Adams v Ursell [1913] 1 Ch

269
D was in the trade of selling fried fish. The shop was located in the residential part
of a street. Faced with a claim for an injunction, he argued that his business
benefited the public, especially the poor and therefore the smell produced by his
trade was justified.
Held: Court rejected the defense as Ps comfort and convenience also had to be
considered
Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC
358 House of Lords
The defendant owned View Park Colliery which was situated in a field adjacent to a
road. There was a fence around the perimeter of the field although there were
large gaps in the fence. The field was frequently used as a short cut to a railway
station and children would use it as a playground. The defendant would often warn
people off the land but the attempts were not effective and no real attempt was
made to ensure that people did not come onto the land. A child came on to the
land and was killed when he climbed onto a piece of haulage apparatus.

Held:
No duty of care was owed to trespassers to ensure that they were safe when
coming onto the land. The only duty was not to inflict harm wilfully.
Viscount Dunedin:
"In the present case, had the child been a licensee, I would have held the
defenders liable; secus if the complainer had been an adult. But, if the person is a
trespasser, then the only duty the proprietor has towards him is not maliciously to
injure him; he may not shoot him; he may not set a spring gun, for that is just to
arrange to shoot him without personally firing the shot. Other illustrations of what
he may not do might be found, but they all come under the same headinjury
either directly malicious or an acting so reckless as to be tantamount to malicious
acting."
A-G v P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd.
(1957)
Held that any nuisance is public which materially affects the reasonable comfort
and convenience of life of a class of Her Majestys subjects.
Alcock v. The Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire
[1992] 1 AC 310
Relatives of those killed or injured at a football stadium claimed damages against
the police for causing them nervous shock resulting in psychiatric illness. The
relatives saw and heard the tragedy via live television or radio broadcasts. The
police admitted liability in negligence but denied any duty of care to the plaintiffs.
The issue was whether the relatives were entitled in law to damages. The House of
Lords held that a claimant for damages for psychiatric injury must pass two tests.
The injury must be reasonably foreseeable (shown by a close tie of love and
affection between the individuals). Second, the claimant must have been proximate
to the incident or its aftermath at the time the incident occurred and the shock must
have resulted from seeing or hearing the incident or its aftermath.
Alexander v North Eastern
Railway (1865) 6 B&S 340
The Defendants published a notice at their train station saying the Claimant had
been caught riding on a train without a ticket and was sentenced to 1 fine or three
weeks imprisonment. In actual fact it was 14 days imprisonment if he failed to pay
the fine. The Claimant complained that the overstatement made it appear as if the
offence he had committed was worse than it was. The jury found for the
Defendants.
Al-Kandari V J R Brown & Co Recognized the duty of a lawyer towards 3rd arty only because the lawyers
byundertaking to keep the Client's passport with them had assumed the
responsibility to make sure that harm did not come to the 3rd party. Since the client
had somehow obtained the passport the lawyers had breached this assumed duty
towards the 3rd party
Allen v Gulf Oil Refinery
[1981] AC 1001 House of
Lords
The claimant brought an action in nuisance for the smell, noise and vibration
created by an oil refinery which had been constructed by the defendant on their
land. The defendants action in constructing the oil refinery was authorised by an
Act of Parliament.Held:The defendant was not liable as it had a defence of
statutory authority.
Allied Maples v Simmons &
Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907
The defendant solicitors were acting for the claimant in a takeover of the Gillow
group of companies. The defendant's failed to warn the claimant of potential
liability that may arise under the transaction. The transaction was completed and
risk of liability became a reality leaving the claimant liable to pay substantial sums.
The claimant sought to recover some of this from the defendant arguing that if they
had been advised correctly there was a chance that they would have been able to
negotiate out of the liability.

Held:
The claimant was entitled to recover a sum to reflect their loss of a chance of
negotiating out of liability.

Where the result depends on what a third party would have done in a hypothetical
situation, the claimant only has to demonstrate that there was a more than
speculative chance rather than on the balance of probabilities. The assessment of
the chance will be reflected in the damages.
AMF International Ltd v
Magnet Bowling Ltd (1968)
The contractor was to provide and install valuable timber and other specialised
bowling alley equipment. On July 21, 1964 an exceptionally heavy rainstorm
flooded the building and the timber for the building work was seriously damaged.
The court held that the contractor and the building owner were both occupiers of
the building.
Anns v Merton London
Borough Council [1978] AC
728
The claimants were tenants in a block of flats. The flats suffered from structural
defects due to inadequate foundations which were 2ft 6in deep instead of 3ft deep
as required. The defendant Council was responsible for inspecting the foundations
during the construction of the flats. The House of Lords held that the defendant did
owe a duty of care to ensure the foundations were of the correct depth. Lord
Wilberforce introduced a two stage test for imposing a duty of care. This has since
been overruled by Caparo v Dickman.

Lord Wilberforce's two stage test:

"in order to establish that a duty of care arises in a particular situation, it is not
necessary to bring the facts of that situation within those of previous situations in
which a duty of care has been held to exist. Rather the question has to be
approached in two stages. First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged
wrongdoer and the person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient
relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause
damage to the latterin which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if
the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether
there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to
which a breach of it may give rise."
Ashdown v Samuel Williams
& Sons Ltd (1957)
Held that it is sufficient for an occupier to post a clear and unequivocal notice at
the point of entry excluding liability with respect to non-contractual entrants.
Attia v British Gas plc The plaintiff brought an action for damages from the defendants for nervous shock.
She alleged that she had suffered a psychiatric illness caused by witnessing the
destruction of her home by a fire caused by the defendants' negligence while
installing central heating to her home. The judge decided as a preliminary issue on
assumed facts that the plaintiff could not recover damages and dismissed the
action.The plaintiff appealed.David Tucker (instructed by Fremont & Co) for the
plaintiff. Janet Turner (instructed by the solicitor, British Gas plc (North Thames))
for the defendants.Dillon LJ said that the issues at trial, assuming the facts pleaded
including the psychiatric illness were proved, would have been (a) causation and
(b) foreseeability of the damage as a question of remoteness. If the plaintiff could
surmount those two hurdles there was no good reason why the law should refuse
to allow her to recover damages for nervous shock. His Lordship was not prepared
to hold that the fact that the shock which caused the plaintiff's psychiatric illness
was caused by damage to property must preclude her from recovering damages
for nervous shock, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that she might suffer
psychiatric illness as a consequence of the defendants' negligence in causing the
fire in her house. Whether the plaintiff's assumed illness caused by the shock was
or was not a foreseeable consequence of the defendants' negligence must depend
on the actual evidence given at the trial. His Lordship would set aside the judge's
order and allow the action to proceed to trial.Woolf and Bingham LJJ delivered
judgments concurring with Dillon LJ.Appeal allowed.
Attorney General v Corke
[1993]
The Defendant allowed people onto his land to live in caravans. These people
engaged in anti social activities which took place off Defendant's land. The court
held that these people were 'dangerous' within the meaning of Rylands v Fletcher.
Attorney General v Hartwell
(British Virgin Islands) [2004]

PC Laurent was the sole police officer stationed on the island of Jost Van Dyke,a
small island with a population of about 135 people in the British Virgin Islands.
Laurent was still on probation and was subject to daily supervisory visits by a
police sergeant from a nearby larger island. As the sole officer, PC Laurent had a
key to the police station's strongbox which contained a gun. One night he took the
gun and went to a restaurant where his wife was associating with another man (the
Claimant). He then fired four shots injuring the two in addition to a tourist in the
restaurant. The claimant brought an action against the police for allowing a
probationary officer to have access to a gun.

Held:
A duty of care is owed by the police authorities in entrusting officers with guns.

Lord Nicholls:
"In the view of their Lordships the appropriate analysis is that when entrusting a
police officer with a gun the police authorities owe to the public at large a duty to
take reasonable care to see the officer is a suitable person to be entrusted with
such a dangerous weapon lest by any misuse of it he inflicts personal injury,
whether accidentally or intentionally, on other persons. For this purpose no
distinction is to be drawn between personal injuries inflicted in the course of police
duties and personal injuries inflicted by a police officer using a police gun for his
own ends. If this duty seems far-reaching in its scope it must be remembered that
guns are dangerous weapons. The wide reach of the duty is proportionate to the
gravity of the risks."
Baker v Willoughby [1970] AC
467
The claimant suffered an injury to his leg when the defendant ran into him in his
car. He suffered pain and loss of amenity and had to take a lower paid job. He tried
various different employments some of which he had to discontinue because of his
injury. He was employed sorting through scrap metal when he sustained a further
injury to his leg. He was on his own when two men came in and demanded money.
When he refused they shot him in his injured leg. As a result of the shooting, the
claimant had to have his leg amputated. The defendant argued that the second
injury removed the very limb from which the earlier disability had stemmed, and
thattherefore no loss suffered thereafter can be attributed to the defendant's
negligence. Arguing that the second injury submerged or obliterated the effect of
the first and that all loss thereafter must be attributed to the second injury. The trial
judge rejected this argument which he said was more ingenious than attractive. But
it was accepted by the Court of Appeal.House of Lords held:The defendant
remained liable for the loss of amenity and lower earning capacity even after the
amputation.
Barker v Corus, [2006] 3 All
ER 785
Barker was exposed to asbestos in his course of employment with several
employers, but also in the course of self-employment. He developed mesothelioma
and sued for damages. He was unsuccessful at the lower courts and appealed to
the House of Lords.

Does it matter that the plaintiff was one of the parties that might have contributed
to the injury?

Hoffman, in the majority, states that the purpose of Fairchild can be applied here.
He states that it does not matter that Barker was one of the parties that helped
cause the injury - the liability of the other two parties depends only on their own
actions and not on those of other parties. Therefore, the other two parties are still
liable however the damages are divided according to the probability of each
respondant causing the harm.
In the dissent, Rodger of Earlsferry states that Fairchild cannot apply here because
it tips the scales too far in favour of Barker. It is essentially stating that in cases
exactly like this a plaintiff recovers unconditionally, however if the case only differs
a little bit then plaintiffs cannot recover for suffering the increased risk of an injury.
He also talks about how dividing damages is bad, because claimants often end up
with only a small proportion of the damages that they deserve. Appeal allowed.

Fairchild applies even if the plaintiff himself is one of the causes of the injury, but
the damages are divided up based on the probability of each partys actions
causing the harm.
Barker v Saint Gobain
Pipelines [2004] EWCA Civ
545 Court of Apeal
Mr Barker contracted mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos. He worked for the
defendant between 1960-68. He worked for a different employer for 6 weeks where
he was also exposed to asbestos. After 1968 he became self-employed as a
plasterer for 20 years. Whilst self employed he was exposed to asbestos on three
occasions. The defendant argued that his exposure to asbestos whilst self-
employed prevented him from being able to rely on the causation principle
established in Fairchild v Glenhaven whereby the claimant is able to demonstrate
that the defendant's breach of duty materially increased the risk of contracting the
disease.Held:Fairchild did apply and the claimant was thus successful in
establishing causation. His damages would be reduced under the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 to reflect the periods where he exposed
himself to risk during the course of his self-employment.
Barnett v Chelsea &
Kensington Hospital [1969] 1
QB 428
Mr Barnett went to hospital complaining of severe stomach pains and vomiting. He
was seen by a nurse who telephoned the doctor on duty. The doctor told her to
send him home and contact his GP in the morning. Mr Barnett died five hours later
from arsenic poisoning. Had the doctor examined Mr Barnett at the time there
would have been nothing the doctor could have done to save him.

Held:
The hospital was not liable as the doctor's failure to examine the patient did not
cause his death.

Introduced the 'but for' test ie would the result have occurred but for the act or
omission of the defendant? If yes, the defendant is not liable.
Berkoff v. Burchill A libel civil action which he brought against Sunday Times journalist Julie Burchill,
after she published comments suggesting that he was "hideously ugly"; the judge
ruled for Berkoff, finding that Burchill's actions "held him to ridicule and contempt
Blake v Galloway [2004] 3 All
ER 315
The claimant, a 15 year old boy, was out with four of his friends including the
defendant. The boys started throwing pieces of bark chippings and twigs at each
other. The claimant did not join in at first but then threw a piece of bark chipping at
the defendant hitting him in the leg. The defendant picked it up and threw it back at
the claimant. The piece of bark struck the claimant's eye resulting in serious injury.
The claimant brought an action contending that the injury was caused by the
battery and or negligence of the defendant. The defendant raised volenti non fit
injuria. The trial judge rejected the defence of volenti but held that the damages
should be reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act
1945. The defendant appealed contending that there was no breach of duty and
that the judge was wrong to reject the defence of volenti.Held:Appeal allowed. In
the context of 'horseplay' there is a breach of the duty of care only where the
defendant's conduct amounts to recklessness or a very high degree of
carelessness. The defendant had consented to the risk of injury occurring within
the conventions and understanding of the game. Lord Justice Dyson:"If the
defendant in the present case had departed from the tacit understandings or
conventions of the play and, for example, had thrown a stone at the claimant, or
deliberately aimed the piece of bark at the claimant's head, then there might have
been a breach of the duty of care. But what happened here was, at its highest, "an
error of judgment or lapse of skill" (to quote from Diplock LJ), and that is not
sufficient to amount to a failure to take reasonable care in the circumstances of
horseplay such as that in which these youths were engaged. In my view, the
defendant's conduct came nowhere near recklessness or a very high degree of
carelessness." The game was played on the basis that the objects were thrown at
no particular part of the body. It follows that an object thrown in the general
direction of a participant, without negligence and without intent to cause injury, but
which happened to hit him in the face, was being thrown in accordance with the
understandings and conventions of the game, and in a manner to which the
participants had consented.
Bliss v Hall [1838] 4 Bing NC
183
D managed a factory for 3 years and during this time smoke, smell and other
remittance came from the factory. P moved into a house near the factory.
Held: A defence that an activity has been going on before an action brought to halt
the activity is inapplicable as P had his rights too, one of which is clean air.
Blyth v Birmingham
Waterworks (1856) Exch
Defendants had installed water mains along the street with hydrants located at
various points. One of the hydrants across from Plaintiffs house developed a leak
as a result of exceedingly cold temperatures and caused water damage to the
house. Plaintiff sued for negligence.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The
defendants might have been liable for negligence, if, unintentionally, they omitted
to do that which a reasonable person would have done, or did that which a person
taking reasonable precautions would not have done.
Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee
[1957] 1 WLR 583
The claimant was undergoing electro convulsive therapy as treatment for his
mental illness. The doctor did not give any relaxant drugs and the claimant
suffered a serious fracture. There was divided opinion amongst professionals as to
whether relaxant drugs should be given. If they are given there is a very small risk
of death, if they are not given there is a small risk of fractures. The claimant argued
that the doctor was in breach of duty by not using the relaxant drug.Held:The
doctor was not in breach of duty. The House of Lords formulated the Bolam test:"a
medical professional is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that
particular art . . . Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is
acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of
opinion who would take a contrary view."
Bolitho v City & Hackney
Health Authority [1997] 3
WLR 1151
A 2 year old child was admitted to hospital suffering from breathing difficulties. A
doctor was summoned but did not attend as her bleep was not working due to low
battery. The child died. The child's mother brought an action claiming that the
doctor should have attended and intubated the child which would have saved the
child's life. The doctor gave evidence that had she attended she would not have
intubated. Another doctor gave evidence that they would not have intubated. The
trial judge applied the Bolam test and held that there was no breach of duty. The
claimant appealed.

Held:
In applying the Bolam test where evidence is given that other practitioners would
have adopted the method employed by the defendant, it must be demonstrated
that the method was based on logic and was defensible.
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 Miss Stone was injured when she was struck by a cricket ball outside her home.
She brought an action against the cricket club in nuisance and negligence. The
cricket field was surrounded by a 7 foot fence. The pitch was sunk ten feet below
ground so the fence was 17 feet above the cricket pitch. The distance from the
striker to the fence was about 78 yards and just under 100 yards from where the
claimant was standing. A witness who lived in the same road as the claimant but
close to pitch said that five or six times during the last 30 years he had known balls
hit his house or come into the yard. Two members of the Club, of over 30 years'
standing, agreed that the hit was altogether exceptional to anything previously
seen on that ground.

Held:
No breach of duty. The likelihood of harm was low the defendant had taken all
practical precautions in the circumstances. The cricket ground had been there for
90 years without injury and provided a useful service for the community.
Bonnington Castings Ltd v
Wardlaw [1956] AC 613
House of Lords
The claimant contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling air which contained
minuteparticles of silica during the course of his employment. The defendant was
in breach of a statutory duty in failing to provide an extractor fan. Had they installed
an extractor fan the number of particles of silica that the claimant was exposed to
would have been reduced, however, there would still be some particles present.
There were thus two possible causes: the guilty dust, which should not have been
in the working environment and the innocent dust, which would have been present
in any event. The trial judge held that where the duty arose by statute then it was
for the defendant to show that his breach of duty (the guilty dust) did not cause the
disease. As the defendant was unable to do this they were liable. The defendant
appealed contending the burden of proof rests on the claimant.Held:The burden of
proof remains on the claimant. However, the claimant only had to demonstrate that
the guilty dust had made a material contribution to the disease. He did not have to
demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the guilty dust was the sole cause
of the disease
Bourhill v Young [1943] AC
92
The claimant was a pregnant fishwife. She got off a tram and as she reached to
get her basket off the tram, the defendant drove his motorcycle past the tram at
excessive speed and collided with a car 50 feet away from where the claimant was
standing. The defendant was killed by the impact. The claimant heard the collusion
but did not see it. A short time later, the claimant walked past where the incident
occurred. The body had been removed but there was a lot of blood on the road.
The claimant went into shock and her baby was still born. She brought a
negligence claim against the defendant's estate.

Held:
No duty of care was owed by the defendant to the claimant. There was not
sufficient proximity between the claimant and defendant when the incident
occurred.
Box v Jubb LR 4 EX Div 76 The defendant had a reservoir on their land. There was another reservoir situated
at a higher level than the defendants. The owner of this other reservoir emptied it
through a drain connected to the defendants reservoir causing the defendants
reservoir to overflow and damage the claimants land. The claimant brought an
action under Rylands v Fletcher contending that there was a non natural user of
the land and that there had been an escape of water that caused damage.

Held:
The defendant was not liable for the damage as it was caused by the act of a third
party over which the defendant had no control.
Bradford Corporation v
Pickles [1895] HL
[Tort negligence - duty of care - proving fault - malice not normally relevant]D
owned land containing underground streams which fed C's (Bradford Corporation)
waterworks. D began to sink shafts for the alleged purpose of draining certain
beds of stone. The effect of Ds operations was to affect seriously the supply of
water to appellants springs. The corporation alleged that defendant was not acting
in good faith, but to compel them to purchase his land. Held: D has the right to
divert or appropriate the water within his own land so as to deprive his neighbour of
it. His right is the same whatever his motive may be, whether genuinely to improve
his own land, or maliciously to injure his neighbour, or to induce his neighbour to
buy him out.No use of property which would be legal if due to a proper motive can
become illegal if it is prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious.
British Railways Board v
Herrington [1972] AC 877
House of Lords
A six year old boy was electrocuted and suffered severe burns when he wondered
from a play park onto a live railway line. The railway line was surrounded by a
fence however, part of the fence had been pushed down and the gap created had
been used frequently as a short cut to the park. The defendant was aware of the
gap in the fence which had been present for several months, but had failed to do
anything about it. Under existing authority of Addie v Dumbreck no duty of care
was owed to trespassers. However, the House of Lords departed from their
previous decision using the 1966 Practice Statement and held that the defendant
railway company did owe a duty of common humanity to trespassers.

Lord Pearson:

"It seems to me that the rule in Addie v. Dumbreck has been rendered obsolete by
changes in physical and social conditions and has become an incumbrance
impeding the proper development of the law. With the increase of the population
and the larger proportion living in cities and towns and the extensive substitution of
blocks of flats for rows of houses with gardens or back yards and quiet streets,
there is less playing space for children and so a greater temptation to trespass.
There is less supervision of children, so that they are more likely to trespass. Also
with the progress of technology there are more and greater dangers for them to
encounter by reason of the increased use of, for instance, electricity, gas, fast
moving vehicles, heavy machinery and poisonous chemicals. There is
considerably more need than there used to be for occupiers to take reasonable
steps with a view to deterring persons, especially children, from trespassing in
places that are dangerous for them.

