People v Tomas

Version of the Prosecution

Estrella Doctor Casco (Estrella) was based in the United States, working there as a procurement specialist with
Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the Philippineson July 9, 2006 or about 10 days before her untimely
demise.

At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19, 2006, the victim (Estrella), with her mother Damiana Doctor (Damiana)
and caretakers Liezl Toledo (Liezl) and Angelita Duque (Angelita), were traversing the road towards her house
in Barangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac after she had parked her rented car at the house of Liezls mother-in-
law, Erlinda Toledo. They had just come from the clinic of Dr. Salvador for a medical check-up of Damiana.
Estrella was walking slightly ahead of her mother and Angelita when appellants Tomas, Sr., Doctor and
Gatchalian suddenly came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of
Estrella. Thereupon, without saying anything, Tomas, Sr. drew a gun and shot Estrella twice at a distance of
about 1.5 meters away. Gatchalian, without a gun, allegedly supported Tomas, Sr. by standing in a blocking
position along the road, while Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a
handgun at them, telling them to lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but
were in a kneeling position.

When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still followed it with three
more shots when she was already prone on the ground. After the five shots, the three accused fled towards the
house of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about four meters away from Estrella, shouted, Saklulu, tulungan
ninyo kami (Help, help us), then ran to her house. Meanwhile, Angelita came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana,
who suffered a hypertensive attack after seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to
seek assistance from Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road.

Both Liezl and Angelita recognized the three accused from the light coming from the lamppost. The road was
well lit. Doctors house was barely seven (7) meters from the scene of the crime, that of Tomas, Sr. about 15
meters away, while Gatchalian was staying in a hut in the fields.
On the same day, July 20, 2006, Tomas, Sr. and Doctor were arrested in their respective homes, while Gatchalian
was arrested in the woodland (kahuyan). The three were subjected to paraffin tests shortly after the policemen
took them in custody and were found negative for gunpowder burns.

Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were the facts that: (1) Tomas, Sr.
was removed as administrator of Estrellas properties inBarangay Baybayaos, Mayantoc, Tarlac; (2) Tomas, Sr.
lost several cases against Estrellas father, Cecilio Doctor (Cecilio); (3) Tomas, Sr. accused Estrella of instigating
and financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case against Alejandro Doctor, the father of
accused Doctor, involving an easement of a property. These apparent motives were corroborated by Angelita.

Version of the Defense

The accused denied involvement in the incident.

Tomas, Sr. averred that he was at home sleeping when the incident happened. Since he suffered a cardiac arrest
in December 1988, he had regular attacks and, on that day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7:00 p.m. in a bed
in the living room in front of the television and woke up at 4:00 a.m. the next day. He was not awakened by the
gunshots the previous night and it was his wife who told him about Estrellas death from the shooting. In the
morning of July 20, 2006, as barangay captain, he confirmed Estrellas death in front of Doctors house from his
neighbors. His investigation did not identify the persons responsible for the crime.

On the other hand, Doctor, the brother-in-law of Tomas, Sr. and a cousin of Estrella, likewise denied any
involvement in the incident. He asserted that after working in the field the whole day of July 19, 2006, he went
home at 4:00 p.m. At around 9:00 p.m. he went to sleep. At 10:00 p.m. he awoke to urinate and was told by his
wife that his cousin Estrella met an accident. He was prevailed upon by his wife not to go out of the house. He
then went back to sleep and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the next day.

Gatchalian admitted that he was a farm helper of Tomas, Sr. and worked in the latters rice field. On the night of
the incident, he claimed he was at home asleep with his 10-year-old son Jayson. He woke up the next day at 5:00
a.m. and proceeded to work in the farm of Tomas, Sr.

On July 20, 2006, P/Insp. Mangrobang invited the accused to the Mayantoc police station for investigation but
instead immediately brought them inside the municipal jail. An hour later, policemen brought them
to Camp Macabulos for paraffin tests. Thereafter, they were returned to jail.

RTC Guilty of murder. The RTC appreciated treachery in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon
the unarmed Estrella without the slightest provocation, and the attendance of conspiracy through the accuseds
contributory acts to successfully carry out the crim
CA affirmed.

SC:
ISSUE 1: Credibility of Liezl and Angelita: First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Accused-appellants assert that prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita are not credible witnesses on the
grounds of their partiality since they rely on the family of Estrella for their livelihood. They argue that the
testimonies of Liezl and Angelita are too perfect since appellants could not have committed the crime in such a
well-lit place where they could easily be identified, coupled with the fact that Liezl, Angelita and Damiana were
spared from harm. They infer that the testimonies of Liezl and Angelita were fabricated. They also point to the
reason that the adverse testimony of Liezl is on account of her ill feelings towards Doctor who previously
subjected her to shame when he slapped her in public, and also to ingratiate herself to her employer, Cecilio,
Estrellas father, who was charged by Tomas, Sr. in a case.

To cast more doubt on their testimonies, accused-appellants point to the incongruity of both Liezl and Angelita
not identifying them as the perpetrators of Estrellas killing immediately after the incident when they had ample
opportunity to do so. In the case of Angelita, she only mentioned Tomas, Sr. to Cecilio and did not include Doctor
and Gatchalian. And much worse in the case of Liezl, who rushed home looking for her cellular phone, and did not
even bother to reveal accused-appellants identities to the responding policemen.

We disagree.
Liezl and Angelita narrated in a straightforward and candid manner

2
nd
issue: negative paraffin test
ccused-appellants were subjected to paraffin tests on July 20, 2006 at 11:05 a.m. or the very next day and a little
over 14 hours after the shooting incident. Since gunpowder nitrates stay for 72 hours in the hands of a person
who fired a handgun, a timely paraffin test, if positive, will definitely prove that a person had fired a handgun
within that time frame. A negative result, however, does not merit conclusive proof that a person had not fired a
handgun. Thus, the negative paraffin test results of accused-appellants cannot exculpate them, particularly
Tomas, Sr., from the crime.

