he made that earning during the year in which this case was being heard is not convincing.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are
constrained to hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
RICHARD VELASCO, petitioner and appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor and appellee.
1960-05-25 | G.R. No. L-14214
D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after trial, was
denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has appealed.
Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiu who
became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth in Manila on May 12, 1932 he
continuously resided in the Philippines, particularly at 1441 Magdalena St., Manila; that he finished his
elementary education at the Francisco Balagtas Elementary School, and his high school at the Arellano
University; that he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where he graduated in
dentistry in 1954; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China in Formosa; that he has not followed the
citizenship of his father when the latter became naturalized as he was then already 23 years old; that he
is single, although he is engaged to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi Eugenia; that he is
at present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly salary of P150.00;
that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary of P2,400.00 per annum, even if his
father was only an agent of Elizalde and Co.; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog;
that he is a Catholic by faith; and he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
that he does not believe in polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of men's
ideas; that he does not own any real property although he allegedly has cash savings amounting to
P3,500.00 at the Republic Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern
University, P2,000.00 shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he is
not suffering from any contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos; that he has
shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a
Filipino citizen because he considered the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.
His qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila
Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective
mother-in-law of petitioner.
The trial court found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the documentary
evidence submitted in support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco, Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua
Velasco, and that while petitioner states in his petition that his full name is Richard Velasco, the
signature thereon is Richard C. Velasco. Again, the court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses
states that the affiants personally know and are acquainted with Richard Velasco while the documentary
evidence shows that his name is Richard Chua Velasco. On the other hand, petitioner testified that he
has no alias nor other names and has always been known as Richard Velasco. No evidence was
submitted to prove that they are one and the same person.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the prospective
mother-in-law of petitioner, and as such her testimony is biased. It also found that she and her
companion witness Santiago Mariano were also the character witnesses of a brother of petitioner in his
petition for naturalization, a circumstance which in its opinion indicates that petitioner has a limited circle
of Filipino friends. The court finally found that the present income of petitioner is only P150.00 a month
which, considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing power of our peso, is neither
lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirement of the law.
Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court declared petitioner not qualified to become
a Filipino citizen.
We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at
the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month
before he filed the instant petition, and that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth
capital investment therein. This leads one to believe that petitioner's employment, even if true, is but a
convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to show a token compliance with the
requirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must have a lucrative income or occupation.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Y Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are
constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
In the matter of the petition of CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES to be admitted a
citizen of the Philippines. CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES, petitioner-appellee, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
1958-11-29 | G.R. No. L-10761
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, from a decision, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, granting the petition for naturalization, as citizen of the Philippines, of appellee
Celestino Co y Quing Reyes.
Appellant maintains that:
"1. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee has failed to comply with all the
requisites prescribed by the law to acquire Philippine citizenship.
"2. The lower court erred in finding that the petitioner-appellee possesses all the qualifications
prescribed by Revised Naturalization Law.
"3. The lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the herein petitioner-appellee."
From the viewpoint of this Court, the question raised in the first assignment of error is the only one that
requires consideration, namely: did the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and
granting the petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that said petition was publish in the
Official Gazette only once, instead of three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473.
This provision reads:
"Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the
same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette,
and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides,
and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and
conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such
notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the
Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of
his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninety
days from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible,
forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data
to the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Justice, the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein the petitioner
resides."
This section was squarely construed and applied in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines, 101
Phil,, 649, in which we said:
"It could be seen that, under the aforequoted section of the Revised Naturalization Law, the notice
of hearing of the application for citizenship should be published three times in the Official Gazette,
or, in the language of the law, 'once a week for three consecutive weeks, and so in the order of
publication of the notice of hearing of the present case it was enjoined that the same be made
'once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the Voz de Manila.' The
notice of hearing of this case should therefore have been published three times not only in the Voz
de Manila but in the Official Gazette as well. And there being only one publication of said notice of
hearing in this case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly incomplete and therefore insufficient
to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and grant the petition. It is argued, however,
that there has been a substantial compliance with law because the notice of hearing in question
was published three times in the Voz de Manila and once in the Official Gazette; but since the law
expressly provides that the notice of hearing be published three times, this should be strictly
observed; for, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief,
'The publication required by law in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is a means of screening aliens applying for Filipino citizenship by giving the public
a chance to come forward and protest the grant of such citizenship if they possess any
information derogatory to the applicant. The official organ of the government caters to the
officials and employees of the government and to the lawyers as well. These people, by
reason of their occupation are in a better position to acquire knowledge of aliens running
afoul of the law than the average reader who scans the newspapers for news. If the law was
not after the number of times the notice is published in the Official Gazette, it could have
expressed in words that a single publication in the Official Gazette would suffice; but when
the law expressly provides its publication 'once a week for 3 consecutive weeks' the
intention to give the reading public 3 chances to read that item is very clear. A single
publication therefore of the notice where the law requires 3 is an incomplete publication, and
an incomplete publication is not a valid publication. The grant of citizenship is only a mere
privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the applicant is essential.'
"Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the publication of the notice of
hearing should be made for three consecutive weeks and as the Official Gazette is now being
published monthly, and not weekly as it was before, petitioner cannot actually comply with law;
and because he had the notice of hearing in question published, once, in the Official Gazette, he
should be given the benefit of having followed the law. This contention does not merits serious
consideration. While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannot actually be published for
three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is no less true that said notice may be published
three times consecutively, altho not weekly, in the Official Gazette, and because the true intent of
the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is our considered opinion that in the instant
case the single publication of the notice of hearing in question is not a sufficient compliance with
law."
We find no valid reason to depart from such view. Indeed, said section 9 requires that the petition for
naturalization be published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This
provision demands compliance with the following requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be
weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3) and these must be "consecutive".
Compliance with the first condition was, admittedly, impossible, inasmuch as, until recently, the Official
Gazette was not published weekly. Petitioner could have, and, hence, he should have, complied,
however, with the second and third conditions. Hence, the publication once in the Official Gazette is not
a substantial compliance with the provisions of the aforementioned section 9.
Appellee alleges, however, that the sufficiency of said publication was not questioned in the lower court
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; that the duty to publish the petition is imposed by law
upon the clerk of court, not upon petitioner; and that non-compliance with said section 9 "is not a fatal
defect unless it is actually established that it prejudices the opposition to the application."
This pretense is untenable. The decision of the lower court granting appellee's petition for naturalization
affected his personal status and accordingly, it "is in the nature of a judgment in rem" (2 C. J. 1123; U. S.
vs. Gleason [C.C.N.Y.] 78 Fed. 396 [aff. 90 Fed. 778, 33 CCA 272]; In re O'Sullivan, 137 Mo. A. 214, 117
S.W. 651; Esker vs. McCoy, 5 Oh. Dec. [Reprint] 573; 6 Am. L. Rec. 694; 3 C.J.S. 853; 31 Am. Jur. 98).
As stated in Scott vs. Stroback (49 Ala. 477, 490): "A judgment admitting an alien to citizenship has none
of the properties or qualities of a judicial proceeding in personam. It is rather in rem."
"A proceeding in rem is not confined to the status of things, but extends to the status of individuals
and their relation to others." (I Am. Jur., p. 436.)
"Proceedings in rem include not only those instituted to obtain decrees or judgments against
property as forfeited in the admiralty or the English exchequer, or as a prize, but also suits against
property to enforce a lien or privilege in the admiralty courts, and suits to obtain a sentence
judgment, or decree of other upon the personal status or relations of the party, such as marriage,
divorce, bastardy settlement, or the like. Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal. 118, 125, citing Bouv."
(21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 542.)
Accordingly, the decision of the lower court, in the case at bar, if valid, would be binding upon "all the
world" (Smith vs. Smith, W. Va. 83 S.E. 2d. 923, 926). In the language of the Court in Bartero vs. Real
Estate Savings Bank (10 Mo. App. 76, 78):
"A judgment in rem is generally said to be a judgment declaratory of the status of some
subject-matter, whether this be a person, or a thing. Thus the probate of a will fixes the status of
the document as a will; so a decree establishing or dissolving a marriage is a judgment in rem,
because it fixes the status of the person. A judgment or forfeiture against specified articles of
goods for violation of the revenue laws is a judgment in rem. In such case the judgment is
conclusive against all the world, . . ." (21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 540.)
Upon the other hand, in order that a court could validly try and decide any case, "it must have jurisdiction
both over the subject- matter and over the persons of the parties" (Comments on the Rules of Court, by
Moran, Vol. I [1957 ed.] p. 128). Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner is acquired by his voluntary
submission to the authority of the Court, resulting from the filing of the complaint or petition. Jurisdiction
over other parties may be obtained, either by their voluntary appearance or by service of summons (42
Am. Jur. p. 7). In a proceeding in rem, which binds the "whole world", the latter is, in legal contemplation,
a party therein, for, otherwise, it could not be bound by the result thereof. It being impossible to serve
summons personally upon every human being in this world, the summons must be published as
provided by law. Otherwise, the court would have no jurisdiction over all parties concerned and, as a
consequence, any decision rendered in the case would be a nullity (42 Am. Jur. 8; Scott vs. McNeal, 154
U.S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Earle vs. McVeigh,
91 U.S. 503, 23 L. ed. 398; Hobby vs. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S.E. 113, 20 Am. St. Rep. 301; Davies vs.
Thompson, 61 Okla. 21, 160 P. 75, LRA 1917-B 395; Greenwood vs. Furr [Tex Civ. App.] 251 S.W. 332;
44 Am. Jur. 98). For this reason, it is well settled that the procedure prescribed by law for the
naturalization of an alien "should be strictly followed" (2 C.J. 1120, citing In re Hollo, 206 Fed. 852; Ex
parte Lange, 197 Fed. 769; In re Liberman, 193 Fed. 301; State vs. King County Superior Ct., 75 Wash.