In my opinion the Addie v. Dumbreck formulation of the duly of occupier to
trespasser is plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and its rigid and restrictive
character has impeded the proper development of the common law in this field. It
has become an anomaly and should be discarded."
Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB
818
The Defendants owned a golf club where illegal gambling machines were kept.
Someone told the police and they were removed. Shortly after a piece of paper
appeared on one of the walls saying but 'he who gave the game away, may he
byrnn in hell and rue the day'. Did these words defame the claimant in the sense
that he was guilty of underhand disloyalty to his fellow club members by telling the
police about the machines. The Court of Appeal held that even though some
people may consider that the fruit machines were so trivial that they weren't really
criminal, the right-thinking man cannot ever view the reporting of crime as
defamation. To report crime, however trivial, cannot be a source of scorn or ridicule
in the eyes of the law
Cambridge Water v Eastern
Counties Leather plc [1994] 2
AC 264 House of Lords
The defendant owned a leather tanning business. Spillages of small quantities of
solvents occurred over a long period of time which seeped through the floor of the
building into the soil below. These solvents made their way to the borehole owned
by the Claimant water company. The borehole was used for supplying water to
local residents. The water was contaminated at a level beyond that which was
considered safe and Cambridge Water had to cease using the borehole.
Cambridge Water brought actions based on negligence, nuisance and the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher.Held:Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage
was too remote. It was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result
in the closing of the borehole. The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-
requisite of liability in actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands
v Fletcher in the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence. The Wagon
Mound No 1 case applies to determine remoteness of damage.
Candler v Crane, Christmas &
Co
Donald Ogilvie was the director of a company called Trevaunance Hydraulic Tin
Mines Ltd, which mined tin in Cornwall. He needed more capital, so he put an
advertisement in The Times on July 8, 1946, which said,
"10,000. Established Tin Mine (low capitalization) in Cornwall seeks further
capital. Instal additional milling plant. Directorship and active participation open to
suitable applicant - Apply"
Mr Candler responded, saying he was interested in investing 2000, if he could
see the company's accounts. Mr Ogilvie instructed Crane, Christmas & Co, a firm
of auditors, to prepare the companys accounts and balance sheet. The draft
accounts were shown to Mr Candler in the presence of Crane, Christmas & Cos
clerk. Mr Candler relied on their accuracy and subscribed for 2,000 worth of
shares in the company. But the company was actually in a very bad state. Ogilvie
used the investment on himself and then went bankrupt. Mr Candler lost all the
money he invested. He brought an action against the accountants, Crane,
Christmas & Co. for negligently misrepresenting the state of the company. As there
was no contractual relationship between the parties, the action was brought in tort
law for pure economic loss.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Sir Lionel Cohen and Sir Cyril Asquith) relied
on the case of Derry v Peek to refuse a remedy to the plaintiff, holding that loss
resulting from negligent misstatement was not actionable in the absence of any
contractual or fiduciary relationship between the parties.
Caparo Industries Plc v
Dickman
FactsA company called Fidelity plc, manufacturers of electrical equipments, was
the target of a takeover by Caparo Industries plc. Fidelity was not doing well. In
March 1984 Fidelity had issued a profit warning, which had halved its share price.
In May 1984 Fidelity's directors made a preliminary announcement in its annual
profits for the year up to March confirming the negative outlook. The share price
fell again. At this point Caparo had begun buying up shares in large numbers. In
June 1984 the annual accounts, which were done with the help of the accountant
Dickman, were issued to the shareholders, which now included Caparo. Caparo
reached a shareholding of 29.9% of the company, at which point it made a general
offer for the remaining shares, as the City Code's rules on takeovers required.
Once it had control, Caparo found that Fidelity's accounts were in an even worse
state than had been revealed by the directors or the auditors. It sued Dickman for
negligence in preparing the accounts and sought to recover its losses.IssueWhat
test should be employed in determining negligence? DecisionThe majority of the
Court of Appeal (Bingham LJ and Taylor LJ, O'Connor LJ dissenting) held that a
duty was owed by the auditor to shareholders individually, and although it was not
necessary to decide that in this case and the judgment was obiter, that a duty
would not be owed to an outside investor who had no shareholding. Bingham LJ
held that, for a duty owed to shareholders directly, the very purpose of publishing
accounts was to inform investors so that they could make choices within a
company about how to use their shares. But for outside investors, a relationship of
proximity would be "tenuous" at best, and that it would certainly not be "fair, just
and reasonable". Appeal allowed.ReasonsBridge of Harwich, writing for a
unanimous court, states that the two part test employed in Dobson should not be
used, and subsequently it has been abandoned in England. He reasons that when
deeming if negligence has occurred one should compare cases to precedent cases
with similar facts, rather than simply having an overarching test.RatioEngland
abandons the Anns test for negligence.
Carmarthenshire CC v Lewis [Tort negligence - duty of care - public policy duty owed in operational matters]
D a Local Authority employed a teacher who left a 4-year-old child alone for about
ten minutes while she did other things. The child left the classroom onto a busy
road, where he caused a lorry driver to swerve and collide with a telegraph pole.
The lorry driver was killed and his widow sued the education authority.

Held: The education authority had taken charge of the child and had a duty to take
reasonable care to prevent him from causing harm to others.

C won.
Carslogie Steamship Co v.
Royal Norwegian
Government
On 26 November 1949 the vessel Heimgar, while under time charter to the Ministry
of Transport, suffered damage in a collision with the Carslogie. It was admitted that
the Carslogie was solely to blame. The Heimgar had temporary repairs done in a
port in England before proceeding to a port in the United States where permanent
repairs could be carried out. During the voyage across the Atlantic, the ship
sustained heavy weather damage, which necessitated immediate repair. The ship
remained in dock for fifty days during which the repairs due to the collision and
those due to the weather damage were carried out concurrently. It had been
agreed that ten days would be allocated to the collision repair and thirty days for
the weather damage. The owners of the Heimgar claimed damages for the ten
days attributable to the collision damage while at port.The owners of the Carslogie
were only liable for such loss of profit suffered by the Heimgar as resulted from the
Carslogies wrongful act. During the time that the Heimgar was detained in dock
she had ceased to be a profit-earning machine because the heavy weather
damage had rendered her unseaworthy. Therefore, the respondents had sustained
no damage by reason of the fact that for ten days the vessel was undergoing
repairs in respect of the collision damage, as the heavy weather damage was the
sole reason the Heimgar had to dock for repairs before reaching its destination.
Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929]
2 KB 331
The Defendants took a photograph of Mr Cassidy (a racehorse owner) with a
woman who was not his wife. Mr Cassidy, who often used a different name, told a
reporter that he was going to marry her and the image had a caption saying they
were engaged, using his alternative name. Mrs Cassidy, the lawful wife, brought an
action for defamation. Although they lived separately, Mr Cassidy sometimes came
to visit her. She alleged that people would see him arriving at her house thinking
he is the man from the photo (where his alternative name was used) and assume
that they were living together immorally and only pretending to be his wife. The
Court of Appeal said that words published about one person can sometimes
defame another person and that Mrs Cassidy had in fact been defamed. By people
seeing this man coming to her house who is supposed to be marrying another
woman, she looks like she was simply pretending to be his wife. The blame here
was on the newspaper but arguably, the fact that a lawful wife existed may have
been difficult to discover.
Century Insurance v.
Northern Ireland Road
Transport Board 1942 House
of Lords
A patrol lorry driver smoked a cigarette while driving, which caused an explosion.
Is the smoking of a cigarette in the course of employment or not?

It was not too far from the employment, the driver did act as an employee.
Chaplin v Hicks Chaplin, along with 6,000 others, entered a nation wide beauty contest and got
through to the final stage where only 50 contestants were left. Hicks was to select
the twelve winners from these remaining contestants. The winners were to be
given theatrical engagement by him for three years at 5 per week. Hicks, in
breach of his contract with Chaplin, prevented her from taking part in the final
selection stage. The judge and jury awarded her damages of 100 for the
opportunity she lost in being prevented from taking part in the final selection stage.

Where by contract a man has a right to belong to a limited class of competitors for
a prize, a breach of that contract by reason of which he is prevented from
continuing a member of the class and is thereby deprived of his chance of
obtaining the prize is a breach in respect of which he may be entitled to recover
substantial, and not merely nominal, damages.
The existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition of a third person
does not necessarily render the damages for a breach of contract incapable of
assessment.
Charleston v News Group
Newspapers [1995] 2 AC 65
Two popular characters from the tv show Neighbours were portrayed on the front
cover of a newspaper naked except for black leather engaged in sexual
intercourse. The title read "Strewth! What's Harold up to with out Madge? Porn
shocker for Neighbours stars" however the captions on the pictures made clear
that the images were false. The image was taken from a sordid computer game
which had computer-generated the images. The rest of the article condemned the
game in a tone which can be contrasted with the prominence given to the image.
The House of Lords accepted that the image must have deeply offensive but said
that it was not defamatory since a publication has to be read as a whole. Even
though the image and headline were libellous the remainder of the article had a
neutralising effect.
Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1988]
3 All ER 718
the court of appeal held that the duty of care will arise on the defendant who are
the friend of plaintiff that give a negligent advice to the plaintiff to selection of a
second car. The defendant will liable on it, although defendant not as a
professional in the mechanic area. This is an exception existed the duty of care in
a social relationship. Because the Court of Appeal clearly measure that the case
above was an unusual case, the judgment in this case was made in a special facts.
Chester v Afshar [2004] 3
WLR 927 House of Lords
The claimant had suffered back pain for 6 years. This became quite severe and at
times she was unable to walk or control her bladder. An MRI scan revealed that
there was disc protrusion into her spinal column and she was advised to have
surgery. The surgery carried a 1-2% risk that even if it was performed without
negligence the operation could worsen rather than improve her condition. Her
consultant neurosurgeon Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her of this risk
although he failed to do so. The claimant had the operation and unfortunately it
worsened her condition. The trial judge found that the surgeon had not been
negligent in performing the operation but his failure to warn her of the risk was a
breach of duty. The claimant argued that if she had been warned she would not
have taken the decision to have the operation straight away but would have taken
time to consider other options and discuss the risks with her family and would thus
not have had the surgery on the day which she did have it. She did not say she
would never have had the operation. The judge held that if she had the operation
on another occasion it may have been successful. He therefore found for the
claimant. The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and
the defendant appealed to the House of Lords on the grounds of causation in that
she was likely to have consented to the operation and that even if it had been on a
different occassion it carried the same risk.

Held:

3:2 decision (Lord Bingham & Lord Hoffman dissenting) appeal dismissed.

Lord Hope:

"To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the
normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in the
cases where it may be needed most. This would discriminate against those who
cannot honestly say that they would have declined the operation once and for all if
they had been warned. I would find that result unacceptable. The function of the
law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have
been breached. Unless this is done the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all
practical force and devoid of all content. It will have lost its ability to protect the
patient and thus to fulfil the only purpose which brought it into existence. On policy
grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this case.
The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn. The duty was owed by the
doctor who performed the surgery that Miss Chester consented to. It was the
product of the very risk that she should have been warned about when she gave
her consent. So I would hold that it can be regarded as having been caused, in the
legal sense, by the breach of that duty."
Christie v Davey (1893) 1 Ch
316
The claimant was a music teacher. She gave private lessons at her home and her
family also enjoyed playing music. She lived in a semi-detached house which
adjoined the defendants property. The defendant had complained of the noise on
many occasions to no avail. He took to banging on the walls and beating trays and
shouting in retaliation.Held:The defendants actions were motivated by malice and
therefore did constitute a nuisance. An injunction was granted to restrain his
actions.
Cook v Lewis, [1951] SCR
830
All of the parties were hunting. Lewis was hiding in a bush, and his brother tried to
warn Cook and his companions of this but it was misunderstood. A few grouses
flew out of the bush, and Cook and his companions fired shots. Lewis was hit in
the face, and lost an eye. Cook and his companions gave statements claiming that
they could not have shot Lewis. The jury found that it was one of their shots that hit
him, but they could not decide whose shot it was. The Court of Appeal ordered a
new trial, which Cook appealed.

When there are two parties, and it is proven that one of their actions caused harm,
but it cannot be proven which one it was, who, if anyone, is liable?

The decision in the lower court was based upon the general Canadian rule that
stated that when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence, but
it is uncertain which one was the guilty agent, then neither of them can be
convicted. Appeal dismissed. When there are two parties, and it is proven that one
of them caused harm in their actions but it cannot be proven which party actually
did it, then both of them are liable for the resulting damages.
Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd
(2008) UKHL)
Mr Corr was a maintenance engineer who became severely disfigured after he was
struck on the head by a machine at work. He underwent extensive reconstructive
surgery but remained disfigured. He suffered from flashbacks and post traumatic
stress disorder and lapsed into a deep depression from which he never recovered.
Six years after the accident he committed suicide. At the time of his death, Mr Corr
had begun proceedings against his former employers for damages for the physical
and psychological damage he had suffered. After his death, his widow was
substituted as the claimant. However, she also sought to sue for the loss
attributable to the death by suicide under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976.
While IBC Vehicles accepted that the accident was a breach of the duty owed to
Mr Corr to take reasonable care to avoid causing him personal injury, including
psychological injury, they refused to admit liability for his suicide, arguing that it (1)
fell outside the duty of care owed to him by the company; (2) was not an act which
was reasonably foreseeable and therefore not one for which they should be held
liable; (3) broke the chain of causation and constituted a novus actus interveniens;
(4) was an unreasonable act which broke the chain of causation; (5) was the
voluntary act of the deceased, and so precluded by the principle volenti non fit
injuria; (6) amounted to contributory negligence.

The companys appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. The Lords held that
the appellant owed Mr Corr a duty to avoid not only physical but also psychological
injury and that the deceased had acted in a way that he would not have done had it
not been for the breach by the appellant. In addition, suicide was found to be
foreseeable. Although it was not a usual manifestation of severe depression, it was
not uncommon. In these particular circumstances it was reasonably foreseeable by
the appellant if one considered the possible effect of such an accident on a
hypothetical employee. The appellants other arguments were rejected.
Cunningham v Reading FC
[1991] Times LR 153
D liable to police injured by concrete loosened from terraces. D neglected to take
precautions against clearly foreseeable acts of violent supporters.
Cutler v Vauxhall Motors the claimant grazed his right ankle in an accident caused by the defendants. The
injury caused an ulcer to form and, because the claimant had been suffering for
some time from varicose veins in both legs, an immediate operation was
necessary. He claimed damages from the defendants for the pain and discomfort
of the operation but the Court of Appeal held that since the claimant would very
probably have needed a similar operation within ve years in any case, the
defendants negligence could not be regarded as the cause of the operation.
Dann v Hamilton [1939] 1 KB
509
The Claimant was injured when she was a willing passenger in the car driven by
the Mr Hamilton. He had been drinking and the car was involved in a serious crash
which killed him. In a claim for damages the Defendant raised the defence of
volenti non fit injuria in that in accepting the lift knowing of his drunken condition
she had voluntarily accepted the risk.

Held:
The defence was unsuccessful. The claimant was entitled to damages.
Asquith J:
"There may be cases in which the drunkenness of the driver at the material time is
so extreme and so glaring that to accept a lift from him is like engaging in an
intrinsically and obviously dangerous occupation, intermeddling with an
unexploded bomb or walking on the edge of an unfenced cliff. It is not necessary to
decide whether in such a case the maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' would apply, for in
the present case I find as a fact that the driver's degree of intoxication fell short of
this degree".
Derbyshire County Council v
Times Newspapers Ltd and
others
The council brought an action for libel against a newspaper in respect of articles
alleging impropriety in the administration of its superannuation fund. The
defendants' application to strike out the statement of claim, on the ground that a
local authority could not maintain an action in libel for words reflecting on its
governmental and administrative functions, was dismissed. The Court of Appeal
allowed the defendants' appeal.
The council appealed.
Charles Gray QC and Heather Rogers (instructed by Kingsford Stacey for solicitor,
Derbyshire County Council) for the council. Anthony Lester QC and Desmond
Browne QC (instructed by Biddle & Co) for the defendants.
Lord Keith of Kinkel said that it was of the highest public importance that a
democratically elected governmental body, or indeed any governmental body,
should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for
defamation had inevitably to have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech and it
was therefore contrary to the public interest for organs of government, whether
central or local, to sue for libel. A local authority did not have the right under the
common law of England to maintain an action for damages for defamation.
Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf
agreed.
Appeal dismissed. (WLR)
Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T.L.R.
625
In a company prospectus the defendant stated the company had the right to use
steam powered trams as oppose to horse powered trams. However, at the time the
right to use steam powered trams was subject of approval of the Board of Trade,
which was later refused. The claimant purchased shares in the company in
reliance of the statement made and brought a claim based on the alleged
fraudulent representation of the defendant.Held:The statement was not fraudulent
but made in the honest belief that approval was forthcoming.Lord Herschell defined
fraudulent misrepresentation as a statement which is made either:i) knowing it to
be false, ii) without belief in its truth, oriii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be
true or false.
Dillon v Twin State Gas &
Electric Co (1932), 85 NH
449, 163 A 111.
Facts:
Defendant maintained wires to carry electric current over a large public bridge.
Wires ran across bridge a foot above the horizontal girders. Wires were insulated
for weather protection but not against contact. Deceased and other boys had
played on the bridge for many years. Deceased, sitting on a horizontal girder, lost
balance and instinctively grabbed the wires to save himself from falling. He was
electrocuted
What is the extent of the defendants liability in causing the plaintiffs loss?
Ratio:
If a defendant would have died but for the negligence of the tortfeasor, the
tortfeasor will not be liable. (If the defendant would have been seriously injured, the
damages awarded will be decreased)
Analysis:
The deceased, in falling from bridge was entitled to no protection from the
defendant to keep from falling. Liability is only in exposing deceased to the danger
of charged wires. But for the current, the deceased would have been killed or
seriously injured from the fall. Therefore, the defendant deprived him, not of a life
of normal expectancy, but of one too short to result in any economic loss.
Donoghue v Stevenson
[1932] AC 562
Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend brought her a bottle of
ginger beer and an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that
the contents could not be seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the
bottle over her ice cream and also drank some from the bottle. After eating part of
the ice cream, she then poured the remaining contents of the bottle over the ice
cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. Mrs Donoghue suffered
personal injury as a result. She commenced a claim against the manufacturer of
the ginger beer.Held:Her claim was successful. This case established the modern
law of negligence and established the neighbour test.Lord Aitken:"The rule that you
are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and
the lawyer's question " Who is my neighbour ?" receives a restricted reply. You
must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in law is my neighbour ?
The answer seems to be persons who are so closely and directly affected by my
act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."
Dooley -v- Cammell Laird and
Co Ltd; 1951
The plaintiff was a crane driver whose load of timber, drums of paint, and bags of
bolts etc, and without any fault on his part, fell into the hold of a ship as they were
being lowered along with scaffolding. No one was actually injured but the plaintiff
knew that fellow workers were then in the hold, and he suffered nervous shock. He
sued his employers saying that the sling was either overloaded or defective in
breach of shipbuilding regulations and the common law duties to provide safe plant
and a safe system.
Held: The plaintiff was entitled to recover in those circumstances. Cammell Laird
were in breach of the regulations. one of which was made as a protection against
the risk of bodily injury which included injury to the nerves, the nerves being a part
of the body.
Donovan J said: I suppose I may reasonably infer that his fellow workmen down
the hold were his friends, Mr Dooley was the unwitting agent of the defendants
negligence. He was the crane driver who, without any fault, was party to an
accident which could have killed his fellow workers. It was his activity in operating
the crane which caused the actual and potential damage. It was that activity which
brought him into the category of persons for whom the defendants owed a duty of
care, not really any question of relationships of friendships.
Doughty v Turner
Manufacturing Co
FactsDoughty was injured in his work at a factory owned by Turner when a cover
over a cauldron of molten hot liquid fell in and caused an explosion, propelling the
liquid toward him. It was not known that the cover would explode when it fell in the
liquid. Turner was found liable at trial and damages awarded, which they
appealed.IssueWas the specific cause of injury foreseeable? DecisionAppeal
allowed.ReasonsDiplock states that in this case the ratio of Wagon Mound must be
applied. Although this is similar to Hughes, there is a crucial difference. In that
case the boy was injured as a result of the defendants' negligently leaving the
manhole uncovered. Although the specific injury was unforeseeable, the negligent
act directly led to it. In this case, the only duty owed to Doughty was to ensure that
he would not be injured if the top fell in the molten liquid and splashed some over
the side. This was prevented the only reason he was injured was because of the
unforeseeable explosion. Turner did not have a duty to protect Doughty from this,
as they could not have foreseen it.RatioIf there is no duty owed to the plaintiff in
regard to the initial action that led consequentially to the injury, then the defendants
are not liable for damages.
Doughty v Turner
Manufacturing Company
[1964] 1 QB 518
An asbestos lid was accidentally knocked into a cauldron of molten liquid. A few
moments later an explosion occurred. The claimant was standing close by and
suffered burns from the explosion. The explosion occurred as a result of the
asbestos reacting with the chemicals in the liquid in the high temperature. At the
time of the incident it was not known that the asbestos could react in that way.

Held:

The damage was too remote. It was not foreseeable that an explosion would
occur. Whilst it may be foreseeable the lid may have caused a splash resulting in a
scold, it was not foreseeable that an explosion would occur resulting in burns
Dulieu v White [1901] 2 KB
669
By her statement of claim A. alleged that while she was sitting behind the bar of
her husband's public-house (she then being pregnant) B.'s servant negligently
drove a pair-horse van belonging to B. into the public-house. A. in consequence
sustained a severe shock which made her seriously ill and led to her suffering a
miscarriage. (She gave premature birth to a child. In consequence of the shock
sustained by the plaintiff the said child was born an idiot.)

Held, that the statement of claim disclosed a good cause of action against B.
Per Kennedy, J.: Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not
support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, then, if the
fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence, an action lies, and the
physical damage is not too remote to support it.
E .Hutton and Co V Jones
(1910) AC 20
It was held the intention is irrelevant, the use of a fictious character is no defence.
It need not answer 100% description of the plaintiff before it can be said to refer to
them. The plaintiff was a barrister and the article referred to a church warden it was
held a person charged of libel cannot defend himself by saying that he didnt intend
to defame the plaintiff. Thus there need not be express neither is it necessary for
any key or pointer in the statement to indicate the claimant the test is whether the
ordinary sensible reader in the light of the special facts would understand the
words as referring to the claimant. He/she is entitled to rely on a subsequent
publication to prove it was him referred to.
Edwards v Railways
Executive [1952] AC 737
House of Lords
A particular spot on a railway was used as a short cut on a regular basis. The
fence was repaired on several occasions and whenever it was reported to have
been interfered with. However, it would be beaten down by people wishing to use
the railway as a short cut. Witness testimony was to the effect that the fence was in
good repair the morning of the incident.

Held:
No licence was implied. The Defendant had taken reasonable steps to prevent
people coming onto the railway.

Lord Goddard:
"Repeated trespass of itself confers no licence"
Esso Petroleum v Mardon
[1976] QB 801
Mr Mardon entered a tenancy agreement with Esso Petroleum in respect of a new
Petrol station. Esso's experts had estimated that the petrol station would sell
200,000 gallons of petrol. This estimate was based on figures which were prepared
prior to planning application. The planning permission changed the prominence of
the petrol station which would have an adverse affect on the sales rate. Esso made
no amendments to the estimate. The rent under the tenancy was also based on
the erroneous estimate. Consequently it became impossible for Mr Mardon to run
the petrol station profitably. In fact, despite his best endeavours the petrol station
only sold 78,000 gallons in the first year and made a loss of 5,800.

The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the
statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact.
However, the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent
misstatement at common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract.
Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002]
3 WLR 89 House of Lords
This was a conjoined appeal involving three claimants who contracted
mesothelioma, a form of lung cancer contracted by exposure to asbestos.
Mesothelioma can be caused by a single fibre of asbestos. The condition does not
get worse the greater the exposure. Once the fibre has embedded into the lung it
can lay dormant for 30-40 years before giving rise to a tumour which can then take
10 years to kill. It will be only the last 1-2 years where a person may experience
symptoms. By this time it is too late to treat. Each of the claimants had been
exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers. They were unable to
demonstrate, and medical science was unable to detect, which employer exposed
each of them to the one fatal fibre.