Time and again this Court had reiterated that even negative findings of the paraffin test do not conclusively show
that a person did not fire a gun,
[20]
and that a paraffin test has been held to be highly unreliable.
[21]
This is so
since there are many ways, either deliberately or accidentally, that the residue of gunpowder nitrates in the hands
of a person who fired a handgun can be removed.



Issue 3&4: conspiracy and treachery
ince their simultaneous and sudden appearance could not amount to it, for Tomas, Sr. still had to draw his gun
before shooting Estrella, and Doctor still had to position himself behind Damiana and Angelita before ordering
them to drop or lie face down on the ground. Evidently, the victim Estrella had ample opportunity to dodge or
defend herself.

And finally, accused-appellants point to the dearth of evidence showing their concerted acts in pursuing a
common design to kill Estrella. Prosecution witnesses Liezl and Angelita point to Tomas, Sr. as the one who fired
a handgun; Doctor was purportedly carrying one but did not use it, while Gatchalian did not carry one. They aver
that the prosecution failed to show evidence of their intentional participation in the crime with a common design
and purpose since Doctors act of holding a gun was never shown to be in furtherance of the killing of
Estrella. And much less can Gatchalians act of merely standing on the road in the path of the four ladies ever
constitute furtherance of the common purpose of killing Estrella.

Accused-appellants arguments are partly meritorious.

After a judicious study of the records at hand, We are compelled to affirm the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and of conspiracy. However, the evidence adduced and the records do not support a
finding of conspiracy against appellant Gatchalian
Gatchalian, however, is differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would
show that Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned above,
mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement
to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.
[44]


It appears that Gatchalian is a party to the conspiracy as found by the courts a quo. Gatchalian appeared in the
company of Tomas, Sr. and Doctor. He also fled together with them. However, Gatchalian was unarmed and did
not say anything or commit any overt act to externally manifest his cooperation with the shooting of Estrella. On
the other hand, Gatchalian never attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was aware of the
plan and intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting of Estrella.

The trial court viewed Gatchalian as supporting Tomas, Sr. by taking a blocking position in the road. We,
however, cannot subscribe to such a view considering that his presence is merely extraneous to the
accomplishment of the crime. Besides, Angelita and Damiana were covered by Doctor who poked a gun at them,
while Liezl was so far back that it would be incongruous, to say the least, that Gatchalian was blocking the
road. Who would he be blocking then when the road is wide and Liezl was far back?

People v Estacio

Facts:
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10, 1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo, arrived at Casa
Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner Street, Quezon Citywhere the three of them would meet with Charlie
Mancilla Chua (the victim). Maritess had earlier told Sumipo that she would settle her debt to the victim and then
deretsong dukot na rin x x x kay Charlie [the victim].
[6]
Sumipo assumed, however, that Maritess was just
joking.

After the victim arrived past midnight and talked to Maritess for a short while, the group boarded his car, Maritess
taking the seat beside the victim who was driving, as Estacio and Sumipo took the backseat.

Not long after, Estacio pulled out a gun and ordered the victim to pull the car over. As the victim complied,
Estacio, with a gun pointed at him, pulled him to the backseat as Maritess transferred to the backseat, sat beside
the victim, tied the victims hands behind his back, and placed tape on his mouth. Estacio then directed Sumipo
to take over the wheels as he did.
[7]


While Sumipo tried to dissuade appellants from pursuing their plan, they replied that they would kill the victim so
that he would not take revenge.
[8]
Thereupon, the victim told Maritess, bakit mo nagawa sa akin ito sa kabila ng
lahat?, to which she replied, Bayad na ako sa utang ko sa iyo ngayon.

On Estacios instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place,
Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did. Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a grassy
place. Estacio with bloodied hands later resurfaced.

The three then headed towards Malinta, Valenzuela, Bulacan. On the way, Estacio and Maritess talked about how
they killed the victim, Estacio telling Maritess, Honey,wala na tayong problema dahil siguradong patay na si
Charlie sa dami ng saksak na nakuha niya.

On Estacios and Maritess directive, Sumipo stopped by a drug store where Maritess bought alcohol to clean their
hands. Along the way, Maritess and Estacio threw out the victims attach case. Maritess later told Estacio
Honey, sana hindi muna natin pinatay si Charlie para makahingi pa tayo ng pera sa mga magulang [niya].

The three later abandoned the car in Malinta.

The following morning, Estacio went to the residence of Sumipo where he called up by telephone the victims
mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The mother replied, however, that she could not afford that
amount.

In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess and Estacio went to Sumipos residence again where Estacio again
called up the victims mother, this time lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000 which she still found to be
too steep. Sumipo expressed his misgivings about future calls, as they might get caught, but Estacio and Maritess
assured him that that call would be the last.

The group then went to Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the victims mother, still lowering the
ransom demand to P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be advanced. The victims mother having agreed to
the demand, Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills
at 11:30 in the evening. Estacio and Sumipo later proceeded to Pizza Hut, and as they were seated there, a patrol
car passed by, drawing them to leave and part ways.

Sumipo soon learned that Maritess and Estacio sold Chuas gun, watch, and necklace from the proceeds of which
he was given P7,000.

On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996, Estacio
surrendered to the police. The police then informed the victims mother that Estacio had admitted having killed
her son, and that he offered to accompany them to the crime scene.