239, 134 P. 916; see, also, 3 C.J.S. 844). In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, naturalization laws
"should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against applicant for
citizenship" (3 C.J.S. 833). And such, accordingly, has been the criterion adopted by this Court in the
interpretation and application of our naturalization laws. (Pardo vs. Republic, 85 Phil., 323; 47 Off. Gaz.,
3447-3450; Ng vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 366; 50 Off. Gaz., 1599; Yu vs. Republic, L-3808, July 29, 1952;
Bautista vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 818; De la Cruz vs. Republic, 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 958; Tiao vs. Republic, 95
Phil., 709; Sam vs. Republic, 98 Phil., 592; 53 Off. Gaz., [1] 145; Ong Son Cui vs. Republic, 101 Phil.,
649; 55 Off. Gaz. [22] 4044.)
As the Supreme Court of the U.S. has aptly put it in U.S. vs. Gingsberg (243 U.S. 472, 61 L. ed. 853,
856), and quoted, approvingly, by this Court in Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines (supra):
"An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only upon
terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or
modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of the matters so vital to
the public welfare."
In the language of the editors of the American Jurisprudence:
". . . It is not within the province of the courts to make bargains with applicants for
naturalization. The courts have no choice but to require that there be a full compliance with
the statutory provision." (2 Am. Jur. p. 577.)
Referring, specifically to service of notice by publication, American Jurisprudence has this to say:
"Substituted service and service by publication was unknown to the common law but depends
upon statutory authorization, and the principle of statutory construction that there must be strict
compliance with enactments modifying the course of common law in regard to legal proceedings is
exemplified in the cases involving the construction and application of provisions authorizing
substituted and constructive service. When, by the local law, substituted or constructive service is
in certain situations submitted in the place of personal service when the latter is inconvenient or
impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to
support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive service. Jurisdiction is not to be
assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the
power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the statute have been
complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record. The fact that the defendant had
actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the service effectual if in fact the process
was not served in accordance with the requirements of the statute." (42 Am. Jur. pp. 55-56.)
In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition, affects
the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the
authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the
petitioner or his counsel. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect.
Upon the other hand, for obvious reasons, public interest demands that the courts of justice refrain from
performing invalid acts. Consequently, it is not only proper, but, also, advisable, and, even, necessary,
that the issue raised in appellant's first assignment of error be considered and decided by us. In any
event, the provisions of section 10, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, relative to the implied waiver of
defenses not pleaded in the answer or motion to dismiss," shall not apply to . . . naturalization . . .
proceedings, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient" -
pursuant to Rule 132 of said Rules of Court - and it is, neither "practicable", nor "convenient", to do so in
the case at bar.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against petitioner-appellee. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
I consider that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with law.
Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires that the clerk of court publish the petition for
naturalization at the petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official
Gazette, a publication undertaken by the Government through the Bureau of Printing, and in one of the
newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. It is admitted that at the
time the petition was filed the Official Gazette was being published once a month. It is on account of the
failure to have published the petition for naturalization in the Official Gazette once a wekk for three
consecutive weeks that the majority voted to reverse the judgment of the lower court granting the petition
for naturalization. I regret to be unable to subscribe to their view.
The majority admits that compliance was impossible and suggests that Section 9 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 must be construed to mean that the publication in the Official Gazette should be made once a
month for three consecutive months. I cannot, however, persuade myself to believe that this construction
could have been the intention of the legislature. An obligation based on an impossible condition is void
(Art. 1183, New Civil Code). Had the legislature merely provided in said act that such petitions should be
published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, or had it been a fact that the Official
Gazette was being published at the time of the passage of said act once a week, then I shall have been
coinvinced by the majority view. The significant fact of which we may take judicial notice and whichI
cannot lose sight of is that at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Official Gazette
was being regularly published three times a week - every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, so that the
legislative could not have intended that the publication of the petition for naturalization be simply made in
three consecutive issues of the Gazette. The legislature clearly meant what the law provides -
publication in the Official Gazette, once a week for three consecutive weeks.
"Where an act is free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
its spirit." (Gooden vs. Police Jury of Lincoln Parish, 48 So. 196, 122 La. 755; Flanagan vs. City of New
Orleans, 9 Orleans App. 19.)
"Courts may not look beyond letter of unambiguous statute in pretended attempt to ascertain reason
prompting enactment." (Item Co. vs. National Dyers & Cleaners, 130 So. 879, 15 La App. 108, followed
in Deverges vs. National Dyers & Cleaners, 130 So. 882 15 La. App. 339.)
"Where an act is free from ambiguity, the court will not give its language a different interpretation from
that which the words used clearly impost." (Denton vs. Reading, 22 La Ann. 607.)
"Where language is clear and unambiguous a statute must be held to mean what it plainly expresses,
and no room is left for construction." (Walker vs. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 34 So. 749, 110 La. 718.)
When the Government no longer published the Official Gazette three times a week, but monthly, such
that one of the conditions imposed by the statute became impossible of compliance without the fault of
the appellee, I am of the opinion that such condition ceases to be mandatory or obligatory, and should
be dispensed with.
"A statute should be interpreted in a way that will make it practically workable without doing violence to
other rules of construction." (Nevada vs. Slemmons, 43 ALR (2d) 693, 244 Iowa 1068, 59 N. W. (2d)
793.)
". . . Hence if a statute apparently requires the performance of things which cannot be performed, or
apparently bases its commands upon the assumption of an impossible state of affairs, the courts must
seek for some interpretation of its terms, not too strained or fantastic, which will avoid these results. But
yet they are not at liberty to reconstruct the statute, or to import into it, on merely conjectural grounds, a
meaning which its terms will not warrant. . . ." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 121.)
In Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, et al., 77 Phil., 1012; 44 Off. Gaz. 1480, 1483, we
have said that the purpose and intention of the legislature in requiring the publication of the petition for
naturalization in the Official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation, among other
requirements, was to inform the officers concerned and the public in general of the filing of such petition
in order that the public officers and private citizens supposed to be acquainted with the petitioner may
furnish the Solicitor General or the provincial fiscal with such information and evidence as there may be
against the petitioner. This purpose has been accomplished in the instant case by the publication of
appellee's petition for naturalization once in the Official Gazette and once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. As a matter of fact, an opposition to the application was
interposed by the Provincial Fiscal who appeared at the trial. And yet it is to be noted that the record of
this case is silent as to hos the opposition has been prejudiced by the non-publication of the petition in
two more issues of the Official Gazette. (Delgado vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-2546, Jan.
28, 1950; Barreto vs. Republic of the Philippines, 87 Phil., 731; Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines,
87 Phil., 818.)
Montemayor, J., concurs.
HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT, Represented by LEONILA B. JUGALBOT,
Petitioners, versus COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA,
Represented by LOLITA R. GOROSPE, Administratrix, Respondents.
2007-03-12 | G.R. No. 170346
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioners, Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by their attorney-in-fact Leonila Jugalbot, assail the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 where the
petitioners' title to the disputed property, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. E-103,
was cancelled and the previous title, TCT No. T-11543, was reinstated in the name of Virginia A. Roa.
The appellate court reversed the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office in DARAB Case No. 7966, affirming the Decision[4] of the
Provincial Adjudicator and the Order[5] denying the motion for reconsideration in DARAB Case No. X
(06-1358) filed in Misamis Oriental, for Cancellation of TCT No. E-103, Recovery of Possession and
Damages.
On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbot based on the
latter's claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision plan (LRC) TSD-10465, subject
property of the case at bar, with an area of 6,229 square meters, located at Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City. The subject property was registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1, 1970 in the name of "Virginia A.
Roa married to Pedro N. Roa." The property was originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili
from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966.[6]
Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s. On a
Certification dated January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Leader
Eduardo Maandig, the subject property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and
primarily devoted to rice and corn. On March 1, 1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered with the
Register of Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-103.[7]
On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB
Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of
Possession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot, docketed as DARAB Case No. X (06-1358).[8]
On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissing private
respondents' complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent. Private respondents'
motion for reconsideration was denied.[9]
On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on the sole ground
that private respondents' right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot's title was barred by prescription.
It held that an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the
expiration of one year from the decree of registration.[10]
On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents' motion for reconsideration,[11] hence
they filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court
reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on four grounds: (1) the absence of a
tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was
less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification
of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of
Nicolas Jugalbot, and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Simply stated, are petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?
As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals[12] and subsequently in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals
,[13] the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question
does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence
of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in
order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject
matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.[14]
Valencia v. Court of Appeals[15] further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements
of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be
evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of
the records and documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the
allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents. The
principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.[16]
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It
is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals.[17] The intent of the parties, the
understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.[18]
Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No.
27. Private respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of
coverage of the property subject matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did
not have any tenant on the same property; that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No.
27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding
was less than seven (7) hectares.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to
the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.
Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of
Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed
to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices
were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not
the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records,
pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.
Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals[19] held that the presumption under civil law that all property of
the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[20] In Spouses
Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during
the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact that when the title over the land in question was
issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name
of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the
property.[21]
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the phrase "married to" appearing in
certificates of title is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture and are
merely descriptive of the marital status of the person indicated therein. The clear import from the
certificate of title is that Virginia is the owner of the property, the same having been registered in her
name alone, and being "married to Pedro N. Roa" was merely descriptive of her civil status.[22] Since no
proof was adduced that the property was acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Virginia Roa, the
fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Virginia Roa was already married to Pedro
N. Roa as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa," does
not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.
In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team
leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of
October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocular
inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of
Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site
fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the
denial of due process.
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23] applies to the case at bar since there was likewise
a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the
petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before
acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired.[24] Both in
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how
this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.
Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed.
Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of
expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to
Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence,
any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be
deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the
petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests,
except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of his
farm household cultivated the land in question. No proof was presented except for their self-serving
statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent evidence, aside from their self-serving
statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner,
and establish a tenancy relationship.
Furthermore, in the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, it was undisputed that Nicolas Jugalbot was
a soldier in the United States Army from June 15, 1946 to April 27, 1949[25] and upon retirement,
migrated to the United States and returned to the Philippines sometime in 1998.[26] It was established
that Jugalbot's wife Miguela and daughter Lilia P. Jugalbot are residents of 17623 Grayland Avenue,
Artesia, California, U.S.A., where Nicolas Jugalbot spent his retirement.[27] Thus, the DAR, in particular
its team leader Eduardo Maandig, haphazardly issued a certification dated January 8, 1988 that the
subject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 by Nicolas Jugalbot and primarily devoted to rice
and corn without the benefit of any on-site fact-finding investigation and report. This certification became
the basis of the emancipation patent and subsequently, TCT No. E-103 issued on March 1, 1988, which
was less than two months from the issuance of the unsubstantiated DAR certification. Coincidentally,
October 21, 1972 is the date Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law.
Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A. Roa, freely gave her consent, whether
expressly or impliedly, to establish a tenancy relationship over her paraphernal property.
As declared in Castillo v. Court of Appeals,[28] absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be
a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.[29]
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[30] we ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements
regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working
on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.
Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the
fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to
prove the element of sharing.[31] We further observed in Berenguer, Jr.:
With respect to the assertion made by respondent Mamerto Venasquez that he is not only a tenant of a
portion of the petitioner's landholding but also an overseer of the entire property subject of this
controversy, there is no evidence on record except his own claim in support thereof. The witnesses who
were presented in court in an effort to bolster Mamerto's claim merely testified that they saw him working
on the petitioner's landholding. More importantly, his own witnesses even categorically stated that they
did not know the relationship of Mamerto and the petitioner in relation to the said landholding. x x x The
fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the
form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved. (Underscoring supplied)
x x x x
In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be satisfactorily inferred that a sharing
arrangement is present between the contending parties, we, as a court of last resort, are duty-bound to
correct inferences made by the courts below which are manifestly mistaken or absurd. x x x
Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist
between the petitioner and the private respondents. (Underscoring supplied)[32]
Bejasa v. Court of Appeals[33] likewise held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be
adduced.[34] In addition -
The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that
Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land.
However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the
Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy
agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria
agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy
relationship, but a mere civil law lease.[35]
Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes v.
Department of Agrarian Reform,[36] we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites
does not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is
so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy
laws.[37] The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure,
not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.[38]
As reiterated in Qua,[39] the fact that the source of livelihood of the alleged tenants is not derived from
the lots they are allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.[40]
Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property and not
agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084 issued on September 3, 1998 clearly shows that
the subject property Lot 2180-C covered by TCT No. T-11543 with an area of 6,229 square meters and
owned by Virginia A. Roa is located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b),
Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and
Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.[41] To bolster the residential nature of the property, it must
also be noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform Council was organized or appointed by the DAR
existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, as all lands have been classified as residential or
commercial, as certified by Barangay Captain of Lapasan.[42]
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,[43] we held that an agricultural leasehold cannot be established on
land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential
subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a
residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a
residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.[44]
This Court in Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals[45] succinctly ruled that the land surrounded by a
residential zone is always classified as residential. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are
now dotted with residences and, apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being
developed together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or
corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of a metropolitan area
cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian
reform program.[46]
Despite the apparent lack of evidence establishing a tenancy relationship between petitioners and
private respondents, the DARAB improperly recognized the existence of such a relationship in complete
disregard of the essential requisites under Presidential Decree No. 27. DARAB committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing an Emancipation Patent to Nicolas Jugalbot.
Once again, Benavidez v. Court of Appeals[47] is illustrative in its pronouncement that an alleged
agricultural tenant tilling the land does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute which calls
for the application of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the assumption of jurisdiction by the DARAB. It is
absolutely necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants.
In Benavidez, there was no showing that there existed any tenancy relationship between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the case fell outside the coverage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
consequently, it was the Municipal Trial Court and not the DARAB which had jurisdiction over the
controversy between petitioner and private respondent.[48]
Verily, Morta, Sr. v. Occidental[49] ruled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must
exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a
dispute, it would be essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a landlord-tenant relationship:
The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina
Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was her recognized
tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute
as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of
ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings
made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The
issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between
the claimants thereof.[50]
At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered as
tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendo that Josefina
Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however,
Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship
between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue
involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. [51]
In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[52] the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is
limited to the following: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b)
resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial and
other non-agricultural uses.[53]
To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa, to which Presidential Decree No.
27 is found to be inapplicable; hence, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not
only committed a serious error in judgment, which the Court of Appeals properly corrected, but the
former likewise committed a palpable error in jurisdiction which is contrary to law and jurisprudence. For
all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court decision and likewise hold that the DARAB
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the subject matter of
the present action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and that all the essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship were sorely lacking in the case at bar.
On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and
maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with
equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of
protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of
defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them.[54]
As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not be carried out to
such an extent as to deny justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side.
For in the eyes of the Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the
bedrock principle by which our Republic abides.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823
promulgated on October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is
ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. E-103 for having been issued without factual and
legal basis, and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa.
The city Assessor's Office of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed to CANCEL Tax Declaration No.
80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot and RESTORE Tax Declaration No. 270922 in the name of Virginia
Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by Leonila B. Jugalbot or any other person
claiming a right or interest to the disputed lot through the latter's title are directed to VACATE the
premises thereof and peaceably turn over its possession to petitioners Heirs of Virginia A. Roa,
represented by Lolita R. Gorospe. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 28-41. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Ramon R. Garcia.
[2] Id. at 44-49. Penned by DAR Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes, DARAB Vice-Chairman, and
concurred in by Undersecretary Federico A. Poblete, Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, Assistant
Secretary Wilfredo M. Peaflor and Assistant Secretary Edwin C. Sales, Members. DAR Secretary
Horacio R. Morales, Jr., Chairman and Undersecretary Conrado S. Navarro, Member, did not take part.
[3] Id. at 60-61. Penned by DAR Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes, DARAB Vice-Chairman, and
concurred in by Undersecretary Rolando G. Mangulabnan, Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano,
Assistant Secretary Edgar A. Igano, and Assistant Secretary Rustico T. de Belen, Members. DAR
Secretary Roberto M. Pagdanganan, Chairman and Undersecretary Ricardo S. Arlanza, Member, did not
take part.
[4] Id. at 55-58. Penned by Provincial Adjudicator Leandricia M. Monsanto.
[5] Id. at 59. Penned by Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr.
[6] Id. at 29-30.
[7] Id. at 30.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 31.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] G.R. No. 95318, June 11, 1991, 198 SCRA 236.
[13] G.R. No. 125848, September 6, 1999, 313 SCRA 714.
[14] Id. at 719.
[15] 449 Phil. 711 (2003).
[16] Id. at 736.
[17] G.R. No. 105586, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 503.
[18] Id. at 511.
[19] 334 Phil. 577 (1997).
[20] Id. at 586.
[21] Id.
[22] Rollo, p. 39.
[23] G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106.
[24] Id. at 147.
[25] Rollo, p. 102.
[26] Id. at 37.
[27] Id.
[28] G.R. No. 98028, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 529.
[29] Id. at 536.
[30] G.R. No. L-60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431.
[31] Id. at 439.
[32] Id. at 439-440.
[33] G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 190.
[34] Id. at 199.
[35] Id.
[36] G.R. No. L-78214, December 5, 1998, 168 SCRA 247.
[37] Id. at 254.
[38] Philippine National Railways v. Del Valle, G.R. No. L-29381, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 573,
580.
[39] Supra note 13.
[40] Id. at 239-240.
[41] Rollo, p. 143.
[42] Id. at 145.
[43] G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 398.
[44] Id. at 401.
[45] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[46] Id. at 438.
[47] Supra note 14.
[48] Id. at 719-720.
[49] 367 Phil. 438 (1999).
[50] Id. at 446.
[51] Id. at 447.
[52] UDK No. 9864, December 3, 1990, 191 SCRA 885.
[53] Id. at 889.
[54] Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 176. Ynares-Santiago, J., concurring and
dissenting.
In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE of PETRONILA TAMPOY, deceased, vs.
DIOSDADA ALBERASTINE, petitioner and appellant.
1960-02-25 | G.R. No. L-14322
D E C I S I O N
This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament of one
Petronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in accordance with law and petitioner had presented
oral and documentaryevidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin
of the first of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling
but the Court of Appeals certified the case to us because it involves purely a question of law.
The facts of this case as found by the trial court as follows:
De las pruebas resulta que Petronila Tampoy, ya viuda y sin hijos, rogo a Bonigfacio Mioza que la
leyera el testamento Exhibito A y la expicara su contenido en su casa en al calle San Miguel, del
municipio de Argao, provincia de Cebu, en 19 de noviember de 1939, y lasi lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza en
presencia de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, y
despues de conformarse con el contendido del testamento, ella rogo a Bonifacio Mioza, que escribiera
su nombre al pie del testamento, en la pagina segunda, y asi lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza, y despues ella
estampo su marca digital entra su nombre y apelido en presencia de todos y cada uno de los tres
testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy y de Bonifacio Mioza,
y despues, Bonifacio Mioza firmo tambien al pie del todos y cada uno de lo tres testigos arriba
nombrados. La testadora asi como Bonifacio Mioza parte de la primera pagina del testamento qeu se
halla compuesto de dos paginas. Todos y cada uno de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan,
Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, firmaron al pie de la clausula de atestiguamiento que esta escrita
en la pagina segunda del testamento y en la margen izquierda de la misma pagina 2 y de la pagina
primera en presencia de la testadora, de Bonifacio Mioza, del abogado Kintanar y de todos y cada uno
de ellos. El testamento fue otorgado por la testadora libre y expontaneament, sin haber sido amenazada,
forzada o intimidada, y sin haberse ejercido sobre ella influencia indebida, estando la misma en pleno
uso de sus facultades mentales y disfrutando de buena salud. La testadore fallecio en su case en Argao
en 22 de febrero de 1957 (Vease certificado de defuncion Exhibito B). La heredera instituida en el
testamento, Carmen Alberastine, murio dos semanas despues que la testadora, o sea en 7 de Marzo de
1957, dejando a su madre, la solicitante Diosdada Alberastine.
The above facts are not controverted, there being no opposition to the probate of the will. However, the
trial court denied the petition on the ground that the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
the testatrix. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside for the reason that, although the first page
of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses her true intention
to givethe property to her whose claims remains undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has
filed any to the opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the
thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed by
the three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed,
the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the
true and voluntary will of the deceased.