Held:

If the claimants could demonstrate that one employer had materially increased the
risk of contracting mesothelioma they were entitled to claim full compensation from
that one employer
Ferguson v John Dawson &
Partners (Contractors) Ltd
Ferguson was employed by John Dawson & Partners 'on the lump' [a device, now
prohibited by statute, for avoiding the payment of national insurance and income
tax]. Whilst working on the roof of a building Ferguson fell 15 feet and was
seriously injured. He claimed damages from John Dawson & Partners for his
injuries. In order to be able to claim damages from John Dawson & Partners he
had to show that he was an employee of theirs; they claimed that he was self
employed and that, therefore, they were not liable for his injuries. The issue before
the court was what terms governed the contract between Ferguson and John
Dawson & Partners.In my judgment, on the tests laid down in the authorities, all of
this indicates beyond doubt that the reality of the relationship was employer and
employee: a contract of service... My own view would have been that a declaration
by the parties, even if it be incorporated in the contract, that the workman is to be,
or is to be deemed to be, self-employed, an independent contractor, ought to be
wholly disregarded - not merely treated as not being conclusive - if the remainder
of the contractual terms, governing the realities of the relationship, show the
relationship of employer and employee...
Ferguson v Welsh [1987] 1
WLR 1553 House of Lords
Sedgefield District Council, in pursuance of a development plan to build sheltered
accommodation, engaged the services of Mr Spence to demolish a building. It was
a term of the contract that the work was not to be sub-contracted out. In breach of
this term, Mr Spence engaged the services of the Welsh brothers to carry out the
demolition who in turn engaged the services of Mr Ferguson to assist. Mr Ferguson
suffered serious injury resulting in permanent paralysis when a wall he was
standing on collapsed due to the unsafe practices operated by the Welsh brothers.
He brought an action against the Council, Mr Spence and the Welsh brothers. The
trial judge held that the Welsh Brothers were liable but that Mr Spence and the
Council were not liable. Mr Ferguson appealed against the finding against the
Council since the Welsh Brothers (or Mr Spence) had the funds or insurance to
meet liability.

Held:
The appeal was dismissed.
Mr Ferguson was a lawful visitor despite the clause forbidding sub-contracting
since Mr Spence would have apparent or ostensible authority to invite him on to
the land. However, the danger arose from the unsafe system of work adopted by
the Welsh Brothers not the state of the premises. Whilst there was evidence that
Mr Spence had sub-contracted demolition work to those executing unsafe
practices on previous occasions, there was no evidence that the Council were
aware of this.
Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB
286
The Claimant was injured in a car accident due to the negligence of the Defendant.
The Claimant was not wearing a seat belt. There was disagreement as to the
apportionment of loss under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Lord Denning set out guidance as to apportionment of damages in such cases.
Giles v Walker (1890) 24
QBD 656
Seeds from some thistles on the defendants land blew into neighbouring land
owned by the claimant and damaged his crops. The defendant was not liable as he
had not brought the thistles onto his land and there can not be liability under
Rylands v Fletcher for a thing which naturally accumulates on land.
Glasgow Corporation v Muir
(1943),
A group of children were having a day out with their Sunday school. They were
meant to be having a picnic, but the rain had ruined it. The leader of the trip asked
the manager of a tearoom, run by Glasgow Corporation, if she would allow the
children to have their picnic on their premises. She agreed and the group entered.
In the tearoom there was a tuck shop, the window to which was located midway
along a corridor. The children had all started to line up along the corridor to buy
sweets at the tuck shop. At this time a large tea urn was being carried along the
corridor by two adults, to the main room of the tearoom. Somehow, and it is still
unknown how, the tea urn overturned and scalded a young girl (Muir).The parents
of the girl sued Glasgow Corporation, claiming that they owed the child a duty of
care and that they had breached this.The court held that the manageress in charge
owed a duty of care, generally, to everyone in the tearoom. However, she did not
owe a duty of care to the Sunday school, to take additional precautions to prevent
their being injured as a result of her allowing them to enter. So long as the tearoom
was run in the same manner as it was day to day, and to the same safety
standards, she was not required to take extra steps to prevent the incident which
occurred. It was not reasonably foreseeable that allowing the children to come into
the premises would result in one of them being scalded. As such, the incident was
put down as an accident which could not have been prevented. The reasonable
man is presumed to be free both from over-apprehension and from over-
confidence, i.e., The reasonable man has been described as the man on the
street or the man on the Clapham omnibus
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd P sued D, an Internet Service Provider, over a newsgroup posting made available
from D's newsgroup servers in this jurisdiction. D sought permission to amend its
defence to rely, in mitigation of damages, on numerous allegedly provocative
postings previously made by P, including to other newsgroups apart from that in
which the posting complained of appeared. P resisted the amendment on the
ground that it offended against the rule in Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 Q.B.D 491 as
bringing in inadmissible evidence of particular acts of misconduct on the part of the
P.

Whether the amendments should be permitted.

The amendments should be permitted. The other postings were relevant and
admissible in support of D's case that the action was not brought bona fide, but as
part of a cynical practice by P of provoking people into overstepping the mark so
that he could then bring vexatious libel actions against them. They were
'introduced to establish that the Plaintiff should only receive derisory or small
damages because of his bad conduct which is causally connected to the libel sued
upon. In my judgment the Plaintiff's postings are germane to the defamatory
posting the subject of his claim.'
Goldman v Hargrave A 100 foot red gum tree on the defendants land was struck by lightning and caught
fire. The following morning the defendant contacted a tree feller to cut down the
tree saw it into sections. The wood was still smouldering and the defendant failed
to douse it with water to eliminate the risk of fire. Over the next few days the
weather became very hot and reignited the fire which spread to neighbouring
property.

Held:
The defendant was liable for the naturally occurring danger that arose on his land
as he was aware of the danger and failed to act with reasonable prudence to
remove the hazard.
Goldsmith v Bhoyrul ( 1998) Political parties also do not have the right to bring an action for defamation as they
should always be open to criticism in a democratic system. Individual candidates
for elected office can make claims for defamation and political parties can be sued
if they publish defamatory statements.
Goodwill -v- British
Pregnancy Advisory Service
[1996]
Professional Negligence, Health Professions
The doctor executed a vasectomy, and advised the plaintiff that he need no longer
take contraceptive precautions. Held: No duty fell on a doctor to advise on the
possibility of the failure of a vasectomy toward possible future sexual partners of
the subject of the operation. The law could not extend a duty to a possible future
partner. That was a tenuous relationship.
Greatorex v Greatorex and
Others [2000] The Times LR
May 5, QBD
On 11 April 1996 the First Defendant had been drinking with a friend, who is the
Part 20 Defendant in the proceedings. The First Defendant was driving a car
belonging to the Part 20 Defendant, who had given him permission to drive the car
and was a passenger in it. Whilst overtaking on a blind brow the First Defendant
negligently drove over on the wrong side of the road and was hit by an oncoming
vehicle. The Part 20 Defendant was uninjured. The First Defendants head was
injured and he was unconscious for about an hour. Initially he was trapped inside
the car. The police, ambulance and fire services attended the scene of the
accident.
Among the fire officers who attended the scene was the First Defendants father,
the Claimant. At the time of the accident he was employed as a Leading Fire
Officer. He was nowhere near the scene of the accident when it happened. He
went there in the course of his employment. Having been informed that his son
has been injured, he attended to him. The Claimant was later diagnosed as
suffering long- term post traumatic stress disorder as a result of the accident.
The First Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving a motor vehicle without
due care and attention, driving without insurance, and failing to provide a
specimen.
The Claimant brought proceedings claiming damages against the First Defendant,
his son. Since the First Defendant was uninsured at the time of the accident, the
Motor Insurers Bureau was joined as a Second Defendant. The Second Defendant
in turn brought proceedings against the Part 20 Defendant seeking an indemnity
against him.
There was no duty of care owed by a victim of self-inflicted injuries towards a
secondary party who suffered only psychiatric illness as a result of having
witnessed the event causing the injuries or its aftermath.
The policy considerations against there being such a duty owed clearly outweighed
the arguments in favour, since to impose liability for causing psychiatric harm in
such circumstances, particularly where the parties were members of the same
family, would be potentially productive of acute family strife.
Greenock Corporation v
Caledonian Railway [1917]
AC 556
The corp. constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream
and obstructed the natural flow of the stream. Owing to a rainfall of extraordinary
violence the stream overflowed at the pond and damaged the property of the
plaintiffs. Held that the extraordinary rainfall did not absolve the corp. from
responsibility and that they were liable in damages.
Gregg v Scott The defendant, Dr Scott, misdiagnosed negligently the plaintiff's malignant cancer,
stating it to be benign. This had the effect of delaying Mr Gregg's treatment by nine
months, reducing his chances of surviving ten years from 42% to 25%.[1]Under the
earlier decision of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority, the view taken at
first instance, and by the Court of Appeal, the claimant could not establish the
defendant had prevented him being cured, as his original chance of a cure was
below 50%. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to recover for the loss of the
17% chance the defendant had deprived him of.On appeal to the Lords, the
majority upheld the earlier decision of Hotson, though Lord Nicholls (joined by Lord
Hope) dissented in arguing that loss of a chance should be actionable:
Gwilliam v West Hertfordshire
Hospital NHS Trust [2002]
EWCA Civ 1041 Court of
Appeal
The claimant, a 63 year old woman, was injured at a summer fair hosted by West
Hertfordshire Hopsital. She was injured whilst using a splat wall whereby
participants would bounce off a trampette against a wall and become attached to
the wall by means of Velcro material. The injury occurred as a result of negligent
set up of the equipment. The equipment was provided by a business called Club
Entertainments who were an independent contractor engaged by the Hospital.
Club Entertainments public liability insurance had expired four days before the
incidence and thus they had no cover for the injury. They agreed to settle her claim
for 5,000. Mrs Gwilliam brought an action against the hospital based on their
failure to ensure that the entertainment arranged was covered by public liability
insurance. She claimed the difference between the 5,000 and what she would
have received had they been covered by insurance.

Held:
The Hospital owed a duty of care Under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 this duty
did extend to checking whether the independent contractor had insurance cover
since this would be relevant to whether they were competent. However, there was
no breach of duty since the Hospital had enquired and had been told by Club
Entertainment that they had insurance cover. There was no duty to inspect the
insurance documents to ensure that cover was adequate.
Haley v London Electricity
Board
Some workmen were digging a trench in a pavement. They went off to lunch. They
had nothing to fence of the trench so they left a shovel and pick at one end and a
punner at the other end to warn pedestrians. The claimant, a blind man, tripped on
the punner and fell hitting his head. As a result of the fall he became deaf. The
defendant argued they had done all that was necessary to warn an ordinary person
of the danger and there was no need to take extra precautions for blind persons as
it was not foreseeable that a blind person would be walking unaided down that
street.

Held:
The defendant was in breach of duty. It was foreseeable that a blind person might
walk down the street and they should be given appropriate protection
Hall v Simons (2000) HL ^[Tort - negligence duty no duty situations - breach - professionals immunity
advocates not a special case]
One of several cases (conjoined cases) on similar issues, where claimants had
done less well than they would but for negligence of their legal advisers.

Held: It was no longer in the public interest that advocates should enjoy immunity
from being sued for negligent acts concerned with the conduct of litigation whether
in civil or criminal proceedings.

Change of rule on lawyers immunity
Harrison v British Railways
Board (1981)
The court said that an injured rescuer could sue the person who created the
danger. The rescuer was found to be contributory negligent for not following
established work procedures.
Harrison v Michelin Tyre Co
Ltd [1985] 1 All ER 918.
The plaintiff employee was working on the duck-board of his machine. The fellow
employee (let us call him the joker) was pushing a hand-truck along a passageway
marked by chalk lines. In order to startle the plaintiff the joker turned his truck
slightly towards the plaintiff and overstepped the chalk lines by some two inches.
The truck caught the edge of the duck-board, tipped it upwards and caused the
plaintiff to be thrown off. He suffered injuries

The joker had been authorised to push the truck and was in the course of so doing
when the urge to play the practical joke overcame him. The matter was quite
simple; was the joker acting in the course of his employment, or had he embarked,
in the words of Parke B in Joel v Morrison (1834) 6 C & P 501, on a frolic of his
own? Comyn J took the view that the employer was vicariously liable for the act of
the employee-joker. The task was admitted to be difficult, but it is, with respect,
suggested that, whatever the reasoning or the difficulty, the result was correct.
Haseldine v Daw The claimant in this case was injured by a faulty lift, which was just surveyed by a
group of technicians a week before the accident. The claimant purported to sue the
owner of the building.

The court held that the technical and specialist nature of lift mantainance meant
that the qualifty of the survey was not something that the occupiers could
reasonably be expected to verify. Hence the occupiers were not liable. Rule to
exempt liability on the basis of contracting:

The injury must have been caused by the work carried out by the contractor which
they were contracted to do;
It was reasonable for the occupier to employ independant contractor;
The occupier must be reasonably satisfied that the contractor was competent.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1
KB 146
The Defendant left a horse-drawn van unattended in a crowded street. The horses
bolted when a boy threw a stone at them. A police officer tried to stop the horses to
save a woman and children who were in the path of the bolting horses. The police
officer was injured. It was held that the Defendant owed a duty of care as he had
created a source of danger by leaving his horses unattended in a busy street
Heasemans v. Clarity
Cleaning 1987 Court of
Appeal
The defendant was an office cleaning company which had a contract to clean the
plaintiff's office.
One of the women cleaning the office used the telephone (bill: L 1,411).
Has she done this in course of her employment?
The employers were not responsible.
It was not part of her job.
There must be a line where the employers are protected.
The courts have become more strict in holding employees liable.
This case was a change of attitude towards vicarious liability.
Heath v Mayor Brighton
(1908)
A church claimed that the noise form an electric power station was a nuisance.
However the noise did not interfere with the services and so the claim was
unsuccessful.
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v
Heller & Partners Ltd [1964]
AC 465
IssueWhether and under what conditions a person can recover damages for loss
suffered by reason of his having relied on an innocent but negligent
misrepresentation.^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - extent of the duty depends on
the courts assessment of demands of society]D, a bank gave a reference to C
(another bank) regarding the financial responsibility of a customer, expecting the
bank to act on it. The reference was given "without responsibility." The second
bank acted on the reference and suffered financial loss as a result. They sued D in
negligence. Held: The law will imply a duty of care when a party seeking
information from a party possessed of a special skill trusts him to exercise due
care, and that party knew or ought to have known that reliance was being placed
on his skill and judgment. However, since here there was an express disclaimer of
responsibility, no such duty was, in any event, implied. C lostThis case modified
pure economic loss in negligence. The effect of Hedley Byrne makes possible the
recovery of compensation for financial damage through reliance by the plaintiff
according to statements made negligently by the defendant but only where there
exists a special relationship' between the parties. The term special relationship
which must be between plaintiff and defendant before there can be liability was not
fully defined but for its existence seems to be:A, a reliance by the claimant on the
defendants specialist skill and judgment;B, reasonable expectation of knowledge
on the part of the defendant, that the claimant would be relying on that
statement;C, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the defendant;D, there
had to be an assumption, either explicit or implicit, of responsibility on behalf of the
defendant.
Henderson v Merrett
Syndicates [1994] HL
[Civil Process - C can claim in tort or contract]
C and other Lloyds "names" sued their underwriting agents for negligent
mismanagement of their affairs.

Held: Cs claims in tort should go for trial. A claimant, who has remedies available
in tort and in contract, is free to choose whichever appears to him to be the most
advantageous so long as the contract does not expressly preclude this.
Holden v White [1982] 2 All
ER 328 Court of Appeal
The claimant, a milkman, was injured on the defendants land by a manhole cover
which broke when he stepped on it. At the time he was delivering milk to the house
of a third party who had a right of way across the defendants land. It was held that
he was not entitled to claim against the defendant since he was exercising a right
of way and was not therefore a lawful visitor of the defendant.
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v
Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468
The claimant bred silver foxes for their fur. Silver foxes are particularly timid and if
disturbed when pregnant they are prone to miscarry. If alarmed when they have
young they may devour them. The defendant was the claimants neighbour. He
objected to the fox farm and fired a gun on his own land close to the breeding pens
with the intention to scare the foxes and impede breeding. The claimant brought
an action in nuisance.

Held:
The defendant was liable despite the abnormal sensitivity of the foxes because he
was motivated by malice.
Home Office v Dorset Yacht
Co Ltd
Some young offenders were doing some supervised work on Brown Sea Island
under the Borstal regime. One night the Borstal officers retired for the evening
leaving the boys unsupervised. Seven of them escaped and stole a boat which
collided with a Yacht owned by the claimant.Held:The Home Office owed a duty of
care for their omission as they were in a position of control over the 3rd party who
caused the damage and it was foreseeable that harm would result from their
inaction.
Horsley v. MacLaren aka the
ogopogo case 1971 (Canada)
MacLaren was the owner and captain of a boat called the "Ogopogo". He invited
several friends out on his boat including Mr. Matthews, Mr. Horsley, and Mr. and
Mrs. Jones. During their cruise, Matthews fell overboard into the icy water which
caused him to have a heart attack and die. MacLaren backed the boat up to rescue
Matthews not knowing if he was alive. Horsley jumped into the water to save
Matthews but he was also overcome by the cold water. Mrs. Jones then jumped in
to help them both. Mr. MacLaren moved the boat into a better position to rescue
the three. In all, Mr. Matthews and Mr.Horsley were killed.

The Court held that "encouragement by the common law of the rescue of persons
in danger would ... go beyond reasonable bounds if it involved liability of one
rescuer to a succeeding one where the former has not been guilty of any fault
which could be said to have induced a second rescue attempt." The Donoghue v
Stevenson case doesn't touch this principle, because it says that you have a duty
to avoid causing harm, not a duty to help someone else. In the Court of Appeal for
Ontario decision [1970] 2 O.R. 487, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 277, Arthur Jessup J said the
Well-Known Quotes: "So, despite the moral outrage of the text writers, it appears
presently the law that one can, with immunity, smoke a cigarette on the beach
while ones neighbour drowns and, without a word of warning watch a child or blind
person walk into certain danger".
Hotson v East Berkshire Area
Health Authority [1987] AC
750 House of Lords
The claimant as a school boy fell out of a tree from a height of 12 foot. He suffered
a fracture to his hip and was taken to hospital. The hospital failed to diagnose his
fracture and sent him home. He was in severe pain so he was taken back to
hospital 5 days later where an X ray revealed his injury. He was treated and
suffered an avascular necrosis which resulted in him having a permanent disability
and a virtual certainty that he would develop osteoarthritis. According to medical
evidence, had he been correctly diagnosed initially there was a 75% chance that
he would have still developed this condition, but there was a 25% chance that he
would have made a full recovery. The trial judge awarded damages of 11,500
based of 25% of 46,000 which was what would have been awarded if the
claimant had shown that the defendant's conduct had caused the avascular
necrosis of the hip.

Held:

The claimant had failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the
defendant's breach of duty had caused the necrosis since there was a 75% chance
that it was caused by the fall. Therefore the claimant was not entitled to receive
anything in respect of the necrosis.
Hughes v Lord Advocate
[1963] AC 837 House of
Lords
Two boys aged 8 and 10 went exploring an unattended man hole. The man hole
had been left by workmen taking a break. It was surrounded by a tent and some
paraffin lamps were left to warn road users of the danger. The boys took a lamp
down the hole. One of them dropped the lamp and an unforeseeable explosion
occurred resulting in extensive burns.Held:The damage was not too remote it was
foreseeable that the boys may suffer a burn from the lamp. The fact that the burn
resulted from an unforeseeable explosion did not prevent the type of damage
being foreseeable.
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1998]
1 WLR 434 House of Lords
690 claims were made against Canary Wharf ltd. The claimants lived in the Isle of
Dogs and complained that the erection of the Canary Wharf Tower interfered with
their television reception. In addition, a second action against London Docklands
Development Corporation involved 513 claims for damages in respect of excessive
amounts of dust created during the construction of the tower. Some of the
claimants were owners or tenants of properties, but many of the claimants had no
proprietary interest in lane at all. Some were children living with parents, some
were relations or lodgers with use of a room and some were spouses of the tenant
or owner of the property.
The two issues the House of Lords were required to consider were:
1. Whether interference with television reception was capable of giving rise to
an actionable nuisance
2. Whether an interest in property was required to bring an action in

Held:
1. There is no right of action in nuisance for interference with the television
reception.
2. An interest in property is required to bring an action in nuisance.
Khorasanjian v Bush overruled in so far as it holds that a mere licensee can sue in
private nuisance.
Hunter v. British Coal
Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R.
97
An employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he
was driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood the
mine. One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut off the
valve. They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further assistance. When
he was 30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr. Carter. Mr. Hunter initially
assumed that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when he was informed of the death
15 minutes later he blamed himself and suffered a shock which triggered a two-
year depressive illness. The trial judge found as a fact that the accident (and the
death) had been caused by the fault of the defendant employer, which had failed to
observe the relevant regulations about the siting of the hydrant, and had not been
caused or contributed to by Mr. Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover
damages from his employer for the shock which he suffered on hearing about a
death which he did not witness but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The
trial judge held not and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their
reasoning demonstrates some of the confusion surrounding this topic. It was
accepted by all members of the Court of Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as
a secondary victim he would fail in his claim for nervous shock since he lacked,
amongst other things, the necessary physical proximity required by the House of
Lords in Alcock: he had witnessed neither the accident itself nor its aftermath. The
only way in which he could recover was if he could bring himself within some other
category, either (i) because he could be regarded as a primary victim or (ii) purely
on the basis of the contractual duty of care which the defendant owed him as his
employer.
Hussain v Lancaster City
Council [1999] 2 WLR 1142
Court of Appeal
The claimants own a shop and residential property which is situated on a housing
estate owned by the defendant. The claimants suffered severe harassment,
including racial harassment which was predominantly from tenants and their
families from the housing estate. The harassment took the form of congregating
outside the shop, intimidation, shouting abuse and threats, throwing bricks, stones
and balls, smashing windows, burning objects put through the door. The
defendant was aware of the harassment from 1991. The council had sent letters to
the perpetrators threatening them with eviction if they continued to harass the
claimants, however, this was ineffective and the council did not in fact take
possession proceedings against any of the perpetrators. The Council had the
power to evict them for causing a nuisance under the tenancy agreements and
under the Housing Act 1985. The claimants brought an action against the council
for their failure to prevent the nuisance when it was in their power to do so. The
defendant Council applied for a strike out which was refused. The council
appealed.Held:The appeal was allowed and the claim struck out. The case was
outside the scope of nuisance since the acts of the perpetrators did not involve the
tenants use of the tenants land. Furthermore the Council had neither authorised
nor adopted the nuisance.
Huth v Huth [1915] 3 KB 32 A man sent a letter to his wife which defamed her and their children. It was opened
and read by the butler. An action was brought by the children (as a wife could not
sue her husband at the time). The Court of Appeal dismissed the case saying that
it was not the butler's job to open letters and he only did so out of curiosity. There
cannot, therefore, be a publication to a third party where it is not natural and
probable that that third party would hear the information.
Imperial Chemical Industries
Ltd v Shatwell [1965] AC 656
House of Lords
The claimants were brothers who were qualified shotfirers employed by the
defendant. They were injured as a result of an explosion at the defendant's quarry
caused by the brothers' negligence. They had insufficient wire to test a circuit to
allow them to test from a shelter. Another worker had gone to fetch more wire but
the brothers decided to go ahead and test with the shorter wire. Each brother
claimed against the defendant based on their employer's vicarious liability for the
negligence and breach of statutory duty of the other brother. The defendant raised
the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that the brothers the brothers had full
knowledge of the risk and were acting against express instructions. At trial the
judge held that the defence of volenti could not apply where there was breach of a
statutory duty. This was upheld in the Court of Appeal.