SUMIPO

Sumipo explained in an affidavit,
[9]
which he identified in open court,
[10]
that Maritess got angry with the victim
after he lent money to her husband, one Robert Ong,
[11]
enabling him to leave the country without her knowledge,
while Estacio was jealous of the victim with whom Maritess had a relationship.
[12]


Version of defense

In his affidavit
[13]
which he identified in open court, Estacio claimed that a quarrel broke out in the car between
the victim and Maritess about a debt to the victim; that he tried to pacify the two, but the victim got angry at him,
prompting him to point a fan knife at his neck; and that he then asked Sumipo to drive the car up to Barangay Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan where he dragged the victim away from the car and accidentally stabbed him.

When asked on cross-examination why the stabbing was accidental, Estacio replied that he and Maritess
originally planned to leave the victim in Bulacan, but since there was talk of the victim getting back at them, he
got confused and so it happened.
[14]


Maritess for her part denied
[15]
having conspired with Estacio. She claimed that while on board the car, the victim
took issue with her friendship with Estacio, whom he insulted. Incensed, Estacio grabbed the victim by the
collar, prompting the victim to pull out a gun from under the drivers seat which he aimed at Estacio.

Continuing, Maritess claimed that she tried to pacify the quarreling men; that the car stopped at San Jose del
Monte and the three men alighted; that Sumipo returned to the car and was later followed by Estacio who
said Masama raw ang nangyari,
[16]
he adding that he did not intend to stab the victim.


RTC: kidnapping on the occasion of which the victim was killed
CA: Kidnapping with murder

Sc: The Court finds, however, that the offense of which appellants were convicted was erroneously designated.

Appellants were eventually charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder,
defined in the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. In a special complex crime, the prosecution
must prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made
the subject of separate complaints.
[28]


In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and
transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his killing, not because they intended
to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing
him. That appellants intention from the beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which
Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create
noise.
[29]
The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants prior acts as
kidnapping.

Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot
be inferred that the latters purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent
killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be
considered as a component felony to produce the complex crime of kidnapping with murder.

Murder with gen aggravating circumstance use of a motor vehicle, reclusion perpetua.

People v Molina

ROLANDO DREZA testified that as one of the civilian security officers of the deceased/victim Mayor Bonifacio
Uy, he reported for work on August 14, 1989 at 7:00 in the morning. He was in the office when the Mayor received
an invitation to administer the oath of the new officers of the Parents-Teachers Association at the Agro Industrial
School in Barangay San Antonio, Ilagan, Isabela. The [m]ayor consented and left the office at 11:00 oclock a.m.
with Councilor Antonio Manaligod, DILG Officer Potenciano Tabije and four (4) civilian security men -- Policarpio
Estrada, Rolando Dreza, Rodolfo Bunagan and Jaime Vargas. They had lunch upon arrival at the school. Later, at
3:00 oclock p.m., the program started right in front of the school and this lasted [until] 5:00 oclock p.m., followed
by some socializing and food and drink session, singing and guitar playing. They ended at about 10:30 oclock
p.m. Barangay Captain Veriato Molina invited the Mayor to a funeral wake in the house of Ventura Hernandez,
about 200 meters from the school. Mayor Uy obliged, and with Councilor Manaligod, Mr. Tabije, Barangay Capt.
Molina and other officials of the PTA, followed by the Mayors civilian security men, proceeded to the wake,
walking. Their vehicle, the NISSAN 4 x 4, was attended to by Bunagan.
When the [m]ayor and Barangay Captain Veriato Molina arrived, Ruben Molina (another accused and uncle of
Veriato) was already there. He and the [m]ayor greeted each other before the [m]ayor entered the house where
the body of the girl was lying in state. When he came out, he (the [m]ayor) joined Ruben Molina. The two
conversed[;] Dreza heard Ruben Molinas remark: Pare, ang saya-saya ninyo sa eskwelahan, and the [m]ayors
answer, Ikaw kasi, wala ka roon. Dreza also heard Wala na bang natira from Ruben (which Dreza assumed
refer[red] to the drinks). To this the [m]ayor replied, If you want, lets buy some more (in Tagalog) but Ruben
assured he [would] take care, requested Veriato to buy. Veriato left and returned 30-40 minutes later, with
bottles. Veriato was seen whispering to Ruben before leaving the place.
Ruben opened the bottle, took one shot, followed by the [m]ayor who also took one shot. The conversation grew
heated, but Dreza opined it was because they (Ruben and the [m]ayor) had a previous standing grudge against
each other.
The further questions and answers, in the direct examination conducted by Private Prosecutor Mario Ongkiko on
[W]itness Rolando Dreza on January 8, 1992, follows:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And when the conversation became heated will you describe to the Honorable Court the events that
eventually followed?
A I heard Ruben Molina uttered to Mayor Uy, in Ilocano, Ukinam (Putang Ina mo).
Q And what was the reaction of Mayor Uy?
A Mayor Uy reacted immediately and he threw a kick at Ruben Molina.
Q And do you know if Ruben Molina was hit?
A I did not know if he was hit or not.
Q And what happened after Mayor Uy threw a kick at Ruben Molina?
A When I saw that, I brought the [m]ayor away from Ruben Molina.
Q And what happened next?
A When I was leading Mayor Uy away from Ruben Molina, that was the time when I saw Bgy. Captain Veriato
Molina approached [sic] with a gun (baril).
Q My question is, do you know what kind of gun Bgy. Captain Molina was carrying?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was it?
A It was an M-14 folded, sir.
Q And what happened when Bgy. Capt. Molina approached with a folded M-14, did he utter any word or words?
A What I heard was, Bgy. Capt. Molina uttered, Papatayin ko kayo.
Q Was this in Tagalog or in Ilocano?
A It was in Tagalog.
Q And after you heard Bgy. Capt. Molina uttered those words, what happened?
A Tumakbo po ako.
x x x x x x x x x
Q And did you hear anything while you were running?
A That was when I heard many shots.
Q Do you know or did you see anyone firing any of those shots?
A I only saw Bgy. Capt. Veriato Molina firing shots.
(TSN, Jan. 8, 1992, pp. 35 to 36)
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And do you recall what happened after you heard shots?
A After I heard the gun fire, I saw Mayor Uy clutching a post already weak (mahinang-mahina na), and I
concluded that he was hit.
(TSN, p. 37, Jan. 8, 1992)
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And when you saw the [m]ayor in a reclining position, his feet moving, what else did you see or notice?
A Then I saw Bgy. Capt. Veriato Molina returned [sic] and again open fire at the [m]ayor.
Q Do you know what weapon did Bgy. Capt. Molina use this time?
A He was using the same M-14 folded.