This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Thus, Section
618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in
the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation
clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will
(Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to
be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A
will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All
these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the
defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other
conditions or dispence with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil.,
405, 407; See also Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs.
Morata, 54 Phil., 481).
Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix
on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the
conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera
and Gutierrez, David, JJ., concur.
RUFINO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. CAYETANO ALCALA ET AL.,
opponents-appellants, AQUILINA MINAS, wife of the opponent Isaac Reynoso, now
deceased, opponent-appellee.
1930-11-05 | G.R. No. 32672
D E C I S I O N
JOHNSON, J.:
This case relates to the probate of the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara. On or about March 26, 1929,
a petition was filed by Rufino R. Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas,
praying (1) that the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara be admitted to probate, and (2) that he be
appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The petition was accompanied by the will
(Exhibit A) written in Tagalog, with its translation into English (Exhibit A-1).
To said petition Cayetano Alcala, husband of the deceased, filed an opposition. Oppositions were also
filed by the spouses Maximino de Luna and Petra Rodriguez, and by Isaac Reynoso, all of them relatives
of the deceased. The oppositions were based on the following grounds: (1) That the will was not
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by Act No. 190, and (2) that the signatures of the
testatrix were not authentic and were procured through fraud and undue influence.
Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial before Francisco Enage, judge. After
hearing the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the opponents in support of their respective claims,
the trial court denied the petition for the probate of the will, and rendered a judgment in favor of the
opponents declaring the will invalid on the ground that the attestation clause thereof was not in
conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. The pertinent parts of the
decision read as follows:
"Aunque en realidad la testadora y los testigos instrumentales firmaron todas las paginas del
testamento de autos en su margen izquierdo, no se ha hecho constar, sin embargo, este hecho en
la clausula de atestiguamiento arriba transcrita. La frase que dice: `y lo firmamos nosotros los tres
testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento,' no cumple con la ley.
Deberia expresarse en dicha clausula, de que los testigos firmaron en
`todas y cada una de las hojas del testamento en su margen izquierdo,' como requiere la ley.
xxx xxx xxx
"Por todo lo expuesto, se deniega la legalizacion del testamento objeto de la solicitud de autos,
con las costas al solicitante."
From that judgment both the petitioner and the opponents, with the exception of Isaac Reynoso,
appealed.
The petitioner-appellant now contends that the lower court erred in not admitting the will to probate
because of the alleged defect of the attestation clause in not expressly stating that the testatrix and
witnesses signed each and every page of the will "on the left margin." It is contended that the omission in
the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin" is not fatal because the will itself shows that each
and every page thereof was signed on the left margin, and that this failure of the attestation clause to
specifically state the particular location of the signatures on each page is not sufficient to invalidate the
will.
The opponents-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the signatures of the
testatrix were procured through fraud and undue influence. The lower court deemed it unnecessary to
make specific finding as to this feature of the case, and denied admission of the will to probate on the
other ground alleged by the opponents, namely, that the attestation clause is not in conformity with
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
The portion of said section 618, pertinent to the case, reads as follows:
". . . The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other."
The attestation clause in question, as translated into Spanish, reads as follows:
"Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y eficaces, sin
tacha de ninguna clase, lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en presencia de nosotros
los tres testigos, y al terminar de leerlo la testadora, ella estampo su nombre y apellido en
presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos tambien en
presencia de la testadora y en presencia unos de los otros, y lo firmamos nosotros los tres
testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento."
The foregoing attestation clause expressly states that the testatrix signed the will in the presence of the
witnesses and that the latter signed it in the presence of the testatrix and of each other, and that both
testatrix and witnesses signed each and every page of the will. It will be noted, however, that the
attestation fails to state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
witnesses and that the latter signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and
of each other.
We are unable to agree with the lower court that the omission alone of the phrase "on the left margin" in
the attestation clause, in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the validity of the will. Section 618 of
Act No. 190, as amended, quoted above, does not expressly provide that the phrase "on the left margin"
must necessarily be inserted in the attestation clause. And in our opinion the reason is obvious, because
the will itself, as in the present case, will show that all the pages thereof were signed on the left margin.
Furthermore, in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145, 146) this court held: "A will
otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid
by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin
instead of the left." This ruling shows that the inclusion of the phrase "on the left margin" in the
attestation is not indispensable to the validity of the will.
In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479) this court, speaking of the object of the formal
requisites prescribed by law in the execution of wills, said:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded."
We may conclude, therefore, that a mere omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left
margin," which is not expressly required by the statute, when said clause is otherwise in strict conformity
with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not render a will invalid.
The cases cited by the lower court in its decision denying probate of the will (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506), do
not support the proposition that the omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin,"
in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the validity of the will.
We are of the opinion, however, that the will should not be admitted to probate on another ground. There
is a fatal defect in the attestation clause which escaped the attention of the lower court. As pointed out
above, said defect consists in the failure of the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrix
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed
each and every page thereof in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. The attestation clause
simply recites that the testatrix and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will ("y lo firmamos nosotros
los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento"). In the presence of
whom they signed each and every page of the will, the attestation fails to state, in violation of the
express requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, to wit: "The attestation clause shall
state . . . that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, . . . in the presence of three witnesses,
and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
each other." This defect of the attestation clause is fatal to the validity of the will.
In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405, 407) the court said:
"Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly
construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, `A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal
importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No
power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those
enumerated in the statutes.'
"The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, that
the attestation clause of a will must state the number of pages in the will, and that the witnesses
signed in the presence of each other, are mandatory and non-compliance therewith invalidates the
will."
In the case of Sano vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that:
"An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every
page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect
annuls the will."
This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).
In the case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481) this court, following the doctrine laid down in the cases
above cited, held that:
"The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of
Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those
requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will.
"Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the
execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defective execution of a
will."
For all of the foregoing, it is held that the will in question is invalid because of the failure of the attestation
clause to state in whose presence the pages of the will were signed by the testatrix and the witnesses.
The judgment appealed from, denying probate of the will, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
The will in question was not admitted to probate by the court below for the reason that the attestation
clause did not state that all the witnesses signed on the left-hand margin of each and every page of the
will.
The petitioner Rufino R. Rodriguez appealed from this decision and alleged that the court below erred: (1)
In declining to admit the will to probate on account of the single defect believed to be in the attestation
clause; and (2) in denying the motion for a new trial and the reconsideration of said ruling.
Cayetano Alcala and others, opponents, likewise appealed from the decision of the court below alleging
that the court erred only in not holding that the alleged will of Marta Alcantara had been obtained through
fraud and undue influence.
According to the majority opinion, the mere omission of the words "on the left margin" from the
attestation clause, words which are not expressly required by the law, when said clause otherwise strictly
conforms to all the requirements set forth in section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not nullify the
will.
I agree with this conclusion of the majority, which is indeed the doctrine laid down in Avera vs. Garcia
and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), and Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476).
But the majority affirms the judgment appealed from on another ground, namely, that the attestation
clause does not specifically state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence
of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed each and every page thereof in the presence of the
testatrix and of each other.
It seems to me extremely doubtful that in a civil cause the court on appeal should have authority to
decide any question not raised by assignment of error. The only question which the petitioner has raised
is the nullity or validity of an attestation clause which does not state that the witnesses signed all the
pages of the will on the left margin. The appeal taken by the opponents is based upon alleged fraud or
undue influence used in preparing the will. The court below made no pronouncement upon this point,
and neither does this court now.
But apart from this aspect of the case, I believe that the declaration made by the majority that "said
defect" (of the will) "consists in the failure of the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrix
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed
each and every page thereof in the presence of the testatrix and of each other," is not supported even by
the very terms of the clause in question.
The attestation clause here spoken of reads word for word as follows:
"Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y eficaces, sin
tacha de ninguna clase, lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en presencia de nosotros
los tres testigos, y al terminar de leerlo la testadora, ella estampo su nombre y apellido en
presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos tambien en
presencia de la testadora y en presencia unos de los otros, y lo firmamos nosotros los tres
testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento."
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides with respect to attestation clauses:
". . . The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person
to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each
other."
The law then requires that the attestation clause should state: (1) The number of sheets or pages used,
upon which the will is written; (2) the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses; and (3) that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other.
A careful reading of the attestation clause shows that it contains the following statements: (a) The
number of pages used upon which the will is written; (b) that the testatrix Marta Alcantara, after reading
the will, signed her name and surname on each of the pages thereof in the presence of the three
witnesses; and (c) that these three witnesses signed each one of the pages of the will in the presence of
the testatrix and of one another.
While said clause is not drawn up in exactly the same terms used in the law, there can be no doubt that
from the terms thereof it appears the testatrix signed each one of the eight pages of which the will is
made up, in the presence of the witnesses, and that the witnesses signed each of those same pages of
the will in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. And it has already been held heretofore, in
Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (46 Phil., 922), that for the validity of the attestation clause it is not
necessary to employ the very words used in the law, but that it will be sufficient if the facts required by
the law to be stated, are intelligibly set forth.
In Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios aforesaid, the court had occasion to consider the following attestation
clause:
"`. . . y firmo' (el testador) `al pie del referido testamento en presencia de nosotros, quienes, a su
ruego, en su presencia y en presencia los unos de los otros hemos firmado tambien nuestros
nombres como testigos del testamento, y por ultimo, en la misma forma, tanto el testador como
nosotros sus testigos, hemos firmado en la margen izquierda de todas y cada una de sus hojas,'"
the court held that such an attestation clause was sufficient, and admitted the will to probate.
In Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar (47 Phil., 152), the attestation clause reads:
"`(Firmado y declarado por el testador Don Antonio Mojal, como su ultima voluntad y Testamento,
en presencia de cada uno de nosotros, y, a ruego de dicho testador Don Antonio Mojal, firmamos
este presente testamento, cada uno en presencia de los otros y en la del testador.)
"`PEDRO CARO
"`SILVERIO MORCO
"`ZOILO MASINAS,'"
it was held that this clause is valid and the will was admitted to probate. In the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan (40 Phil., 476), the following rule was laid down for judging of the formalities of a will:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded."