Held:
The appeal was allowed. The brothers had deliberately acted in defiance of the
employer's express instructions in full knowledge of the risks. The workers were
under the statutory duty not the employer. The employer had been instrumental in
bringing in the statutory regulations and ensured all workers were aware of them.
They had also previously dismissed a worker for flouting the regulations.
James McNaughton Paper
Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson
& Co
During negotiations in 1982 between the plaintiff and MK Ltd concerning a possible
takeover of MK by the plaintiff, the defendants, MK's accountants, were instructed
by MK to prepare accounts for it as quickly as possible. Draft accounts, which
showed a net loss for the year ended 30 June 1982 of 48,094, were made
available to the plaintiff's chairman. At a subsequent meeting a member of the
defendants' firm, P, answering a question from the chairman, asserted that MK
was 'breaking even or doing marginally worse'. After the takeover the plaintiff
discovered errors in the accounts. It claimed from the defendants damages in
negligence in respect of the accounts and of P's assertion. The judge decided the
defendants were negligent in relation to both matters and both had to a material
extent induced the plaintiff to continue with the takeover; he awarded the plaintiffs
75,000 damages.The defendants appealed.Nicholas Padfield and Monique Allan
(instructed by Herbert Smith) for the defendants. Quintin Iwi (instructed by
Cameron Markby Hewitt) for the plaintiff.Neill LJ said that it became necessary, in
the absence of some general principle, to examine each individual case in the light
of the concepts of foreseeability, proximity and fairness. The last of those
concepts, however, was elusive and might be only one of the criteria by which
proximity was to be judged. It was sufficient to underline that in every case the
court had not only to consider the forseeability of the damage and whether the
relationship between the parties was sufficiently proximate but also to enquire
whether in the particular situation it was fair, just and reasonable that the law
should impose on the defendant a duty of the scope suggested for the benefit of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff had argued that the judge had been fully entitled to
conclude that a duty of care existed. However, his Lordship had concluded that,
applying the tests established in recent authorities, the existence of a duty of care
had not been made out.Nourse and Balcombe LJJ delivered concurring
judgments.Appeal allowed.
JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks,
Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER
289
in this case, a firm of accountant, who carelessly made a financial statement of Y
company, and the plaintiff relied on it. The court held that, the firm of accountant
imposes the duty of care to plaintiff because the defendant fully aware that the
plaintiff will investing in or taking over Y company thus, defendant will knew that
the plaintiff will rely on the published accounts.
Jebson v Ministry of Defence The claimant, a soldier, suffered severe injuries after a night out drinking organised
by the MOD. The claimant was transported with 19 other soldiers in the back of an
army vehicle with a canvass roof. On the return journey the claimant and other
soldiers were very drunk. The senior officer travelled in the front of the vehicle and
was unable to see what was going on in the back of the vehicle. The claimant
climbed on to the tailgate and attempted to climb on to the roof. He fell and was
struck by a lorry. The trial judge held that whilst it was foreseeable that an injury
may occur by high spirits and stumbling inside the vehicle it was not foreseeable
the claimant would attempt to climb on the roof and therefore the damage was too
remote as it had not occurred in a foreseeable manner.

Held:

It was foreseeable that injury (whether slight or serious) would occur as a result of
the drunken and rowdy behaviour of the passengers, including the danger that
someone would fall from the vehicle as a result, such wider risk being apt to
include within its description the accident which actually happened.
Jobling v Associated Dairies
[1982] AC 794 House of
Lords
Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his
employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his
earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back
condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial
judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to
recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer
appealed.Held:The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated
where the victim is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling
illness, the decision had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the
decision in Baker v Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.
Jobling v Associated Dairies
[1982] AC 794 House of
Lords
Mr Jobling, a butcher, slipped on the floor at his place of work due to his
employer's negligence. He injured his back which caused him to reduce his
earning capacity to 50% of what it was. He then developed an independent back
condition which was unrelated to the injury which left him unable to work. The trial
judge applied Baker v Willoughby and held that the claimant was entitled to
recover damages beyond the onset to the back condition. The employer appealed.

Held:
The House of Lords distinguished Baker v Willoughby and stated where the victim
is overtaken before trial by a wholly unconnected and disabling illness, the decision
had no application. The House of Lords were critical of the decision in Baker v
Willoughby but stopped short of overruling it.
Jolley v Sutton [2000] 1 WLR
1082
Two 14 year old boys found an abandoned boat on land owned by the council and
decided to do it up. The boat was in a thoroughly rotten condition and represented
a danger. The council had stuck a notice on the boat warning not to touch the boat
and that if the owner did not claim the boat within 7 days it would be taken away.
The council never took it away. The boys had been working on the boat for 6-7
weeks when one of them suffered severe spinal injuries, resulting in paraplegia,
when the boat fell on top of him. The boys had jacked the boat up to work on the
underside and the jack went through the rotten wood. The claimant brought an
action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The trial judge found for the
claimant. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that whilst it was
foreseeable that younger children may play on the boat and suffer an injury by
falling through the rotten wood, it was not foreseeable that older boys would try to
do the boat up. The claimant appealed.

House of Lords held:

The claimant's appeal was allowed. The risk was that children would "meddle with
the boat at the risk of some physical injury" The actual injury fell within that
description.

Lord Steyn:
"The scope of the two modifiers - the precise manner in which the injury came
about and its extent - is not definitively answered by either The Wagon Mound (No.
1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an
intense focus on the circumstances of each case."
Jones v Boyce (1816) The plaintiffs was a passenger on the top of the defendant's coach. Due to the
breaking of a defective rein the coach was in danger of overturning. The plaintiff
therefore jumped from the coach and broke his leg. In the event the coach was not
upset.Held The plaintiff was successful i claiming for his injuries caused by the
negligence of the defendant who allowed the defective rein t be used. The plaintiff
was said to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person although he had
selected the more dangerous of the two alternatives i.e. to jump form the coach
instead of staying where he was. He was entitled to do so in the agony of the
moment and was able to recover damages.
Jones v Livox Quarries [1952]
2 QB 608 Court of Appeal
The claimant worked in the defendants quarry. One lunch break he hitched a lift
back to the canteen by standing on the tow bar of a traxcavator. The driver of the
traxcavator was unaware that the claimant had jumped on the back and it was
against company rules to stand on the back of the traxcavators. Unfortunately a
dumper truck, driven recklessly by another employee, crashed into the back of the
traxcavator crushing the claimants legs. Consequently the claimant had to have
his legs amputated.

Held:

The defendant was liable but the claimant was held to be 1/5 to blame under the
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. He had acted against orders and
exposed himself to danger.

Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so
contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is
guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he
did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself: and in his
reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.
Junior Books v Veitchi (1983)
HL
[Tort negligence - duty of care - development and scope - damage remoteness
- economic loss]
D, specialist-flooring contractors negligently laid a floor in Cs factory.
D as specialist flooring contractors knew what products were required and were
alone responsible for the composition and construction of the floor. C suffered loss
and damages, such as the cost of removal of machinery and loss of profits while
the floor was being re-laid.

Held: Te scope of the duty of care extended to a duty to avoid causing pure
economic loss consequential on defects in the work.

D lost
Kemsley -v- Foot [1951] 2 KB
34
The plaintiff complained that the defendant had defamed him with a headline to an
article 'Lower than Hemsley' which otherwise had no connection with the plaintiff.
He said it suggested that he was a byword for poor journalism. Held: Criticism of a
newspaper owner as to the presentation of news by the paper was to be treated on
a par with criticism of a book or play. The critic is not prevented from relying upon
fair comment as a defence only because he does not particularise the conduct of
which he complains. He need only state plainly the subject-matter of the complaint.
Birkett LJ said: "It is clear, therefore, and indeed it was not contended otherwise,
that ALL the facts need not be stated, but when the matter is submitted to the
judgment of a jury particulars of the facts relied on must be supplied" and "I do not
think it is possible to lay down any rule of universal application. If, for example, a
defamatory statement is made about a private individual who is quite unknown to
the general public, and he has never taken any part in public affairs, and the
statement takes the form of comment only and is capable of being construed as
comment and no facts of any kind are given, while it is conceivable that the
comment may be made on a matter of public interest, nevertheless the defence of
fair comment might not be open to a defendant in that case. It is almost certain that
a naked comment of that kind in those circumstances would be decided to be a
question of fact and could be justified as such if that defence were pleaded. But if
the matter is before the public, as in the case of a book, a play, a film, or a
newspaper, then I think different considerations apply. Comment may then be
made without setting out the facts on which the comment is based if the subject-
matter of the comment is plainly stated. This seems to me to accord with good
sense and the true public interest." Somervell LJ identified two cases where a
publisher may not be obliged to set out the factual basis of his comment in detail:
where the subject matter was a work of art placed before the public for comment,
and where the subject was a public figure subject in any event to vigorous
discussion and where a detailed recital of the facts would be unwelcome. In
contradistinction: "At the other end of the scale one may imagine a comment
reflecting on the integrity of a subordinate official, whose activities had so far
received no publicity, where it might be held that the defence was not available
unless the facts relied on were substantially set out or indicated."
Keown v Coventry Healthcare
NHS Trust, CA (Civ Div)
2/2/2006
No Occupiers Liability Claimant put himself at risk by indulging in a dangerous
activity. An 11-year-old child who had climbed the outside of a fire escape was not
at risk of suffering injury by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises
within the Occupiers Liability Act 1984 s.1(1)(a) but had put himself at risk through
his own choice to indulge in a dangerous activity. If there was a danger attributable
to the state of the premises, thus giving rise to a potential duty, the content of the
duty might vary according to whether the trespasser was a child or an adult, but
until that point was reached, then in the general run of cases, the age of the
trespasser was not relevant.
Kirkham v CC Greater
Manchester Police [1990] 2
QB 283 Court of Appeal
Mr Kirkham was an alcoholic and suffered from depression. He had made a two
suicide attempts on 6th Jan 1980. He was admitted to hospital but discharged
himself the following day. When he arrived home his wife prevented him from
drinking and he became violent and started smashing furniture. The police were
called and arrested him. His wife informed them of his suicide attempts and
discharging himself from hospital and it was agreed that he should be remanded in
custody for his own safety. However, the police failed inform the prison authorities
that Mr Kirkham was a suicide risk. He committed suicide whilst on remand at
Risley Remand Centre. His wife brought an action based on the negligence of the
police in failing to pass on the information. The Police raised the defences of
volenti non fit injuria and ex turpi causa.Held:The claimant was successful. The
defence of volenti non fit injuria, although normally would apply where a person of
sound mind were to take their own life, had no application where a person of
unsound mind took their life. The defence of ex turpi causa was not limited to
illegal acts but extended also to immoral acts. The court applied the public
conscience test and concluded that to allow the claimant to succeed would not
affront the public conscience, or shock the ordinary citizen.
Knightley v Johns & Ors
[1982] 1 WLR 349 Court of
Appeal
As a result of Mr John's negligent driving his car overturned in a tunnel. Two police
officers on motorcycles arrived at the scene. The senior officer instructed them
both to ride their motorcycles to the other side of the tunnel and close the entrance
to the tunnel as he had forgotten to close it earlier. They took the decision of
driving on through the tunnel on the wrong side of the road on a blind bend rather
than going the long way round. Unfortunately one of the officers, Mr Knightly, was
involved in a head on collision with an oncoming vehicle driven by Mr Cotton and
sustained serious injuries. He brought an action against Mr Cotton, Mr John, the
senior officer and the Chief Constable of West Midlands. The main contentious
point was whether Mr. John remained liable or whether the actions of the other
defendant's and the claimant amounted to a novus actus interveniens.

Held:

The senior officer's instructions and failure to close the entrance to the tunnel were
negligent and broke the chain of causation. The claimant's decision in going
through the tunnel was not negligent. Thus the claimant was entitled to full
damages from the senior officer and Mr John was not liable
Knupffer v London Express
Newspapers [1944] AC 116,
Some articles published during the second world war referred to a political group of
Russian exiles as people who wanted to work with Hitler to make Russia facist.
The Claimant was the head of the group in the UK and claimed that the words
could reasonably be understood as imputing him. The global membership was
2000 but the UK membership was only 24. The House of Lords said that there
could be no general rule preventing a lawsuit as long as the statement can be
understood as referring to individual members in the party, which they did not do in
the present case.
Lamb v Camden LBC [1981]
2 All ER 408 Court of Appeal
The defendant council negligently fractured a water pipe outside the claimant's
house. This caused extensive damage and the property had to be vacated. One
year later the council had not undertaken the repairs. Squatters had also moved in
and caused further damage. The claimant arranged for repairs to be done herself
and submitted a bill to the council for the repairs and damage caused by the
squatters.Held:The local authority was not liable for the acts of the squatters. It
was not foreseeable that squatters would move into an empty house in Camden
and cause damage despite the prevalence of such behaviour in Camden at the
time.
Latimer v AEC [1953] AC 643 The claimant worked in the defendant's factory and slipped up on the factory floor.
The factory had become flooded due to adverse weather conditions. The
defendant's had put up warning signs mopped up and placed sawdust in the most
used places to make it as safe as possible. The trial judge held that there had been
a breach of duty as the defendants should have closed the factory if it was
unnsafe. However, no argument had been advanced on this.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. There was no duty to close the factory. The
defendant only had to take reasonable precautions to minimise the risk which they
had done. There was no need to go to great expense to eliminate any possible risk
and thus no obligation to close the factory.
Law Society v KPMG Peat
Marwick and Others
The defendant accountants prepared annual accounts reports for a firm of
solicitors which the solicitors then provided to the Law Society in accordance with
s.34 of the Solicitors Act 1974. Following the discovery of fraud by two partners in
the solicitors' firm, substantial payments were made from the compensation fund
maintained by the Law Society. The Law Society, as trustee of the fund,
commenced proceedings against the defendants, claiming damages on the ground
that the defendants had negligently prepared the accounts reports and, as a result,
it had not exercised its powers of intervention into the firm which would have
reduced the amount paid out of the fund. On a preliminary issue, Sir Richard Scott
V-C ([2000] 1 All ER 515) held that the defendants had owed the Law Society, as
trustee of the fund, a duty of care when preparing the accounts reports. The
defendants appealed.
Gordon Pollock QC and Rhodri Davies QC (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the
defendants. Lord Goldsmith QC and Matthew Collings (instructed by Wright Son &
Pepper) for the Law Society.
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the question of whether a duty of care was owed
by the accountants to the Law Society as trustee of the compensation fund had to
be examined against the test laid down in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990]
2 AC 605, namely, reasonable foreseeability of damage, proximity and whether it
was fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty; that the intervention by the
Law Society, which an adverse accounts report could trigger, protected both the
public and the compensation fund; that it was made clear to the accountants that
the reports were required so that protective steps could be taken and it was
obvious that if protective action was not taken because a report did not draw
attention to non-compliance with the account rules that could have adverse
consequences on the fund; that there was no reason why there should not be a
private law duty owed to the Law Society, the performance of which would assist it
to perform its public or regulatory duty; and that, accordingly, the defendants had
owed a duty of care to the Law Society.
Leakey & Ors v National
Trust [1980] QB 485 Court of
Appeal
The claimants land had been damaged by falls of soil and other debris from the
defendants land known as Burrow Mump. The falls were caused entirely by nature
there was no human activity involved that would have caused the fall. The
defendants were aware of the risks since 1968. They had taken legal advice and
were told that they would not be liable for naturally occurring slides and
consequently did nothing to prevent such slides. Following the exceptionally hot
dry summer of 1976 and unusually heavy rainfall in the autumn, Mrs Leaky noticed
a big crack appear in the bank above her house. She informed the National Trust
and offered to pay half the cost of making it safe. Her offer was rejected. A few
weeks later there was a large fall. She joined forces with other neighbours to bring
an action in nuisance.Held:The National Trust were liable following the Privy
Council decision in Goldman v Hargrave. A defendant is liable for a naturally
occurring hazard on the land if they are aware of the danger and failed to act with
reasonable prudence to remove the hazard.
Lennon v Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis
The claimant, an officer with the Metropolitan Police, successfully applied to join
the police service of Northern Ireland. He sought advice about his transfer from a
police personnel executive officer in London. In reply to his specific enquiry he was
informed that his housing allowance entitlement would not be affected by his taking
time off work during the course of his transfer. He in fact took three weeks off work
which resulted in a break in his continuity of service, and on taking up his new
position he permanently lost entitlement to a monthly housing allowance of 134.
The Court of Appeal upheld his claim in negligence against the commissioner
arising from the manner in which his transfer was handled and upheld the award of
some 44,000 damages. The general principles governing the existence of a duty
of care not to cause pure economic loss to another by careless acts or omissions
are well established, and the commissioner was wrong in suggesting that the
decision broke new ground involving a radical departure from the existing law.
Although there was no contract of employment between the police commissioner
and the claimant, the relationship between them was analogous to that created by
such a contract; it was fair, just and reasonable to impose on the police
commissioner a general duty of care to give advice to the claimant to protect him
from economic loss.
Lewis -v- Daily Telegraph Ltd
[1963] 1 QB 340
The court considered a request from jurors when assessing damages in a A police
investigation into a company that produced plastics were leaked to a newspaper.
The front page of the newspaper copied the document which said that an
investigation was going on by the fraud squad after criticisms of the chairman's
accounts by a shareholder. The company was later absolved of any wrongdoing
and they sued for defamation alleging that the newspaper had intended that
readers assume the company was fraudulent. The action wasn't based on what the
words said themselves, but on a secondary meaning which may have been
inferred by the reader: the innuendo meaning. The House of Lords held that the
right-minded person would not infer guilt just from the article and the case was
dismissed.
Limpus v. London General
Omnibus Co. 1862
A bus driver racing to a stop to collect passengers deliberately obstructed the
driver of a bus of a rival company, overturning the latter's vehicle.
The bus driver had been given instructions against obstructing other buses.

The defendants were liable.

The driver was acting within the course of his employment at the time; it was
immaterial whether his act was forbidden.
Profit for the company when the bus is first (more passengers).
Otherwise, companies could exculpate themselves simply by prohibiting their
servants from committing any torts during their service.
Lippiatt and Febry -v- South
Gloucestershire County
Council; CA 31-Mar-1999
The defendant had failed to remove travellers who had encamped on its land and
caused nuisances against neighbouring farmers.Held: The court refused to strike
out a claim in nuisance by neighbouring land owners. It was arguable that a land
owner can be liable for repeated acts constituting nuisance committed from its land
by those it knew were in occupation, and where no steps were taken to evict them.
It was its own land from which a continuing nuisance emanated.
Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001]
UKHL 22
Hesley Hall was a boarding house for students with severe emotional problems,
the warden Mr Graine had supervision of the pupils at Hesley Hall and their daily
routine. It transpired during the early 90s that Mr Graine had sexually abused these
children and they have suffered psychiatric injuries. Hesley Hall was sued in all
sorts of tort from battery to negligence.

If the court was to uphold the Salmond test which required:
The wrongful act must be authorised by the employer; or
The wrongful mode was authorised.
This draconian rule meant that an employee engaging in a criminal act (such as
the current case) will never be acting in the course of employment, would therefore
in the context of the current case cause significant injustice. In the Court of Appeal
the judges followed the case of Trotman and held that Hesley Hall is not liable.
When the case went up to the House of Lords, the Law Lords unanimously held
that vicarious liability is established, hence overruling Trotman. The House of
Lords found:

The purpose of the warden's duty was to develop trust with the children, that trust
gave him access to the boys and allowed the abuse;
There was geographical and temporal proximity to the employment, as the abused
occured on the premise of his employment and during the time which he should be
carrying out his employment duties;
There is an inherent risk of sexual abuse in these types of occupations, for the
courts to find Hesley Hall liable could potentially be a deterrent to potential
abusers.
Lord Steyn whose judgment is the most often cited said that the warden's criminal
acts are inextricably interwoven with his duties, hence it is closely connect to his
work therefore Hesley Hall is liable under vicarious liability.
Lord Hobhouse on the otherhand reject the whole notion of vicarious liability, and
argued that Hesley Hall owned a direct duty to the children, therefore they are
directly liable in tort for systemic negligence.

Lord Millett preferred a wider approach than Bazley, i.e. any risk that are incidental
to employment will give raise to vicarious liability. This approach is based on
enterprise theory in criminology.
Lister v. Romford Ice and
Cold Storage Ltd. 1957
A father directed his son parking a lorry, but by negligence of the son, the father
was injured.
The son was the employee of the company.
The company sued the son for the full money they had to pay in damages.

They succeded.
Mostly employers do not sue their employees but it can be done.
Lochgelly Iron & Coal v.
M'Mullan [1934] AC 1
A miner was killed when part of the coal mine that he was working in fell on top of
him. The man's family successfully sued for damages under the Coal Mines Act
1911 (c 50) s 49 (repealed), which required that an employer must ensure that the
roof of every coal mine is made secure and not order an employee to work there if
it is not. The coal mine owners appealed the decision, but their appeal was
dismissed as it was held that the initial action was competent as their negligence
had been proved.
London Artists v Littler [1962]
2 QB 375
The Defendant wrote a letter to some actors in a play who had all given notice to
quit at the same time accusing them of a plot to force the end of a successful play.
So many actors giving notice at the same time was apparently an almost unheard
of event. They sued him. He pleaded justification and then withdrew it as it became
clear that the actors had withdrawn for different reasons and not in order to end the
play. The Defendant also argued fair comment on a matter in the public interest.
The Court laid down this test: Was the comment made on a matter of public
interest, Was the statement an expression of fact or opinion, If opinion, are the
underlying facts true and contained in the article, Would a fair man make the
same comment.Regarding (1), they held that whenever a matter affects people at
large it can be held to be in the public interest.
Lowery v Walker [1911] AC
10 House of Lords
The Claimant was injured by a horse when using a short cut across the
defendants field. The land had been habitually used as a short cut by members of
the public for many years and the defendant had taken no steps to prevent people
coming on to the land. The defendant was aware that the horse was dangerous.