Defenses version:
n August 14, 1989, after attending, as inducting officer-guest speaker, the induction of officers of the Parents
Teachers Association of Isabela which started noontime with a luncheon and ended at 5:30 p.m., followed by a
drinking session which lasted up to about 10:30 p.m., Ilagan, Isabela Mayor Bonifacio Uy, together with
[M]unicipal [C]ouncilor Antonio Manaligod, the mayors three bodyguards, namely Jaime Vargas, Policarpio
Estrada and Rolando Dreza, DILG officer Potenciano Tabije, [b]arangay [c]aptain of Centro San Antonio, Veriato
Molina and others walked to the house of Ventura Hernandez which was about 200 meters away from the school
to attend the wake of Hernandez' deceased daughter Michelle. Another bodyguard of the mayor, Rodolfo
Bunagan, drove the mayor's Nissan pick-up to the [sic] Hernandez' residence.
On reaching Hernandez' house, the mayor greeted Ruben Molina, herein accused-appellant, who was then
seated, along with others, between Hernandez' house and that of the latter's brother-in-law Jerome Rivero. The
mayor then went inside the house to view the remains of the deceased after which he went out and joined Ruben
Molina.
While outside, the mayor and Ruben Molina drank liquor in the course of which, though they started with
cordiality, they later engaged in a heated argument which arose from the mayors accusation that Rubens jeep
was the vehicle used by the killers of his (mayors) aunt and that Rubens act in the previous elections was
suspect. One Moises de la Cruz, a pastor of the Iglesia ni Cristo, tried to pacify the mayor by suggesting that he
change the topic, he (de la Cruz) having become aware that people around were apprehensive and some had in
fact started leaving.
As the mayor repeatedly accused Ruben Molina, the latter suggested that he bring the matter to court drawing
the mayor to say Ukinam, and [to] kick Ruben who fell down. Not long after, shooting occurred and when it
ended, the mayor, the councilor and two of the mayors bodyguards, namely, Policarpio Estrada and Jaime
Vargas, were dead while the following were wounded: Ruben Molina, who had [a] gunshot wound below his left
knee, and Veriato Molina, a nephew of Ruben (Ruben and Veriatos father being brothers), who had thru and thru
gunshot wound at his right thigh.
RTC: The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and frustrated murder
qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. That the intention of accused-
appellants was to kill the mayor and his bodyguards, including the councilor, was deduced by the trial judge from
the statement reportedly made by Appellant Veriato Molina: Papatayin ko kayo. The collective pronoun
kayo was used instead of its singular form, which Veriato could have used had he meant to kill the mayor only.
The lower court also found both accused-appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene included a Smith and Wesson revolver (.38 caliber),
bearing SN (Serial Number) C617376, and six spent shells which were found by the NBI to have been fired from the
aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and Explosives Unit in Camp Crame, Quezon City, certified that said
revolver had been issued to Veriato Molina of Amulung, Cagayan; and that Ruben Molina was likewise a licensed
holder of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with SN 232904. Neither appellant, however, had a permit to
carry any firearm outside his residence.
[30]

With respect to the other individuals charged together with the Molinas, the court a quo sadly noted that none of
the prosecution witnesses -- vital and corroborative -- ever mentioned as present, during that fateful incident, the
names of Accused Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola. During the cross-examination of Defense
Witness Oscar Malana, Private Prosecutor Ongkiko attempted to establish the participation of these three
accused, but in vain.
[31]
Thus, their acquittal.
Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, both surnamed Molina, filed through
counsel
[32]
their Notice of Appeal
[33]
direct to this Court.

ISSUE: Sufficiency of evidence for murder and frustrated murder: Appellants contend that the prosecutions
evidence is not sufficient to override the constitutional presumption of their innocence; neither does it prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We carefully reviewed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were perceived to be credible, and
found that their accounts of the shooting incident corroborated one another on material points. In any event,
based on the declarations in court of both prosecution and defense eyewitnesses, there is no real dispute on the
antecedents leading to the initial burst of gunfire
He was positively seen pointing an M-14 rifle at Mayor Uy and, while in that position, he was heard spewing upon
his very victim the exact words of his ill design to snuff out the life of the latter. Almost simultaneously, he fired at
the mayor. Chaos within the premises ensued, followed by successive bursts of gunfire. Veriato himself was shot
on his right leg. Yet, upon seeing the mayor still alive, though barely, Veriato -- doubtless determined to end the
mayors life -- approached and fired his automatic weapon two more times upon his unarmed victim, despite the
latters pleas of surrender