Following this rule, in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez, supra, the court held:
"A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not
rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses
appear in the right margin instead of the left." In Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), it was held:
"Paging in inventory with Arabic numerals is in compliance with the spirit of the law, requiring that
the paging of a will be made in letters, and is just as valid as paging with letters A, B, C, etc."
In the case before us, the expression "lo firmamos nosotros los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una
de las paginas de este testamento" at the end of the clause, taken in connection with the preceding
phrase, "ella estampo su nombre y apellido en presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y cada
uno de nosotros lo firmamos tambien en presencia de la testadora y en presencia unos de los otros,"
clearly indicates that the will was signed by the testatrix upon each and every one of the eight pages in
the presence of the witnesses and by the witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and of one another,
which is exactly what the law requires.
If the omission of the words "left margin" does not invalidate the attestation clause, and if the particular
clause under consideration contains the three elements required by the law, as we have shown, what
reason can there be for affirming the judgment appealed from and thus refusing to admit the will in
question to probate?
For the reasons given, I dissent from the majority opinion.
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, vs PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPOUSES
SATURNINA BARIA &TOMAS CO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT II, Respondents.
2012-01-25 | G.R. No. 187021
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its February 27, 2009 Resolution,2 in CA G.R. No. SP-94771, which affirmed the
November 25, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig City (RTC), granting the
motion for issuance of a writ of execution of respondents.
The Facts
The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case were succinctly recited by the CA in its decision as
follows:
Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine Savings
Bank (PSB), entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis, the real property owned and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the latter's name. However, Anama defaulted in
paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB rescinded the said contract and title to the property
remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria
and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of the
same in their names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239.
Resultantly, Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific performance with damages against PSB, the
Co Spouses, and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.
On August 21, 1991 and after trial on the merits, the Respondent Court dismissed Anama's complaint
and upheld the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Undaunted, Anama appealed, at
first, to this Court, and after failing to obtain a favorable decision, to the Supreme Court.
On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anama's petition and sustaining
the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its decision became final and executory on
July 12, 2004. Pursuant thereto, the Co Spouses moved for execution, which was granted by the
Respondent Court per its Order, dated November 25, 2005.
Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the Respondent Court's November 25, 2005
Order arguing that the Co Spouses' motion for execution is fatally defective. He averred that the
Spouses' motion was pro forma because it lacked the required affidavit of service and has a defective
notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap of paper. The Respondent Court, however, denied Anama's
motion(s) for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC Order before the CA for taking judicial cognizance of the
motion for execution filed by spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1) not in
accord with Section 4 and Section 15 of the Rules of Court because it was without a notice of hearing
addressed to the parties; and (2) not in accord with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with Section 13,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because it lacks the mandatory affidavit of service.
On March 31, 2008, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It reasoned out, among others,
that the issue on the validity of the deed of sale between respondents, Philippine Savings Bank (PSB)
and the Spouses Co, had long been laid to rest considering that the January 29, 2004 Decision of this
Court became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of right on
the part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing a
final and executory decision.
The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a motion are mandatory
requirements, the Spouses Co's motion for execution of a final and executory judgment could be acted
upon by the RTC ex parte, and therefore, excused from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The CA was of the view that petitioner was not denied due process because he was properly notified of
the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. It stated that the act of the Spouses Co in resorting to
personal delivery in serving their motion for execution did not render the motion pro forma. It refused to
apply a rigid application of the rules because it would result in a manifest failure of justice considering
that petitioner's position was nothing but an obvious dilatory tactic designed to prevent the final
disposition of Civil Case No. 44940.
Not satisfied with the CA's unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition praying for the reversal
thereof presenting the following
ARGUMENTS:
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR
TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE REQUISITE NOTICE OF
HEARING - IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES NOT TO THE CLERK OF COURT, THE
LATEST (THEN) BEING GARCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 167103, AUGUST 31, 2006, 500
SCRA 361; DE JESUS V. JUDGE DILAG, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1921, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, 471 SCRA
176; LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. 127198, MAY 16, 2005, 458 SCRA
441; ATTY. JULIUS NERI V. JUDGE JESUS S. DE LA PENA, A.M NO. RTJ-05-1896, APRIL 29, 2005,
457 SCRA 538; AND ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 213;
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR
TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE REQUISITE AFFIDAVIT OF
SERVICE - IT SHOULD BE IN THE PROPER FORM AS PRESCRIBED IN THE RULES AND IT
SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE MOTION, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING ELLO V. COURT OF
APPEALS, G.R. NO. 141255, JUNE 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 406; LOPEZ DELA ROSA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 148470, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 614;
ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 213; EL REYNO HOMES, INC.
V. ERNESTO ONG, 397 SCRA 563; CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA 72, 80-81; AND
MERIS V. OFILADA, 293 SCRA 606;
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION ON THE "FRAUD
PERPETRATED UPON THE COURT" BY RESPONDENT-SPOUSES AND THEIR LEAD COUNSEL.
SINCE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
RESPONDENT BANK'S ACTION - THAT OF:
ENGAGING IN A DAGDAG-BAWAS (LEGALLY "INTERCALATION") OPERATION OF A PORTION OF
THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES (TSN), OCTOBER 12, 1984, OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 167, PASIG CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 44940, PAGES 54-55, AND
PRESENTING IT IN ITS APPELLEE'S BRIEF (IN THE OWNERSHIP CASE, CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663,
LIKEWISE, BEFORE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT) BY CITING IT ON PAGE 14 OF SAID
BRIEF, AS IMPLIEDLY COMING FROM THE TSN OF THE TRIAL COURT.
THINKING THAT THEIR FALSIFIED APPELLEE'S BRIEF WAS MATERIAL IN SAID CA-G.R. NO.
CV-42663.
IT COULD NOT RULE THAT THE SAME HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A CRUCIAL MATERIAL CHANGE IN
THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES WHICH MAKES EXECUTION INEQUITABLE (PUNCIA V.
GERONA, 252 SCRA 424, 430-431), OR, IN THE WORDS OF DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. CA,
G.R. NO. 75964, DECEMBER 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 84, 90, "THERE EXISTS A COMPELLING REASON
FOR STAYING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT."
Basically, petitioner argues that the respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule on notice and
hearing when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the RTC. He claims that
the notice of hearing in the motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co was a mere scrap of paper
because it was addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the parties. Thus, the motion for execution did
not contain the required proof of service to the adverse party. He adds that the Spouses Co and their
counsel deliberately "misserved" the copy of their motion for execution, thus, committing fraud upon the
trial court.
Additionally, he claims that PSB falsified its appellee's brief by engaging in a "dagdag-bawas"
("intercalation") operation in pages 54 to 55 of the TSN, dated October 12, 1984.
Position of the Spouses Co
The Spouses Co counter that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising both questions of facts
and law in violation of Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Spouses Co aver that petitioner
attempts to resurrect the issue that PSB cheated him in their transaction and that the RTC committed a
"dagdag-bawas." According to the Spouses Co, these issues had long been threshed out by this Court.
At any rate, they assert that they have substantially complied with the requirements of notice and hearing
provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioner's allegations, a copy of the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was given to
petitioner through his principal counsel, the Quasha Law Offices. At that time, the said law office had not
formally withdrawn its appearance as counsel for petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they sought to
be executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly affirmed by the CA and this Court, thus, putting the
issues on the merits to rest. The issuance of a writ of execution then becomes a matter of right and the
court's duty to issue the writ becomes ministerial.
Position of respondent PSB
PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 44940 entitled "Douglas F. Anama
v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al."3 had long become final and executory as shown by the Entry of
Judgment made by the Court on July 12, 2004. The finality of the said decision entitles the respondents,
by law, to the issuance of a writ of execution. PSB laments that petitioner relies more on technicalities to
frustrate the ends of justice and to delay the enforcement of a final and executory decision.
As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the notice of hearing appended to the motion for execution
filed by the Spouses Co substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules since petitioner's then
counsel of record was duly notified and furnished a copy of the questioned motion for execution. Also,
the motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co was served upon and personally received by said
counsel.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the Spouses Co that petitioner's allegations on the "dagdag-bawas operation of
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes," the "fraud perpetuated upon the Court by said spouses and their
lead counsel," the "ownership," and "falsification" had long been laid to rest in the case of "Douglas F.
Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al."4 For said reason, the Court cannot review those final
pronouncements. To do so would violate the rules as it would open a final judgment to another
reconsideration which is a prohibited procedure.
On the subject procedural question, the Court finds no compelling reason to stay the execution of the
judgment because the Spouses Co complied with the notice and hearing requirements under Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said sections, as amended, provide:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. - The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of
the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. - No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof.
Pertinently, Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 13. Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party
served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement
of the date, place, and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is
made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing
and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to
comply with the above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted
upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte
if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the rigid
requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and executory. As such, the
Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty
to enforce the same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based
on Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.-
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.- On motion of the prevailing party with notice
to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of
either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such
motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.- A several, separate or partial judgment may be
executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
(2a) [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution executed as a matter of right
without the needed notice and hearing requirement to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of
Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of
Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez,5 it was written:
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe that a
copy of the motion for the execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated
party, like litigated motions such as a motion to dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial
(Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of
which instances a written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in
order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application.
It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already become final
and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a litigation may, at any time within five (5)
years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for its enforcement and the court not only
has the power and authority to order its execution but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been
held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or
quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to
object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in
the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it appears that the
controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or when it appears that the writ of
execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been
issued without authority. Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls in any of the situations
afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable. Otherwise, as
was said by this Court in Molina v. de la Riva, a case could never end. Once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it are deemed resolved and its judicial
function as regards any matter related to the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its
judgment is purely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of
the prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.
In Pamintuan v. Munoz, We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice of the application for execution.
Also of the same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party can have it executed as a matter of right and the granting of execution becomes a ministerial duty
of the court. Otherwise stated, once sought by the prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just
follow as a matter of course. Hence, the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the
application for execution nor he afforded prior hearing.
Absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute an infringement of the
constitutional guarantee of due process.