Held:
The defendant was liable. Whilst the claimant did not have express permission to
be on the land, a licence was implied through repeated trespass and the
defendants acquiescence.
Luxmoore-May v Messenger
May Baverstock (a firm)
(1990) CA
D valued two Stubbs paintings at 30; they eventually sold at auction for 88,000.
Valuation of a picture of was not an exact science and in deciding not to attribute
the picture to a particular artist a valuer was not necessarily guilty of professional
negligence
Malone v Laskey 1907 2 KB
141
The claimant was injured when vibrations from an engine on an adjoining property
caused a bracket to come loose and the cistern to fall on her in the lavatory. She
was unsuccessful in her claim as she did not have a proprietary interest in the
house. Her husband was a mere licensee through his employment as a manager.
Mansfield v Weetabix [1997]
EWCA Civ 1352
The defendant drove his lorry into a shop owned by the claimant. At the time of the
incident the defendant was had a malignant insulinoma which resulted in him being
in a hyperglycaemic state although he was unaware of this. On the day of the
crash he had also been involved in two minor incidents.

Held:
The defendant was not in breach of duty

Leggatt LJ
"In my judgment the standard of care that Mr Tarleton was obliged to show in these
circumstances was that which is to be expected of a reasonably competent driver
unaware that he is or may be suffering from a condition that impairs his ability to
drive. To apply an objective standard in a way that did not take account of Mr
Tarletons condition would be to impose strict liability. But that is not the law."
Maynard v West Midlands
Regional Health Authority
The patient presented with symptoms of tuberculosis but both the consultant
physician and the consultant surgeon took the view that Hodgkin's disease,
carcinoma, and sarcoidosis were also possibilities, the first of which if present
would have required remedial steps to be taken in its early stages. Instead of
waiting for the results of the sputum tests, the consultants carried out a
mediastinoscopy to get a biopsy. The inherent risk of damage was to the left
laryngeal recurrent nerve, even if the operation was properly done. In the event,
only tuberculosis was confirmed. Unfortunately, the risk became a reality and the
patient suffered a paralysis of the left vocal cord. The decision of the physician and
the surgeon to proceed was said by their expert peers to be reasonable in all the
circumstances. A court may prefer one body of opinion to the other but that is no
basis for a conclusion of negligence.
McFarlane v. E.E. Caledonian
Limited [1994] 2 All ER 1
An oil worker, the claimant, claimed damages for psychiatric injury, after witnessing
the destruction caused by a fire on an oil rig from his workplace on a support boat
100 metres away. The fire killed 164 men although the claimant was uninjured. It
was held that the claimant was owed a duty of care on the ground that he was a
participant in an event and had reasonable been in fear for his life and safety and
the impact of the events had caused shock. The defendants appealed. Held, that
the claimant was entitled to damages because he was more than a mere
bystander to the event.
McFarlane v. Tayside Health
Board [2000]
A father, wishing to limit the size of his family to six children, underwent a
vasectomy. Months later his surgeon confirmed the success of the operation and
that he need not use contraception. The man subsequently made his wife pregnant
and the family sought damages from the Health Board for the costs of raising the
child. Held, the vasectomy was intended to stop pregnancy and therefore the
mother could claim for costs in that regard only. However, the costs around raising
the child could not be recovered as it would not be fair just or reasonable to impose
such a burden on a liability for financial loss on a doctor.
(This is a case where a healthy child was born due to failed sterilization)
McGhee v National Coal
Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 House
of Lords
The claimant worked at the defendant's brick works. His normal duties did not
expose him to much dust but he was then asked to work on the brick kilns in a hot
a dusty environment. The defendant was in breach of duty in not providing washing
and showering facilities. The claimant thus had to cycle home still covered in the
brick dust. The claimant contracted dermatitis. There were two possible causes:
the brick dust he was exposed to during the course of his employment which was
not attributable to a breach of duty and the brick dust he was exposed to on his
journey home which was attributable to a breach. The defendant sought to
distinguish Wardlaw's case by arguing that it was proved that every particle of dust
inhaled played its part in causing the onset of the disease whereas in this case it is
not proved that every minor abrasion played its part.

Held:
The claimant only had to demonstrate that the dust attributable to the breach of
duty materially increased the risk of him contract dermatitis.

Lord Salmon:
My Lords, I would suggest that the true view is that, as a rule, when it is proved, on
a balance of probabilities, that an employer has been negligent and that his
negligence has materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an
industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that employee if he contracts the
disease notwithstanding that the employer is not responsible for other factors
which have materially contributed to the disease.
McKay v Essex AHA (1982)
CA
^[Tort - negligence - duty of care - public policy - wrongful birth creates no cause of
action]DD, the doctors who did not advise a mother to have an abortion. C was
born disabled as a result of an infection of rubella (German measles) suffered by
her mother while the child was in her womb. The child claimed damages on the
ground that she had been "suffered entry into a life in which her injuries are highly
debilitating," and for distress, loss and damage.Held: There is no claim in law
which allows a child born alive with deformities to claim damages for negligence
against doctors in allowing it to be born alive. The doctor was under no legal
obligation under the Abortion Act 1967 to the foetus to terminate its life, and the
child's claim was contrary to public policy as a violation of the sanctity of human
life, and a claim which could not be recognised since the court could not evaluate
damages for the denial of non-existence The effect of the Congenital Disabilities
(Civil Liability) Act 1976 was that no child born after the passing of the Act could
have a cause of action based on the loss of a chance to die. C lost
McKew v Holland [1969] 3 All
ER 1621
The claimant sustained an injury at work due to his employer's breach of duty. He
strained his back and hips and his leg was prone to giving way. Whilst in this state
he attempted to climb down a steep concrete staircase without a handrail unaided.
He got part way down and felt his leg give way so he jumped 10 steps to the
bottom. He suffered a fractured right ankle and was also left with a permanent
disability. The defendant accepted liability for the injury sustained during his
employment but disputed liability for the second injuries resulting from the
claimant's action in jumping down the stairs.

Held:

The claimant's action amounted to a novus actus interveniens because his action
in attempting to climb the steps unaided knowing that his leg might give way was
unreasonable. The defendant was therefore not liable for the injuries resulting from
the incident on the stairs.
McKinnon Industries v Walker
[1951] WN 401 Privy Council
The defendant manufactured steel and iron products 600 feet from the claimants
property. The claimant had a dwelling house and also a commercial florists and
nursery. As part of his business he specialised in growing orchids which are known
for their particular sensitivity. The claimant brought an action in relation to noxious
fumes and smuts which had deposited over his shrubs, trees, hedges and flowers
causing them to die.

Held:
The defendants actions constituted an unlawful nuisance and therefore the
claimant was entitled to recover damages in respect of the orchids despite the
sensitive nature of the flowers.
McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983]
1 AC 410
A mother received news that her family had been involved in a car accident. On
hearing the news she rushed to the hospital to find her injured family and be told
that her son had been killed. The mother suffered severe shock, depression and
personality change. The defendant admitted negligence. The issue was whether
the mother could succeed in her claim because she had not been present at the
accident or it aftermath. Held, she could succeed at it was reasonably foreseeable
McManus v Beckham 2002 Whilst visiting the claimants' autograph shop the defendant allegedly claimed that a
signed photograph of her husband, David Beckham, was not genuine. The shop
sought to rely on the subsequent publication in the media of the defendant's
alleged claims in support of its claim for damages. The judge at first instance struck
out the shop's plea in this respect.Whether the shop could rely at trial on an
allegation that the claimant was responsible for subsequent press coverage of her
visit to the shop.The plea would be reinstated to go to the jury at trial, who would
be directed to consider the questions of whether the defendant knew that what she
had allegedly said was likely to be reported and that if she slandered someone that
slander was likely to be repeated or a reasonable person in the position of the
defendant should have appreciated that there was a signficant risk that what she
had allegedly said would be repeated.
McWilliams v Arrol [1962] HL [Tort negligence - duty of care - causation]
D a building firm had not provided a safety belt to a steel erector who fell 70 feet to
his death. C the widow. D was in breach of its statutory duty to provide a safety
belt (but not to insist that it be worn) but, there was evidence to show that the man
would probably not have worn a belt even had it been provided.

Held: The firm's negligence and breach of statutory duty were not the cause of his
death.

C lost
Merivale -v- Carson (1887) 20
QBD 275
A published criticism of a play made reference to one of the characters being "a
naughty wife", though in fact there was no adulterous wife in the play. Held: The
defence of fair comment is open to a commentator however prejudiced he might
be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views.
Bowen LJ said: "Still there is another class of cases in which, as it seems to me,
the writer would be travelling out of the region of fair criticism - I mean if he imputes
to the author that he has written something which in fact he has not written.
That would be a misdescription of the work. There is all the difference in the world
between saying that you disapprove of the character of a work, and that you think it
has an evil tendency, and saying that a work treats adultery cavalierly, when in fact
there is no adultery at all in the story. A jury would have a right to consider the
latter beyond the limits of fair criticism."
After citing Campbell, Lord Esher MR asked what was meant by 'fair comment' and
answered: "What is the meaning of a 'fair comment'? I think the meaning is this: is
the article in the opinion of the jury beyond that which any fair man, however
prejudiced or however strong his opinion may be, would say of the work in
question? Every latitude must be given to opinion and to prejudice, and then an
ordinary set of men with ordinary judgment must say whether any fair man would
have made such a comment on the work . . Mere exaggeration, or even gross
exaggeration, would not make the comment unfair. However wrong the opinion
expressed may be in point of truth, or however prejudiced the writer, it may still be
within the prescribed limit. The question which the jury must consider is this
would any fair man, however prejudiced he may be, however exaggerated or
obstinate his views, have said that which this criticism has said of the work which is
criticised? If it goes beyond that, then you must find for the plaintiff; if you are not
satisfied that it does, then it falls within the allowed limit, and there is no libel at all."
Mersey Docks and Harbour
Board v. Coggins & Griffiths
(Liverpool) Ltd. 1947
The appellants hired out a crane to the respondents for the purpose of unloading a
ship; they also provided a driver for this crane upon the terms that he should be for
the duration of the contract 'the servant of the hirers'.In fact although the
respondents supervised this man's work, they had no power of control over his
actual management of the machine.Through negligent handling of it he injured
someone.The defendant was liable.The right of ultimate control over the driver's
management of the crane was theirs.It lies upon the general employer to establish
that the vicarious responsibility has been shifted from his shoulders to those of the
special employer.Principle: in the case that one employer lends a servant to
another it depends on whichever of the two had the right of control over the
servant's activities at the time the injury was caused.
Miller v Jackson [1977]3 WLR
20 Court of Appeal
The defendants were members of the Lintz Cricket Club. Cricket had been played
at Lintz cricket ground for over 70 years. The land was owned by the National Coal
Board (NCB) who also owned some fields surrounding the grounds. Four years
prior to the action, the NCB sold one of the fields and a development of Wimpey
homes was put up in close proximity to the cricket ground. Mrs Miller purchased
one of the houses and brought an action against the cricket club seeking an
injunction to prevent them playing cricket at the ground. Initially quite a number of
balls were hit over the houses. However, in 1976 the cricket club erected a higher
fence and the number of balls hit out was reduced to nine over a two year period.
There had been no personal injuries resulting from the balls but some property
damage had been caused which the cricket club had paid for. Mrs Miller
complained that she could not use her garden during matches and would often
stay out of the house altogether.

Held:
The defendants were liable in both negligence and nuisance (Lord Denning
dissenting)

However, Cumming Bruce LJ refused the injunction on the grounds that it would be
inequitable to grant an injunction given that the cricket ground had been used for
so long and would be a loss to the community and Mrs Miller received the benefit
of being adjacent to an open space.

Lord Lane would have granted the injunction stating that the decision in Sturges v
Bridgeman involves the assumption that it is no defence for the defendant to show
that they came to the nuisance.
Ministry of Housing and Local
Government v Sharp
An employee of the authority failed to exercise reasonable skill and care in
searching for entries in the local land charges register. The search certificate
prepared by the clerk negligently failed to record a charge of 1,828 11s. 5d. in
favour of the Ministry.

Lord Denning MR held the local authority was liable to the Ministry for the
employee's incompetence. At 268 he rejected that a duty of care only arose when
there was a voluntary assumption of responsibility, rather "from the fact that the
person making it knows, or ought to know, that others, being his neighbours in this
regard, would act on the faith of the statement being accurate."
MLC v Evatt (1968) 12 CLR
556
Established that a professional adviser owed a duty of care to clients to whom they
supplied information.
Morgan Crucible Co plc v Hill
Samuel & Co Ltd and others
The plaintiffs took over another company and later brought an action against the
advisers, accountants and directors alleging breach of a duty of care by negligent
misrepresentation in financial statements published prior to the bid and in defence
documents sent to shareholders and served on the plaintiffs' advisers after the bid
on which the plaintiffs had relied in making and increasing their offer and whereby
they had suffered loss. After the decision of the House of Lords in Caparo
Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 WLR 358 the plaintiffs sought to amend their
pleading by restricting it to representations made in the course of the bid when
their relationship as identified bidders was sufficiently proximate to create a duty of
care owed to them by the defendants, but including the previously issued financial
statements as 'continuing representations' never withdrawn or qualified. The
plaintiffs further alleged that a particular purpose of the representations was to
persuade them to offer better terms. On a summons for leave to amend Hoffman J
refused leave holding that despite the amendments the case could not be
distinguished from Caparo and was bound to fail because of the absence of a duty
of care.The plaintiffs appealed.Jonathan Sumption QC, Stephen Suttle and John
Nicholls (instructed by Herbert Smith) for the plaintiffs. Gordon Langley QC and
Michael Brindle (instructed by Berwin Leighton) for the first defendants. Nicolas
Bratza QC and Ian Croxford (instructed by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert) for the second
defendants. Leslie Kosmin (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain) for the
third defendant. Nigel Davis (instructed by McKenna & Co) for the fourth and fifth
defendants. Michael McLaren (instructed by Allison & Humphreys) for the sixth,
seventh and eighth defendants.Slade LJ said on the assumed facts pleaded the
defendants intended that the plaintiffs would rely on the representations in deciding
whether or not to make an increased bid and that the plaintiffs had so relied and
that it was therefore plainly arguable that there was a relationship of proximity
between the plaintiffs and the defendants sufficient to give rise to a duty of care
and the case should go to trial.Appeal allowed.
Morgan -v- Odhams Press
Ltd; HL 1971
The plaintiff claimed in defamation. The defence was that the words did not refer to
the plaintiff and could not be understood to refer to him.
Held: The question as to what meaning words are capable of bearing has been
described as a question of law, but only in the sense that the decision thereon is
reserved to the judge rather than to the jury: It is not a question of law in the true
sense.
The ordinary reasonable reader is a layman, not a lawyer, and his capacity for
implication is much greater than that of the lawyer.
Lord Morris said: The question for the Judge at the end of the plaintiffs case was
whether there was evidence upon which the jury could (not would) decide in favour
of the plaintiff. That in turn raised the question whether the jury could decide that
some readers (having knowledge of certain circumstances) would reasonably
understand the words as referring to the plaintiff. If no reasonable reader could
have understood the words as referring to the plaintiff, then there would be nothing
to be left to the jury.
Lord Reid said that some people may think that the law has gone too far in
holding a publisher liable for a reference innuendo, if the statement concerned
applies to someone the publisher has never heard of.
Morgans v. Launchbury 1973
House of Lords
A husband used his wife's car; it was ensured by the wife.The wife said, 'If you get
drunk, get a friend to drive you'.He asked his friend, his friend did not want to.So
he drove the car himself and had an accident, both he and his friend were killed
and some people were injured.The man was not an agent.He did not do something
specific for his wife.It would be the same if he had used it for work (only if he was
doing something specific his wife asked him to do).Husband and wife are not
necessarily agent and principal.
Moriarty v Brookes [1834]
EWHC Exch J79
The defendant was a publican. He argued with a customer over a disputed
payment and struck him causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he had
asked the customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force was
lawfully applied in ejecting him from the pub.

Held:
The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the definition
of a wound as
"The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which the
skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a wound"
Moy -v- Pettman Smith (a
firm) and another; HL 3-Feb-
2005
Damages were claimed against a barrister for advice on a settlement given at the
door of the court. After substantial litigation, made considerably more difficult by
the negligence of the solicitors, the barrister had not advised the claimant at the
door of the court to accept an offer. The claimant was not advised as to potential
difficulties in having essential evidence admitted, and the evidence was not
admitted, and a much lower sum was received. The court of appeal had found the
advice itself not to be negligent, but that she should have given the client more
detailed advice.

Held: The question whether her advice was negligent has to be judged in the light
of the choices that were available in the light of her assessment. She had to
balance the possibility of her clients desire to achieve a full settlement against the
loss of a chance to sue the solicitors for negligence. it is the substance of the
advice, not the precise wording used to convey it, that needs to be examined in
order to judge whether it was negligent. The significance of Miss Perrys failure to
tell Mr Moy that the prospects of getting the evidence in were 50/50 has to be
measured against what she did tell him, which was that she was hopeful that the
judge would admit the evidence. The court of appeal had been wrong to disturb
the finding that the barrister had not been negligent: it was not incumbent upon the
appellant to spell out all her reasoning, so she was not in breach of her duty of
care to the claimant in the advice which she gave. As to the right of the solictors
to appeal: section 1(5) of the 1978 Act should be so construed as not to bar an
appeal in a case such as the present. This could be done in either or both of two
ways. One could construe the word judgment as referring to a final judgment after
any appeals have been determined, rather than the judgment at first instance of
the trial judge; or one could confine the operation of the subsection to actions for
contribution subsequently brought, so excluding further proceedings by way of
appeal in the original action. Whichever construction one adopts, I consider that
the solicitors right of appeal to the Court of Appeal was not barred by the operation
of section 1(5)
Muirhead v Industrial Tank
Specialties Ltd and Others
The third defendant manufactured motors for pumps which were incorporated in a
tank for the storage of lobsters which was installed at the plaintiff's fish farm. The
motors, being unsuited to UK voltages, cut out and the plaintiff's entire lobster
stock died from lack of oxygen. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, damages from the
third defendant in negligence for the loss of the lobsters and the economic loss,
including loss of profit, resulting therefrom. The trial judge held that the third
defendant was liable to the plaintiff in respect of the pure economic loss. The third
defendant appealed.Piers Ashworth QC and G W Lowe (instructed by Hadaway &
Hadaway, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the third defendant. Robin Stewart QC and
Michael Heywood (instructed by Crutes, Newcastle-upon-Tyne) for the
plaintiff.Robert Goff LJ, having considered Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983]
1 AC 520, said that damages in negligence for pure economic loss could be
recovered only if there were such a very close proximity of relationship between
the parties and reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant that the defendant was to
be taken voluntarily to have assumed direct responsibility to the plaintiff. The
ultimate purchaser of goods supplied unde a chain of ordinary sale contracts could
recover such damages only from his immediate vendor, since such proximity and
reliance would not arise between him and the manufacturer, and accordingly the
plaintiff could not recover his economic loss from the third defendant. Nourse LJ,
occurring , said that in the absence of close proximity and reliance, the court was
bound by Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [1973] QB 27
not to award damages for pure economic loss.O'Connor LJ, concurring, said that
Spartan Steel could not be distinguished, and had not been overruled by
implication in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd.Appealed allowed in part with one-
half costs. Leave to appeal refused.
Mulcahy v Ministry of
Defence (1996) CA
[Tort negligence - duty of care - no duty situations - just fair and reasonable -
public policy employers liability]
D, responsible for the army and therefore its soldiers, employed a gun commander
during the Gulf War. C an artilleryman sustained damage to his hearing when a
howitzer was fired accidentally.

Held: A serviceman owes no duty of care to his fellow servicemen in battle
conditions, since as a matter of common sense and public policy it would not be
fair, just and reasonable to impose such a duty. For the same reason the Ministry
of Defence as Cs employer does not have a duty to provide a safe system of work
in those circumstances.

C lost
Mullin v Richards [1998] 1
WLR 1304
Two 15 year old school girls were fighting with plastic rulers. A ruler snapped and a
splinter went into one of the girls eyes causing blindness. The girl brought an
action against the other girl for her negligent action.

Held:
The girl was only expected to meet the standard of a reasonable 15 year old
school girl not that of a reasonable man. She was found not to be in breach of
duty.
Murphy v Brentwood District
Council [1991] HL
[Tort negligence - duty of care - general principles - the nature of negligence -
duty of care - proving fault]D, local authority negligently approved plans for the
footings (a concrete raft) of a house that subsided. C the house owner could not
afford repairs and sold the house at a loss. C alleged that he and his family had
suffered an imminent risk to health and safety because gas and soil pipes had
broken and there was a risk of further breaks. Held: The damage suffered by C
was not material or physical damage. D was not liable for pure economic loss of
the cost of remedying defects To permit C to recover his economic loss would
logically lead to an unacceptably wide category of claims in respect of buildings or
chattels which were defective in quality, and would in effect introduce product
liability and transmissible warranties of quality into the law of tort by means of
judicial legislation. C lostPer curiam. It is unrealistic to regard a building or chattel
which has been wholly erected or manufactured and equipped by the same
contractor as a complex structure in which one part of the structure or chattel is
regarded as having caused damage to other property when it causes damage to
another part of the same structure or chattel, since the reality is that the structural
elements in a building or chattel form a single indivisible unit of which the different
parts are essentially interdependent and to the extent that there is a defect in one
part of the structure or chattel it must to a greater or lesser degree necessarily
affect all other parts of the structure. However, defects in ancillary equipment,
manufactured by different contractors, such as central heating boilers or electrical
installations may give rise to liability under ordinary principles of negligence.
Nettleship v Weston [1971] 3
WLR 370
The defendant was a learner driver. She was taking lessons from a friend. The
friend checked that the defendant's insurance covered her for passengers before
agreeing to go out with her. On one of the lessons Mrs Weston turned a bend, Mr
Nettleship told her to straighten the wheel but Mrs Weston panicked and failed to
straighten the wheel. She approached the pavement and Mr Nettleship grabbed
the handbrake and tried to straighten the wheel but it was too late. She mounted
the pavement and hit a lamp post. Mr Nettleship fractured his knee. The defendant
argued that the standard of care should be lowered for learner drivers and she also
raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria in that in agreeing to get in the car
knowing she was a learner, he had voluntarily accepted the risk.