Issue: attendance of treachery
n convicting accused-appellants of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the trial court ruled that the crimes
were qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. But, as the appellants note, the
said court did not explain its basis for appreciating the last two circumstances. Indeed, the records of the case do
not contain evidence sufficient to conclude that appellants took advantage of excessive force notoriously out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked.
[52]
Neither is there enough evidence to
support, beyond reasonable doubt, a finding that appellants had purposely sought and used the aid of armed men
in attacking their victim. It is a settled rule that the circumstances qualifying a killing to murder must be proven as
indubitably as the crime itself.
[53]


At first glance, the circumstances immediately preceding the shoot-out seem to negate the presence of
treachery. Quite evident in the records is the fact that the victim, Bonifacio Uy, who was drunk at the time and in
a sardonic predisposition, engaged Appellant Ruben Molina in a heated argument, accusing him of complicity in
the killing of a relative. The drunk mayor even asked for a grenade which he threatened to detonate in the
premises. When no one gave him any, he took a gun from one of his bodyguards and proposed to Appellant
Ruben that they play Russian roulette. Said appellant, still unprovoked at the time, calmly refused. Then the
victim shouted invectives at Ruben and even kicked him. All in all, the victims acts, done in the presence of
several people who knew him and Ruben, constituted provocation sufficient to make the latters blood
boil. Within hearing and seeing distance was Rubens nephew Veriato who, in all likelihood, also heard the threats
and accusations hurled at his uncle, as well as witnessed the foul deeds done to him. A reprisal from Ruben or his
nephew was, therefore, not unexpected.
However, the subsequent acts of accused-appellants were definitely treacherous. After the initial shot, Appellant
Veriato, despite seeing his helpless victim on his last legs and pleading to be spared of any more shooting, still
cold bloodedly fired his automatic rifle at the unarmed mayor. The victim was already defenseless when Veriato
attacked him the second time. Treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger or
initially assaulted frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and had no means to defend
himself or to retaliate.
[56]


CONSPIRACY ISSUE: yes may conspiracy

Esqueda v people

Venancia Aliser (Venancia) and Gaudencio Quiniquito (Gaudencio) are live-in partners, living at Sitio Nagbinlod,
Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental, together with their children from their first marriages. They were already in bed
when, at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999, Gaudencio was awakened by a voice coming from
the outside of their house calling his live-in partner and asking for a drink. He immediately awakened his live-in
partner. While inside the house, Venancia asked the person outside to identify himself. In response, the voice
replied that he and his companions are men of Sgt. Torres conducting a roving patrol. When Venancia asked how
many they were, the person replied that they are many and with them is Toto Vibar, the son of
their Barangay Captain. Venancia directed Gaudencio to light a lamp. After lighting the lamp, Gaudencio
proceeded to open the door and went out, while Venancia tailed him and stayed by the door. Outside, at the
porch, they found a person sitting on a bamboo bench whom they could not identify, while a person whom they
identified as Edgar Esqueda (petitioner herein) was standing at the side of the door leading to the
porch. Suddenly, the unidentified man stood up and stabbed Gaudencio hitting him on the chest. When
Venancia saw the stabbing, she shouted watch out Dong! and she turned her back to run away but was stabbed
by petitioner. She then fell to the ground, but petitioner continued stabbing her on different parts of her
body. Gaudencio lost his consciousness. Their children brought them to the crossing in Nagbinlod and they were
brought to the Bayawan District Hospital by a barangay councilman. Dr. Patrocinio Garupa was the attending
physician who treated them. The medical certificate of Gaudencio showed that he sustained a perforating stab
wound at the left anterior chest, stab wounds at the neck, left arm and left part of the axillary area.
[6]
Venancia's
certificate showed that she suffered from multiple stab and incised wounds.
[7]
SPO1 Jamandron conducted his
initial investigation at the hospital by interrogating Venancia and Gaudencio. The offended parties were referred
to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital, where they were confined for more than a week.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Claudio Babor, Domingo Dimol, SPO4
Hermenegildo Cadungog, SPO1 Winefredo Jamandron, Viviana Namoco and the accused Esqueda. The evidence
of the defense was intended to establish the following:

On March 3, 1999, from 8 o'clock in the evening to 2 o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1999, petitioner was trawl-
fishing in the sea of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. Claudio Babor testified that he was also trawl- fishing at the same
time. He and petitioner, together with their respective companions, were on different boats, which were side by
side. Both were able to catch Atay-atay and Tulakhang.

Domingo Dimol was at the beach of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina. He stayed there from 8 oclock in the evening
of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning of the following day waiting for petitioner and Claudio to buy fish
from them. At 2 o'clock in the morning, petitioner came ashore and Domingo bought fish from him.

Viviana was at the seashore of Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2
o'clock in the morning of March 4, 1999. She, together with twenty other persons, helped the group of petitioner
in pulling the rope of the fishing net. Petitioner was manning the rudder. She said that there were two fishing
groups. At 2 o'clock in the morning, they all went home and petitioner gave her fish for free.

SPO1 Jamandron conducted the initial investigation in the morning of March 4, 1999 at
the Bayawan Emergency Hospital where Gaudencio and Venancia were confined. His investigation revealed that
Gaudencio and Venancia could not identify their assailants. He also testified that Gaudencio and Venancia were
both conscious, but were in pain during the investigation. He recorded the result of his investigation in the police
blotter.

Petitioner denied having committed the crime imputed against him.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, NO TREACHERY

Petitioner's defense is anchored on alibi and denial. His witnesses, Claudio, Domingo and Viviana, aver that
during the time of the incident, petitioner was out at sea fishing. Petitioner, when called to the witness stand,
denied having committed the crime.