However, the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a defendant who has
been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court should, after a judgment has been
rendered against him, have a further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to
reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is
not essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property;
after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what will follow," no further notice being
"necessary to advance justice." [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in the case of Leonardo Lim De Mesa v. Hon. Court of Appeals,6 it was stated:
In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had already become
final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs,
herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of
right, and the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution
nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.
On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted correctly in holding
that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there
was no necessity for such service. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co.
The records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by,
petitioner's counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a
"signed stamped received mark" appearing on said pleading.7 The records are bereft of proof showing
any written denial from petitioner's counsel of its valid receipt on behalf of its client. Neither is there proof
that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally withdrawn its appearance as
petitioner's counsel-of-record. Considering that there is enough proof shown on record of personal
delivery in serving the subject motion for execution, there was a valid compliance with the Rules, thus,
no persuasive reason to stay the execution of the subject final and executory judgment.
Moreover, this Court takes note that petitioner was particularly silent on the ruling of the CA that he was
notified, through his counsel, of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co when he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC's order dated June 28, 2005, holding in abeyance said motion pending the
resolution of petitioner's pleading filed before this Court. He did not dispute the ruling of the CA either
that the alleged defect in the Spouses Co's motion was cured when his new counsel was served a copy
of said motion for reconsideration of the RTC's June 28, 2005 Order.8
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where
the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has
not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule
on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse
party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the
parties were duly notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack
of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had
filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the
requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect
the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is
not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding
surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion
and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.9 [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
Likewise, in the case of KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,10 this Court stated:
Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements
of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the
Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of
a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally
defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are:
(1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will
be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious
discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the adverse parties a
chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is
given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeles's Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and
time of the hearing. However, we still find that petitioner was not denied procedural due process. Upon
receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an Order dated September 9,
2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only after the
reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and comment on
the motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly.1?wphi1 Procedural due process is not based
solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead,
procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and proceeding. [Emphases supplied]
At any rate, it is undisputed that the August 21, 1991 RTC Decision11 in Civil Case No. 44940 is already
final and executory. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties
are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter
of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court's
ministerial duty.12
The Court agrees with the respondents that petitioner mainly relies on mere technicalities to frustrate the
ends of justice and further delay the execution process and enforcement of the RTC Decision that has
been affirmed by the CA and this Court. The record shows that the case has been dragging on for
almost 30 years since petitioner filed an action for annulment of sale in 1982. From the time the Spouses
Co bought the house from PSB in 1978, they have yet to set foot on the subject house and lot.
To remand the case back to the lower court would further prolong the agony of the Spouses Co. The
Court should not allow this to happen. The Spouses Co should not be prevented from enjoying the fruits
of the final judgment in their favor. In another protracted case, the Court wrote:
As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the
execution of this Court's judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply
because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTC's order of execution based on arguments that
cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in
its favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that every litigation
must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the
judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party
is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this
Court should write finis to this litigation.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 103-113. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by Associate
Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon.
2 Id. at 115-117.
3 G.R. No. 128609, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 338.
4 Id.
5 G.R. No. L- 30359, October 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 256, 260-261.
6 G.R. No. 109387, April 25, 1994, 231 SCRA 773, 781.
7 Rollo, p. 143.
8 Id. at 110.
9 Fausto R. Preysler, Jr. v. Manila South Coast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28,
2010, 621 SCRA 636, 643.
10 G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 432, 440-441.
11 Rollo, pp. 122-136.
12 National Power Corporation v. Spouses Lorenzo L. Laohoo, G.R. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA
564, 580.
13 Bernardo De Leon v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 547,
565-566.
JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS
JAMES CALISIN, respondents.
1994-01-10 | G.R. No. 109005
R E S O L U T I O N
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 2,
Article IX of the Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated January 22, 1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay and (b) its Resolution dated February 22, 1993,
which denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.
The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Albay for purposes of succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first, second and third districts of the
Province of Albay were elected and proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:
FIRST DISTRICT
Name No. of Votes Garnered
1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes
SECOND DISTRICT
1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes
2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes
THIRD DISTRICT
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes
2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes
(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo
Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as
vice-governor. Under the law, Azana\\\'s position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest
ranking Sanggunian member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent.
In answer to private respondent\\\'s petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the
Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in
the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its
certification on the member of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of
registered voters in the district.
Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department of Interior and Local
Government designated private respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution which was denied on February
22, 1993.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number
of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in
the district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of
registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low
percentage of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of
registered voters but may have a big voters\\\' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a
higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking
Sanggunian member.
Petitioner gives the following illustration:
1. for private respondent.
107,216 (actually voted) x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
2. for petitioner
121,423 (actually voted) x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84%
154,665 (registered voters)
(Rollo, p. 9).
We are not persuaded.
The Local Government provides:
\\\"SEC. 44 Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
---- (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of
the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case
of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor,
vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall
be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx
\\\"For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election\\\" (Underlining
ours).
The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three Sanggunian members:
NAME : District : Registered : Votes : Percent : Rank
of Elected : : Voters : Obtained : Dist\\\'n :
Candidates : : : : :
------------------------------
ALBAY : : : : :
CALISIN, : : : : :
JESUS JAMES : : : : :
B. : 1st : 130,085 : 28,335 : 21.78 : 1st
: : : : : VICTORIA, : : : : :
JUAN D. : 2nd : 155.318 : 32,918 : 21.19 : 2nd
: : : : : MARCELLA : : : : :
NA : : : : :
JESUS, M. : 2nd : 155.318 : 26,030 : 16.76 : 3rd
------------------------------
(Rollo, p. 14)
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It
does not mention anything about factoring the numbers of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the
Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable
intent of the legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).
In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206
SCRA 710 (1992), we held that:
\". . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or
will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure. . . .\"
Petitioner\\\'s contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves
no room for other interpretation. We are not unmindful of the practicality of petitioner\\\'s interpretation
but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to
change the law. p
Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing
the Resolution dated January 22, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) represented
by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.,Petitioner, versus PHILIPPINE GAMING
JURISDICTION INCORPORATED (PEJI), ZAMBOANGA CITY SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY, et al.,Respondent.
2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333
SECOND DIVISION
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for Prohibition.
Republic Act No. 7903 (R.A. No. 7903), which was enacted into law on February 23, 1995, created the
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
Among other things, the law gives the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f),
viz:
Section 7.
x x x x
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others,
tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and recreational and sports
facilities;
x x x x
Apparently in the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority passed Resolution No. 2006-08-03 dated August 19, 2006 approving the
application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance.
PEJI forthwith undertook extensive advertising campaigns representing itself as such licensor/regulator
to the international business and gaming community, drawing the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) to file the present petition for Prohibition which assails the authority of the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in the
ZAMBOECOZONE.
PAGCOR contends that R.A. No. 7903, specifically Section 7(f) thereof, does not give power or authority
to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games of chance in
the ZAMBOECOZONE. Citing three (3) statutes, which it claims are in pari materia with R.A. No. 7903
as it likewise created economic zones and provided for the powers and functions of their respective
governing and administrative authorities, PAGCOR posits that the grant therein of authority to operate
games of chance is clearly expressed, but it is not similarly so in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903.
Thus PAGCOR cites these three statutes and their respective pertinent provisions:
Republic Act No. 7227, or the "Bases Conversion and Development Authority Act" enacted on March 13,
1992:
Section 13. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. -
x x x x
(b) Powers and functions of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. - The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority, otherwise known as the Subic Authority, shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(7) To operate directly or indirectly or license tourism-related activities subject to priorities
and standards set by the Subic Authority including games and amusements, except
horse-racing, dog-racing and casino gambling which shall continue to be licensed by the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) upon recommendation of the
Conversion Authority; to maintain and preserve the forested areas as a national park;
x x x x
Republic Act No. 7922 or the "Cagayan Economic Zone Act of 1995" enacted on February 24, 1995:
Section 6. Powers and Functions of the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority - The Cagayan
Economic Zone Authority shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others,
tourism-related activities, including games, amusements, recreational and sports facilities
such as horse-racing, dog-racing gambling, casinos, golf courses, and others, under
priorities and standards set by the CEZA;
x x x x
And Republic Act No. 7916 or the "Special Economic Zone Act of 1995," enacted on February 24, 1995
authorizing other economic zones established under the defunct Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA) and its successor Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) to establish casinos and other
games of chance under the license of PAGCOR by way of the ipso facto clause, viz:
SECTION 51. Ipso Facto Clause. - All privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions granted to
special economic zones under Republic Act No. 7227 shall ipso facto be accorded to special
economic zones already created or to be created under this Act. The free port status shall not be
vested upon the new special economic zones.
PAGCOR maintains that, compared with the above-quoted provisions of the ecozone-related statutes,
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 does not categorically empower the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate, license, or authorize entities to operate games of chance in the area, as the words "games" and
"amusement" employed therein do not include "games of chance." Hence, PAGCOR concludes,
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority's grant of license to private respondent PEJI encroached on its (PAGCOR's)
authority under Presidential Decree No. 1869 vis-a-vis the above-stated special laws to centralize and
regulate all games of chance.
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, in its Comment,[1] contends that PAGCOR has no personality to file the
present petition as it failed to cite a superior law which proves its claim of having been granted exclusive
right and authority to license and regulate all games of chance within the Philippines; and that, contrary
to PAGCOR's assertion, the words "games" and "amusements" in Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 include
"games of chance" as was the intention of the lawmakers when they enacted the law.
In its Reply Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam,[2] PAGCOR cites the November 27, 2006 Opinion[3] rendered
by the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Manuel B. Gaite, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of t
ourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling
activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE.
x x x x
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly
authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Court finds that, indeed, R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to
operate and/or license games of chance/gambling.
Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 authorizes the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority "[t]o operate on its own, either
directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license to others, tourism-related activities, including games,
amusements and recreational and sports facilities."
It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[4]
The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have
expressed the intent by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum.
From the words of a statute there should be no departure.[5]
The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly
different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or
contest; while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment.[6] On
the other hand, a "game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the
outcome," while "gambling" is defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in
hope of gaining something of value." [7]
A comparison of the phraseology of Section 7(f) of R.A. No. 7903 with similar provisions in the three
cited statutes creating ECOZONES shows that while the three statutes, particularly R.A. No. 7922 which
authorized the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority to directly or indirectly operate gambling and casinos
within its jurisdiction, categorically stated that such power was being vested in their respective
administrative bodies, R.A. No. 7903 did not.