Held:
A learner driver is expected to meet the same standard as a reasonable qualified
competent driver. Volenti did not apply as he had checked the insurance cover
which demonstrated he did not waive any rights to compensation. His damages
were reduced by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945
to reflect the degree to which he was also at fault.
Newstead v London Express
Newspapers (1940)
A newspaper report of a trial referred to Harold Newstead, a 30 year old
Camberwell man, as a bigamist. The claimant, who had the same name, lived in
Camberwell and was unmarried, successfully sued for libel.
Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen
Tat [1988] RTR 298.
The first defendant was driving a coach owned by the second defendant
westwards in the outer lane of a dual carriageway in Hong Kong. Suddenly the
coach crossed the central reservation and collided with a public light bus travelling
in the inner lane of the eastbound carriageway. One passenger in the bus was
killed, and the driver and three other passengers were injured. The plaintiffs, who
were those injured and the personal representatives of the deceased, commenced
against the defendants an action claiming damages for negligence. At the trial the
plaintiffs did not call oral evidence and relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
contending that the fact of the accident alone was sufficient evidence of negligence
by the first defendant. The defendants called evidence which established that an
untraced car being driven in the inner lane of the westbound carriageway had cut
into the outer lane in front of the coach, and to avoid hitting the car the first
defendant had braked and swerved to the right whereupon the coach had skidded
across colliding with the bus. The judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs on liability
holding that the defendants had failed to discharge the burden of disproving
negligence. On appeal the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong reversed that decision
and found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove negligence. On appeal to the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:Held, that it was misleading to talk of the
burden of proof shifting to the defendant in a res ipsa loquitur situation because the
burden of proving negligence rested throughout the case on the plaintiff (p 300L);
that in an appropriate case the plaintiff established a prima facie case by relying
upon the fact of the accident and if the defendant adduced no evidence there was
nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff would have proved his
case, but if the defendant did adduce evidence that evidence had to be evaluated
to see if it was still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere
fact of the accident (p 301D); that the judge had mislead himself by assuming that
there was a legal burden on the defendants to disprove negligence and he had
also failed to give effect to those authorities which established that a defendant
placed in a position of peril and emergency had not to be judged by too critical a
standard when he acted on the spur of the moment to avoid an accident (p 302D);
that in attempting to extricate himself, his coach and his passengers from a
situation which appeared to him as one of extreme danger, the first defendant had
acted with the alertness, skill and judgment which could reasonably have been
expected in the circumstances, and that, accordingly, the appeal should be
dismissed (p 302 H-J).
Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2
ExD 1
The defendant diverted a natural stream on his land to create ornamental lakes.
Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to be flooded
and damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable under Rylands v
Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of God.

Mellish LJ:

Now the jury have distinctly found, not only that there was no negligence in the
construction or the maintenance of the reservoirs, but that the flood was so great
that it could not reasonably have been anticipated, although, if it had been
anticipated, the effect might have been prevented; and this seems to us in
substance a finding that the escape of the water was owing to the act of God.
However great the flood had been, if it had not been greater than floods that had
happened before and might be expected to occur again, the defendant might not
have made out that she was free from fault; but we think she ought not to be held
liable because she did not prevent the effect of an extraordinary act of nature,
which she could not anticipate.
Norman v Future Publishing The operatic diva, Jessye Norman, sued for libel over the attribution to her in
Classic CD music magazine of a joke which involved her getting stuck, being
advised to exit sideways from the situation and responding with the line "Honey, I
ain't got no sideways". She put various defamatory interpretations on this story.
Her claim was struck out by Buckley J on the grounds that the words could not
carry a defamatory meaning. She appealed.Whether the attribution of this joke was
capable of conveying a meaning defamatory of the claimant.Dismissing the appeal:
(1) Where words were alleged to be defamatory because they exposed a claimant
to ridicule a line had to be drawn between insults and ridicule; in doing so the
perceived intention of the writer could be relevant. (2) The article was generally
sympathetic and favourable, and did not disclose an intention to ridicule. (3) The
words could not bear any of the defamatory meanings advanced.
Ogwo v Taylor [1987] 3 WLR
1145 House of Lords
The Defendant attempted to burn off paint from the fascia boards beneath the
eaves of his house with a blow lamp and in so doing set fire to the premises. The
fire brigade were called and the Claimant, an acting leading fireman, and a
colleague entered the house wearing breathing apparatus and the usual fireman's
protective clothing and armed with a hose. The two firemen were able, with the aid
of a step- ladder, to squeeze through a small hatch to get into the roof space. The
heat within the roof space was intense. The Claimant suffered serious burn injuries
to his upper body and face from scalding steam which must have penetrated his
protective clothing.

Held:
A duty of care was owed to a professional fireman. There was no requirement that
the risk be exceptional. The defence of volenti had no application.

Lord Bridge:
"The duty of professional firemen is to use their best endeavours to extinguish fires
and it is obvious that, even making full use of all their skills, training and specialist
equipment, they will sometimes be exposed to unavoidable risks of injury, whether
the fire is described as "ordinary" or "exceptional." If they are not to be met by the
doctrine of volenti, which would be utterly repugnant to our contemporary notions
of justice, I can see no reason whatever why they should be held at a
disadvantage as compared to the layman entitled to invoke the principle of the so-
called "rescue" cases."
Ormrod v. Crossville Motor
Service 1953
A car should be transported to Monte Carlo by an agent.
The driver's negligence caused an accident.

The principal was responsible for this accident in the course of a principal-agent-
relationship.

Even if it was partly for the agent's benefit.
Owens v Brimmell [1977]
QBD
Remedies - contributory negligence - 20% deduction for not wearing a seat belt
and allowing himself to be carried by drunken driver]
C and D together in D's car drank considerable amounts of beer in a pub. Whilst
driving home C did not wear a seat belt. D negligently caused an accident,
whereby C was injured.

Held: The principle was recognised that a passenger can be held to have been
contributorily negligent if he rides with a driver who he knows has consumer
alcohol in such quantity as is likely to impair to a dangerous degree that driver's
capacity to drive properly and safely.

On the facts, the passenger was found guilty of 20% contributory negligence.
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC
155 House of Lord
The claimant had suffered from ME over a period of time and was in recovery
when he was involved in a minor car accident due to the defendant's negligence.
The claimant was not physically injured in the collision but the incident triggered his
ME and had become chronic and permanent so that he was unable to return to his
job as a teacher. He was successful at his trial and awarded 162,000 in
damages.Held:Provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable it did not
matter whether the injury was physical or psychiatric. There was thus no need to
establish that psychiatric injury was foreseeable. Also the fact that an ordinary
person would not have suffered the injury incurred by the claimant was irrelevant
as the defendant must take his victim as he finds him under the thin skull rule.
Palsgraf v Long Island
Railway Co (1928) New York
Appeals
[Tort negligence - duty of care to whom owed - foreseeability of damage]
D employed a railway worker who carelessly knocked a box to the ground.
Unknown to him it contained fireworks which exploded on impact; the blast
knocked a weighing machine onto C standing some distance away.

Held: injury to C was not foreseeable from the mere dropping of a box, and D was
not liable for Cs injuries.

C lost
Paris v Stepney [1951] AC
367
The claimant only had sight in one eye due to in injury sustained in the war. During
the course of his employment as a garage hand, a splinter of metal went into his
sighted eye causing him to become completely blind. The employer did not provide
safety goggles to workers engaged in the type of work the claimant was
undertaking. The defendant argued there was no breach of duty as they did not
provide goggles to workers with vision in both eyes and it was not standard
practice to do so. There was therefore no obligation to provide the claimant with
goggles.

Held:
There was a breach of duty. The employer should have provided goggles to the
claimant because the seriousness of harm to him would have been greater than
that experienced by workers with sight in both eyes. The duty is owed to the
particular claimant not to a class of persons of reasonable workers.
Parkinson v St James and
Seacroft University Hospital
NHS Trust 2001
(This is a case where a disabled child was born as a result of a failed sterilization)
FACTS:-
The Claimant underwent a sterilisation procedure, but this was unsuccessful and
she conceived a fifth child, with severe learning difficulties. She brought a claim
against the health authority and the matter came before the Court of Appeal.
JUDGMENT:-
The courts awarded her "all costs that she would incur which were attributable to
the childs disabilities." A healthy mother who gave birth to a severely disabled
child after a negligently performed sterilisation could not claim the whole cost of
bringing up the child but that she could recover the additional costs resulting from
the childs disability.
Perl (Exporters) Ltd v
Camden London Borough
Council (1984),
the defendant council owned adjoining premises. Number 142 was let to the
claimant, and #144 was divided into flats. There was no lock on #144, and thieves
entered #142 by knocking a hole through the adjoining wall. The Court of Appeal
held that the defendants were not liable, mere foreseeability was not sufficient to
establish a duty. Policy factors are at work here; the claimant would be insured
against this type of loss.
Perry v Kendricks Transport
[1956] WLR 85 Court of
Appeal
The defendant kept an old coach that needed repair on their land adjoining a piece
of wasteland. The claimant, a young boy of 10 approached two other boys on the
wasteland close to the coach. As he got close, the boys lit a match and threw it into
the petrol tank of the coach causing an explosion which left the claimant with
severe burns. The claimant brought an action under the principle set out in
Rylands v Fletcher.Held:The defendant was not liable as the escape was caused
by the deliberate action of a third party.
Phillips v William Whiteley Ltd
[1938] KBD
^[Tort negligence - breach - standards of professionals]
D (a jeweller), employed a man to pierce Cs ears, two weeks later she developed
an infection that caused an abscess on her neck that required surgical draining.

Held: A jeweller is not bound to take the same precautions as a surgeon would
take, and D had taken all reasonable precautions. C was unable to prove that the
operation was negligently performed, and that the abscess which formed in her
neck was due to the negligence.

C lost
Phipps v Rochester
Corporation [1955] 1 QB 450
A 5 year old boy was walking across some open ground with his 7 year old sister.
He was not accompanied by an adult. He was injured when he fell into a trench.
The Corporation were not held liable as an occupier is entitled to assume that
prudent parents would not allow their children to go unaccompanied to places
where it is unsafe.

Devlin J on duty owed to children
The law recognises a sharp difference between children and adults. But there
might well I think, be an equally marked distinction between big children and little
children. The occupier is not entitled to assume that all children will, unless they
are allured, behave like adults; but he is entitled to assume that normally little
children will be accompanied by a responsible person. The responsibility for the
safety of little children must rest primarily upon the parents; it is their duty to see
that such children are not allowed to wander about by themselves, or at least to
satisfy themselves that the places to which they do allow their children to go
unaccompanied are safe. It would not be socially desirable if parents were, as a
matter of course, able to shift the burden of looking after their children from their
own shoulders to those persons who happen to have accessible pieces of land.
Pigney V Pointers Transport
Services Ltd (1957)
The claimant injured his head at work due to the Defendant's negligence. Some
years later he hanged himself as he was suffering from acute anxiety and
depression caused by the original injury.

Held. COA. original injury was still operating, and anxiety/depression are a
common cause of damage to the head.
Plato Films -v- Speidel [1961] The plaintiff had been the Supreme Commander of the Axis Land Forces in Central
Europe, and brought an action claiming that he had been defamed in a film
showing him privy to the murders of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Barthou
in 1934, and as having betrayed Field-Marshal Rommel in 1944. The trial had not
yet occurred. The defendants sought to rely on the fact that the plaintiff chose to
sue on certain parts of the film, and not on others which were also defamatory of
the plaintiff, as a ground for mitigating damages. Held: This was vigorously
rejected: "[The defendants] plead that the respondent has been depicted in the film
as having been 'guilty of the conduct hereinafter set out the truth of which the
plaintiff . . does not deny'. It surprises me that it should be considered a proper
matter for pleading that a plaintiff has not thought fit to include in his action every
libellous statement made about him by a defendant. It is, in my opinion, wholly
improper. and If it is said that other parts of the entire film constitute
'circumstances in which the alleged libel was published' (in themselves a
recognised head of mitigation), I think that is a highly artificial meaning to attribute
to the phrase. The real purport of this portion of paragraph 5 of the defence seems
to be to make the point that the plaintiff must be taken to have admitted the truth of
such accompanying derogatory statements as he is not challenged in his libel
claim. That is not a matter for pleading. If it amounts to anything at all, it is a matter
for comment. As a proposition of law designed to set up some sort of estoppel, I
think that it has no foundation.
Prendergast v Sam & Dee
Ltd., Kosary, and Miller in
1989
The case is the classic example of transcription error. In this case, a reasonably
legible hand-written prescription for Amoxil was misread by the dispensing chemist
and a toxic dose of glibenclamide was dispensed three times daily" a dose some
fifty times the maximum daily dose of 15 mg. Dr Miller was found liable for 25% of
the damages in the above case due to the apparent illegibility of his handwriting (I
find it quite legible).
Qualcast (Wolverhampton)
Ltd v Haynes [1959]
a thirty-eight year old who had been a moulder all his working life was casting
moulding boxes, the ladle of molten metal which he was holding slipped, and some
of the metal splashed on to his left foot and, as he was not wearing protective
spats or special boots, his foot was injured. He lost because he was experienced
and should have guarded against the danger.
Rainham Chemical Works v
Belvedere Fish Guano
F: X and Y set up a company Z Ltd. The function of Z Ltd was to perform a
contract entered into both X and Y, with another party, to manufacture explosives.
Z Ltd was to manufacture the explosives on X and Ys land. So Z Ltd was a
licensee. An explosion occurred, damaging neighbouring property.

H:The House of Lords found Z Ltd liable as the licensee which had accumulated
the thing. X and Y, as occupiers and landowners were also liable for the escape of
the thing accumulated by their licensee as the accumulation was a discharge of X
and Ys contractual duty to another party.
Re Polemis & Furness Withy
& Company Ltd. [1921] 3 KB
560
Some Stevedores carelessly dropped a plank of wood into the hold of a ship. The
plank struck something as it was falling which caused a spark. The spark was
ignited by petrol vapours resulting in the destruction of the ship. The arbitrator held
that the causing of the spark could not have been anticipated and therefore no
liability arose. The claimant appealed.

Held:

There was no requirement that the damage was foreseeable. The defendant was
liable for all the direct consequences of their action.

NB This was overruled in Wagon Mound No 1
Read v Lyons [1947] AC 156 The claimant was employed by the defendant in their factory which made
explosives for the Ministry of Supply. During the course of her employment an
explosion occurred which killed a man and injured others including the claimant.
There was no evidence that negligence had caused the explosion. At trial the
judge held that the case was governed by the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and
liability was therefore strict. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision as the rule
in Rylands v Fletcher required an escape of the hazardous matter. The claimant
appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. In the absence of any proof
of negligence on behalf of the defendant or an escape of dangerous thing, there
was no cause of action on which the claimant could succeed.
Ready Mixed Concrete
(South East) Ltd v Minister of
Pensions and National
Insurance [1968]
RMC is in the business of selling concrete, previously they had hired a contractor
to deliever the concrete to the customers, but had terminated his contract and
decided to offer the jobs to RMC's current staffs. Mr Latimer signed up for the hire-
purchase agreement for the lorry and started to deliever concrete for RMC. The
employer RMC argued that because Mr Latimer was an independent contractor
they needed not pay for his national insurance.

MacKenna J reversed the finding of the lower court and held that Mr Latimer was
in fact a "small business man" and concluded that the contract was not of service,
but of carriage.
Test for contract of service:

Is the worker subject to a right of control?
Did the worker provide personal service in return for remuneration?
Are the other provisions of the contract consistent with a contract of service?
MacKenna J also placed significant emphasis on the existence of
wages/remuneration, the absence of which there would not be consideration,
hence a contract would not have been formed.
Rees -v- Darlington Memorial
Hospital NHS Trust; HL 16-
Oct-2003
The claimant was disabled, and sought sterilisation because she feared the
additional difficulties she would face as a mother. The sterilisation failed. She
sought damages.
Held: Any disabled woman who gives birth to a normal, healthy child after a
negligently performed sterilisation operation is not entitled to sue for the extra
childcare costs she incurs because of her disability, the House of Lords ruled last
week. However there should be a standardised award, set at 15.000. No
damages should be awarded for the extra costs of parenthood arising from a
mothers own disability.
Reeves v Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis
[2000] 1 AC 360 House of
Lords
Martin Lynch committed suicide whilst in a police cell. He had attempted suicide
earlier that day in the cells at the magistrates. He had also attempted suicide on
previous occasions. He had been seen by a doctor at the police station on arrival
who reported that he was not schizophrenic or depressed but was a suicide risk.
The custody officer checked him at 1.57 pm and left the hatch open. He was found
at 2.05 pm having used his shirt as a ligature secured by the open hatch. He was
unable to be resuscitated and died a week later. The defendant argued that as
Lynch was of sound mind his voluntary and informed act of suicide broke the chain
of causation.

Held:

The act of suicide was the very thing that the police were under a duty to prevent
to treat this as a novus actus interveniens would deprive the duty of any
substance. Therefore the defendant was liable, however damages were reduced
by 50% under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
Revill v Newbery [1996] 2
WLR 239 Court of Appeal
Mr Newbery was a 76 year old man. He owned an allotment which had a shed in
which he kept various valuable items. The shed was subject to frequent break ins
and vandalism. Mr Newbery had taken to sleeping in his shed armed with a 12
bore shot gun.Mr Revill was a 21 year old man who on the night in question,
accompanied by a Mr Grainger, went to the shed at 2.00 am in order to break in.
Mr Newbery awoke, picked up the shot gun and fired it through a small hole in the
door to the shed. The shot hit Mr Revill in the arm. It passed right through the arm
and entered his chest. Both parties were prosecuted for the criminal offences
committed. Mr Revill pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Mr Newbery was acquitted
of wounding. Mr Revill brought a civil action against Mr Newbery for the injuries he
suffered. Mr Newbery raised the defence of ex turpi causa, accident, self-defence
and contributory negligence.Held: The Claimants action was successful but his
damages were reduced by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence)
Act 1945 to reflect his responsibility for his own injuries. An occupier cannot treat a
burglar as an outlaw
Reynolds v Times
Newspapers Ltd
The Plaintiff, a prominent public figure in Ireland, began proceedings for
defamation against the Defendants, the publishers of an article contained in the
British mainland edition of a national newspaper. The publication related to the
political crisis in Ireland in 1994 culiminating in the Plaintiff's resignation as
Taoiseach and the collapse of the Irish government. The Plaintiff claimed that the
words bore the meaning that he had deliberately lied to mislead the Dial and his
cabinet colleagues. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, qualified privilege at
common law. At the trial the jury returned a verdict in the Plaintiff's favour and
awarded the sum of 1p by way of damages. The Court of Appeal set aside the
jury's verdict and ordered a retrial on the grounds of misdirections to the jury. The
Court also ruled that the defence of qualified privilege was not available. The
Defendants appealed.

Whether the courts should recognise a generic qualified privilege encompassing
the publication by a newspaper of political matters affecting the people of the
United Kingdom.

The common law should not develop a new subject matter category of qualified
privilege whereby the publication of all political information would attract qualified
privilege whatever the circumstances, since that would fail to provide adequate
protection for reputation, and it would be unsound in principle to distinguish political
information from other matters of public concern; but that qualified privilege was
available in respect of political information upon application of the established
common law test of whether there had been a duty to publish the material to the
intended recipients and whether they had had an interest in receiving it, taking into
account all the circumstances of the publication including the nature, status and
source of the material.
Riches -v- News Group
Newspapers Ltd [1986]
The defendant published serious defamatory allegations against several plaintiff
police officers. The defendant newspaper appealed against an award of 250,000
exemplary damages for their defamation of the respondent police officers. Held:
Damages for defamation might be increased where a newspaper advertised the
story complained of. Nevertheless, a retrial was ordered. The jury should be asked
to make one award of exemplary damages which should then be divided between
the plaintiffs. The award of exemplary damages was proper because there was
evidence that the defendant had calculated the risk of damages against the benefit
of increased sales.
Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC
263 Privy Council
The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The defendant
owned the building and leased different parts to other business tenants. An
unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the fourth floor and
turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This damaged the claimants stock
and the claimant brought an action based on the principle set out in Rylands v
Fletcher.Held: The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage
was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of land.
Robinson v Kilvert (1889) Brown paper kept by the plaintiff was damaged by the heat from the defendant's
paper box manufacturing process carried on next door to the plaintiff's store room.
The plaintiff was unsuccessful as the brown paper was exceptionally sensitive.
Robinson v Post Office [1974]
CA
[Civil Process negligence standard of proof chain or causation]
D employed C who slipped on a ladder at work because of oil on the step. C
suffered a minor injury. At hospital, he was given an anti-tetanus injection. He
contracted encephalitis due to an allergy of which he was previously unaware.

Held: The hospital was negligent but not liable, since even the proper procedure
would not have revealed the allergy. C's employers, on the other hand, were
legally responsible for the encephalitis as well as for the minor injury: if a
wrongdoer ought to foresee that as a result of his wrongful act the victim may
require medical treatment then he is liable for the consequences of the treatment
applied although he could not reasonably foresee those consequences.
Roe v Minister of Health
[1954] CA
[Tort negligence - duty of care - foreseeability of harm]
A spinal anaesthetic had become contaminated through invisible cracks in the
glass vial, when used, paralysed two patients.

Held: The cracks were not foreseeable given the scientific knowledge of the time,
The foreseeability of harm is clearly a major factor in determining how a
reasonable person would act, and although actual foresight by D is generally
irrelevant, a reasonable person would not have taken precautions against a risk of
which reasonable people in that profession were not aware.

D not liable.
Rogers v. Whitaker. Australia The High Court of Australia affirmed the Supreme Court of New South Wales'
determination that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of any material risk
involved in a proposed treatment. A risk is considered material if a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would attach significance to the risk, or if the
doctor is, or should be, cognizant that the particular patient would express concern
about the risk. The trial court overruled the precept that a doctor could not be found
negligent in warning a patient if the doctor acted within the purview of common
practice, even though other practitioners may follow different procedures and
regardless of the particular patient's concerns. In this case, Maree Whitaker
became essentially blind after an unsucessful operation on her right eye caused
sympathetic ophthalmia in her left eye. Although there was no question that the
surgery had been performed with the requisite skill and care, Ms. Whitaker
petitioned the court for relief due to the failure of the ophthalmologist, Dr.
Christopher Rogers, to warn her of the possibility (approximately 1 in 14,000) that
the sympathetic ophthalmia condition could develop. The trial court's award of
damages was affirmed because, in spite of Ms. Whitaker's expressed specific
concern that her "good eye" not be harmed, Dr. Rogers did not inform her of the
potential risks associated with the surgery.
Roles v Nathan [1963] 1 WLR
1117 Court of Appeal
Two brothers, Donald and Joseph Roles were engaged by Mr Nathan as chimney
sweeps to clean the flues in in a central heating system at Manchester Assembly
Rooms. The flues had become dangerous due to carbon monoxide emissions. A
heating engineer had warned them of the danger, however, the brothers told him
they knew of the dangers and had been flue inspectors for many years. The
engineer monitored the situation throughout the day and at one point ordered
everybody out of the building due to the levels of carbon monoxide. The brothers
ignored this advice and continued with their work. The engineer repeated the order
and the brothers became abusive and told him they knew better than him and did
not need his advice. The engineer forcibly removed them from the building. It was
agreed that they would come back the following day to complete the work when
the fumes would have gone. They were also told they should not do the work whilst
the fires were lighted. However, the next day the brothers were found dead in the
basement having returned the previous evening to complete the work when the
fires were lit. Their widows brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act
1957.Held:The defendant was not liable. The dangers were special risks ordinarily
incident to their calling. The warnings issued were clear and the brothers would
have been safe had they heeded the warnings.
Rose v. Plenty 1976 Court of
Appeal
Children were helping the milk men.
A boy was injured.
The company was responsible.
They had a benefit out of the boy's work (the milk comes earlier).
Ross v Caunters [1979]
ChDiv Megarry VC
[Solicitors duty to their clients]
D a solicitor prepared a will for a client and sent it to him for signature. D failed to
warn the client that his signature should not be witnessed by the spouse of a
beneficiary, and subsequently did not notice that this had actually happened.