Court= Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime
transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two
places.
[17]
Where there is least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must
fail.
[18]


Aside from the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses that he was fishing at Cawitan, Sta. Catalina from 8
o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1999 until 2 o'clock in the morning the following day, petitioner was unable to
show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

During the trial of the case, both the prosecution and defense witnesses testified that Nagbinlod and
Cawitan, Sta. Catalina, were merely more than 5 kilometers apart which would only take about 20 to 40 minutes
ride. Thus, it was not physically impossible for the petitioner to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident


HEART AND SOUL OF THE CASE:
However, with regard to the proper crime committed, We are inclined to modify the trial courts ruling.

Petitioner was charged with frustrated murder in an Amended Information. After trial on the merits, the
court found that petitioner committed the crime of frustrated homicide. The trial court found that treachery,
which would qualify the crime to frustrated murder, was wanting in the present case.

The trial court found that Venancia was already aware of what would happen to Gaudencio because she
shouted watch out Dong before Gaudencio was stabbed. Before Venancia was stabbed by petitioner, she too
was aware of the fate that befell her, because she tried to retreat to the confines of her house when she herself
was unfortunately stabbed. The trial court postulated that Venancia must have already been alerted and
forewarned of the impending attack; thus, there was no treachery.

We rule that the trial court's finding that there was no treachery is misplaced.

MAY TREACHERY! In the present case, treachery in the commission of the crime was sufficiently proven by the
prosecution. When Gaudencio opened the door and went outside, Venancia tailed him. There they found two
persons at the porch, one sitting at the bench and the other standing. Without warning, the unidentified man
stood up and stabbed Gaudencio in the chest. Upon seeing this, Venancia shouted Watch out, Dong! She then
turned her back, but was stabbed by petitioner and fell on the ground. While in this position, petitioner continued
hitting her on different parts of her body. Clearly, the hapless Venancia was stabbed immediately after the
unidentified person stabbed her live-in partner, thus, giving her no opportunity to retaliate or defend herself. It
could not have taken Venancia more than a second or two to run after Gaudencio was stabbed.

The method of attack adopted by the petitioner placed Venancia in a situation where it would be impossible
for her to resist the attack or defend her person.

The suddenness of the attack is shown by the fact that Venancia was immediately stabbed by petitioner right
after she turned her back to run. She was not able to safely distance herself due to the suddenness of the
attack. Further, before opening the door, she and her live-in partner had no inkling that they would be attacked,
since petitioner did not reveal his true identity to the victims. His partner in crime misrepresented that they were
the men of Sgt. Torres and with them was Toto Vibar, the son of the barangaycaptain. Petitioner misled the
victims, so the latter lowered their guard and suspicion. Thereafter, when the door was opened, the malefactors
attacked them. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the assault on the victims was treacherous

COLINARES V PEOPLE

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated homicide
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
[1]


Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he and
Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside
with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a
huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple, knocking him
out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside
his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate
[2]
showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated wounds on
the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and potentially fatal but
Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified
that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite
drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him,
causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but
missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias
saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit
Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily
surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the
incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in heated
argument with Arnel.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
CA= AFFIRMED, CORINALES INVOKED SELF-DEFENSE

SELF DEFENSE NOT PROVEN

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense
when he hit Rufino back with a stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the
victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of
criminal intent of the accused.
[4]


In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the
offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is
reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did
not act with sufficient provocation.
[5]


If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel
and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression
contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force
or with a weapon.
[6]


Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that
Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated
Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he
saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical
certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions

FRUSTRATED/ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE??

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide
when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it
did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his victims life. The
prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal
intent.
[9]
And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
[10]


Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino
out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel
inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v.
People,
[11]
we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and
the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated
murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or
attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victims
wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head injuries are always very serious,
[12]
he could not categorically say
that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal.


People v Penesa

Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as husband and wife, in the barrio of Marupit, municipality of
Camalingan, Province of Camarines Sur. Their daughter and five children of Rosario by her late husband lived with
them. Due to continuous wrangles between Timoteo and Rosario's children by her late husband, both agreed to
part. In pursuance of the agreement and after dividing the palay, lumber and firewood between Timoteo and the
children of Rosario by her late husband, Timoteo left the house on 30 August 1942. Early in the morning of the
following day, Timoteo returned to the house and asked Rosario to live with him in another place (pp. 4, 31, t.s.n.).
The request was refused (p. 4, t.s.n.). Santiago Cerrado, a cousin of Rosario, came to the house and, upon seeing
Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they had agreed to live apart. Angered by this remark, Timoteo
unsheathed his bolo and assaulted Santiago. Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried to prevent
another blow upon Santiago and had made a remark similar to that of Santiago before the latter came to the
house, was also assaulted by Timoteo. At this juncture, Rosario went down through the stairway, preceded by
Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo grappled for the possession of the bolo and both fell to the floor. A brother of
Rosario appeared upon the scene and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the hands of Timoteo. As a result of
the assault upon Santiago Cerrado, two wounds were inflicted upon him, one on the left forearm and another
under the left axilla. They were not serious. Upon Crescensio Doro, the following wounds were inflicted: in the left
palm affecting two fingers, 3 inches long and from 1/2 to 3/4 inch deep, which on the day of the trial was still
bandaged because it was not yet healed; a cut in the skin not so deep in the left axilla parallel to the left nipple, 3
inches long; a cut above the elbow of the left arm, 3 inches long and 1/8 inch deep; and another in the right hand
from the index to the little finger. The one in the left palm which cut the joints of the bones was serious and, if the
hemorrhage was not stopped, it would have resulted in Crescencio's death

Version of defense:
Appellant testifies that on 30 August 1942, Rosario Aguillon agreed to live with him in another house; that early in
the morning of the following day, he returned to the house and sat on a trunk, and not long after Santiago
Cerrado came and in a loud voice told him to come down because he had nothing left in that house, a remark
which Santiago repeated when he went up the house; that he answered Santiago that he had a share in the house
because he had built it, and for that reason he hold him that he would not move out; that Santiago took hold of
him by the hand and forced him to leave immediately; that while he was being led by Santiago and pushed toward
the kitchen, he was assaulted from behind with a piercing weapon, and for that reason he fell down; that when he
tried to rise, they struck him on the right shoulder and on the head; that he took from the partition wall (tabique) a
bolo to defend himself; that he struck and hit with the bolo all his assailants; that he was further struck on the
right side of the breast, on the right eye, on the neck, and on the cheek; that fell unconscious; and that when he
came to he found himself tied to a post.