The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.28 Not any of these instances is
present in the case at bar, however. Using the literal meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude
"games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it
defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could have easily employed the words "games of
chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to grant the power to operate the same to
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, as what was done in R.A. No. 7922 enacted a day after R.A. No. 7903.
But they did not.
The Court takes note of the above-mentioned Opinion of the Office of the President which, after
differentiating the grant of powers between the Cagayan Special Economic Zone and the
ZAMBOECOZONE Authority, states that while the former is authorized to, among other things, operate
gambling casinos and internet gaming, as well as enter into licensing agreements, the latter is not. The
relevant portions of said Opinion read:
The difference in the language and grant of powers to CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE is telling. To
the former, the grant of powers is not only explicit, but amplified, while to the latter the grant of
power is merely what the law (RA 7903) states. Not only are the differences in language telling, it
will be noted that both charters of CEZA and ZAMBOECOZONE were signed into law only one (1)
day apart from each other, i.e., February 23, 1995 in the case of ZAMBOECOZONE and February
24, 1995 in the case of CEZA. x x x Accordingly, both laws have to be taken in the light of what
Congress intended them to be, and the distinction that the lawmakers made when they enacted
the two laws.
Coming to the issue at hand, the ZAMBOECOZONE Charter simply allows the operation of
tourism-related activities including games and amusements without stating any form of gambling
activity in its grant of authority to ZAMBOECOZONE. On the other hand, the grant to CEZA
included such activities as horse-racing, dog-racing and gambling casinos.
x x x x
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that under its legislative franchise (RA 7903), the
ZAMBOECOZONE is not authorized to enter into any gaming activity by itself unless expressly
authorized by law or other laws specifically allowing the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision of the Office of the President, the latter's
interpretation of R.A. No. 7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for
administrative or practical construction. In applying said doctrine, courts often refer to several factors
which may be regarded as bases thereof - factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling
weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors include the respect
due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law
they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the
practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with
unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.[8]
In fine, Section 7(f) did not grant to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the power to operate and/or license
games of chance/gambling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is
DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise
authorize and regulate the operation of any games of chance. And private respondent Philippine Gaming
Jurisdiction, Incorporated is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from operating any games of chance
pursuant to the license granted to it by public respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 75-85.
[2] Id. at 99-109.
[3] Annex "A" of Reply, id. at 111-113.
[4] Vide National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 163448, March 8,
2005, 453 SCRA 70, 79; Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 141246, September 9, 2002,
388 SCRA 485, 487, 491.
[5] Id.
[6] Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A., 1990, pp. 679
and 84.
[7] Id. at 679.
[8] Asturias v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617, 623.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES,
defendant-appellee.
1971-03-31 | G.R. No. L-28771
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1
The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains
that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it
was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter's stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of
ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that
should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls
within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff's complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the
donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely
because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until
1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly
agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That
said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted
by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made
during the common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now
deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by
reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of
self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon'" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not
spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of
donation had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We
reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v.
Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of
the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV,
Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the Pandects (Bk.
24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be
doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party
over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would not be just that such donations
should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.' So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other
conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a
failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if
it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just
and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If
there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the
law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such
codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely
literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language
of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la
aplicacion de sus disposiciones.'' 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March
28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Footnotes
1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor. Neither
does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of
any family rejoicing."
2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
3. Ibid., p. 3686.
4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. 50 O.G. 3679.
8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between the spouses made
during the marriage shall be void."
9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).
10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., 80 Phil.
833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacion de la ley es insostenible. El espiritu que informa la ley
debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacion de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse
a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacion literal se separa de la intencion de la legislatura
especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay
conflicto entre la interpretacion literal y la interpretacion fundada en el proposito de la ley, la ultima debe
prevalecer." Cf. Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970,
33 SCRA 105; Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children the other half. (953, 837a)."
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES,
Respondent.
2012-11-14 | G.R. No. 192330
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering
from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconstruction projects affecting the homes of victims of
calamities.
The Facts and Case
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public property (technical
malversation) Under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.1
The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte,
operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to indigent
calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor needed for
construction.
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was 70%
done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for their
families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction stoppage
could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought the help of
Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality's Supplemental Feeding
Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had
sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the
mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his
approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal
slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP.2 Mayor Ysidoro
instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department regarding the matter. On
being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant's Office, signed the
withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the release of the goods.
Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards, Garcia reported the matter
to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.
On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the present
complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the
subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte's malnourished children. She also
pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units
governed the distribution of SFP goods.3 Thus, Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he
approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the poor
of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity Fund.
Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality's poor CSAP beneficiaries were also in
urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor conducted a
comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its transactions.
On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined
him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or ordinance. On
May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro's motion for reconsideration. On June 8, 2010 Ysidoro
appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.
The Questions Presented
In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan's finding that he committed technical malversation. He
particularly raises the following questions:
1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from
their originally intended purpose;
2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that could be
used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;
3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and
4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.
The Court's Rulings
One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code4
has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public funds
or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for which such funds
or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law
or ordinance.5 Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element
because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not
appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution
00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.6 This appropriation was based on the executive
budget 7 which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and
Integrated Delivery of Social Services8 which covers the CSAP housing projects.9 The creation of the
two items shows the Sanggunian's intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the
annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used for
SFP's needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding
programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual10 are: 1) the moderately and severely
underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of six members
whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below.11 This rule provides assurance that the SFP would
cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the government's limited
resources.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those providing
free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not
legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP
malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that, therefore,
the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v. People12 which
states that funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or ordinance and can be
used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro's argument.
The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran
throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already finished its
project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already distributed the
food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not mean that the
remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the requirements of hungry
mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the view that the subject goods
were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite premature.
In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly apply
funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. - Funds shall be available exclusively for the
specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the
presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any
item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items within
the same expense class of their respective appropriations.
The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law gives
the Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the
augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.
Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the
subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to
present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would have been adverse
if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence and the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified, his
testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor's view regarding the transaction
is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor's liability if it happened to be
favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding what the municipal
auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.
Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent,
he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy,
order, and convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal
intent is completely irrelevant.14
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro's act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the
crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is not grave,
warranting a mere fine.
WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article Vlll of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation. I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member, per Special Order 1299 dated August 28, 2012.
1 Records. p. 1
2 Id. at 250.
3 Id. at 260-329.
4 Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. - Any public officer who shall apply any public fund or
property under his administration to any public use other than for which such fund or property were
appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or
a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any
damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall
also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification. If no damage or embarrassment to the public
service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5 to
50 per cent of the sum misapplied.
5 Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 451, 460 (1991).
6 Records, pp. 258-259.
7 SEC. 318. Preparation of the Budget by the Local Chief Executive. - Upon receipt of the statements of
income and expenditures from the treasurer, the budget proposals of the heads of departments and
offices, and the estimates of income and budgetary ceilings from the local finance committee, the local
chief executive shall prepare the executive budget for the ensuing fiscal year in accordance with the
provisions of this Title. The local chief executive shall submit the said executive budget to the
sanggunian concerned not later than the sixteenth (16th) of October of the current fiscal year. Failure to
submit such budget on the date prescribed herein shall subject the local chief executive to such criminal
and administrative penalties as provided for under this Code and other applicable laws. (Emphasis
supplied) SEC. 319. Legislative Authorization of the Budget. - On or before the end of the current fiscal
year, the sanggunian concerned shall enact, through an ordinance, the annual budget of the local
government unit for the ensuing fiscal year on the basis of the estimates of income and expenditures
submitted by the local chief executive.
8 Records, p. 254.
9 TSN, May 23, 2006, p. 15 (rollo, pp. 127-128) and TSN, August 2, 2007, pp. 15-16 (rollo, p. 130).
10 Guidelines on the Management of CRS Supported Supplemental Feeding Program Implemented by
the Local Government Units; Sandiganbayan rollo, Vol. I, pp. 260-329.
11 Id. at 263.
12 495 Phil. 70 (2005).
13 FLORENZ REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS (2003 rev. ed), citing People v. Pavlic, 227
Mich., 563, N.W. 371, 35 ALR.
14 Luciano v. Estrella, 145 Phil. 454, 464-465 (1970).
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) presided over by HON.
JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, respondent.
1976-02-10 | G.R. No. L-30576
D E C I S I O N
ESGUERRA, J:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court, dated June 27, 1968, dismissing
petitioners' petition to adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. It seeks to have the findings and
conclusions of law contained in the decision annulled and revoked and to declare the petition for
adoption meritorious and the child sought to be adopted, the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan,
declared the child by adoption and heir of herein petitioners-appellants, Robin Francis Radley Duncan
and Maria Lucy Christensen. 1
Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen are husband and wife, the former
a British national residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an American Citizen born
in and a resident of the Philippines. Having no children of their own but having previously adopted
another child, said spouses filed a petition with respondent court (Sp. Proc. No. 5457) for the adoption of
a child previously baptized and named by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. The petition is filed
and denominated as Sp. Proc. No. 5457.
In the decision rendered by respondent Court dated June 27, 1968, the petition for adoption was
dismissed. 2
The principal reason given for the dismissal of the petition was that ". . . the consent given in this petition
Exhibit "J" is improper and falls short of the express requirement of the law." 3
Rationalizing its action respondent Judge said:
"Art. 340 (of the Civil Code) provides that the written consent of the following to the adoption shall
be necessary:
2.The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted."
"Under the law aforementioned, it will be noted that the law is couched in mandatory terms by the
word SHALL be necessary, and it enumerates the persons who will give the consent to the
adoption in the order as follows: parents, guardian, or the person in charge of the person to be
adopted.