Held: D liable to pay damages to the disappointed beneficiary.
Rylands v Fletcher [1868]
UKHL 1 House of Lords
The defendant owned a mill and constructed a reservoir on their land. The
reservoir was placed over a disused mine. Water from the reservoir filtered through
to the disused mine shafts and then spread to a working mine owned by the
claimant causing extensive damage.

Held:
The defendants were strictly liable for the damage caused by a non- natural use of
land.

Lord Cranworth:
If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape,
may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and
cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and
whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage.
Salmon v Seafarer
Restaurants [1983] 1WLR
1264
The defendant owned a fish and chip shop. One night he left the chip fryer on and
closed the shop for the night. This caused a fire and the fire services were called to
put out the fire. The claimant was a fire man injured in an explosion whilst fighting
the fire. He had been thrown to the ground whilst footing a ladder on a flat roof.
The defendant sought to escape liability by invoking s.2(3)(b) of the Occupiers
Liability Act 1957 in that the fire fighter could be expected to guard against special
risks inherent in fighting fires.Held:The defendant was liable. Where it can be
foreseen that the fire which is negligently started is of the type which could require
firemen to attend to extinguish that fire, and where, because of the very nature of
the fire, when they attend they will be at risk even if they exercise all the skill of
their calling, there is no reason why a fireman should be at any disadvantage in
claiming compensation. The duty owed to a fireman was not limited to the
exceptional risks associated with fighting fire but extended to ordinary risks.
Scott v London and St
Katherine Docks (1865) 3 H &
C 596
This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Exchequer in making
absolute a rule to set aside the verdict for the defendants and for a new trial.
The defendants were in possession of a warehouse, and were operating a certain
crane or machine for lowering goods at the time of the accident. The Defendants
and their servants were lowering the crane or machine, with bags of sugar onto the
stone pavement in the Docks at St Katherines at the time of the accident.
The Claimant, an officer of the Customs could not find who he was looking for, so
made inquiries and was told he was in a warehouse, which was pointed out to him.
When passing lawfully from the doorway of one warehouse to the other, he fell to
the ground as six bags of sugar which were being lowered to the ground from the
upper part of the warehouse by the crane fell on him. The Claimant said that he
had no warning, and there was no fence or barrier to show persons that the place
was dangerous, and nobody called out to him to stop him from going through the
door or under the hoist. He also said that instantly before the bags fell he heard
the rattling of a chain
The Defendants pleaded not guilty.
The learned Judge found that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on
the part of the Defendants to entitle him to leave the case to the jury. His Lordship
then directed the jury to find verdict for the Defendants.

Erle , C. J held that the majority of the Court came to the following conclusions.
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shown
to be under the management of the Defendant or his servants, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care.
The judges all agreed to the principles laid down in the cases cited for the
Defendants although the judgment turned on the construction to be put on the
Judges notes. Erle CJ and Mellor found that they could not find reasonable
evidence of negligence which has been apparent to the rest of the Court.
The judgment of the Court was affirmed, and the case was ordered to go to a new
trial, when the effect of the evidence will in all probability be more correctly
ascertained.
The Judgment was affirmed and appeal dismissed.
Sedleigh-Denfield v
OCallaghan [1940] AC 880
House of Lords
The council undertook some work on the defendants land at the request of a
neighbouring landowner. They had placed a culvert in a ditch to allow the water to
drain away, however, they had negligently placed a grate in the wrong place which
rendered the grate useless and the culvert became prone to blockages. The
defendants workers had cleaned the culvert periodically over a three year period
to prevent blockages. However, a heavy rain storm caused a blockage and the
ditch became flooded. The flood spread to neighbouring property owned by the
claimant and caused substantial damage. The claimant brought an action in
nuisance for the damage caused. The defendant argued that he had neither
consented to nor had knowledge of the existence of the culvert.Held:The
defendant was liable. An occupier may be liable for the acts of a trespasser if they
adopt or continue the nuisance.Lord Maugham:My Lords, in the present case I am
of opinion that the Respondents both continued and adopted the nuisance. After
the lapse of nearly three years they must be taken to have suffered the nuisance to
continue; for they neglected to take the very simple step of placing a grid in the
proper place which would have removed the danger to their neighbour s land. They
adopted the nuisance for they continued during all that time to use the artificial
contrivance of the conduit for the purpose of getting rid of water from their property
without taking the proper means for rendering it safe.
Shakoor v. Situ (t/a Eternal
Health Co) [2000] 4 All ER
181
Mr Abdul Shakoor went to a Nottingham based Chinese herbalist, which traded as
the "Eternal Health Co."[1] Mr Kang Situ, who ran the herbalist had trained for five
years in China, gaining both a traditional "medicine" and "modern" medical
qualifications. His grade was "excellent". He had no British professional medical
qualifications. In November 1994, Mr Situ prescribed a course of Chinese herbal
remedies for Mr Shakoor's benign lipomata, a skin condition, which produces fatty
tissue that lies just below the skin, but causes no risk to health. There is no
treatment in the UK, except surgical removal. Mr Shakoor was given a mix of
twelve herbs in ten sachets which were to be taken on alternate days after a meal.
After nine doses Mr Shakoor got ill, nauseous, his eyes went yellow and he
suffered heartburn. He vomited, and had abdominal pain. He went to hospital, and
was diagnosed as having "probably hepatitis A". His liver failed, he had hepatic
necrosis. He had an operation, but he died in January 1995. In the post-mortem,
his liver was found to contain Bai Xian Pi, or dictamnus dasycarpus, which some
evidence suggested could be hepatotoxic.

A practitioner of traditional Chinese herbal medicine did not have to meet the
standard of skill and care of a reasonably competent practitioner of orthodox
medicine, but he did have to take account of relevant reports in orthodox medical
journals. In this case the prescription had not been inappropriate for a reasonable
herbalist, and accordingly Mr Situ of the Eternal Health Co. was not liable for the
death of Mr Shakoor.
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal
Hospital Governors
The claimant suffered from pain in her neck, right shoulder, and arms. Her
neurosurgeon took her consent for cervical cord decompression, but did not
include in his explanation the fact that in less than 1% of the cases, the said
decompression caused paraplegia. She developed paraplegia after the spinal
operation. Rejecting her claim for damages, the court held that consent did not
require an elaborate explanation of remote side effects. In dissent, Lord Scarman
said that the Bolam test should not apply to the issue of informed consent and that
a doctor should have a duty to tell the patient of the inherent and material risk of
the treatment proposed.
Sim v. Stretch [1936] a defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person, "in the estimation of
right-thinking members of society." It is not that the statement be made to the
person in regard, it must be communicated to another. Tort law protects one's
interest in preserving his/her reputation. In Canada, the law of defamation permits
actions for Libel and Slander against those who seek to damage the anothers
reputation.
Simaan General Contracting
Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd
The plaintiffs, the main contractors under a contract for a new building in Abu
Dhabi, sub-contracted the supply and erecton of curtain walling. The defendants
contracted to supply green glass units for incorporation in the curtain walling. They
were not in contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. The units were alleged by the
building owner to be defective in their colouring. The plaintiffs eventually rejected
them and instructed the sub-contractors to replace them with approved panels.
The plaintiffs claimed against the defendants damages for negligence in respect of
the loss they had suffered as a result of the supply of the defective units. The
question whether the defendants, as specified suppliers of the units, owed to the
plaintiffs, as the main contractors, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid defects
in the units which had caused them loss was tried as a preliminary issue. Judge
Newey answered it in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed.
David M Harris (instructed by C R Bayley, Pilkington legal departmen, St Helens)
for the defendants. Romie Tager (instructed by Michael Conn & Co) for the
defendants.

Bingham LJ said that a claim might lie in negligence for recovery of economic loss
alone. The defendants owed the plaintiffs a conventional duty of care to avoid
physical injury or damage to person or property. The planitiffs could not be said to
have relied on the defendants. Where a specialist sub-contractor was nominated
by a building owner it might be possible to conclude that the specialist had
assumed a direct responsibility to the building owner. There was no basis on which
the defendants could be said to have assumed a responsibility to the plaintiffs.
Junior Books v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 had been interpreted as arising
from physical damage. That interpretation was binding on the court. The authorities
did not establish a general rule that claims in negligence might succeed on proof of
foreseeable economic loss even where no damage to property and no proprietary
or possessory interest had been shown. It was a type of claim against which the
law had consistently set its face. If the units could be regarded as damaged at all,
the damage occurred at the time of manufacture, and the plaintiffs had not shown
any interest in them at that tme.

Lord Donaldson of Lymington MR and Dillon LJ agreed.
Appeal allowed.
Simpson & Co v Thomson
(1877)
The claimant insured Ts property against being damaged. The property was
damaged as a result of the defendants fault with the result that the claimant had to
pay out on the insurance policy with T. Held: claimant could not sue the defendant.
Slipper v British Broadcasting
Corporation [1991] 1 QB 283
The Claimant was a retired police officer was the subject of a film about trying to
capture some men who had committed the Great Train Robbery. The Claimant
alleged that the film showed him as a complete idiot. The film had been shown to
some journalists before its release to the public and those journalists had
published reviews contained the defamatory sting of the film i.e. that he was an
incompetent police officer. The Claimant sued not only for the release to the public
but the repetitions in the journalists' reviews. The defendants argued that the
repetitions are only actionable where the defendant has authorised them. The
court rejected this argument and said that the Defendant can be liable for any re-
publication of the defamatory material as long as it was reasonably foreseeable.
Smith v ADVFN Plc (CA) S took part in postings on a bulletin board on a financial services website
maintained by ADVFN. He claimed to have been defamed by hundreds of postings
published by users under cover of pseudonyms. He wished to know their IP
addresses in order to obtain their names and addresses from their internet service
providers. Gray J had made an order for the disclosure of the registered IP
addresses of users responsible for over 100 postings in April 2007, but in most
cases that information did not enable S to discover the identities of those
responsible. He applied to the judge for disclosure of the IP addresses of the users
at the times when their postings were made (an order which was not opposed in
principle since disclosure of the identity of the users had already been ordered by
Gray J), and for the disclosure of the IP addresses of those responsible for a
further 150 postings. He appealed from the decision of Mackay J not to order
disclosure in respect of the further 150 postings.Whether the judge had wrongly
refused to make an order for disclosure of the identities of the users responsible for
the further postings.Dismissing the appeal:(1) It was unreasonable to expect the
judge, in the short time available, to assess without proper guidance each and
every alleged instance of defamation, given the volume and incoherence of the
material which he had been expected to consider. Accordingly, he had been
entitled to refuse to make the order sought.(2) The Appellants inability to pay the
Respondents costs would be a factor which could properly be taken into account
against him if he made a further application.
Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1
AC 831
A survey report of the claimants house carried out by the defendant failed to
advise on some structural damage to the property which resulted in the chimney
breast collapsing. There was no contractual relationship between the claimant and
defendant as the mortgage company arranged the survey and the claimant made
payment to the mortgage company. The contract between the claimant and the
mortgage company contained a clause exempting the surveyor from liability. In
considering if such a clause was reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 the court took into account the fact that it was a modest house to be used as
the family home and concluded that it was an unreasonable clause and therefore
ineffective. The House of Lords held that it might be reasonable for a surveyor to
exclude liability if the property was of higher value or to be used for investment or
business purposes.
Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2
QB 405
A widow brought a claim against the defendant under the Fatal Accidents Act for
the death of her husband. The defendant employed the husband. As a result of
their negligence he incurred a burn to his lip. The lip contained pre-cancerous cells
which were triggered by the injury sustained. He died three years later from
cancer.

Held:

The burn was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence and this
resulted in the death. The defendant was liable for his death. It was not necessary
to show that death by cancer was foreseeable, nor that an ordinary person would
not have died from the injury. The egg shell skull rule applies and the defendant
must take his victim as he finds him.
Smith v Littlewoods
Organisation Ltd
he defendant owned a disused cinema which they purchased with the intention of
demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. The cinema was last used on
29th May 1976. Littlewoods acquired the building on 31st May 1976. Contractors
were present at the cinema until 21st June and thereafter the cinema was empty
until the incident on 5th July 1976. The contractors had left the building secure,
however, vandals had broke into the building. Littlewoods had not been informed of
this and so the building remained unsecured. There was evidence to suggest that
further entry by vandals had occurred over the couple of weeks. The fittings inside
the building were damaged and debris was thrown. On one occasion a sink had
been removed and thrown onto the roof of a billiard hall. There were also two small
incidents involving fire. None of this was reported to the police or Littlewoods. On
July 5th the vandals broke into the cinema and set fire to it. The fire spread and
caused damage to neighbouring properties. The owners of the properties brought
an action in negligence claiming that Littlewoods owed them a duty of care to
prevent the actions of the vandals.Held:Littlewoods were not liable. Whilst they did
owe a duty of care they were not in breach of duty. They were not required to
provide 24 hour surveillance and were unaware of the previous incidents. The law
is unwilling to impose liability for the deliberate act of a third party see Lamb v
Camden London Borough Council [1981] QB 625 but will do so in appropriate
cases (Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004). The general rule relating to
omissions is that no liability arises for a pure omissions but there exist exceptions
to this where there is a special relationship, an assumption of responsibility, where
the defendant is in control of a 3rd party that causes the damage, where the
defendant is in control of land or dangerous thing.
South Hetton Coal Company
vs North Eastern News
Association Limited (1984).
The newspaper in that case had published an article that was strongly critical of
the way the plaintiff a colliery owner housed its workers.
The company, when suing for libel, had neither stated nor sought to prove that it
had suffered any actual damage. It was argued by the paper that a company could
have no personal character and that the article had not related to the business of
the company. This argument was unanimously rejected.
The Court held that, "It is not necessary to prove any particular damage. The jury
may give such damages as they think fit, having regard to the conduct of the
parties, respectively, and to all the circumstances of the case."
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v
Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd
Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd had a stainless steel factory in Birmingham, which
obtained its electricity by a direct cable from the power station. Martin & Co Ltd
were doing work on the ground with an excavator and negligently damaged that
cable. As a consequence, the factory was deprived of electricity for 15 hours which
has caused physical damage to the factorys furnaces and metal, lost profit on the
damaged metal and lost profit on the metal that was not melted during the time the
electricity was off. Spartan Steel claimed all the three heads of damage.The Court
of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Edmund-Davies LJ and Lawton LJ
delivered a majority judgment (Edmund-Davies LJ dissenting), that the Spartan
Steel could only recover the damages to their furnaces, the metal they had to
discard and the profit lost on the discarded metal. They could not recover the
profits lost due to the factory not being operational for 15 hours. Their main
reasoning for this was that while the damage to the metal was "physical damage"
and the lost profits on the metal was "directly consequential" upon it, the profits lost
due to the blackout constituted "pure economic loss".Although the majority seemed
to agree that Martin & Co Ltd owed the Spartan Steel a duty of care and the
damage was not too remote since it was foreseeable, they declined to allow the
recovery of pure economic loss for policy reasons outlined by Lord Denning in his
leading judgment:Statutory utility providers are never liable for damages caused by
their negligence.A blackout is a common hazard and a risk which everyone can be
expected to tolerate from time to time.If claims for pure economic loss in such
cases were allowed, it might lead to countless claims, some of which may be
spurious (the "floodgates" argument).It would be unfair to place the entire weight of
many comparatively small losses upon the shoulders of one person in such
cases.The law does not leave the claimant without remedy by allowing him to
recover the economic losses that are directly consequential upon physical
damage.
Spring v. Guardian
Assurance PLC.
In this case the claimant had been employed by an insurance firm and when it was
discovered that he was planning to leave and join a rival firm he was dismissed.
When the rival firm asked for a reference, the former employer stated that the
employee had deliberately mis-sold insurance policies to clients, had acted
dishonestly and had creamed off the most profitable business for himself, and had
been dismissed as a result. Due to this unfavourable and inaccurate reference the
employee was not only unable to get a job for several years but was also struck off
the insurance industry register. Initially the Court of Appeal overruled the precedent
set in Lawton, but the case was then appealed again to the House of Lords which
took a very different view.
St Annes Well Brewery Co v
Roberts 1929
Where the nuisance existed before the occupier acquired the property he will be
liable if it can be proved that he knew or ought to have known of its existence
St Helens Smelting Co v
Tipping [1865] UKHL J81
House of Lords
The claimant owned a manor house with 1300 acres of land which was situated a
short distance from the defendants copper smelting business. He brought a
nuisance action against the defendant in respect of damage caused by the
smelting works to their crops, trees and foliage. There were several industrial
businesses in the locality including and alkali works. The defendant argued that the
use of property was reasonable given the locality and the smelting works existed
before the claimant purchased the property.

Held
Where there is physical damage to property, the locality principle has no
relevance. It is no defence that the claimant came to the nuisance
Stansbie v Troman [Tort - negligence - duty of care - created by contract]D decorator was left alone
on the premises by the householder's wife. During her absence, he left the house
to obtain wall-paper. He failed to secure the behind him. During the his absence a
thief entered the house and stole property.Held:1. A duty of care was created by
the contractual relationship.2. It was a breach of that duty to leave the front door
insecure3. As a direct result of that breach of duty that the theft occurred.C won
Steel & Morris v McDonalds:
Steel & Morris v United
Kingdom
The applicants were sued by McDonalds after handing out a six-page leaflet
containing allegations damaging allegations about the company, entitled "What's
Wrong with McDonalds". At trial (the longest in English legal history, at 313 days),
Mr Justice Bell found for McDonalds and awarded them 60,000 in damages
(reduced to 40,000 on appeal), although he did find some of the allegations made
by the Defendants to be true. The applicants appealed to the ECHR.

(1) Whether the unavailability of legal aid for defamation meant that the applicants
had been denied their rights to a fair trial under Art 6; (2) Whether the proceedings
and their outcome infringed Art 10.

Finding violations of Art 6 and Art 10: (1) Denial of legal aid deprived the applicants
of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the court - central to the
concept of a fair trial. States are free to decide how litigants are guaranteed this
right. Legal aid is one means. Whether it is necessary depends on the facts of the
individual case. The applicants were defending their right to freedom of expression,
the financial consequences to them were great and the case was highly complex,
both factually and legally. The disparity of legal assistance gave rise to unfairness.
(2) The allegations constituted political expression, requiring a high level of
protection. It was not incompatible with Art 10 to allow companies to sue for
defamation. Nor was the incidence of the burden of proof itself an infringement.
However, balancing the procedural unfairness, inequality of arms and the means of
the applicants, the damages award was a disproportionate infringement of Art 10.
Stevenson v Nationwide
Building Society (1984) 272
EG 663
The purchaser bought a property spanning a small river. The lenders valuer
disclaimed any liabillity to the buyer, and a structural report was offered for an
additional charge. The property was not sound.
Held: The valuation was negligent, and the defendant lender would be vicariously
liable unless liability had been excluded. In the absence of some other estoppel,
the exclusion term had to pass the test of reasonableness under the Act. Given
that the purchaser was himself an estate agent and properly experienced in such
matters, the exclusion clause was reasonable. Similar to Smith V Bush. But buyer
was estate agent and was held by the court to have 'trade knowledge'. Therefore
the disclaimer used by the cheaper surveyor they chose to use was held to be
reasonable
Stevenson, Jordan and
Harrison v. McDonald 1952
Contract of service; employer-employee-relationship: the employer says what and
how to do it.
Contract of services: the employer says what to do; independent contractor.
'Business integration test'.
Problem: is the person fully integrated or only an accessory?
Lord Denning brought up this question, but he was not the only one who found it
relevant.
Storey v. Ashton 1869 A driver took a different route to make a frolic of his own.On this way he caused an
accident because of his negligence.No liability of the company.Though this was
just a little detour, the driver was carrying out his own business.
Sturges v Bridgman [1879] 11
Ch D 852 Court of Appeal
The defendant ran a confectionary shop which operated a noisy pestle and mortar.
It had done so for over 20 years but had no neighbouring property so there were
no complaints as to its use. The claimant then built a consulting room for his
practice as a physician adjacent to the defendants noisy shop. The claimant
brought an action in nuisance to obtain an injunction to prevent the continuance of
the noise. The defendant, relying on the Prescription Act, argued that he had
obtained the right to be noisy by operating the noisy pestle for over twenty years.

Held:
The use of land prior to the construction of the consulting room was not
preventable or actionable and therefore it was not capable of founding a
prescription right.
Tate & Lyle v Greater London
Council [1983] 2 AC 509
Tate & Lyle operated a sugar refinery on the bank of the river Thames. They had a
jetty from which raw sugar would be offloaded from barges and refined sugar
would be taken. The sugar would be taken be larger vessels and then transferred
to smaller barges to enable them to get to through the shallow waters. As part of
development Tate & Lyle wished to construct a new jetty and dredge the water to
accommodate the larger vessels. At the same time the GLC was constructing new
ferry terminals. The design of the ferry terminals was such that that it caused
siltation of the channels. After using the channels for a short while, Tate & Lyles
larger vessels were no longer able to use them. Further dredging at the cost of
540,000 was required to make the channel and jetties usable by the vessels. Tate
& Lyle brought an action in negligence and nuisance to recover the cost of te extra
dredging.

Held:

The claim in negligence and private nuisance failed since they did not possess any
private rights which enabled them to insist on any particular depth of water. The
claim succeeded in public nuisance since the interference caused by the ferry
terminals affected public navigation rights. Tate & Lyle suffered particular damage
as a result of this interference.
Tetley v Chitty 1986 1 All ER
663
A council allowed a go-kart club to use their land for a race track. Nearby residents
brought an action in nuisance. The council were held liable for authorising the
activities of the go-kart club. The noise was an ordinary and necessary incident to
go-kart racing which was the purpose for which the permission to use the land was
granted.
The Wagon Mound no 1
[1961] AC 388 House of
Lords
The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in
Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from
some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of
some boats and the wharf.