RTC = FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

SC: There was no reason for Santiago Cerrado and Crescencio Doro to force the appellant to leave the house,
after all the latter and Rosario Aguillon already had agreed the previous day to live apart. It is incredible that he
could have gotten hold of the bolo from the partition wall (tabique), because the trunk on which he sat was
opposite the corner of the house where the bolo was kept and the trunk was nearer the door and the kitchen than
said corner (pp. 46, 47, t. s. n.), and he was being pushed from the trunk to the kitchen.

When he went to the house of Rosario early in the morning of 31 August, it was not with the intention to kill
anybody, for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live with him in another house. Neither could the
remarks uttered by Crescencio Doro and Santiago Cerrado have aroused his temper to such an extent as to
engender the desire and intent to kill them. The finding of the trial court is based on the kind of weapons carried
by the appellant when he went to the house and on the parts of the victims' bodies at which the weapons were
aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. The bolo with the appellant inflicted the wounds upon Santiago Cerrado
and Crescencio Doro was one ordinarily used by farm laborers. The dagger was carried for self-defense. The
wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the appellant were caused indiscriminately and not deliberately.
Appellant's purpose in going to the house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the parts of the victims'
bodies on which the wounds were inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and determinative of his intent.
We are of the opinion that crime committed by the appellant against Santiago Cerrado, in the absence of proof as
to the period of the offended party's incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, is slight physical
injuries, as provided for in article 266 of the Revised Penal Code; and against Crescencio Doro is serious physical
injuries, for, although the physical who had treated him did not state in his testimony the time during which the
wounds would heal or the period during which the offended party would be incapacitated to perform his ordinary
or usual work, nevertheless the evidence shows that the wound inflicted on the 31st of August upon Crescencio
Doro in the left palm affecting two fingers, 3 inches long and from to inch deep, was not yet cured on the day
of the trial held on 9 October 1942, or that the wound did not heal within 30 days. Pursuant to article 263,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and giving the appellant the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation, taken into consideration in his favor by the trial court (article 13, paragraph 6, Revised
Penal Code), the penalty to be imposed upon him is six months and 1 day of prision correccional for the wounds
inflicted upon Crescencio Doro; and 15 days of arresto menor for the wounds inflicted upon Santiago Cerrado



PEOPLE V CASTILLO


Spartein sulphate 1.00
Phenobarbital 0.50
Carbromal 5.00
Mx. Div. et pone in cap. No.
XV

Sig.; one capsule once a
day.

Belarmino presented the prescription to the Universal Drug Store, in the City of Manila, where he
secured the medicine described therein contained in a bottle (Exhibit C) on which the prescription
was written, and after taking said medicine his health was somewhat improved. When the symptoms
of the said disease recurred, following the instructions given him by Doctor Sison to continue taking
said medicine, he copied said prescription (Exhibit 2), and, in the morning of February 18, 1941,
presented it to the Escudero Drug Store, in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, and asked Dr. Leon
Castillo, the manager of the said drug store, and a friend of the complainant, whether they could
prepare said medicine, after having failed to secure the same in other drug stores in the locality; and
having been answered in the affirmative, the complaining witness requested Doctor Castillo to have
prepared for him 1/3 of the formula and Doctor Castillo himself wrote "1/3 f." on Exhibit 2, for P1, as
the whole formula cost P3; as there was some doubt as to the figure appearing after the word
"carbromal" on Exhibit 2, Belarmino requested Doctor Castillo to check it up, and the latter corrected
the said figure by writing the figure "5" in ink in the figure "6" appearing after the word "carbromal."
As Belarmino himself wanted to be sure about the said figure, he proposed to return to said drug
store in the afternoon with the bottle marked Exhibit C, on which the prescription was written; and in
fact he returned at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. The pharmacist, Saturnino
Gesmundo Cortes, of said drug store, was then in the house, and Doctor Castillo sent for defendant-
appellant Nena Tanalega Raymundo, who was employed in said drug store as pharmacy clerk. Mrs.
Raymundo was already a pharmacy graduate, but she had not yet taken and passed the
government examination conducted by the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners; and she had
worked as a pharmacy clerk in different drug stores in the City of Manila, before her employment in
the same capacity in the Escudero Drug Store in the City of San Pablo. Before the arrival of the
defendant and appellant, Doctor Castillo, took two bottles from the shelves and a cardboard box and
placed them on the dispensation table. Mrs. Raymundo then prepared the balance and began
computing the formula contained in Exhibit 2 to reduce it to 1/3 after which she proceeded to
compound the medicine, using, among others, the substances contained in said two bottles. The
medicine compounded by defendant and appellant was placed in five (5) capsules and was
delivered by Doctor Castillo to herein complainant contained in a cardboard box (Exhibit B), for
which he paid P1, as previously agreed upon with Dr. Leon Castillo, manager of the Escudero Drug
Store; that at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, February 18, 1941, the complainant
took one of the capsules with a glass of water, and left his house for a walk; and about 20 minutes
after he had taken said medicine, he became ill. He felt dizzy and had difficulty in breathing, and he
could hardly stand as his knees became shaky, and for that reason, he immediately consulted with
physicians, namely, Dr. Felisa Celestino and Dr. Ricardo Reyes, and the latter advised him to go
home and rest. About two hours afterwards, complainant's legs began to stiffen, his stomach to
harden, his lips to draw back, and his tongue to shrink to his throat, and he could not talk and
thought that he was in a serious condition; and so complainant's family sent for Dr. Ricardo Reyes,
who advised complainant's wife to rub his body with hot water which produced some relief, after he
had urinated; and the following day when Doctor Reyes returned, complainant explained to him all
that had happened and showed him the remaining four capsules contained in the cardboard box,
marked as Exhibit B, on which the prescription had not been written, and Doctor Reyes advised the
complainant not to take any more of said remaining four capsules.
That believing that there must have been something wrong with the medicine which he had
purchased from the Escudero Drug Store, on February 24, 1941, the complaining witness sent two
of the four capsules (Exhibits E-2 and E-3) to the Bureau of Science for examination => PRESENCE
OF A POISIONOUS SUBSTANCE (STRYCHNINE SULPHATE)