"It is admitted by witness Velasquez that she knew the identity of the mother who gave her the
child. This being the case, the proper person who is supposed to give the parental consent to the
adoption should first be, in the order of preference, the parent or the mother herself." 4
On the allegation of petitioners that their principal witness, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, under
whose care the newly-born child was entrusted by the unwedded mother, could not reveal the identity of
the mother because it would violate the privileged communications between the attorney and client,
respondent Judge explained: "The contention that for her (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the witness
for the petitioners who gave the written consent to the adoption of the child in her capacity as loco
parentis to said child) to reveal the identity of the mother would be violative of the client-attorney
relationship existing between her and the mother cannot hold water, because in the first place, there was
no such relationship existing between them in so far as this case is concerned and secondly, it is not
only a question of revealing the identity of the mother but rather, of giving consent to the adoption by that
alleged unwed mother." 5
Taking exception to respondent Judge's decision and the ratio decidendi thereof, appellants-petitioners
alleged the following as errors committed by the trial court: 6
1)The inviolability of privileged communication between attorney and client is only binding upon
the attorney in the same case where such relationship of attorney and client arose when the client
imparted the privileged communication and that elsewhere or in another case the attorney is not
bound to the secrecy;.
2)The infant that was given away by the natural mother, even without the latter providing for the
child's maintenance and support, could not be considered as abandoned;
3)The stranger who received the baby or child, in this case, Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez,
could not be considered as the guardian de facto and in loco parentis of the child, and therefore, is
not empowered by law to give written consent to the adoption;
4)That whenever and as long as the natural mother is known to anybody, only said natural mother
can give the written consent to the adoption;
5)That the term "person in charge of the person to be adopted", one of those who can give
consent to the adoption under Article 340 of the Civil Code, means or refers to institutions or
orphanages established for the purpose of rearing orphans, foundlings and destitute children.
The facts of this case are few and simple.
a) Sometime in May, 1967, a child, less than a week old (only 3 days old) 7 was given to
petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and his wife Maria Lucy Christensen, for them to adopt,
by Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The child was later on baptized as Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan with the aforementioned spouses appearing in the records of said baptism as the parents
of said child; 8
b) Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez on the other hand, received the infant from the child's unwed
mother who told the former never to reveal her (the mother's) identity because she wanted to get
married and did not want to destroy her future. The mother instructed Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez to look for a suitable couple who will adopt the child. The mother did not provide for the
maintenance and support of her child; 9
c) In the petition for adoption filed by petitioners in September, 1967, Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez, as the de facto guardian or loco parentis of the child subject of the adoption petition,
gave the written consent required by law; 10
d) Learning from the testimony of witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez that the natural
mother of the child sought to be adopted was still alive, the court then pressed upon the witness to
reveal the identity of said mother. The witness refused to divulge the same on the ground that
there existed an attorney and client relationship between them. She had been instructed by her
client not to reveal the latter's identity. She could not now violate such privileged communication.
11
After examining the facts and the arguments presented, it appears to this Court that there is only one
principal issue involved, i.e., whether or not the person who gave the consent for adoption, which in this
case is Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, is the proper person required by law to give such consent.
The law applicable is Art. 340 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 340.The written consent of the following to adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2)The parents, guardian or person in charge of the person to be adopted.
On the other hand, the Rules of Court (Rule 99) has this to say on those who are required to give
consent in adoption:
Sec. 3.Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the child's spouse,
if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not an insane or hopelessly intemperate or
has not abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian, or guardian
ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home or society, or
by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father
to the adoption shall not be required.
Going by the set of facts in this case, only one of two persons particularly described by law may be
considered here as legally capable of giving the required written consent. They are:
Under Art. 340 of the Civil Code, the "parent, guardian or person in charge of the person to be
adopted" while the other one is that mentioned Section 3, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, describing
it as each of the known living parents "who has not abandoned such child." The father's consent
here is out of the question as the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.
Since the person whose written consent to the adoption (Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez) is assailed
by the trial court as being unauthorized and had consequently caused the rejection of the petition, this
Tribunal will now look into her alleged authority or lack thereof to give the controverted consent.
Sometime in May of 1967, the child subject of this adoption petition, undisputedly declared as only three
days old then, was turned over by its mother to witness Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez. The natural
and unwedded mother, from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court which started
in mid-year of said 1967, and up to the present, has not bothered to inquire into the condition of the child,
much less to contribute to the livelihood, maintenance and care of the same. In short, this parent is the
antithesis of that described in the law as "known living parent who is not insane or hopelessly
intemperate or has not abandoned such child." We are convinced that in fact said mother had completely
and absolutely abandoned her child. This Court has previously declared that abandonment imports any
conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental claims to the
child. 12 Applying this legal yardstick, the unidentified mother of the child in this case can be declared,
as she is hereby declared, as having abandoned her child with all legal consequences attached thereto.
Having declared that the child was an abandoned one by an unknown parent, there appears to be no
more legal need to require the written consent to such parent of the child to the adoption. As had been
said by this Court in the aforecited case of Santos vs. Aranzanso, the parental consent required by the
law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not abandoned their child. 13 The question now
is whether or not Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez, the undisputed custodian of the abandoned waif,
may be considered as the guardian under Art. 340 or the person standing in loco parentis of said infant
contemplated in Art. 349 of the Civil Code.
It seems to Us that when the 3-day old baby was left to and placed in the hands of Atty. Corazon de
Leon Velasquez, the helpless infant was in dire need of someone who could give it protection and
sustain its delicate and fragile life. Atty. Velasquez was under no legal compulsion to accept the child
and to extend to it the protection and care it badly needed. Since there had been no showing that the
identity of the natural mother was made known to the trial court or to the herein petitioners, nor had said
mother seen fit to present herself before the court despite the public notice given to the proceedings as
required by law, there clearly appears only one person who could be considered as the guardian
exercising patria potestas over such abandoned child. Since there was no guardian ad litem appointed
by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home or any
benevolent society, there could not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon Velasquez who
could, with reason, be called the guardian of said infant. It was she who had actual physical custody of
the infant and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the mantle of protection over the
hapless and helpless infant which otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown into
some garbage heap as had often happened to some unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this Court
could do to recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to extend, as it hereby extends, to
her the recognition that she was a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the abandoned child.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to
cleanse its hands of the hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage generally finds apt
application in many other legal cases, in adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to
apply the law with less severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for adoption is more
for the benefit of unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for those born with a
silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to provide homes, love, care and education for
unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to hardened criminal offenders
and become serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy, encouragement
and assistance. The law is not, and should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of a
salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their texts and intendments should
be construed so as to give all the chances for human life to exist - with a modicum promise of a useful
and constructive existence.
The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen, appear
to be qualified to adopt the child. There is no showing that they suffer from any of the disqualifications
under the law. Above all, they have the means to provide the child with the proper support, care,
education and love that a growing child needs, even if they have previously adopted another child as
theirs.
The fact that even before they have applied for legal custody and adoption of the infant they have
already showered it with love and care and had it baptized, with them appearing in the records of the
baptism as the parents of the child, speaks well of the genuine desire of petitioners to have the child as
their very own. The child was born in May, 1967, and he will be at this time, 1976, about 9 years of age.
In all the years, from the time he was turned over to the herein petitioners when he was only about a
week old, (there is no showing that the said child was ever placed at any time in the care and custody of
some other persons) he had been cared for and loved by the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan and
Maria Lucy Christensen. He must have known no other parents than these persons. If we are now to
sustain the decision of the court below, this Tribunal will be doing a graver injustice to all concerned
particularly to said spouses, and worse, it will be imposing a cruel sanction on this innocent child and on
all other children who might be similarly situated. We consider it to be justifiable and more humane to
formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son, existing between the herein petitioning spouses and
the minor child baptized by them as Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, than to sustain the hard, harsh and
cruel interpretation of the law that was done by the respondent court and Judge. It is Our view that it is in
consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with the policy of the State, to uphold,
encourage and give life and meaning to the existence of family relations.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in Sp. Proc. No. 5457, dated June 27, 1968, is hereby annulled, and We
declare that the minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan is the adopted child and the heir of petitioners
Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz-Palma, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Brief for Petitioners, p. 23; Rollo, p. 66.
2.Decision, Annex "A", Petition for Certiorari; Rollo, p. 24.
3.Ibid, p. 8; Rollo, p. 31.
4.Ibid, pp. 6-7.
5.Ibid, p. 7.
6.Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, p. 66.
7.Petition for certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.
8.Ibid, p. 6.
9.Ibid, p. 7.
10.Ibid, p. 7.
11.Ibid, p. 7; Petition for Certiorari, p. 3; Rollo, p. 12.
12.Santos vs. Aranzanso, L-23828, Feb. 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 344. .
13.Ibid.
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
1987-05-28 | G.R. No. L-72873
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of
law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against
the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court
both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the
scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the mane of
their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964,
Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated
"Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P440.00. 3
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to
two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the
same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the
spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. 5
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same
right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
The trial court* also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
7
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs,
including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the
portions sold to the petitioners. 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same
house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they
alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area
occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially significant
was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was
done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent
law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article
1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale by the vendor."
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article
was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De
Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that decision,
interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form
was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a
copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written
notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the
particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running."
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy, 12 the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,
emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a
similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be.
The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners."
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular
method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by
the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws"
as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by
the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one
conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run,
much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice
are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid,
may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will,
that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature.
While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read
out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit
that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the
letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated
differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent
of the lawmakers." 14
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption.
Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise
date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a
day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but
years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977,
thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the
petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing, would there be
any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in
1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were
unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of
such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of
ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure
that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we
do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started
running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years,
when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when
Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is
essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
same as if he had known the facts." 15
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not
among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials.
This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like
an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of
them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which
the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted
properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited
cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between
the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs
exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of
the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
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Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 5.
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Id., p. 64.
4. Id.
5. Id., p. 21.
6. Id., p. 21.
* Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco.
7. Id., p. 65.
8. Id., p. 5.
9. Id., p. 64.
10. Id., p. 26.
** Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.
11. 16 SCRA 775.
12. 4 SCRA 527.
13. Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.
14. Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing Manila Race Horse Trainers' Assn.
v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v.
Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578; People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
15. Ater v. Smith 245 Ill. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.
16. Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite, Lorenzo F., p. 39, 1981.