Held:

Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good law. A test of remoteness of
damage was substituted for the direct consequence test. The test is whether the
damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a foreseeable type of damage is
present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the damage, no matter whether
the extent of damage was foreseeable.
The Wagon Mound no 1
[1961] AC 388 House of
Lords
The defendant's vessel, The Wagon Mound, leaked furnace oil at a Wharf in
Sydney Harbour. Some cotton debris became embroiled in the oil and sparks from
some welding works ignited the oil. The fire spread rapidly causing destruction of
some boats and the wharf.Held:Re Polemis should no longer be regarded as good
law. A test of remoteness of damage was substituted for the direct consequence
test. The test is whether the damage is of a kind that was foreseeable. If a
foreseeable type of damage is present, the defendant is liable for the full extent of
the damage, no matter whether the extent of damage was foreseeable.
Theaker v Richardson [1962]
1 WLR 151,
A husband opened a letter which defamed his wife. It was held that the defamation
had been published to the husband as it natural and probable that the husband
would open it.
Thomas v Bradbury, Agnew
and Co Ltd and another
[1906]
The court held that evidence that the defendant was actuated by malice would
defeat the defence of fair comment, notwithstanding that in all other aspects the
comment may be considered fair. It is for the claimant to adduce such evidence.
Thorley v Lord Kerry Was an action on a libel published in a letter which the bearer, who had no
authority to do so, happened to open, and that case shows that a man is
responsible for the publication which has arisen through the curiosity of a person
into whose hands the letter happens to pass. Belief that a third person might open
it is evidence to go to the jury of intended publication: Delacroix v Thevenot;
Gomersall v Davies. A letter not sealed or fastened up is analogous to a post-card,
and a post-card is a publication to every one through whose hands it passes.
Thorpe v Brumfitt ((1872
73) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 650, CA
(Eng))
M had granted P a right of way over a passage for all purposes over his land for
the purpose of getting to and from Ps Inn. Ms tenants obstructed the passage so
that potential customers could not get to the Inn operated by Ps tenant. An
injunction was granted against all of the parties causing the obstruction. There was
an argument that the words for all purposes meant that the claimed easement did
not benefit any specific land and so was invalid. This argument was rejected: the
words clearly meant for all purposes connected with the use of Ps land.
Tolley v Fry Tolley was a well-known amateur golfer. During the 1920s if an amateur golfer
entered into a commercial contract for benefit, that could harm the reputation and
status of the golfer. Fry, without the consent of Tolley, had used a caricature of
Tolley in several advertisements in order to promote chocolates.

At first instance the judge held that this was capable of being libellous leaving the
actual decision to a jury. This body found in favour of the claimant and awarded
damages. The Court of Appeal found that the advertisement was not capable of
producing libellous effects. To their mind, the case should not have been brought
before a jury. They reversed the judges decision and dismissed the action.

The House of Lords, in a decision of four against one, restored the original
decision in favour of the claimant but ordered a new trial concerning the level of
compensation.

Viscount Hailsham delivered the major opinion: An action of libel would succeed if
the publication complained of produced at least some of the meanings attributed to
it in the innuendo, and those meanings were defamatory. Libel is a possible
remedy against unwanted character advertising, if some further element of an
individuals reputation, such as status as an amateur golfer, were endangered. The
case also shows the limits of this action as mere vulgarities are non-actionable.
Tomlinson v Congleton
Borough Council [2003] 3
WLR 705 House of Lords
The defendant owned Brereton Heath Country Park. It had previously been a sand
quarry and they transformed it in to a country park and opened it up for public use.
The defendants had created a lake on the park which was surrounded by sandy
banks. In the hot weather many visitors came to the park. Swimming was not
permitted in the lake and notices were posted at the entrance saying Dangerous
water. No swimming. However despite this, many people did use the lake for
swimming. Rangers were employed and on occasions sought to prevent swimming
but some of the visitors would be rude to the rangers attempts to prevent them
and many continued to swim. The claimant was injured when he dived into shallow
water and broke his neck. At the Court of Appeal it was held that he was a
trespasser despite the repeated trespass and inadequate steps to prevent him
swimming. They also stated that the warning signs may have acted as an
allurement to macho young men. The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that since
the introduction of the Occupiers Liability Act 1984, the courts should not strain to
imply a licence. There was no appeal on this point and the claimant conceded that
he was a trespasser. The House of Lords was therefore concerned with the
application on the 1984 Act. The Court of Appeal had held that the council were
liable but reduced the damages by 2/3 under the Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act 1945. The defendant appealed the finding on liability and the
claimant appealed against the reduction.House of Lords held:The Council were not
liable.No risk arose from the state of the premises as required under s.1(1)(a)
Occupiers Liability Act 1984. The risk arose from the claimants own action. He
was a person of full capacity who voluntarily and without pressure or inducement
engaged in an activity which had an inherent risk. Even if there was a risk form the
state of the premises, the risk was not one against which the council would
reasonably be expected to offer the claimant some protection under s.1(3)(C). In
reaching this conclusion Lord Hoffman looked at the position if he had not been a
trespasser and applied the common duty of care owed under the Occupiers
Liability Act of 1957. He was of the opinion that there was no duty to warn or take
steps to prevent the claimant from diving as the dangers were perfectly obvious.
This was based on the principle of free will and that to hold otherwise would deny
the social benefit to the majority of the users of the park from using the park and
lakes in a safe and responsible manner. To impose liability in this situation would
mean closing of many such venues up and down the country for fear of litigation.
He noted that 25-30 such fractures occurred each year nationwide, despite
increased safety measures the numbers had remained constant.
Topp v London Country Bus
(South West) Ltd
[Tort - negligence - duty of care - omissions - actions of third parties]

D, a bus company left a mini-bus parked in a public place with the keys in the
ignition, the bus was stolen, and, in the course of the theft, was involved in an
accident in which a woman cyclist was killed. C, her husband (and daughter)
brought an action against the bus company for negligence. The vehicle was left at
a changeover point that normally took 8 minutes, on this occasion it rested there
for nine hours.

Held: The bus company may have been negligent to leave the bus with the keys in,
in an easily accessible place, they could not be held responsible for the accident
as it had occurred through the voluntary act of a third party over whom they had no
control

C lost
Transco plc v Stockport
Metropolitan Borough Council
[2004] 2 AC 1 House of
Lords
The defendant council were responsible for the maintenance of the pipe work
supplying water to a block of flats. A leak developed which was undetected for
some time. The water collected at an embankment which housed the claimants
high pressure gas main. The water caused the embankment to collapse and left
the gas main exposed and unsupported. This was a serious and immediate risk
and the claimant took action to avoid the potential danger. They then sought to
recover the cost of the remedial works under the principle established in Rylands v
Fletcher.Held:The defendant was not liable. The councils use of land was not a
non-natural use.Lord Bingham:I think it clear that ordinary user is a preferable test
to natural user, making it clear that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is engaged only
where the defendant's use is shown to be extraordinary and unusual. This is not a
test to be inflexibly applied: a use may be extraordinary and unusual at one time or
in one place but not so at another time or in another place.
Tremain v Pike [1969] 1 WLR
1556
The farm labourer contracted leptosporosis from handling materials on which rats
had urinated.

Held:

The defendant was not liable. It was not known at the time that leptosporosis could
be transmitted in this way. Whilst it was foreseeable he may contract the disease
by a rat bite the way he contracted the disease was not foreseeable.
Urbanski v Patel Facts
Patel, a surgeon, removed the only kidney of Shirley Firman believing that it was
an ovarian cyst. As a result, she had to be placed on dialysis until she could find a
kidney. Urbanski, Shirley's father, tried to donate his kidney to her, but it was
rejected. Urbanski brought an action for the losses he experienced from the
removal of his kidney.

Issue
Is donating a kidney a reasonable action attempting to protect his daughter from
the harms of the doctor's negligence?

Decision
Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Reasons
Wilson found that in the medical world, the donating of a kidney is accepted as a
usual solution to a problem of this type. As a result, Urbanski was acting perfectly
reasonably. This case, therefore, follows the ratio of Haynes v Harwood and
Urbanski was entitled to recover.
Vellino v Chief Constable of
Greater Manchester [2002] 1
WLR 218 Court of Appeal
The Claimant was a known offender and had a string of convictions. He was
seriously injured when he jumped out of a second floor window having just been
arrested. The police were aware that he was likely to escape and had done so on
several previous occasions. They were also aware that such activity was
dangerous but did nothing to prevent him from jumping. The Claimant suffered a
fractured skull, brain damage and tetraplegia which rendered him totally dependent
on others for support. He brought an action against the police arguing that having
arrested him, they owed him a duty of care to prevent him injuring himself. The
Defendant denied owing a duty of care and also raised the defence of ex turpi
causa in that it was a criminal offence for an arrested person to abscond. The trial
judge held that ex turpi causa excluded the imposition of a duty of care. The
Claimant appealed.Held:2:1 The appeal was dismissed.Sir Murray Stuart-Smith
identified four principles relating to the maxim ex turpi causa:1. The operation of
the principle arises where the claimant's claim is founded upon his own criminal or
immoral act. The facts which give rise to the claim must be inextricably linked with
the criminal activity. It is not sufficient if the criminal activity merely gives occasion
for tortious conduct of the Defendant. 2. The principle is one of public policy; it is
not for the benefit of the Defendant. Since if the principle applies, the cause of
action does not arise, the Defendant's conduct is irrelevant. There is no question of
proportionality between the conduct of the Claimant and Defendant. 3. In the case
of criminal conduct this has to be sufficiently serious to merit the application of the
principle. Generally speaking a crime punishable with imprisonment could be
expected to qualify. If the offence is criminal, but relatively trivial, it is in any event
difficult to see how it could be integral to the claim.4. The Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 is not applicable where the Claimant's action
amounts to a common law crime which does not give rise to liability in tort.Applying
these principles it is common ground that the Claimant has to rely on his criminal
conduct in escaping lawful custody to found his claim. It is integral to the claim.
The crime of escape is a serious one; it is a common law offence for which the
penalty is at large. It is almost invariably punished by a sentence of imprisonment,
although the length of the sentence is usually measured in months rather than
years. In my judgment it is plainly a sufficiently serious offence for the purpose of
the application of the maxim.
Vowles v Evans [2003]
EWCA Civ 318 (11 March
2003)
A referee of an adult rugby match was held liable for injuries suffered by players
during the course of the match. The court found that Rugby was a dangerous
game and found that the safety of the players relied on the due enforcement of the
rules. The referee owed a duty of care to all players in the match. The referee had
failed to comply with particular rules and this was found to be the cause of the
Defendants injuries,.
W v Essex County Council
(1998) HL
[Tort negligence - duty of care no duty situations - statutory duty - duty of care,
to whom]
D, the council placed a known sex offender with foster parents C. Cs children were
abused. C made it clear that they were anxious not to put their children at risk by
having a known sex abuser in their home, the social worker and D knew that and
also knew that the boy placed had already committed an act or acts of sex abuse.
The risk was obvious and the abuse happened.

Held: It was plainly arguable that there was a duty of care owed to the parents and
a breach of that duty by the defendants.

C won.
Walters v North Glamorgan
NHS Trust ([2002] All ER
(D)7 (Dec) CA)
The claimants 10-month-old son was in hospital suffering from liver failure which
was the result of the defendants admitted negligence in failing to diagnose his
condition. The claimant was with her son when he had an epileptic seizure which
the defendants doctors told her was very unlikely to have caused any serious
damage. The childs condition deteriorated and he was taken by ambulance to
another hospital for a liver transplant, followed by the claimant in her car. On arrival
she was told that her son had in fact suffered severe brain damage, which she was
told on the following day was so severe that he would have no quality of life. She
agreed to his life support system being turned off and he died. It was agreed that
the claimant had suffered shock and a recognised psychiatric illness, namely
pathological grief reaction, as a result of what she had witnessed and experienced
over a period of some 36 hours between her sons seizure and his death. Could
this be categorised as injury by shock that is sudden appreciation by sight or
sound of a horrifying event, which violently agitates the mind? Yes, held the Court
of Appeal. A realistic view should be taken of what constitutes the necessary
event. In this case there was a seamless tale with an obvious beginning and an
equally obvious end. It was played out over a period of 36 hours, which for the
claimant was undoubtedly one drawn-out experience. Accordingly, the 36-hour
period constituted one entire event, albeit made up of discreet events. It was a
short step for the Court to find that such a step was horrifying
Warren v Henley's Ltd (1948) Employer not held liable for the assault of the employee because this was an act of
personal vengeance and so was outside the course of employment.
Watt v Hertfordshire [1954] 1
WLR 835
The claimant was a fireman. A woman had been involved in a traffic accident and
was trapped underneath a lorry. This was 200-300 yards away from the fire station.
The fire services were called to release the woman. They needed to transport a
heavy lorry jack to the scene of the accident. The jack could not go on the fire
engine and the normal vehicle for carrying the jack was not available. The fire chief
ordered the claimant and other firemen to lift the jack on to the back of a truck.
There was no means for securing the jack on the truck and the firemen were
instructed to hold it on the short journey. In the event the truck braked and the jack
fell onto the claimant's leg causing severe injuries.

Held:
There was no breach of duty. The emergency of the situation and utility of the
defendant's conduct in saving a life outweighed the need to take precautions.
Watt v. Longsdon Browne sent a letter to D, who worked as a liquidator for the firm. The letter alleged
that a maid had been Ps mistress and that he was conducting orgies in his flat. D
shared this letter with his boss, and Ps wife. Trial court gave judgment to D on the
grounds that they were privileged, court of appeals reversed.Did D have a duty to
inform, thus shielding him from liability? Holding: Ds publication was privileged as
to his disclosure to his boss, but not to Ps wife. In my view on these facts there
was a duty, both from a moral and a material point of view, on Longsdon to
communicate the letter to Singer, the chairman of his company, who, apart from
questions of present employment, might be asked by Watt for a testimonial to a
future employer. However, using the best judgment I can in this difficult matter, I
have come to the conclusion that there was not a moral or social duty in Longsdon
to make this communication to Mrs. Watt such as to make the occasion
privileged.Privilege arises when:A duty to communicate information believed to be
true to a person who has a material interest in receiving the information, orAn
interest in the speaker to be protected by communicating information, if true,
relevant to that interest, to a person honestly believed to have a duty to protect that
interest, orA common interest in and reciprocal duty in respect of the subject matter
of the communication between speaker and recipient.The information came from a
very doubtful source, and in my judgment no reasonably right minded person could
think it his duty, without obtaining some corroboration of the story, and without first
communicating with the plaintiff, to pass on these outrageous charges of marital
infidelity of a gross kind, and drunkenness and dishonesty, to the plaintiffs wife
Weiland v Cyril Lord Carpets
Ltd (1969)
where the claimant was unable to adjust her bifocals as a result of a neck injury
caused by the defendants negligence. She was worried about catching public
transport in such a condition and went to her sons office to ask for a lift home. On
the way into the office she fell down a flight of stairs and was injured. The claimant
was held to have been acting reasonably; the defendant was liable for those
injuries.
Wheat v Lacon [1966] AC
552
The claimant and her family stayed at a public house, The Golfers Arms in Great
Yarmouth, for a holiday. Unfortunately her husband died when he fell down the
stairs and hit his head. The stairs were steep and narrow. The handrail stopped
two steps from the bottom of the stairs and there was no bulb in the light. The
claimant brought an action under the Occupiers Liability Act 1957 against the
Brewery company, Lacon, which owned the freehold of The Golfers Arms and
against the Managers of the Pub, Mr & Mrs Richardson, who occupied the pub as
a licensee.

Held:
Both the Richardsons and Lacon were occupiers for the purposes of the Occupiers
Liability Act 1957 and therefore both owed the common duty of care. It is possible
to have more than one occupier. The question of whether a particular person is an
occupier under the Act is whether they have occupational control. Lacon had only
granted a license to the Richardsons and had retained the right to repair which
gave them a sufficient degree of control. There is no requirement of physical
occupation. However, it was found that Lacon was not in breach of duty since the
provision of light bulbs would have been part of the day to day management duties
of the Richardsons. Since the Richardsons were not party to the appeal the
claimants action failed.
White V Chief Constable Of
Yorkshire Police
This case also relates to the Hillsborough disaster. In this instance police officers
were seeking compensation on the basis that they had suffered psychiatric illness
as a result of rescuing victims after the crush. They claimed that because they
were rescuers they should be treated as primary victims'. The distinction between
primary victim and secondary victim was made in the Alcock v Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire Police, where all claimants were secondary victims. In Page v
Smith this distinction was further developed.The Court of Appeal in Frost v Chief
Constable of Yorkshire Police [1997] 3 WLR 1194 (by a majority) had held that the
police officers who were allowed to recover for their psychiatric illness as a result of
carrying out their professional duties as rescuers and/or employees at the
disastrous Hillsborough football stadium stampede were classifiable as primary
victims.The House of Lords however, held that for the purposes of distinction
between primary and secondary victims, that rescuers were not in a special
position in the law. They could only recover if they were exposed to physical
danger as primary victims. Since they were not endangered in the discharge of
their service or in rescuing, as employees and/or rescuers, the police officers were
only secondary victims. As secondary victims they, like the bystanders or
spectators, were not entitled to recover damages for their psychiatric illness.
White v Jones 1995 Facts
Two daughters of 78 year old Mr White sued Mr Jones for failing to follow their
father's instructions when drawing up his will. Mr White and his daughters had
fallen out briefly and he asked the solicitor to cut them out of the will. Before he
died they resolved their problems. He asked Mr Jones to change the will again so
that 9000 would be given to his daughters. After he died, with the will still the
same, the family would not agree to have the settlement changed. The question
was whether Mr Jones could be sued instead.

Judgment
Lord Goff held with a majority of three to two in the House of Lords that the
daughters would be able to claim. Influenced by the idea that solicitors may escape
the consequences of not doing their job properly, he said that a special relationship
existed between the daughters and the solicitor and that Mr Jones had assumed
responsibility towards them. This was so even though there was no contract or
fiduciary relationship between them.
Whitehouse v. Jordan [1981]
1 All ER 267:
The claimant was a baby who suffered severe brain damage after a difficult birth.
The defendant, a senior hospital registrar, was supervising delivery in a high-risk
pregnancy. After the mother had been in labour for 22 hours, the defendant used
forceps to assist the delivery. The Lords found that the doctor's standard of care
did not fall below that of a reasonable doctor in the circumstances and so the baby
was awarded no compensation.
Williams v Natural Life Health
Foods Ltd (1998).
The claimants were interested in opening a health food shop in Bristol. They went
to a health food company for advice as to how successful such a shop might be.
They received a report, that had been prepared by the defendant, which said that
the shop the claimants were proposing to open should be very successful. This
was incorrect, and the defendant should have known that. On the strength of the
report, the claimants invested a lot of money in opening a health food shop in
Bristol and lost their investment. Held: the claimants could not sue the defendant
for compensation for the money they lost relying on his overly optimistic projections
as to how well their shop would do.
Willsher v Essex Area Health
Authority [1988]
A premature baby was given too much oxygen by a junior doctor. The baby
suffered from a condition affecting his retina which left him totally blind in one eye
and partially sighted in the other. The condition could have been caused by the
excess oxygen he had been exposed to or it could have been caused by four other
factors unrelated to the oxygen, but related to the premature birth. The trial judge
found the Health Athority liable. He applied McGhee v NCB but stated that
McGhee had reversed the burden of proof where there was more than one
possible causes. The Health Authority appealed.Held:Appeal allowed. The
defendant was in breach of duty. A junior doctor owes the same standard of care
as a qualified doctor. McGhee did not reverse the burden of proof which always
remains on the claimant.
Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd
v English
Mr English was employed at Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltds colliery at Glencraig
from 27 March 1933. He was repairing an airway leading off the Mine Jigger Brae,
a main haulage road. Between 1:30pm and 2pm he was going to the pit bottom
and the haulage plan was put in motion. He tried to escape through one of the
manholes, but was caught by a rake of hutches and crushed between it and the
side of the road. His family claimed damages. The company claimed that Mr
Englishs own negligence contributed to his death, because he should have told
the person in charge of the machinery, or taken an alternative route.

House of Lords held unanimously that an employer has a non delegable duty to
create a safe system of work. Even if an employer gives that duty to another
person, they still remain responsible for workplace safety.
Woodward v Mayor of
Hastings
The defendant school hired cleaners to defrost the ice on the staircase, the
claimant was badly injured after slipping on ice on the staircase.

The court found that this case was different from Haseldine v Daw because
defrosting the stairs did not entail any technical knowledge, it was something that
the school could have done themselves, and therefore ensuring that the cleaners
had done their jobs properly was not unreasonable to expect of the school
authority.
Yianni v Edwin Evans (1982)
QB 438
Mr Yianni applied to a building society for a mortgage advance of 12,000 for the
purchase of a property. The building society appointed an independent surveyor to
undertake a valuation of the property. The surveyor reported that the property was
adequate security for the mortgage. Mr Yianni did not see a copy of the report
although he paid the fee for the valuation. The building society made the required
mortgage advance and the purchase went ahead. It subsequently came to light
that the surveyor had failed to detect serious structural defects that rendered the
property virtually worthless. Mr Yianni sued the surveyor directly. The judge found
the surveyor liable, even though the building society, and not the purchaser, had
employed him. The surveyor knew, however, that the advance would be granted
only if his report were favourable and that it was unlikely the purchaser would
obtain his own survey. The surveyor was therefore held to have a duty to both
Yianni and to the building society. Since this decision, lenders have made
valuation surveys available to prospective purchasers, thus widening the liability of
surveyors. -
Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures
(1934) CA
[Law and morality - morality shifting over time]C complained that she could be
identified with the character Princess Natasha in the film 'Rasputin, the Mad Monk'.
The princess claimed damages on the basis that the film suggested that, by reason
of her identification with 'Princess Natasha', she had been seduced by Rasputin.
Held: The princess was awarded 25,000 damages.It was contended that if the
film indicated any relations between Rasputin and 'Natasha' it indicated a rape of
Natasha and not a seduction.Slesser LJ considered the film defamatory whether it
suggested rape or seduction:I, for myself, cannot see that from the plaintiffs point
of view it matters in the least whether this libel suggests that she has been
seduced or ravished. The question whether she is or is not the more or the less
moral seems to me immaterial in considering this question whether she has been
defamed, and for this reason, that, as has been frequently pointed out in libel, not
only is the matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her part, but also if it tends to make
the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on her
part. It is for that reason that persons who have been alleged to have been insane,
or to be suffering from certain disease, and other cases where no direct moral
responsibility could be placed upon them, have been held to be entitled to bring an
action to protect their reputation and their honour. One may, I think, take judicial
notice of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished,
albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in opportunities of
receiving respectable consideration from the world.Later he added:'When this
woman is defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise manner in
which she has been despoiled of her innocence and virginity is a matter which a
jury can properly be asked to consider.