CFI FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
CA SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

SC:
Section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code (1940 ed.) provides as follows:
SEC. 751. Responsibility for quality of drugs. Every pharmacist shall be responsible for
the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale; and
it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer
any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction,
pretense or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold, or offered
for sale. Any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or
deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from the standard of quality or
purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.
And the violation of any provision contained in said section 751 of the Revised Administrative Code
(1940 ed.) is punished in accordance with the provisions of section 2676 thereof, which are as
follows:
SEC. 2676. General Violation of Pharmacy Law. Any person engaging in the practice of
pharmacy in the (Philippine Islands) Philippines contrary to any provision of the Pharmacy
Law or violating any provision of said law for which no specific penalty is provided shall, for
each offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment
for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
It is an elementary rule of criminal jurisprudence that the defendant in a criminal case may be found
guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegations made in the information, and fully
established by the evidence. (Rule 116, section 4, Rules of Court; United States vs. Paua, 6 Phil.,
740; United States vs. Jeffrey, 15 Phil., 391; United States vs. Lim San, 17 Phil., 273; United
States vs. De Guzman, 19 Phil., 350; United States vs. Salvador, 22 Phil., 113; United
States vs. Guzman, 25 Phil., 22; United States vs. Panlilio, 28, Phil., 608.)
Defendant and appellant cannot complain that she has been found guilty of a criminal offense,
without due process of law. She had ample opportunity to defend herself against the charges filed
against her.
With reference to the requirements of "due process of law" as applied to criminal procedure, in the
language of the Supreme Court of the United States, generally speaking, it may be said that if an
accused has been been heard in the court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under
the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law. (Rogers vs. Peck, 199 U.S., 425, 435; Twining vs. New Jersey,
211 U.S., 78.)



People v Avecilla

It appears from the records that at about 11:00 oclock in the evening of December 24, 1991, accused-appellant
arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street, Pandacan, Manila, and, for no apparent reason, suddenly
fired a gun in the air. He then went to a nearby alley and, minutes later, proceeded to the closed store about four
(4) meters away from the basketball court. There, he initiated an argument with the group of Boy Manalaysay,
Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable, Jr. Afable tried to pacify accused-appellant, whereupon, the latter placed
his left arm around Afables neck and shot him pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley and
accused-appellant ran after him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystanders, Carlos Taganas, went to the
alley and there, he saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun. The Chief Barangay
Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun away from accused-appellant, who immediately fled from the scene
of the incident. Afable was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually expired.

Rtc= qualified illegal possession of firearms
Sc: However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by Republic Act No. 8294, which took
effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent provision of the said law provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low
powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, that no other crime was committed.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where the unlicensed firearm is
not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attemptedcoup
detat. Otherwise, the use of unlicensed firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide.
With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with the use of the unlicensed
firearm as aggravating, inasmuch as said felonies are not charged in the information but merely mentioned as
the result of the use of the unlicensed firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or
murder. Hence, he cannot be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED. Criminal Case No. 92-105691, for
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, is DISMISSED

Celino v CA

That on or about the 12
th
day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with
thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004
without first having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[5]


Criminal Case No. C-138-04

That on or about the 12
th
day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded
with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary
permit to possess the said firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[6]



Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge.
[7]


Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
[8]
contending that he
cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x xx if he was also charged of having committed another
crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.
[9]


By Order of July 29, 2004,
[10]
the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this Courts
[11]
affirmation
in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses
[12]
of therein respondent judges denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground
that the other offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.
[13]
Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution,
[14]
hence, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari
[15]
before the Court of Appeals.

By Decision dated April 18, 2005,
[16]
the appellate court affirmed the trial courts denial of the Motion to
Quash. Petitioners May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration
[17]
having been denied by Resolution of September
26, 2005,
[18]
petitioner filed the present petition.

The petition fails.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter
than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
Petitioners reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore,
misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of
their commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.
[34]
In the present case, however, petitioner
has only been accused of committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with
guilt, there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.
[35]
Consequently, the
proviso does not yet apply.

More applicable is Margarejo
[36]
where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an
information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that the other offense charged [i.e., violation of gun
ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.
[37]
in consonance with the earlier
pronouncement inValdez
[38]
that all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.
[39]


In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal
possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together
with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,
[40]
or absorbed
as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat.
[41]
Conversely, when the other offense
involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm
should continue to be prosecuted.

Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is for him to go to trial
on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by
law.
[42]
Although the special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of
discretion,
[43]
the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the
present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.